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Vietnam - Where the Action Is, 1966.

Vietnam, Where The Action Is
Daniel Jeremy Silver
May 15, 1966

Today marks the last day of this year's series of Sunday worship sermons. We have spoken of many things and of many themes, but throughout the year there has been one single overriding and overarching crisis - the rising crescendo of the conflict in Vietnam. Casualties have mounted. The commitment of the North Vietnamese and of the United States has increased markedly. There has been a domestic spillover of the emotions and the of the war into our own national scene and there is increased danger this conflict will explode and its sparks ignite, ignite, the tinderbox of an international conflagration. Let us turn then this last Sunday of our winter year back to this crisis, to the war that few seem to want, that everybody fears and nobody seems to know how to stop. If you would ever require a classic example of the paralysis of human reason you can find it in the events which led up to the misadventure we call Vietnam. For all of us, friend and foe, seem to be caught up in a surging tide of illogic and emotion which sweeps us on towards that abyss, that destruction, the pit which we know lies before us, which we see and know to be there but which we seemingly lack the strength to avoid. The world seems caught up by its own madness, determined to trip over the abyss and fall into the pit.

This past year I confess I have often known, yes, even physically, the agony and the pain of Jeremiah who cried out: "my bowels, my bowels, pain rise within me. Oh, the chambers of my heart, my soul mulls, there is no peace and now, O Lord, has forced my soul to see the standards of war, for my ears to hear the sounds of the horns of war. Destruction follows upon destruction across the face of the land and there is no end and there is no peace. How long must I bear the sight of the standards of battle? How long must I endure the sounds of conflict? Oh, my people, thou hast been foolish indeed."

Now, it is bitter. It is bitter to be citizens of a land whose soldiers torch the hamlets and the villages of people who loudly proclaim we are protecting in freedom. But I would not this morning deal with the incongruities and the immoralities of war. There is obviously a patent and deep gulf between the proposals for peace which must be spoken from the pulpit, and the proposals for pacification which are spoken by the Pentagon, by

the general staff. Rather, I would deal with the world of real politik, the hardheaded, no-nonsense world of military plans and political ambitions and economic needs which is the world of the National Security Council and of the CIA and of the Pentagon and of the Administration, what they leave ^{behind} for us, the men of the cloth, the privilege of morality for it is my feeling, and it has become increasingly evident to me in these last months, that even on their own terms, the narrow, grasping terms of political need, this war has been from the beginning a stupidity, a folly and worse. Of course, I am not a general, but it is the cardinal rule of all military activity that no nation engages its honor and its activities unless there is a chance of victory. And I submit that we have engaged our army and our honor without - without - chance of victory.

Three administrations have deliberately gone counter to the military advice of history, indeed of their own generals. Twenty years ago General Douglas MacArthur warned the American people against a land war in Asia. He said that we lacked the man power to combat Asian man power and unless we went into a state of total mobilization we could not supply an adequate army half the world away from our home base. And twelve years ago, when that ardent crusader, Secretary Dulles, was eager to have American planes fly in over Dien Dien Phu in support of the beleaguered French, our own joint chiefs of staff warned against this action for they told the Secretary that if there are planes there must be men, and that the United States simply lacked the man power and the resource, men and logistics, in order to support a land army in the jungles and the mud and the slime of Southeast Asia.

Ten years ago, ten years ago when President Eisenhower revealed that we had sent in military advisers into South Vietnam and asked the Congress *expos facto* for authority and for funding, he was warned by Senator Russell, the Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, that two thousand men today make twenty thousand men a few years from now; and twenty thousand men a few years from now meant an army in a few more years, and that he doubted that the President really wished to commit United States to such a war so far away from our homes.

Three administrations have plunged ahead into conflict despite the best military advice they could be given. And there can only be one excuse for a nation plunging ahead

foolishly into a war that cannot be won. And that is the overriding reason that the enemy is at your jugular vein, that you have no choice, if you don't fight back you'll be a corpse, dead. National survival depends upon your defending yourself, but has anyone asserted clearly that our national survival depended upon a pro-western, dictatorial state in South Vietnam? As I recall the march of events in the late 1950's when America was being encouraged to sponsor the government of Mr. Diem, our commitment was argued on very altruistic and high-flown terms. We had no political interest in southeast Asia. We had no military interest in southeast Asia. Quite the contrary; our only interest was salvationistic, religious. We wanted to preserve the freedom of a wonderful little people that was being attacked by a predatory enemy from without. And the fact that these policy statements were made speaks highly of the moral judgment of the American polity and it speaks quite low, in low terms, of the candor of our own government.

We went into South Vietnam. We were told to protect the freedom of the South Vietnamese. No one really knows what the South Vietnamese want. Surely, they want freedom, freedom for land reform, freedom for public education, freedom for public health, freedom from the burden of taxation which crushes the poor and from which the rich escape, freedom from the military dictatorships and the juntas to which they have been subject. Yes, I'm sure that they want freedom and that we ought to protect them in those freedoms, but it has become increasingly clear, has it not, that they care not one bit for our concept of freedom, freedom from some other political oppressor, freedom to join the west in its holy crusade against Communism. They have never known political freedom and it makes not one wit of difference whether they are misruled by Saigon or by Hanoi or by Washington.

As the American people began to recognize where South Vietnam was and to read about it and to learn what could be known of that nation, we required a greater candor of our government, and new explanations were given. Yes, we were in South Vietnam to protect our national interest. It was not really a question of survival; it was a question of prestige, a dangerous word, a slippery word. And there was trotted out that old bugaboo, the parlor game of dominoes, which fits quite badly into the world of international

policy. We were told that if South Vietnam went Communist today, continuous countries would go Communist tomorrow and within a matter of months or years America would be pushed back within its national boundaries, beleaguered by an aggressive, expansionist Communist world without. We would be fighting on the beaches of Hawaii, then on the beaches of California, and so our involvement in South Vietnam was made a statement of our national interest although we protested, even as we are protesting today, we have no wish for bases, we will pull out our army if there can be stability. We have no wish to control that nation, but somehow we must draw a line around the Communist world and say, thus far shalt thou go and no further. Now this thinking goes back to the early 1950's when the United States was, and I think we are still, preoccupied with a holy ideological crusade. And Secretary Dulles and others encouraged us to pull down our maps and to conceive a cordon senaitaire, a political Manijou line of defensive alliances around the entire periphery of the Sino-Soviet world. There would be NATO in Europe, the Baghdad Pact nations in the Near East, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in Southeast Asia, the Phillipines, Formosa, Japan, our own fleet and armies. So preoccupied were we with the Russian Bear and with the Chinese Dragon that we brought into our camp a conjury of vipers and parasites, petty dictators and oligarchies of the elite, who were eager to sign defense treaties against Russia as long as they got arms to fight their own dissidents, petty dictators champing at the bit who desired to conquer adjacent lands, who were eager to receive American know-how and American weapons in order to prosecute their own narrow political ambitions. And we found ourselves by the middle of the 1950's aligned and in league with diems the world over, aligned and in league with the past, aligned and in league with dictatorship, with the heavy hand of taxation, with those of privilege who refuse to admit the possibility of the inevitable revolution of the twentieth century. What a tragedy politically this has meant for the American people for our democracy has become besmirched by these alliances. Our way of freedom, our way of economic opportunity has been sight lost of in these nations. These men see only their reformers, their rebel leaders marched into American-made jails between oppressors mercenary troops dressed in American khaki wearing sidearms carry-

ing American rifles and sub-machine guns. Instead of being in the forefront, the vanguard of the future, we have become the armors, the provision of those who wish to prohibit, the future from coming into being.

Now we tried in the late 1950's to paint Mr. Diem into the very very model of a modern Southeast Asian democrat and the suit did not fit. And in the 1960's we have tried to delude ourselves that somehow military rule, the junta, is a necessary requirement now, that there will come a time when South Vietnam will have the maturity for the democracy which we affirm, and this, too, is a delusion as the very rebellion which is spreading throughout the Southeast Asia, the South Vietnam which we control even today is making self-evident, clearly evident.

Now our Administration would have us forget the past. They are quick to admit that there have been mistakes, In a very exuberant and excessive speech the other day the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Humphrey, said, past mistakes are ancient history and they cannot be repeated. Would that this were so. What disturbs me is that the very same mistakes which led to our military commitment in Southeast Asia, to our military political commitment to the forces of reaction in South Vietnam, are being carried forth at this very moment in Malaysia, in Thailand, in Pakistan, in Iran, in Iraq, in Saudi Arabia, in Yemen, in Tunis, in Algeria, across half the face of the globe.

Let's talk about Thailand. Let's talk about the near neighbor of Vietnam. We have been sending hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of military and economic assistance to Thailand over the past decade. Now Thailand is a dictatorship. In Thailand there is no free press. In Thailand there is no constitution. In Thailand labor unions are prohibited. In Thailand none but the Thais who have a small majority of the citizenry may occupy positions in the government. In Thailand no visitor can stay in the country more than twenty-four hours. Thailand has become the great bastion of American power in Southeast Asia. Every day from jet strips which we have built in this country, our planes fly high and quickly over to North Vietnam to carry out their bombing missions. Now the Thai army is dressed in American uniforms, equipped with

American guns, powered by American tanks, protected by American planes. There is restiveness in Thailand, economic restiveness, political restiveness, the restiveness of minorities who have no share in the national sun, Laotians in the northeast, Chinese in the cities, Malays in the long Southern Peninsula. And when their leaders are marched off to jail they're marched off by Thais, of course, Thais dressed as Americans. Of course, past mistakes are ancient history that we never repeat. Thailand is today the great bastion of American power outside of South Vietnam. We have in Thailand some 15,000 men. We have placed in Thailand in the northeastern provinces in Korat enough equipment, tanks and provisions to equip an entire province in twenty-four hours.

Now if you were a Thai seeking freedom, land reform, education, constitution, the vote, and you saw American tanks and American planes controlling your streets where would you turn? Where would you find guns and equipment and support for your ambitions? America continues to play into the hands of Communist subversion because we make their case self-evident when it is not at all self-evident. And if you want to spend a sleepless night or two think of this. We have proudly and loudly announced policy in South and North Vietnam of hot pursuit, no sanctioning. If planes from China fly into North Vietnam to protect the North Vietnamese cities we will pursue these planes to their bases and bomb the bases. Turn it around. What if the Chinese and the North Vietnamese decide to pursue our planes to their bases in Thailand? What if their armies launch attacks across Laos into Thailand to destroy these bases? How long will it be before America finds itself plunged into a war not in the small nation of South Vietnam but across all of southeast Asia from the eastern port of Burma to China's sea in a war without frontiers, without trenches, a swirling brutal war, jungle war in a country two-thirds the size of these United States. We've sent a quarter of a million men into South Vietnam. They require twenty-five millions of men to fight such a war. But of course, past mistakes are never repeated. They had best be buried, put aside, forgotten.

I'm afraid that the United States has not yet learned the lesson of the tragedy of our South Vietnamese misadventure. But let's narrow our focus. What of the battle in

South Vietnam itself? What possibilities are there? There is, of course, the possibility of victory, control, of defeat of the Viet Cong. And we have in our government men like Secretary McNamara who are persistently optimistic, who find in every statistic new grounds for vote. As late as last week Mr. McNamara was pledging that the American victories of the past several months brought about what he called a progressive disinclination by the countryside to support the Viet Cong.

Now I have tried to read the reports of foreign and American military correspondence rather carefully and they speak with one voice not of victory but of stalemate. They see Vietnam as a chess game in which neither side can win, and they warn the American people against this numbers game, we killed 250 Viet Cong yesterday and lost only 25 of our own effectives for they remind the Americans that we are exhausting our own man power reserves far more rapidly than the Asian is exhausting his. We cannot control the land which we conquer, we lack the force to do it, and no one in Washington has made clear the number of men, the level of mobilization which will be required to control and to pacify the entire land, but it is clear that it is many times the number of men that we have already committed. But can we ever entirely control and pacify this land? For one thing is clear and it is that for every escalation on our part the Communists are capable of an escalation on theirs. When we sent in the newest jets it was only a matter of a month before MIG 21's, equally capable jets appeared in the sky. We fired the first air-to-air missiles two weeks ago. The Communists fired the first air-to-air missile one week ago. As we have increased our reserves in South Vietnam, brought in brigade after brigade and division after division, we have read of brigade after brigade and division after division of the North Vietnamese coming into the combat. Total mobilization, the ultimate end result of escalation, can mean only total war. To every challenge there is an enemy response, and this is the lesson which our optimism has not permitted us to learn.

And there's a second reason why we probably cannot win in South Vietnam and that is that we lack the support for the very people we are pledged to support. This

morning as you hurriedly read your papers you read of an attack by the Saigon government against the Denang government, civil war. There has been insurrection and counter insurrection not only among the figureheads in the junta but between the great polities which make up the South Vietnamese citizenry, between Catholic and Buddhist, between the hills people and the lands people, between the rich and the poor, between the northerners and the southerners, between those of the central cities and those of the countryside. There is apparently no sense of nationality, of nationhood, of corporate destiny in South Vietnam. These fourteen millions of people are fractionated, divided among themselves. And when in the past several months they took to the streets demanding civilian government we heard, did we not, the dangerous, the very clear overtones of their demands, Yankee, go home, we want our own say, there are many worse things than a united Vietnam under some popular front government.

Senator Russell, hardly a flaming liberal, hardly one of those men that the Administration can tick off as a leading heart, was heard to muse aloud the other day that if we can win a quick victory in Vietnam let's win it, but if our boys on the streets of Vietnam are endangered by the very people they are there to protect, then he said perhaps we ought to hold a survey of the Vietnamese to find out whether they really want our protection and if they do not to withdraw.

I do not believe that there is a quick victory to be won in Vietnam. And I do not believe that one could sample with a Roper poll South Vietnamese opinion. There is no single such opinion, but I do believe, sadly, humbly, that we ought to withdraw, withdraw now.

There are times when prudence is not enough. There is an illogic to war, power to violence which carries it on and on, and the man who tries to balance out and to be moderate in his opinions, his policies, is caught up by that very illogic. I believe that our president would sincerely like to find a way out of Vietnam, but I'm afraid that trying to balance the hawks and the doves, military strategy and political underground strategy, is carried along in such a way that military becomes predominant and escalation becomes, in effect, the end results of his prudence.

Withdrawal is a word which the Administration does not believe can be uttered. It does not believe that this is a feasible project. It argues that our national prestige is engaged. One might remark cynically for almost a century now Americans have believed that one's honor, one's face, one's concern with face was an oriental preoccupation. But I believe that there are many cases in history when the great nations, without loss of their honor or their policy have withdrawn. The British withdrew from India. Belgians withdrew from the Congo. The French withdrew from Algeria and from Vietnam, and one could make a point that the Russians withdrew from Cuba. And there is reason to withdraw. Surely, if the South Vietnamese were a freedom-loving people, determined to hold on to democracy, we ought to do all that we can for them, but they are not and this has become patently self-evident. We have two alternatives in Vietnam: to take over the country, run it to suit ourselves and run the military show according to our own standards. The Vietnamese army of 400,000 men had 130,000 deserters the first six months of this year.

Let's put aside the masquerade we've been living under that we are protecting the freedom of another nation, and let's look at it squarely. The Vietnamese as a people do not want freedom. There may be a million, a million and a few hundred thousand North Vietnamese, political refugees, largely Catholic, who fear the Communist North Vietnamese victory, let's take them out with us. Withdrawal need not mean Dunkirk. A sudden precipitated defeat can be done under the umbrella of the United Nations, and as we withdraw there are surely political advantages which can be gained, the neutralization of certain cities, the neutral presence of U.N. observers, perhaps even a neutralized unification of the whole countryside. But let us withdraw and announce our willingness to do so.

And you know, really, we have withdrawn. For all of our victories these past two years we control less than ten percent of the countryside of South Vietnam. And for all the anger of the Administration against the enclave theory of General Gavin that was submitted to the Fulbright Commission, that is exactly what has happened in Vietnam. There is an enclave in Saigon, there's an enclave in DaNang, there's an enclave Pleiku, there's an enclave in the Mekong Delta, and beyond these enclaves we are

in a sense powerless to hold the land and to make effective our power.

Analogy is always drawn whenever one dares to utter the word, withdrawal, to Munich. I believe the analogy to be fundamentally misleading and false. Czechoslovakia was a nation, a democratic nation, proud of its tradition, prepared to defend itself. Its army was led effectively and the nation was led effectively, and with the exception of some of the Germans in the Sudetanland there was a desire among this brave little people to stand up to Hitler if only, only the Western democracies would come to their aid.

South Vietnam is no Czechoslovakia. Marshal Chai is no Benesch and no Mazarek. South Vietnam lacks any sense of national identity. There's not even the sense of peoplehood here. Rather, the country is split religiously and ethnically into many parts. We have not committed the entire honor of a freedom-loving peoples in Vietnam, not at all. We will commit the honor of the West only if we are intransigent and insist on bulling our way through, somehow winning the war.

I believe that withdrawal offers the only opportunity for peace in that part of the world. I do not fear the growth of Chinese hegemony in that part of the world. The Chinese have always had economic advantages in southeast Asia even as we have had in Latin America. And I respect, deeply respect, the nationalism of the Vietnamese which for a thousand years and more has opposed Chinese domination. Imagine this. Four years after this bitter war had broken out, this very week, it was still necessary for Mao-Tse-Tung and the Premier of Albania, Mamet Schesu, meeting in Peking to denounce Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh. Why? Because somehow Ho Chi Minh has managed to maintain his independence of China even as he had to depend upon China for armaments and for skills. The South Vietnamese have for a generation fought to hold off the Chinese from their borders, and I believe that if a neutral South Vietnam can be established the South Vietnamese nationalism will again come to the fore and unite with North Vietnamese nationalism and we will have a country which will be independent of China even if its government has many features which we may not like.

I believe in the mission of the United States to protect the freedom of freedom loving peoples. I believe that you cannot withhold your support to any who are threatened by subversion from within or coercion from without. I am not a pacifist, but I fail and have failed consistently to understand how these particular principles operate in South Vietnam. I believe it is time for our government to make effective pledges of withdrawal even as Israel did from Suez under United Nations auspices. I believe we ought to as we withdraw to explore every possibility of securing the peace and constitutional government for this part of the world, neutralism, its economic developments, and I believe that America ought to get back to that which is our most important business, the securing of our own domestic freedoms, war against our own poverty, the ability of our young men to grow up, to learn, to mature into responsibility, power which will help those who seek freedom and know freedom and love freedom to retain their freedoms.

These are difficult words to say, for they imply that the men who are losing their lives in South Vietnam are losing their lives in a purposeless war. Let's be honest. This is their implication. I begrudge every life lost. War is folly. War is fundamentally immoral and senseless. I believe that the United States has nothing to gain by protracting this war because of my concern for American lives and I speak out, I do, against the continuation and the protraction and the inevitable escalation of this bitter conflict. The enemy are not angels. The Viet Cong are not all great social reformers. The North Vietnamese have not made the way of peace any easier, but somehow, in this particular conflict the burden of responsibility rests upon our shoulders. We are the mature nation. We are the nation with vision and with tradition and I would hope that our government will see the reason that considering up till now it has considered unreasonable the possibility of withdrawal, the drawing up of proposals of peace rather than further proposals for pacification.

Since it is the tradition in our people never to end a book, never to end a season with words of despair and words of fear, I am firmly convinced that somehow

America will again find its reason. The protest which has been raised across the land has been villified and pilloried but it has not been silenced. It has been spoken and not always heard. I believe it would be heard. The men who speak in protest today, as I do, speak not out of any other concern but their fundamental loyalty for the tradition of this great nation. It is not that we fear war. It is not that we are too tender-hearted to see the necessity at times for standing up or being counted. It is simply that this war at this time in this little nation makes no sense whatsoever. It never has and it never will.



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NY 5/1/13

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WRHS



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repented".

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NY 5/1/50

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They are not all the same

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6000 The addition of 1000 to 5000 is 6000

Implication - big deal unless - I'd - No should not

See - C. 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917,