



## Daniel Jeremy Silver Collection Digitization Project

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Terrorism, 1972.



TERRORISM  
Daniel Jeremy Silver  
October 22, 1972

In Belfast and Londonderry they are called the IRA. In the Phillipines they're called the Huks. In Uruguay and the Argentine they're called the Tupamaro. In Quebec they're called the PLF; in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt they're called the Black September group or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In Chicago they're called the Weather Men and the de Mau Mau. In West Germany they're called the Bader-Meinhof group, in Japan they're called Rengo Sekigon. These disparate groups, from many parts of the world, deal in kidnapping, bombing, <sup>in</sup> terror, ~~ism~~, Terrare; the Latin word means to frighten; and these groups have frightened a good part of the civilized world. Free societies do not know how to deal with violence which erupts suddenly out of the dark and disappears into the dark. We're troubled and disturbed and not sure what to do.

I'd like to address myself this morning to ~~our understanding of~~ this phenomenon, its social pathology, because we are going to be called to deal with it. Unfortunately, it's here to stay. Terrorism is part of the turbulence of modern life and I'm afraid that sweet reason, the instinctive response of decent folk, is not always adequate to comprehend or control this <sup>VIOLENCE</sup> ~~pathology, this demonology; for~~ We deal here with the dark spaces of the soul, the shadowed parts of the human psyche, which are not amenable to reason or to well-intentioned efforts to social reform.

I will take as my jumping-off point an article written by Tom Wicker ~~just~~ two days after the most headlined of all ~~of~~ the terrorist acts this year, the attack on Israeli athletes in the Olympic Village in Munich. Tom Wicker is a man whose compassion and whose sensitivity



I hold in esteem. I suspect that his reactions mirror those of many decent folk, <sup>well meaning but</sup> and I believe his reactions to have been wrong, and I would like to argue with them. Hopefully, ~~holding this argument may~~ shed some light on this phenomenon of violence. Wicker began his article, which he called "The Seeds of Terrorism," by saying that he, of course, deplored and was saddened ~~and shocked~~ by the reprehensible violence <sup>(which marked)</sup> in the Olympic games. His shock, his sadness and his feeling of moral outrage are as honest and genuine <sup>feelings;</sup> as ours; but then he continues, ~~with the first of two points with which I take issue with him:~~ "Even those who most strongly condemn the Arabs who precipitated the incident can hardly be satisfied with the outcome apparently precipitated by the West German police in the airport shootout. Earlier reports at least raised the question whether the death of the hostages was worth the killing and worth the apprehension of the terrorists, where the best resolution of the problem was a violent showdown rather than continuing every feasible effort to negotiate the hostages' release. This is the same question raised by the death of so many prisoners and hostages in the hail of New York State police gunfire at Attica - the tragedy of the anniversary of which will fall just next week." Wicker feels that, whenever possible, we ought to bend to the demands of the terrorists, ~~of those who use violence to achieve their ends~~ since it is a consummate tragedy that <sup>innocent</sup> ~~innocents~~, people who <sup>by chance</sup> ~~simply happen~~ <sup>became</sup> ~~to be~~ caught up in the net of violence, should have to pay with their lives for the intransigence of governments in not giving in to the demands which are placed upon them.

I will return to <sup>this</sup> ~~that~~ point, for I ~~am in complete disagreement~~....

Wicker goes on to say that, ~~obviously~~, efforts must be made to deny the hostages places of safety where they can hide and regroup, arm and train themselves. He then speaks of the political difficulty of



REFUGEE  
persuading Arab governments to deny such centers to the terrorists, because of their popularity in the Arab world or because the <sup>These</sup> Arab governments find them a useful and convenient tool for certain policies of their own and, of course, that's true. Wicker ~~goes on to speak~~ <sup>writes</sup> of the difficulty of imposing international sanctions on governments which harbor the terrorists, ~~because many governments support groups labeled~~ terrorists by other governments and because the divisions of our world make it impossible for international sanctions to be successfully imposed and, of course, this is true. ~~But this conclusion is the second point with which I disagree:~~ <sup>He concludes:</sup> "So it is a good deal easier to call for something to be done than to say what that something should be. Defensive measures such as those President Nixon has pledged for Israelis traveling in America are certainly necessary. West German security provisions of the Olympic Village appear in the first reports to have been sketchy at best, but no adequate defenses can be erected that will always thwart fanatic terrorists willing to die for their cause. That is the heart of the matter. Whether it is the strange mixture of religious and political animosity in Ireland; or radical Americans bombing banks and university buildings to bring down 'the system,' or obscure tribes slaughtering one another for obscure (to outsider) reasons in Africa, or Palestinians acting by any means to recover a homeland they see as stolen, profound religious, political and racial faiths can stir men and women to the most unreasoning pitches of action and response. When such people will not hesitate to die for their beliefs, however strange or distorted those beliefs may seem to others, they will seldom hesitate to take the most drastic and outrageous actions to defeat those who stand in the way. The cause justifies any and everything; ultimately, the cause consumes common humanity. That is why the only thing, finally, to be done to end Palestinian terrorism is



to find some means of resolving the profound conflict that produces it."

*And this is the second argument with which I disagree.*  
Obviously, the conflict between Israel and the Arab world ought to be resolved, but I question whether the resolution of this conflict would in any way reduce the level of terrorism in our world.

Let's examine these points one by one. Mr. Wicker's first point is that we ought to do everything possible to avoid injury of innocents who are trapped in some flareup of terrorism, ~~and, obviously, this should be done~~. His point of view is shared by most Americans, ~~and peculiarly American~~. We've had to deal with terrorism, largely in terms of skyjacking, and it has been relatively easy for us to give the skyjacker half a million dollars and the plane and let him fly to Algeria, knowing that the Algerian government would the next day return the plane and a few days later would return the money, and little would be lost except one unwilling citizen. But ~~I wonder~~. I suspect that the spectacular increase in highjacking is directly due to the success of the highjacker. If we had taken repressive measures and not given these people the notoriety which comes with success, the headlines by which they lived, the epidemic of skyjacking might have abated long since. Less, not more, lives would be endangered. For these men are little men who desperately need to be seen, to be acknowledged, to wield power. It's that one moment of power which they seek, and it's the success of another skyjacker which gives them the courage to try.

*IN ANY CASE WE ARE NOT CONSISTENT*  
When America was faced with terrorist uprisings in our prisons <sup>the</sup> and ~~when~~ prisoners demanded, as they did in Washington two weeks ago, not only prison reform but personal freedom, we didn't give it. To have done so would have been to exchange one set of innocent victims for another set of innocent victims. When you have men who are known to be violent and you free them, you release the warden and the guards whom they hold captive, but how many innocent people will later be attacked because those men were released? Is this not precisely the kind of



equation which the Israeli government has had to balance? The demand in Munich was that two hundred men who had infiltrated Israel and planted bombs and committed murder should be released from Israeli prisons.

<sup>By releasing</sup> Israel might have gained the release of eight <sup>hostages,</sup> ~~lives in Munich by releasing~~ ~~these two hundred terrorists.~~ But how many other innocent lives would have been lost when these men again had guns in their hands and their courage was redoubled by the knowledge that, if captured, they would soon be released by companions who would take <sup>other</sup> ~~Israeli~~ hostages? That game would go on and on with little danger to the murderers. That's the kind of decision that the Israeli government faced and the <sup>supremacy which derives</sup> ~~reason for what~~ men of sweet reason, <sup>who say they are appalled at</sup> ~~the Tom Wickers of our world, sometimes call~~ Israel's intransigence, ~~particularly when they have not faced the cold realities of the situation.~~

In 1970 the FLQ, <sup>The</sup> Front for the Liberation of Quebec, kidnapped a British trade official by the name of ~~Mr.~~ Cross and the Quebec Minister of Labor, <sup>Mr.</sup> LaPorte. They held these men for several weeks, ~~and~~ <sup>They</sup> demanded great sums in ransom and the separation of Quebec from Canada. During that particular incident the London Economists published an analysis which, <sup>this view and remains apposite</sup> ~~since it does not deal with Israel and the Arab world and issues of immediate emotional concern to us,~~ suggests a cooler judgement. "What has happened in Montreal and is happening in a lot of other places, too, is the increasingly indiscriminate use of violence for the sake of increasingly imprecise political objectives. It is the uncontrolled in pursuit of the undefined. The other word for it, of course, is terrorism. The terrorists are the people who reject the idea that it should be possible to set some limits on the use of force in settling political quarrels. Men have spent a good deal of history in trying to impose such limits. The limits have never been accepted by everyone and they have often been violated, but they have done something to make life a little less anarchic. One such rule of the



thumb was the notion that there ought to be a clear connection between the grievance that makes people resort to violence and the targets of their violence.

That is why feudal theoreticians said that single combat was a suitable way of settling the thing and why, when that had long since failed to catch on, the eighteenth century tried to confine war to a test of strength between uniformed armies and why, when that failed too, it was at least thought proper to make a declaration of war against the people you were supposed to have it out with. The technique of the terrorist snaps the last constraint. The people the terrorist kills or threatens to kill if his demands are not met are more or less random victims. Their chief qualification for being selected is that they can be gotten at.

It is not only the Canadian government that finds itself stuck for an answer to the "anybody is fair prey" game. There are half a dozen Latin American countries where left wing revolutionaries and right wing counter terrorists have polished the trick of whipping the man off the pavement-remember the murdered German ambassador in Guatemala - and disappearing with him to some undefinable hide<sup>e</sup>out in the city. The Palestinian highjackers go about their work in a different way, but the aim is the same. To get control of an airliner full of people who have nothing to do with the Palestinian's quarrel with Israel and threaten to blow them to pieces unless the governments do that which the highjackers say. So far the Weather Men and the Black Panthers have not pulled off a political kidnapping in United States. It will be surprising if they do not try, the Black Panthers have the same immediate aim as the Palestinians and the FLA - the release of friends held in prison for previous acts of violence - and they can see the advantage of an operation that promises to make a sentence of imprisonment more



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or less a formality. There are men in Ulster and Dublin and other places who have similar motives, who can make the same calculation. A cabinet minister or an ambassador will fetch a fine price; if you can't get one of those, a mayor or businessman will do very nicely; and, even if that is beyond your reach, you can play on the heart strings of public opinion with anybody who has a family and friends who want to see them whole again. There must be a lot of men around the world who have noted the Palestinian success and the cat and mouse game in Montreal, who feel the temptation to copy the examples that have been given to them.

It is tempting because it is the cheapest known way of enforcing your political ideas and because so far it has worked. The only thing you need for a successful campaign of modern terrorism are a handful of brave or unfeeling toughs organized in tiny squads operating almost independently of each other, a few cupboards of small arms and explosives, and somewhere to hold your captives when you have got them. There is not<sup>a</sup> shortage of the necessary fanatics: desperate, obsessed or unblanced men, encouraged by the rhetoric of the new left and the trendy talk about violence being a ~~flag~~<sup>form</sup> of communication. There are enough guns on the market in the world to equip an army corps of guer<sup>r</sup>illas. The warren of a modern Western city where the police keep order in the streets, but have got out of the habit of poking into people's houses, is a fine place to hide people. This is why in the West terrorism has come out of the country into the cities; the country is too easy to keep an eye on. And, once the hostage has been grabbed, the guer<sup>r</sup>illa knows that the television and the newspapers will do the rest of the job for him, provided they stay uncaught. The motives of the people who practice urban guer<sup>r</sup>illa war are as much a psychological problem as a



political one. But the things that make it possible for them to operate - weapons, the environment, the publicity - are what a liberal society has given them.

And, of course, the result will be a curtailment of some of the advantages of living in a liberal society... But sometimes the precautions will fail to work! The hostage will be taken and the dance of negotiators will begin all over again. It is necessary, too, to say a hard thing about what may have to happen then. There is nothing a minister fears more than the moment when a man's life or death depends on his decision. The instinct is always to give in to the kidnappers or the hijackers, and get the hostages out and then hope faintly that it won't happen again. But the odds are that it will. It is success, not failure that breeds imitation. The act of terrorism which succeeds in getting convicted men released from prison or brings in a pot of ransom money, is providing new resources for future acts of terrorism. There will come a point, - it may have come already, - when the probable death of one or two men has to be reckoned against the likelihood that a lot more people will face the same threat if the government gives in. Of course, kidnappers may not carry out their threat if they are defied. Defying them is something that very few governments have yet the nerve to try. It has to be tried. This is, after all, a kind of war, and in war every decision is a calculation, or a hope, and life lost now will prevent a greater number of lives being lost later."

The Israeli government, almost alone <sup>OF</sup> among the governments of the world, has <sup>been willing</sup> forced itself to make the hard decision. Israeli <sup>shots</sup> acts have endangered passengers, <sup>but have killed skyjackers.</sup> on a plane when there is a shootout. There was Munich; but it is a matter of protecting those back home from a company of guerrillas who would again be free for their



Israeli toughness has thrown some fear into the hearts of the men of great courage who shoot from the dark with masks over their faces. ~~Since the attack~~ Recently few acts of terrorism have been directed against Israel by the guerrilla ~~groups~~ themselves. More and more they've resorted to dupes, to the foolish and the disturbed of the world. Did you see the little article in the paper on Saturday last about a Frenchman named Guy Bouchard who was implicated in the planting of a bomb at the El Al counter at Orly. ~~I don't know who the man is, but~~ Guy Bouchard is an unemployed Frenchman who ~~once~~ had worked for Air France. Apparently he had an argument with the airline and was found and asked by the guerrillas to ~~take a bomb~~ and to plant <sup>a bomb</sup> ~~it~~ near the El Al counter. Bouchard is unemployed. The money was attractive. He had a grudge. He has no interest in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. And what does this great hero do? He asks the girl who's in love with him to leave ~~a~~ <sup>the</sup> package <sup>by</sup> the counter. Of such heroism crusades of terror are made. This year the Israelis have captured two pairs of simple-minded girls, two French girls, two Italian girls, who had been picked off the streets of Paris and of Rome by Arab gigolos, bedded down for a while, then given plane tickets to Lydda, and asked to carry a case or a transistor radio filled with explosives on to the plane. Israel's ~~At a pressurized language of fear~~ <sup>At a pressurized language</sup> has transmitted itself to the Black September group. They know that their lives are at stake if they undertake ~~certain~~ acts of terror against Israel, so they resort to ~~these~~ surrogates. <sup>to</sup> I doubt that there is any other way of dealing with terrorism but to attempt to suppress it, to punish those who engage in it, not to give in to it. Repression does not eliminate crime, but it may limit it because the disturbed, those who want their moment in the sunlight, don't want that moment to be in the grave. They want to live to enjoy it.



What about Mr. Wicker's ~~second contention~~, the argument that eliminating the <sup>assumed</sup> ~~assumed~~ cause of the guerrillas will eliminate terrorism? This argument comes from a good heart, and it's obviously true that if we could remove a ~~number of the social conflicts in this world~~ <sup>reduce certain international tensions</sup> we would make a contribution to peace. But I doubt that we would eliminate terrorism. <sup>And</sup> Terrorism does not exist simply because there is a Palestinian-Israeli conflict. ~~As a matter of fact,~~ <sup>Surprisingly,</sup> the Popular Front and the Black September group have very little to do with the Palestinian cause. Those who held the hostages in Munich were not Palestinians. They came from Iraq, Syria and Algeria, and were buried in Libya. ~~They were not~~ Palestinians. As a matter of fact, the Palestinians, who do have some very legitimate <sup>needs</sup> ~~needs in this world for a certain degree of sovereignty~~ and self determination which they do not now enjoy, <sup>generally</sup> have rejected these groups as their champions. The Black September gang is a radical Arab <sup>cell</sup> ~~action group~~ which is out to unseat the Arab governments, <sup>established</sup> ~~who do not suit~~ their ~~political~~ <sup>theirs</sup> needs. These groups set out to overthrow the Hashemites in Jordan and the Democratic coalition in Lebanon, to establish power bases for a new kind of radical revolutionary Arab <sup>political life,</sup> ~~government which is~~ to their liking. <sup>Generally, it has been ARAB AGAINST ARAB</sup> ~~Most of the actions of these Arab terrorists have~~ been directed towards toppling Hussein, who had to fight a civil war to expel them from his country. Both Syria and Egypt who use the Popular Front for their own purposes <sup>but</sup> ~~have seen to it that they cannot organize~~ in numbers in their country. The guerrillas are, ~~to the established~~ <sup>on a local level</sup> governments of the Arab world, far more than they are a threat to Israel. As a matter of fact, they use the Israeli <sup>issue</sup> ~~cause~~ largely to give them a certain kind of credibility in that world. It's a way of attracting support. We must recognize that those who attach a cause to their terror need not be primarily concerned with the success of that cause. ~~Israel is a means to an end, a means which leads to power,~~ headlines, status and acceptability. Americans, unfortunately, tend to



take a romantic view of violence. It comes from the movies, perhaps it comes from our past; whatever it comes from, we tend to assume that there's some cause behind violence; and so, when President Kennedy was assassinated, we appointed a Warren Commission which deliberated for months to discover why Lee Harvey Oswald <sup>had</sup> murdered the President of the United States. We looked for a left wing conspiracy. We looked for a right wing conspiracy. We looked for any kind of a conspiracy. There had to be a cause. And there was no cause except Lee Harvey Oswald's own frustrations. He was a little man who wanted to be known. He was an insignificant man who wanted to shake the world. With a gun pointed at a significant man, a little man <sup>is ultimately significant.</sup> ~~can shake the world.~~

When Martin Luther King was assassinated we assumed his assassin would have some cause, a racist cause; or perhaps he'd been paid by a racist, ~~and~~ <sup>all</sup> we found was James Earl Ray, a little man, an unsuccessful convict, a petty felon who ~~had~~ needed his moment of glory. When the psychiatrists are through analyzing the man who shot at Governor Wallace they're going to find another <sup>little man.</sup> ~~similar example of human pathology.~~ For the men of violence, ~~the assassins and terrorists of our world, are men who are desperate to be seen and known and acknowledged. They need to prove their manhood, so they clamp on to some man of power or to some cause, and they try to gain power, gain acceptance, by drawing to themselves the mantle of a crusader, the mantle of a holy cause.~~ <sup>they attach,</sup> ~~Nowhere~~ can this be seen as clearly as in the violence that occurred at Lydda Airport in June of this year. Air France's Flight 132 landed with some 300 passengers aboard. The passengers disembarked and were standing around the shed waiting for the conveyor belts to bring in their baggage. There were three young Japanese aboard this plane, and no one paid much attention to them as they stood in line patiently waiting for their luggage. They bent down as if to loosen the straps so they could go through customs, and suddenly each had an automatic rifle in his hand.



They began shooting. Before the carnage ended, twenty-eight were dead, two of the terrorists, sixteen Puerto Rican Catholics who had been on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land and a number of people who simply happened to be around the shed at that moment. Now, what had three Japanese to do with Israel or with the Palestinian cause? The media in the United States spoke of a new partnership among radical movements in which each would carry out the job of the other because they were basically sympathetic to each other's needs. Perhaps, but one of the Japanese had survived, a young man named Kozo Okamoto; and, at his trial, he made a statement. He spoke of belonging to the Red Army in Japan, a group of young Japanese who have taken the old Samurai tradition and wedded it somehow to the theory of permanent revolution and come out with a kind of radicalism which insists the world must be convulsed by violence and that ultimately out of the carnage will emerge a new society. I want to read to you from his statement because it clearly suggests that there's no way in which the solution of the "Palestinian cause" will eliminate violence: ~~he said~~: "You are either a member of the 'Red Army' or a bourgeois. I warn the entire world the Red Army will slay anyone who is on the side of the bourgeois and this is not a joke. Our relations with the P.F.L.P. Arabs was just a jumping-off point for us to propel ourselves onto the world stage. This is why we decided on the military action at the Tel Aviv Airport." Japanese soldiers had carried out the attack, rather than Arab terrorists "because we wanted to be known. We, the Red Army soldiers who have been in the Arab world, do not demand that they be soldiers like us. I take full responsibility for myself and my friends for the killing at the airport. The three of us decided that, after we die, we want to become three stars in Orion... In Japan little children are told that, after they die, they can become stars in the sky. I don't know the customs in other parts of the world, but I believe that some of the people we killed have become stars. The revolutionary war



will continue and there will be many more stars." Revolutionary warfare would be worldwide. "In New York and Washington, the houses of simple folk must be destroyed - that is how they would be able to feel the seeping torrent of world revolution."

How will Mr. Wicker's solving of the Palestinian problem obviate the distorted and pathological, ideological mishmash of world revolution of an Okamoto and of the thousands like him who <sup>know</sup> ~~feel~~ that the <sup>machine</sup> ~~gun~~ ~~that kills innocent people~~ is the only way to sow the revolution. Unfortunately, when one begins to argue, as does Mr. Wicker, that the only thing to be done to end Palestinian terrorism is to find some means of resolving the ~~profound~~ <sup>and</sup> conflict that produces it, ~~we~~ inevitably take <sup>responsibility</sup> the ~~problem~~ from where it belongs, ~~actions against the terrorist~~ <sup>and the countries which sponsor and encourage terrorism, and place the</sup> onus on the victims. Somehow Israel must do what needs to be done to diffuse the conflict and make terrorism disappear. That's the innocent, optimistic, American way of reasoning. Would that it were so, but it's simply not so. Yes, there ought to be a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but that's not the end of terror. ~~Terror will end~~ only when most ~~men~~ <sup>recognize</sup> that terrorism ~~only aggravates a situation.~~ It never resolves anything. One of the myths of our times is that, if you call enough attention to your cause, you will somehow do your cause good. Often, if you call attention to your cause, you only cause the counter-productive forces to rally, to be even more oppressive, more reactionary, more intransigent than they've been before. Yes, there are demonstrations which are useful. There is need to call attention to injustice, but ~~useful demonstrations are almost always non-violent and do not let loose these bloody reverberations which force an Israel to take retaliatory measures against terrorists' camps in Syria or Lebanon.~~

We can't put the responsibility upon Israel to solve the problems of Arab terrorism. Terrorism will be solved only when we unravel the



secrets of the human mind. Till then I'm afraid that terrorism will attach itself to this cause or to that and that we had best beware, you and I, and particularly the media, of glorifying any act of terrorism by <sup>allowing</sup> ~~allowing~~ it the justice of the particular cause it claims it sponsors. Terrorism <sup>is</sup> ~~is~~ murder, nothing more; nothing better. There's no such thing as holy terror. There's no such thing as holy rage. There's only terror and rage and innocent victims.

We've gone through several decades in which we have learned to see the hidden violence in any governmental system. We have been made to recognize that violence is not only the attack of a worker upon the factory or the attack of <sup>the</sup> ~~a~~ proletariat against privilege, but the abuse by the privileged of the poor and the powerless. Most of us, I'm afraid, have gone one step further and become pretty disenchanted with government as an instrument. We've talked about radical freedom, a kind of open society in which police and courts and all of the oppressive systems of the society simply do not operate. We've assumed that such a society is possible. Perhaps it is, when the Messiah comes. But, until the Messianic Age, we're going to need police and sky marshalls and government. Yes, we need justice and many reforms, but we also need to be protected against the men who use guns indiscriminately. The human being has the potential to be God-like, but he can also be a beast; and his capacity for cunning, his need of blood, for a moment which justifies his whole existence, is immense. ~~Perhaps he's society, and~~ I am afraid that all of us, however much we might wish it otherwise, need to support those elements in our repressive political structure which protect us, protect all of us, from the tyranny of the few. There is the tyranny of the many, and there is the tyranny of the few. Somehow we must learn to <sup>be</sup> ~~be~~ protected from both ~~to enlarge the social order, to solve the problems~~ <sup>which are real problems quite independent of this whole issue of violence,</sup>



BRUNO SKIKIN  
Bender - main bot

# The Seeds of Terrorism

By TOM WICKER

Most of the world is saddened and shocked by the reprehensible violence that erupted at the Olympic Games, and calls are already being heard for something to be done about such unconscionable terrorism. But the question is, what can be done?

Even those who most strongly condemn the Arabs who precipitated the incident can hardly be satisfied with the outcome apparently precipitated by the West German police in the airport shootout. Early reports at least raised the question whether the death of the hostages was worth the killing and apprehension of the terrorists—whether the best resolution of the problem was a violent showdown, rather than continuing every feasible effort to negotiate the hostages' release. This is the same question raised by the death of so many prisoners and hostages in a hail of New York State police gunfire at Attica—a tragedy the anniversary of which will fall just next week.

Even before the deaths of the Israeli hostages were announced, Charles W. Bray 3d, the State Department spokesman, quite properly demanded that nations who might have extended some aid to Palestinian guerrillas should stop doing so, in order that the commandos be treated as "an intolerable

affront to human society." The trouble with that is that in some Arab countries the guerrillas are seen as heroes fighting for a holy cause; in many areas, they are actively feared; and in any case — aside from the military problem of stamping out the commandos—it is politically difficult for Arab governments to move against Arab guerrillas without calling into question their own commitment to the struggle against Israel.

The tough Israelis can take their own effective measures of reprisal and prevention, and often have, but for the long pull that may well be counterproductive. However effective in the short run, military strikes into Lebanon, for example, may increase guerrilla bitterness and fanaticism and tend to undermine the Israeli position as a law-abiding nation menaced by outlaws and brigands.

International sanctions and pressures against the guerrillas and the nations that harbor them might be devised, at least on paper. How hard it is to give such plans practical effect has just been demonstrated in Washington where a seventeen-nation conference has flatly rejected an American-Canadian proposal that signatory nations would halt air travel to nations refusing to punish or extradite airplane hijackers and to release hi-

## IN THE NATION

jacked crews, planes and passengers.

Given the experience of recent years, and the worldwide impact of hijackings, this proposal seems reasonable enough—deny asylum to the hijacker and where is he or she to go? But Britain and France and the Soviet Union apparently valued more highly the small amount of sovereignty they would have had to yield in agreeing to a supra-national process of sanctions. In addition, the British and French may have feared disruptions in their airline operations in the Middle East and Algeria—the latter country a goal of numerous hijackers.

Surely anything that could be devised to limit Arab guerrilla operations through international action would encounter as much or more difficulty—the more so because the Arab-Israeli controversy reverberates throughout world politics, Soviet-American relations in particular.

So it is a good deal easier to call for something to be done than to say what the something should be. Defensive measures, such as those President Nixon has pledged for Israelis traveling in America, are certainly neces-

sary: West German security provisions at the Olympic Village appear in first reports to have been sketchy at best. But no adequate defenses can be erected that will always thwart fanatic terrorists, willing to die for their cause.

That is the heart of the matter. Whether it is the strange mixture of religious and political animosities in Ireland, or radical Americans bombing banks and university buildings to bring down "the system," or obscure tribes slaughtering one another for obscure (to outsiders) reasons in Africa, or Palestinians acting by any means to recover a homeland they see as stolen, profound religious, political and racial fates can stir men and women to the most unreasoning pitches of action and response. When such people will not hesitate to die for their beliefs, however strange or distorted those beliefs may seem to others, they will seldom hesitate to take the most drastic and outrageous actions to defeat those who stand in the way. The cause justifies any and everything; ultimately the cause consumes common humanity.

That is why the only thing finally to be done to end Palestinian terrorism is to find some means of resolving the profound conflict that produces it. Which is to say that the end is hardly in sight.

# Cristo

By RUSSELL B

WASHINGTON, Sept. 7. Sons who admire President Nixon have objected to the account in the Nixonian history which was published today. They demand, in fair play, an equally biased history according to Sebern.

Regrettably, the McGraw-Hill history of America is not yet a publication, and may not be on the shelves on the 400th anniversary of Columbus Day, if ever. The author's difficulty in the very first chapter—"Columbus Discovers America"—and despite writing many pages have still not finished. This chapter has, however, been titled "Columbus Tries to Conquer America."

Space limitations and the cost of reproducing verbatim have been written so far, but the author's history may indicate the problems:

After obtaining money from Isabella for the purpose of exploring America, Columbus bought a ship called the "Rosa" and then went to the port city of Seville to meet his crew and sail for the Indies.


They had scarcely cleared the harbor when the "Rosa" began to list. It went down in record time. The crew later discovered that the ship was so bothered to put the stolen money in the enlisted men's bathtubs that the ship had to wait in the harbor for the "Conchita" to rescue her.

Since he had neglected to appoint a body in charge aboard the ship, however, its crew were about who had the right to take the lifeboats over the side. The ship disappeared over the horizon, leaving Columbus to swim for his life.

Because the "Conchita" could not agree on a name, the ship of the North Star, the ship

# The Storm Over Agnes

"The children have had to grapple



ISSUES 1972

Pennsylvania regional office administrators serve as chairmen of their respective councils.

One of the first such actions was a grant to the state of Pennsylvania of \$250,000 for comprehensive planning, which was authorized by the



rillas know that television and the newspapers will do the rest of the job for them provided they stay uncaught. The motives of the people who practice urban guerrilla war are as much a psychological problem as the political one. But the things that make it possible for them to operate—the weapons, the environment, the publicity—are what a liberal society has given them.

And of course the result will be a curtailment of some of the advantages of living in a liberal society. The only way of beating these guerrillas of the cities, as it is the only way of beating the guerrillas in the countryside of Southeast Asia, is to make sure that you know in good time who they are and what they are planning and where their bases are. That means the long plod of checking out the whole assortment of possible troublemakers: the known members of extremist groups, the coffee-bar revolutionaries, the nut cases with a political twist, the middle-class young intellectuals who have never recovered from the boredom of not being students any longer. It means keeping an eye on the empty houses and sheds and cellars, and the sort of apartment blocks where a prisoner can be held for a fortnight without the neighbors knowing anything about it. It means trying to control the underground market in guns and hand-grenades. It takes a good information-gathering system and a lot of policemen to cope with a problem like this.

The first signs of the defensive system going into operation have been visible in London: . . . the extra guards on likely targets, the inquiring policemen, the check on visitors to Embassy Row. The result is inconvenience and irritation for ordinary people trying to go about their own lives. That is doubtless one of the by-products the guerrillas are aiming at. Most of them say they are men of the left; but their attitude to violence—the easy way they take to it, the random way they pick the victims of it—is eerily reminiscent of the fascists of a generation ago. . . .

But sometimes the precautions will fail to work: the hostage will be taken, and the dance of the negotiators will begin all over again. It is necessary to say a hard thing about what may have to happen then. There is nothing a minister fears more than the moment when a man's life or death depends on his decision. The instinct is always to give in to the kidnappers or the hijackers, and get the hostages out, and then hope faintly that it won't happen again. But the odds are that it will. It is success, not failure, that breeds imitation. The act of terrorism which succeeds in getting convicted men released from prison, or brings in a pot of ransom money, is providing new resources for future acts of terrorism. There will come a point—it may have come already—when the probable death of one or two men has to be reckoned against the likelihood that a lot more people will face the same threat if the government gives in. Of course, the kidnappers may not carry out their threat if they are defied. Defying them is something that very few governments have yet had the nerve to try. It has to be tried. This is, after all, a kind of war; and in war every decision is a calculation, or a hope, that a life lost now will prevent a greater number of lives being lost later.



## DEALING WITH URBAN GUERRILLAS

### TERRORISM RAMPANT

*The latest terrorist assaults in Montreal, Canada focus attention on guerrilla tactics now world-wide in scope. A comment from the London Economist, Oct. 17, 1970:*

**The Economist  
(London)**

If you are filled with rage because the twentieth century is as imperfect as the others, or because the injustice that hurts you most has not been removed from the world, or just because you cannot get other people to agree with you, you are entitled to grab the first person you see on the street and hold him at gunpoint in a cellar until the government buys you off. It sounds like nonsense, and the overwhelming majority of people would say it was nonsense. Yet there is only a sliver of difference between this and the argument used by the kidnappers of Mr. Cross and Mr. Laporte in Montreal.

The men with machine-guns who took Mr. Cross and Mr. Laporte from their homes call themselves the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (F.L.Q.), but they do not want an independent Quebec and the majority of the local independence movement will have nothing to do with them; their real politics, so far as it is possible to pick an idea out the neo-Marxist jargon, are the politics of something called universal revolution. The men they seized, a British trade official and Quebec's minister of labor, were not selected as particular enemies of that idea. They were hostages pure and simple: living men who would be turned into dead bodies if their captors did not get their way. It takes only one small step beyond this to reach the kidnapping, in the name of some revolutionary new order, of an unknown housewife shopping in a supermarket.

What has happened in Montreal, and is happening in a lot of other places too, is the increasingly indiscriminate use of violence for the sake of increasingly imprecise political objectives. It is the uncontrolled in pursuit of the undefined. The other word for it, of course, is terrorism. The terrorists are the people who reject the idea that it should be possible to set some limits on the use of force in settling political quarrels. Men have spent a good deal of history in trying to impose such limits. The limits have never been accepted by everyone, and they have often been violated, but they have done something to make life a little less anarchic. One such rule of thumb was the notion that there ought to be a clear connection between the grievance that makes people resort to violence and the targets of their violence. That is why feudal theoreticians said that single combat was a suitable way of settling the thing; and why, when that had long since failed to catch on, the eighteenth



Political  
kidnapping

century tried to confine war to a test of strength between uniformed armies; and why, when that failed too, it was at least thought proper to make a declaration of war against the people you proposed to have it out with. The technique of the terrorist snaps the last constraint. The people a terrorist kills, or threatens to kill if his demands are not met, are more or less random victims. Their chief qualification for being selected is that he can get at them.

It is not only the Canadian government that finds itself stuck for an answer to the anybody-is-fair-prey game. There are half a dozen Latin American countries where left-wing revolutionaries and right-wing counter-terrorists have polished the trick of whipping a man off the pavement—remember the murdered German ambassador in Guatemala—and disappearing with him into some unfindable hideout in the city. The Palestinian hijackers go about their work in a different way but the aim is the same: to get control of an airliner full of people who have nothing to do with the Palestinians' quarrel with Israel and threaten to blow them to pieces unless their governments do what the hijackers say. So far the Weathermen and the Black Panthers have not pulled off a political kidnapping in the United States. But it will be surprising if they do not try; the Black Panthers have the same immediate aim as the Palestinians and the F.L.Q.—the release of friends held in prison for previous acts of violence—and they can see the advantage of an operation that promises to make a sentence of imprisonment more or less a formality. There are men in Ulster and Dublin, and other places, who have similar motives and who can make the same calculation. A cabinet minister or an ambassador will fetch a fine price; if you can't get one of those, a mayor or a businessman will do very nicely; and if even that is beyond your reach you can play on the heartstrings of public opinion with anybody who has a family and friends who want to see him whole again. There must be a lot of men around the world who have noted the Palestinians' success, and the cat-and-mouse game in Montreal, and feel the temptation to copy the examples that have been given to them.

A conducive  
environment

It is tempting because it is the cheapest known way of enforcing your political ideas and because, so far, it has worked. The only things you need for a successful campaign of modern terrorism are a handful of brave or unfeeling toughs, organized in tiny squads operating almost independently of each other, a few cupboards of small-arms and explosives, and somewhere to hold your captives when you have got them. There is no shortage of the necessary fanatics: desperate, obsessed or unbalanced men encouraged by the rhetoric of the new left and the trendy talk about violence being a form of communication. There are enough guns on the market in the world to equip an army corps of guerrillas. The warren of a modern Western city, where the police keep order in the streets but have got out of the habit of poking into people's houses, is a fine place to hide people. This is why in the West terrorism has come out of the country into the cities; the country is too easy to keep an eye on. And once the hostage has been grabbed the guer-







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TOM WILSON

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## DE PACT

Ze'evi said he confession from the signing an agreement to him a pistol, with that he could commit

the defence to say ended to fulfil the had signed with the Ze'evi replied: "Good simply a bait."

is successful, Aluf Okamoto suddenly and smiling, after a stubborn silence rs of questioning. nvinced me that we ferent technique in talk," the general

Okamoto continued giving details, Aluf had nullified the sui-

Requested to pro-agreement, Aluf Ze'evi take him a day or But he was able to om memory. Asked sought legal advice, the agreement, the I consulted myself."

cross-examination by Kreitzman was mark-arp exchanges. When ded his replies to "good enough for lled to order by the

also called the Ja-er, Tomo Ishida, a t the Hebrew Uni-ida testified that he Ze'evi make the sui-Okamoto had said: executed by firing... be shot."

reement was signed, Okamoto suddenly tive. But this lasted rs. During this time s had received word hat Namba — the Okamoto has been most likely a pseudo-amoto refused to re-entify, the investiga-to cancel the agree-

hours of deliberation.

Previous to the ruling on the confession, the court rejected Mr. Kreitzman's demand that the court disqualify itself because Aluf Ze'evi had talked with the judges in their

instead of immediately?"

Aluf Ze'evi: "It is not important if your sister-in-law is not on the casualty list."

Visibly angered, the defence counsel protested sharply to the

appears in court...

The president of the court managed to cool the parties' tempers; but it was clear that Mr. Kreitzman was shaken by the exchange.

# CONFESSION AND STATEMENT

Okamoto said that in February, 1971, he was invited by his "second oldest brother" to attend a meeting of the "Red Army." In March, his brother — Hakeshi — asked Okamoto to send him money. Later that month Okamoto said he heard that his brother had been involved in a hijack attempt.

The first time he came into contact with Arabs, he wrote, was when the organization, together with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, screened a film called the "Red Bus" at his rented apartment. The film apparently dealt with the pending "world revolution" the two groups were planning.

Later Okamoto received a letter from Lebanon inviting him to undergo military training there, and also to see his brother again. He accepted, but instead of flying directly to Beirut he was sent to New York via Europe and Canada. He was instructed to take an El Al 747 from New York to Paris in order to study "every last detail of the plane." The plan apparently backfired, "because of extremely strict security precautions," and Okamoto flew by an ordinary 707 to Paris.

Okamoto related that when he went to buy a first-class ticket aboard the jumbo, officials seemed extremely suspicious. "They wanted to know why I was travelling first class and who was paying for the ticket," he wrote.

From Paris he flew on to Lebanon, where after a few days in Beirut he went to an address in Baalbek where he met three other Japanese — two of whom were later to join him in the Lod massacre. The four of them underwent training with arms, ammunition and explosives, as well as physical exercises, and were trained by one Abu Idja — a well-known terrorist.

While at Baalbek the three members of the "Red Army" planned their attack on Lod. The fourth member of the group did not take part in these plans since he was destined to return to Japan, Okamoto writes, to prepare the way for the "great revolution." The initial plan for the attack was altered at the last minute, according to

the accused, when while waiting for the suitcases at Lod airport, minutes before opening fire, the three decided to blast the planes as well.

## FORGED PASSPORTS

The three left Lebanon for Paris via Rome and eventually met in Frankfurt, where they received forged passports and suitcases containing the machineguns and grenades.

"Mr. Okudaya, Mr. Yashida and myself," the confession reads, then left for Rome after spending two days in Frankfurt and booked onto the Air France plane which carried them to the target — "the Israel airport in Tel Aviv." The three sat together in the back row of the plane.

On landing Okamoto went into the toilet, tore the picture out of his forged passport and went to collect his baggage with his two friends.

"Okudaya and I stood two metres apart while Yashida stood far away and to the right. He opened fire first, and we joined in."

Okamoto said he saw many people dropping to the floor as he fired repeatedly at the crowd in the packed customs hall.

"While I was shooting I saw many people fall to the floor, and then I opened fire in the direction of where I saw many people standing. I then ran out and threw two hand grenades at a parked plane, but it did not catch fire and I was caught in the middle of all the excitement." All the time he was firing nobody shot back at him, he said.

## OKAMOTO'S STATEMENT

On Friday, at the end of the evidence, Okamoto elected to make a statement instead of giving evidence on oath, which would have exposed him to cross-examination.

"You are either a member of the 'Red Army' or a bourgeois. I warn the entire world: the 'Red Army' will slay anyone who is on the side of the bourgeois, and this is not a joke," Kozo Okamoto told the court.

"Our relations with the P.F.L.P. Arabs were just a jumping off point

for us to propel ourselves onto the world stage. This is why we decided on the military action at the Tel Aviv airport." In trying to explain why Japanese "soldiers" had carried out the attack, rather than Arab terrorists, he added, "We, the 'Red Army' soldiers who have been in the Arab world, do not demand that they be soldiers with us. I take full responsibility for myself and for my two friends for the killing at the airport."

Okamoto finished his sometimes rambling and disjointed speech in a poetic vein:

"The three of us decided that after we die we wanted to become three stars of Orion." He explained to the surprised judges, "In Japan little children are told that, after they die, they can become stars in the sky. I don't know the customs in other parts of the world, but I believe that some of the people we killed have become stars. The revolutionary war will continue, and there will be many more stars."

He said revolutionary warfare should be worldwide. "In New York and Washington, the houses of simple folk must be destroyed — that is how they would be able to feel the seeping torrent of world revolution."

## IMPASSIVE

His face impassive, he said of the 26 people killed in the Lod attack: "Warfare includes slaughter and destruction. We, as we engage in this, cannot but know that the slaughter of humans is inevitable. Therefore we know this will become more severe than the battle between nations."

In his speech, Okamoto frequently referred to Vietnam, whose people, he said, were shedding tears for the world, and to the American Black Panthers, who, he said, were treading the path of world revolution.

He said in the new society which his "Red Army" hoped to establish there would be no judicial courts. But he added that he accepted his own trial "as a means of propaganda."



One Cup & Beer

Value is ~~in~~ of right  
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~~Handwritten scribble~~

Peas in shell can - ~~last~~ one  
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