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To Recognize or Not to Recognize - The China Question, 1958.

TO RECOGNIZE OR NOT TO RECOGNIZE --

THE CHINA QUESTION

The Temple
December 14, 1958

Rabbi Daniel Jeremy Silver

The non-recognition of the People's Republic of China has been the stated policy of our United States government for ten years now. As recently as a week ago last Thursday our Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, reiterated the opposition of our government to any recognition of the People's Republic at this time. Speaking in San Francisco before a convention of foreign affairs analysts and experts, Mr. Dulles spoke these words in defense of the American policy:

Developments make it ever more clear that if we were to grant political recognition to the Chinese Communist regime, it would be a well-nigh mortal blow to the survival of the non-Communist governments in the Far East. Such recognition and the seating of the Chinese Communists in the United Nations would so increase their prestige and influence in the Far East, and so dishearten the free nations, that the Communist subversive efforts would almost surely succeed.

But it is certain that diplomatic recognition of the Chinese Communist regime would gravely jeopardize the political, the economic and the security interests of the United States. The Pacific instead of being a friendly body of water would in great part be dominated by hostile forces and our own defenses would be driven back to or about to our continental frontiers.

Three weeks ago the International Department of the National Council of Churches of Christ in America held a World Order rally in our city. This study and discussion group was attended by six hundred

delegates representing the thirty-three major Protestant denominations numbering over thirty-eight million congregants. Mr. Dulles is not only our Secretary of State but a man of high rank in the councils of the National Council of Churches of Christ. He expressed his own feeling of the importance of the deliberations and the debates of this World Order group by appearing before them on the first night of their convention to state again and to defend his formulation of American policy. After five days of meetings, these six hundred delegates came together and summarized their findings in a five thousand word report which they entitled "A Message to the Churches." In this report they rejected Mr. Dulles' contention that the non-recognition of the Chinese government is an integral and essential part of our foreign policy. In reference to this problem they wrote:

Christians should urge reconsideration by our government of its policy in regard to the People's Republic of China. While the rights of the people of Taiwan (that is, Formosa) and of the people of Korea should be safeguarded, steps should be undertaken towards the including of Red China in the United Nations and for its recognition by our government. Such recognition does not imply approval. These diplomatic relations should constitute a part of a much wider relationship between our peoples. The exclusion of the effective government on the mainland of China, currently the People's Republic of China, from the international community is in many ways a disadvantage to that community. It helps to preserve a false image of the United States and of other nations in the minds of the Chinese people. It keeps our people in ignorance of what is taking place in China. It hampers negotiations for disarmament. It limits the functioning of international organizations. We have a strong hope that the resumption of relationships between the peoples of China and of the United States may also make possible a restoration of relationships between their churches and ours.

This rejection by the World Order group of a policy of the United States Government, a policy in large measure formulated by a man high up in their own Council, should not be taken by us lightly, as it was not undertaken lightly and without a great deal of sober reflection by the

leaders of the World Order group. These men are not publicity seekers. This rejection was not done in search of newspaper headlines or some sensational news release. These six hundred delegates represented a cross-section of the most respected and substantial members of the Church community and of the professional and business communities of America, and their rejection of Mr. Dulles' non-recognition policy merits certainly our considered judgment. If I may be permitted to interpret the premises on which their rejection is based (and I have read the entire report of their message to the Churches) I would say that it is based on two main factors. The first is largely concerned with the facts of this particular situation. It is pragmatic and to the point, and it would emphasize that our current policy of non-recognition is unrealistic, that it is pointless, that it is fraught with grave danger of our involvement in a major war. And I believe that the second major premise on which they formulated this rejection of our policy of non-recognition is more general in scope, and involves their feeling that much of our current policy is overly doctrinaire, overly moralistic, too inflexible, too unrealistic, too determined to rest our search for peace on rearmament and on the power of massive retaliation, too unwilling to sit down and to negotiate bit by bit and block by block the problems which confront our people and all the peoples of the world. And I should like to discuss these two premises with you here this morning.

The People's Republic of China, which we commonly refer to as Red China, assumed the control of the Chinese mainland during a bloody civil war which ravished China between the years of 1946 and 1949. In 1945 and 1946 before the outbreak of that civil war United States policy favored neither the party and the policies of Chiang Kai Shek and his Kwomintang

nor the party and policies of Mao Tse Tung and his Communist party. We knew that both these parties were based on autocratic rule. Neither of them had been freely elected to power. Both of them tended to the tyrannical. Both of them had frustrated to a degree our efforts to combat the Japanese in China during the Second World War. We also knew that even though the Kwomintang and Chiang Kai Shek had come into power in the mid-twenties and early thirties on a policy and a platform which bespoke an atmosphere of Western liberalism, their twenty years of power had done much to shatter our hopes that they might bring needed reform and Western ideals of law and order to the Chinese people. Their years of power had been years of unbelievable venality, corruption, incompetence, and partially because of the Japanese invasion and partially because of their own limitations, partially because of their own need to seek and to grasp power, the high ideals which we had held for the party of Sun Yat Sen and later of Chiang Kai Shek had pretty well been dissipated by the facts of their rule. And so in 1945 and 1946 the American government for the most part contented itself to try to prevent a bloody and, in our view, useless civil war. We tried to arrange a coalition government which would include members of both the adherents of Mao and the adherents of Chiang. Now, intransigence on both sides brought about the failure of these negotiations, and during the early years of the civil war we for the most part kept our hands off of the Chinese situation. We saw no reason to support the one or the other. The two groups seemed to be just two more of the groups of competing war lords who for centuries have despoiled and ravished the Chinese countryside seeking the treasury and the power which rested in Peking. And we did not want, in those days when we were thinking of retrenchment and demilitariza-

tion, to involve ourselves in a hopeless Chinese morass.

It was only once the defeat of Chiang Kai Shek in 1947 and '48 was evident to all, that the United States government for the first time saw reason to involve itself and to ally itself with Chiang. And the reasons for this change of heart had remarkably little to do with the Chinese situation itself. You remember that these years, '47 and '48, were the years in which America woke up to the fact that we were in a world with countries still grasping for power, and we identified our enemy as a force which we called "international communism", and events such as the Berlin blockade and the attempts of Russia to gain access to the Mediterranean and to infiltrate the Near East - all these events caused us to ally ourselves with any party and any group in any place of our world who seemed to be opposed to forces that were communistic or were labeled communistic or espoused a Marxist doctrine. Now, historical research has pretty well shown that during these years the Russian government gave surprisingly minimal service and military help to the party of Mao and to his armies, and yet the policies which Mao Tse Tung espoused for the reconstruction of China was definitely Marxist. They were collectivists. They were dictatorial. It was based on Marx and then Lenin and Stalin, and all of a sudden we found ourselves as allies of Chiang in a holy crusade against the extension of Communism into southeast Asia. At the very moment then, when Chiang had committed his troops to a last futile battle to control the upper Yangtse Valley America threw at least its emotional support to his side, and though he was an unreconstructed war lord and nothing more, we suddenly clothed him in our minds in shining armor of a knight fighting in a holy cause. His cause became ours and his defeat became ours, and when in 1949 Mao came and his government assumed the reins of power we refused

to recognize that government because we continued to hope that situations might be remedied, that this temporary defeat might be turned into an ultimate victory and that, as Napoleon once had returned from Elba to be raised again by his cheering troops to the leadership of the French Empire, so Chiang might be returned from Formosa to the leadership of the Chinese troops and he would be able to overthrow a regime which we now had no reason to want in control of the Chinese mainland. Our hopes unfortunately proved futile. In power for twenty years, Chiang had not been able to win the loyalty and the admiration and the support of any group of the mass of the Chinese population. Out of power he seemed just another deposed war lord, and Formosa has been the traditional refuge of these war lords who have lost in the battle for the control of the throne of the empire. The Chinese people, then, were unwilling to recall to their bosom a man whom we devoutly hoped they might recall. Though we lent him our moral support, our economic support, our military support, the counterrevolution which we hoped would break out in China once the tyrannical nature of the Communist government had become self-evident, this counterrevolution was simply not to be. And I believe that most hard-headed analysts would have assumed that once the Chinese government of the People's Republic had shown its ability to stabilize the situation and to assume control of the provinces, to to put down and suppress all the dissident elements in the population - this was the moment in which the countries of the world should have recognized this government as the de facto existing government on the mainland of China. But we were adamant. We resented having our cause defeated. And though we had done in fact precious little to gain victory for the forces of Chiang, we now continued to make Chiang feel that if in time he were able to lead again an amphibious attack against the mainland or find in the mainland a

party of sympathizers who would raise him to power we were wholly and totally committed to such a policy of counterrevolution. And we continued this policy of non-recognition as our symbolic gesture to Chiang, in which we said to him, "We are with you if you can engineer a coup which will re-establish you in power."

As the years, as the days, as the months passed by any hope of Chiang's return to power diminished, and soon the United States government found itself in an anomalous position. We were committed economically by treaty, by military aid to the support of Chiang, to the defense of Formosa, and we had encouraged and encouraged again his thoughts of reconquest. But we found as we looked practically and realistically at the situation that there was little hope of this reconquest, and our military leaders told us that if Chiang were rash enough to commit his troops to the mainland it would be to a defeat. And not only would he bring defeat upon himself but he would involve us in a Chinese war which we lacked the manpower to prosecute successfully, and even if we were able to prosecute successfully would inevitably involve us in the morass of an immediate thermo-nuclear and global war, something we devoutly hoped to avoid. And so by 1950, just one year after Chiang had been forced to retreat to Formosa, President Truman had to order the Seventh Fleet into the Formosan Straits, in part to protect Formosa from any amphibious attack by Mao, but in larger measure to protect the United States from any rash attack by Chiang against the mainland of China, an attack which would inevitably have committed us to his support and equally inevitably have committed us to a war which we did not want and which we could not win.

And there has been ever since this ambiguous and ambivalent nature in American policy. On the one hand, by continuing the theory of non-

recognition, we have encouraged, at least tacitly, Chiang to believe that his moment of reconquest will come and that if he chooses, he has an American marker which permits him to commit his troops in the full knowledge that America stands ready to support that commitment. And on the other hand, with the exception of a few months in the first days of the Republican administration of 1952, America has been committed in practice to the containment of this tiger cub on Formosa because we know the consequences which any rash act of commitment on his part would have for us. We hope to unleash Chiang, but to unleash Chiang against China is to unleash a mosquito against a modern, technically trained, nuclear powered army. It is simply not to be, and in practice we have had to eat our words, though we have never retracted our words, and in that, the World Order and I believe, we have made our cardinal and most unrealistic error.

Twice in the last ten years we have had a chance to see how perilously close to the brink of war this emotional commitment which we have made to Chiang through the non-recognition of the Peking government has brought us. When Chiang retreated to Taiwan his army was able to retain control over three series of small off-shore islands, Quemoy, Matsui and Teichen. In the early years of his Formosan government Chiang used these islands to mount small guerrilla attacks against the mainland, he used these islands to unleash propaganda barrages against the mainland. He used these islands to send his spies and his messengers from there to the mainland. During the Korean War our own unofficial intelligence agencies used these islands to our government's advantage. Obviously as the military build up of these islands continued Mao Tse Tung could no longer allow this irritant to continue unchecked. In September of 1953 Mao began an artillery barrage against the Teichens, against Quemoy and Matsui. And Chiang

immediately cried: "You have promised your support. My territory has been violated. Commit yourselves now. Allow me to bomb these artillery emplacements. Allow me to bomb the supply depots of these artillery emplacements." And if we had allowed this there would have been an Asian war. And in our own country, especially among some of the military, who advocated a preventive war policy, there were cries that now was the moment for a showdown. Now was the moment to unleash Chiang against the mainland, to reconquer China from the Chinese.

In January of 1954 the little island of Itchiang in the Teichens was attacked by an amphibious invasion of Mao Tse Tung's troops. Apparently this island was a particularly disturbing hornet's nest to the Chinese coast. And again the cry of "Support" was raised. Again Chiang cried out, "You have committed yourselves to protect the integrity of my territory. Protect now my territory. Involve yourselves in a Chinese war." And only the presence in Washington of a few cool heads prevented our involvement in that war. And again this year - this fall - we have seen that the military build up of Quemoy and Matsui have so disturbed the forces of the People's Republic of China that they have again brought to the light this irritant to them, they have again begun to shell the island, and again we have walked that narrow precipice between war and peace - between a war which we do not want, which we cannot win, a war over a little piece of an island two miles square, four thousand miles from our mainland, without strategic value to us, to the Formosans, or to the world. We walked this precipice because we continued to permit Chiang to believe that he is the legitimate governor of the Chinese people, we continued to permit Chiang to believe that whatever crusade he is able to undertake against the Chinese mainland we encourage, we will support, and

we will help to prosper.

Such then, I believe, is the reasoning which has led the World Order group to espouse a change of policy on our American government's part. They recognize fully that such a change of policy would be difficult for us to swallow, for we would have to swallow our pride. They recognize that we have had great and good reason to be angry and to be irritated by the People's Republic of China in the past ten years. They bloodied our noses in Korea and they fought our troops to a standstill. They published the unwarranted, purely propagandist charge of germ warfare against us, and that charge got great adherence and acceptance in many parts of the Asian world. Surprisingly they were able to win the allegiance of some of our prisoners of war, and we have never been able to understand how American young men would prefer to remain in China than to return to their homes. We have spoken a great deal about the capacities of brainwashing and of subtle psychiatric and psychological techniques which the Chinese used against these men. We have been irritated by the whole process of communization of China because we disagree fundamentally with the despotic, inhuman, tyrannical collectivist aspect of that policy. And we allowed in our own domestic affairs Senator McCarthy to equate the recognition of China with Communist appeasement and to silence for years any spokesman who wanted to, who cried out for a more realistic policy vis a vis the Chinese people. All this the World Order group knew. And ~~they~~ yet they also knew that unless we succeed in restraining Chiang to Formosa, in reminding him that he is the legitimate governor of this area and not the legitimate governor of China itself, that unless we recognize China and accept it as one in the body of world nations and impose upon it the responsibility of international law which such acceptance implies, unless

we succeed in demilitarizing these few off-shore islands which can tomorrow force us into an unwanted war, unless we succeed in removing this danger-fraught situation from the list of irritants and causes of trouble and tension in our world, unless we succeed in the near future in doing that, each year brings us closer to war and each time we come to grips with the China situation we are less capable of adjusting to the newness of the situation, we are less capable of compromising our position, we are more and more committed emotionally and in fact to old policy and old ways.

I agree with the logic of the World Order Study Group. Though we may not like to accept the fact, the Chinese government of the Communists has gained wide acceptance in the China mainland. The Chinese have never known a liberal government. For two millenia now they have been ruled by despotic emperors, and the loss of their liberty is not a matter of great moment to them as yet. But they have had in return a vision of a great future, a group in power which for the first time this century has been able to stabilize the currency, to increase industrial production, to increase the opportunities for education, to raise the standard of living, to do something about agrarian reform. For the first time they, as the individual - the mass, the farmer, the coolie, the peasant, the student - have been able to see in the policies of the government a vision of the great China which he loved and of which he dreamed. And though we may not want to admit it to ourselves, the Chinese government is, for the near future at least of the People's Republic, here to stay. And I think we will have to agree with the summarization of Professor John King Fairbanks of Harvard University, the Head of the Chinese Department there, who in his recently revised volume on the United States and China has had this to say:

One consolation in this crisis, therefore, is to think that the Chinese Communist dictatorship does not represent the interests of a large enough proportion of the Chinese people, that it maintains itself only by force and manipulation, that, in fine, it is too evil to last. This can be endlessly debated. Some will argue that the new order is not viable.

Such, I fear, is not the case. Peking's collapse is always a possibility but at present we have little reason to think it probable. What we see in the mainland China is a new all-powerful bureaucracy coercing the populace but drawn from it for the purpose; a new elite urging on their labors, organizing their lives. This new totalitarian system has profound evils built into it but it has remained viable in Russia. A less thorough and more superficial autocracy proved viable under one Chinese dynasty after another. We cannot conclude that Chinese Communism's obvious evils are likely to be sufficient to destroy it. Clutching at this straw will not help us.

In short, we have to face it.

The recognition of China does not imply any approval of the Chinese way of government. I have no sympathy with its dictatorial and tyrannical methods. I have no sympathy with its Marxist and collectivist philosophy. But we are not in sympathy with many governments whom we recognize. We recognize after all the parent of all communist governments, the Soviet Union. We recognize Franco Spain and the Dominican Republic and Tito's Yugoslavia, and we have no sympathy certainly with any of those governments. Recognition simply implies that a government is in control of a particular geographic area, and as one of the body of nations it must be brought into contact with the rest of the nations and if possible agreements on minor problems and on major problems must be worked out with that government. We cannot force the peoples of the world to accept a form of government which to us seems right, for manifestly the peoples of Asia are not prepared for the type of democratic rule which we have achieved. You cannot expect a people who yesterday were ninety-five percent illiterate, who yesterday did not own the simplest commodity, who yesterday had no vision of the technical age and of its philosophies and of its needs to accept overnight

a highly sophisticated type of Western government which demands an educated electorate, which demands mass literacy, which demands scientific know-how which they cannot as yet command. It may be that this type of primitive agrarian communism which we see developing in China is but the first step in an evolving political pattern which may some day lead to a more democratic or liberal government. It may be and it may not be. It may be that Chinese traditions, Confucians, Statists, collectivists, will not permit this. But in any case we simply cannot play the ostrich and put our heads into the soil and say a country strong and growing of six hundred million people does not exist; we will have nothing to do with that country. For you know an outlaw makes his own law. You cannot expect the outlaw, the gangster to abide by the police regulations and the civic rule of a country or of a community.

To outlaw China is to continue to permit it to make its own law. To bring it into the body of nations, into the collective council of the nations, is to impose upon it the restrictions of that international body. And I agree with Professor Quincy Wright, who has written that "It seems likely that stability and peace would be served better by bringing the most populous state of the world and the greatest power of Asia into normal relations with the United States, the United Nations, and in the world community than by treating it as an outcast."

As long as we continue to treat China as an outcast we free it from any responsibility to international order. We freed it in Korea from the Geneva Convention because of that. We free it from the responsibilities of engaging with us in the difficult negotiations towards disarmament, towards the control of thermo-nuclear explosions. We free it from the obligation of sitting down with us at the bargaining table to discuss the difficult

problems of Quemoy and Matsui and the Formosa Straits or the mandated territories still along the Chinese mainland. Major and minor, we have no means of communication with the Chinese government until we recognize it and impose upon it a necessary two-way system of telecommunication.

This I think is the reasoning which has led the World Order, and it certainly has led me, to believe that continued non-recognition of the Chinese government is unrealistic and at this stage pointless and fraught with grave danger.

I spoke of a second premise of the World Order group, and that was that their premise that this policy of non-recognition is symptomatic, or symbolic if you will, of much that is too negativistic, too doctrinaire and too moralistic in our current American policy. In the "Message to the Churches" to which I have referred the World Order spoke words which will have a familiar ring to you because you have heard them often from this pulpit, words which emphasize the need of a policy seeing beyond power to peace, seeing beyond the possibilities of massive retaliation to the necessity of immediate conference and compromise and adjustment, seeing the need of recognizing our responsibility to live in a world of both friends and competitors, to live successfully and at peace in that world. I should like to quote to you a few paragraphs from the "Message to the Churches":

Stronger efforts should be made to break through the present stalemate and to find ways of living with the Communist nations. Sometimes this is called "co-existence," but we are concerned with something more than the minimum meaning of that word. Our relationship with the Communist nations should combine competition between ways of life with cooperation for limited objectives, our resistance to Communist expansion goes with recognition of the fact that Communist nations as nations, have their own legitimate interests and their own reasonable fears. We should avoid the posture of general hostility to them and cease the practice of continual moral lectures to them by our leaders.

and remember that this is a Church group, speaking about a Church leader.

In the cold war we allow ourselves to drift into a defensive position in which we hesitate to admit any imperfections in our society, lest it confirm the Communist indictment; thus we inhibit the self-criticism which is essential to the health of a democracy. We tend to make opposition to communism the touchstone for policy both in domestic life and in international relations.

There is real hope that new generations within the Communist countries will be less fanatical in their ideological convictions and that they will be more preoccupied with peace, with economic well-being and with tentative experiments in cultural freedom than with the attempt to dominate other nations.

It is not to be expected that they will formally renounce what we consider to be their errors. It is enough for the kind of living together described above if their emphasis and priorities change. The establishment of good relations will require tireless negotiations with them and imaginative programs of communication, cultural exchange and personal contacts.

It is not enough to deplore war and call for its abolition, we must engage, and encourage our country to engage without reservations, in the things that make for peace.

Though military peace in the non-communist world remains a necessity, its limits should be more clearly recognized and far more of our attention and our resources should go into the task of helping nations find their own ways to solutions of their social and economic problems.


and then they repeat:

It is not enough to deplore war and call for its abolition, we must engage, and encourage our country to engage without reservations, in the things that make for peace.

I submit to you that this is one of the finest statements of a "new look" in American foreign policy, one which I heartily commend and feel is much needed. It is not one which deplores strength. It is not one which deplores the need of defensive armament. But it is one which emphasizes the need to go beyond the negativistic elements of our policy, to admit the realities of our world today, a complex set of nations, some willing to accept our leadership, some willing to accept the Russian leadership, some earnestly seeking a neutralist position where they can accept simply their own ways of living and of alliance. We will have to live in a very complex

world, a world which will not easily or willingly follow the moral or the political or the military leadership of one side or of the other. To adjust to this world we are going to have to begin to develop the techniques of peace, not the armaments of war.

What are these techniques? A healthy analysis of the situation as it exists. An unwillingness to continue any policy which smacks of subversion of other nations. An unwillingness to keep our heads in the clouds and deny that the situations have so changed that much that we might want to see happen cannot happen. And a willingness to sit down at the bargaining table and bit by bit hammer out the clauses of contracts of compromise, contracts which would permit us to live with both friend and competitor in a world destined to find its life in peace and not its death in thermo-nuclear war.



Kaddish

Friday DEC. 12
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Sunday

Those who passed away this week

Dr. Edward J. Greene

Yahrzeits

JEROME SANFORD ROSE
LEOPOLD ARNSTEIN
DAVID C. HABER
ROSA KOBLITZ
LESLIE JOYCE HAAS
LINDA JOAN HAAS
FLORA ROSENBERG
SOL R. BING
JOSEPH LEHMAN WITTE
IGNATIUS SCHOENBERGER
ADOLPH KOHN
ISADORE D. WERTHEIMER
MINNIE FULDAUER

BENJAMIN MESHORER
JOSEPH HAYS
SAMUEL KANGISSER
BERNARD A. RUBIN



THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY

TERMINAL TOWER • CLEVELAND 1, OHIO

CYRUS S. EATON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

December 15, 1958

Dear Rabbi Silver:

Heartiest congratulations on your statesman-like address yesterday on China and our unhappy foreign policies.

The enclosed editorial from the influential Globe and Mail of Toronto expresses vigorously the disapproval of our China policy, which is shared by all of our NATO allies. While Dulles' San Francisco speech was given front page prominence with big headlines and pictures in most of our American papers, none of them pointed out the distortions and serious misrepresentations in that speech.

Sincerely yours,

Rabbi D. J. Silver
The Temple
East 105th and Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio

CE:rs
Enclosure

The Globe and Mail

CANADA'S NATIONAL NEWSPAPER

MONDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1958

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Is published every weekday at 140 King St. W.,
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R. HOWARD WEBSTER,
Chairman of the Board.
OAKLEY DALGLEISH,
Editor and Publisher.

*The subject who is truly loyal to the Chief Magistrate will neither
advise nor submit to arbitrary measures.—JUNIUS.*

Back to the Old Stand

During recent months, the policy of the Eisenhower Administration on China has been widely and vigorously criticized, both within the United States and among its allies abroad, as wholly unrealistic. For a time, this criticism seemed to be having a salutary effect in Washington, and forcing a reconsideration of its basic attitudes in the Far East.

The speech by Secretary of State Dulles at San Francisco last week, however, indicates that the Administration is swinging back to the old policy of uncompromising hostility toward Communist China. It declared that recognition of the Peking Government, or trade with it, would "gravely jeopardize the political, economic and security interests of the United States".

As on previous occasions, the U.S. stand was excused by the assumed effect on other Asian countries. U.S. recognition of the Peking Government, and consent to its admission to the United Nations, would be "a well-nigh mortal blow to the survival of the non-Communist Governments of the Far East". It would so "dishearten" them, in fact, that Communist efforts to take over

these countries "would almost certainly succeed". After that, the Pacific would be dominated by hostile forces and United States defenses would be driven back "to or about our Continental frontiers".

In the light of actual conditions in Eastern Asia, this argument is far-fetched in the extreme. A majority of the independent, non-Communist nations of the area—including India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia—recognize Communist China and conduct normal diplomatic and trade relations with her. Why should their Governments be "disheartened", and give up the battle against subversion at home, just because the U.S. followed their example? On the contrary, such a move would be welcomed nearly everywhere in Asia.

It is difficult for an outsider to know what pressures, in the intricacies of American politics, have produced this return to a completely rigid policy in Washington. The fact, however, must be lamented. Not only will it increase the possible danger of war over Matsu and Quemoy, but it must delay the return of anything like stable conditions in the Far East.

R. A. FLETCHER 13995 Superior Road, East Cleveland 18, Ohio

Dec 15, 1958.

Rabbi Daniel J. Silver.
% The Temple,
Cleveland.

Dear Sir: I would indeed be doing less than my duty if I failed to compliment you on your splendid talk of yesterday. Your presentation was admirable and at all times gave your audience the impression that you had studied your subject thoroughly. The only objection I could voice - and certainly this is no fault of yours - was that you didn't have a capacity audience for so scholarly a lecture. Or, that it couldn't have reached as the City Club did the day before. One other talk of yours on the life of Karl Marx I recall, and do you know I learned more about this reformer that Sunday forenoon than I had ever known before? Now incidentally, I would also

like to take the opportunity to comment
upon one other thing I enjoy in your
Temple and that is the simple majesty
embodied in the beautiful words of many
of your prayers - particularly those for the dead.
A year ago I suffered a deep personal loss
myself and I still don't know of anything
that brings to me the solace and abiding
comfort than those beautiful expressions
I read in your book of prayer. Yes, I was
more than repaid for my truancy from
my own church (Dr Mac Gowan) yesterday.

With every good wish, I am.

Sincerely yours,

R. A. Fletcher.



THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY

TERMINAL TOWER • CLEVELAND 1, OHIO

December 17, 1958

CYRUS S. EATON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

Dear Rabbi Silver:

You doubtless will have observed this editorial page piece, in which the Cleveland Press emphasized your position on Red China. I feel that your statement will encourage hundreds of other religious leaders in the United States to speak up.

I certainly hope that you, for one, will take the Press up on its invitation to readers to express their views. You can be sure that members of the well-organized China lobby will lose no time writing the Press to take the opposite view, and urging a vigorous continuation of the cold war.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Rabbi Daniel J. Silver
The Temple
East 105th and Ansel Road
Cleveland 6, Ohio

CE:rbm
enclosure



Give Light and the People Will Find Their Own Way

The Cleveland Press

A SCRIPPS-HOWARD NEWSPAPER

LOUIS B. SELTZER, Editor

GEORGE E. CARTER, Business Manager

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Tuesday, December 16, 1958

Are Americans More Willing to Deal With the Reds?

By JULIAN KRAWCHECK

Last Oct. 15 Cyrus Eaton, freshly returned from Russia, stood before a Cleveland Advertising Club audience and declared America must come to terms with the Reds or face annihilation.

He received moderate applause from a respectful but far-from-convinced audience.

Last Saturday, just two months later, he propounded essentially the same thesis, couched in stronger language, before the City Club Forum.

This time Eaton received a thunderous standing ovation.

Did the altered reaction reflect a significant shift in public opinion or merely a different audience?

As a reporter who has specialized in covering world affairs topics for 10 years, I believe Saturday's ovation for Eaton was symptomatic of an important change in public opinion.

This change should not be interpreted as public approval of all of Eaton's views, especially those concerned with the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 and the relative freedom of speech, or lack of it, in Russia and this country.

Nevertheless, on the larger issue of U. S. foreign policy, the reaction to Eaton's latest speech appeared to be another link in a chain

A skillful reporter in the field of world affairs senses that an important change in opinion is cascading through the American public. Do you agree?

of developments which reflect a substantial shift in public opinion.

An important measurement was taken here a month ago at the World Order Conference of the Protestant Churches of America.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, long active in that group of prominent laymen and clerics, came here to outline his foreign policy before a presumably sympathetic audience. Among other things, he defended America's refusal to recognize Red China.

After hearing Dulles, the conference approved a report favoring U. S. recognition of Red China.

Another local straw in the wind came Sunday when Rabbi Daniel Jeremy Silver devoted his entire sermon at the Temple to a carefully-documented argument for the immediate recognition of China as a step in putting "real-

ism" into our foreign policy.

I was present on both occasions. Yet the most lasting impression a reporter gets is gained from what he hears people say in private conversation.

What they say, for instance, when they gather in little knots after a World Affairs Council lecture. Or around the punch bowl at a holiday party. Or in the seat just ahead on the CTS Rapid.

The sum total of what this reporter hears is that more and more people—perhaps a majority—have importantly revised their thinking on U. S.-Soviet relations in the last few months.

I am certain these good Americans like Russia no more than they ever did. Nor do they trust Nikita Khrushchev, even if Cyrus Eaton obviously does.

They simply have come to the conclusion that there no longer is an alternative to peace.

At least, they reason, an accommodation with people we don't like might buy all of us a few more precious if precarious years on this planet. At best, it might start a chain reaction of events, some within Russia, that might lead to a better world for all time to come.

For what it's worth, that's the impression this one, very fallible, reporter gets from tuning two bent ears to the ground.

TEXT OF CHINA STATEMENT

Cleveland, Nov. 21

Following are examples from a message adopted here today by a World Order Study Conference sponsored by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. The excerpts refer to the recognition of Communist China.

Stronger efforts should be made to break through the present stalemate and to find ways of living with the Communist nations. Sometimes this is called "co-existence", but we are concerned with something more than the minimum meaning ^{that} of the word. Our relationship with the Communist nations should combine competition between ways of life with cooperation for limited objectives, our resistance to Communist expansion goes with recognition of the fact that Communist nations as nations, have their own legitimate interests and their own reasonable fears. We should avoid the posture of general hostility to them and cease the practice of continual moral lectures to them by our leaders.

In the cold war we allow ourselves to drift into a defensive position in which we hesitate to admit any imperfections in our society, lest it confirm the Communist indictment; thus we inhibit the self-criticism which is essential to the health of a democracy. We tend to make opposition to communism the touchstone for policy both in domestic life and in international relations.

There is real hope that new generations within the Communist countries will be less fanatical in their ideological convictions and that they will be more preoccupied with peace, with economic well-being and with tentative experiments in cultural freedom than with the attempt to dominate other nations.


It is not to be expected that they will formally renounce what we consider to be their errors. It is enough for the kind of living together described above if their emphasis and priorities change. The establishment of good relations will require tireless negotiations with them and imaginative programs of communication, cultural exchange and personal contacts.

~~Vigilance and realistic precautions are necessary, but congition about the good of all of each other's on all counts is a poisonous atmosphere in which to try to conduct negotiations.~~

It is not enough to deplore war and call for its abolition, we must engage, and encourage our country to engage without reservations, in the things that make for peace.

Though military peace in the non-communist world remains a necessity, its limits should be more clearly recognized and far more of our attention and our resources should go into the task of helping nations find their own waysto solutions of their social and economic problems.

We need to recognize that communist nations, as nations, have their own legitimate interests and their own reasonable fears, and we should avoid the posture of general hostility to them and cease the practice of continual moral lecture to them by our leaders.



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Prof. Wright

It seems likely that stability and peace would be served better by bringing the most populous state of the world and the greatest power of Asia into normal relations with the United States, the United Nations, and in the world community than by treating it as an outcast.



D

DULLES ON COMMUNIST CHINA

In a speech in San Francisco last Thursday, Secretary of State Dulles defended United States policy on China and reaffirmed Administration determination not to recognize the Peiping Government. Excerpts from the speech follow.

Developments make it ever more clear that if we were to grant political recognition to the Chinese Communist regime, it would be a well-nigh mortal blow to the survival of the non-Communist governments in the Far East. Such recognition and the seating of the Chinese Communists in the United Nations would so increase their prestige and influence in the Far East, and so dishearten the free nations, that the Communist subversive efforts would almost surely succeed.

Opposing Arguments

Contrary arguments come largely from two sources.

There are those who argue that since the Chinese Communist regime exists and has power in Mainland China, we ought to accord it political recognition.

There is, however, no principle of international law to this effect.

The Chinese Communist regime is bitterly hostile to the United States. It is dedicated to expelling us from the Western Pacific. It is determined to take over the free peoples and resources of the area. It violates all established principles of international law and of civilized conduct.

Why should we give aid and comfort to such a regime and to such policies?

Some think we should rec-

ognize the Chinese Communist regime in the hope that large and profitable trade would follow. That is an illusion.

The United States today is exporting to the non-Communist countries of the Far East at the rate of over \$2½ billion a year.

Loss of Trade

We may be sure that if the Communists should take over these free nations of the Far East, our trade with them would drastically shrink, as has been the case with our trade with the Soviet Union and its European satellites.

Should we, then, in the quest of a few millions of dollars of unreliable trade with Communist China, jeopardize exports of \$2½ billion?

We deal with the Chinese Communist regime whenever that is expedient. We do not pretend that it does not exist.

But it is certain that diplomatic recognition of the Chinese Communist regime would gravely jeopardize the political, the economic and the security interests of the United States. The Pacific instead of being a friendly body of water would in great part be dominated by hostile forces and our own defenses driven back to or about our continental frontiers.

foreign aid economists fr
limited amount
train

One consolation in this crisis, therefore, is to think that the Chinese Communist dictatorship does not represent the interests of a large enough proportion of the Chinese people, that it maintains itself only by force and manipulation, that, in fine, it is too evil to last. This can be endlessly debated. Some will argue that the new order is not viable.

Such, I fear, is not the case. Peking's collapse is always a possibility but at present ~~(in 1958)~~ we have little reason to think it probable. What we see in ^{the} mainland China ~~today~~ is a new all-powerful bureaucracy coercing the populace but drawn from it for the purpose; a new elite urging on their labors, organizing their lives. This new totalitarian system has profound evils built into it but it has remained viable in Russia. A less thorough and more superficial autocracy proved viable under one Chinese dynasty after another. We cannot conclude that Chinese Communism's obvious evils are likely to be sufficient to destroy it. Clutching at this straw will not help us.

In short, we have to face it.

Developments make it ever more clear that if we were to grant political recognition to the Chinese Communist regime, it would be a well-nigh mortal blow to the survival of the non-Communist governments in the Far East. Such recognition and the seating of the Chinese Communists in the United Nations would so increase their prestige and influence in the Far East, and so dishearten the free nations, that the Communist subversive efforts would almost surely succeed.

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Christians should urge reconsideration by our government of its policy in regard to the People's Republic of China. While the rights of the people of Taiwan ^(that is Formosa) ~~in~~ ^{or of the} Korea should be safeguarded steps should be undertaken towards the including of Red China in the United Nations and for its recognition by our government.

With reference to China, Christians should urge reconsideration by our Government of its policy in regard to the People's Republic of China. While the rights of the people of Taiwan and of Korea should be safeguarded, steps should be taken toward the inclusion of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and for its recognition by our Government. Such recognition does not imply approval. These diplomatic relations should constitute a part of a much wider relationship between our peoples. The exclusion of the effective government on the mainland of China, currently the People's Republic of China, from the international community is in many ways a disadvantage to ~~that~~ ^{our} community. It helps to preserve a false image of the United States and of other nations in the minds of the Chinese people. It keeps our people in ignorance of what is taking place in China. It hampers negotiations for disarmament. It limits the functioning of international organizations. We have a strong hope that the resumption of relationships between the peoples of China and of the United States may make possible ~~also~~ ^{also} a restoration of relationships between their churches and ours.

The non recognition of the People's Republic of China has been the stated policy of our government since the establishment of that government ^{in 1949} ~~in 1949~~ ^{ago}. No recently as two weeks ago Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reiterated the official opposition to any recognition of the Peking regime.

Three weeks ago the Dept. of International Affairs of the North Conference of American States held a world wide Rally in our city, 600 delegates representing 38 major Protestant denominations numbering 37 million communicants ^{studied} ~~attended~~ and discussed the thousand international letters. Mr. Diller besides being Secretary State has been for many years a high ranking member of the North Conference, he testified to the importance of the deliberation by appearing before it in person to defend American policies. After his session of the day after the delegation summarized their views in a 5,000 word message to the Churches. On the issue of ~~the People's Republic of China~~ the Woodlawn Rally took a view diametrically opposed to that of the Secretary of State.

This rejection of basic American policy was not ~~intended~~ ^{offended} and
unintentionally, the non-aligned nations ~~included~~ ^{included} many of our nation's
most ~~valued~~ ^{substantive} and ~~respected~~ ^{respected} allies. Above all else memory to the Chinese
This reality leads me to believe that the world's rejection is based on
two major premises - both of which I should like to discuss with you this
morning. The first premise ~~is~~ ^{that} non-recognition is an ~~unilateral~~ ^{unilateral}, sometimes
dangerous ~~act~~

This rejection of basic American policy was not deliberate even then, surely.
The World Order Delegates included many of our nation's most respected and
substantiated citizens.

This rejection certainly merits our considered judgment. I have read the
order message to the Chinese, if I may be permitted to ^{interpret} its position
I find that the statement on China is based on two major premises - first
that the continuance of non-recognition is inevitable, possible, and
extremely dangerous - secondly, that our China policy reflects an already
militaristic and doctrinaire emphasis which has furthered much of our current
policy - an emphasis on ^{almost solely} force and suppression - an emphasis which the World
Order really finds inadequate in our current situation.

I should like to explore such further meaning as is justified.

The U.S. failed to recognize the People's Republic of China until December
January in 1949. The People's Republic, commonly known as Red China, was
established under the reign of Mao Tse Tung and his followers after they
had succeeded in defeating the party of Chiang Kai Shek in a bloody
Civil War which convulsed China between 1946 and 1949.

In 1945 & 46 before the Civil War began America had found itself
divided between the party of Mao & the party of Chiang. Both were considered
Bolsheviks, ruled by force. Though the Kuomintang of Chiang had been seen as an
atmosphere of delayed idealism its corruption and autocracy - the generally
of many high officials, and the personal dictatorial predilection of Chiang had
done much to discredit the Nationalist Party. Our policy in those days was to
assist Civil China by negotiating a coalition government composed of both
groups.

~~As a result of this policy~~

Both sides on both sides caused these negotiations to fail - U.S. troops
did - and for a while America watched its hands of the whole situation
during the whole matter, but another in the national balance between
even less struggling for the control of China; however, out of the
military, in complete, treachery, and personal and official unpopularity

scattered the tide of fortune against the Kuomintang - and it was at this moment precisely when Chiang's troops were committed to a last vain push in the upper Yangtze Valley that our joint, devoted but one had reason to see ourselves with Chiang's cause.

The reason for the change of heart have inevitably little to do with the results of the Chinese situation. The change stems from other causes entirely. The late 1940's were years in which America first came to realize that the kind of man peace was really not so much a peace as a cold war. ~~That was the year in which we were~~ We suddenly became aware of an enemy which we labeled International Communism. Suddenly all those who were formerly Communists in any form in any place in our world became our allies. That was the effect of a great Russian and to make definite meeting was required, man's phil. for Chinese revolution was mapped, to defeat man became a holy cause, and ^{as we had} ~~every~~ in his hand those of defect became a necessity for America's ^{blind} ~~persecute~~. ~~to maintain~~ to have that

Even when Chung had to flee to Formosa we continued to hope that he would return temporarily defect into mainland China. Had not Napoleon returned from Elba to be again forced to pass by his Chinese troops. We did not recognize Mao as being as hoped for as a great outburst. But Chung was not to be allowed near 100 by of Restoration Day. By 1949 Chung was a thoroughly discredited leader to the average Chinese. In power he had not won their sympathy. Out of power he did not give much American in the importance of an anti-communist cause. Out of power Chung seemed only a leader of a small group of people - no better and no more than a head of a small group of people. Chung's fault in 1949 was not that he was a leader of a small group of people, but that he was a leader of a small group of people who were not the people of China. Chung's fault in 1949 was not that he was a leader of a small group of people, but that he was a leader of a small group of people who were not the people of China. Chung's fault in 1949 was not that he was a leader of a small group of people, but that he was a leader of a small group of people who were not the people of China.


declined to remain no more no less than that of
 it did not take our joint long to recognize that any return by China
 to the mainland was out of the question. Indeed, we came to regret that
 we had ever encouraged such pretensions. Committed as we were to
 Chiang's support - any mainland attack meant U.S. involvement
 in a large scale Asian ~~war~~ - we all participated in a general
 determination. By 1950 the American 7th Fleet was patrolling
 the Formosa straits to keep Mao from the conquest of Formosa
 to retain Chiang from any real commitment & to be against his
 on with every

Since 1950 the continuation of ^{our} policy of non-recognition has kept alive
for China his burning hopes of return, since 1950 and the execution of a
~~the~~ ^{the} ~~policy~~ ^{policy} for real movement during the political campaign of 1952 - the
first round of P.R. Campaign, administration of 1952 - it has been America
policy in fact as well as stated principle to keep the Formosa tiger
well closely leashed to its tail.

Taiwan in the past 5 years has been reminded ^{how close to an unprovoked} ~~of the~~ ~~policy~~
even our China policy has forced us. When the Kuo-min-tang retreated to
Formosa they retained control of those small island groups within sight of
the mainland coast. From their island of Quemoy, Matsu, & Tachen the
nationalist mainland perimeter generally - subject to all against the
mainland. During the Korean War an unopposed intelligence operation
was solid to real advantage. By September 1953 they had become an
invited to the people's Republic. Shouldered and belatedly began to pose as
solid. They began to demand the right to bomb from the air the
batteries. Some promises were exposed in America and out for a
fixed show-down. In January of 1954 the Communists attacked the island
islands of 14 islands in force. They demanded that we live up to our
treaties of defense & support. ^{a few} ~~of~~ ^{even} ~~had~~ ^{managed} to withstand
and America committed - but we had drifted paradoxically from
war over an island not two miles square, 8,000 miles from our mainland.
~~Against the fact that the island was not a member of the~~


Continuing non-recognition continues the right that China, represent
the legitimate govt. of China. Continuity non-recognition continues the
tension of the offshore islands. Against the fact that we have continued
to bomb Quemoy & Matsu. As long as China has any amphibious
ambitions against the mainland you can not well permit the
military buildup & the propaganda use of the island to gain uninvited.
What America must seriously consider is whether ^{continuing} ~~the~~ ~~continuing~~
cultivation of China's illusion is worth the risk of war or whether
useful not to a young Mao as leader of China, China a
governor of Formosa, necessarily the offshore islands, and release
ourselves of a ^{situation} ~~potential~~ ^{which} ~~any~~ ^{might} ~~place~~ ^{up} ~~into~~ ^{our}

It is not necessary, I believe, which does the honorable group to
advocate Chinese recognition. I approve this logic. I have no
administration for the limited and collected aspect of the ^{present} Chinese
regime - but it is in many ways uneconomically & politically painful
regime. Other men do support of most of the large group of the Chinese
people. It can point to a comprehensive in industrial development, agrarian
reform, educational improvement, and currency stabilization. It has
been able to identify native Chinese national goals with the accomplished
tasks of the regime. I must give credit to the head of Chinese studies at
Harvard University Prof. John King Fairbank that for the present the
People's Republic of China is here to stay




This being so, it seems to me fully right to end one end for all China's
pretensions. It seems to me fully not to negotiate with China the
large issue of nuclear control, disarmament, and world peace. I know that
recognition is not a step we can undertake with any ease. The Chinese
have made the world aware of us against us, accused us of
genocide, frustrated us at the Congress table, I know that Mr. McNamara
succeeded in identifying Chinese recognition with Communist
aggression - but in the matter it appears to me to have neutralized
the issue.

We must somehow reduce world tension
We must somehow force China to share the common sense of nations
and we cannot be alone a long time before we refuse to admit that a
large part of 600 million people are not equal - or of it
exist China beyond the pale - I am not a pacifist and Professor
Dwight D. White



On matters of external relations of necessity must be our law - Only as
China becomes a nation based by the laws of nations can we expect
to assume the burden of international responsibility

The immediate needs of the
~~the~~ Chinese people demand the World War, designed to ^{make} ~~some~~ ^{some}
actional points which take account almost exclusively of foreign policy in
general.



These words ought to be repeated carefully. They are, as you know,
things that have been often expressed from the past. These
emphatic, representative words and have a much deeper for peace-
for the Chinese people and not as much as the Chinese are usually
the People's Republic of China, but whether we recognize the reality
of the nature of our people & whether we can ~~obtain~~ ~~our~~ ~~desired~~
~~to the world as a whole~~ ~~it is not~~
policy and such regard preparation to peace beyond the moral
disapproval to the absolute necessity of showing such competition &
which life rather than death on the globe.

The Story Behind Quemoy: How We Drifted Close to War

A Post editor traces the Alice-in-Wonderland processes
which led us to the edge of an Oriental abyss—
and may yet push us in.

By Stewart Alsop

The island of Quemoy is a block of land about the size of the District of Columbia, nestled up against the coast of China. Five years ago, not one American in ten thousand had ever heard of Quemoy. Yet twice in the last four years we have come close to war with Communist China because of Quemoy, and the danger of war over the little island has by no means ended yet.

Surely this is a situation which needs some explaining. For no one pretends that Quemoy, or the other small Nationalist-held islands off the China coast, are important pieces of land. Quemoy has been ruled of little or no military value by such competent military authorities as Dwight D. Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur. There is not a responsible official in Washington, from John Foster Dulles on down, who thinks the islands, as real estate, are worth a plugged nickel. "If only," one very high official has remarked, "the damned islands would sink below the sea."

And yet, if the Communists tried to take Quemoy or the other islands by direct assault—which they could conceivably do before these words are printed—the United States would probably intervene with force, risking a global nuclear war in the process. In-

The U.S. cruiser Helena, its guns at the ready, escorts Chinese Nationalist supply ships to beleaguered Quemoy.



deed, as things now stand, the United States would have no honorable alternative.

How, then, did the American Government get into a situation where it has already twice come close to war, and may yet in the future go to war, for some islands the American Government devoutly wishes did not exist?

A great many thoughtful people must have been asking themselves that question in recent months. It is the purpose of this report to try to provide a partial answer. The answer must of necessity be incomplete, for the record of our China policy is remarkably murky, complex and passion-laden, and two honest men can and often do violently disagree about past events in which both have participated. The story of the offshore islands is, moreover, a story without a villain or a hero, and like most real-life stories it has a wandering, illogical plot, without a beginning or an end. But it is a fascinating story all the same, with much meaning for our past and future, and it is worth trying to understand its main outlines.

A good place to start the story is at a meeting in the office of Allen Dulles, able director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and brother of John Foster Dulles. The meeting was convened on a cold and dreary morning late in March, 1952, to hear John Foster Dulles expound his ideas on American policy in Asia, where he had spent some months successfully negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty.

John Foster Dulles was then about to shed his carapace as "consultant" to Dean Acheson, to become chief campaign strategist for the Republicans on foreign-policy issues. A certain chilliness had inevitably grown up between him and the highest-level Democratic policy makers, like Acheson. Thus the meeting was attended largely by the second level of officials—men like his brother Allen, then number-two man in the CIA; Charles Bohlen, then State Department Counselor; John Allison, then Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East; General Merrill, of Merrill's Marauders fame; John Ferguson and C. Burton Marshall,

of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and a number of others.

No doubt, buried somewhere in the bowels of the State Department or the CIA, there is an official record of what was said that Saturday morning. But what follows is accurate in substance, for the even tenor of bureaucratic life was broken that morning by a moment of passion and anger, and as a result certain of those present remember vividly what happened. John Foster Dulles led off, and in his lucid, carefully worded manner, he made two main points. The first was that Truman's order of June, 1950, interposing the Seventh Fleet between Formosa and the mainland, had led to an "anomalous" situation. For the result was that the Seventh Fleet was "protecting" the Chinese Communists, our enemy in Korea, from attack by the Nationalists. He had discussed this point with Chiang Kai-shek, Dulles said, and Chiang thoroughly agreed that this anomalous situation should be changed.

There were, Dulles continued, "certain islands," close to

(Continued on Page 86)



State Department planner C. B. Marshall six years ago warned that an American commitment on these islands might drag the U.S. into war.



Admiral Radford (left, above) and the State Department's Robertson, Chiang admirers, were assigned to steer him away from the offshore islands. They failed.




MacArthur's 1950 meeting with Chiang which led Truman eventually to dismiss the general for insubordination. The whole U.S. apparently became emotionally involved in the China issue.

Victim of Red artillery fire. In the first six weeks of siege, 474,907 shells plastered the Quemoy outpost.



Map below shows Quemoy's precarious location, only a stone's throw from the Red Chinese port of Amoy.



How We Drifted Close to War

(Continued from Page 27)

the mainland, still held by the Nationalists. Given a "warrant" by the United States to reinsure him against the risks involved, Chiang would be able to re-deploy and strengthen his already-considerable forces on these islands. Thus, increased pressure would be brought to bear on the Chinese Communists, while the strengthening of the islands would also serve as a "symbol" of our determination to adopt a bold "forward" policy against the Chinese Communist aggressors. He made these proposals, Dulles said, in no partisan spirit. He had carefully studied the National Security Council papers on the subject, and he believed the course he advocated was encompassed in existing policy.

The initial reaction to this recital was tepidly polite. Allen Dulles asked a few factual questions, while Allison and Merrill complimented Dulles on his presentation. Then suddenly C. B. Marshall, of the Planning Staff, a big, articulate, irascible man, who was, among those present, low man on the bureaucratic totem pole, cast a bombshell into the placid bureaucratic scene.

It was nonsense, Marshall said, to say that such a course was authorized by existing policy. Truman's order to the Seventh Fleet was designed to prevent the spread of the Chinese civil war, whereas the course Dulles proposed would mean direct American intervention on one side in that war. Moreover, to give Chiang a "warrant" on the offshore islands would "convey to a foreign entity the power to involve the United States in war." As he warmed to his subject, Marshall launched into a passionate peroration. To convey to Chiang Kai-shek's "mendicant and neccessitous regime" a warrant that would permit that regime to drag the United States into a civil war would be an "act of supreme folly."

John Foster Dulles looked at Marshall as though he did not exist—a feat Dulles can perform brilliantly—and said not a word. There was an unhappy silence. Then Bohlen, the able diplomat, took over, asking Dulles questions which were politely phrased, but which nevertheless pointed up the risks involved in the course Dulles proposed. The meeting then broke up, on a strained and inconclusive note.

The story of this brief bureaucratic wrangle is worth recounting despite its inconclusive ending. In 1950, at the beginning of the Korean War, General MacArthur discussed with Averell Harriman "the problem of the island of Quemoy," remarking that it was "important [to the Chinese Nationalists] from the standpoint of eventually landing on the mainland, but had no value for the U.S." Otherwise, the meeting in Allen Dulles' office was the first occasion when the subject of the offshore islands was ever seriously discussed by policy-making officials. Before then, and indeed for a long time thereafter, only the specialists in such matters were aware of the existence of the little Nationalist-held islands like Quemoy, Little Quemoy, the Matsus and the Tachens, all within hardly more than a stone's throw of mainland China.

The dispute in Allen Dulles' office also sharply illuminated the bitter and passionate division on China policy which has plagued the American Government for many years, and still plagues it to this day. Finally, what John Foster Dulles said that day in his brother's office foreshadowed much that was to happen after he became Secretary of State.

Indeed, if one looks back, an odd pattern emerges. Dulles made two related

proposals that day in his brother's office. The first—that the Seventh Fleet should cease to "protect" the Chinese Communists—was loudly put into effect as soon as Dulles became Secretary, and then quietly, but effectively, reversed. The second—that the United States Government should offer Chiang a "warrant" on the offshore islands—was not consciously put into effect at all. Nevertheless, Chiang has his warrant, for all practical purposes. The granting of the warrant has just happened, rather as Topsy just "grewed," without Dulles or anybody else exactly planning it that way. The result, as we shall see, is a situation a good deal more "anomalous" than the one Dulles complained of in 1952.

Dulles' first important act as Secretary of State was expressed in certain phrases in President Eisenhower's first State of the Union message in January, 1953, which were written by Dulles and which were a paraphrase of what he had said in his brother's office. "We certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea," the President said, and he was therefore "issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China." This was, of course, the famous "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek (the word was not Dulles', but a newspaper invention). What was the "unleashing" all about?

Money won't buy health—but that's no excuse for not paying your doctor.

ANTHONY J. PETTITO

Critics of Dulles contend that it was all about politics—that it was a legalistic device to lend a color of reality to the campaign oratory about a "dynamic new foreign policy of liberation." But this is not fair to Dulles. Dulles was quite aware that the defeated Chinese Nationalists represented no serious threat to the Communists on the mainland—unless they had American air and naval support. But, as he has since explained the matter, Dulles wished to implant in the minds of the Communists the fear that Chiang might in fact get American support for an invasion of the mainland. The fear that this might happen, Dulles reasoned, would make them more ready to agree to an acceptable truce in Korea. Dulles, in short, was indulging in psychological warfare. As a gesture of psychological warfare, the unleashing no doubt made sense—Dulles is convinced that it helped to make the Korean truce possible. On the other hand, the President's new order to the Seventh Fleet, which was leaked in advance with much fanfare, was advertised by the new Administration's political propagandists as a great new departure in foreign policy, which it certainly was not.

In that strained moment in Allen Dulles' office, C. B. Marshall overstated his case. Even so, the danger to which he pointed was real—the danger that the Chinese Nationalist tail might end by wagging the American dog, and wagging the American dog right into war with mainland China. And there is no doubt on one point. Though Dulles may have looked at Marshall as though he did not exist, he was quite aware of the existence of this danger, as is suggested by another small bureaucratic episode from the past.

For a number of weeks after the new Administration took office, a few high officials of the old Administration remained insecurely in their posts. Early in 1953, two of these official ghosts-to-be—Gen. Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Paul Nitze, brilliant head of Dean Acheson's Policy Planning Staff—had a worried talk. What worried them was a promised shipment of jet planes to Formosa, which the new Administration had announced with a flourish. These planes, Bradley pointed out, had plenty of range for an attack on the mainland. If Chiang ordered them to shoot up the mainland, might he not start something we would have to finish?

Nitze and Bradley together drafted a paper for the new Secretary of State, proposing that Chiang should be asked to agree not to use the planes against the mainland without the concurrence of the American Government. Nitze then led a small delegation which presented the paper to Dulles. The delegation waited with curiosity and perhaps some slight trepidation for Dulles' reaction—the proposal, after all, certainly amounted to "protecting" or "shielding" the Chinese Communists from attack. Dulles read the paper, making the odd, small clicking noises which he makes when concentrating and penciling in a number of revisions as he read. When he handed it back, the paper had been sharply strengthened—under no circumstances was Chiang to get his new jets without the most explicit written agreement that they would not be used against the mainland without express American permission.

Thus began the "releashing" of Chiang. In the early '50's, the offshore islands were used by the Nationalists as expendable bases of operations against the Communists. Their chief use was for commando-type guerrilla raids on the mainland, which were sometimes mounted in battalion strength, and which were supported, as we shall see, by Allen Dulles' CIA. The islands were also used for reconnaissance, leaflet dropping, occasional bombing forays against the mainland and for blockading such Chinese Communist ports as Amoy, opposite Quemoy. Progressively, as a result of intense American pressure, all these activities have been ended, as the releasing process has gone on. During the recent crisis, John Foster Dulles hinted broadly that, if only the Chinese Communists would stop cutting up rough, Chiang Kai-shek would be so thoroughly released that the islands would not even be used for intelligence purposes, or for any other purpose that might annoy the Chinese Communists in any way.

Meanwhile, while the releasing of Chiang has been going on, we have been helping the Nationalists, with copious dollars, matériel and advice, to strengthen their forces on the offshore islands. In short, the stronger we have made Chiang's forces on the islands, the less we have permitted him to use them against the Communists. Surely this process, with its obvious overtones of Alice in Wonderland, has been "anomalous" enough for anyone. Yet the process has had a sort of built-in logic and inevitability of its own. What has been done has been done by reasonable men, for rational reasons.

Take the build-up of the Chinese Nationalist forces on the offshore islands. In numbers of troops, the build-up has not been all that great—there were supposedly between 50,000 and 60,000 Nationalist troops on Quemoy, for example, in 1951, about 80,000 by 1955, and there are about 85,000 today. But these numbers by no means tell the whole story. In the early days, many of the troops on the islands belonged to one or another of Chiang's

"phantom divisions," in which the official troop strength was double or quadruple the actual strength. The troops who were not phantoms were for the most part a rag-tag-and-bobtail lot. But as time went on, Chiang's best troops were increasingly committed to the islands, while Quemoy especially was progressively transformed from an expendable outpost into a fortress, a little Gibraltar, whose loss would be a major, perhaps a fatal, disaster for the Nationalist regime.

Secretary Dulles has said that the American Government did not "encourage" this build-up, but only "acquiesced." As far as any official, high-level decision by the American Government is concerned, this is quite true. But it is also quite true that official representatives of the American Government—notably the officers of the Military Advisory Group (MAG) which was sent to Formosa in 1951—unquestionably did encourage the build-up, especially after the famous "unleashing" order. One reliable witness who spent some time on Formosa in early 1953 recalls that "officers of the Chinese National Defense Ministry with whom I became friendly" were complaining at the time of the "constant pressure from MAG" to replace the expendable guerrillas on the island with first-line regulars and to beef up the defenses of the islands generally. "The project didn't make sense to them," he recalls, "and they were actively resisting it." Others who were on the spot at the time, including junior officers with the MAG, recall the same pressure from the Americans and the same initial resistance from the Chinese.

There was nothing sinister, or even surprising, about this American pressure to build up the offshore island defenses. "What the hell," one MAG officer has remarked, "we were sent out there to help the Chinats build up their defenses, so that is what we did." Maj. Gen. William Chase, who commanded MAG throughout this period, testifies: "Please remember, I was executing orders, not policy, if you please—that was decided at CINCPAC and in the Pentagon."

When Chase went to Formosa, CINCPAC, or Commander in Chief, Pacific, was Adm. Arthur Radford, who is a key figure in the offshore-islands story. In 1953, Radford moved up to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and thus top military man in the Pentagon. Radford has never made any bones about his views. He has long believed that a showdown with the Chinese Communists was inevitable sooner or later—the obvious conclusion from this premise being, the sooner the better. Radford agrees that any policy decisions involving the MAG were made not by Chase, but by CINCPAC or the Pentagon. Whether or not orders to press the Chinese Nationalists to build up their power on the offshore islands were actually issued in Radford's name, Radford undoubtedly approved of what was being done. By Radford, Chase and all concerned, the build-up on the offshore islands was regarded as an essentially military matter in any case.

The man directly responsible for whatever political implications may have been involved was Walter Robertson, the personally charming, passionately anti-Communist Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Robertson has angrily denied published reports that he approved and encouraged the build-up on Quemoy and the other islands. Indeed, he has said that, until the first heavy shelling of Quemoy in September, 1954, he was aware only dimly, if at all, of the existence of the offshore islands.

Yet MAG's pressure on the Chinese Nationalists to build up their forces on the offshore islands had very great po-

litical implications all the same. A great power is in an unhappy position if it encourages a small power to build up its forces in exposed positions, and then shrugs its shoulders and turns away if those positions are attacked. The American moral commitment to the islands was sharply increased, moreover, when, in early 1954, the MAG began taking over from Western Enterprises on the islands.

Western Enterprises, Inc., was the thoroughly blown cover name for the activities of the CIA in the area. The Western Enterprises—ostensibly “soldiers of fortune”—were responsible for organizing and equipping the Nationalist guerrillas who raided the mainland from the offshore islands, and, until early 1954, the islands were pretty much their exclusive playground. By that time they had settled themselves very comfortably on the islands. The story is told of an intrepid and attractive lady journalist who visited one of the Tachen Islands in early 1954. She noted that her fellow Americans, the Western Enterprises, were handsomely housed in a large barracks complete with PX and hot and cold running water, far more agreeable than the flea-bitten Chinese quarters to which she was assigned. In order to improve her living conditions, she tried to exercise her charms on the “spooks,” as the Western Enterprises were called; but, faithful to their nonexistent cover, they refused to speak to her. So she sent the head spook a note: “If you won’t speak to me, you might at least let me sleep with you.” She was assigned a comfortable billet.

On the initiative of CIA Chief Allen Dulles, Western Enterprises began to be liquidated in early 1954, and the MAG took over from the spooks. Before that, American officers in uniform had been discouraged from going to the islands, although a few had made brief inspection trips. Now the officers and men of the MAG began for the first time to be stationed permanently on the islands, notably Quemoy and the Tachens. Unlike the spooks, these men in American uniform could not be disavowed—they were a visible symbol of the American presence, as visible a symbol as the American flag which flew over their headquarters. In this way, a “warrant” to protect the offshore islands was for all practical purposes conveyed to Chiang Kai-shek—not by any high-level decision by Dulles or anyone else, not by any low-level plot, but by a slow, bureaucratic and somnambulist process.

The extent of the American commitment to the islands was tragically dramatized in the first week of September, 1954, when for the first time the Chinese Communists opened up on Quemoy with a heavy artillery barrage. On the day the shelling started, September third, two American officers of the MAG were killed—Lt. Col. Alfred Menendorp and Lt. Col. Frank W. Lynn. This shelling also set in train the first great crisis over the offshore islands, and insistently faced the American Government with the need to decide in what way, if at all, the unspoken, unwritten and even unconscious moral commitment to Chiang on the offshore islands was to be honored. And, although no more than a tiny handful of people knew it at the time, the American Government came very close to responding with a conditional decision to go to war with Red China.

When the shelling began, the American Government was, like *Gallia omnis*, divided into three parts. President Eisenhower was vacationing in Denver. Secretary Dulles, the indefatigable traveler, was in Manila, negotiating the SEATO Pact. Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in

Washington, were the first to react to the Quemoy shelling, which they interpreted as a probable prelude to an invasion of Quemoy. They immediately proposed that Chiang’s Air Force be permitted to bomb military objectives across from Quemoy, and this recommendation the President approved.

It was followed by a second recommendation, very much more far-reaching. Admiral Radford, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, with the support of Gen. Nathan Twining and Adm. Robert Carney, proposed that Chiang’s Air Force also be permitted to bomb targets far inland, as Chiang had requested. They further proposed that, if a retaliatory assault on Quemoy or on Formosa itself was launched by the Communists, American planes should join in attacking mainland targets, if need be with nuclear weapons. What the three chiefs were proposing, in short, was the showdown with Communist China which Radford had long believed inevitable, and perhaps desirable. Gen. Matthew Ridgway was the lone dissenter. As he wrote later, the other chiefs “sincerely felt, I think, that it was better to face the issue then and there. . . .” Ridgway, the lone ground soldier among the chiefs, did not believe in the theory of the majority that action could be confined to sea and air strikes. He felt that action would “spread to full and all-out war, employing all the weapons at our command,” and he called such a war for Quemoy “an unwarranted and tragic course.”

It has been reported that Dulles cabled his concurrence with the majority of the chiefs from Manila, and that the chiefs and Dulles were subsequently overruled when President Eisenhower sided with Ridgway. This is not accurate. Instead of cabling his views, Dulles cabled back to the Pentagon two questions, which may be paraphrased as follows: Can Quemoy be defended successfully against an all-out assault? And are Quemoy and the other offshore islands essential to the defense of Formosa?

Meanwhile, in Washington, Ridgway had found two allies. One was Robert Bowie, who had inherited Nitze’s job as chief of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. Bowie, who has since resigned, is a cautious fellow, and under him the planning staff lost much of its old influence. But on this occasion Bowie played a key role in the unfolding of events.

When the Joint Chiefs’ proposal came to his desk, Bowie’s hair stood on end in horror, and he immediately voiced his horror to Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, then Undersecretary of State. A ground soldier like Ridgway, Smith shared Ridgway’s distrust of the theory of the “immaculate war.” He telephoned his old chief, Eisenhower, in Denver, and pointed out that the majority proposal of the Joint Chiefs, which might lead to global thermonuclear war, was not something to be decided lightly. The President agreed and called for a National Security Council meeting in Denver on September twelfth, the day of Secretary Dulles’ scheduled return.

Bowie felt so strongly about the issue that, on his own initiative, he flew out to California and boarded Dulles’ plane when it landed to refuel at Travis Air Force Base. On the way to Denver, Bowie argued passionately against the showdown course recommended by the chiefs. Meanwhile, Dulles had been provided with the official answers to the two questions he had cabled from Manila. With the inevitable dangling qualifications, the answers were in the negative.

The meeting of the National Security Council, which took place in the comfortable officers’ club of the Lowry Air Force Base soon after Dulles landed in Denver, must have had an undercurrent of high drama. Everyone knew that war or peace might depend on the decisions taken in that room. Everyone also knew that the views of the Secretary of State, unknown before the meeting, would carry great weight with the President, who must make the final decision. In the past, moreover, Dulles had been identified with the Radford-Robertson group, which favored a very tough policy toward the Chinese Communists. But, on this occasion, no doubt due in part to the heart-felt air-borne persuasions of Bowie, Dulles favored a compromise course. He used the negative answers to the two questions he had cabled from Manila to support the view that American forces should intervene only on one condition—if an attack on the offshore islands was clearly the prelude to an attack on Formosa.

This argument met with little persuasive opposition, and the President ruled in its favor. The President’s ruling amounted to a decision to avoid a showdown if possible, rather than a decision to force a

showdown, as three of the four Joint Chiefs had proposed. Everything that has happened since has related to that basic decision in Denver, which is still the decision guiding American policy as this is written. Right or wrong, it was surely one of the most crucial decisions any President has taken in our history.

The President’s decision did not, to be sure, end the argument. In the private counsels of the Government, Radford argued strongly for at least a blockade of Red China. When the Chinese Communists imposed brutal sentences on thirteen American prisoners in their hands, Sen. William Knowland, then a powerful figure on Capitol Hill, publicly called for a blockade of the China mainland. Thus the pressure for further action against Communist China—or at least some gesture—mounted, while the President and Dulles continued to resist the pressure. A key moment came with the Communist assault on the tiny island of Ichang or Yikiang—there are other spellings—in the Tachen group in January, 1955. The corporal’s guard of Chinese Nationalist troops on the island resisted bravely, but they were slaughtered to a man by junk-borne Communists.

Dulles had an uncharacteristically emotional reaction to the Ichang assault. There was, it seems, a distinction in his mind between the shelling of Quemoy and the assault on Ichang—the latter involved the “direct” use of force, and was thus “a challenge” to the United States as well as the Nationalists. It was agreed that the assault was a prelude to an attack on the Tachen group of islands, which were, for reasons of geography, indefensible from Formosa. Dulles’ first impulse was to offer the Chinese Nationalists a flat, unconditional guaranty to defend Quemoy and the Matsus, embodied in a Senate resolution, in exchange for an agreement to evacuate the Tachens under the protection of the Seventh Fleet.

There is no doubt, indeed, that Chiang and his foreign minister, George Yeh—now Ambassador to the United States—firmly believed that Dulles had offered just such a guaranty, or “warrant,” to use the word Dulles had used almost three years before. In any event, as the outcome of a brief but bitter debate within the Government, Dulles was overruled by the President. In this debate Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson played a key role. Wilson has no compunctions about repeating himself, and he kept saying over and over, “It’s easy enough to get into a war with China, but how do you get out of the war?” More important, it became clear that a flat guaranty on the offshore islands would meet bitter opposition in the Senate. So in the end, the Formosa resolution as submitted to the Senate—to the fury of Chiang and George Yeh, who felt that they had been double-crossed—left the matter of defending the offshore islands ambiguous. These “related areas,” Administration spokesmen explained, were to be defended only if, in the President’s judgment, an attack on the islands was the prelude to an attack on Formosa itself.

The Formosa resolution was, in short, a paraphrase of the position Dulles had taken in the Denver meeting in September. Yet, by Dulles’ own standards, there was—and still is—a glaring weakness in the policy embodied in the Formosa resolution. Dulles is the chief exponent of the view, which he has often expressed, that the best way to avoid a war is to draw a firm and precise line, and tell the potential enemy that to overstep that line means war. Under the Formosa resolution, no final line is drawn, and American intentions are left, by Dulles’ own reasoning, dangerously ambiguous.



Dulles had tried to correct this weakness, of which he was unhappily aware, by drawing the line between the mainland and Quemoy and the Matsus. He had been overruled by the President. The President then tried to draw his own line—this time in the Formosa Straits, leaving out the offshore islands. In April, the President summoned Dulles to his vacation headquarters in Augusta, Georgia, and told him in effect that he had concluded that it ultimately would be best for all concerned for the Nationalists, with American logistical support, to evacuate the offshore islands. Dulles agreed, and the two men drafted a letter to Chiang for the President's signature, urging him to evacuate the islands and offering American help to that end, plus iron-bound guarantees on Formosa and the Pescadores. At Dulles' suggestion, the two men in the government most closely identified with Chiang's cause—Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson and Adm. Arthur Radford—were chosen to deliver what must have seemed to Chiang a poisoned chalice.

The mission was a hideously difficult one—the moment when Robertson produced from his pocket the letter from the President must have been horribly uncomfortable. Officers under Radford's orders, after all, had encouraged Chiang to transform the islands into little fortresses, and thus into symbols of Chiang's dream of a return to the mainland. And here were Chiang's friends, come to his house to urge him to abandon what they had helped to build, and to abandon his dream as well.

How strong was the urging? It has been said that Robertson and Radford undercut their own mission, because they did not believe in it—that they argued weakly, gave in easily. Queried on this point, Robertson has replied: "If anyone says that to me, I'll call him a liar to his face." Robertson is an honorable man, and the transcript of the conversation with Chiang, according to those who have seen that secret document, bears him out. In any case, it probably matters little how persuasive Robertson and Radford were. For Chiang flew into a coldly bitter rage, said that he would no more abandon his islands than he would desecrate the graves of his ancestors. On April twenty-sixth, after less than two days on Formosa, Robertson and Radford flew home again, their mission a failure.

Almost immediately after the Radford-Robertson mission, something curious happened. The great crisis over the offshore islands, which had dominated the headlines and the thoughts of the policy makers for months, suddenly died, as though it had never been. Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai remarked graciously that he would consent to negotiate with the Americans about "relaxing tensions in the Formosa Strait," while the Soviet leaders began to make cooing noises in preparation for the Geneva Summit Conference. And so, as by the wave of a Communist magic wand, the crisis simply disappeared from view.

The President had made a basic policy decision—that evacuation of the offshore islands was in the vital American interest. But when the pressure eased, the decision was forgotten about, and the whole messy business was shoved under the rug, where it remained for almost three and a half years. But last August, the Chinese Communists flipped over the rug, exposed the messy business and rubbed our faces in it.

There is no space here to go into detail about this year's crisis over Quemoy. Nor is there any good reason to do so. There is little real significance in the inner history of the 1958 crisis, simply because the basic decisions had already

been made in 1954 and 1955. The only really new decision was the decision not to permit Chiang to use his air force over the mainland even against the Chinese Communist batteries which were shelling Quemoy, as he had been permitted to do in 1954-55.

Knowledgeable observers, like the editors of the Washington Post and Times-Herald, claimed to detect a "marked change of American policy" in the direction of a "two-China policy" during the course of the 1958 crisis. Cited as evidence were President Eisenhower's Dulles-

become the policy of Chiang's Nationalist government, or for that matter of Mao Tse-tung's Communist government, and it is not today. To any suggestions that he should be content with building a model society on Formosa, Chiang responds with the cold fury he displayed to Robertson and Radford in 1955. And whether in the secret talks in Warsaw or in propaganda broadcasts, the Chinese Communists repeat again and again that they are not interested simply in taking Quemoy and the offshore islands. They intend, they say, to "liberate" Formosa

been decided at CINCPAC and the Pentagon. It ought to have been decided at the White House and the State Department. For what Chase and his people were doing had very grave political implications, involving as it did an American moral commitment to defend the offshore islands. Where such implications are involved, it is the business of the civilian authority, and not the military, to make the final decisions, as provided in the Constitution.

Second, the tendency ought also to be resisted to let catchwords and attitudes, based on situations which have wholly changed, determine policy. The Republicans, for example, had a valid case against the Democratic conduct of Asia policy—few sensible people now defend the publicly announced decision of the Truman Administration in 1950, before the Korean War started, to abandon Formosa to the Communists. Moreover, while we were fighting the Chinese Communists in Korea, both the "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek and the build-up on the offshore islands made sense, at least as psychological warfare.

But after the Korean truce was signed, in July, 1953, these policies ceased to make sense—unless, of course, a policy of preventive showdown were to be adopted. Perhaps such a policy should have been adopted. Perhaps Radford and his supporters were right in September, 1954. Perhaps, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, we should have strangled the Communist Chinese baby in his bath, before he became a giant powerful enough to strangle us. But, in 1954 and 1955, the Eisenhower Administration decided against a policy of showdown, and in favor of avoiding a showdown if possible.

The natural corollary of that decision was the "two-China policy" of "releasing" and "disengagement," which was in fact adopted. But because of all that had gone before, like the fanfare over the "unleashing," the fact that this policy had been adopted could not be publicly acknowledged—it is not publicly acknowledged today—and the American people could not be persuaded of the need for it. Thus, when Chiang angrily refused to agree to the President's proposal to evacuate the islands, nothing more was done, and the whole messy problem was shoved under the rug.

And this suggests the final conclusion. The President and Dulles were surely right not to scuttle and run when the Chinese Communists renewed the pressure some weeks ago. If necessary, at whatever risk, our pledge under the Formosa resolution must be honored. But if ever we are granted another breathing spell, as we were after April, 1955, we cannot again afford to sigh with relief and shove the mess under the rug, for if we do, the mess will surely be rubbed in our faces again, more painfully than ever.

"You must understand," the officials say, "that Chiang is not our satellite." That is true. But it is also true that the American Government is not a satellite of Chiang. And the time must come when the President's decision of April, 1955, is followed to its logical conclusion. The time must come when we must tell the Chinese Nationalists that, if they refuse to evacuate their troops and civilians from the offshore islands, with our guarantee of safe conduct, that is their responsibility, and not ours.

As for the Chinese Communists, we would then—but only then—be in a position to face them with a united country and the support of the free world. We could then say to Mao Tse-tung, "If you want to take Formosa and chase us out of the Western Pacific, go ahead and try, and we will see who gets a bloody nose"—and mean every word of it. THE END

NEXT WEEK

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inspired statement in August comparing Quemoy to Berlin, and Dulles' efforts in September and October to persuade Chiang to reduce his forces on Quemoy and renounce the use of force against the mainland. In fact, there has been no real change. A "two-China policy" was clearly implicit in the 1954 decision to avoid a showdown and the 1955 decision to try to persuade Chiang to evacuate the islands. For if a showdown was to be avoided, Chiang must be prevented from invading the mainland, and the offshore islands would then become not only useless but also a positive liability.

In short, semantics aside, a two-China policy became for all practical purposes the policy of the American Government more than three years ago. But it did not

and to drive the Americans out of the Western Pacific.

So there we stand today, and that is the curious story of the offshore islands, or as much of it as a reasonably diligent reporter can uncover and crowd into a few thousand words. What does it mean?

The reader who wishes to answer that question for himself should stop right here. But this exercise in hindsight has suggested certain conclusions to this reporter, and for anyone who is interested, they may be listed as follows:

First, we must resist the tendency of the military to move in and determine policy wherever the civilians leave a vacuum. "Policy, if you please," writes General Chase, "was decided at CINCPAC and the Pentagon." Policy ought not to have

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