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The Tragedy of Vietnam, 1965.

Western Reserve Historical Society 10825 East Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio 44106 (216) 721-5722 wrhs.org American Jewish Archives 3101 Clifton Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio 45220 (513) 487-3000 AmericanJewishArchives.org THE TRAGEDY OF VIET NAM Sunday, February 21, 1965 The Temple

#140 89/94

Rabbi Daniel Jeremy Silver

The United States has stumbled and backed up into our third Asian war in twenty-five years. We first came into Southeast Asia as part of our military operations against the Japanese. At the end of the Second World War we left. The United States never has had vital political, economical or military interests in this far-away part of the world. The Cold War brought us back to Southeast Asia at the end of the Second World War. A Nationalist front was organized in Indo China for the purpose of driving out the French colonial regime. The Communists took a major role in this liberation drive. In 1953 Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, noticing the presence of these Communists and concerned that the French were falling into inevitable defeat, was most eager that the United States involve itself militarily to bail out the French. His rationalization then was the now familiar dominoe theory, which remains the major expressed justification of United States commitment till this day. According to this theory, any nation which is communist subverts and weakens the nations around its borders. Therefore, an iron ring must be drawn around the Sino Soviet bloc, and the free world must be prepared to abort invasion or insurgency or subversion wherever these may appear. Dulles argued that if Indo China were to go Communistic, Burma, Malaysia and the Philippines would be seriously threatened. In testimony before a Congressional Committee last week, Secretary MacNamara

repeated this justification almost word for word. On the surface of it the dominoe theory seems simple and self-evident. Unfortunately, it is not so. It commits us to global military intervention. Wherever a revolution roils and Communists are found among the revolutionaries, which means everywhere, we must intrude to stabilize the government. In the first place we lack the financial wherewithal and the military power to stabilize all the governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, wherever our world is in tumult and confusion. Then, too, the dominoe theory puts us in opposition to our own aid. We become the support of the bayonets and the tanks of the governments of the privileged and hated who for centuries have dominated the peasansts and the laborers and the illiterate, all those who now clamor for their place in the sun. The longer we support these greedy and privileged regimes, the more violent will the revolution be and the more dominant the place of disciplined Communist cadres in the inevitable revolution. In a paradoxic way, our determination to stablize non-communist or anti-communist governments has contributed to Communist strength in the emerging nations. And so it is that following out the illogic of this dominoe theory we have supported the Batistas, the Tshombes, the Diems and it has not availed us.

In 1953 Mr. Dulles was not able to effect his policy for Indo China. Public opinion would have none of it. We had just extricated ourselves from deep Korean mud and were not about to reinvolve ourselves in another Asian morass. In 1954 Russia and Great Britain effected a hard-nosed and realistic compromise to the Indo-Chinese situation at Geneva. Laos was federated. Cambodia was freed. Viet Nam was divided between a largely communist government in Manoi and an anticommunist government in Saigon. Mr. Dulles, ostentatiously, would not participate in the Geneva Conference. He would not be sullied with such negotiations. He was determined that though one line had been broached, a new line could be drawn. South Viet Nam was to be the anti-communist state - a showcase of freedom in

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Southeast Asia. To this end Dulles created the South East Asia Treaty Organization and he drew the paper guarantees of this organization, the guarantee of our

own concern, around the government of Ngo Diem. He saw to it that large amounts

of American foreign aid were poured into this small country. Its prosperity was

to shine into the bleakness of the communist world and advertise to Asians the advantages of belonging to the freedom side.

From 1954 to 1959 progress of an economic order did take place in South Viet Nam and much was made in our press and by our Presidents of the so-called South Viet Namese "success story." South Viet Nam was proof of the virtue of belonging to our side. In fact, our aid only masked temporarily the bitterness and the restlessness of a troubled and divided people. Those who ruled in Saigon had not been popularly elected. They had taken over during a power vacuum. They were representatives of the Mandarin class who, for centuries, had enjoyed the advantages, the monopolies and the tax farming of South East Asia. Ngo Diem was an autocrat. The press was censored. Political opponents were jailed. Students were curbed. Buddhists were repressed, even though Catholics were in the minority. The tribes people and the hills people who control 60-70% of the land of South Viet and who have always been viewed as racially inferior by the Saigonese continued to be condemned and continued to long for a freer and better day. Finally, in 1959 bitterness led to revolt. The Viet Cong came into being and took to guerrilla insurrection. Our economic aid became military aid. Our foreign aid advisors became military observors. As attacks and aid multiplied the support of the Saigon Regime became a priority of our foreign policy.

By 1961 the situation had deteriorated to the point where radical remedies were required. A new policy was announced. We would establish walls and armed hamlets at strategic points. A scientific passification of the countryside would be begun. We were told much about the way in which the British had pacified

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Malaysia. This was to be our example. President Kennedy ordered 20,000 American men of a special force into South Viet Nam to organize this pacification. We were promised that they would be home in six months. Victory was easy, and it would soon be ours. Six months became a year; a year became two. Defeat followed defeat. Soon bombings took place not in isolated hamlets, but in the heart of Saigon. Our military billets and our military airfields became the targets. These past weeks a final ingredient has been added to this whole bloody mess. We have - what is the word? - escalated the war. It is a nice of way of saying that we have followed the old law of "an eye for an eye." We have decided to bomb north of the 17th parallel. We have decided to interdict supply lines in Laos and Cambodia. We have escalated the war and the war has escalated on us. The great powers of the world have been drawn into it. Our actions in South Viet Nam draw us to the brink.

This must be said, our South Vietnamese commitment has never been popular yet it has been taken by leaders of both parties. Viet Nam is not a partisan issue. This, in itself, is surprising. From the first, intervention aroused little enthusiasm. As each President committed us to economic aid, then to military aid and then into military action, he had to back and to fill and to qualify. We have stumbled backward somehow into this war. In our history no war has been so little understood by the American people. Never has a government - and this goes back over the last twelve years - never has our government been so unwilling to allow the nation to debate priorities, to suggest alternatives and to arrive at a consensus. There has been a great deal of new - management and even of downright deceit emanating from Washington. It has been unwise and, worse, unnecessary. Just two years ago the head of our U.S. Information Agency, Mr. Carl Rowan, said some very foolish things about, what he called, the right of the people not to know. For a long time the Administration tried to deny that Diem was anything but the very, very model of a modern Asian democrat. For

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a long time we were told that all would be well - this military operation or another would quickly solve the issue. And so after twelve years of involvement, when Americans meet today and discuss Viet Nam the question we still ask each other is the elementary question - why are we there?

Why are we in Viet Nam? The government answers we want to negotiate. Fine, but first what was and is the rationale for this entire action? Why are we in South Viet Nam in the first place? Self-preservation is a legitimate undertaking of national policy. Are we in South Viet Nam to preserve the nation? In May of last year, in a speech which was subsequently released by the State Department as an authorative definition, Secretary MacNamara made the following categorical statement: "Our National interests do not require that Viet Nam serve as a Western base or as a member of the Western alliance." A few North Vietnamese PT boats and a puny and archaic air force do not threaten our shipping lanes or our shoreline. Self-preservation is not the issue in South Viet Nam. What is?

Several years ago in a speech before the Economic Club in Detroit, Undersecretary Ball gave this explanation of our involvement: "Viet Nam," he said, "is one of the world's danger spots where valiant people are struggling to defend the freedom of a weak people but a valiant people far across the world from insurgency and subversion." So reads the text. The official explanation of the text is this. Mr. Ho Chi Minh, head of the North Vietnamese, was never happy with the partition of Indo China. Minh proclaimed the reunification of Viet Nam as a first order of North Vietnamese business much as our own West German al ly has proclaimed the reunification of Germany as its first order of business. Ho Chi Minh is eager for power and for a sounder economy. The North has the industry and the Scuth has the rice. The workers of the North need the excess food production of the South to balance out the economy. In the early months of 1959 Ho Chi Minh determined to speed up the reunification of Viet Nam and he began to

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permit the passage of material and manpower throughjungle trails to the Viet Cong. Apparently he had first hoped that the Saigon government would fall under its own weight. It was an unpopular regime - autocratic and rather puritanical and greedy. It was a government of the feudal few. He felt that it would soon fall in one of those endemic revolutions which sweep over this part of the world. This might have been the case but our aid shored up Diem. He did not fall. So Ho Chi Minh gave history a nudge and the Viet Cong muscle. The Viet Cong turned to terror. There was murder and ravage and brutality of an unconsciable order. Matters went from bad to worse. Saigon was not able to defend its town, its farmers, its people, and asked for our help and we, who have so much, we were willing to help out. And we are giving still. Viet Nam is one of the world's danger spots, so goes our philosophy - where a valiant people are struggling to defend their freedom. We Americans are assisting them in their struggle. On first reading, Secretary Ball's argument seems clear and compelling and there is truth in it. North Viet Nam has supplied men and materials to the Viet Cong. Even though some of us, unfortunately, have come to suspect all that is said in Washington on this issue, we cannot suspect the definite statements made by the International Controls Commission. In 1962 this neutral commission brought out a report which specifically accused the North Vietnamese of interfering and meddling in South Viet Nam.

Ball's case seems to be made. But unfortunately, life does not fit nearly into logical phrases. There is insurgency. There is subversion. There is communist plot in South Viet Nam, but all of this is inextricably bound up in a bitter, fundamental and partially insolubke civil war. No one knows the percentage of the North Vietnamese personnel in the Viet Cong. Or, if they know, it has not been released. But this much is certain, the Viet Cong took to the field on their own. They represent a revolt of the masses against the privileged, a revolt of the peasant against the tax farmer; a revolt of the

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student against the censor' a revolt of the hill peoples against segregation. The countryside has provided the Viet Cong information and men and hiding -all that a guerrila band needs to operate. The countryside spawned the Viet Cong. Washington tried for a long time to deny this truth, but then those bright suicide pyres of protesting Ehudist monks through a glaring light behind the Saigon facade. We began to hear the chant of students dancing and singing their protests in the streets. We began to ask ourselves how is it that northern

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infiltrators can receive so much indigineous support? Remember this too: the division of Viet Nam is not new. In the 18th and 19th century there was a Berlin wall across the narrow middle of Viet Nam within miles of today's demarcation line. For two centuries before French rule, Hanoi and Saigon were separate governments -- each with its own narrow and selfish political ends. We had become involved in a nation which was not only suffering attack from without but which was suffering class war and political revolution within. Indeed no one as yet knows whether it was the existence of the Viet Cong which led to the North Vietnamese action, or whether the North Vietnamese brought the Viet Cong into the field by promises of support. In any case, we have interfered in a local civil war. We have interfered in a nation where the government is not responsive to the popular will and where the government cannot marshall the vigor, the wealth or the will of its people to fight for what we call freedom. I have no way of knowing whether the Vietnamese are valiant or not. There are heroes and cowards in all nations but no people willingly sacrifices its young men unless its will is united behind some beloved purpose. The South Vietnamese are not united. Knives and guns have turned brother against brother. It is a bitter, ugly futile piece of business. And as long as this inter-nicene squabble continues - as long as South Vieg Nam's political and economical revolution does not follow its inevitable course, all the Pentagon's helicopters and all the Pentagon's men will not put the South Vietnamese

government together again.

How did we get into this mess? Three theories have been offered. I reject the first. The first theory holds that we have been manipulated into Southeast Asia by the military and the war hawks who are determined that a preventive war must be fought before China fully controls her nuclear arsenal. All of our actions are seen as sinister and clandestine. Unfortunately, the silence of our own government gives ammunition to those who peddle the theory of industrial beligerancy. It is inaccurate. We have backed into this war. We have stumbled into it. We have not been guided by unseen but deliberate hands.

The second explanation, and this is offered by some of our best military minds -- holds that we over-committed ourselves in Southeast Asia. There are some things that man must learn to live with. We cannot avoid death. We cannot stave off all disease. It may not be to our liking that Southeast Asia may go communist, but we lack the manpower, and the supply to effect any other end. General MacArthur argued a dozen years ago that we are essentially a seapower and that the choice of terrain in Southeast Asia vitiates our superiority, the delicate balance of the cold war limits the use of our nuclear arsenal. Perforce a war in Southeast Asia is jungle combat and man to man. And for every man that we have to put into the field and to keep there, the Asians can put a hundred or a thousand, and maybe yet another thousand and far less expense. Just three weeks ago, Senator Church explained this point effectively: The elephant cannot drive the whale from the sea or the eagle from the sky, but, it is also true that neither the whale nor the segle can drive the elephant from his jungle." I accept this cold-blooded military calculation, and I believe it to be true. I believe that the United States has over-committed itself in South east Asia.

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But again I say, why are we there? General MacArthur was not silent. His position was well known, and yet our Presidents went ahead. The root explanation I would submit lies in a naive belief that we can solve bread and butter problems with bayonets. We still believe that guns and tanks and foreign aid can resolve to our liking all the complex and political problems of the age. It simply cannot be done. France poured 350,000 men into Indo-China. France spent one third of its total national budget fruitlessly. Why? Because the age is behind us when men must bend their backs before the royal will. Bao Dai was an anachronism. We have poured our treasure into South Viet Nam for twelve years now, and we have not been able to sustain Ngo Diem. Why? Because the age of the Mandarin is over. Asia has outfrown feudalism. We must somehow find ways of accepting revolution and not place our hope and faith in a vanished and unlamented past. Foreign policy ought not be an archeological science.

Of course, there is no point in raking over the coals except the hope that somehow we will learn a lesson and recognize in Latin America and Africa that we need to align ourselves with peogress with the underprivileged and the under-nourished, with the revolutionary masses - for all of their fumblings and for all of their stumblings and for all of their flirtations with the East.

What now? Everyone seems to be agreed that some hard choices will have to be made. But no one seems prepared to define the alternatives or to make public the choice. We need a policy. Measured retaliation is not a policy. It is after the fact. It is a response to someone else's initiative. It is retaliation to decisions made in the heat of a jungle battle 5000 miles from our shore. Sporadic retaliation is nothing more than nuclear age's version of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. It is primitive. It is futile,

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and it is absurdly dangerous. How will a few more corpses affect the sway of battle? The one material that Asia has in over-supply is life. It is an absuredly dangerous policy. It gives over the fate of this nation indeed, and, of the world, to semi-illiterate Viet Cong chiefs in the mountain fastness of Southeast Asia and into the hands of South Vietnamese generals who make their decisions by the law of narrow political calculations.

The sttack is made. Hanoi or Saigon retaliate. The attack is escalated. We shell a coastal position north of the 17th parallel or an American special force billet is attacked in Saigon. Russia and China renew their pledges of friendship and military support to North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong. We, of course, do the same with whatever government exists in Saigon. Little by little Vietnamese passions force the great powers of the world to the brink. I ask myself: Is control of this little land of 17 million people - five thousand miles from our shore worth 120 or 130 million American dead. This is precisely the estimate given by Secretary MacNamara in testimony before Congress last week - the number of dead in the case of an all-out nuclear war. Mr. Kosygin must be wrestling with the same murderous equation. How do we avoid Armagedon?

I dere you. I dare you. I double dare you. Pray God no one blinks. We need a policy. Our present policy is one of drift. Our present policy is one of improvisation. The President of the United States is elected to lead, but he has not led. Instead, he has limited himself to narrow military decisions. I know of no similar example in the history of our nation when during such a grave moment, a President of the United States has withheld himself from the nation for so long. I am deeply troubled by this distance. An uninformed nation is an uneasy nation. An uneasy nation makes erratic and oft times cruelly wrong decisions. The American people need to know.

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We need to feel that we can be trusted. We need to feel that all the alternatives have been weighed. We need to know that our lives and our tax monies are being spent in a truly significant pursuit. I am troubled by those who say that we will negotiate, but that we will negotiate only when we have arrived at a position of strength. The hard truth is that there can be no victory in South Viet Nam. Even if the Viet Cong were to be defeated and the indications are now that they have achieved at least a partial victory - even if the Viet Cong were to be defeated and our men were to be secure in the seats of power in Saigon, our men would be anti-American. They would have to be. Recall the speeches of General Khan just six weeks ago, and how he damned this nation and our pro-counsels and our military might. No nation likes to take orders from another. No nation likes to feel beholden. No nation likes to accept responsibility for its own agony. As a military base, as a military ally - whatever happens - South Viet Nam is lost to the West.

I am troubled by those who say that we will negotiate but only from a position of strength and only on our own terms. The hard truth is that we will never have our way in South Viet Nam. Whatever its ulterior motives the Viet Cong represents the revolt of the peasant against the Mandarin. It is the voice of the twentieth century in arms against the Eighteenth. The hard truth is that we cannot turn back the hands of the clock.

What of the argument that we have no right to turn over this nation to Communist dominance? Again, there is a hard truth and it is this: if they will it we cannot prevent it. We cannot impose our will on a people who will not see the light. We know the advantages of freedom. What advantage has freedom brought to a South Vietnamese except the privilege of seeing his village burned, and the advantage of having his son die violently?

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Whenever negotiation comes, and negotiation will come, the hard truth is

that South Viet Nam will not be a good friend or a close ally.

And I am further troubled by those who say that to negotiate now would

be to weaken the American image. Is it not time that we stopped this

adolescent concern with a mirror? The world is ruled by calculating men. They know full well that men of power sometimes overestimate their capacity. If a giant power must withdraw from a committment, these calculating men are not so naive as to assume that that country has been bled of all its power. Mr. Kruschev showed in the Cuban missile crisis that a giant power can retreat from a position once taken. The hard truth remains that for all of our might we cannot impose our will. International obstinancy is the sure way to the fallout shelter.

Somehow we must take a step back along the power road in order that we and the world may take a step or two forward along the road to a settled world order. Insofar as our government has made its position clear it seems to be this: we insist upon the surrender of the Viet Cong and the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese infiltrators. Once this is achieved, we will negotiate the withdrawal of our troops. Until then we intend to prosecute the war with every capacity in our arsenal. At first blush this seems a decent proposal. But is it? The Viet Cong include infiltrators. Can we ask them to surrender? Will they surrender? China and Russia, not to speak of North Viet Nam, are committed to their lives. The Viet Cong has tasted victory. Will it surrender? Can a band of revolutionary South Vietnamese surrender to other South Vietnamese? What of their lives? To require their surrender is to impose our will on a Vietnamese civil war and to give a brisk business to the firing squad. No official has been elected in this little nation since the French were pushed out in 1954.

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These men are seen as our puppets or, worse, as quislings. What then? We need peace. The world needs peace. Apparently even the Russian-Chinese world would not be averse to some negotiation. Strangely, Russia was among the leading nations of the Geneva Conference and was helpful in establishing neutralist arrangements for Indo-China. According to London, Russia already has indicated her desire to convene a similar conference. We need peace. The world needs peace. South Viet Nam can be, but need not be, the dynamite cap which explodes the final holacaust. I call upon the President of the United States to make clear to the American people and to the world our willingness to negotiate now and our willingness to enter into hard bargaining with all parties concerned with a view to the stability and progress of the area. I call upon the President to inform the American people that there can be no victory in South Viet Nam. We should harbor no illusions. We must negotiate now and negotiation never leads to victory. The more treasure we pour in, the more gold stars hang in mothers' windows, the more men are wounded, the longer the situation remains exacerbated, the shriller the eagle's scream. Frustration leads to belligerency. Belligerency leads to erratic, angry action. If the President delays taking the nation into his confidence, he may find his hands tied when he wants to negotiate. Negotiations now can be presented to the American people as a useful function of our national policy. Many in Congress have argued this for many years. Delayed, negotiations will be seen as a sellout which the American people may not be willing to accept.

Are there practical political solutions to the South Vietnamese situation? There are always practical and peaceful solutions. There is a possibility of a new international conference not unlike Geneva. There is a possibility of a presence of these nations that were signators to the 1954

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Geneva Conference. There has even been a suggestion of the neutralization of the entire area from the passions and the tensions of the Cold War. There are always possible peaceful solutions if none of the great nations are

fearful that they may lose face and if none of the leaders of the great nations are fearful that they may be let out of office. I am certain that we will negotiate in South Viet Nam. Today, a year from now. Who knows, but it will come. Negotiation is the only solution. I only pray that we will attempt negotiations now and not tardily; now, before the dangers mount; now, before that benighted nation is made to suffer a more brutal agony than it has yet known; now before another life is lost. Amen.



RESUME' OF AN ADDRESS

GIVEN BY RABBI DANIEL DANIEL SILVER AT THE TEMPLE FEBRUARY 21, 1965


What now? Everyone seems agreed that we are faced with some hard choices but no one in authority has spelled these out or seems prepared to make them. We need a policy! Measured retaliation is not a policy, it is an erratic response. It is always after the fact. It leaves our decisions at the mercy of far away skirmishes and orders issued by unknown men in the heat of battle. Sporadic retaliation ig the nuclear age's version of an eye for an eye. It is a primitive and a futile and absuredly dangerous process. It is futile. A few more corpses will not win this war. Human life is the one thing that Asia has in oversupply. It is absuredly dangerous. It places the fate of this nation in the hands of semi-literate Vieg-Cong guerrilla chiefs and of Viet-Namese field commanders of narrow political vision. There is an incident - we retaliate or Hanoi retaliates. They blow up a Special Force barracks, or we shell the coast north of the 17th parallel. China and Russia reemphasize their determinationjust as we underline our support of Saigon. Bit by bit these bombings and these skirmishes - these jungle decisions - drag the nuclear powers to the brink - against their will and against their respective national interests. Is this strip of Asian land worth 120 or 130 million dead? Thursday, Secretary McNamara foresaw this figure as the cost of an all out nuclear attack. Mr. Kosygin ponders NEITHER WILLES II. the same murderous equation. Yet, bit by bit Viet-Namese bullets lead us toward the holocaust.

We need a policy! Our present policy is one of improvisation and spot decision. The President of the United States must lead, but he has not led. He must give broad policy direction. He has issued military orders. I know of and that according to London, Russia is even now making similar proposals.

I call on our President to make public our willingness to negotiate and our understanding of the hard terms for us and for the Communist bloc in which such negotiations must take place. I call on our President to begin now to A campaign to inform the American people that victory cannot be won in these teaming jungles 5,000 miles around the world. If he delays too long I am afraid that Mr. Johnson may find that his hands are tied by a rising tide of frustration and beligerance. Today the American people will still accept a negotiated settlement. Tomorrow it will be seen as a sell out. There are still many in and out of Congress who have long insisted that negotiation is the only solution. The more blood that is spilled the more gold stars that are hung in front windows, the more treasure that is spent, the more shrill becomes the eagle's scream. Are there peaceful solutions in South East Asia? There are any number of alternatives - - & United Nations presence - - a special peace-keeping force under the Geneva Conference - area-wide neutralization. There are always peaceful alternatives if the great nations do not insist upon their pound of flesh and if the leaders of the great nations do not fear losing face.

I am certain that now, or a month from now, or a year from now, there will be a South-East Asian Pannaunjon and a Viet-Namese Truce Commission. Let it be now, rather than later. Let us save the lives.

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governments of the world are composed of calculating men and they know that even the greatest world powers sometimes overestimate their capabilities. To know this is in no way to minimize continuing power. In the Cuban missile crisis Mr. Kruschev demonstrated that a momenth power can retreat from a position taken. The hard truth is that for all of $\operatorname{pup} \mu_1^{\text{d}}$ sales we cannot bull it through. International obstimance today is a sure way to a fall-out shelter. We must take a step backwards on the power road in order to make two steps forward on the road to a settled world order.

Insofar as one can understand American policy, our present decision is to TC demand the surrender of the Viet-Cong and then promise a military withd ave. Until then we are determined to increase our military involvement. This seems a decent offer, but it will not be accepted. Russia, China and of course, North Viet-Nam, have ruled out a Viet-Cong surrender. I wonder if we are prepared to insist on it? The Viet-Cong began this blood-letting. Our position would be understandable if it were only an army of infiltrators. Unfortunately, the majority of the Viet-Cong are South Viet-Namese. To require their surrender is to impose our will on a Viet-Namese civil war. All our talk about strengthening the popularity of the government of Saigon is just that, talk. A privileged few The have Fact is That have been scrapping for power as dogs scramble and howl for the bone. Uniers MASSIVE UPHEAVE Saigon must suffer its revolution -----before it can ever have a popular government. The hard truth is that the Cunnews military and political regimes is discredited and our beyonets and bezookas vill never make them creditable. | Moral niceties aside, have we the strength to achieve

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their defeat? If there is a single thread in this entire bloody mess it is that every military initiative triggers an equal military response by the enemy. Escalation is a dead-end and a deadly road to go. We must, somehow, break out which for eacloy of of the narrow and constricting range of military alternatives and begin negotiations and political arrangements. South Viet Nam needs peace. The world needs peace. It would seem that even the great Communist powers want to dampen down these fires. You will recall that Russia took initiative in 1954 in the original Geneva Conference,

itself for its agony." Leaders ont like to do another's will. anti-General Taylor, speeches of Saigon's military Junta? A nation never blames Saigon will be anti-American. Even if "our" men are in the seats of power operation is inextricably involved in a bloody civil war. Even if the Viet-Cong on negotiation - - that we can negotiate only from a position of strength. they can be popular only by being anti-American. Recall the recent anti-American, hard truth is that we will never have our way in South Viet Nam. Our military surrenders - - and they seem now on the road to at least a partial victory - -The

helicopters and all the Pentagon's men cannot put South East Asia together again. that Viet-Nem is lost as a military base or as a military ally. All the Pentagon's violently. Whenever the negotiation comes, now or tardily, the hard truth will be The hard truth is that if they will it we cannot prevent it. We know the advantages of freedom. What of the argument that we cannot Leave these people to Communist domination? the 20th Century - - of the mass man- - in arms against the age of privilage. tax farmer, of the student against the censor - - in short, it is the voice of of the peasant against the mandarin; of the hill's people against the low land Viet Nam. only on our own terms. The hard truth is that there can be no victory in South I am troubled by those that say that we can negotiate only from strength and The Viet-Cong, whatever its ulterior motives, represents the revolt In Viet-Nam the only advantage of freedom today is the freedom to die

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I am troubled by those who say that we will negotiate everyone agrees	are invariably wrong and costly.	nation is an uneasy nation. Decisions taken aside f	kept so out of touch with his people. I am troubled by his silence. An uninformed	no other occasion in American history where a Fresident, in such a grave moment,
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
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Viet Nam Is one of the world's danger spots where a valiant people are struggling to defend their freedom. We Americans a re straggling taxta defend their struggle,

The United States is essentially a naval and aerieal power and there is no way for the land lock locked forces of Asia to drive us from the Pacific. The elephant cannot drive the whale from the sea or the eagle from the **mix** sky. But it is also true that neither the whale nor the eagle can drive the elephant from his junglr.





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
If the book has more than one story, choose the story you liked best and give the title:

Did you enjoy the book?


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


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
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
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
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
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
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