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The Cuban Revolution and the American Dilemma, 1960.

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND THE AMERICAN DILEMMA

THE TEMPLE March 27, 1960

Rabbi Daniel Jeremy Silver

The story is told of a fledgling correspondent who was sent from his American newspaper to cover one of the "Banana Republics" of Latin America. He reported for duty to the veberan newspaper man who had been assigned in this republic for many years, and he was assigned the night shift. The veteran correspondent was worried that this young man might not know how to cover any unusual or exciting events which might occur. And so he advised him that if anything out of the ordinary came to pass he should call him by telephone even if it was in the middle of the night. The first night the young man received news that a palace revolution was in progress, and, excited, hastily he ran to the telephone to call his senior and advised him of these tremendous new events. His answer: "Why did you wake me up? There is certainly nothing exciting about a revolution here."

Revolutions are and were endemic in Latin and South America. A new Chief of State, a new Chief of Staff, but the old order remained, politically, economically, and socially. "Plus on change, plus la memo chose." The more change, the more sameness. But for the most part, these political revolutions were cook-fights between caudillos, between strong men and potential strong men who fought between their factions over control of patronage and privilege and power. But of late the revolutions of Latin America have assumed a new dimension of significance. Since 1955 moven dictators, seven tyrents have been overthrown, six of them by

revolution. And when the middle class of Argentina rose against Juan Peron three years age he was ousted, not by another strong man seeking to assume the power which Peron held, but rather he was ousted by a congregation of the laboring classes, of the peasant classes and of the middle class, who were insisting for civil rights, freedom, an end to censorship, an end to oppression, an end to the graft and the misgovernment which had been their lot. Since 1955 and for a decade or so before the revolutions of Latin and South America had been indications, inarticulate but inexorable, of the dawning in that part of the world of a new age.

As you will recall, Latin America was settled, conquered, colonized and exploited largely by the Spanish, and to the Spaniard the Latin American owes his genteel manners, his generous impulses, the grace of his bearing. But of all the countries of Europe, the Spanish monarchy was the least able to adjust itself to the challenges of the Renaissance and of modern times. The Spanish empire of the Middle Ages faltered and fell into an oblivion, a disgrace from which she has even now not raised herself. And so it was with her colonies, even with those colonies who one by one in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries won their independence. For the aristocracy of these colonies were too proud to sully their hands with industry and with commerce. The Church in these colonies was too aristocratic to concern itself with teaching the people how to read and how to write, to develop for them their tastes for better education and better housing and better laboring conditions. The prejudices of the Spanish nobility were too high to allow them to adjust to the stress, to the challenges of modern society. But of course no country can put up a sign, "Twentieth century not wanted here". These countries are rich -- rich in bananas, rich in coffee, rich in rubber, rich in tin, magnesium, rich in oil, and the Dutch and the British and the French and the Americans came into these countries and they brought with them new machinery, new engineering techniques, new ways of living and new ideas.

And the sons of the aristocracies of these countries went to school at Oxford and Cambridge and Harvard and Yale, and they brought back to their fatherlands and motherlands the works of Mr. Thomas Jefferson and Mr. Adam Smith and Mr. Karl Marx. And missionaries came to these countries -- missionaries who were determined to teach the -- what the Germans would have called the "Lumpen proletariat" -- the mass how to read, how to think. Their tastes were developed for better things. A new age dawned and is dawning slowly upon these countries. And the technique of change, politically, is the revolution, because these Latin and South American countries have no tradition of democratic machinery. A political debate is not resolved at the voting place, but largely by violence. Those countries which have a democratic machine largely see these machines used by tyrants, by those who usurp power, to justify the usurpation which has already taken place.

Democracy has not yet developed traditions, it is not yet effective. So change can take place only violently, only by force, only through revolution.

We in the United States have the/unfortunate habit of judging diplomatic changes outside of our borders by black-and-white standards. We like to think of them in terms of a T.V. Western serial. There is the easily identifiable villain, the tyrant, closked in black, whom we hiss instinctively when he walks on the stage. And there is the equally easily identifiable hero, a man of courage, a man of bravery, a man whose ideals are the same as ours, and we applaud, and we shout "bravo" as he walks upon the stage. And then there is the violence, the gun-play, the hero triumphs, and justice and law are brought to Dodge City for ever after. Well, unfortunately, when the hero triumphs in Latin America, if he does triumph in Havana or in Bogeta or in Caracas or in Buenos Aires, law and peace do not always come to those cities for ever after. Because you can not think of politics in this monochromatic scale of good and evil, black and white. It is panchromatic. The heroes range from the extreme of bravery to

the extreme of folly, and all in-between characteristics are merged sometimes into one man.

Colombia had a hero-liberator, a Moses, who became the worst tyrant in their history. And on the other hand Peru had a tyrant who allowed the will of the people to vote him out of office.

So it is difficult to make easy, universal judgments about events south of our border. We must see these men as heroes and as human beings, men of foibles, men of accomplishment, men of failings, men with whom we agree and men with whose policies we must sometimes disagree. Because these are the agents of change, and Latin America is trying to cover the road of change, the road that took us four hundred years, in perhaps four years, or at most four decades, quickly. And the change which she is trying to effect is a violent change and it is often being effected in ways with which we can not agree.

The events in Cuba, the events which have been so often headlined in our paper in recent months, are a case in point. Here we have a traditional Western hero type, Fidel Castro. A young man, a strong man, a man courageous and brave, and a man dedicated to the principle of freedom for his people. And the arm band which his olive-dressed warriors carried into battle with them, the ban which read "The Twenty-Sixth of July", is testament of this philosophy of freedom. For on the twenty-sixth of July in the year 1953 Fedel Castro, then a young law student, raised in rebellion some one hundred of his fellow students against the first excesses of the Batista regime, and they attacked the police garrison in Santiago de Cuba, and the attack was repulsed, and many died, and Castro was caught and imprisoned and tried. And in an act of great personal bravery this young Castro stood before his accusers, in a court convinced already of his guilt, and he recited in open court the whole litany of Batista's villainies, and he accepted without plea his imprisonment, and he was freed from that imprisonment only when a general amnesty was granted. He went immediately into

exile, to persevere, to plan again, to overthrow a man whom he and his fellow

Cubans felt anew had not only usurped power but had undertaken a program of

planned police action determined to wipe out and suppress all anti-Batista

thought and feeling and expression in the land. Batista was economically perhaps
a sound leader, but his hands were sullied in blood, in the blood of his political
opponents whom he had one by one silenced, , or murdered.

In December of 1956 the young Castro landed again in Cuba. He and thirteen of the young men who landed with him were able to get away safely into the fastness of the Sierra Maestra Mountains, and there for three and a half long years he fought and he worked and he planned and he built for the overthrow of the Batista regime which he accomplished just fifteen months ago. Here is a hero, a Washington, a man who personally led his troops into battle, a man who drew into himself all the feelings of Cuba, a desire to break out of the chains of their captor and of their tyrants and to win for themselves a new day. And this Castro we can admire without equivocation.

But the revolt in Cuba is a complex phenomenon. It has not only a philosobegin phy -- freedom -- a philosophy which we, as Jews, who hardwarm our history in a cry for freedom could well understand -- but it has a psychology, and the psychology is purity, and this we find somewhat strange. Castro is a young man. He is only thirty-four years of age. The average age of the volunteers who fought with him throughout these three and a half years was less than nineteen years. Strangely, the older people of Cuba, the fathers of these volunteers, even if they had a tradition of being anti-Batista politically, were not welcome into his hosts. This was a revolt of the young against the old, not only of the freedom-loving against the tyrant.

You remember that when Batista was overthrown and fled to the Dominican Republic Castro hesitated for many days before he advanced upon Havana, the capital itself. He did not want to come to Havana. Why? Because Havana was the city of wickedness, the Sodom and Gemorrah of Cuba. Here it was that the fathers, even the democratic fathers had accepted bribery and graft. Here it was that a people's morals were fun-loving rather than strict. And if you have read of the revolt of Castro you know that his personal integrity and the integrity of his government has been above reproach, something absolutely unique in Cuban history, that he has tried to turn the Cubans aside from their pleasure loving, fun loving, indifferent ways and awaken them to what he considers to be the characteristics, the moral characteristics required of young men and women in the twentieth century.

The Castro rebellion has something about it of the nature of the decision which was made by the Jews when they left Egypt. None of the fathers who knew Egypt were deemed sufficiently strong of mind and of purpose to attempt the conquest of the promised land. None of the fathers in Cuba were deemed sufficiently dedicated, sufficiently aware of the challenges, the changes required for the new age to be worthy of taking part in and building the new Cuba. There is a philosophy there in this revolution and there is a psychology deeply embedded in it. And since it is a revolt of young people -- "The young men see visions" -and the young men are impatient, it is a revolt which is in a hurry, a hurry to accomplish its ends. Often in the past great manifestos have been written by and others, great manifestos Cuban leaders, by the and the which catalogued Cuba's ills and the methods which they proposed to cure these ills, and these manifestos were used at election time, and man much like our own political platforms, were filed away for use four years later. Not so with Castro's revolution. They knew the ills of Cuba -- absolute dependence upon one crop, sugar; sixty-one percent of the land is sowed in sugar can, one third of the economy depends upon the sugar crop. Any imbalance in the world's sugar market devastates the budget, does devastate the finance of Cuba. The evils were known. Twenty percent of Cuba's arable land was never summed sown with any crop because most of Cuba's land was owned by a few individuals, many absentee

landlords indifferent to the welfare of their people, indifferent to the welfare of their country. Cuba had an unfortunate balance of trade. She had to import more than she exported because she produced raw materials and not manufactured products.

And so we see, in the last fifteen months, a government in a hurry, expropriating land, developing campaigns of buying Cuban goods -- "Cuba for the Cubans" -- developing high tariff walls to prevent the Cubans from spending their dollars and their silver abroad, impatient with old ways of doing business, insisting that new schools, new hospitals, new roads, new programs of public works be put into effect. And much has been effected. Five thousand school buildings in a single year. Thirteen major hospital complexes. Miles upon miles of roads. Hundreds upon thousands of workers' cooperatives and workers' housing. But much of this has been done without due regard to accepted practice of business or of law. The land has been expropriated with promises of repayment but as yet with no actual pledge of repayment. These are the hallmarks of young men in a hurry, young men who sometimes overreach themselves, sometimes overstep the bounds of propriety, sometimes often overstep the bounds of legality. But of young men who accomplish and whom perhaps for their accomplishment, we can forgive greatly.

This is a revolution of young men and of young men in a hurry, young men who are impatient. And this impatience causes us the most worry, because the government of Cuba is today not a democratic government. The government of Cuba is Fedel Castro. He has been too impatient to relax his control of all aspects of the government. He does not want bureaucracy to set in. He does not want plans to be shifted from one desk to another without anything being accomplished. And his impatience has arrogated all power to him. As Lord Acton so well has reminded generation upon generation of observers, power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely. And there is danger that Castro may never be willing to turn over bit by bit the powers which he has assumed unto himself, to allow the machinery of democracy to feed and to begin to grow and to develop in Cuba.

And if this be true, then whatever his accomplishments in all other spheres, he will become in time a tyrant like unto the tyrant he deposed, and Cuba's revolution will not be a new birth of freedom but simply a new indication that the forces which will inevitably establish freedom in Cuba are at work underly whatever political situation exists there.

Now, what can we learn, you and I, Americans, from Castro's rebellion? We can learn many things. We can learn first of all why it is that America is so often hated, disliked about our world. Castro has made the United States the whipping boy of the revolution. He is a fluent, able speaker. His speeches are unendurably long for anyone who is not a Cuban, and they turn and return to a single theme, and that is that it is the American economic imperialism which brought about Batista, the ills of yesterday, and that Cuba must free itself of American grasp, of American control, and must find its way alone in the new world. Now we do not like to be attacked, and if we were to recite the litary of our accomplishments in Cuba they are many. We have time and again lent Cuba needed millions to prevent her from becoming impossibly entangled in debt. We have sent many technicians. We are responsible for having wiped out the yellow fever epidemic which annually destroyed and decimated her population. We have supported free elections whenever we could. But equally, equally we are guilty of many sins against Cuba. During the Batista regime, especially during the last seven years of his power, the American ambassadors to Cuba were wholehearted supporters of Batista. Batista was bringing economic security to Cuba. He was making Cuba a tourists' paradise. Never before had the great American corporations who had so many hundreds of millions of dollars invested in Cuba -- never before had these great corporations enjoyed such stable profits and operating conditions. Indeed, Mr. Gardner, one of our ambassadors of this period, was so fulsome in his praise that Mr. Batista had to request of the United States government that he tone down his comments, that he was in a sense overwhelming Batista with his praise and

this was not setting well with the Cubans themselves. Never once, during the seven years of Batista's regime did an American ambassador decry the political murders, denounce the assumption of unmerited, unwarranted power. Never once during these years did an American ambassador speak out against the imposition of a secret service, of thought control, of censorship upon the cubans. And most unfortunate of all, during this period in the name of the cold war we supplied Batista with millions of dollars worth of arms, and these arms were never used against a single Russian, of course, but they did kill many a partisan of the July twenty-sixth revolution.

America had a great chance in Cuba. In 1898 we were ceded Cuba in trust for her citizens at the end of the Treaty of Paris which concluded the Spanish-American War. Our troops occupied Cuba for three years, and during those years great advances were made in education and housing and transportation and the establishment of democratic procedures. Then, at the end of those three years, we granted freedom and independence to the Cubans but added what was known as the Platt Amendment, which stated that we could interfere in Cuban activities internally whenever the conditions warranted it. And from 1902 till the 1930s when President Roosevelt withdrew the Platt Amendment, we often did interfere in the Cuban economy and Cuban politics. But never once in that time did we complain against the graft which was endemic in the political system of Cuba. Never once in that time did we tell the Cubans, who have a seventy percent rate of illiteracy, "We will lend you the money. Be busy about destroying this illiteracy." Rather, we interfered in Cuba whenever our economic investments there were threatened by uncertainty of government. We could have taught the Cubans how to live in the twentieth century. We could have taught them how to make democracy work. We could have spanked the fingers of those who attempted to usurp power, but instead we encouraged them in their usurpation because strong government means good business. It is no wonder that the Cubans look askance upon we in the United

States, however good most of our intentions may be. And if we can learn any one thing from the Cuban revolution, it is this: though we have strategic needs all about the world, and though we must protect American inverstment throughout the world, pre-eminent of all the requirements of United States policy must be an affirmation of what is dearest and most essential to us, our love of liberty, our desire to see democratic institutions established, our insistence upon civil rights and upon justice.

R. Hart Phillips, the long time New York Times correspondent in Havana, in a recent book made these observations:

Anti-American sentiment in Latin America is directly related to the United States' failure to support and encourage the establishment and maintenance of democracy. Latin Americans are bewildered by the American foreign policy. They see the United States striving to establish democracy in distant lands, Japan, Germany, Korea, while failing to support democracy in Latin America, where people are striving for participation in their national affairs.

For many years the United States has recognized any dictator who managed to seize a country in Latin America. I point out two examples -- Truijillo and Somoza. Both of these were supported by the administrations of Roosevelt, of Truman, and of Eisenhower. Recognition of any government in Latin America implies approval, despite anything the United States Department of State might say, and no Latin American will ever be convinced to the contrary. The United States should never recognize any government in Latin America which obtains power by force of arms, without regard to whether the leader is a "dictator" or a "liberator".

The shameful support to existing dictators in Latin America should be withdrawn. No loans should be made to these dictators. All shipments of arms and ammunition from the United States should be halted. The dictators should be advised in an open note, made public to the world, that the United States looks with disfavor on the disregard for human rights in their territories. This policy must be maintained regardless of world political situations. It would increase United States' prestige and give Latin American peoples confidence that their big neighbor to the north decided at last to see to it that democracy came into being below the Rio Grande.

The decision of the United States to send arms and military missions was an unfortunate one. The basic idea behind it was that these countries should learn to defend themselves and to help the United States in times of war. Although excellent in theory, in practice it became one of the greatest hindrances to friendly re-

lations with the people of Latin America. These arms have been used again and again to oppress and to enslave the peoples of the countries that received them. The United States military missions have inadvertently trained the armies and navies and air forces of these countries only to fight against their own people, not a foreign enemy. Cuba and Venezuela are sad examples of the evils such a policy can produce. Army, navy and air missions of the United States should be immediately withdrawn from Latin America. The United States should realize that the Latin American countries will not at the present time contribute troops to any war of a major scale in which the United States may be involved. Perhaps, if the proper policy were followed Latin Americans might one day consider any war in which the United States was involved their war.

A new age is coming to the world. We see it in Africa, Southeast Asia, in Latin and South America. Its dimensions are nationalism, industrialization, the demand of the peasantry and the worker for a fair share of the prosperity of his nation, the demands of the woman for equal rights, the increase of the rate of literacy throughout the world. Powers have been set in motion which will bring the twentieth century into these nations, and these powers, once unleashed, can never be recalled. Unleashed, these powers will unsettle all these countries. That is why I speak of these revolutions as panchromatic, as made up of many colors, good and bad and indifferent alike. If we, as the United States are concerned, honestly and sincerely concerned with helping the peoples of the world, then we must see to it on the one hand that we do nothing to increase the pressures and the powers of the vested interests now in authority -- who seek only to continue the past and its special privileges -- and on the other hand we not only must encourage in every way that we can, these countries/to progress economically, which is Russia's wish as well as our own, but to develop democratically, which is our own wish alone.

If these countries are to have freedom and to enjoy it in perpetuity, if they are not to come into the twentieth century as -- to use the Russian term -- economic democracies, advanced technological nations under some strong man or strong men, but iffthey are truly to have freedom then we must welcome the young people of these nations into our universities and into our cities and into our

homes, where they can learn by example, by osmosis, the techniques of America.

Then we must stand in their eyes as a nation determined to help every group which seeks to establish freedom. We must not be too harsh with their excesses — and their excesses will be many, and they will give us cause for complaint — because these are young men with a vision. History is marching with them. They have no experience as we have experience with the realities of day to day twentieth century living. Their mind dreams sometimes beyond — beyond what is feasible, beyond what is possible, beyond what is right. But we must help them to dream, and help them to build. This; then, is our challenge, and I am sure that it is a challenge which we happily undertake. For it is a challenge to be only one thing — ourselves. Not economists to the world, not militarists to the world, but the advocate of democracy to our world.

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The United States is confronted with a problem of servival in the face of the Russian military conspiracy to gain control of the world by force. There is no doubt that our foreign policy at the present time will be the determining factor in our continued existence as a sovereign, independent nation. Anti-American sentiment in Latin America is directly related to the United States' failure to support and encourage the establishment and maintenance of democracy. Latin Americans are bewildered by the American foreign policy. They see the United States striving to establish democracy in distant lands, such as Japan, Germany, and Korea, while failing to support democracy in Latin America, where people are striving for participation in their national affairs.

For many years the United States has recognized any dictator who managed to seize a country in Latin America. I point cut two examples—

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Truijille and Somoza, who were supported by the administrations of

Prenklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and new by President Eisenhower.

Recognition of any government in Latin America implies approval, despite anything the United States Department of State might say, and no Latin American will ever be convinced to the contrary. The United States should never recognize any government in Latin America which obtains power by force of arms, without regard to whether the leader is a "dictator" or a "liberator." An announcement should be made to the world that the policy of the United States has changed, that new governments will be recognized only after a period of one year, during which it will be observed whether the liberator calls for elections and gives the people a chance to choose their government.

The shameful support to existing dictators in Latin America should be withdrawn. No loans should be made to these dictators. All shipments of arms and ammunition from the United States should be halted. The dictators should be advised in an open note, made public to the world, that the

United States looks with disfavor on the disregard for human rights in their territories. This policy must be maintained regardless of world political situations. It would increase United States' prestige with the people of Latin America and give them confidence that their big neighbor to the north has decided at last to see to it that democracy came into being below the Rio Grande.

The highly touted "economic assistance" which the American liberals state is the answer to Latin-American problems is a dangerous policy.

Loans and gifts have created hatred of the United States in most of the countries of the world. The money is, almost invariably, drained off in graft by the administration in power. Latin-American countries need financial assistance in developing their resources. Make no mistake about that. However, this assistance should be handled by an Inter-American Development Bank in which all the countries are stockholders.

Loans should be given only on projects which have been checked and verified by experts as to their cost, usefulness and suitability to the country in question. Control of the money spent on these projects should be retained by the bank. There should be no gifts.

The decision of the United States to send arms and military missions to latin American countries was an unfortunate one. The basic idea behind it was that these countries should learn to defend themselves and to help the United States in times of war. Although excellent in theory, in practice it became one of the greates hindrances to friendly relations with the people of latin America. These arms have been used again and again to oppress and enslave the peoples of the countries that received them. The United States military missions have inadvertently trained the armies navies and air forces of these countries only to fight against their own peoples, not a foreign enemy. Cuba and Venezuela are sad examples of the evils such a policy can produce. Army, navy and

air missions of the United States should be immediately withdrawn from Latin America. Officers of these countries could be trained in the United States if so requested by the countries. The United States should realize that the Latin American countries will not at the present time contribute troops to any war in which the United States may be involved. Perhaps, if the proper policy were followed Latin Americans might one day consider any war in which the United States was involved as their war.

