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Zionist activities, confidential notes, 1944-1947, undated.

Monday Aug 5. - Cable from N. & to
meet him in N.Y. arriving with
instructions from Paris. (see lab)

Tues. Aug. 6. Fly to N.Y. from
Plymouth. H.J. come to Coney
Island c. 4:30 P.M. Shows me
instructions (7 v.) & J.C. are
back proved. Have together by
plane for Washington, arriving c. 7:30.
9 P.M. meet in my room Stallen.
H.J. reports his story to group
(Herman, Atzin, Efrim, Cohen,
et. al). Agree to not to write
par. 2, but strategy to press
for short-term in formulation
of out of discussions, particularly
as suggested by others, we should
repress them of Par. 2. H.J. agrees.
- In the train to Washington
Zion. Council tomorrow
4 P.M.

Wed. Aug. 7. h.f. does not contact
me all day. Does not ask me to
go with him to any friends.
4 P.M. Meeting (Exe.) - wait for
h.f. two hrs.

When he arrived, he again told his
mission. Ex. discusses it. I
turn margin, along him, & peruses
evening. h.f. concerns. (See
minutes, WRHS)

He did not tell meeting that he
had already seen Rebbers & Uppel
Parlaten. has the door to inform

me that he is to see Cohen with
me later that evening for some
purpose. - C. informs me that h.f.
is planning to write letters to his

Thurs. Aug. 8. Opening disturbed at
h.p. indep. & secretary returns, asks
me to meet with h.p. at 3 P.M.
which I decline.

Meeting with Wankly. He will see
Patterson at his residence &
Clark.

Meeting 7 Aug. Am. Gen. Wankly
& Lady Carr. sang as they
(Aug. Am.) Wankly in Henry
Haley report.

Fri. Aug. 9. Being called from 11:30
to conference with h.p. Reply (21
Cables).

Comm. ends session. Reports that
this report is "dead".

Leave by plane 3 P.M. Land in
Newark - wait for Boston connection.

Then Comm at 7. Tell me situation
is bad. Report that Por. may
accept Haley report with slight

modification. I change my plan
+ fly back to Washington every
11 Mts.

Sat. Aug. 10. Afternoon phone - Aizen
has the book. Will not reveal
to me what h.f. has done in book.
Urges me to telephone h.f.
Evening phone Postman is talk
about. fits story. Pres. is now
in partnership of State. Aizen
will use it in name, as fact.

Arrived near morning phone.
h.f. had been in touch with Lamm
disturbed by story in "Times" that
Pres. will accept "decision" with slight
changes in final plan. Later Lamm
phone me. I asked him whether h.f.
had told him what he did as Wash.
Ambassador. No. I told Lamm to tell
h.f. that, not knowing the facts + not
wishing to do anything, that would

to at cross purpose I am leaving
here. ~~at~~ in afternoon.

At 2:30 h.p. telephone from
Free Island. Reported, elaborating on
What Z. had learned from Pustanen.
It had seen the papers which Arthur
Stenderen were to send to H. ~~in~~
with approval of Pres. Paul Report +
Wages - J. Stat. - Arthur was for
a J. Stat. now. Arthur had phoned
F. P. to that effect - H. P. had suggested
that a statement should now be
issued for public as waiting on
papers of negotiations. Pres. had
also taken to Patterson (A. P. & Mark.
went there together). So out now
that H. will accept —



THE WILLARD HOTEL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

As you know I am away for a few more days. Here is the only trouble about additional action in the house. There are $\frac{1}{2}$ m. Jews. Besides another million who want to go there of all shades - gent, Col, indifferent. On the other side, the speakers there are 70 M. workers out to cut their throats. I want to avoid a massacre.

Anything said or done over here will add fuel to the flames.

I hope at this juncture no branch of our gent. will act.

Everybody knows what American hopes are. If we talk about them too much we will hurt (?) purpose.

WRHS



Conf

to Pres Roosevelt
to Senator Wagner

I N D E X

CONFIDENTIAL NOTES

- TAFT, ROBERT A. -- Oct. 9, 1944 -- Telephoned me at home. Had spoken to McCloy about military objection to Palestine Resolution. Majority of War Cabinet agree no longer military objection. McCloy asks whether formal reply to inquiry to Secretary of War Stimson wanted.
- WISE, Stephen S. -- October 12, 1944 -- Dr. Wise visited White House. Requests President to send message to ZOA Convention meeting in Atlantic City.
- SHULMAN, Herman -- Telephoned re conversation reported by Dr. Wise with President, re money for Democratic Campaign, etc.; also re communication to ZOA Convention. Shulman reads draft of letter President to send.
- DEWEY, Governor -- Oct. 12 -- Interview at Hotel Roosevelt. Governor Dewey says "Dr. Silver, I shall never let you down." Statement issued to Press.
- EXECUTIVE MEETING OF EMERGENCY COUNCIL -- Oct. 12, 1944 - P.M. -- Dr. Wise's action reviewed - also Rabbi Silver's meeting with Gov. Dewey.
- PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT (Exhibit A)
- DEWEY'S STATEMENT (Exhibit B)
- STIMSON -- Secretary of War -- October 13, 1944 -- Letter sent to Taft re Palestine Resolutions (no longer military objection)
- MORGENTHAU, Secretary of Treasury -- Oct. 25, 1944 -- Interview -- I explain my position of neutrality as chairman of American Zionist Emergency Council.
- EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEETING - Oct. 30, 1944 -- Advisability of proceeding with resolutions discussed.
- STETTINIUS, Ass't Sec'y of State -- Interview -- Nov. 9, 1944 -- Dr. Wise and Nahum Goldmann also attend. We ask for green light on Resolutions. He says will get in touch with President. Discussion of partition. Says no action taken yet on Palestine by our Government; also no announcement imminent. Discuss representative our view be attached to American delegation -- projected visit between Roosevelt and Churchill.
- JOSEPH, Bernard -- Nov. 9 -- at Plenary session of Council in evening -- says Smuts told him on Aug. 29 in So. Africa: "There must be a Jewish State" from British point of view.
- SACK, Leo -- Nov. 16 -- I telephone Mr. Sack - ask him to get in touch with Senator Wagner to see President. Told him to tell Wagner of conversation with Stettinius.
- TAFT, Robert A. - I call him. Ask him to See Wagner. Said he would see Connally re advisability not having hearings before Foreign Relations Committee.

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WISE, STEPHEN S. - Nov. 17, 1944 -- Dr. Silver calls him. Conversation re Stettinius and Wise.

DREW PEARSON ORGANIZATION -- Jan. 24, 1945 -- Hear of appointment of Col. Harold Hoskins as successor of Judge Landis as Economic Minister in Middle East.

CABLE FROM JEWISH AGENCY LONDON -- August 28, 1945 -- Received cable to close Washington Office of Emergency Council.

Sept. 13 - Committee of Eight decide to cable -- Washington office should remain open.

SWOPE, HERBERT -- August 29, 1945 -- Spent evening at home of Mr. Swope. Discussed whole situation.

TRUMAN, Harry S. -- Sept. 13, 1945 -- Informed President authorized Senator Gillette to announce letter sent to Attlee asking for transfer of 100,000 Jews to Palestine.

STRAUS, NATHAN -- September 19, 1945 -- Meeting with Nathan Straus who is to have meeting with President.

GOLDSTEIN, NATHANIEL -- September 19, 1945 -- Met with him -- request to contact Dulles in London to have him see Weizmann.

BARUCH, BERNARD -- September 19 -- Dinner at his home -- told him of serious situation which developed.

BERNARD SWOPE -- September 20 -- Telephoned Swope. -- Baruch, was told, had been in touch with "White House. Told President "political dynamite" to let Jews down.

MEETING IN SEVERANCE HALL, CLEVELAND - Sept. 20 -- Report of London Conference. Advise people to write letters to President.

WEIZMANN, CHAIM -- Sept. 21, 1945 -- Dr. Weizmann telephones from London. Telephone Wise.

CONNELLY (Sec'y to President) - Sept. 21 -- Receive letter from him informing of appointment to be made to see President.

HOWARD, ROY (Scripps Howard) - Sept. 24, 1945 -- 1½ hour conversation with Roy Howard. Promise to send him memorandum.

BLACK, HUGO -- September 26, 1945 -- Discussion with him on Zionism.

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Sept. 25 and 26 -- Arranged for Senate "show" for Monday October 1st.

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SEPTEMBER 26, 1945 -- MEET WITH CONGRESSMEN BLOOM, Celler, Coppelman and Raphael. Frank discussion of role of Jewish Congressmen in Jewish problems which arise. Meeting date for Dr. Silver with President discussed. Also meeting with Senators.

Invite Morgenthau to Madison Square Garden. Not free.

Arrange for Gov. Dewey to address meeting.

WHITE HOUSE - Sept. 27, 1945 -- White House called -- President would see Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver Sat. 10:30 A.M. Dr. Wise unable to come on Friday.

TRUMAN, HARRY -- Sept. 29, 1946 -- CONVERSATION with President.

MADISON SQUARE MEETING - September 30, 1945 -- 70,000 people in and outside Hall. Dewey tells Dr. Silver Proskauer in touch with Medallie to urge Dewey to tone down speech and not speak of "Jewish Commonwealth."

NATIONAL EMERGENCY CONFERENCE -- WASHINGTON -- October 4, 1945 -- All Day Conference. Delegates call on congressmen and senators.

BYRNES (Secretary of State) Send wire asking for appointment. Byrnes just returned from London.

STATE DEPARTMENT release President Roosevelt's letter to Ibn Saud -- Oct. 19, 1945.

EMERGENCY COUNCIL PLENUM meeting -- Oct. 20, 1945 -- Vote unanimously to re-introduce congressional resolution subject to approval of Committee of Eight.

BYRNES, (Secretary) -- Oct. 23, 1945 -- meet with Byrnes. Also Wise. Present him with Memorandum.

3:00 P.M. - Conference at which Memorandum released.

4:00 P.M. - Meet with Senators Taft, Brewster and Vandenberg.
Agree to have Taft and Wagner call on President to get reaction on re-introducing resolution.

5:15 P.M. Meet with Senator Wagner

TAFT, WAGNER - October 24, 1945 -- Speak to both of them.

SACK, LEO--October 25, 1945 -- Instruct him to see Wagner and Taft -- resolution not to be introduced without signal from us.

SACK, LEO -- October 26 -- Mr. Sack called. Senator Wagner determined to introduce resolution immediately. Call Wise. See full notes.

OCTOBER 29, 1945 -- Emergency Committee and Committee of Eight approve Resolution.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN -- October 30, 1945 -- Wise and Dr. Silver send telegram to President opposing Joint Commission as reported in Press.

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WEIZMANN, CHAIM -- Nov. 9, 1945 -- Weizmann arrives country. Asked by Emergency Council not to make statement to press on landing.

BEVIN -- Nov. 13, 1945 -- Bevin makes statement announcing creation of Anglo-American Committee to investigate Palestine problem.

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE - Oct. 14, 1945 -- Take up our Resolution.

BLUM, LEON -- April 2, 1946 -- meeting and conversation with Blum at French Embassy.

BACKER, GEORGE -- April 9, 1946 -- Backer just returned from Europe. Conversation with him via telephone, re partition. General picture.

WEISGAL, MEYER -- April 9, 1946 -- Telephone conversation with Weisgal who had spoken with Shertok in Switzerland. Ask Weisgal to ask Shertok to telephone directly to Cleveland.

SHERTOK -- April 11, 1946 -- Shertok telephones from Switzerland.

APRIL 27, 28, 29, 1946 -- Talks with Neumann, James G. McDonald, Mr. Crum re report of Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry. Statement of President Truman which is to be issued.

BEVIN -- May 1, 1946 -- Neumann told by Crum that Bevin asked Byrnes to ask President not to issue any statement; Huthcheson likewise.

ATTLEE, Prime Minister -- May 1, 1946 -- statement by Attlee in House of Commons.

FIERST, HERBERT - May 6, 1946 -- speaking for Dean Acheson -- confidential conference being called to discuss influx of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe into American zone

GOLDMANN'S VISIT -- August 5-9, 1946

LETTER OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO SENATOR WAGNER

INTERVIEW WITH LORD INVERCHAPEL - British Ambassador
October 20, 1946

MEMORANDUM - October 3, 1946

Re: Dr. Wise seeing President; conversation with Mr. Crum; telephone conversation with Eliahu Epstein.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT -- October 4, 1946

ELIAHU EPSTEIN -- Nov. 11, 1946

Telephone conversation - also with Mowrer re getting senators to write to Secretary Byrnes.

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ERNEST BEVIN -- Interview -- at Waldorf Astoria -- Nov. 14, 1946. Lord Inverchapel present. Bevin defended position of England. Critical of resistance in Palestine, illegal immigration, etc. British Government trying to solve problem. If it fails, whole subject to be submitted to UNO. Looked upon Grady-Morrison proposals as implementation of Anglo-American Committee Report. He is anxious for Jewish Agency to come to London Conference.

VANDENBERG, Senator -- Nov. 14, 1946 -- Discussion of entire situation since elections. He for viable Jewish state in which all men will enjoy equality regardless of race or creed. If U.S. prepared to move forward can count on his fullest support. Said he would discuss subject with Byrnes.

BREWSTER, Senator -- Nov. 16, 1946. AHS telephoned Brewster. Informed him of conversatio with Vandenberg. Also telephoned Senator Taft who was out.

TAFT, Senator -- Nov. 19, 1947 -- Senator Taft called me. Informed me hat Byrnes would see me during week.

INVERCHAPEL, Lord -- Nov. 19, 1946 -- phoned me. Said Mr. Bevin would like to see me again -- Wed. at 10 A.M.

INVERCHAPEL -- Jan. 6, 1947 -- Interview. Explained to him resolutions of Basle Congress.

Byrnes, James -- Jan. 6, 1947 -- meeting with Secretary Byrnes.

MASS MEETING -- Jan. 6, 1947 -- at Manhattan Center. Report on Congress. Splendid enthusiasm.

NEUMANN, EMANUEL -- Jan. 7, 1947 -- Called from Switzerland. Also Shertok called from London. E fort being made for informal talks with British Government outside framew rk of London Conference.

FANNY HOLZMANN -- Jan. 7, 1947 -- Drafted cable to Williams of 10 Downing Street.

SHERTOK -- Jan. 10, 1947 -- called from London. Cable sent to Mr. Shertok.

LEO SACK -- Feb. 1, 1947 -- phoned from Washington. Report of conversation with Loy Henderson re Acheson and British Ambassador. U.S. wants decision now. England must take responsibility.

GARDNER, Ambassador (to Great Britain) Feb. 3, 1947. Interview with him. Mr. Gardner passed away on Feb. 6.

MARSHALL, George (new Secretary of State) Feb. 4, 1947 -- interview re position of U.S. Government.

VANDENBERG, Senator -- Interview
Feb. 4, 1947

LOY HENDERSON -- Luncheon -- Feb. 5, 1947. Requested me to see Acheson.

SENATOR BREWSTER -- Interview. He agrees that Republican leadership should speak up immediately and make position known.

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6.

DEAN ACHESON -- Interview -- Feb. 14, 1947

GOVERNOR DEWEY -- Feb. 19, 1947 - Telephone conversation. Discussed Bevin's statement before House of Commons. Asked for his advice.

PATTERSON, SECRETARY OF WAR -- Interview -- Feb. 25, 1945 -- He was sympathetic, intelligent and well informed. He waiting for Hoover's report.

FEBRUARY 26, 1947 -- Action taken in Washington in view of Bevin's speech in House of Commons. Discussion in Senate. Dinner for senators in evening to meet Newmann and AHS. Very helpful discussion.

GOVERNOR DEWEY -- Feb. 27, 1947 -- called me. Had spoken to Dulles who promised to to discuss our case favorably both with Marshall and Bevin in Moscow. Conference to be held in fortnight.

HERBERT SWOPE -- March 3, 1947 -- Interview. Eager to cooperate. Will talk to F.F. and B.B. in connection with possible interim action and Palestine immigration.

DULLES -- March 3, 1947 -- interview.

HERBERT HOOVER -- March 3, 1947 -- interview. He will speak to President Truman. Visited DP camps.

LOY HENDERSON -- interview -- April 16, 1947. Also present were Merriam, Wilkins and others. Discussed referral Palestine issue to UN. Discussed Jewish representation at UN.

SENATOR VANDENBERG -- April 17, 1947 -- interview. Discussed same as above.

SENATOR BREWSTER -- April 17, 1947 -- telephoned him. Brewster just returned from Palestine. Agreed letter to be sent by senators who visited Palestine to State Department urging immediate immigration relaxation.

LOY HENDERSON -- JUNE 19, 1947 - Interview. Criticized attitude of our government in not assisting Committee of Inquiry of UN by indicating its present position.

GEORGE MARSHALL -- June 19, 1947 -- Interview. Left memo elaborating on arguments made to Mr. Henderson. His attitude friendly.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUNDAY EVENING, OCTOBER 9, 1944 -- 8:00 P.M.

Senator Taft called me at my home. He said that he had talked with McCloy about the military objection to our Palestine Resolution. He had had one conversation with him previously. McCloy stated that the question had been discussed by the War Cabinet. While there was difference of opinion, the majority had decided that there was no longer any military reason which could be brought against these resolutions, that it was a political question now which should be handled by the State Department.

Senator Taft also reported that his secretary had then been called by McCloy and asked whether the Senator wanted a formal reply to his inquiry which he had addressed to Secretary of War Stimson. The Senator said he did want that reply in writing and that he is waiting for it.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1944

On my arrival in New York in the morning, I read in the paper that Dr. Wise had visited the White House and asked the President to send a message to the Convention of the ZOA which meets in Atlantic City on Friday. The Emergency Council had decided at its last meeting that the ZOA should not request a message from the President for its Convention. The paper reported that Dr. Wise said, following his interview with the President: "I think it is not too much to say that the President, a candidate, gives his full support to this plank (The Democratic Plank)." The papers also carried the report that following his visit to the President, Dr. Wise had told the newspaper men that he is not partisan in the campaign, he does not care who is elected, the President or the Republican candidate.

Mr. Shulman reached me during the morning and told me that Dr. Wise had reported to him on Wednesday evening, after his return from Washington concerning his conversation with the President. Dr. Wise had discussed with the President money for the Democratic Campaign, speaking for the Democratic Party, etc. along with a communication which the President was to send to the ZOA Convention through Senator Wagner. The Emergency Council had at its last meeting also opposed this move. Mr. Shulman read to me the draft of the letter which the President was to send. The substance of it was that the President, as a candidate, approves of the Democratic plank, that he hopes that action will be taken soon either through the United Nations or through joint action of the American Government and Great Britain. I told Mr. Shulman that the term, "as candidate" was most unfortunate. He agreed, but thought that nothing could be done about it. I also warned about bringing "United Nations" into the picture because that would mean postponement of any decision until after the war.

I knew that there would be no change in the President's intended letter unless some pressure were brought. I immediately got in touch with Nathaniel Goldstein who came to see me at the Commodore. I presented to him the draft of the statement which I thought that Governor Dewey should issue at an interview which the Governor was to hold with me later in the day. The Governor had previously expressed a desire to meet with me. He was coming to New York for the Columbus Day Parade. Later in the morning, Nathaniel Goldstein telephoned me that George Medallie and Roger Straus would like to come over to see me. They came to my quarters at the Commodore Hotel and suggested the elimination of the word "Jewish" from the term "Jewish Commonwealth," and one or two other changes. I told them that unless Governor Dewey's statement was a clear and unequivocal endorsement of the Jewish Commonwealth, it was better to issue no statement at all because it would fall far short of the statement which the President would issue. They agreed and Roger Straus telephoned Mr. Dulles who likewise agreed.

I met with Governor Dewey in his suite at the Hotel Roosevelt at about 3:30 P.M. We had a very pleasant talk on many things. A statement he heartily approved was issued. At the conclusion of our interview, the Governor said to me: "Dr. Silver, I shall never let you down." The Governor's statement was immediately released to the press.

At the meeting of the Emergency Council, later in the afternoon, the action of Dr. Wise was fully reviewed by the Committee -- seeing the President alone, his asking for a statement for the ZOA Convention, the injection of Senator Wagner into the picture, the mix-up of Democratic politics with Zionist affairs in his

conversation with the President, and more especially his announcement that he was backing the President in connection with a visit which had to do with the Zionist Movement.

I reported to the Committee my interview with Dewey and the reasons for it. I read them the statement which Dewey had issued. The Committee was highly pleased that the statement had been obtained.

The Dewey statement was immediately conveyed to Mr. Shulman who began a series of feverish negotiations with Senator Wagner and contacts with the President and his advisers, (Mr. Shulman had announced that he spent over \$400 in telephone conversations) as a result of which the President's letter to the Senator was finally revised to read as follows: (Exhibit A)

Dewey's statement appended herewith as (Exhibit B).



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

Conveyed in letter to Senator Wagner

"Knowing that you are to attend the forty-seventh annual convention of the Zionist Organization of America, I ask you to convey to the delegates assembled my cordial greetings.

"Please express my satisfaction that, in accord with the traditional American policy and in keeping with the spirit of the four freedoms, the Democratic Party at its July convention this year included the following plank in its platform:

"We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth."

"Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if re-elected I shall help to bring about its realization."



GOVERNOR DEWEY'S STATEMENT

"I heartily endorse the Palestine plank in the Republican party platform. Again I repeat what I previously stated to the great leader of the American Zionist movement and distinguished American Dr. Abba Hillel Silver that I am for the re-constitution of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth in accordance with the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the Resolution of the Republican Congress in 1922. I have also stated to Dr. Silver that in order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jews driven from their homes by tyranny I favor the opening of Palestine to their unlimited immigration and land ownership.

"The American people have time and again declared themselves in favor of these principles. The Republican party has at all times been the traditional friend of the movement.

"As President I would use my best offices to have our government working together with Great Britain to achieve this great objective for a people that have suffered so much and deserve so much at the hands of mankind."



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, October 13, 1944

On my arrival in Atlantic City there was a message for me from Senator Taft's secretary in Washington, Mr. Martin. I telephoned Mr. Martin and he read to me the copy of the letter which Secretary of War Stimson had written to Senator Taft in which he states the following:

"I refer to your letter of September 12, 1944, regarding S.R. 247, introduced by Senator Wagner and yourself on the subject of opening the doors of Palestine to the free entry of Jews into that country.

"At the time your resolution was being considered by the Foreign Relations Committee the endorsement of such a proposal by the Congress had grave implications which would seriously have interfered with the progress of the war. In response to your inquiry I have reviewed the considerations which applied at that time. I find that there is still strong feeling on the part of many officers in my department that the passage of such a resolution would interfere with our military effort. However, I do feel that the military considerations which led to my previous action in opposing the passage of this resolution are not as strong a factor now as they were then.

"In my judgment, political considerations now outweigh the military, and the issue should be determined upon the political rather than the military basis."

On Saturday morning, the newspaper carried the announcement from Washington, evidently released by the War Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1944 -- Interview with Secretary of the Treasury, Morgenthau, at his office in the Treasury Department. 3:45 - 4:15 P.M.

I explained to him the reasons for the attitude of neutrality which I, as head of the American Zionist Emergency Council, felt called upon to maintain in the present political campaign. I read him what I said in my speech in Atlantic City about the non-partisan character of our Movement. I asked him to explain my position to the President. He suggested that I write to him. He and his friends in the Administration had gotten the impression that I was working for Governor Dewey. Some have told him that I wanted to be "head of the Republican Jews of America." I asked him whether he could point to any statement of mine which would indicate that I had publicly declared myself for Governor Dewey. Upon reflection, he said that he could not. He did not feel that neutrality was possible. The situation "cut too deep." I told him that heads of national movements such as Zionism have no right to commit their movements by publicly endorsing one candidate or another.



CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY - OCTOBER 30, 1944

At the plenary session in the evening of the Emergency Council, a discussion developed over the advisability of proceeding with the Congressional Resolutions. While no decision was arrived at, it appeared as if the representatives of the Zionist Organization had previously caucused and had agreed to urge deferrment of action. We are to see Stettinius on November 9, a postponed date which he asked for. We had an appointment with him for Tuesday, October 31.

Dr. Wise begged off from reporting on his interview with the President fearing criticism from the body. During the afternoon meeting of the Executive he had no comments to make on the minutes of the previous meeting which sharply criticized his action. At the evening meeting, Judge Rothenberg raised the question of post-ponement on the resolution. For postponement or abandonment — Judge Levinthal, Shulman, Boukstein spoke; Lipsky and Neumann against. Wertheim thought that it perhaps should be delayed until the next Congress and Neiditsch and Mereminsky likewise thought that action should be delayed for the time being.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1944 -- 10:00 A.M.

I visited Mr. Stettinius together with Wise and Nahum Goldmann. We asked him for the green light on our Congressional Resolutions in view of Stimson's letter removing the military objections. Stettinius said he would get in touch with the President and let us know within a week. We asked him whether there had been any decision on partition. He asked, "partition of what?" We explained to him. He said he would call up the British Embassy at once and in our presence he telephoned Mr. Wright whom he said was the best informed person at the Embassy. Wright told him that there was no decision reached on partition, that no announcement on Palestine was imminent. Stimson also said that our Government had not been informed about it and would in all probability be informed before any action was taken.

We asked him whether the subject of mandates had come up at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. He said it did not.

In anticipation of the projected conference between Churchill and Roosevelt, and the possibility of Palestine being discussed by them, we requested that an expert representing our point of view be attached to the American delegation. Stettinius inquired whether we had someone to recommend. We said that we did not have at the moment, but that we would present such a name to him. He said that he would take the matter up with the President.

In the evening Bernard Joseph addressed the plenary of the Emergency Council. Among other things he reported that Shertok, who recently returned from London reported that Churchill had made the statement that the United States was heavily committed to Zionism. Also reported that Smuts had told him, on August 29 in South Africa that "there must be a Jewish State" from the British point of view.

CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, November 16 -- 1:30 P.M.

Called Leo Sack, Washington. Told him to get in touch with Senator Wagner to see the President and urge upon him to give us the green light and to explain why a delay at this time would be bad. He was to tell Mr. Wagner of our conversation with Stettinius and that Stettinius was planning to see the President.

At 1:40 P.M. I called Senator Taft. Told him of our meeting with Stettinius. Asked him to see Wagner. He said that he would talk to Connally and let me know. Told him that it would be advisable not to have any hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1944 - 1:15 P.M.

Telephoned Wise having heard from Shapiro that Stettinius had spoken to him. Wise said that he had mailed me a memorandum on Stettinius' conversation to the effect that he had spoken to the President who suggested that we do not go through with it just now. He may go over soon and presumably he will take up the subject with Churchill and perhaps Stalin. I reminded him of the ill effects of posponement. The matter will be discussed at the Executive next Tuesday.



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1945 -- 1:00 P.M.

While in the office of Charles Rosenbloom, Pittsburgh, Pa., Mr. Moore of the Drew Pearson organization, telephoned me stating that he had information that the President would in a day or two appoint Col. Harold Hoskins as the successor of Judge Landis as Economic Minister in the Middle East. Col Hoskins, of course, is a bitter anti-Zionist. Mr. Moore stated that two people might be seen in this connection -- Leo Crowley and Secretary Stettinius.

I telephoned Arthur Lourie in New York and conveyed the information to him.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1945

Received a cable from London stating that the Executive decided that our Washington Office be closed and that only the Jewish Agency office in Washington operate. The Emergency Council sent protest. (See exchange of cables.)

On September 13 the Committee of Eight met and decided to cable unanimous opinion of Committee that Washington office should remain open.



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1945

Spent the evening with Mr. Herbert Swope at his home in the company of Mr. Landau. Discussed the whole situation with him. He telephoned Frankfurter. Swope suggested that we see Acheson. Frankfurter thought that we should first see Ben Cohen. Swope undertook to arrange meeting between me and Baruch.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1945

Informed that the President authorized Senator Gillette to announce that he has sent a letter to AtLee asking that 100,000 Jews from the concentration camps be permitted to migrate to Palestine.

Mr. Charles G. Ross, White House Secretary, informed Leo Sack that there is something of that sort pending, but he was not authorized to say anything. (See Memo of Leo Sack)



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1945 - 3:00 P.M.

Meeting with Nathan Straus at his office. He is to see the President. I told him some of the subjects which he should discuss with the President. He is very anxious to be of help.

5:00 P.M. - SEPTEMBER 19

Meeting with Nathaniel Goldstein, Attorney General of New York State - in my rooms at the Commodore. I asked him to request Governor Dewey to contact Dulles in London and have Dulles see Weizmann in London. I also took up the possibility of having Dulles represent us in Washington.

8:00 P.M. - SEPTEMBER 19

Dinner at the home of Bernard M. Baruch with Herbert G. Swope and Mr. Landau present. Told Baruch of the serious situation which had developed - the Reuters report of the sub-committee of the British Cabinet recommending practically the retention of the White Paper. Asked him to help. Covered the whole field.

CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1945

I telephoned Swope. Swope told me that Baruch had already been in touch with the White House. He had told the President that it was "Political dynamite" to let the Jews down, etc.

8:00 Pm.. - September 20

Addressed meeting Severance Hall — Cleveland, Ohio — where I gave report of London Conference. Told those present to write letters to the President.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1945

Another conversation with Dr. Weizmann who telephoned from London. He is to see Byrnes tomorrow and Mr. Bevin on Wednesday. Evidently Baruch's intervention has borne results. I reported to him what was being done in this country. He felt that our Government should intimate concretely to the British Government that it intends to help in the reconstruction work in Palestine.

Following our conversation, I telephoned Wise and told him of the conversation, of my meeting with Baruch. He told me that he had not yet succeeded in arranging a meeting with the President.

I received a letter from the President's Secretary, Mr. Connelly, saying that the President will see me, but at a little later time. I wrote Mr. Connelly enclosing the Reuter's dispatch, stressing the urgency of the situation and asking for a very early appointment.



CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1945 -- 3:00 P.M.

Had an hour and half's talk with Roy Howard of Scripps Howard to interest his chain of newspapers in aggressive campaign in our behalf. He is well informed on the subject with a definite anti-Russian bias which leads him to believe that a favorable pro-Jewish solution might drive the Arabs into the Soviet Camp. I promised to send him a memorandum.

Spent Tuesday and Wednesday in Washington. Arranged for a Senate "show," for Monday, October 1. To participate: Senators Taft, Brewster and Vandenburg for the Republicans; Murray, MacMahon and Mead for the Democrats -- possibly also Barkeley.

Spent considerable time with all of these Senators. Also saw Senator Guffy.

On the afternoon of the 26th, spent an hour and half with Justice Hugo Black in his Supreme Court Chambers. Had a very interesting discussion of Zionism and the whole Jewish problem. He promised to send a letter to the Madison Square Garden meeting on September 30th.



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1945 -- 7:00 P.M.

Had dinner at Statler with Congressmen Bloom, Celler, Coppelman and Raphael. A very frank discussion of the role of the Jewish Congressmen in Jewish problems which arise. Congressman Bloom said that he would see that an early date is set for our meeting with the President. A meeting was also planned for all the Jewish Congressmen with the President.

I spoke with Morgenthau. Invited him to the meeting in Madison Square Garden. He was not free to come.

Arranged from Washington to have Governor Dewey address the meeting.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1945 -- 11:00 A.M.

The White House called stating that the President would see me and Dr. Wise on Saturday morning at 10:30. They had hoped that the engagement would be for tomorrow morning, but Wise could not come on Friday. The White House arranged for transportation.



CONFIDENTIAL

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1945 -- 10:30 A.M.

Dr. Wise and I see the President in the White House. Conference lasts thirty-five minutes. See attached notes.



CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES ON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN
Saturday, September 29, 1945

The President seemed to be under strain because of the failure of London Conference. "War is far from over." There are many problems that have to be solved. We must have patience. He cannot be rushed. There is too much pressure. Six million Poles, five million Italians and five million Jews. Will not be confronted by past commitments. Will work things out his own way. A matter of votes.

He wants good conditions for Jews everywhere -- Poland, Germany. He implied that this is more important. He doesn't favor a religious state -- a Catholic state or a Jewish state. When he was explained what was meant by the Jewish Commonwealth, he was not opposed to such a Jewish state being built in Palestine.

We took up with him the matter of the 500,000 soldiers who he thought would be needed to keep the peace. He is strong on the subject of America's non-involvement.

When asked whether he thought that his request of Prime Minister Attlee for 100,000 certificates would be granted, he said he was very hopeful. He knows this is only the first step in total solution. He denied that Great Britain had asked the United States to share in the responsibility. He refused to issue a statement.

He thought that a Congress Resolution might be helpful at the psychological moment. Will know better when Byrnes comes back. Would be glad to see us again. We should see Byrnes when he returns.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1945

Great demonstration meeting in Madison Square Garden. 70,000 people in and outside of hall.

Governor Dewey told me at the meeting that Proskauer had been in touch with Medallie to urge Dewey to tone down his speech and not refer to "Jewish Commonwealth." Proskauer said he was quoting someone at the White House.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, October 4, 1945

All day meeting of the National Emergency Conference in Washington. 500 delegates representing 40 states. Delegates call on their congressmen and senators.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1945

Sent a wire to Secretary of State Byrnes who had just returned from London, asking for an appointment.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1945

Flew to New York. The State Department released President Roosevelt's letter to Ibn Saud.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1945

Meeting of plenum of Emergency Council. Votes unanimously to re-introduce congressional resolution subject to approval of Committee of Eight.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1945 -- 11:00 A.M.

In Washington. Wise and I meet with Secretary of State Byrnes and present him with Memorandum.

3:00 P.M.

Conference at which Memorandum released.

4:00 P.M.

Meeting with Senators Taft, Brewster and Vandenberg in Senator Vandenberg's office. Agree to have Taft and Wagner call on the President and get his reaction to re-introducing the resolution.

5:15 P.M.

Saw Senator Wagner.



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1945

Spoke with Taft and Wagner. They had seen the President and Secretary of State Byrnes. They have no objection to the introduction of the resolution. They suggest that we wait until Friday because tomorrow (Thursday) Bevin is likely to make a long awaited statement on Palestine, suggesting that a joint commission representing Great Britain and the United States be appointed to look into the entire matter.

Wagner and Taft anxious to introduce their resolution on Friday.

Rabbi Thurman saw the President at 12:45. He went to Washington at our suggestion.

Today is the big open air protest meeting in New York City.

Spoke long distance with Senators Wagner and Taft. They had seen the President and Secretary Byrnes. Byrnes informed them that they would not oppose the re-introduction of the congressional resolution, draft of which they showed them. They asked that the Senators wait until Friday before introducing resolution because Bevin was likely to make statement on Thursday. Bevin would suggest a joint British and American commission to study the situation.

Received also a report of Rabbi Thurman's visit with President Truman

Thursday, October 25 -

Spoke to Leo Sack, instructed him to see Wagner and Taft again and to impress upon them that the resolution is not to be introduced without first getting the signal from us. Sack conveyed the message to both Senators.

Friday, October 26 - 11:30 A.M.

Mr. Sack phoned from Senator Wagner's office stating that the Senator is determined to introduce the resolution immediately. He had spoken to Secretary of State Byrnes and Byrnes again told him to go ahead with the resolution. I then asked to speak to Wagner and told him that he must delay the resolution until after our Monday's meeting in New York. I am committed by the action of the World Zionist executives not to proceed with the resolution before getting unanimous consent of the American Committee of ~~Ais~~; that in fact I will have to resign if the resolution were introduced immediately. I told him that I ^{was} ~~would~~ not even be able to contact Dr. Wise and to read him the resolution because Dr. Wise was in Chicago at the convention of the Hadassah.

I told the Senator to get in touch with Dr. Wise immediately. He said he would.

I immediately called Dr. Wise but by the time I reached him Senator Wagner had been in touch with him. The Senator told Dr. Wise that ~~he~~ had asked for a delay but Dr. Wise felt that in view of the article in the New York Times about the agreement between Great Britain and the United States that it would be very helpful to introduce the resolution at once.

When I reached Wise he told me of his conversation with Wagner. I reminded him of the resolution, that we must consult the Committee of ~~Ais~~. I also told him that neither he nor the Committee of ~~Ais~~ had seen the resolution which Wagner had introduced and I suggested to him that he get in touch immediately with Wagner and urge him not to introduce his resolution. He said that he would and he did phone his office but by that time the Senator was already on the floor of the Senate and had introduced his resolution.

Before reaching Dr. Wise on the telephone I also got in touch with Mr. Martin, the secretary of Senator Taft and urged him to rush to the floor of the Senate and get Senator Taft to stop Wagner.

I called Senator Wagner about 12:30 again and was informed by him that he had already introduced the resolution. I told him that I was deeply put out and felt very much embarrassed, that I might have to consider issuing a public statement. He persuaded me not to. He told me that he had spoken to Byrnes again. I told him that the report in the New York Times was not true and that he, Wagner and Taft both felt that the introduction of the resolution at this time might be very helpful in bringing additional pressure on Great Britain. If we wish to consider changes in the wording of the resolution that might be done later on in the Committee. I requested him to telephone Dr. Wise and explain the situation.

At 12:45 I called Dr. Wise, told him of my conversation with Wagner and read to him the text of the resolution. He thought it was a very good resolution, would be helpful at this time and we would explain to our people how it came to be introduced without their consultation.

Rabbi Silver



CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1945

Emergency Committee and Committee of Eight approve of the Resolution which was introduced by Senators Wagner, Taft and Walsh in the Senate on Friday, October 26.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1945

Wise and I send a telegram to the President opposing the Joint Commission as reported in the press on Friday, November 9.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1945

Weizmann arrives in the country. Emergency Council asks Weizmann not to make any statement on landing in this country. I write letter on November 8 to the American members of Executive of Agency indicating what I regard Dr. Weizmann's role to be while he is in this country.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1945

Bevin makes his statement in Parliament announcing the creation of the Anglo-American Committee to investigate the Palestine problem.



CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1945

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee takes up our Resolution. Connally raises objection. Members of Committee feel that there should be another "Whereas" clause referring to the Anglo-American Committee. The Committee decides to appoint sub-committee of five to see Byrnes and attend to revision of Resolution which is to be brought up at a special meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate next Monday.

I spoke with Senator Taft in Washington. He is hopeful about its passage.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY, APRIL 2, 1946 -- 5:00 P.M.

Saw Mr. Leon Blum at French Embassy in Washington. He looks well in spite of the things which he has been through. I discussed with him (a) the question of the Mufti. Blum did not know that he was in France. Urged close surveillance of Mufti lest he escape. Blum said that he would keep that in mind.

Discussed the matter of Zionist activities in French territory in North Africa. Requested that there be no interference with Zionist activities, Hachsharah and emigration. Blum felt that we need have no fear on that score. I expressed the hope that at UNO, the French representatives would be in sympathy with our cause if and when it is brought up. Blum felt that France would be friendly. DeGaulle had expressed friendship before.

We discussed the forthcoming report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Blum felt there would be difficulty with England. He asked about Dr. Weizmann -- where he was. He had promised him to visit Palestine this Spring. Instead he had to come to the United States "begging."

I left with him a document of the Lebanese Habib Joseph Awad.



CONFIDENTIAL

APRIL 9, 1946

I telephoned George Backer Tuesday afternoon, April 9th, at the Berkshire Hotel, New York. He arrived from Europe on Saturday and gave me his picture of the situation. The American delegation is standing firm for 100,000 immigrants this current year. The British, while they would like to spread this figure over a number of years, are likely to accept.

The difference in the American ranks concerns bi-nationalism or partition. He had spoken to Ben Gurion who told him that while he is not prepared publicly to come out for it, he would accept partition on the basis of the Peel Report plus Gallilee, plus the Negev. He believed that Shertok, Kaplan and Weizmann will also support it, that 80 to 85 percent of the Jews of Palestine would accept it. The only ones who oppose it would be Magnes, the Mizrachi and the Shomer Hazair.

Crum, McDonald, Crossman and possibly Buxton are for partition. He had the right to feel, he stated, that the Administration is prepared to indicate its approval of partition, and if it did, the other members of the American delegation would favor it. He expressed the thought that much depended on my position in the matter.

Bi-nationalism, Backer felt, would be a constant source of irritation.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH WEISGAL

On the same afternoon I spoke to Weisgal. He had just heard from Shertok from Switzerland. He informed me that our War Department had been asked who would pay the bill for the moving of the D.P.'s to Palestine. The cost would be about \$8,000,000. The J.D.C. is prepared to spend three to four million for the transfer. Weisgal informed me that the President had sent a cable to Judge Hutcheson urging him to stand pat and to bring a unanimous American decision, a positive report. Weisgal reported that Shertok expressed the thought to him that if we cannot get an ^{ultimate} decision satisfactory to us that they would prefer an Interim report.

I asked Weisgal to ask Shertok to telephone me directly to Cleveland.

CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY EVENING, APRIL 11, 1946

Shertok telephoned me from Geneva, Switzerland. Said that we should contact Washington. Not to insist upon agreement among all the twelve members of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Such a telegram has gone forth from the White House. Shertok also suggests no publicity or speculative reports about attitudes of members of Commission. He thought that two favored partition and three bi-nationalism. I conveyed to him the request of the Emergency Council to come to the United States. He is unable to come to the United States. Must go to London and Palestine first.



CONFIDENTIAL

SATURDAY EVENING, APRIL 27, 1946

Upon my return from the Aircraft Carrier Tarawa, I received the report of the Anglo-American Commission on Inquiry from Mr. Neumann. It was certainly far different from what the advanced press released led one to believe. They justified all that I had said about it a few months ago.

SUNDAY, APRIL 28 -- 9:00 A.M.

James G. McDonald came to my room at the Commodore to have breakfast with me. I gave him my frank reaction to the Report. I told him that it was both bad and sad, and represented a complete repudiation of the Zionist program. He gave me some of the background of how the Report came to be written, what even worse recommendations the British had threatened to make. He was clearly most concerned about my reaction and what I was likely to say in public about the Report. I told him that the President, in issuing the Report, should make a statement approving of the recommendation for the removal of the one hundred thousand refugees to Palestine, the land and immigration provisions, specifically calling attention that as far as long range political policies recommended by the Committee are concerned, that he would merely take them under advisement for future study. McDonald felt that that was a way out.

SUNDAY, APRIL 28 -- 12:00 Noon

Met with Mr. Crum at the St. Regis Hotel. Spent three hours with him and again gave him my sharp criticism of the Report. He spent a great deal of time explaining how it all happened. I told him what I thought President Truman ought to do. He too, agreed. In the course of the conversation, he told me that the man whom the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office fear most in the world is Rabbi Silver. He also told me that the fate of the Report was in my hands.

At the St. Regis, Neumann and I drafted the statement which we believed President Truman should make. We left it with Mr. Crum.

I called a meeting of the Emergency Council for the following Monday.

MONDAY, APRIL 29, 1946

Crum and Eliahu Epstein phoned me from David Niles' office in Washington. Crum had seen the President. The President would issue the Report. He would like to have included a statement about the protection of the Holy places, to which I had no objection, of course. Crum also requested me to indicate the kind of a reaction we would make to the Report if the President consented. I told him that I would telephone back to him the text.

In the meantime the Emergency Council was in session. I recounted to them all foregoing, read to them the draft of the statement which Truman was to issue and also the draft of my statement representing what the Emergency Council would issue. Certain revisions in the text were suggested, but during the discussion, another

telephone call came in from Washington and McDonald said that the President would also like to have a sentence about the Arabs included in his statement. I objected to it, but said that I would take it up immediately with the Committee and would let him know. The Committee suggested some verbal changes in the sentence which McDonald had read to me, which changes were accepted by McDonald and Crum, to whom I also read the draft of our statement which had been approved by our committee. The statement, Mr. Crum said, was statesmanlike and was entirely satisfactory. (See the attached draft of the statement to be issued by the President and our statement, and also the original sentence about the Arabs and our revision of it.)

Eliahu Epstein who was in Washington in Niles' office all through these discussions said that he had spoken to Shertok, that Shertok strongly urged the procuring of the statement from the President. Epstein thought that it would be an historic achievement and strongly urged upon me to agree to it. Later in the afternoon, while attending the Executive meeting of the ZOA, he again called me from Washington and congratulated me upon the arrangements which by then had been finally made.

The proposed statement of President Truman, which Neumann and I had drafted, was read by Dr. Wise before we gave it to Crum, and he approved of it.

Earlier the same day I spoke to Ben Gurion over the telephone to London and he indicated that the Agency would issue a statement approving of what was positive in the Report, but rejecting all its negative features. I told him that I am in complete agreement with it.



The sentence proposed by Mr. Crum and Mr. McDonald to be included in the President's statement read: "One of the most significant factors in the report is that it ensures complete protection to the Arab population of Palestine, not only their civil and religious rights, but also guarantees a constant improvement in their cultural, educational, and economic position."

After bringing it to the Executive Committee, the following changes were recommended which were accepted by Mr. Crum. "One of the significant features of the report is that it aims to ensure complete protection to the Arab population by guaranteeing their civil and religious rights, and by recommending measures for a constant improvement in their cultural, educational and economic position."

AHS:jm

4/29/46

This is the statement which President Truman is to issue when he releases the report of the Anglo-American Committee to the press. The original draft was made by me and Mr. Neumann, approved by Dr. Wise, and submitted to Mr. Crum. Mr. Crum, upon presenting it to the President, recommended the inclusion of the two sentences on the Holy places and on the Arab population. Mr. Crum also suggested the change from the words "the Government" to the words "I will". Our own Committee suggested the inclusion of the words "and questions of international law" in the final sentence. The statement then will read as follows:

"I am very happy that the request which I made for the immediate immigration of one hundred thousand Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The transference of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished with the greatest despatch. The protection and safeguarding of the Holy places in Palestine sacred to Moslem, Christian and Jew is adequately provided for. One of the significant features of the report is that it aims to ensure complete protection to the Arab population by guaranteeing their civil and religious rights, and by recommending measures for a constant improvement in their cultural, educational and economic position. I am also pleased that the Committee recommends in effect the abrogation of the White Paper of 1939, including existing restrictions on immigration and land acquisition to permit the further development of the Jewish National Home. It is also gratifying that the report envisages the carrying out of large-scale economic development projects in Palestine which would facilitate further immigration and be of benefit to the entire population. In addition to these immediate objectives, the

report deals with many other questions of long-range political policies and questions of international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement."



AHS:jm

4/29/46

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 1, 1946

I learned from Emanuel Neumann who was told by Crum that on Monday Bevin asked Byrnes (the two are meeting at the moment in Paris) to ask the President not to issue any statement, that Hutcheson likewise urged him not to issue any statement, that Hutcheson likewise urged him not to issue a statement, but that Crum and Hanegan persuaded him to do so.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 1, 1946

Prime Minister Attlee spoke in the House of Commons and indicated 1) that the Report will have to be taken as a whole, 2) that the transference of the one hundred thousand refugees will be contingent upon the disarming of the Jews of Palestine, and 3) that the British will want to know first to what extent the United States will be prepared to share in the military and financial responsibilities.

There is a clear dissatisfaction on the part of the British of President Truman's statement and a desire to stall.



ASSOCIATE REPORT OF PRIME MINISTER ATTLEE'S STATEMENT IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS MADE MAY FIRST

2
"It is clear from the facts presented in the report requesting private armies maintained in Palestine and from the recent activities that it would not be possible for the government of Palestine to admit so large a body of immigration unless and until these formations had been disbanded and the arms surrendered.

As the Report points out, private armies constitute a danger to the peace of the world and *ought not* to exist. Jews and Arabs in Palestine ~~also~~ must disarm. The committee has drawn attention to the failure of the Jewish Agency to cooperate in dealing with this evil and for expressing the view that the Agency should at once resume activities and responsible cooperation with the mandatory power. The British Government regard as essential that the Agency should take a positive part in suppression of these activities.

They hope that both Jewish and Arab leaders will give council of patience and restraint.

The British Government and the United States jointly appointed the Committee and the Report is addressed to both governments.

The British Government are now studying it and will consult with the United States as soon as possible.

~~The~~ The Report must be considered as a whole in all its implications.

Its execution would entail very heavy, immediate and long-term commitments.

The British Government wish to be satisfied that they will not be called upon to implement the policy which would involve them single-handed in such commitments and in the course of a joint evaluation they ~~wish~~ wish to ascertain to what extent the United States will be prepared to share the resulting additional military and financial responsibilities.

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 6, 1946

Herbert Fierst speaking for Dean Acheson telephoned me this morning saying that Acheson is calling confidential conference to discuss the influx of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe into the American zone in relation to the Anglo-American Committee. He invited me to attend. Others invited are Wise, Monsky, Proskauer, Warburg, Mrs. Epstein and Judge Rifkind. I requested Mr. Emanuel Neumann to substitute for me at the meeting.



MEMORANDUM - GOLDMANN'S VISIT

MONDAY - August 5, 1946

Cable from N.G. to meet him in New York. Arriving with instructions from Paris. (See Cable)

TUESDAY - August 6, 1946

Fly to New York from Plymouth. N.G. came to Commodore at 4:30 P.M. Shows me instructions of (V.) and gives me background. Leave together by plane for Washington, arriving at 7:30.

9:00 P.M. meet in my room Statler. N.G. repeats his story to group (Neumann, Akzin, Epstein, (Cohn, et. al). Agree not to urge par. 2, but strategy to press for short-term implementation, if out of discussions, partition is suggested by others, we should inform them of Par. 2. N.G. agrees.

Invite him to meeting of Zionist Emergency Council tomorrow - 4:00 P.M.

WEDNESDAY - August 7, 1946

N.G. does not contact me all day. Does not ask me to go with him to any officials.

4:00 P.M. Meeting of Executive -- Wait for N.G. two hours.

When he arrived, he again told his mission. Executive discusses it. I summarize, along line of previous evening. N.G. concurs. (See Minutes.)

He did not tell meeting that he had already seen Acheson and urged partition. Nor does he inform me that he is to see Crum with Niles later that evening for same purpose. C. informs me that N.G. is planning to write letters to President.

THURSDAY - August 8, 1946

Epstein disturbed at N.G. independence and secretive action. Asks me to meet with N.G. at 3:00 P.M. which I decline.

Breakfast with Monsky. He will see Patterson at his invitation and Clark.

Meetings of Anglo-American Committee members and Grady Committee going on. They (Anglo-American) unanimous in offering Grady report.

FRIDAY, August 9, 1946.

Receive cable from Mizrachi to cooperate with N.G. Reply (See Cables).

Committee ends sessions. Informed that their report is "dead."

Leave by plane 3:00 P.M. Land in Newark. Wait for Boston connections.

Phone Crum at 7. Tell me situation is bad. Report that President may accept Grady report with slight modification. I change my plane and fly back to Washington arriving 11:00 P.M.

SATURDAY - August 10, 1946

Epstein phones. Akzin had spoken to him. Will not reveal to me what N.G. has done in Washington. Urges me to telephone N.G. Crum phones Proskauer in Lake Placid. Gets story. President is now for partition and a Jewish State. Acheson will urge it in name of our Government.

Around noon Manson phones. N.G. had been in touch with Lourie. Disturbed by story in "Times" that President will accept "decision" with slight changes in Grady Plan. Later Lourie phones me. I asked him whether N.G. had told him what he did in Washington. Answer - No. I tell Lourie to tell N.G. that, not knowing the facts and not wishing to do anything that might be at cross-purposes, I am leaving Washington in afternoon.

At 2:30 N.G. telephones from Fire Island. Reported, elaborating on what C. had learned from Proskauer. He had seen the proposal which Acheson and Henderson were to make to Britain with approval of President. Peel Report and Negev - Jewish State - Acheson was for a Jewish State now. Acheson had phoned F.C. to that effect. N.G. had suggested that a statement should now be issued for public is waiting on progress of negotiations. Pres. had also spoken to Patterson (N.G. and Proskauer went there together). Is not sure that Britain will accept.



LETTER OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO SENATOR WAGNER

As you know, I am away for a few more days. Here is the only trouble about additional action in either house. There are 1/2 m. Jews. Besides another million who want to go there of all shades, good, bad, indifferent.

On the other side of the picture there 70 M. moslems out to cut their throats. I want to avoid a massacre.

Anything said or done over here will add fuels to the flames.

I hope at this juncture no branch of our government will act.

Everybody knows what American hopes are. If we talk about them too much we will hurt (?) purpose.




CONFIDENTIAL

INTERVIEW WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR -- LORD INVERCHAPEL

FRIDAY, October 20, 1946 -- 10:30 - 11:15 A.M.

Saw British Ambassador in Washington. Reception very cordial throughout. Lord Inverchapel does not seem to be in complete agreement with the present policy of the British Government. He deprecated the shooting of the Tommies. He wondered whether many of the legal immigrants coming to Haifa were really not refugees but those coming from Roumania, Hungary, etc. If he had had his way he would have admitted the hundred thousand at once and allowed the Jews to take full responsibility. He did not think that the United States was doing enough for the immigration of refugees. He felt that the Zionists should go to the London Conference even if the Agency basis is not accepted. The Government is not committed to a Jewish State. The people of England have not been sold on the idea, but they do understand the Jewish National theme. However the mind of the Government is not closed. If the Jews in Great Britain could come to an agreement on the right kind of solution, his Government, he felt would go through with it regardless of the Arabs. There is nothing to be lost in going to the Conference even if the Conference fails.

I asked that the Agency members be set free from LaTrune to enable the Agency to go to the Conference and as indicating a new turn in relationship. The Ambassador was skeptical of the soldier-mind -- the military in Palestine and their reaction to the proposal. He thought that concerning Western Gallilee we ought to be able to negotiate with the Arabs (or with Abdullah). Implied in what he said was the thought that the Negev might be included in the Jewish area. He assumed that we would have no objection to the British having some air bases there. He was convinced that the Jews were not anti-British.



CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM -- October 3, 1946

except to me

Dr. Wise had been to see the President in the company of Mr. Lehman on Thursday, September 19. Mr. Carl Sherman, with whom I spoke about the situation, had interested himself in the matter and had seen Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Feighan of the Democratic Party. It was they who had arranged the meeting. Mr. Tuvim had made an appointment for me to meet with Mr. Fitzpatrick at Democratic Headquarters in New York, and so the meeting was not held. Mr. Niles had a hand in the final arrangements to have Lehman and Wise see the President. Wise twice asked me to call a meeting of the Emergency Council to report on his meeting with the President. Due to the holidays, the Executive did not meet until Tuesday evening, October 1. But at this meeting, after much hesitation, Wise finally announced that he could not make a report at the meeting because the conversation was so very confidential. I met Wise after the meeting at the Biltmore Hotel after the meeting and he told me what the conversation was about. He had explained to the President the feeling of the Jews about the inactivity of the Jews in the Democratic Party. He stated that further promises would be of no value and that the Zionists were expecting action, etc. Dr. Wise failed to tell me what the President said. Evidently the President said nothing. He showed me the draft of a letter which Lehman was to send to the President summarizing their representations to him. This letter asked the President to put the authority of the Government aggressively behind the Agency partition scheme which the State Department seemingly approved of.

During the week, Mr. Crum phoned me stating that he had been in touch with Hannegan and that he had urged upon the President through Hannegan to ask Great Britain to start immediately with the transportation of the children and the aged and sick from the concentration camps as the first step, etc. I expressed my serious concern about this proposal and later on I requested Mr. Neumann to communicate with Crum, which he did.

A memo was then drafted by Mr. Crum in which he incorporated what we wanted the President to do, namely, throw the power of the Government behind the Agency proposals seeing that the Government approved of them, and that we are no longer in position to ask for more in Washington, and at the same time ask for the moving of the hundred thousand as the first step in the realization in the program.

This afternoon Mr. Eliahu Epstein phoned and stated that he had been reliably informed that the President would issue a statement tomorrow outlining what the Administration has done for Palestine during the year. I told Mr. Epstein to telephone Mr. Niles and to tell him that unless the statement vigorously calls for action and is the index of a real determination on the part of our Administration to bring about results, that I would promptly attack the President's statement. We would not fall for the bait on the eve of another election. Mr. Epstein said that he would communicate with Mr. Niles immediately.

This morning Oscar Cox phoned and told me that he had been asked to draft a statement for the President. I told him that statements are no good. What we want is action, that the Jews begin moving into Palestine.

CONFIDENTIAL

OCTOBER 4, 1946

The President issued today a fifteen hundred word statement on Palestine reviewing the Administration's efforts during the year strongly urging Mr. Attlee to allow "substantial immigration" immediately into the country and saying that the American people would back the Agency proposal for partition.

This was clearly the result of the pressure on the Administration from all sides. I doubt the value of this statement. It would have been much better if the President had carried on intensive diplomatic negotiations with London rather than issue a public statement. It has all the earmarks of another pre-election maneuver.



CONFIDENTIAL

NOVEMBER 11, 1946

Eliahu Epstein phoned me from Washington and asked me to speak over the telephone to Mr. Edgar Mowrer who was in his office. Mowrer suggested that I get eight or ten Republicans to address letters to Secretary Byrnes now that Byrnes is to discuss the Palestine situation with Bevin. I expressed to him and to Mr. Epstein my hesitancy in the matter in view of the fact that I do not wish to seem trespassing on the work of the Jewish Agency, that I had not been contacted by Mr. Ben Gurion who has been in the country two weeks. Mr. Epstein urged me to go ahead saying this was purely an American matter.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, November 14, 1946 -- 10:30 - 11:30 A.M.

At his rooms at the Hotel Pennsylvania, met with Senator Vandenberg. Had a long friendly chat about the whole situation since the elections and since the Republicans came into control of Congress. He understands fully that the Republican leadership must now assume joint responsibility with the Administration for the solution of the Palestine problem. He drafted a letter while I was there to Byrnes in which he told him that he was glad that Byrnes will not personally devote himself to the Palestine problem, that he feels that this matter is now very urgent, that this may be the last chance. He knew of the Agency proposal. He himself was always for partition as a solution of the problem. He had been greatly impressed by the Peel Report. He is for a democratic and viable Jewish state in which all men will enjoy equality regardless of race or creed. If the United States Government is prepared to move forward aggressively in this direction it can count upon his fullest support. He also said that he would have dinner with Byrnes on Sunday and that he would go to town with him on the subject.

SATURDAY - November 16, 1946

I telephoned Senator Brewster and informed him of my conversation with Vandenberg. I also telephoned Senator Taft who was out. The Senator called me back on Monday, November 18. I told him of my conversation with Vandenberg and what Brewster said about Byrnes, namely that Byrnes had told him that he was in favor of the Jews going back to their original homes six months ago and that he was still in favor of it. I expressed the feeling to Senator Taft that Byrnes is the weak link in the whole chain. I thought that it would be helpful if I could have a quiet chat with the Secretary of State. He said that he would communicate with Byrnes.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1946

Senator Taft called me in the morning and said that he had talked to Byrnes, that Byrnes would be pleased to see me sometime during the week and asked that I inform him where I can be reached during the week. I sent the following telegram to Secretary Byrnes at the Waldorf Astoria: "Senator Taft telephoned me that you would be pleased to see me someday this week at your convenience. I am deeply grateful for the opportunity. I can be reached at The Temple Cleveland, Ohio all week. My telephone number is Randolph 0822. Kindest Regards."

At 11:00 A.M. the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel telephoned me and said that Mr. Bevin would like to see me again and could I come on Wednesday morning at 10:00 o'clock.

M E M O R A N D U M

November 26, 1946

When I called on Senator Vandenburg at the Hotel Pennsylvania on Thursday, November 14, he drafted a letter to Secretary of State Byrnes in which he said that he had seen in the newspapers that the Secretary had finally decided to take over the Palestine matter into his own hands. He was glad that it was so. That while the responsibility was still the Secretary's and the Administration's, he could not resist the impulse to tell him that he was on the trail of a possible settlement at long last unless the situation was to go from bad to worse. This might be the last chance.

The only possible answer under existing circumstances is a satisfactory partition, with the Jews being given a viable democratic state which will at last approximate their long-time pledged rights in which, of course, there will be complete racial and religious equality of freedom. He respectively urged that Byrnes should consider whether our Government should not put every possible emphasis upon the necessity of solving this problem, and he would welcome an opportunity of supporting an affirmative and positive action on the part of our Government.

CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, JANUARY 6, 1947

Saw Lord Inverchapel in the morning from 10 to 11. Explained to him the resolutions of the Basle Congress. Told him that a new situation can be created which would make it possible for us to attend the conference either by word i.e., acceptance by Great Britain of the principle of Jewish statehood or by way of an act beginning to move the refugees from the D.P. camps and the sending immediately of three or four boatloads to Palestine. He said that he would transmit to London.

At four o'clock met with Secretary of State Byrnes. Also told him about the Congress and also suggested what I had told to Inverchapel. He thought well of the idea and said that he would get in touch with the British Ambassador.

In the evening I addressed the big Mass meeting in Manhattan Center at which I reported on the Congress. Splendid enthusiasm at the gathering.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 7, 1947

Heard from Emanuel Neumann from Switzerland by telephone and from Shertok in London. Effort is being made to have informal talks with British Government outside of the framework of the London Conference. I reported to Shertok my conversations with Lord Inverchapel and Byrnes. Also received cable from Ben-Gurion in Paris giving gist of conversation with Creech-Jones.

In the afternoon met with Fanny Holzmänn. Drafted cable to Williams of 10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, January 10, 1947 at 1:30 PM. - Mr. Shertok called from London



They were informed that, inasmuch as we had decided not to go to the London Conference and the Government was unable to accept our conditions, informal meetings be held with the Government to discuss the situation, without reference to the London Conference. The date suggested was January 22. The meeting is to be held in the Colonial Office, to be attended both by the Colonial Minister and by the Foreign Minister. He suggested that I should come on for the meeting.

Shertok is leaving for America tomorrow and will arrive either Sunday or Monday. He plans to remain here five or six days. He had spoken with Neumann, who is going on to London right away. He has also informed all the members of the Executive.

Rabbi Gold is on his way to America. He had spoken to Goldie Myerson in Jerusalem. There is a lull there but she is not sure how long the truce will be maintained.

At 2:45 P.M. I sent the following Cable to Mr. Shertok:

"The date you mentioned in your conversation so close to date of formal meeting as to lead to misinterpretation and confusion. I had hoped that informal discussions could be held prior to announced date. If not they should be postponed to later date when they would be clearly dissociated from the announced conference. Regards. (Signed) Silver"



CONFIDENTIAL

SATURDAY - FEBRUARY 1, 1947

Leo Sack phoned from Washington. He had had a conversation with Loy Henderson who reported that Acheson had called in the British Ambassador four days ago and told him that the United States wants a decision on Palestine now, that it favors partition, that it is opposed to cantonization, that we would find it easier to support partition than any other plan, that it wants a considerable amount of immigration now and more later, that it will not send any troops. Great Britain must take the responsibility. She is prepared to support the plan and give it considerable support. That England must take the responsibility.

Late in the afternoon I spoke with Emanuel Neumann in London. Conveyed to him the report of Leo Sack. Asked him to see Ben Gurion and make sure that the Haganah is not used to fight the Irgun and thus start civil war. Also repeated to him the thought that our representatives should not propose partition at the next meeting with the British representatives but wait for them to make proposals. Told him that I was to see Marshall and Vandenburg on Tuesday.



CONFIDENTIAL

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1947

Visited the new ambassador to Great Britain, Mr. Gardner, at the State Department in connection with his departure for England.

Mr. Gardner died on Thursday, February 6.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1947 -- 11:45-12:15

Called on the new Secretary of State, Mr. Marshall. Asked him what the position of the American Government is in connection with the London Conference. He asked me whether he could trust me and whether the information would be kept out of the press. The American Government had been contacted by London and London was informed (1) that the American Government favors partition, (2) immediate transference of the hundred thousand.

I spoke to him about the rapid deterioration of the situation in Palestine and the threat of martial law, and requested that the American Government intervene. I found Marshall friendly and desirous to be helpful.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1947 -- 2:00 P.M.

Called on Senator Vandenberg. He stated that he had just had luncheon with Marshall at which the situation of Palestine was touched on and Marshall had said to him that on that subject they should be in complete accord because the State Department had been guided in its present position by the letter which Vandenberg had written to Secretary of State Byrnes late in November.

Senator Vandenberg regretted that he had not touched on the Palestine problem when he spoke on the International Forum in Cleveland. I told him that this is the time for him to declare his position in public. He said that he would seriously consider my suggestion and would let me know. He was sending to Marshall immediately a copy of his letter to Byrnes with a covering letter.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1947 - 1:00 P.M.

Luncheon with Loy Henderson at the Willard. Nothing new. Requested him to get the State Department to intervene in the situation in Palestine which has developed following the ultimatum of the military. He felt that London would probably propose as a first proposal a modified Grady-Morrison scheme. We discussed the attitude of the Arab states to partition and of Ibn Saud to Zionism. He felt that Great Britain would ultimately send the Palestine question to UNO, but he did not know whether that would be following an announced solution by Great Britain or before. He himself had been opposed to the Grady Plan. He suggested that I see Acheson, that people had misrepresented me and my position to Acheson.

CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1947 - 4:30 P.M.

Saw Senator Brewster. He agreed with me that the Republican leadership should speak up immediately and make its position known.



CONFIDENTIAL

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1947 --3:45-4:30 P.M.

Interview with Dean Acheson at State Department. I referred to my conversation with Secretary Marshall and what he said was attitude of American Government. I called attention to the fact that the British proposals are a rejection of the American attitude. I asked what the Government intends to do now. He thought that negotiations had not yet been entirely abandoned, that the Arabs were still in London. (He was wrong -- that very afternoon the papers published a statement that official negotiations of Devin ended in a break-down). He felt that the discussion should continue.

I asked him what would happen to the refugees if the matter were turned over to the Assembly of the UN which was not likely to meet until September. He thought that an increase in immigration was indicated. He was rather hopeful about it.

He thought that a five-year trusteeship would mean five years of continued unrest and struggle and he deprecated it. He said that he would get in touch with the British Ambassador about the immigration schedule.

I took occasion to set him right about many misrepresentations concerning myself to which he had been subjected, my attitude towards Great Britain, extremism, and the reasons for my opposition to the partition proposals of the Jewish Agency. He referred time and again to Great Britains problems in the Middle East, implying the Russian problem, of course. He did not feel that official representation to Great Britain at this time would be helpful. He referred to the fact that Great Britain was, after all, responsible for Palestine to which I replied that Great Britain had never asked for America's political or military aid, and that economic aid had been promised by our Government. I told him that the so-called terror in Palestine could not be checked unless large-scale immigration began at once.

CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1947 - 3:00 P.M.

Spoke by telephone to Governor Dewey in Albany. Discussed with him Bevin's statement before the House of Commons and the need for liberalizing immigration to Palestine. Asked for his advice. He mentioned Vandenberg and Taft. I told him of the action both Taft and Vandenberg have taken. I suggested that he might wish to get in touch with Marshall. He said that Marshall is not listening to Republicans these days. He did not consult Dulles and it is doubtful if he would ask Dulles to go along with him to Moscow. Bi-partisan arrangement may not be working out under Marshall. He would, however, contact Dulles as soon as he gets back from Mexico and ask him what can be done in the situation. He will also consult some of his other friends about it. He thought that Taft ought to build a fire under Vandenberg and have the leader speak in the name of the Republican Party.

Earlier in the day, Col. Julius Klein of Chicago called and said he had made an appointment for me with Secretary Patterson next Tuesday at one o'clock.



CONFIDENTIAL

TUESDAY - FEBRUARY 25, 1947 -- 1:00 P.M.

Had luncheon with Secretary of War, Patterson, at the Pentagon Building. Found him very sympathetic, intelligent and well-informed on the problem of the DP's. Asked for his cooperation in pressing for relaxation of the immigration schedule to Palestine. He said that he would contact again the State Department on the subject. He was waiting for Mr. Hoover's report.

WEDNESDAY, February 26, 1947

In view of Mr. Bevin's speech in the House of Commons where he attacked the President and held him responsible for wrecking Bevin's Palestine negotiations, considerable action had to be taken in Washington.

5:00 P.M.

Attended the Senate where Senators Brewster and Barkley spoke on Bevin and Senators Taft, Magnusson, Hatch participated in the discussion.

7:00 P.M.

Dinner at the Mayflower arranged by Senator Brewster to meet Newman and myself. Fifteen senators in attendance. Among them, eight members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Among those present were Vandenberg, George, Hatch, Pepper, Ives, Wiley. A very helpful discussion took place at this dinner.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1947

Governor Dewey phoned me this morning to Cleveland. Said that he had spoken to Dulles. Dulles promised to discuss our case favorable both with Marshall and Bevin in Moscow. The Moscow Conference will be held in a fortnight.

CONFIDENTIAL

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 1947 -- 4 P.M.

Saw Loy Henderson in the State Department. Present also Merriam, Wilkins Vidal (?). Discussed the subject of referral of Palestine issue to UN. State Department hoped for a short special session with a restricted agenda to the appointment of the committee. There were various proposals as to the composition of the committee. The issue was not settled. U.S. leaned to a small neutral committee excluding English and Arab States, and by implication also all the other big powers including the U.S.

I raised the question of Jewish representation. H. thought there was merit although the legal formula was not yet clear which would make it possible. America is not inclined to take initiative or to press its solution until after the committee will have rendered its recommendations. The American Government still stands on the policy announced by the President on October 4. He felt that in the interim pending final decision immigration should be relaxed but doubted whether the American Government is prepared again to make official representation on this score. He was sure that Marshall had not discussed the Palestine matter with Bevin in Moscow. He deeply regretted the execution of Gruner and the other men.

The British may not be very earnest about referring the matter to the UN. But they better be. They may have tried to put the baby at the door of some other nation, but they will not be able to defy the decision of the UN.

THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1947 -- 10 A.M.

Saw Senator Vandenberg at his office. Spent an hour with him. Discussed the matters as with Mr. Henderson. He gave me much the same information that Henderson had. He still feels that our Government should press when the time comes for partition as the only possible solution. I proposed to him the idea of having the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate write to the Secretary of State drawing attention to the resolution adopted by Congress etc. He was not prepared to declare himself on the subject although he felt that the resolution was no longer practical politics. He thought that we should see the President and bring pressure on him so that the U.S. would take an active part. The President would then contact, he was sure, the Democratic leaders of New York to find out how the Jews felt about it. He himself had stated his position and he stood by it.

Prior to my leaving Washington, at 2:00 P.M. I spoke to Senator Brewster who had just returned from Palestine. We agreed that a letter be sent by the senators who visited Palestine to the State Department urging immediate immigration relaxation.

CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1947 - 2:15 P.M.

Interview with Mr. Henderson at the State Department prior to my interview with Mr. Marshall. Criticized the attitude of our Government in not assisting the Committee of Inquiry of the United Nations by indicating what its present position on Palestine is and to what extent our Government is prepared to implement the recommendations of this special committee. I called his attention to similar positions taken in the past, technically and formally correct, but thoroughly unsound, such as the appointment of the Grady Commission, the early attitude of the U. S. delegation at UN, and indicated that our Government is following similar unsound line now which will later on bring down great criticism upon it. Mr. Henderson was rather close-mouthed and indicated that our Government would be prepared to present its views when the Committee of Inquiry would ask for it. It did not want to take the initiative lest the impression be given that the recommendations that will emerge will be of the U.S. making. The U. S. policy is not yet crystallized, he suggested and he did not think that the British had any fixed position.

THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1947 - 2:30 P.M.

Interview with Mr. Marshall lasting about 20 minutes. Left a memorandum with him elaborating upon the arguments which I made to Mr. Henderson, and also discussed the subject with him. He stated that the subject of Palestine was very much in the mind of our Government, but that the Government cannot formulate or announce America's position definitively until certain things are worked out, presumably of international import. He did not specify what these certain things were. But the Government will not confront us with any fait accompli. He will invite us before long for a full discussion. His attitude was friendly.

That same evening, I reported the interview with Mr. Marshall to Sumner Welles who said he would see Mr. Henderson over the week-end.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 7 -- 6-7:30 P.M.

Meeting with Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones at the home of Miss Fanny Holtzman -- 24 E. 64.

A cordial and frank discussion took place. Mr. Creech-Jones expressed the thought that no 2/3 vote on the majority report was at present in sight. He thought that the Arabs and Jews should make another try to talk things over among themselves in view of the new situation which has been created by the British announcement of withdrawal. He was not clear in his mind on what basis this new discussion should take place. He suggested that there are serious differences among the Arabs themselves, referring to King Abdullah. He stressed time and again that Great Britain will get out of Palestine and that plans already are on the way for evacuation. Great Britain is anxious to get quick and decisive action at this Assembly. It is not sparring for delay.

Great Britain is not yet ready to indicate what it would do by way of implementation if the majority report is adopted but he gave a broad hint that his Government may cooperate in case the majority report is approved.

Among other things, he said that Mr. Bevin is not opposed to partition, that Mr. Beeley is not the policy-maker on Palestine. His role should not be over-estimated.

I spoke to him, among other things, of the desire to continue on the friendliest terms with Great Britain after the Jewish State is set up, as a tradition of friendship between two peoples which has been unfortunately seriously marred by the efforts of the last few years. I also suggested to him that the report of the UN offers the one possibility for the great powers to unite on any one issue before the UN. This would enormously add to the prestige of the UN which is in danger of being undermined by the hopeless wrangling and division which has developed between the great powers on every issue before the UN. Mr. Creech-Jones seemed to be impressed by both of these statements of mind.

CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1947 -- 10:30 A.M.

Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones called on me at my room at the Commodore and spent 40 minutes with me following up the line of discussion of October 7. I was particularly anxious to make sure that his address before the UN scheduled for that afternoon should not be critical of the report, nor of the position of the U. S. Government, nor that it should give the impression that after the withdrawal of British forces chaos will result thereby creating a mood of panic among the delegates. On all these matters, Creech-Jones re-assured me. The meeting was most cordial. Our conversation of last week was evidently forwarded to London and the Cabinet meeting which followed authorized Creech-Jones to adopt a more moderate and constructive line which was reflected in the speech which he delivered that afternoon.

I asked him to reread his speech with an eye of its total effect on the listeners to the address to make sure that it would be constructive rather than critical and non-cooperative. He indicated that the British Cabinet while not adopting a resolution in favor of the majority report indicated that it would not oppose such a solution if approved by the UN and that Great Britain might assume a share in the implementation.



CONFIDENTIAL

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1947 -- 11:30 A.M.

Governor Dewey telephoned me from Albany. He had tried to reach me the night before. He said that he had been in the last 24 hours that the U. S. Government is not only not helping, but is apparently sitting on its hands in relation to the Latin American Governments. As a result the Arabs have made great progress among these countries. He feels that there is a real danger of our not getting the required 2/3 vote. Only Marshall has the power to change the situation. Our Government has great influence with the South American countries but is not using it. Unless our Government will tell you that they have approached these people in Latin countries and that they have their votes, the situation is precarious.



Oct - 1947

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency, yesterday announced that the closing presentation of the case of the Jewish Agency before the ad Hoc Committee on Palestine will be made by Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department, and that an invitation has been extended to Dr. Chaim Weizmann, former president of the Jewish Agency, who is visiting the U.S.A. to make a concluding statement before the Committee.



copy file

Monday Aug 11-

5:38 PM Bamber called me

Had spoken to Marshall.

Told him failure to adjust Pol. situation
will endanger Br. negotiation here.

Asked him to talk to Vandenberg

W. not very communicative as Amer. plan.

B. mention Arthur Brock's article in Times
which he inspired.

B. will see Lloyd Henderson.

Mrs. Frances Bolton had requested him to
see 2 people whose names B. did
not at the moment have before him

I told B. about Mrs. Bolton.

(Had dinner previous at B's home in Port
Washington Tues. Aug. 5. with Surfe

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

THE TEMPLE
EAST 105TH STREET AT ANSEL ROAD
CLEVELAND, OHIO

Tues. - Aug. 12 - Sack phoned
He had talked to Seey Snyder. They
suggested that I call the Prudents. Seey
counselly hundreds - and asked for
resumés from Pres. on Gent.
~~at~~ present attitude towards Pol.
+ refugees.

Wed. Aug. 13. - Sack phoned from Wash.
No statement from State Dept. as
+ affected.
I asked him to phone Chapman
in re an proposed meeting this
week with Snyder.
+ Sack had spoken to Sullivan
this morning. Latter is on way
to White House. He had heard
from all parts of country all
Pol.

National Press Club

Washington

Acheson + L. Murchafel

4 days ago (Tues Jan. 28) at L. Murchafel's

Request —

And Reflecting Marshall
men who had discussed
subject several times with
Acheson + Henderson

Was told that U. S. deems
it essential that present
conferences come to a
happy Termination; That
~~something~~ now is the

2 Time That Something
Be Done if Ever.

U.S. is much concerned
over present situation
& wants solution now

Immerchapel has
advised Govt. At Once
this was 4 days ago

emphasized that U.S.
wants decision along
lines of Satisfactory
Portugal Plan, U.S.

National Press Club

Washington

Inclined to Support ~~the~~
 Parties ~~also~~ but would
 not give a Blank Check
was emphasized to But
 That They must Take
 Responsibility for Decision,
 U.S. will not take Responsibility
 nor will U.S. enter into
 any arrangement for
sharing responsibility
 nor will U.S. send
 troops troops x

4 was emphasized that
British will have to
enforce whatever
decision arrived at

I mentioned was told
"we will find it easier
to support Partition
than any other Plan" x

Ambassador was advised

"we will find it
extremely difficult to
support any immediate plan
which did not

Contemplate Considerable
Amount of Immigration
now + Large Numbers
Later with self
Autonomy for Pale
Jewish ~~to~~ Area
now is time was
Repeated frequently.

British told if any
Satisfactory Plan
evolved will have
all public support

4
National Press Club

Washington

as well as our
economic support

No Blank Checks

But Particular

No talks with Na-

him said so 40 min.
with Tr but no
mention Palestine + Jim
they got around to
it was time for
lunch

7

Penketo has denied
reports that Amer want
to move or necessity
for it - St Helt
issued denial

London Conf to
cantonnement plan Helt
advised x

Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the request of the State Department, postponed action for the time being on the Palestine Resolution, we wish to record our own personal approval of the Resolution which calls for the free entry of Jews into Palestine and full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may as soon as practicable reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth.

Elmer Thomas
Arthur Capper

Sup. F. Capper
Caleb Capper
Benjamin Champ Clark

Robert La Follette

Francis Pickens

Wm. H. Shipstead

Paul H. Reubens
James H. Hays

James E. Murray
George H. Russell

From Leo R. Sack

For the American Zionist Emergency Council

For Immediate Release

Washington, Dec. 14- Twelve members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seven Democrats and five Republicans, which earlier this week postponed action on the Palestine Resolution at the request of the State Department today signed a joint statement recording their "personal approval" of the resolution.

They are Senators Joseph F. Guffey, Pennsylvania; Claude Pepper, Florida; Bennett Champ Clark, Missouri; Elbert D. Thomas, Utah; James E. Murray, Montana, James M. Tumell, Delaware and Robert R. Reynolds, North Carolina, Democrats: Senators Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., Wisconsin; Arthur Capper, Kansas; Gerald P. Nye, North Dakota; Henrik Shipstead, Minnesota and James J. Davis, Pennsylvania. The twelve Senators constitute two-thirds of the Senators who participated in the Foreign Relations Committee discussions. The Resolution was rejected because Secretary of State Stettinius told Senators that passage "at the present time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation."

Here is the statement of the Senators:

"Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the request of the State Department, postponed action for the time being on the Palestine Resolution, we wish to record our own personal approval of the Resolution, which calls for the free entry of Jews into Palestine and full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may as soon as practicable reconstitute Palestine as a free and Democratic Commonwealth."

Senator Wagner, Democrat, of New York, one of the sponsors of the Resolution is out of the city. Senator Taft of Ohio, the other sponsor, is not a member of the committee. ----

7/ Ready to offer his ^{new} party
on that subject.

8/ Recalled his early visit
to Val. - first visit -
50 yrs in Headbook
- but only for money - &
that's better -

9/ Huffs that Pol. will
be no more refugees
but & children -

10/ Asked him to stay in
Israel - will come & teach

Baruch - ① Stands by - let me to
desert goal, historic causes -
② J. Nat. Home in Pol-
and migration to absorption
capacity - which Jews can
create ③ Am. & J.B. as
partners in Turkish ship, by
not jealous. Am. partners in
Over destinations were together
④ Nothing can stop us now
we open as Pol. - our
salvation lies in that open-
ment ⑤ Asked when he was
⑥ Referred to Bu rado
- not to play.

11) Recalled that he
visited White Paper

12) was away thru who
visited Hal Weinstock

13/ ① I am pressed - was
plight - Can better -

- ask for him to issue

statement

- ① difficult for Jews

② 30,000 Jews -

Tr. 7-4548



HERBERT BAYARD SWOPE
745 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N.Y.

March 12, 1946.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
The Temple,
East 105th St. at Ansel Road,
Cleveland, Ohio.

Dear Dr. Silver:-

Mr. Bernard M. Baruch has asked
me to advise you that he has made arrangements
for you to meet Mr. Churchill. At the moment
the exact time and place have not been set,
but the meeting will take place after March 15th.

Faithfully,



Secretary to Herbert Bayard Swope

Confidential



Sat. Dec. 14. 7 P.M.

Conversation with Ch. W.

W.: Our views are far apart. He is for going to Conference, against terms of all kinds. He was not informed of Ex. decision as subject in Nov. 1946. He is resolved regardless what the Congress decides on issues not to talk again. He is there. He has had a belly-ful. But Ben Murrin is Pol. + one he would be in a bad spot. Regards any position as dangerous. He has no objection to my stepping in leadership - but he will not interfere. He will also not cooperate.

I asked him why he changed his mind about the resolution which he inserted in his letter to Hall. He said that he was forced to do so, as had the movement by the Executive. He never believed in it.

I told him that the cause, the Ex. in last 4 months was disastrous. If they

wanted Parkhurst - they bumped it. He said
that he was ill at the time it was done.

I said that from all indications they will
not get Parkhurst. I saw him very impressive
of Brierley and Byrnes. He was not sure his
talk with Cook-Jones left him more satis-
fied.

I said that the Byrnes should declare
itself clearly on the issues. If his line
is adopted he and those who think like
him should carry on. He said that if
that were so, I should not be a member
of the Executive. I said certainly. I would
never dream of it.

We exchanged 2-3 times assurances
of mutual respect. He reminded me
that in London, Lisbon & in Cleveland
He suggested my coming into the
world movement.

CLASS OF SERVICE

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WESTERN UNION

1220

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NT = Overnight Telegram

LC = Deferred Cable

NLT = Cable Night Letter

Ship Radiogram

R. B. WHITE
PRESIDENTNEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARDJ. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

NN71 123 GOVT=THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC 13 1200P
HONORABLE ROBERT F WAGNER=
=530 EAST 86 ST=

DEAR BOB:

KNOWING THAT YOU ARE TO ATTEND THE FORTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA, I ASK YOU TO CONVEY TO THE DELEGATES ASSEMBLED MY CORDIAL GREETINGS.

PLEASE EXPRESS MY SATISFACTION THAT, IN ACCORD WITH THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN POLICY AND IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE FOUR FREEDOMS, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AT ITS JULY CONVENTION THIS YEAR INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PLANK IN ITS PLATFORM:

"WE FAVOR THE OPENING OF PALESTINE TO UNRESTRICTED JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION, AND SUCH A POLICY AS TO RESULT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT THERE OF A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC JEWISH COMMONWEALTH."

EFFORTS WILL BE ^{made} ~~MADE~~ TO FIND APPROPRIATE WAYS AND MEANS OF EFFECTUATING THIS POLICY AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.

WITH CORDIAL REGARDS AND BEST WISHES=
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT.

CLASS OF SERVICE

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11196 65 'OOVT=THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC1A 1207P
1 OCT 14 PM 12 37
HON ROBERT F WAGNER=
550 EAST 66 ST=

DEAR BOB: YOU MAY ADD THE FOLLOWING TO MY TELEGRAM TO YOU
OF YESTERDAY QUOTE I KNOW HOW LONG AND ARDENTLY THE JEWISH
PEOPLY HAVE WORKED AND PRAYED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
PALESTINE AS A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC JEWISH COMMONWEALTH. I
AM CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE GIVE THEIR SUPPORT
TOWARD IT AND IF REELECTED I SHALL HELP TO BRING ABOUT
ITS REALIZATION UNQUOTE=

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Congressman Flood did not want
this mentioned publicly -

He wants the Council to prepare
a speech which he will
immediately deliver on the floor
& use as basis for pressure
with President & State Dept.

Ramon Weiss

WRHS



PALESTINE FORMULA AGREED UPON BY MR. BEN-GURION AND MR. MAURICE WERTHEIM

June 5, 1942.

1. To act in common

- a) For the maintenance of Jewish rights under the Mandate in Palestine for the immediate future.
- b) For the fulfillment of the original purposes of the Balfour Declaration, whereby through unrestricted Jewish immigration and large-scale colonization under a regime designed for this purpose Jews may constitute a majority in Palestine and establish an autonomous commonwealth, it being clearly understood that
 - 1) In such a commonwealth, all the inhabitants, without regard to race or religion, shall enjoy complete equality of rights.
 - 2) The establishment of this commonwealth will in no way affect the political or civil status and allegiance of Jews who are citizens of any other country.

2. To set up a sub-committee to study and define the ways and methods best calculated to secure the achievement of the above aims.

C
O
P
Y

(TELEGRAM)

DECEMBER 5 1944

WE ARE GLAD TO LEARN THAT PALESTINE RESOLUTION SR 247 IS ABOUT
TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE PASSAGE
OF THE RESOLUTION MOST EARNESTLY DESIRED BY ENTIRE AMERICAN
JEWISH COMMUNITY WE FEEL IT VITAL TO CAUSE WHICH WE REPRESENT
AND TO AVOID FUTURE AMBIGUITIES THAT THE WORD QUOTE ULTIMATELY
UNQUOTE BE OMITTED FROM PRESENTLY PENDING RESOLUTION AND THAT
THE TERM QUOTE JEWISH UNQUOTE BE RETAINED BEFORE QUOTE COMMONWEALTH
UNQUOTE KNOWING HOW FRIENDLY YOU ARE TO OUR CAUSE WE APPEAL TO YOU
TO SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION IN THAT FORM

DAVID WERTHEIM, NATIONAL SECRETARY
POALE ZION, LABOR ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
45 EAST 17th STREET, NEW YORK

C
O
P
Y

(Telegram)

DECEMBER 5, 1944

WE EARNESTLY URGE YOU REPORT OUT FAVORABLY PALESTINE RESOLUTION
FOR ADOPTION BY PRESENT CONGRESS STOP IMPORTANT REMOVE WORD QUOTE
ULTIMATELY UNQUOTE WHICH HAS ALREADY LED TO MISUNDERSTANDING LIKEWISE
IMPORTANT RETAIN WORD QUOTE JEWISH UNQUOTE BEFORE WORD QUOTE COMMONWEALTH
UNQUOTE YOUR COMMITTEES FAVORABLE ACTION WOULD BE DEEPLY APPRECIATED
AS FULFILLMENT PRESIDENTS MAGNIFICENT MESSAGE TO LAST ZIONIST ORGANIZATION
CONVENTION AND OVERWHELMING AMERICAN OPINION AS EXPRESSED RECENTLY IN
BOTH PARTY PLATFORMS

ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN, PRESIDENT
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
41 East 42nd St., New York

C
O
P
Y

(Telegram sent to Senator Wagner and Senator Connally)

DECEMBER 5 1944

WITH REFERENCE TO THE PENDING RESOLUTION SR 247 PRESENTLY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, I HAVE THE HONOR TO SUBMIT FOR YOUR INFORMATION THE FOLLOWING QUOTATION FROM A RESOLUTION ADOPTED TODAY AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE HELD IN PITTSBURGH, AND REPRESENTING THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE JEWS OF THIS COUNTRY, QUOTE

THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE GREETES THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND HAILS HIS FORTHRIGHT ASSURANCE TO THE JEWISH PEOPLE THAT IN ACCORD WITH TRADITIONAL AMERICAN POLICY, AND IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE FOUR FREEDOMS ... EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO FIND APPROPRIATE WAYS AND MEANS FOR THE OPENING OF PALESTINE TO UNRESTRICTED JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND COLONIZATION, AND HE WILL HELP TO BRING ABOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINE AS A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC JEWISH COMMONWEALTH

THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE NOTES WITH SATISFACTION THAT IN THE FIFTEEN MONTHS SINCE ITS FIRST SESSION, ITS RESOLUTION ON PALESTINE HAS WON THE WARM AND SYMPATHETIC ENDORSEMENT OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE IS CONFIDENT THAT THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES WILL RECORD ITS SUPPORT AND HELP IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY ENUNCIATED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT. THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE LOOKS TO THE MANDATORY POWER AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE SPEEDY AND EFFECTIVE FULFILLMENT OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S HISTORIC DECLARATION UNQUOTE

HENRY MONSKY
CO-CHAIRMAN AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE

HOTEL WILLIAM PENN, PITTSBURGH, PA.

C
O
P
Y

(Telegram sent by Hadassah to Senators as per the attached list.)

PITTSBURGH PA DECEMBER 5 1944

WE HAVE LEARNED THAT PALESTINE RESOLUTION SR 247 IS SCHEDULED FOR DISCUSSION BEFORE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TOMORROW WE KNOW YOUR DISCUSSION IN THIS MATTER IS PROMPTED BY A SENSE OF URGENCY FOR EFFECTIVE AND SPEEDY ACTION TO MEET TRAGIC NEEDS OF JEWISH PEOPLE ON BEHALF OF HADASSAH WOMENS ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN AND ITS MORE THAN 125,000 MEMBERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WE MOST EARNESTLY PLEAD THAT THE RESOLUTION BE FREE FROM ANY POSSIBLE AMBIGUITY WHICH WOULD SUBJECT IT TO VARIED INTERPRETATIONS IN THE FUTURE WE RESPECTFULLY URGE THAT THE WORD QUOTE JEWISH UNQUOTE BE INSERTED BEFORE THE WORD QUOTE COMMONWEALTH UNQUOTE AND THAT THE WORD QUOTE ULTIMATELY UNQUOTE BE ENTIRELY ELIMINATED WE MOST EARNESTLY APPEAL TO YOU TO SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION IN THE FORM ABOVE INDICATED

JUDITH EPSTEIN, PRESIDENT

HADASSAH WOMEN'S ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

1819 BROADWAY NEW YORK

C
O
P
Y

(Day Letter)

(Telegram)

DECEMBER 5, 1944

ON BEHALF OF RELIGIOUS ORTHODOX ZIONISTS OF AMERICA WE DESIRE
RESPECTFULLY CONVEY THE EARNEST HOPE THAT FAVORABLE ACTION WILL
BE TAKEN ON PALESTINE RESOLUTION SR 247 IN ENLISTING YOUR SUPPORT
FOR THE RESOLUTION WE FEEL IT VITAL IN THE INTERESTS OF CLARITY TO
ELIMINATE FROM THE RESOLUTION AS AT PRESENT DRAWN THE WORLD QUOTE
ULTIMATELY UNQUOTE WHICH IS LIABLE TO MISINTERPRETATION SO THAT
THE CONCLUDING CLAUSE SHALL READ QUOTE THAT THE JEWISH PEOPLE MAY
RECONSTITUTE PALESTINE AS A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC JEWISH COMMONWEALTH
UNQUOTE

LEON GELLMAN, PRESIDENT

MISRACHI ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

(Dictated by Dr. Goldmann to Arthur Lourie over the telephone)

Minute of Conversation with Mr. Stettinius
Wednesday, December 13, 1944

Mr. Stettinius called Dr. Wise and me into his room before meeting with the delegation. He told us that he had been in touch with the President about the statement which we had suggested he should issue. He said that the President was in a very bad mood because we had gone ahead with the Resolution and instead of acquiescing in his request to hold the matter up for the time being, had sought to bring pressure to bear through the Senate. He felt that the Zionists had lost confidence in him and Mr. Stettinius said that in the circumstances it was difficult to discuss such questions with him at this time. It would not be possible for him ^(M.S.) to issue the letter suggested.

N.G.

12/15/44

Lourie

Mr. James E. Brown, Asst. to the Secretary of State, advised that Dr. Goldman's memorandum" was not quite in accordance with the Secretary's record."

"The Secretary told Dr. Wise that he had been in touch with the President as he had offered to do regarding the statement which Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver had requested him to make. The reaction that Mr. Stettinius obtained was that the President felt that this group should have confidence in his handling of the matter and that it would not be appropriate for Mr. Stettinius to issue the statement."

"Mr. Stettinius asked Dr. Wise if he would be good enough to give this information to Dr. Silver."



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 15,

RECEIVED			
NOTED BY	REFER	TO	DATE
	#LS		
DATE	DEC 20 1944		
	AL		
	HPM		
ANSWERED			

Dear Dr. Silver,


I received your letter written from
the Willard and, as promised, took the
question up with the President.

copy to
sent
date

Rabbi Wise called in my office yesterday afternoon and I took the opportunity of his visit to explain the reaction which I obtained on this. If Dr. Wise has not already told you of this, I am sure he will if you will make an inquiry of him.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,



Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York City 17, New York

December 12, 1944

The Honorable Edward R. Stettinius
The Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing herewith the draft of the statement which we discussed yesterday morning and copy of which you requested at the earliest moment. You were to receive this copy from Dr. Wise by telegram from New York. Your secretary informed me that you have not yet received it and I am, therefore, dispatching it to you by messenger.

I believe, Mr. Secretary, that the issuance of this statement promptly to the public will help to allay some of the misgivings and resentments which have already made their way into the public press. The Jewish press particularly is reacting bitterly and violently to the intervention of the State Department in the situation, and the President's position is being laid open to grave misinterpretation in view of his public pronouncement on October 15th.

Should you wish to reach me, I shall be at the Willard Hotel until this evening. With all good wishes, permit me to remain,

Very sincerely yours,

Enc.

WALTER F. GEORGE, GA., CHAIRMAN
DAVID I. WALSH, MASS.
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, KY.
TOM CONNALLY, TEX.
JOSIAH W. BAILEY, N. C.
BENNETT CHAMP CLARK, MO.
WY FLOOD BYRD, VA.
R. G. GERRY, R. I.
JOSEPH F. GUFFEY, PA.
EDWIN C. JOHNSON, COLO.
GEORGE L. RADCLIFFE, MD.
SCOTT W. LUCAS, ILL.
ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, JR., WIS.
ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG, MICH.
JAMES J. DAVIS, PA.
JOHN A. DANAHER, CONN.
ROBERT A. TAFT, OHIO
JOHN THOMAS, IDAHO
HUGH BUTLER, NEBR.
EUGENE D. MILLIKIN, COLO.
OWEN BREWSTER, MAINE

CHRISTIE B. KENNEDY, CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

January 18, 1945.

Rabbi Abba H. Silver,
The Temple,
East 105th Street at Ansel Road,
Cleveland, Ohio.

My dear Rabbi Silver:

I cannot begin to tell you how much I appreciate your thoughtful and generous note of January 15th. Commendation could come from no more appreciated source. I think you know what profound respect I have for your opinion.

I continue to deeply regret the little "unpleasantness" in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Let us hope for greater success next time. I want always to be at your service in any way I can be helpful.

With warm personal regards and best wishes,

Cordially and faithfully,



Confidential

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

April 23, 1945

Dear Dr. Wise,

Immediately on my return to the Department after talking to you this noon I requested that your letter of March 21 be handed to me personally for attention. I deeply apologize that it has not been acknowledged sooner. The letter arrived in the Department during my absence and, through inadvertence, was not referred to me when I returned.

You know I am sure, that I desire to do anything I can to be helpful to you. In this instance, however, it is not possible for me to encourage you to send representatives to San Francisco and I believe you will agree with me when I explain the matter to you.

As we have said publicly the San Francisco Conference is limited solely to the preparation of a Charter for the new International Organization for Peace and Security which will be submitted for ratification in the various countries of the world in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. To put the matter another way, the Conference at San Francisco is not designed to be a peace conference in any sense of the word. Questions of boundaries, the future disposition of any specific territories and like questions emerging from the war are not within the province of the Conference. In view thereof, I believe you will agree with me when I say that it would not seem appropriate for the Palestine question to be raised at San Francisco.

I know this will be disappointing to you but trust, in view of the explanation I have given, you will understand.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

ED (signed) *(Stettinius)*

Dr. Stephen S. Wise
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, N.Y.

Tawst
Mr. Brown, Asst. to the Secretary, advised that Dr. Goldman's memorandum " was not quite in accordance with the Secretary's record".

f Stett
Mr. Brown had not talked with Secretary Stettinius himself regarding the statement that Stettinius made to Drs. Wise and Goldman, but had talked with several other people in the Department and reported back " it was not quite in accordance with the Secretary's record".

"The Secretary told Dr. Wise that he had been in touch with the President as he had offered to do regarding the statement which Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver had requested him to make. The reaction that Mr. Stettinius obtained was that the President felt that this group should have confidence in his handling of the matter and that it would not be appropriate for Mr. Stettinius to issue the statement".

"Mr. Stettinius asked Dr. Wise if he would be good enough to give this information to Dr. Silver."

WRHS



Goldman

Mr. Brown, assistant to the
Secretary of State, advised that Mr.
"Goldman's memorandum" was not
quite in accordance with the
Secretary's record."

"The Secretary told Mr. Wine that
he had been in touch with the
President as he had offered to do
regarding the statement which
Mr. Wine and Mr. Silver had
requested him to make. The
reaction that Mr. Stettinius
obtained was that the
President felt that this
group should have confidence
in his handling of the

matter and that it would
not be appropriate for Mr.
Stettinius to issue the
statement.

" Mr. Stettinius asked Mr.
Wise if he would be good enough
to give this information to
Mr. Silver."



July 21 1946
1/ 1/2 hr - more cordial - learned -
2/ Raids - Arrests - ^{(Fishman) - not terrorist} ~~sympathy~~ ^{promoter - how to end it} - had not been in prison.

Learned 9 of on day they occurred -

Device to achieve further delay - 30 days -

We ask him to intervene - off-record 'he had
already done so - Used various channels.

Perturbed at consequences on delicate situation in
Middle East - Rumor - Conf. in Paris - May
lead to war loc. of oil. - They are all
tied together - China is "on handkerchief"

3/ 100,000. - We requested him - 10 months old. - Firm
- We asked him - whether - he had given clear direction -

- Whether on his opinion - work in 1946 - Yes.
- ~~Atlee accepts 100,000~~ - Means to it at any time
- Spoke of Report - fine document

- asked whether he would give a statement - (Nile)
- ① Express regret ② Not been consulted ③ will make
it for release - normal.

no delay in pushing forward with policy, 100,000
① Referred to his statement when made, Report

⑤ Was prepared to assume technical & financial
resp. for the transportation ⑥ Thank to Agency

"Wish would be" my letters enclosed in letter Jan 14
- Re: financial matters - transfer & will be over

MEMORANDUM

To

Date

From

WRHS



July 2, 1946

Memorandum

Visit to Mr. Truman

(3) 50.000 - 10.000

(3) 100.000 - 20.000

100.000 - 20.000

100.000 - 20.000

4/ We issued in our name a statement (Yiddish)

5/ From this we learned - feels less - phew. the
O.S.B. draft demand for military and

(2) Help for Arab ~~set~~ educations

(3) 20.000 - 10.000

6/ Six Am. members



From

To

Date

MEMORANDUM

11/10/46

Returned to Dr. Silver

State N

הנהלות מדיניות.

א. היהודים בארצם הם אומה עצמאית וממשיכים לבנות ביתם הלאומי ברשות עצמם.

ב. כוח המנדט הבריטי פקע, לאחר שממשלת המנדט הפרה התחייבותיה לעם העברי ולחבר הלאומים, קבעה בארץ משטר זרזן וטירור, חיללה את הדת היהודית, תקפה את נציגות העם היהודי והתנפלה על הישוב.

ג. כל השטח הקודם של המנדט הבריטי משני עברי הירדן, אשר חוספה עליו קדושה היסטורית, צריך להקבע ע"י האומות המאוחדות כשטח נייטרלי לצמיתות. שום צבא זר של מדינה גדולה וקטנה, קרובה ורחוקה, אינו רשאי להנחות בשטח זה, לעבור אותו, להקים בו בקביעות או לשעה, שום בסיס צבאי, ימי ואווירי, בשום חנאי ושום זמן, לא בימי שלום ולא בימי מלחמה.

ד. שתי מדינות חפשיה ועצמאיות, יהודה ועבדאליה, יוקמו בשטח זה, אשר יספקו את השאיפות המוצדקות של שני העמים. שני העמים יבואו מיד בדברים על חיקון הגבולות, שנקבעו באופן מלאכותי ע"י ממשלת המנדט בעבר, והפכו את מדינת עבר הירדן לפיקציה שאינה אלא כסות לשלטון בריטי. עבדאליה תקבל שטח רצוף, נושב כולו ערבים במאכזה של א"י המערבית, ויהודה תקבל בתמורה שטחים בלתי מיושבים במזרח - בעמק הירדן ובסביבות ים-המלח בעבר הירדן, באופן ששתי המדינות תהיינה בנוות קימה ועצמאיות למעשה.

ה. כל אחת משתי המדינות הללו תקבע ברשות עצמה את חוקי העליה וההתישבות בארצה.

ו. במקרה שהיהודים והערבים בשטח המנדט הקודם לא יבואו באיזון שאלה שהיא לידי הסכמה - ימסר העניין לבוררות לשלש או חמש מדינות קטנות ובלתי מעוניינות, שאין להם שום אינטרסים פרטיים בא"י, באופן ישר או בעקיפין. האומות המאוחדות יערבו על קיום פסק הבוררות.

1. המקומות הקדושים של הנוצרים ימסרו לפיקוחם של נציגי שלוש הדתות הנוצריות: - קטולים, פרוטסטנטים ויוונים-אורתודוכסים.
 2. שתי המדינות בשטח המנדט הקודם לא יחזיקו שום צבא - אלא מיליציה בלבד, לשם שמירת הבטחון הפנימי, מכיון שבטחונן ההיצוני מובטח בארץ ניטרלית ע"י כל האומות המאוחדות.
- שתי המדינות יכולות מתוך הסכם חרדי לנהל במשותף על יסוּחַשֶׁל שוויון גמור כל ענין כללי הנוגע לכל שטח המנדט הקודם, כגון פיתוח חקלאי, השקאה, מכס וכדומה.

ניו-יורק, 19 ביולי, 1946.

ד.ב.ג.



Extracts From Letter Received From London, dated
July 28, 1946

You cannot imagine my consternation ----- The Americans were going about quietly to accept everything the British suggested. There were a few minor skirmishes going on in the financial sub-committee but nothing serious. To say that Grady was acting as a British "stooge" is a gross understatement. He was actually publicly reprimanding his staff for venturing to differ with the British even over secondary matters. In private he explained to them that there were things more important in Anglo-American relations than the question whether 100,000 Jews were admitted to Palestine.

Gaston folded up like an accordion. Dorr has merely made a public fool of himself. The staff has been somewhat better. Hanna, some days ago, recommended that the Americans formally break off negotiations over the 100,000 and go home. Mikesell has taken the same line and has tried - against Grady's and Gaston's sabotage to fight out some financial issues. Villard has also filed a memorandum of protest against the July 24 submissions to the two Governments. Even Rood says, "Wee fight the skirmishes but cede all the battles."

It is impossible for you to go too far in emphasizing to our friends and to the press the complete abandonment of the President's declared program by Grady. I assure you that I write with measured words and in full knowledge. For instance, when the British were veering toward suggesting a starting rate of 10,000 per month, Grady broke in to indicate that 6,000 would be quite enough. There are a score of such incidents. The British simply have not been pressed to go ahead with the 100,000, to grant the area of Jewish settlement adequate frontiers, to give the proposed provinces any real power, or anything of the kind. Grady merely says that there is a strong Jewish lobby in Washington but that Truman exaggerates its voting strength: he, Grady, is going to ignore it.

copy

AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE
MEMORANDUM

DATE: September 6, 1946


TO: Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

FROM: David R. Wahl *[Signature]*

SUBJECT:

On the advice of Harold Manson, whom I saw yesterday in New York, I am undertaking to send memos directly to you on activities of mine which impinge on areas of interest to you. A few days ago, Robert Hannegan's office got in touch with me in connection with their concern over the Jewish vote in New York State. As a result of that conversation, I spoke with Harold Manson, Bartley Crum, and several people on the Democratic National Committee. The attached memo is now receiving the attention of Robert Hannegan and several other selected individuals in the administration. There will probably be some developments following from this on which I will inform you currently. In connection with your visit to Secretary Wallace on Friday, September 20 at 3:30, I should like to have some discussions with you beforehand. It would be desirable, before seeing Wallace, that you spend about one-half hour or an hour with Harold Young who is the solicitor of the Commerce Department and Wallace's most trusted advisor.

Best regards.



September 6, 1946

The Jewish vote in New York, as of this moment, is a vote which will go into the Republican pocket only because the Jewish population of New York is using it as its only method of fighting back against an administration which they think has failed them with respect to Palestine. A tragic situation of confusion and misunderstanding has thus arisen. Praiseworthy actions of the administration, because they are concealed from the voters, are actually driving voters into the opposition camp while those actions, if made public would gain votes and obtain tremendous political support for the administration. Two steps could be taken which could turn the tide: (1) To make known the real position taken by the President vis-a-vis Attlee, which is understood to be, in effect, that the President will have no part of the Grady-Morrison report, and in fact will not consider any kind of plan for Palestine which does not include the pre-condition of the immediate granting of 100,000 certificates, nor will the President consider any plan of the partition, etc. which does not meet with the complete favor of the American Jewish community and the Palestine Jewish community. Though it is understood that the President has made these statements to Attlee, no public announcement has been made to this effect, and, so far as the American public can know, the President has not taken this forthright stand. The President is said to have delayed in making his position known to American voters because of exigencies of Anglo-American-Soviet negotiations, and a desire on his part, upon the advice of Byrnes, not to rock the boat with what would seem to be a smaller issue. However, enough information about the President's position has become known to informed persons in the United States and abroad so that this country's position is no diplomatic secret, while the issue of the

attitude of New York and other American voters has grown to be of major importance. Therefore point 1, in salvaging the New York vote for the Party, would call for a very clear, strong stand upon the part of the President in the form of a public statement or an open letter from himself to the British Government.

(2) There has been an unfortunate lack of liaison between the White House and official authoritative leadership of the American Jewish community. The most important and authoritative elected official in Jewish life in America is Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, who is the elected President of the Zionist Organization of America and Co-Chairman of the Emergency Zionist Council. He is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Since he is by far the most influential leader and spokesman in American Jewish life, it would be most desirable, and in fact essential, that there be continuing opportunities for the President and Silver to confer to the extent that the President would be able to hear directly from Silver or his deputy the most representative thinking of the American Jewish community, and Silver would be able to pass on to the Jewish community authoritative and authorized reports of the President's attitudes, statements, and activities with respect to matters of great interest to them.

There has been an unfortunate voicing of the myth that Silver is closely tied to the Republican party, and particularly Senator Taft. This is definitely not so. If these two steps are taken at the present time, it is possible that Silver's impressive leadership in American Jewish life can be made an important political factor accruing to the

advantage of the Democratic party. It should be borne in mind that in October there will be the national convention of the Zionist Organization of America in Atlantic City. In November there will be the World Zionist Congress session in Switzerland. In both of these places Rabbi Silver's voice will be the definitive voice in policy making; therefore, the above outlined steps should be taken at the earliest possible moment. It is specifically recommended that Paul Fitzpatrick be the person to arrange for a meeting with Silver and the President in the near future to establish the relationship.

In addition to the above two-point program, there is one specific act which would have a dramatic and immediately calculable value with respect to the Jewish vote. That would be a public statement that Loy Henderson had been removed or transferred from his present position.

Dr. Silov

In Re Loan

August 7, 1946

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Mr. Harry Shapiro, Executive Director
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Shapiro:

In connection with the British loan controversy, it was suggested to me that I give you the details of what Oscar Cox told us at a lunch last Saturday, August 3rd. My recital of that story is based on the combined recollections of Tuvim, Schulson and myself.

At that lunch, Cox told us that Acheson had informed him that Congressman Bloom had violently expressed his opposition to the British loan in a talk with Mr. Balfour, the British Minister in Washington. Balfour was very perturbed by Bloom's emphatic stand and took the matter up with Acheson. The State Department people tried to budge Mr. Bloom but couldn't. Acheson had asked Cox to try to persuade him, but Cox did not want to get involved in the matter and refrained from making any such promise. The State Department people had even thought at that stage of asking the President to press Bloom to change his attitude, but apparently that became unnecessary after the consultations between Bloom and Dr. Wise.

This information jives very much with what Mr. Graham, the publisher of the WASHINGTON POST, told me when I saw him on July 8th. He said that Bloom had been very vehement against the British loan, and that the Department of State then got in touch with Dr. Wise, who persuaded Bloom to change his stand.

Sincerely yours,

Benjamin Akzin

BA:cw

MEMORANDUM - THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1946

INTERVIEW WITH MR. ERNEST BEVIN IN THE PRESENCE OF LORD INVERCHAPEL AT THE WALDORF ASTORIA

3:30 to 4:20 P.M.

I greeted Mr. Bevin by saying that I should like to meet the man whom I have been attacking so much. Mr. Bevin spent most of the time defending the position of his government, criticising the failure of the Jews to cooperate, and especially criticised the American Government for utilizing the Palestine issue in connection with its own election needs.

His government had tried to do all that it could. It had continued Jewish immigration at the rate of 1500 a month in spite of the White Paper and his government was by way of making a satisfactory solution when the President intervened with his request for 100,000 which threw the whole Arab world into a turmoil.

He was critical of the resistance in Palestine, illegal immigration and acts of terrorism with which the Agency at times was associated, and which made it necessary for England to keep troops in Palestine which should have been demobilized long ago. He resented the fact that a good deal of the financing of illegal immigration came from the United States. His government had recently made another gesture of good will by releasing the prisoners from Latrun and elsewhere. He implied that there has not been a corresponding move on the part of the Yishuv. As a result of what was happening in Palestine, the killing of British soldiers, etc., anti-Semitism is growing among the common people in England.

His government was beset with many grave problems all over the world and we should have been more patient with it. The Balfour Declaration had made commitments to both peoples of Palestine, a national home to the Jews, and the protection of their rights to the Arabs. This made the solution of the problem very difficult. A Jewish State was never promised to the Jews.

The British Government is trying to solve the problem. If it fails, it will have to submit the whole issue to U.N.O. He himself stakes his political career on the proper solution of the problem. He will not, however, yield to force majeure.

He looked upon the Grady-Morrison proposals as the implementation of the Anglo-American Committee Report. His government wants these proposals to be on the agenda when the London Conference reconvenes. He was aware of the Agency's proposal for partition. The Agency is free to present and to discuss its proposal at the Conference. His government did not have a closed mind on the subject. It is prepared to consider it.

I took occasion, of course, throughout the interview to refute and correct some of Mr. Bevin's statements, which was not difficult to do. I need not restate them here. The answers would readily suggest themselves to any well-informed Zionist. I did take occasion to point out how the American people felt about the whole matter, and the terrible misconception that many in England seem to be laboring under — that the subject of Palestine is only a by-product of American political campaigns. This is a dangerously misleading piece of propaganda which will make sound political thinking and action on the subject impossible. The American people, not to speak of the American Jews, are determined to keep this issue alive until a just solution is arrived at.

I carried away the following impressions with me from the interview:

1) Mr. Bevin is deeply disturbed and deeply concerned about the whole problem. It has gotten under his skin. He knows more about it now than he did when he spoke so cavalierly about the entire subject a year ago. There is still much that he does not know about it.

2) He does not seem to have a clear plan in his own mind. His confidence in the Morrison-Grady Plan as a solution seems to be pretty well shaken. He will probably not insist upon it as a basis for discussion when and if the London Conference reconvenes. He does not yet seem to be prepared to accept the Agency proposal as a basis for discussion. He expressed no criticism of the Agency proposal and repeated two or three times during the interview that they have an open mind on it and that they are prepared to consider it.

3) Pressure from America, while it is greatly resented, is very much present in Mr. Bevin's mind. He is not under-estimating its importance. Should the American Government very firmly and determinately now begin to insist upon a quick and satisfactory solution, Mr. Bevin would be clearly urged on to a definitive solution he does not wish to make at this time.

4) He is very anxious for the Jewish Agency to come to the London Conference.



Wed, Nov. 20-46.

10-10-45

/7

Revin - Inverchapel.

- 1/ At outset B showed me "Formula" dated Sep. 18-46 sent by G.B. - stating that J. Ag. - could attend London Conf. - to discuss solution of the problem (not conditions! of Partition or basis for discussion) - asked me - whether I knew anything about it. Told him we knew only of letter from C.W. to Ball - where conditions were clearly stated. Told him that ~~not~~ no one had any authority to ~~write~~ such a formula.
- 2/ Read letter from C.W. to Ball.
- 3/ Said he is not yet prepared to give an answer to before consulting Cabinet.
- 4/ Told him what situation would be at Agency - G.B. had not accepted Anglo-Am. Com. Report. - G.B. was unwilling to implement full purpose of mandate - a J. Nat. Plan in White, SO - only - more proposals - reported by Amos - said to J. Agency. - and if Agency proposes are not accepted

in principle by F.B. - there would be nothing
left for Congress to do but to update
Section 7 Executive Order which many (as we discussed
were taken without proper authorization and were
totally unwise) - reaffirm all full legal
rights - ~~and the situation refers to~~ to
London Conf - and situation would continue
in the present tragic state with.

5/ B. said that F.B. had very much on his
mind on Palestine.

6/ L. Dr. asked whether ~~indicators~~ I meant
that F.B. should indicate in writing that
it accepted statement given etc. I said
that that is not the essential factor. Any
clear indications ~~given to~~ agreement
given to me or any leader of the movement
would serve the purpose. I assumed that
no such indications would be given unless
B. felt had made up his mind and an-
nounced it.

7/ ~~They~~ B. again said that he would assault
the Librarians. (3)

8/ B. spoke, Arab ~~for~~ Jew crowding into
that country - (Jewish). I said that Arab
had no reason to complain / crowding. They
had 1 million of under-employment -

(a) 5 Arab states steal since war. One
carved out of Pal - what did they do
in war? Jews flee! Not
Jews! Lost 6 M - 10 times a day
(a) S.B. O.V.S. put top 4 lines

Why do they not entitled to a state then and

9/ ^{B.} 8/ B. disturbances - mentioned Shitok.
I said could it freeze - Shitok no pull
They are Jews people - Israel democrats
- and it is these who you gave has set
out to crush

10) I mentioned effort for JSD to finally carry (4)
B. said "it is much better now"

I reminded him that JSD & J.A. will not
be able to do it alone - They must be
helped by proper pol. action in part
lead to stop Tenn - for donors P.

11) I urged that a campaign statesmanhood is
now indicated. H, B. - should talk to institution
in backing log - Jan -

12) Am. is supposed to go along - Econ. effort

(Do you really wish Amer. unilateral effort?)

Yes in the corner!

would very much like U.S. to talk as unilateral
as U.N. - I would like, P.B. seems
entirely on this now.

13) Just was P.B. - but J.B. was less

G.B. was U.S. - & Just was a confused
factor. - We wish to do together! G.B. must
make it possible.

Grosvenor Hotel
London, England
January 29, 1947

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio -- U.S.A.

Dear Dr. Silver:

Following is the account of today's meeting between leaders of the British Government and of the Jewish Agency, as reported to me by Emanuel Neumann:

The meeting lasted approximately two ^{and a half} hours. ~~from 2:30 until 5:00~~ Present were: For the British Government--Bevin, Creech-Jones, and various officials of both the Colonial and Foreign Office, including Brook, Sir Douglas Harris, etc. For the Jewish Agency--Ben-Gurion, who led the delegation, Neumann, Shertok, Brodetsky, Locker, Goldmann, as well as a few members of the Agency staff.

Creech-Jones presided. In his opening statement he avoided any suggestion that this meeting was part of the formal Conference on Palestine now going on. He described it as another occasion for consultation with the Jewish Agency, at which the difficulties involved in any proposed solution would be examined. In the course of his opening remarks, Creech-Jones referred to partition as one of the proposed solutions and mentioned the difficulties that one must consider in connection with such a proposal.

Bevin was to follow Creech-Jones, but he indicated that he was prepared to wait and listen. Ben-Gurion then took the floor. He stressed that we have two objects in view: 1) to secure the return of Jews to Palestine; 2) to develop Palestine in the interest of the Jews, & of the Near East as a whole. He also emphasized that we have independence in view. He said that the Congress did not preclude our considering any proposal that may be made to us regarding a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine. That if such a proposal for a really viable Jewish State in a really adequate area were made to us, we would submit it to our people for favorable consideration. He made it clear, however, that our view is that the whole of Western Palestine should become a Jewish State with a Jewish majority. He said that 1,200,000 Jews need to emigrate to Palestine.

14/ G. had been approached about part time under
Conf. He would not be opposed to it at all - due
to pressure of work

15/ Will see Ray Byers about Pol. Matter.

16/ Hopes to leave on 29th

17/ L. M. will contact one - if there is anything to
report


18/ Refers to him to handle when I am in town

19/ Refers to him to handle when I am in town
told a few jokes

20/ Refers to him to handle when I am in town
told a few jokes

21/ Refers to him to handle a close kindred people
told him, friendly relation
but these people all their centuries - will
again be friends - when Sp. Nat. Assembly
will be organized

22/ Read to B. Statement of John P. as P. (as)



HOTEL COMMODORE

"NEW YORK'S BEST LOCATED HOTEL"

CABLE ADDRESS
"CODORE" NEW YORK

42ND STREET ★ RIGHT AT GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL ★ NEW YORK 17, N.Y.

Nov.
Dec. 1944 - It said - it sounds like Harold
Larke - it ^{def} ~~is~~ ^{was} ~~not~~ ^{committed} ~~to~~ ^{being} ~~any~~ ^{thing} ~~more~~ ^{on} ~~subject~~ ^{subject} -

21/ Told B - Formal Conf will lead to no reports
unless there are further ~~agreements~~ ^{agreements} ~~substantiated~~ ^{substantiated}.
Only he did not want us to go there without
of prospect of sales. Settlement as well as by tel.
P. subject is not new. All for good on
Kumar - for year now - For new arguments,
an Q by the President. It is all important
for F.B. to work up to united + btas
Kumar -

22/ I mentioned that some Gov State favor
Penthouse. B said that he made careful inquiry
and could not find a clear favorable stand. I
told him that since F.B. to S. announce it
on their policy - the Gov State will require

Then Bevin spoke. His remarks were not well-organized, and he touched on many things including partition, which he spoke about in a negative way. He said: (The words are those used by Bevin, so far as Neumann can recall) "Just what partition scheme do you have in mind? Put all your cards on the table face up; don't keep any up your sleeve. If there's any proposal for partition, let's hear it."

But at the same time Bevin indicated clearly that he was not a believer in partition. He stressed that a "viable Jewish State" will not permit the development of a "viable Arab State" in Palestine. He indicated a strong preference for what he termed a "bignational state," but which turned out to be a scheme of federalization -- a unitary state with provinces having a large measure of autonomy. In the Jewish area there would be opportunity for immigration (both Bevin and Creech-Jones indicated that they were prepared to go beyond the Morrison Plan in this regard), but a central Federal Government (British, of course) would take care of services for the whole country.

With regard to partition Bevin also said that he did not think the U.N. would support such a solution. This was answered by Goldmann, who pointed out that a solution having the support of the U.S. and the Jews would certainly be upheld by a 2/3 majority in UN.

Both Bevin and Creech-Jones said that they could not go back to the Mandate, which Brook ~~defined~~ explained as meaning that they could not go back to the Mandate "as it was." In this connection Creech-Jones made some fine comments like : there is now an alien government imposed upon unwilling peoples...the situation is intolerable... and the Mandate in its old form could not be continued. If continued at all, it would have to be modified considerably.

Neumann then pointed out that the basic question involved was : ~~Is~~ Are Jewish immigration and Jewish development to be dependent on Arab consent? He pointed out that the Arabs will oppose anything that permits of such immigration and development.

Then Bevin ~~said some vigorous things about~~ made a number of vigorous and uncomplimentary references to America's role. He said that he had been quite prepared to accept all 10 recommendations of the "American Committee of Inquiry," but that America wanted only immigration. He referred to the Committee of Inquiry twice as an "American" committee, until Neumann reminded him that it was an Anglo -American Committee.

In the course of his remarks about America Bevin said that Roosevelt had made promises to both the Arabs and the Jews, and that some of Roosevelt's promises to the Arabs went further than any commitments which he, Bevin, had made -- which was embarrassing to him.

Shertok pointed out to Bevin that as "an old negotiator" he surely understands that it is not easy for us to put forward any proposal without the slightest assurance that it will be taken up. Shertok pointed out that this would involve a waiver of our historic rights, etc

Creech-Jones replied emphatically that he understands ~~Shertok's~~ this point of view, but that we should not worry, there are no tricks, "it is entirely without prejudice," it is simply a matter of exploring the possibilities.

Both Bevin and Creech-Jones pressed our people to give serious consideration to the idea of a unitary state -- without a definitive partition -- in order to see if the problem could not be worked out on that basis. Creech-Jones urged our people to state at least the principles regarding partition: "what are the elements required to make it a viable Jewish State?" Creech-Jones also wanted to know exactly what were our objections to the Morrison Plan. Could we give him an analysis stating our views, as well as an analysis of the Arab proposals and of "other plans."

Our people stressed the urgent need for immediate immigration, pointing out that without such immigration the tensions will increase and greater catastrophes may result. Creech-Jones stated that this question was very much on his mind and that the Government might consider interim measures, ~~to deal with it.~~

The meeting ended at that point. Ben-Gurion and the British leaders agreed on next Monday, February 3, as the date of the next talk. Neumann, Shertok and Brook drafted the official communique of the meeting.

Neumann says that he thinks Creech-Jones is a decent, sincere man. ---It is significant that there was no discussion whatever of the present situation-~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ in Palestine -- suppression of terrorism, etc.

~~XXXXXX~~

We have received the following additional information which we regard as reliable:

- 1) Bevin is reported to have told the Arabs informally (at a reception) that he favors a cantonization plan.
have reached London
- 2) Reports ~~of a completed~~ that a completed plan for cantonization is in the hands of British officials in the Middle East.

With kind regards, I am

Cordially yours,

Harold P. Manson

Harold P. Manson

CONFIDENTIAL

I called on Senator Taft at his office in Washington on Wednesday, April 26, at which time I raised the subject of the introduction of the Palestine plank in the Republican Platform. Senator Taft seemed agreeable to the idea and stated that in all likelihood, he would have much to do with the drafting of the Platform.

At that time Senator Taft suggested that I see Mr. Dewey and elicit his opinion. On Tuesday, May 2, I saw Attorney General Nathaniel L. Goldstein of New York, and told him of the conversation which I had with Senator Taft, and the advisability of eliciting an opinion from Mr. Dewey. Mr. Goldstein was very friendly to the idea and said that he would arrange a meeting between Mr. Dewey and myself. On May 5, I wrote to Senator Taft and told him of my meeting with Attorney General Goldstein and of the contemplated contact with Mr. Dewey. On May 19 I received a letter from Senator Taft stating that he is drafting the Palestine plank and that I would have an opportunity of seeing a copy of it before he went to Chicago. The thought was that the Senator's plank would follow closely the Resolution which he introduced in the Senate. He suggested, furthermore, that we do not agitate publicly for it.

On June 1, in company of Attorney General Nathaniel Goldstein, I met Governor Dewey at Hotel Roosevelt in New York. I told him of our hope that a Palestine plank would be included in the Republican Platform and I showed him the Resolution which had been introduced in Congress. Governor Dewey read it very carefully and said: "I agree most heartily." He said he would talk to Senator Taft about it in a few days when he planned to see him. On June 2 I wrote to Senator Taft and told him of the meeting which I had with Governor Dewey in New York.

In order to indicate to the Senator more definitely the kind of a plank we would prefer, I had Mr. Herman Shulman draft a plank which I sent on to the Senator on June 9. (See Exhibit A)

In the meantime, Attorney General Goldstein suggested that we publish an attractive folder on Palestine to be distributed among the delegates and members of the Resolutions Committee who would attend the Republican Convention. He requested that a statement of his on Palestine be included, among others, feeling that that would give the endorsement of an important Republican leader to the cause. This booklet was published and distributed. (See Exhibit B)

On June 16, Mr. Harrison E. Spangler, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, telephoned me from Chicago and invited me to deliver the invocation at the session of the Republican Convention on Tuesday, June 27. I accepted. The invitation was confirmed in a telegram and letter on June 20. The Resolutions Committee of the Republican Convention met in Chicago beginning Wednesday, June 21. I arrived in Chicago that morning, together with the staff from our office including Mr. Manson, Mr. Leo Sack, Mr. Elihu Stone. We stopped at the Shoreland Hotel, a considerable distance away from the headquarters of the Convention which were at the Stevens Hotel downtown. Our purpose was first not to give the impression of a lobby and secondly not to announce our presence in such a way as to arouse any possible opposition on the part of anti-Zionist forces in the country who might have bombarded the Resolutions Committee with telegrams, etc. urging it not to adopt any Palestine plank. I remained in Chicago for the 21 and 22, going to Cincinnati to attend the sessions of the Central Conference of American Rabbis over the week-end and

returned to Chicago Monday morning, June 26 and remained until after the Platform was announced and approved by the Convention.

On the 21st and 22nd, I saw Senator Taft who gave us the names of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and of the Drafting Committee who might be contacted. I spoke with Attorney General Goldstein long distance to Albany (the Attorney General did not arrive until Sunday morning) suggesting that it would be advisable for Governor Dewey to telephone to his campaign manager in Chicago, Mr. Brownell, and through him to his other representatives that the Palestine plank must be inserted in the Platform. I called upon Mr. Brownell, and at that very time the Governor called him up and spoke to him about our plank. Mr. Brownell indicated that there would be no difficulties at all. I also saw Mrs. Anna McCormack Simms, a leader of the Dewey forces in the Mid-west. Mr. Manson, Mr. Sack and Mr. Stone interviewed quite a number of other leaders including Miss Mary Donlon, Senator Austin of Vermont, William L. Hutchison of Indiana, Representative Joseph W. Martin of Mass. who was the permanent chairman of the Convention, Mr. McCaffery of New York, Senator Danaher of Conn. and quite a number of others.

When I left at midnight on Thursday, June 22, the situation was well in hand. But it had completely changed when I had returned to Chicago on June 26. Opposition to our plank had developed. Numerous changes in the plank were suggested. The original authors of these suggestions were not always revealed to us. It may well be that some anti-Zionists had made their opposition known to Mr. Goldstein. It may also be that opposition developed among the members of the Drafting Committee. But by Monday morning, our representatives in Chicago received two substitute drafts which the Committee was prepared to act upon, one prepared by Miss Mary Donlon (Exhibit C) which was completely negative and worthless. The other one was given by Senator Taft to Mr. Leo Sack (Exhibit D) which omitted reference to "Commonwealth."

Upon my being informed of the situation, I called Attorney General Goldstein and told him that these substitute planks were untirely unsatisfactory, that they would insure the defeat of the Palestine Resolutions pending in Congress because if the Republican Party was not prepared to refer to "Commonwealth" in a Party Platform which is, after all, not legislation, its representatives in Congress would certainly not feel inclined to vote for a "Commonwealth" in a Congressional resolution. I told him that rather than have that kind of a negative resolution I would prefer none at all, and that if a revised resolution such as was presented is insisted upon, I should have to leave the Convention and not participate in the Tuesday evening program. The Attorney General said he would re-canvass the situation and let me know. At the same time I got in touch with Senator Taft and expressed my misgivings. I told him that I would send down to him a revised draft of the resolution which I thought would meet the situation, although preferring the original draft which I submitted to him on June 9. My revised draft (Exhibit E) and the accompanying letter (Exhibit F) are appended herewith.

At 10:15 that morning, I telephoned Dr. Wise in New York, read to him Senator Taft's draft which eliminated the "Jewish Commonwealth" and asked him whether failing to obtain the inclusion of "Commonwealth" in the draft we should accept Taft's draft, or reject it and have no plank at all. It was Dr. Wise's

thought that the Taft Resolution, while it does not go as far as we should like, should not be turned down if we cannot get the "Commonwealth" resolution.

At 12:30 Monday noon, Mr. Dulles, who is political adviser to Mr. Dewey, telephoned me, evidently at the suggestion of Mr. Goldstein, to discuss with me the proposed revised resolution. He read it to me over the telephone, and what he read was another revision of the Taft resolution eliminating "unrestricted immigration" and substituting the word "constitute" for "reconstitute." He argued that no nation had unrestricted immigration and that if the Jews had a state of their own they would not accept such a principle. To meet his suggestion, I suggested that the sentence should read "in order to give refuge to millions of Jewish men, women and children" (instead of men, women and children).... "we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration" (instead of to unrestricted immigration.) He also announced for the first time the intention of the Resolutions Committee to include in the resolution a condemnation of the President because of his failure to insist that the mandatory of Palestine should carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration in its Mandate while he pretends to support them. I urged Mr. Dulles not to include that sentence as it was unnecessary and provocative. His reply was that that was not the concern of us, but of the Republican Party. This was not a resolution which the Zionists were adopting, but which the Republican Party was adopting and that it was their right to express themselves on the weaknesses of the present Administration if they so wished.

The draft of the resolution as submitted by Mr. Dulles over the telephone Monday morning is appended here as Exhibit G.

This was the situation as of Monday evening. The Resolutions Committee and the Drafting Committee met to the early hours of Tuesday morning. Towards the close of its long deliberations on the Platform, the Palestine plank came up for discussion and here strenuous opposition developed to the resolution at the hands of Senator Danaher of Conn. who was opposed to the "commonwealth" clause and also to our telling Great Britain what to do in a matter which really did not concern us. Senator Danaher was a problem to us in Washington. As a result of his objections, our plank was tabled, and as of Tuesday morning there was no resolution on Palestine to be included in the Platform. (This information was conveyed to us early Tuesday morning by Attorney General Goldstein.)

On Tuesday morning, the entire Resolutions Committee reconvened at ten o'clock. I got in touch with Mr. Brownell and apprised him of the situation. He said that he would get in touch immediately with their supporters on the Resolutions Committee. We telephoned about extensively to members of the Resolutions Committee whom we believed to be our friends. The situation lined itself up as follows: We could have a resolution such as was shown to us by Senator Taft passed, but this would exclude any reference to "commonwealth" and would endanger our position in Congress; or we could ask that no resolution at all on Palestine be introduced. In spite of the opposition which had developed, I felt that our position in the general political picture was strong, that the Republican Party leaders knew that it was worthwhile to consider the desires of the Jewish citizens of America. I therefore took the chance and the responsibility to notify Senator Taft that unless the term "commonwealth" were included in the resolution, I preferred that no resolution at all be adopted. I dictated a letter to him which I sent down with Mr. Leo Sack around 10:30 Tuesday morning. It is herewith appended as

Exhibit H.

At noon, I went down to the Hotel Stevens where the Resolutions Committee was in session. Shortly after I arrived, the Resolutions Committee adjourned its meeting. We were then apprised that our resolution came up for discussion, that Senator Danaher had opposed it, that Alfred Landon of Kansas, Miss Mary Donlon, Mr. McCaffer of New York and others spoke enthusiastically for it and that the Resolutions Committee approved of it and authorized the Drafting Committee to make the final revisions which would meet some of the objections raised.

At three o'clock, Senator Taft gave us the final draft of the resolution which is appended as Exhibit I.



EXHIBIT "A"

Draft of plank by Mr. Herman Shulman submitted to
Senator Taft.

In this most tragic hour for the Jewish people of Europe, of whom millions of innocent men, women and children have been brutally massacred by the Nazis, we favor the taking of immediate and effective measures to rescue those who still survive, and in accordance with the traditional American policy we call for the opening of the doors of Palestine to the free entry of Jews into that country and for the granting to them of full opportunity for colonization and settlement so that Palestine may be reconstituted as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth, in which all its inhabitants shall enjoy religious, cultural and civic equality, and in which the holy places, a heritage to mankind, will be fully safeguarded.




EXHIBIT "C"

Substitute draft prepared by Miss Mary Donlon

In order to give refuge to millions of Jewish people driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of the doors of Palestine to the entry of Jews into that country and for the granting to them of opportunity for colonization and settlement.



EXHIBIT "D"

Revised Draft By Senator Robert A. Taft - given to
Mr. Leo Sack on June 25, 1944

PALESTINE

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and land ownership and the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, all in accord with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of Congress adopted in 1922. We call on the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration contained in its Mandate.




EXHIBIT "E"

Dr. Silver's revised draft to Senator Taft
Submitted Monday morning, June 26

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and land ownership, so that the Jewish people may, in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of Congress adopted in 1922, reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth. We call on the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate.




EXHIBIT "F"

Letter sent by Dr. Silver to Senator Taft enclosing
revised draft.

June 26, 1944

Hon. Robert A. Taft
Stevens Hotel
Chicago, Ill.

My dear Senator Taft:

I am enclosing herewith the revised draft which I think meets the objections which have been raised, and at the same time does not do harm to the chances of the resolutions still pending in Congress. I am following closely the draft which you gave to Mr. Sack last night.

I am still of the opinion that the original draft which I sent you some time ago is the one which most adequately meets the situation and will arouse the greatest satisfaction among our people. However, use your own good judgment as to which of the two should be adopted.

I am profoundly grateful to you for your continued and loyal interest in this great cause.

Most cordially yours,

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

AHS:BP
Encs.

EXHIBIT "G"

Draft of Resolution submitted by Mr. Dulles to Dr. Silver
at 12:45 P.M. - June 26.

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that the Jewish people may, in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of the (Republican) Congress adopted in 1922, constitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth. We dondemn the failure of the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate while he pretends to support them.




EXHIBIT "H"

Letter sent by Dr. Silver to Senator Taft on June 27.

June 27, 1944

Hon. Robert A. Taft
Stevens Hotel
Chicago, Ill.

My dear Senator Taft:

I have been informed that there has developed in the drafting committee certain opposition to the inclusion of the term commonwealth.

I think it will be a serious mistake to drop the term, inasmuch as it would practically make the resolution valueless. It would also serve notice that the Republican Party has officially declared itself against the resolution which you introduced in the Senate and which is now pending, which resolution embodies the true aspirations of the Jewish people and the only practical solution for the salvation of several million of our oppressed people and for the age-old tragedy of Jewish national homelessness. The revised plank, therefore, far from being a welcome endorsement of Jewish aspirations would, indeed, be a whittling down and a repudiation.

I do not believe that the objection of one or two people ought to be sufficient to force a revision of the plank to which Governor Dewey and many of the foremost leaders of the Party have given their unqualified approval. If it is sufficient, then I would like to request that no plank on Palestine whatsoever be included in the platform. Against the present political background here and abroad, a plank which calls for less than a commonwealth is a defeat.

The American Jewish Conference, meeting last September in New York and representing organized American Jewry, voted almost unanimously for a Jewish commonwealth.

I send you my warmest greetings.

Most cordially yours,

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

AHS:BP

P.S. You may reach me at the above address (Plaza 1000) all morning.

A.H.S.

EXHIBIT "I"

Final draft of Palestine Resolution which was included in
the Republican Platform.

In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the Resolution of a Republican Congress in 1922, Palestine may be constituted as a free and democratic Commonwealth. We condemn the failure of the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provision of the Balfour Declaration and ^{of} the Mandate while he pretends to support them.



הסוכנות היהודית לארץ ישראל

The Jewish Agency for Palestine

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

August 7, 1947

To: American Section of the Executive

FROM: Arthur Lourie

I am enclosing herewith copies of talks Major Comay had with General Smuts, July 24, 1947, and Mr. Hofmeyr, July 31, 1947.

encls.