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A Solution to Vietnam, 1966.

A Solution to Vietnam
Daniel Jeremy Silver
October 23, 1966

On a Thursday, late in September, on the 22nd to be exact, Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert McNamara, held a press conference in Washington in which he announced a 30 percent increase in the production of fighter bomber aircraft during the next fiscal year. That same hour of that self same day Master ARthur Goldberg was speaking at the United Nations before the General Assembly and offering to that world body a broad program of a step-by-step de-escalation of the war in Vietnam, a negotiated settlement. As a first step we were prepared to cease bombing Hanoi and North Vietnam if privately or otherwise the North Vietnamese government would give indication that they would make a corresponding reduction in their war effort. At the self same time then that Mr. McNamara was laying the groundwork for an extended expanded war, Mr. Goldberg was saying, and I quote: "My government remains determined to exercise every restraint to limit the war, to exert every effort to bring the conflicts to the earliest conclusion."

Reading on the ticker tape of the international news services these two reports, an Indian newspaper was moved to comment that it reminded them of those old-fashioned American westerns in which a Sioux chief, beleaguered by land profiteers and poachers, about to be driven off his land to an enclosure, turns to the cavalry officer who has come to smoke the peace pipe and he says, white man speak with forked tongue, white man speak with forked tongue. Now, we in America emphasize the blessed words of peace. The Asians saw the bitter reality - war. And we have every reason to emphasize the words of peace. It took a very long time for our government even to consider publicly the possibility of a conference, of a settlement, to end this expedition into Asia. From our first involvement in South Vietnam until April of 1965 the government was not willing publicly at least to give credence to the proposition that this war could be stopped short of the victory of the Saigon government, the total victory of that government, over the Viet Cong.

Typically, in October of 1963 a White House statement said: We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and the government of South Vietnam. We

denied their country to Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible." Now, these were the years in which Washington could still promise the American people that our troops would be home by Christmas. These were the years in which Washington still seemed to believe that the Viet Cong were nothing more than an advance guard of the North Vietnamese army, a few tens of thousands of insurrectionists who had infiltrated across the border and who could be militarily disposed of. These were the years in which Washington seemed to believe that the government in Saigon was the official government of all of the South Vietnamese people, that it represented something more than a military junta supported by our arms and our money which had somehow fought its way to official position. Then came the bitter disillusionment, the growing casualty lists, the escalating year, the year of the rural pacification programs, the visible evidence that the Saigon military government was not a popular government. The Buddhist revolts, the revolts in the northern cities, dissidence among the Montanards, the hill peoples.

The American people became more sophisticated about the facts of this far away, until then little known nation. The American people began to demand of Washington a clear^{er} statement of principles. Why had we been brought to Southeast Asia in the first place against competent military advice? What were we doing there? How long would we remain? Was this a new commitment of American power across 5,000 miles of water to a continent of almost two billions of people? To clear the American mind and to justify his position, the President of the United States at the Johns Hopkins University on the 7th of April of 1965 made an important speech in which he made it clear that the United States had no imperial designs in asia, we wanted no military bases, no economic privilege; and in which he said inter alia, "the only path to reasonable men is the path of settlement." He said also, "we remain ready for unconditional discussions."

Now, the American people which has never looked upon this government as truculent or belligerent, an American government which has never assumed the ambition of the nation to be imperial, this American people was delighted to hear the government speak of limited ambitions, of a limited program, of the possibility of ending the war by

conference and by negotiation. And when Washington began to spell out the terms of these negotiations, Americans found them most generous. In January of this year the State Department issued what it called a 'basket of peace', fourteen statements which had been made by official representatives, dealing with the terms of a possible settlement.

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;
7. We want no U. S. bases in Southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;
10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option;
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;

13. The President has said "The Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I do not think that would be an insurmountable problem."
14. We have said publicly and privately, that we could stop the bombing of North Viet Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint of suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

In summation, we have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Vietnam.

The American people as a whole were delighted to hear these words from the Administration and far more than ever before, were willing to go along with the Administration's actions in Southeast Asia. I began to hear: 'I don't know why we are there, but I am sure that the Administration must have some good reason for being there.' In any case, we have proposed what seems to be honorable and generous terms. The shoe, now, is on the other foot - what more can we do?' And when Hanoi curtly and contemptuously dismissed these fourteen points and every other proposal made by Washington, the American people began to say, 'perhaps the Administration was right all along in warning us about the cold-eyed contempt of these fanatic ideologues for human life and world peace. Perhaps they are determined to gain their ends by force and by subversion and we may have no alternative but to fight this messy and unwanted war.'

I wonder. My mind keeps coming back to the Indian editorial which assumed that the white man spoke with a forked tongue. I wonder if Hanoi and Asia generally may not have good reason to be suspicious of these proposals. My mind runs back to some rather recent history. At the end of the second World War the United States at Terhan, and again at San Francisco, pledged itself to the principle of national self-determination - an end of colonialism - independence for all peoples of the world. Yet, a year later when France deposed the newly born Democratic Republic of Vietnam which had emerged after Japanese surrender, when France cavalierly reimposed colonial rule and her puppet king, Bao Dai, the United States made no protest. And when many supporters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, communist and non-communist alike, began to fight for independence, a war which ended with the French defeat of Dien Bien

Phu and the Geneva Conference of 1954, the United States supported French repression to the tune of 80 percent of the cost of that military undertaking. And when the world insisted that this bloody fight between France and her once colonial possession must end and brought that war to an end at Geneva in 1954, the United States sat as a member of that Conference until the final treaty was drawn and then withdrew, which temporarily partitioned Vietnam, and set about undermining this international convention by encouraging the designs of Gen Diem for a permanently independent nation called South Vietnam, by supporting him in his contemptuous disregard of the projected 1956 plebiscite on reunification.

I wonder if the white man speaks with a forked tongue. When the President said at Johns Hopkins that "the only path to reasonable men is the path of settlement and that we remain ready for unconditional discussions" there were 30,000 American troops in South Vietnam. That month Hanoi watched the largest debarkation of American expeditionary forces of any month up to that time. Eighteen months ago when the President first spoke of settlement, there were 30,000 American troops in South Vietnam. Eighteen months later, when Mr. Goldberg speaks of settlement, there are 331,000 American troops in South Vietnam, and 44,500 South Korean troops, 4,500 Australian and New Zealand troops, and another 30,000 American troops in Thailand, manning the bases from which we bombed North Vietnam, and 45,000 Americans, sailors and air men with the aircraft carriers and the ships of the Seventh Fleet.

Hanoi hears the words of peace but sees the bitter facts of an escalated war. Hanoi heard Mr. Goldberg speak of America's desire for peace and offer what seems to be a generous proposal. We will stop the bombing as soon as we hear that Hanoi is prepared to restrict its war effort. We will withdraw our troops as Hanoi withdraws hers. We will withdraw our troops totally when all foreign troops are withdrawn. We will go to the Conference tables to effect a final settlement, but Hanoi also saw and suffered that very same week the most devastating air attack of the war, an attack more destructive in its power than any that was flown against Nazi Germany during the entire course of the second World War.

Does the white man speak with a forked tongue? A disconcerting book appeared recently. It is entitled The Politics of Escalation in Viet Nam. It is the work of a group of professors from Washington University in St. Louis and the University of California in Berkeley. These men are historians and political scientists. As academicians they have made a careful search of all that has become public knowledge about the international negotiations of the past two years. It is their sobering conclusion that when domestic or international pressure has mounted for negotiations, the American government has responded with a significant escalation of the war. They raise the possibility that we have used the talk of peace as a camouflage and a prelude to such escalation. As an example, in June of this past year there were Canadian and French official representatives in Hanoi trying to mediate this conflict. Apparently both groups wired their capitals that there were some hopeful signs of a willingness by Hanoi to come to the conference table. That very same June week the President of the United States said: "We must continue to raise the cost of aggression at its source", and he ordered the bombing of industrial targets in the suburbs of Haiphong and of Hanoi.

I do not know if the thesis of this book is, in fact, the full story, but I do know it makes disconcerting reading to an American who has been trained to believe that his government means what it says and that it is fundamentally committed to the cause of peace. But this aside, ought cynicism to stand in the way of peace? As Americans we can well ask, so what? Perhaps we have not always lived up to our word, but this is our publicly stated policy. America could not easily go back on it. If Hanoi believes it to be a bluff why don't they take us up on the bluff? What have they got to lose? The terms are generous.

I would like to suggest to you that the terms of peace which we have offered are not as disingenuous or as generous as they, at first reading, seem to be. I would like to suggest to you that the terms of settlement which we have so far stipulated, in fact, stipulate that the United States will win at the conference table

what we have not so far been able to win on the battlefield, i.e., the integrity of South Vietnam under the unquestioned, unopposed control of the Saigon government. In all of our statements about negotiation and peace one theme is clear. The President said it eighteen months ago at Johns Hopkins. "Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. Peace demands an independent South Vietnam, securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others." The State Department 'basket of peace' statement which I read to you ends with these words: "In other words, we have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Vietnam." Arthur Goldberg, speaking at the United Nations, said it more diplomatically but as clearly: "The essential facts of the Vietnam conflict can be stated briefly. Vietnam remains today divided along the demarkation line agreed upon in Geneva in 1954. To the north and south of that line are North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Provisional though they may be, pending a decision on the peaceful reunification of Vietnam by the process of self-determination, they are nonetheless political realities in the international community." We have in mind a Korean-like settlement. Along the 17th parallel, as Hanoi withdraws her troops and the Viet Cong to the north, we will withdraw our troops to the east. What do we leave behind? It leaves South Vietnam empty of troops except for the troops of the Saigon government. It leaves that major proportion of the population of South Vietnam which has supported the Viet Cong, and apparently still supports it, at the mercy of a Saigon military junta which has been known to use intimidation and terror to achieve its political ends. Such a settlement achieves the very thing which we set about to do in 1954: to subvert the Geneva Conference and to bring about a permanently independent nation, South Vietnam, whose interest economically and otherwise would be towards the west.

Ho Chi Minh knows this well. He remembers the never-held election in 1956. He has only to look at Korea or at Germany to know that all the verbiage about a possible plebiscite, sometime in the nebulous future, is mere rhetoric. Partitions once drawn are not easily erased. If they could be easily undone they would never have

been drawn in the first place. Ho Chi Minh knows that what America will have achieved by such an offer of peace is no more than she seeks to achieve and cannot achieve on the battlefield. We will, in effect, be placing the South Vietnamese people under the full control of the Saigon government which have never been popularly mandated, which has in opposition not only the Viet Cong (Communists and otherwise) but many other dissidents who are not members of the Viet Cong. Saigon would have all the arms. All others would be unarmed. One wonders at the kind of democracy which would be practiced in that little nation. I cannot erase from my mind the evidence of Asian democracy which I heard and saw in Korea. As our troops moved north and recaptured villages, from time to time we would hear gunfire in our rear. We would send out patrols afraid that the enemy had encircled us, but we soon discovered that the Republic of Korea troops, our allies, had moved into the newly liberated village and had lined up the opposition to Sygman Rhee and had shot them down in cold blood. Asian political rules are not our own and they must be considered if we consider a political solution for Southeast Asia.

I am afraid that the terms of peace which we have so far offered are not terms of peace but terms of victory, that the only gain to North Vietnam is the cessation of bombing. Can peace come to the Far East? I believe it can. I believe that the withdrawal of troops to the north and to the east is a prerequisite for such a peace, but I believe that we must go much farther than our present proposals. I believe that we must propose not only that Hanoi withdraw its seventeen battalions and that we withdraw our troops, but that we disarm all of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong, the Buddhists, the bandit groups, the army of South Vietnam and its police force. Only if we disarm all of these groups can their vindictive political vendettas be brought from the battlefield into the political arena and to the ballot box. A nation cannot simply be disarmed. There must be police. Someone must protect the border, and so we will have to encourage, and probably to subsidize, a United Nations presence. There must be withdrawal, the cessation of fighting. But there must also be a disarmament of all South Vietnam and with that disarmament goes that implied statement,

'the government of Saigon is not necessarily the legitimate government of South Vietnam.'

Arthur Goldberg suggested this in one cryptic aside which we need to enlarge upon. He said: "nor do we seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people of peaceful participation in their country's future." Well and good. What I am suggesting is a technique by which this can be accomplished. Withdrawal. Disarmament. A peace-keeping United Nations peace-keeping force, and a time table for a plebiscite on reunification in full recognition that in all probability this plebiscite will be a vote for reunification. There are more Viets to the north than to the south, but let history, for once, take its course and count on growing nationalism in Asia as we have counted on nationalism in Europe to establish a buffer zone between the great powers of the world. We have learned to live with Tito in Yugoslavia, with Poland, with Hungary and with Romania, Communist states all. Why cannot we learn to live with certain neutralists, or at least non-aggressive, Communist states in Asia? Are they not perhaps our best safeguard against Chinese expansion?

A cease fire. Withdrawal. Disarmament. The presence of a United Nations force. A plebiscite for reunification. This is not the glory road. There is no victory here for the United States. We will in the end lose South Vietnam but we will have peace, and perhaps a Vietnam sufficiently strong to stop Chinese imperialism. The policy which we undertook in haste and without thinking through its ramifications, a policy which was born in confusion and bred in fear, cannot be expected to end in victory. We came into Southeast Asia through blindness, ignorance and fear. We remain in Southeast Asia because we did not have in those early years the courage to accept the full complexity of the Asian picture and our commitments. We remained in Asia because we continued to have an overly simple view of what was happening in Vietnam. Saigon was the legitimate government. The Viet Cong were Communist insurgents. Saigon was only a semi-legitimate government. The Viet Cong was not only a group of Communist insurrectionists but a broadly-based revolution. Simplifying what we saw we came to simple answers. There are no simple answers in Asia.

What will we have when it is all over? Very little more than we had in South-east Asia twenty years ago. Will we have an independent South Vietnam? Probably not. Will we have a freedom-loving, democratic Vietnam, north and south? Surely not. We ought not to tick off too quickly semi-Communist nations as irrevocable enemies of the United States. Indonesia must be born in mind. These nations are nations. They are groups of people with their own ambitions. Their ambitions are not those of China or Russia.

I see no victory in Asia. I see only the dim hope that we may be able to reestablish the precarious peace which this world requires. The way of peace is the way of negotiation - negotiation implies bargaining with the man across the table so that each of you can come away with some degree of honor and self-respect - happy at least that you have contributed some share to stability in our world.

We read this morning in our service: "Oh Lord, God of all the world, show Thou the pathway of peace unto all the children of men. Imbue them with the desire for brotherliness and good will which alone can bring enduring peace. May the nations realize the triumphs of war turn to ashes and that justice and righteousness are better than conquest and dominion. For it is not by might nor by power but by Thy spirit that blessings of peace can be made secure.

May the nations realize the triumphs of war turn to ashes and that justice and righteousness are better than conquest and dominion. That it is not by might and not by power but by Thy spirit that peace, hope come into our world for the benefit of all mankind.

On a Thursday day back in Sept (or 22nd) Ray of Ray R.M.N. announced
a 30% increase in the planned production of hydrogen & helium - hydrogen
aircraft being the right kind of car. Once again Ray said the same thing
as the day before, more important, Archie A.C. was making a broader
proposal for stop by stop accumulation of U.N. war against U.N. of
our indignity to resist unjust war of the conflict. As
a first step we must have war U.N. if war should be
U.S. 'primary as attendant' but an idea must be modified
by a comprehensive & appropriate selection of war effort.
Mr M.N. was concerned a subtle for a broader war
effort at the very moment Mr M.N. was saying


WRHS



One would not help but reminded of that indignity was in
old the Western idea as to be that idea supported
position and lead position fully to be any kind of an
idea has come to offer of peace " include now a peace with
for that peace "

Conclusions are so relevant to be the idea that of
settled a peace that was over laying the blame responsibility
entirely of the containing idea. After all it was
only 18 months ago that W.W. for the first time publicly
approved the idea of republicanism. From an 1st annual
to the President John W. speech of April 1965
the first annual republicanism but a first step

meeting To guide a White House Statement of Oct 1963



The trouble was that the reluctance among military personnel
in some instances - never as far as the troops would
be known by X - NEVER M-A-I-N-T-A-I-N-E-D. The U.S. was unwilling
to make a small band of N.V. troops - but the
support of a regular population of the SVN people - the Southern
official was unwilling to be the effect of population
of a freedom area & people - in fact it was not
handful but it was less than the adverse
of a very majority of the VN people



The primary concern is

The Budget result

V.I.C. in the

The responsibility of the VN population should be concerned

public would be more fully understood the reason for the

Another discussion - finally faced the conclusion to be more

concepts - to its objection & to accept the concept of

a peace established at the Congress Talbot rule the

on the hundred in April of 1965 the President finally

said | THE ONLY PATH FOR REASONABLE MEN IS
THE PATH OF SETTLEMENT [AND] WE

REMAIN READY FOR UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS

Conferences' brought a welcome sign of relief. The image of
hellcat ^{TRULLENCE} ~~an unpleasant & uncompromising spirit~~ - is not one that may

be used as a shield. The President did not expect at the J.H.'s
specific time for the negotiation. There was doubt - somewhat

Thursday & Wednesday - 4 at 10:30. By January 8, 1966 the 5th
Dept. could put out a 14 pt. statement of what it would

"U.S. contribution to the Search of Peace"

WRHS

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

There were several bricks thrown + much discussion found
it easier to go along with leaders in charge "It was a
little business - perhaps necessary - but we made a
summary and transmitted offer, what more can we
be expected to do?"

Peace long concern were puzzled and amused by the
act + unpleasant Radio transmission response to these
proposals. ^{which refused even to consider the offer of negotiation} disagrees to these people "I
was not after all to warn us about about the world ago
intent for human peace + peace by a determined future
peace for human peace development and!"

the ~~history~~ book in fact has published by a weekly group
of For Encke reports & other programs at the Un. of Calif in Berkeley &
Wend. Un. at St. Louis ~~included~~ "The Politics of Revolution in VN"
not the historical document ~~the~~ ~~book~~ ~~but~~ ~~whereas~~ ~~there~~
has been heavy donated & interest promoted & retention - ~~there~~
has been a corresponding significant movement now to make so
clear - that

for Allen
Silvestri
must be
proposed

our gestures toward negotiation seem to have
preceded, or even doubled, steps toward our
large and, ambivalent.

To the use of words - This point from both French & Chinese
interactions were received in France and China as a prelude
of a will to negotiate. Mr. Shen can say
well to say "we must continue to reach the end of aggression at
the same" - to order the current boundary right of France &
Humphrey.

This record makes ambiguity needed.

Shen C. C. "no other
kind of enclave is so"
[My notes - French with
no admission to make that -]

Even if it is not the full story - it certainly makes
plain that the peace offer has not been disregarded -
perhaps the subtle man has opened much unspoken language

Even so - an exercise is tempted to ask - why has not
Shen will even bluff - & bring us to the conference table
on the basis of our preparations - and my not really need negotiation
but certainly we can not go back on our word - what
has been to do?

General was heard A.C. mentioned of U.S. proposals at the U.N. —
they seemed ~~quite~~ enough but no need to go to you

AC "hired piece"
reportedly, ~~the~~ proposed ~~was~~ a proposal which is really
rather high under the generous, it offers to be done little
about a four million aid, 20 is what attempt to secure
at the inferior Tulsa which has not been secured in the middle-
field — an independent SVN unlike of a friendly out a

Suez

made one there which appears old U.S. peace proposal.
P.S. said it is the U.S. peace



The State Dept. Bureau of 14 points was decided on the basis!

Arab. League said it somewhat less likely to be
assembly

the peace offer is questionable only if it is not
Washington's attitude towards the possibility of the Arab in S.E. Asia

It is a bald attempt to gain at the Conference table what has not been gained in the battlefield. It imposes our political conviction on Viet Nam. Our terms say in effect, 'withdraw the seventeen battalions of the regular North Viet Nameese army and the entire Viet Cong and we will withdraw the American troops'. Our offer is essentially the offer of a Korean-type peace with the Saigon government left in control of all South Viet Nam. The difficulty is, of course, that Saigon now controls less than one-half of South Viet Nam. A sizeable proportion, perhaps a majority of the South Viet Nameese population are sympathetic to the Viet Cong. These people would be left defenseless and under the guns of a military government which has never feared to use force.

Our peace offer is generous only if we accept Washington's rather too simple understanding of the war in South East Asia. We look on Saigon as the legitimate government of a free people. We look on ^{The} Viet Cong as an outside agent of Communist subversion.

Unfortunately, General Ky's government is hardly a popular one and the Viet Cong is even today largely a broadly-based rebellion by the South Vietnamese ~~as~~ against Saigon. There are Communist elements in it to be sure. They may even play a dominant role but the Viet Cong remains ~~essentially~~ ^{also} a movement of domestic unrest.

To evacuate the Viet Cong is to give Saigon the full control of a nation it does not now and has never fully controlled.


I would suggest that ~~more~~ a reasonable peace offer requires not only the withdrawal of North Viet Nameese regulars and Americans but the disarmament of both the Viet Cong and the armies of Saigon.

The Temple

- 3 -

This can be accomplished only by the introduction of a massive United Nations force which would keep peace in the land and police it. We can not expect Hanoi or the Viet Cong to abandon their followers in the South to a ^{PREDICTABLE} certain unpleasant fate. We can not expect Hanoi or the Viet Cong to accept elections in which dissidents are not allowed to run and in which the army encourages ^{CAN} its favorite candidates at the point of a gun. Peace in South Viet Nam requires both withdrawal of foreign troops and ^{ALL} disarmament of local groups. AND THE
This is the only way in which political solutions can replace the murderous solution on the battlefield. I am afraid that the
present peace offers are really not offers of peace and peace is what Viet Nam and all of Asia supremely require.

PRESENTED
OF AUN
- 2017



I am glad that the American
speakers of peace & reconciliation
But I am afraid that the
present offers are not really
offers of peace - but a
calculated program for
gaining an election -
on day we need peace -
but we need peace - the
peace is not peace - it is
peace very hard to

STRICTLY LIMITED AIMS

.....

Our aims in giving this assistance are strictly limited.

We are not engaged in a "holy war" against Communism.

We do not seek to establish an American empire or a "sphere of influence" in Asia.

We seek no permanent military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent alliances, no permanent American "presence" of any kind in South Vietnam.

We do not seek to impose a policy of alignment on South Vietnam.

We do not seek the overthrow of the Government of North Vietnam.

We do not seek to do any injury to mainland China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests.

We do not ask of North Vietnam an unconditional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything that belongs to it; nor do we seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future.

POLITICAL SOLUTION SOUGHT

Let me say affirmatively and succinctly what our aims are.

*We want a political solution, not a military solution, to this conflict. By the same token, we reject the idea that North Vietnam has a right to impose a military solution.

*We seek to assure for the people of South Vietnam the same right of self-determination - to decide their own political destiny, free of force - that the United Nations Charter affirms for all.

*And we believe that reunification of Vietnam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and South without outside interference, the results of which choice we are fully prepared to support.

These, then, are our affirmative aims. We are well aware of the stated position of Hanoi on these issues. But no difference can be resolved without contact, dis-

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cussions or negotiations. For our part, we have long been and remain today ready to negotiate without any prior conditions.

We are prepared to discuss Hanoi's four points together with any points which other parties may wish to raise. We are ready to negotiate a settlement based on a strict observance of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, which observance was called for in the communique of the recent meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in Bucharest. And we will support a reconvening of the Geneva conference, or an Asian conference, or any other generally acceptable forum.



The following statements are on the public record about elements which the U. S. believes can go into peace in Southeast Asia:

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it;
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;
7. We want no U. S. bases in Southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;
10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option;
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;
13. The President has said "The Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted

to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem."

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

In other words, we have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Vietnam.

THE ONLY PATH TO A REASONABLE MEN IS THE
PATH OF SETTLEMENT - AND WE
REMAIN READY FOR UNCONDITIONAL
DISCUSSIONS —

WE WILL DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO
REACH OUR OBJECTIVES

WE MUST CONTINUE TO RAISE THE COST
OF AGGRESSION AT ITS SOURCE

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6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;
7. We want no U. S. bases in Southeast Asia;
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured;
9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice;
10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision;
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option;
12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars;
13. The President has said "The Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I do not think that would be an insurmountable problem."
14. We have said publicly and privately, that we could stop the bombing of North Viet Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.

The following statements are on the public record about elements which the U. S. believes can go into peace in Southeast Asia:

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;
2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof;
3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it; ^{REQUEST OF}
4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson put it;
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions;
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose;
7. We want no U. S. bases in Southeast Asia;
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11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral if that be their option;
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13. The President has said "The Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I do not think that would be an insurmountable problem."
14. We have said publicly and privately, that we could stop the bombing of North Viet Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint of such action.

My Government remains determined to exercise every restraint to limit the war and to exert every effort to bring the conflict to the earliest conclusion.

Oct 1963
We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and the Government of South Vietnam, to deny their country to communism, and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the viet cong as promptly as possible.

WRHS
The only path for reasonable men is the path for settlement (and) We remain ready for unconditional discussions.



Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. Peace demands an independent South Vietnam--securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others.

In other words we have put everything in the basket of peace except the surrender of South Vietnam.

~~"The Essential Facts"~~

The essential facts of the Vietnam conflict can be stated briefly. Vietnam today remains divided along the demarcation line agreed upon in Geneva in 1954. To the north and south of that line are North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Pro-visional though they may be, pending a decision on the peaceful reunification of Vietnam by the process of self-determination, they are nonetheless political realities in the international community.

Kaddish

Friday Oct 17

Sunday Oct 23

Those who passed away this week

RUTH MARKUS

Yahrzeits

LINDA BAER
CELIA JANOWITZ FREEDMAN
EMANUEL ROSENFELD
AUGUSTA MINTZ
MAX GREENHUT
SIDNEY M. SCHOEN
ARNOLD NATHANSON
JACOB WEISKOPF
FLORENCE FULD ULLMAN
LOUIS L. SQUIRES
HANNAH C. KOBLITZ
EDITH CLARA WEINKLE
MAX HOLLANDER
JOSEPH KOBLITZ
JENNIE WODICKA MERTZEL

SOL H. SCHACHTEL
BENJAMIN F. KLEIN
SARAH BENSON HARRIS
HELEN K. WULIGER
ISAAC E. SPERLING
JENNIE REITER KLEIN



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LEO S. BAMBERGER
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXCERPTS FROM SERMON ENTITLED "A SOLUTION TO VIET NAM"

BY RABBI DANIEL JEREMY SILVER
SUNDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1966
The Temple

Washington did not sponsor a negotiated settlement of the Viet Nameese mess until April of 1965. Until that time Americans who were deeply troubled by our precipitous involvement in Asia and by the dangerous threat to world peace pressed the Administration to define acceptable terms of settlement. Our terms as now expressed by Ambassador Goldberg to the General Assembly of the United Nations seem generous enough. We will cease bombing North Viet Nam at the first indication of Hanoi's willingness to cut back her war effort. We will withdraw our troops as Hanoi withdraws hers and our withdrawal will be total. The Viet Nameese are to make their own political decisions through normal political means.

The shoe seems now to be on the other foot. Washington offers peace and Hanoi curtly dismisses these proffer's. What more can our nation honorably do? This feeling has gained for the President a measure of support which he had not had before for this unpopular enterprise.

Unfortunately, our offer is not as high-minded or disingenuous as it appears to be. It offers Hanoi little except face-saving.


It is a bald attempt to gain at the Conference table what has not been gained in the battlefield. It imposes our political conviction on Viet Nam. Our terms say in effect, 'withdraw the seventeen battalions of the regular North Viet Nameese army and the entire Viet Cong and we will withdraw the American troops'. Our offer is essentially the offer of a Korean-type peace with the Saigon government left in control of all South Viet Nam. The difficulty is, of course, that Saigon now controls less than one-half of South Viet Nam. A sizeable proportion, perhaps a majority of the South Viet Nameese population, are sympathetic to the Viet Cong. These people would be left defenseless and under the guns of a military government which has never feared to use force.

Our peace offer is generous only if we accept Washington's rather too simple understanding of the war in South East Asia. We look on Saigon as the legitimate government of a free people. We look on ^{The} Viet Cong as an outside agent of Communist subversion. Unfortunately, General Ky's government is hardly a popular one and the Viet Cong is even today largely a broadly-based rebellion by the South Vietnamese ~~as~~ against Saigon. There are Communist elements in it to be sure. They may even play a dominant role but the Viet Cong remains essentially a movement of domestic unrest.

To evacuate the Viet Cong is to give Saigon the full control of a nation it does not now and has never fully controlled.

I would suggest that a reasonable peace offer requires not only the withdrawal of North Viet Nameese regulars and Americans but the disarmament of both the Viet Cong and the armies of Saigon.

This can be accomplished only by the introduction of a massive United Nations force which would keep peace in the land and police it. We can not expect Hanoi or the Viet Cong to abandon their followers in the South to a certain unpleasant fate. We can not expect Hanoi or the Viet Cong to accept elections in which dissidents are not allowed to run and in which the army encourages its favorite candidates at the point of a gun. Peace in South Viet Nam requires both withdrawal of foreign troops and disarmament of local groups. This is the only way in which political solutions can replace the murderous solution on the battlefield. I am afraid that the present peace offers are really not offers of peace and peace is what Viet Nam and all of Asia supremely require.



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