

## Daniel Jeremy Silver Collection Digitization Project

Featuring collections from the Western Reserve Historical Society and The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives

## MS-4850: Daniel Jeremy Silver Papers, 1972-1993.

Series III: The Temple Tifereth-Israel, 1946-1993, undated. Sub-series B: Sermons, 1950-1989, undated.

Reel Box Folder 52 16 965

Deeper Into Asian Mud, 1971.

## Deeper Into Asian Mud The Folly of Vietnam Goes On and On and On Daniel Jeremy Silver February 28, 1971

Vietnam has spelled tragedy, a tragedy for the victims of this senseless war, tragedy for all southeast Asia, the war has been fought, the war has despoiled the countryside, the farm and the jungle, tragedy for this nation whose polity it has divided, tragedy for the world whose interests it has preoccupied, there were far more pressing problems to be concerned with. The majority of the American people wanted to be quit of Vietnam for a number of years. people, at least the majority of them, as soon as they saw the consequences of this involvement they began to clamor for withdrawal, for an end. Certainly this was at least part of the significance of the elections of 1968; certainly this is what the Gallup and other polls have been revealing to us in increasing proportions in the last months and years; certainly this is what our own conversations, our own knowledge of others, our neighbors, friends would indicate. The President misunderstood the temper of the American people, he has not denied it. In fact, in the last address to Congress dealing with our foreign affairs, he tried to explain his policies in southeast Asia he wrote of their initiation and to included this phrase: "The support of the American people during the remainder of the conflict requires a diminishing United States involvement. The President, for reasons of principle, his reasons were quite personal reasons, wants to be out of Vietnam. There are only two issues on which he can lose the next election; one is the issue of the economic health of the nation; the other is the issue of the war in Vietnam, the casualty lists, inflation. And the two are intertwined, interlinked , for it is the over two hundred billions of dollars which we have poured into that Asian mud which has to the largest degree unbalanced our economy and brought about the present straitened circumstances. Two hundred

billion dollars - I did a little arithmetic the other day. If in 1960 we had given to every man, woman and child in South Vietnam and North Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos fifty thousand dollars we would have spent less money in southeast Asia than we have spent on war. And imagine the hospitals that could have been built, the roads which could have been laid, the agricultural irrigation project which could have been undertaken, fifty thousand dollars for every man, woman and child. Or if we had taken the same two hundred billion dollars and given it to the poor families in America who represent the "other America", the poor, those who live below the poverty line, we could have given them a quarter million dollars, two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, to every such family and still have spent less of our national treasury. Imagine the decent housing we could have raised, imagine the kindsof schooling we could have provided; imagine the kindsof deprivation we could have undone. Instead of the we find ourselves, because of the budget, because of our war budget, because of fifteen years of war budgets, we find ourselves cutting back on minimal welfare support, cutting back on public housing, cutting back on all the programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity, cutting back on educational and medical research, cutting back on all those things which make for the vitality and The vigor and health of the nation.

Vietnam is a disaster. The question is what do we do about it? How do we get out? Many of us have become so frustrated, the war has lasted so long, the policies which have been undertaken by successive governments, Republican, Democratic, the policies have been so inimicable to what we have wanted that we in a sense have turned to off, turned to out. There are a lot of people I know, there are a lot of people whom you know, who whenever the news comes on flicks the news off, when the black headlines of southeast Asia, out of sight is

somehow out of mind. We don't want any part of this ongoing guilt, ongoing burden, ongoing frustration, it's too much for us. And many of us have become almost paranoid in our reactions about Vietnam. We have come to look upon successive administrations as the devil incarnate; we have come to assume that every word of their undertaking is machavelian, mischievous, crude, diabolic. What they propose in all areas we have come to instinctively deny, we have reacted with our passions rather than with our intelligence. And though as you know I fundamentally and totally believe that we have been misguided in every action we have taken in southeast Asia I submit to you that a kind of naive pacifism is not wisdom but the absence of policy; that a bumper sticker "Another Family For Peace" is not a conceived calculating reasonable realistic foreign policy; that an aire isolationism would be one of the worst disasters which could come out of southeast Asia. The President said in his report to Congress a days ago that he saw forces in America which would sweep us towards an isolationism which would be as disastrous as excessive zeal and in that I agree with him. The American people have somehow come to believe that the world is different than the world really is; that if only America would cease being so belligerent, so monarchous, so imperialistic, if we only would withdraw from wherever we have commitments then somehow all of the problems of the world would drain away. The only guilt which exists in the world is our We have guilt aplenty, but there is guilt to be shared because there is greed guilt. in every nation. The world survives not because the nations of the world want peace, but because there is a balance of terror between the nations. Yes, there is a lesson in southeast Asia but there is also a lesson in the Middle East. Yes, there is a lesson in Cambodia, but there is also a lesson in Czechoslovakia and hunch did take place. I believe we've drawn the line at the wrong place in the wrong part of

where everyone out there is saintly and we alone are the devil. We live in a world of grand greedy nations, each trying to take advantage commercially, militarily, in terms of balance of power of all other nations and we must never forget this. It may not be the world we want to live in; it may not be the world we want to leave to our children, but this is the world. We can't be it away. No amount of moralism, pietism, simplistic pacifism will allow us to change the nature of the world. When a weak animal is blooded the hounds redouble their effort. The President is right when he says that this nation must be very careful to remind itself always that there are commitments, freedom, there for one's self. We cannot be gainsay which must be honored.

I'm not prepared for Many absorbtion to the processions, policies in Vietnam to which two statements he made. I do not believe that he is machiavellen, strait. I believe him when he says I want to end the war and save the lives of the brave young men in Vietnam. And I believe him when he tries to explain his policy in terms of continuing commitments of the United States. I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their younger sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam some place in the world. I simply believe that he is applying the logic to the wrong place, drawing the wrong line. I find myself in short often protesting the war among those whose protests are not taken on the same basis as mine, those who are opposed to all American commitments anywhere in the world and I do believe that the greatest power in the world has commitments in western Europe; it has commitments in the Middle East; it has commitments in Latin America which must be honored, commitments to those weaker, and who are aligned with us in common purpose and common value. My

feeling about Vietnam is that we ought to follow in Vietnam the example that General DeGaulle set for us when he withdrew the French from Algeria. The French, you remember, fought the National Liberation Front of the Algerians for some eight years. It was a bloody war, it drained frances economy, France was being ticked off as no longer a great power, it was a third rate power. Then General DeGaulle Came changed into office. He looked at the situation. He saw that half of the French army was involved in Algeria. He saw how much of the French treasury was being poured down that desert drain and he cut French losses in Algeria overnight. He announced withdrawal. He turned the withdrawal, the retreat of French troops, into a logistic triumph. He negotiated with the National Liberation Front and the Algerians, withdraw peacefully the exodus of the , the French Nationals, some of whom ha lived in Algeria for two, three, four and more generations. And at the end of that tunnel the French economy was buoyant, France was again able to become the glory that DeGaulle thought so much of a major power, and which she has piddled around the world became again a possibility of the French nation and, interestingly, France began to earn dollars from Algeria from its commercial enterprises, not to throw away blank dollars in Algeria as heretofore. I believe that this ought to have been our policy in Vietnam once we saw the disastrous consequences of our involvement. The only arment I have heard against such a policy would be that so many of our allies would be slaughtered in the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front and North Vietnamese marched into Saigon. Perhaps. Blood has flown in southeast Asia for twenty-five years. The streets have been bloody during all of those twenty-five years and I somehow suspect that if we really wanted to we could negotiate with Hanoi about the removal of Thinnons and puppets in that part of the world and have them safely to these shores.

The President has argued

and argued consistently since he has

since he has come into office, not against this policy of unilateral withdrawal. He has spoken of winding down the war and easing ourselves out. His arguments have taken generally this form and I take this from his report of two days ago, but he has spoken in this way on many many occasions. Others, he wrote, urge that we liquidate our presence immediately, cut our losses, and leave the South Vietnamese on their own. He reads me very well. I have repeatedly explained why I consider this a d sastrous path: For the South Vietnamese people who would have lost their collective political choice and countless individual lives. For other non-communist countries, especially in Asia, among whom not a single leader recommended such a policy, for the global credibility of the U.S. word, for those Americans who have made such heavy sacrifices and for the integrity of American society in the post-Vietnam era.

I understand his logic, but I must confess that I reject it. He argues that we ought to wind down the war, not to withdraw, for the South Vietnamese people who could have lost their collective political choice and countless individual lives. When have the South Vietnamese people had a collective free political choice? Yes, they have lost countless individual lives, but I submit to you that the Vietnamization of the war will guarantee only that they will lose countless more individual lives.

What is it? That the policy that the casualty list shall be of Vietnamese corpses rather than of American corpses. Yes, I can understand him when he says for other non-communist countries, especially in Asia, among whom not a single leader recommended such a policy, but I would submit that the policies recommended

South Korea, Thailand and Phillipines are minions and puppets, hardly represent the sum and the burden of the advice which has been given to the west by the free world. What do the leaders in Europe say and what do some of the leaders in free world Latin America say? That American involvement in southeast Asia has precluded America's involvement in their problems, that we have lacked the money, we have lacked the clout, we have lacked the will to maintain the forces of NATO adequately, that we have lacked the money, we have lacked the will to maintain the ties of economic reform and infusion of our monies into Latin America so much needed. And that because of our preoccupation in southeast Asia the free world as it has been traditionally defined is the weaker, not the stronger.

Yes, I can understand the President when he says for other non-communist countries, especially Asia, among whom not a single leader has recommended such a policy, but I submit that Thailand and the Phillipines and South Korea ought not to determine what our policy shall be. It's good for them, but not necessarily good for the free world.



What about for the global credibility of the United States word? When is one's word as a nation creditable? When one can act to meet one's commitments; when so much of American wealth and so much of American weaponry and so much of the American army is tied down in Vietnam what do we have left elsewhere in the world to make our word creditable? Why has the Russian navy moved unopposed into the Mediterranean? Why has the Russian navy moved almost unopposed into the South Atlantic? Because we lack the capability to operate on two fronts effectively because of southeast Asia. The creditability of our word depends on

our ability support the free nations of the world. We have lacked the flexibility with all of our energies, all of our concerns, so much of our treasure was involved in that one little part. What about those Americans who have made such heavy sacrifices? The sacrifice of life is tragedy. Forty-five thousand Americans have died. Will they be resurrected by the sacrifice of more lives? How does one honor the sacrifice of the dead? By maintaining the values of the nation. Is our nation united, whole, strong, of one mind, of common purpose? Or has in fact Vietnam split us apart into roaring camps, where so preoccupied each with its own individual aims there lacks any sense in this nation of ours today of common overarching purpose. Where is the trust we once implicitly had in our government? That somehow it would muddle through internationally and lead us domestically? That, too, has been washed out in the dirty linen of southeast Asia.

I'm afraid that I must respectfully submit to our President that though I can understand the logic of his position I do not believe it ties in with the realities of America or the world today. Southeast Asia represents tragedy and this policy of winding down the war in southeast Asia represents I would respectfully submit potentially greater tragedy than we have seen heretofore. Because the President's policy for winding down the war rather than from simply withdrawing requires two elements: the first, negotiation, Paris,, peace talks and what have we offered at these peace talks? We would withdraw from southeast Asia provided the North Vietnamese would withdraw from South Vietnam. What we insisted upon from beginning to end was the viability of something called South Vietnam. We insisted that South Vietnam must be a nation; it never was, it was never intended to be, but somehow this has become a fixed idea, a requirement of our policy, the one requirement in which, of course, the North will not negotiate. Negotiations have

REK failed. Our attempting a policy which is called Vietnamization. Vietnamization appeals to the American people. It seems to speak of a nation defining itself, assuming responsibility for its own national destiny and it has had one glorious effect which the President never ceases to remind us of in that it has permitted the President to reduce our troop commitments in southeast Asia from 548,000 two years ago to some 320,000 today, supposedly to 286,000 by May 1. And we have watched the casualty lists in southeast Asia lower themselves from a level around 250 monthly in 1968 to 180 monthly in 1969, to 81 monthly in 1970, to 51 monthly in the last six months. Pressure within our country tended to diminish as draft calls went down and as casualty lists dropped. But there is a form of selective morality involved in all of this. What was the cost? During this same period when our draft calls were being reduced and our casualty lists were going down we forced the South Vietnamese army to raise its numbers by over 20 percent, from 900,000 men to 1, 100, 000 men and as our casualty lists went down their casualty lists over the last year have multiplied by five fold. We haven't reduced the number of the dead; we've simply reduced the nationality of the dead. Vietnamization meant simply that bought corpses. We said: we will continue to give you support, we are with you in your efforts, we will buy the soldiers, we will give you all the air and tactical machinery support you require, but you now must slug it out on the ground; it's you who will attack when the attack of moves into Laos. In order to provide the cover for the policy of Vietnamization it was obvious that the United States would have to shelter the Vietnamese forces as they had never been sheltered before.

If our combat troops were to be withdrawn our air umbrella would have to be increased. Well and good, but it soon became obvious that we had to buy more time than just that. We had somehow to cut, interdict the supply lines of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese into South Vietnam. And so about a year ago, just in February of last year you will recall that it was suddenly revealed to the American people that when we had ceased bombing in North Vietnam we had simply moved the bombers and the fighter bombers over into Laos and that we were now operating some five hundred to a thousand missions a day against the Ho Chi Minh trail. The little panhandle of Laos whose geography has suddenly appeared in our papers these last weeks has had more bombs dropped upon it than any other piece of real estate on the face of the globe. Still thousands of trucks a day move down those trails. We began to move our bombing elsewhere into southeast Asia to increase the ambet of the war in order to protect our own troops, so the President said, but actually in order to protect the emerging forces of the South Vietnamese. And then in April of 1970 suddenly the Cambodian government was overthrown and Lun Noa's government was introduced we moved American and South Vietnamese forces into the so-called sanctuaries just across the South Vietnamese borders in Cambodia, again to cut the southern half of the Ho Chi Minh trail, more importantly to prevent supplies from coming in from Sionukville on the coast directly north Viet-Thirdly, we moved in the last weeks north and east. into Laos and were there to cut those forces.

I'm not a strategist. I don't know whether these undertakings were successful

or they were not successful. The President claims that particularly the move into Cambodia was a success, that it cut the southern supply line into the Minkoh base area of South Vietnam and, therefore, freed the South Vietnamese soldiers that were in southern Vietnam to move north for this present undertaking. I simply don't know. I do know that the rate of casualties in southeast Asia has not been reduced. I do know that where a year and a half ago there were North Vietnamese enclaves Vietnamese troops range across two thirds of Cambodia, that only the capital seems to be for the moment safe and that the South Vietnamese who were to be withdrawn when our troops are withdrawn remain in Cambodia because only they maintain the river supply line to the capitol and the route which runs from the capitol to the sea. And I do know that in Laos we seem to be bogged down. We have not yet begun to move against the major parts of the trail and more than this I do know that in Laos that the north, the Communists, have operated with relative ease in one half of the country which they control. They have for reasons best known to them maintained a balance of power and not attacked Yentian, the administrative capitol and not attacked Fon Pen, the provincial capitol, kuk the and that they may do so now. big cities , whether they could do so And I do know the massive air cover which we have provided in Cambodia and in Laos does not seem to be achieving the victory with honor that the President seems to want. We have tried every kind of strategy and tactic in that part of the world each time we have pulled up short. Because of military power there is always a response, ultimately, to every attack that you make.

What concerns me most is now that we have governed our actions by Cooper Church amendment, congressional rules representing the will of certainly the

majority of the American people that our ground forces not be involved in these attacks, we are finding ways around this kind of restriction. We are bending it, our administration is bending it in every way that it can. We'll sendin massive air support; we'll send in helicopters; when the helicopters are down we'll send in combat patrols in order to bring out our own downed flyers. But what happens if it all fails? What happens if we must precipitously pull out all the South Vietnamese from Cambodia and from Laos, if in fact the North Vietnamese troops gain the upper hand? What happens then to our ground involvement in South Vietnam and beyond its borders? And more than this. The President was asked ten days ago at a press conference: were there any limits to the defense of the growing American troops in southeast Asia? His answer was that we would not engage ground troops outside of South Vietnam, that there were really no limits to the engagement of our air power. He reminded the man who asked him, a reporter, that he had told publically and privately the North Vietnamese that it they did not show increased infiltration we would not show increased aerialist response, but that they had spurned this kind of give and take and that we were prepared to do all that was necessary in order to defend our forces as they withdrew. Then he went on to say, he wanted to make special reference to a particularly irresponsible statement made by Hans Morgenthau, a professor from the University of Chicago, in which he had spoken of the possibility of using tactical and atomic weapons in southeast Asia. The United States did not contemplate such use and would not use them. He dismissed this suggestion out of hand. We have long since learned that when a President cites a columnist in a give and take he has taken that columnist seriously, that columnist has made a suggestion which cuts

close to the bone. I began to try and research this xigmentax suggestion.

Hans Morgenthau in an article in The New Republic of February 1920 called "What Price Victory?" tried to analyze the possible alternatives for American action in southeast Asia. He assumed that we would not win on the ground with South Vietnamese troops what we could not win with our own troops, so he asked what alternatives are possible? He said there are three. The first alternative is unilateral withdrawal, the Algerian plan, and that the President has refused to accept. The second alternative is to so enrage the Chinese to force the Chinese to attack through North Vietnam which would unify the American people and create a global war in which the home front would be involved with a massive enemy and this, he says, is rejected throughout the Administration. The third response would be the response of trying to step up the effectiveness of our air power and only one weapon is left in our arsenal - that of tactical atomic weaponry. Tactical atomic weaponry which sounds so neat and so clean can be defined very simply. The bomb which was dropped at Hiroshima would be classified today as a tactical nuclear weapon. We would so destroy the countryside, we would so pollute the air with atomic fallout, that in a sense no life could subsist under this kind of attack; we would be able to seal off southeast Vietnam from enemy attack and, therefore, give the South Vietnamese the time that they require. Now had Hans Morganthau imagined all of this in his fertile mind? Not at all. I reminded myself that I had read of this suggestion earlier and I discovered that on November 12 C. L. Salzberger reporting from southeast Asia from Saigon spoke of a high level briefing which he attended in which the generals present

discussed the possibility and feasibility of tactical nuclear weaponry. They dismissed it. But, obviously, it's on the table, it's in the air and there are very few other alternatives left. The present alternative of South Vietnamese ground forces and of massive American air power fails to achieve our undertaking.

Southeast Asia is a tragedy. What can we do but sit, wail and bement our There are times when that's all we can do. The Administration is embarked on one course. We will have an opportunity here in a few months to vote out an administration if it has failed to make good on this course. There are very few alternatives to pressure the government. The alternatives are desperation and demonstrations. They seem to have little long range effect. Many in America are satisfied with Vietnamization. The reverse of it is the Cooper-Church Amendment because both of these undertakings limit our own debt, limit the cost to the American people. The President can get up and say to an audience: I have reduced the cost of war to you by one half. He said that three days ago, from twenty two billion dollars to eleven billion dollars. Assuming the mathematics has been fudged there's still a reduction in the cost of the war. He can get up and he can say: I have reduced troop levels in southeast Asia by nearly a half and I have reduced casualties in southeast Asia, our casualties, five times. And all this is true, but there is the enlargement of the war. There is the vortex to which we are in a whirlpool and to which we are being sucked into Laos and Cam-There are even noises about an attack north across the demilitarized zone into North Vietnam. Does it end? Can it end? We are determined to have peace and honor, peace and victory, the kind of double goal which the President has

set for us. I don't believe it can be achieved. I don't believe that there is any alternative now nor has there been for some years except for the American people to stand up and look at the mirror and say to themselves: we have finally lost a war. We have been defeated by one of the smallest nations on the face of the earth. We undertook something which we should never have undertaken; we have no alternative now but to withdraw and regroup, to define new national priorities.

Yes, defeat - but that's the last thing a proud people, a vain, glorious people wants to admit.

The world has known many a bitter time. I suppose that there have been more bitter times in our lifetime, in the lifetime of men, than happy times. I wish I could come before you and say here is a simple blueprint. Let's do this, let's vote for this man, let's organize this party and suddenly all will be right. We voted in one party, we voted out that party, and we voted it in again - the more it changes the more it's the same thing. I wish I could say to you that obstinate objurate demonstration against the force of the government is the way for we've had these demonstrations in the last five or six years and they have not proven to have the force. We can amass millions of people in protest. Foreign policy is the prerogative of the Administration and Congress has been willing to go along with the President as long as the President was reducing our own cost and our own lives. It's not easy, it's not a happy thing to be an American today. bear a large measure of guilt. We are burdened with a great sense of unhappiness. What should we do? Keep clear what must be done, not ever substitute passion for intelligence; speak what must be spoken; retain the courage of our convictions. Remind ourselves constantly that every life is precious, yellow skinned, black

skinned and white skinned and that because it is the yellow skinned man who is dying in southeast Asia in largest numbers today does not mean that there is any less guilt on our part for these tragic events.

Someone said that there's a light at the end of every tunnel. A correspondent by the name of Halderstand said the other day that at the end of every tunnel in South Vietnam there's another tunnel. We come from a people who have lived underground, behind walls and in tunnels. We have found that the day, the night, the years, may be long, dark, but somehow there is a light. We must not lose faith in that light, but I cannot tell you when it will come and I cannot tell you that the cost, may not be very high.



Deeper Into MARCH 12, 1971 MR. JACK KALISH 5900 WYNNWOOD ROAD MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 55422 DEAR JACK: THANKS FOR YOUR NOTE -- IT WAS NICE TO HEAR FROM YOU AND TO LEARN THAT THINGS ARE GOING WELL WITH YOU. CONCERNING YOUR REQUEST, I AM REFERRING YOUR NOTE TO RABBI SILVER'S SECRETARY. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE SERMON YOU REQUEST HAS YET BEEN TRANSCRIBED, BUT I AM SURE THAT A COPY WILL BE SENT TO YOU AS SOON AS MISS MIHOK IS ABLE TO GET COPIES MADE. BEST REGARDS TO YOU AND YOUR FAMILY. CORDIALLY YOURS, THE TEMPLE LEO S. BAMBERGER LSB:AF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The you and your found ou hull ted his but on the tubbert En taltmen of it has helped in chauseme I've Refue of table Selices desmen in the med-suplus Dead me a Repy of the permen ? Batel home takey is " Hayon Isto their "Thuil! Hould you pluse-I nether the them of lath hillers person Series from the third you be suftened in fourthered In a round, it has hadful hay un sufermed and in Enfinged necessary the seather Regues of the Tenegh Buildes. In the first we have been in themselves, we have Hear hee; Cleretina Chis. The Toughte Mr. Le S. Bin tenger 114 88.901 Minney of is, Minn signer

The support of the American people during the remainder of the conflict required a diminishing US involvement

sweep us toward an isolationism which would be as disastrous as excessive zeal

I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in VN

I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future VN some place in the world

Others urged that we liquidate our presence immediately, cut our losses, and leave the Viet Namese on their own. I have repeatedly explained why I consider this a Disastrous path. For the South Vietnames, people who could have lost their collective individual lives. For other non Communist countries, especially in Asia, among whom not a single leader recommended such a policy. For the global credibility of the US word. For those Americans who have made such heavy sacrifices, And for the integrity of American security in the post VN era.

political choice and conthoss



Kaddish

Friday Fes. 28

Sundan

Those who passed away this week

MILDRED M. GOLDSTEIN SYLV IA GOTHAM MINNIE KLEIN

EDWARD J. SCHWE ID YETTA SPERO

Hahrzeits

MINNETTE S. LIEBENTHAL LIZETTE RITTER MYERS DINAH SILVER WILLIAM SCHWARTZ PAULINE L. GLICK ANNA WIRTSCHAFTER RICH WILLIAM BENSON JOSEPH J. COPENHAGEN CHRISTINE PALADY ISIDORE EISENMAN DORA MARKS STRAUSS LENA E. KLEIN ROBERT B. MYERS LEO WE IDENTHAL CHARLES ROSENFELD SAM WE ITZ MOLLIE ROCKER SCHONBERG MOSES W. HABER ARTHUR E. WIESENBERGER ARTHUR A. NE IGER

MAX EMERLING SARAH STERN ANITA S. FERTEL ESTHER MELLMAN HERMAN KEMPNER JACK W. HELLER RAYMOND DEUTSCH SIDONIA L. KORACH HERMAN GIMP ESTHER L. BENSON SAMUEL WE ISS DR.HERMAN C.SMITH - DR. IRWIN E.YOELSON READ ON SUN. FEB. 20 ONLY HARRY H. KOZMAN

VIN. is can commerce described - a replaced to the Conserved went out. The 1990 elaction may perco 14000 The pall wall whereast it The branchest and the the amount regard to compare in the ancest of US Frager copies weres just and Freder! THE SULLONG OF THE PROPERTY PEOPLE COLLINE THE REMAINDER OF THE CONFLICT REQUIRED A DIMIN ISHING U.S. ENVOLUGEMENT The how and went out of f.t. sweet were for butte pretticis of pursuped memore. The walk was as states of the Economy and the lase mean a mean of the 1972 comprise - 6 they was 60 mm. And man send of the ANTIATION AND EASHETING - me cay are INTERLINEED - too enderty states of an every in in a major was come 6 the 2000 week writtend, The was of the Site Sine Contraction of the court soul a a now neighbord to have given out any mer mener, - while un NIN, SIE, LANS MIS Centurie a persono somo por 407 - Turk y 60 how peterly a consider and and a consider of the detale, have week weeks were some weeks - o cold of he will make run, ampactor, arefrantes frails back bear down muchos) to new melferand to have green the to erey men, men , oldered in famous en a franch bede reces bedone to paral cont , Thank

for hearing, of the selection conf. to remite to coulder, con queles asuites march conductions deser promoco - , was a to do some mesalos p Older W. C. O. C. purguery our Puller Wilfers progress our Problem blosses progress willed here we do to take please to being the builty to 10 excessed V. N. is the commerce Lingson - XI'm makes are all harden there - muy lave up to me person well a refer most of mend " - occas have tomered to have been and to present drewwarte and the war briggs and - Pearl are well arrived as Centerter fine - de la Rente de la Rente de la la company de la company pliet , V.N. has see excessed of the second to the death was the the entrem muller con come come and a To may water come NO! le accylacy la land propose. the insulant my be many to 500 - 2 belies to be but he is night or minutes love a NAIVE LACITION -- kupe states president : ANOTHER ENRICY FOR are obstinate bolistouling in med LIDIM but an Absence or receing - are much to Congram to mentest enemed of court a mentance. a drup out randed meders money money

SWEED US TOWARD AN WELLOWELL Laber eight would be no despitable AS EXCESSIVE ZERI.

will be many of my free home consens infrance much a restell my jude - of annumer of men termine marge canad acc mende for proofeed. We there is stated that being being the first of the contract of convergence. But com on who wellow in low mender Person, Come, co cano wald - and marry and from present of present or the second of These is a contract of SEA me a comme de com leave on controler & Same of the same of t mes daily mand to manual to the true - much to pred - really of see weeder - at love the world 6 min or 4 the services of one part of a court to begand of the attention on lead Munich man (see please)? a hearend to preside more he seed on much of end T HANT TO WANTED SAVE THE Liver of These brave yours are in U.W and the war was to a suffered TWANT TO END IT IN A WAY WHILL WILL

INCHEASE THE CHANCE THAT THEIR YOUNGER

brother, and There bond will not have to FIGHT IN TONE FLITCHE VIN SOME FENCE IN THE believed her brownly 1 shows et white Break Class I have better to better to be the second of the second

Land opening has breakful THE BATTLE W TEE FAR MURY The eest is too deah AND PRACTICALLY THE STANIA THE PROFILE WATER WIND MAKE CAN NOT BE SWITHINGS The entire before to reached. Whatland low near as grad Consider hand being -con What Tenns, I am my tree when fresh some the wen from the lark 1956 - wales fell the that when indestry medital section were much second - & mile fines ver too me wife to want on the too or much die mulating 2 am for model much by encount on Ab Comin ALTA BRAWAL - per muso wason tous 4 000000 & Descely the Alberta N.C.F. fr. 9 come to persone Percent , Then Ger. 12 Greedes company to a comment and

a hand carrie

heard were person derver - 1/2 of Fine coming when that deeper in Colored . It were tous to med Franco's backs , befored De Comedo Cetters co much plants of home on with a equive transport - to requirement to president meden of the colour Between Bearing Controlle at al le come consens France seems superist de mestress, Pa Genello perliged less mento consel en la faccione a week that I France gladender - This olse were some of it from from Demons parties - En James dis much as a contract person - a medical some pad some and weard as make a d'envoir abrecche en grechen modelle du sen . The and an even meden a Courted when the in water even modern to defense of a far party a service of a pred pred to predict the service of a prediction of the service of have I aprent on career marker in west break received Bleesed her been pleasing was for the fermion -I am merch tomer much his much La U.S. to tree predent on militia . Cash

The brended delectively close ander much - and a police

WRHS © 650



OTLERS ULGED THE LIQUIDATE OUR mesence inviedentiely but our cosses mos LEAVE THE SOUTH ULLTRAMES BUTTON ON THE BETPERTERLY EXPLAINED Why I consider they A DISASTROUS PATE ! FOR THE S. VIETNOMEST DEGLE Who would Ballace Lord Their collective political charact AND LOUNTLESS INDIVIDUAL LIVES FOR OTLE R MON COMMONIAT COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN ASIA, AWAR & WHAM NOT A SINGLE LEADER BECOMMENDED SUCL A PULLEY, FOR The GLOBAR GOLDE DI WILLEY OF THE U.S. WORD, FOR DUST AMERICANS WE GAUP mnot such homey suchtedies, AND FOR THE INTEGRITY OF MERCENA SOCIOTY
IN- THE PORT - VIET HAM ERA.

Do S. S. Deres seres to seres of Jest seres of Jest seres of the seres of Jest seres of the sere

as lest to L. J. lang was our to grant france or the conclusion some to menter were for to extend 460 U.S. Word - but & Where it my many have minde who have as an and 6 prendere see Astan was trumided, Indapane, Kunes as med much meader freed this america in the comme on the Person (m Comes accorded and by the Comes and on mandered a where you so SIN has reached NATO and Blughthere IL - green USER to comerce to wanter many and any Probate to some that we want of the contract of the have buil been a bout I were to have some mention en equiloco eq a colony colony of many on 2 colon a Recenard Camera Way to the one sout but in the med for any -Comes of a me section is tours the sound apoint? Where my feer much have untiled many from the cont Admitted detent - Emande Com co man of winding B WITH LUNON- Cond Con Gran DOWN OF 3447 Ch= = -52887 WOUND 1969 earl my

## But Cross

1) By offers my card mes cared in mer compt organization made had been been present so to the to the medical property and the second so the seco con personned in superior of the 21 & Vietnischer - miller and an enter & sectionalister many massir 14 to me friend august the contract be raid and precon to have when which and and you free MINIBINE CASULTY CUST CON SANT CALL 7008 to 1,1 male Here & SUN and and 9630 marca preti Gras scarces to gree Coope of to wany Conque S. U. Pre Cut 3) The fremant me to all was a comp on 10 miles Epi les mu accerces mendo de la lacora card med mesers or a merger of the land I am me and cases of infiltree. to make Concept & SIV, W. )

and 1990 - mayor mendender y broken in decor a of city werefficed and to Payers due France of much oylar of or enemal las per to suffet Khuen renewer - Probable, to the mut tud and externed bounded are an areach The miles busine with a copy 70 - a committee pulmo capiero hum parisule - Kang Need - 8 - and 30, 1970 - was 60 day without - 4 met signe een [for selvicel wied ] SIN ALTOO - BANKER HS e green ment. He Call Tours - to cost surplies Seer to Zonce one mannied and of namedo am,

Aldre Comme Com property

Deed seed to me ittel

melety compay, ments dent

lan not completed to grade south a mode of many seal Nome seal Nome of sund seal of the to sund seal of the to sund seal Note to sund seal

But - Carlace man harles - miles Vander

buller - N L F molder 248 4 coast - by contact

orge a role we need to see

Sudang - 2 has - food house could be - myes

But see of Pertine is well - of me well our welling andony no co termed metre - melection & les grand of Peles - com posse - meso has reconst them the to Just Verilier - wild of Com come on? - Wall stall acces SUW a war OMZ LThere scratted con and has pacare Jul Be end! Per Ben 91 de in defend of record was a second of the s AMERICAN ROMEN COME OF THE PARTY OF THE PART 2 ozer my somet to most on the Sum Iron Conj -

- Apreses reaction assisted & and WIS WEDNON ZUND TO GOTTED BULL execution rossns cos huseum deposes of each probability is POR POW STANDER POW No per britters - many a) as topon own liam & gives on soll IT a southern . and Belessaye web will is had med grang IN WAS A women of word of the Wall of Day hetery d went heavy brances () men and standard C

Sound a made used from find a statement of and HIN - Field DO Near Merchales - which there willey much is uncommenter of green when a comment made (Cocope - Comed) . So regain how would will be pueser - your premi / com to members land Cumil fe vets and set of the committee of the 3 000 Like 11 remarks white was a series which 1) le serve me ann mangan and reach com time 3) en marie come qui prista land more think before 6. L. Sudglerge MYT) Indone ( alphanter) ( alone have y to make - mit seed (ailsiel - rece) Andrew or opened of new or confects may are with a free in any my dell sent opens ment of species for meadlesself a debutterper of

Payares Supples

alune puned me cory of the Julian of deminis

Come

Cay 6 meter

m. 05 1

, lane promise

Cieles franches program

WRHS © 630

