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An Open Letter to President Johnson on Vietnam, 1966.

AN OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON VIET NAM

An Address Given by Dr. Daniel Jeremy Silver
The Temple

February 20, 1966

My dear Mr. President:

Canaan was a turbulent land, a place of endemic violence. Those whom the camp of Israel sent out to spy out Canaan were unnerved by the omnipresence of armed bands and by the constant wailing of orphans. Their fear was reflected in their report. "This land" they said, "is a land that eateth up the inhabitants thereof." Though written 3,000 years ago and of quite another place I know of no better description of that bedeviled country we now call Viet Nam.

I submit to you, Mr. President, that on this shrunken globe no nation can sit idly by and be indifferent to the agony of another. And when your own nation has played a major role in a national tragedy, no citizen can turn away or be silent.

In the Rible that you and I, Mr. President, deeply cherish there is contained this phrase: "There is a way which seemeth right to a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death." You believe, I know, that our policy of military intervention in South Viet Nam is right; and you are troubled, I know, that the ends thereof are the ways of escalation, search and kill, burning and terror in the night - the ways of death. I understand and I appreciate your urgent effort to secure a political solution to this tragic military confrontation. I appreciate and I understand your frustration that tenders of negotiation have been met with cold silence. I believe, Mr. President, that the greatness of a great leader is measured by his ability to accept frustration, and I would submit to you, Sir, that there is nothing to be gained by acerbating the war. Believing as I do that military involvement was not and is not an effective policy in South

East Asia, I would urge now not the escalation of conflict, but patience, restraint, realism. I would emphasize that if there are privileged sanctuaries to the North, the Red River Delta, the cities of Haiphon and Hanoi; there are also privileged sanctuaries to the South, the shipping lanes of the South China Sea and the estuaries of the Saigon Harbor. That if terror strikes to the North terror can easily be spread to the South. I would emphasize too that though you have pledged unconditional negotiation and though there is no reason to doubt, as indeed I do not doubt, the sincerity of your profer; in effect you seem to be demanding that we win at the conference table what we have not been able to win on the battle field - the political integrity of that nation called South Viet Nam, carved out arbitrarily by the Geneva Conference in 1954 under a government in Saigon. We pledged that we will remove our troops to the sea if the Viet Cong remove their troops to the north. But I submit to you, Sir, as you well know, that the Viet Cong not only include North VietNamese insurgents and subversives, but South Viet Namese rebels, some of whom have fought for a dozen years and more against what they consider to be a tyrannical, undemocratic, unrepresentative and corrupt government in their capitol, in any

I do not believe, as some seem to believe, that terror will bring about the conference table. I do believe that restraint and patience may.

Mr. Fresident, you have asked your critics for practical suggestions. I confess that I have none. As an historian I know that there are times which are inauspicious - where tempers have frayed and the balance of power is such that neither side is prepared to give an inch. But there are also changes in the tides in history. There are shifts of the political climate and shifts in the economic and political realities. I am firm in my conviction that given steadiness, patience and realism; a political solution will be found for South Viet Nam and peace will be brought to that benighted God-forsaken land. For that land cries out for peace. Its plantations are overgrown. Its fields are fallow. Its irrigation ditches are trodden under. Poverty and disease are rampant. Death is

the daily companion. Every day men die, women die, children die. What will we have gained, Mr. President, if we save this small land from Communism, only to have returned a broken, desperate people to a scorched and shattered place?

"There is a way that seemeth right to a man, but the ends thereof are the ways of death." I believe that there will be a political solution in South Viet Nam. My concern is that the United States does not trap itself into any other similar situation. Therefore, I should like to raise with you, Sir, the question, whether the way which seemeth right to you, the way of military involvement, the way of containment is, in effect, the right way? It seems to me that it is an unreasonable response to an irrational fear. I label it unreasonable because I am firm in my belief that the United States lacks the human resource to fight a land war on the Asian mainland I make no claims of being a military expert, but I am given to understand that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our military experts, did, in fact, make that judgment in 1954, when war in South East Asia was first proposed within the government. It was held then that we could not win a technological victory simply by putting our planes and our ships into action. Men would have to be put into the jungles, into the river valley and into the hill country, and it was held then by all (except Admiral Radford) in the highest level of our military, that we lacked the logistic support and the manpower reserve to achieve victory under such conditions. I submit that the validity of this judgment still holds.

I believe that our policy of military effort in South East Asia is an unreasonable response to an irrational fear. What is the irrational fear? It is
the almost phobic concern by many in this nation that there is a controlled,
unified, cumning, international Communist conspiracy - World wide, effective and
aimed at the overthrow of all free peoples and governments. Now conspiracy and

Communist domination are part of the doctrine of Communism. But, Sir, there is doctrine and there is reality. And as we have seen in recent years, nationalism, ethnic consciousness and the concern of individual nations within the Communist Bloc for their own political advantage has blunted and disorganized this doctrine. There has been the breakup of Peking and Moscow. Our own government has found it advisable to give foreign aid to Communist Yugoslavia and to Communist Poland, and has found it advisable to trade with Communist Roumania, Communist Hungary, Communist Yugoslavia and with the Soviet Union itself. There are Communist subversives in many nations of the world. There are CIA agents in many nations of the world. The era of the Cold War is one which has made the paramilitary venture part of the international practice of every government. But I wonder if the this fear of a Communist conspiracy and subversion is a truly rational fear and a sufficient basis for our policy? It is said that we are in South Viet Nam in order to prevent the takeover of Viet Nam by a Communist government. Our fear seems to be that if South Viet Nam becomes Communist today, Thailand will be undermined tomorrow, the Phillipines next week, Japan next month, and within the year we may be fighting subversion in Hawaii and on our own West Coast. Now I submit to you, Sir, were the worst to come about and a truly Communist government been established in all of South Viet Nam, are we so certain that the government would have been a willing handmaiden and tool for Peking or Moscow? Viet nationalism for a thousand years has stood in the way of Chinese expansion to the South. History reveals that the Chinese have never been able to establish effective hegemony and suzerainty INDUCATE THAT AMONG the reasons Ho Chi Ming accepted the 1954 there. Recent events to Geneva Conference and the International Control Commission land was that Control Posts were established along his northern border to prevent the incursion of Chinese agents the had. I wonder too if the reason that he has not summoned Chinese armies now does not lie in the fact that he fears that those

who come to aid will stay to rule.

I wonder, Sir, if our policy of military inter-position has not in effect hastened the very situation that we fear? That ** in countering American mannion military strength Hanoi has had to fall more and more within the Chinese nationalist expansionist sphere? Whether we have not made Viet nationalism less possible?

Last year, Mr. President, you said in a speech at the Johns Hopkins University.

"Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its
own path to change." I believe that there is truth in this statement. I believe
that American policy has, indeed, been interested in allowing peoples the
freedom to establish their own form of government. I believe that there is truth,
to the charge that for a long time now the North Viet Namese have been encouraging the revolution in South Viet Nam, if not, in effect, wholly supporting
it. But I wonder, Sir, if it truly can be said that North Viet Namese infilteration
precipitated or required massive military retaliation by our government?

More to the point, I wonder if our twelve years of support for the Diems and Kys
in Saigon was a policy designed so that this people might choose its own path to
change? How does the support of one who oppresses and suppresses dissent, how
does such a policy, and it has been our policy, jibe with our concern that each
people may choose its own path to change?

I submit, that for all of our posture of concern for the interest of the Viet Namese people, to protect, as you have put it so often, this brave little people in their freedom, the overriding concern of the United States and of all parties who have introged on the tragedy of South Viet Nam, has been the Their geopolitical concern to the Cold War. The Viet Namese have suffered horror and worse because they have become chess pieces in the game of international politics. Let me try and make this point.

In 1945 the victorious Allied nations met at Potsdam to organize a postwar world. In 1945 in the power vacuum which came about with the Japanese surrender,

those Viet Namese who had for thirty years and more fought French Colonial rule, and who had during the forties fought Japanese military rule, united in a Popular Front Government and created the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. There were Communists in the Government, there were Socialists in the Government, there were mandarins in the Government; even the French puppet Bao Dai pledged an allegiance. In September, 1945, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam proclaimed its Declaration of Independence modeled in language, at least, after our own. Included in that declaration were these two or three paragraphs. The whole Viet Namese people, animated by a common purpose, are determined to fight to the bitter end against any attempt by the French Colonialists to recover their country.

We are convinced that the Allied Nations which at Terhan and at San Francisco have acknowledged the principle of self determination and the equality of nations will not refuse to acknowledge the independence of Viet Nam." But that is precisely what the great powers proceeded to do. At Potsdam Stalin sold Ho Chi Minh down the river. Such is the monolithic Communist conspiracy that Russian nationalism preempted any concern for a popular front Communist leader far away in South East Asia. Stalin's concern was with Eastern Europe. The British concern was with Eastern Asia. So a convenient arrangement was arrived at. Stalin gained his freedom in the Satellite nations. Viet Nam was divided between a Chinese sphere of influence to the North and a British sphere of influence to the South. The Chinese and the British were given a mandate to restore law and order in South East Asia. Subsequently, the United Kingdom in one of the most ignoble acts of the post war period interpreted the restoration of law and order to mean the restoration of the French government. Newly-surrendered Japanese troops were ordered to storm the Republic's government buildings and barracks and to hold these buildings and barracks until French transport could

arrive. Washington spoke of national sovereignty and of the independence of the nations, but made no official protest. General MacArthur in Tokyo did.

"If there is anything that makes my blood boil it is to see our Allies in Indo-China and Java deploying Japanese troops to reconquer the little peoples we promised to liberate."

In 1945, the Popular Front Government, a government such as will inevitably be established by whatever negotiations are now achieved after twenty years of bloodshed and horror, could have been, and was, in fact, a reality. But in that year as in every subsequent year, the appetites and ambitions of the great powers overrode the needs of the Viet Namese people. French power was reimposed. Eight years later we had suddenly discovered that this Ho Chi Minh, who had been sold donw the river by Stalin eight years before, was the major agent of Communist conspiracy in South East Asia, and the United States was supporting the French Colonial battle to the tune of 80% of the cost of that bloody war. In April of 1954 Secretary Dulles checked with our Allies and with the leaders of Congress whether they were willing to accept military action against the Viet Namese rebels. No pretense was made then that we were trying to create a world where each people must choose his own path to change. Secretary Dulles minced no words; "The imposition on South East Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Communist Chinese Allies by whatever means must be a great threat to the whole community. The United States feels that it cannot possibly be passively accepted and that it should be met by umited action." In other words, we arbitrarily limited the options available to the Viet Namese people. If they wanted a dmited front government with all of its dangers we would not tolerate that choice. It ran against our own line-drawing policy symbolized then by the South East Asia Treaty Organization that Secretary Dulles had just brought into being.

The questions which we must ask are two. Was the fear which has motivated our policy, and seems to be motivating it today, realistic? Is the method of military intervention an effective way to achieve the ends which we seek?

Is this fear realistic? I have already indicated, Sir, that I do not believe that it is. I will not be backed into the position of describing Communists as angels. They are not. I despise the authoritarianism, the lack of human dignity, the lack of concern for the individual which exists under many Communist regimes as much as any other man and probably, as a man of faith, more. But I do not believe that by drawing lines around a contagion, a philosophy which you do not like, you can deny its existence or contain it. And I do not believe that fear of this philosophy ought to be the underlying thrust of our American policy. Military intervention to support anti-Communist governments is often short-sighted and self-defeating. This is especially true when it applies to governments which exist in the emerging, underdeveloped nations. of the world. For ten years we supported such a government in South Viet Nam. The government of Diem was autocratic, tyrranical, imperious and corrupt. Our aid which should have brought about an economic revolution was slowed down so as to preclude revolution. There was progress, to be sure, but slow, too slow. And quickly our concern for the protection of that government lead to vast military support of that government far exceeding the economic support of the people. Those who were arrested by that presument and imprisoned for dissent, were arrested by police trained by Americans and armed by Americans, and incarcerated in jails which had been built with and made secure by American firms. Communism breeds where there is want, where there is poverty, where there is fear, where there is misery, where there is a tyrannical government which is supported by an American government and anti-Americanism becomes a byword of the revolution.

I trust, Sir, that you understand that the present hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are far more than a miggling critique of mistakes which may have been made by your Administration in the past and far more than a suggestion of this or that subtle change in your policy today. Rather, Sir, your critics have raised a challenge to the entire basis of our foreign policy. It is our belief, and it is certainly my belief, that a policy of military support for governments which stand athwart the progress of their people is self-defeating and that such a policy must be changed before we are trapped again in another Viet Nam.

You have already announced, Sir, that there is evidence of subversion, of Communist subversion, in Thailand, especially in the northeastern provinces of that country. You have already committed to Thailand 12,000 American military personnel and several wings of our Jet aircraft. There is in Korat, near the northeastern province, enough armor to equip within twenty-four hours an entire American division. The military commitment in Thailand has been made in support of an anti-Communist government and that government, is, in fact, anti-Communist. But it is also oligarchical, repressive, and privileged. It has never held an election. It has never allowed a constitution to be promulgated. It has never convened a parliament elected by the people. It is a government of the elite. A government which outlawed labor unions. A government which has closed the dissident press. Like Viet Nam, Mr. President, Thailand is a country which is cleft by deep ethnic and economic and religious divisions. There are in those very north east provinces, which you have pointed out as the place of subversion, some seven million Laos who live on the poorest land and are the poorest citizens of the country, who have no representation in Bangkok. Only in the last year and a half has some of our aid been allowed to trickle through to them. There are, in the long narrow southern end of the peninsula of Thailand, some seven million Indonesian Moslems who have no representation in the government, no say in their affairs, and who, too, are among the poorest in the nation. And there are in the great urban centers of Bangkok and the provincial capitols, several million
Chinese who have no representation in the government. Chinese, who by law,
are prohibited from entering into many areas of commerce, industry and craft.
We have never used in Thailand our aid as a weapon to force this government to
break out of its lethargy and break free of its habit of corruption. Bangkok,
like Saigon, seems to be a capitol without a country. The Prime Minister governs
a nation that has no electorate.

Thailand never knew the dislocations of colonial rule and has not suffered as deeply as Viet Nam. Perhaps war may be avoided in Thailand, but all of the incendiary conditions are there. If revolution comes Communist subversion will only apply a match to the existing timber. Subversion cannot be effective unless people are discontented and have nothing to lose. If that revolution comes, it will be a Communist revolution because it will be an anti-American revolution because we are inexorably bound up with the present government; the government of the few, the government of the past.

Mr. President, I am fully aware that if the policies some of us are suggesting are accepted anti-Communist governments would fall. Your administration has emphasized aid to governments and containment. We would emphasize aid to peoples and humanity. We are fully aware that this is a tumultuous world. Our own nation, Mr. President, had to go through Revolution and Civil War before we came into our freedoms and into our maturity, and surely none of these feudalistic, tribalistic states will emerge into the Twentieth Century without some kind of convulsion and turmoil. Still we plead with you Sir, not to align us now with the few AND The but with the people, the mass and the future. Will Communist subversion win out in some of these countries? It may.

I remind you Mr. President, of another warning in our Bible, "Violence of the wicked shall drag them away because they refuse to do justly." Each nation

has its own bundle of human hopes. In this century of burgeoning prosperity, where the example of freedom is just across the border, no people will long tolerate an ideology which destroys its freedom, saps its hopes, and limits its opportunities. When a leader goes ideologically too far, as Sukarno did in Indonesia, the people rise up and pull him down. Communism may be a way station for some of these underdeveloped nations on their way into the future. If such, it must be accepted, and outgrown.

Mr. President, I am fully and humbly aware of the awesome burden of responsibilities that you bear. I am of the conviction that you have borne them honorably and that you have made your decisions according to your best judgments. But as a man of faith to a man of faith, I plead with you to have faith. To have faith in men - their hope, their hope, their decency and their humanity. To allow our government to stand abroad for that which we enjoy at home - justice, opportunity, freedom and hope

Respectfully yours,

DJS:mgm

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Kaddish

Friday Feb 18 1966 Sunday 20 1966

Those who passed away this week

HARRY A. MYERS

MEYER WEIL

BERNAT A.HUEBSCHMAN

ROSE BUBIS ROSKOPH

ANNA G. REDER

GABRIEL SCHAFFNER

JANE ELLEN UDELF

DR. MORTON MORGENSTERN

SIDNEY S. WOLFE

DAVID STROMBERG

BELLE BLOOM GELLNER

Yahrzeits

ARTHUR KELLER

. ARCHIE PALEVSKY

SADIE A. RIGELHAUPT CHARLES A. MELSHER

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That Americans and Asians are dying for a cause see each people may choose its own path to change.

The whole VietNamese people animated by a common purpose are determined to fight to the bitter end against any attempt by the French colonialists to recover their country.

We are convinced that the allied nations, which at Terheran and San Francisco have acknowledged the principle of self-determination and equality of nations, will not refuse to acknowledge the independence of Viet Nam.

If there is anything that makes my blood boil it is to see our Allies in Indo China and Java deploying Japanese troops to reconquer the little peoples we promised to liberate.

The imposition on South EAst Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist Ally by whatever means must be a grave threat to the whole free community in the United Sates and that that possibility cannot be passively accepted but should be met by united action.

We want nothing for ouselves only that the people of South Viet Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

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here we have been a point in the commence of Commence We my remember on from. at wome builder was Ma Pormo Bet mis the relieble of the level you press pies, I'm amplicage conteined a marker of Company with the manner we the product on the manner for consist on legged good party will be one women's lake multime prospect a charle so former?, but . E. puill's mult Sell , my town , and where when would remark them and by the house here were resistant on any any few quests on deter 21 gut full cars les ment to le la contract de la c perter me ment to deal Description of the second of the second Keep to people here in a new of the or of the Miles de Surphy. 2 labour and in a facility at 600 of 5 duesty of men where I de leve that meles paragraph to for a so in Dopole - Monde - the year to be seen there beaut a midde part - proper o and reducity. I haline the whole the other of the medical we have a former was the same part of the land the le limination à l'étables des marches market de market

E has so much second as the Down Rolledo Man. Novembert about war Thomas as the way on all on the more of the to the more But we had woney seems the charge of the sells while one of the the the The anulaw of the muched obull dry the any Becume les refrer to de quits. Enemy of the transfer Compression of well weeks and hard Things the letter people of the month winter Been o freedom of the property of the same of the property of ARCHIVES ARCHIVES I Doned Jean Rein and the same They were went and