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After Camp David, 1978.

After Camp David
Daniel Jeremy Silver
October 29, 1978

Just five weeks ago the President of Egypt, the Prime Minister of Israel and the President of the United States came down from thirteen days of intense negotiations at Camp David and sat behind a table in the East Room of the White House before an assemblage of dignitaries and the television cameras. They spoke of two protocols which they had agreed upon during those negotiations, protocols which were signed by the three statesmen. One of these protocols dealt with a proposed peace treaty between Israel and Egypt essentially governing relationships in the area of the Sinai. The other framework was designed to permit the negotiations to begin towards a larger peace treaty involving Israel's relationships with her neighbors to the east and north and governing the people who lived in the West Bank and Gaza. The next day the President of the United States spoke to a joint session of the Congress. Among the things he said was it is my hope that the promise of these days will be fulfilled. The Congress in its own way said Amen. In a sense the world echoed that Amen for how else shall we explain the designation two days ago of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat as recipients of the 1978 Nobel Prize for Peace. Two more unlikely candidates the world is unlikely to see again in the near future.

Anwar Sadat is a military man. His skill is that of killing people, and though a deeply religious person he was not averse to launching a surprise attack on Israel just five years ago on the holiest day of our year, on Yom Kippur, when he knew that those Israelis would be in their synagogues.

And Menachem Begin, though he is not a military man, by training a lawyer, was the leader of the Irgun, one of the more active of the underground groups in mandatory Palestine and it's also not long ago, if only 32 years, that the Mapai, Israel's labor party, tabled a resolution at the 1946 World Zionist Organization congress in

Basel, asking, in effect, that Menechem Begin and the Irgun be read out of the Zionist group because they were launching a series of uncoordinated attacks against the mandatory power against England; and so crucial did Chaim Weitzmann, who was then president of the World Zionist Organization, believe this action to be that he announced to the delegates that unless they agreed to read Begin out of the Zionist movement he would resign his presidency. My father led the opposition to that resolution, arguing that at a time when two million Jews still suffered in Displaced Persons Camps in Europe, at a time when the British were refusing to remove their naval blockade against the so-called illegal immigrants into Palestine, this was no time for the Zionist movement to tear itself apart, that whatever one felt about the tactics of Mr. Begin in this or that campaign, he was a patriot, his cause was their cause and that what was needed was a new series of arrangements between the Irgun and the Haganah and not a resolution which would drive the Irgun away from the rest of the Zionist movement. That position prevailed. Chaim Weitzmann resigned his presidency and Menachem Begin in a sense began his movement up in the ranks of the World Zionist Organization, the Israeli government and to the place where he is today.

I suppose that the granting to Menachem Begin and Amwar Sadat of the Nobel Peace Prize says something about our world. It says that we have become utterly pragmatic. We've recognized that there are no saints, or at least if there are any saints, not close to the sources of power. And whether it's the designation of Henry Kissinger and Li Ducto in 1973 for the Nobel Prize or of Begin and Sadat this year it is clear that those who manipulate power are also those who can create the processes which make arrangements, negotiations, peace, ultimately possible.

I suppose that the Nobel Prize Committee also had it in mind by committing these two men to the receipt of its prize they were in a sense committing them to continue

the process now really hardly begun towards really establishing some kind of a more or less permanent peace in that part of the world. In any case, it's not at all an inappropriate designation for a prize which is given with monies earned by and in the name of a man who was, after all, one of the leading munitions merchants of Europe before the first World War.

My mountaineering friends tell me that the descent from the peak is often more time consuming, and sometimes more dangerous, than the ascent. When Menachem Begin left Washington after Camp David he had to go back to Jerusalem and convince his Cabinet, and then the Parliament, the Knessett, that the agreements he had undertaken were in the best interests of the nation. Menachem Begin has in his cabinet men and women who are far more belligerent, far more unwilling to give up any iota of land or territory than he. When Anwar Sadat went back to Egypt he had no such democratic struggle to face. The policies at Camp David to which he had agreed to were claimed by the Egyptian Parliament, but he had to face the anger of his Arab brothers. The rejectionist front, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Libya, Algeria immediately convened in Damascus and announced a one billion dollar campaign treasury to undo the Camp David accords. The Palestine Liberation Organization stepped up its attacks on Israel. There was an abortive torpedo attack on Elat. The number of bombings within Israel, or the attempted bombings, increased several fold; and they announced belligerently that Egypt and the United States were now targets for their anger and for their frustration. And the Syrians who could not attack Israel openly at this moment vented their anger on the Christians of the Lebanon, stepped up the military campaign to destroy the power of the Christian group whom they accused of being the bedfellows with the hated Zionist intruders. Descent was not easy and the process of negotiations, as you have been reading in newspapers, has been an uncertain one. And yet Mr. Begin succeeded in

getting a two-thirds vote in the Kennesset and the assent of his Cabinet; and Mr. Sadat made it quite clear that he was not willing to be brow-beaten by his Arab brothers. He felt he had gone as far as he could go in negotiating their demands and now it was up to them. And so two weeks ago the foreign ministers of Egypt and Israel and representatives of our own State Department met at the Blair House and began to work through the actual documents which would bring into being the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

But in the descent from the mountain it became clear that both countries of all parties had been subjected to new pressures, particularly the Saudis had begun to pressure Sadat to see to it that what is called linkage, the relationship of these two protocols, was made a fact for the diplomatic negotiations. This agreement between Israel and Egypt began, as you remember, not at Camp David but last November in Jerusalem. And it became very clear in the months preceding Jerusalem that both Israel and Egypt conceived of the truth that their national interests were now, to a very large degree, congruent, that is to say, that Egypt faced new enemies to the west and to the south. Egypt faced Libya maddened by the influx of oil money managed by a young ideologue who believes in permanent Muslim revolution, who had already made several attempts on Sadat's life, who just a few months before Jerusalem began to be what was an aborted tank attack on the Egyptian territory. And south of Egypt there was revolution in the Sudan. There were the movements of Cuban and Russian armies throughout Somalia and Ethiopia and sub-Sahara Africa, and Egypt felt threatened by Libya to the west and by the Russian-Cuban presence to the south and, of course, Sadat was also threatened by the sapping of whatever economic potential Egypt had as it prepared for continuing war with Israel. The war budget, the defense budget, in Egypt is something on the order of 65% of the national budget. The standard of living of the average Egyptian was falling. There had been bread riots in Alexandria and Cairo and many of the villages. Sadat

had come to feel that it was necessary to remove the danger from at least one of his borders so that he could begin to think of his other problems and begin to handle them.

Israel, of course, has always looked upon peace as an ultimate goal of its policy, whatever the fore war is about, simply the right to exist in some kind of peace. So the national interests of Egypt and of Israel were congruent and when, in the early fall of 1977, the Israeli shinvet, the Israeli CIA, received information of a plot by the Libyans against the Egyptians they made known the principals of this plot directly to the Egyptian government and the information, as it turned out, proved to be correct and Sadat felt that his government had been spared an embarrassment if he had not been perhaps spared his life, and began to believe that the moment might in fact be an appropriate one for a grand gesture which might make it possible for these two countries to arrive at some arrangements. And so the very dramatic visit to Jerusalem which I suspect was hastened by the fumbling policies of our own government, which were at that point determined to create a comprehensive peace settlement by bringing back that power in the Middle East which Sadat fears the most, the Soviet Union.

In any case, Sadat came to Jerusalem. The two countries found that they had much in common and there was the great heady moment of welcome. Sadat spoke to the Knesset, to the television cameras, and age-old policies of silence towards Israel, denial of Israel's very being was broken, and the world was filled with a new sense of possibility and hope. And then, somehow, after the visit the hope began to unravel. It unravelled because though the Israeli and Egyptian national interests were now one and the same up to a point, there were another set of concerns, the Palestinian concerns about the West Bank and Gaza, of East Jerusalem, about the Golan, the concerns of the other Arab governments and of the Palestinian leaders which were not congruent with those of Israel and which Sadat, under pressure to a certain degree and also because, obviously, he agreed with them, attempted to negotiate. But Asad

and Hussein refused to come into the negotiations. Israel refused to negotiate with Sadat for issues which he would not be the ultimate arbitrator. Whatever they gave to Sadat would be the top of what they could get in their future negotiations with the other parties and so at Aswan and in Scotland and elsewhere attempts were made to keep the pace of negotiations, the process of negotiations, going. Little was accomplished and things seemed to be grinding to an unwanted halt.

What made Camp David successful was the recognition by the United States, by Egypt and by Israel that as long as these two sense of concerns were interwoven there would be no progress, but that if somehow they could be separated out there could be swift progress on the Israel-Egyptian front and there could ultimately be, as greater confidence was gained by the various parties in each other, some progress on the other, far more complex issues. Camp David came very close to being an utter disaster; first, because Sadat was, to a degree, intransigent about his responsibilities to his Arab brothers; and secondly, because of the American tradition of believing that if there only could be an overall comprehensive and complete settlement can there be any kind of stability in the Middle East. But, finally, Sadat and Jimmy Carter came to the recognition that these issues had to be pulled apart, therefore, the two frameworks, each with its own time schedule, each with its own independent sets of targets, goals and obligations.

And the Egyptian-Israeli treaty groups that had been meeting in the Blair House were called to deal only with the Israel Egyptian framework for a peace treaty. Unfortunately, under pressure from the Saudis, Sadat's ambassadors were told to restructure the agreements in the final treaty so that they increased the understanding that implicit and explicit within the treaty was the requirement of linkage. And so the Foreign Minister of Egypt brought back a series of demands which included 1) the requirement that the preamble to the Israeli-Egyptian treaty would state that compliance

with the treaty required both compliance with all the terms of military withdrawal from the Sinai which were explicit and demanded at Camp David and also that there be progress towards autonomy and sovereignty for a West Bank Gaza Arab state, that progress be made toward solving all the other complex Palestinian West Bank issues that are involved in this conflict. They further required that once this linkage had been established and because it was established instead of going by the terms which had been established at Camp David which said that once a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt had been signed there would be an immediate exchange of ambassadors. Egypt would immediately pull out of the Arab economic boycott of Israel and there would be free exchange of goods across the Egyptian Israeli borders. Egypt now demanded that instead of this clear statement of the original framework that the exchange be not of ambassadors but of very low level personnel and that the movement towards a full diplomatic relationship, a full economic relationship, be coordinated with success in the linked treaties, in both treaties, that is to say that there must be progress on the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan to justify Egypt's exchanging ambassadors, opening its borders and so on.

And finally, Egypt insisted that there be a period five years out when the entire treaty be reviewed, that Egyptian-Israeli treaty be reviewed, against the standard of success in working out both arrangements, both the West Bank arrangements and the Sinai arrangements; and that if both treaties had not been successful Egypt reserved the right to renounce the treaty with Israel. The Israelis, of course, were unwilling to accept these terms and for most of the last two weeks Mr. Dayan has been saying to the press that Egypt is making demands upon us which cannot be resolved at this level. It will either have to be resolved by the President of the United States or by another summit. And the President of the United States was saying, really, there is

nothing that cannot be solved. All things will work themselves out, and they, finally, apparently came to some kind of agreement which pulled the teeth of the Egyptian demands and created a language which solved nothing but which by solving nothing solved everything, allowed the two delegations to send back to Jerusalem and to Cairo a proposed peace treaty to be signed within a week or two.

All things seem then in motion. There was process. Dayan and General Weitzmann submitted the peace treaty to the Cabinet. Sadat submitted the peace treaty to his Cabinet and it was confidently expected that everybody would be back in Washington or at some other designated point within a week or two to sign the treaty.

The problem then was that suddenly the Israeli government announced that there would be a thickening of existing settlements in the Sinai. A few hundred more families would be moved in, and that the Prime Minister's office in Jerusalem would be moved from West Jerusalem to East Jerusalem; and over the last few days we've seen an angry response by the American government; and over the last few days we have seen an attempt by the American government to force Israel to rescind these two decisions.

Now why did the Israeli government suddenly announce the thickening of settlers in existing settlements in the West Bank? And why did the Israeli government suddenly announce that the Prime Minister's office, or part of the office, be moved from West Jerusalem to East Jerusalem? The answer here, I would suggest, has to do with the American descent from the mountain. Immediately upon the conclusion of Camp David, you will recall, that Secretary Vance was sent to the Middle East. He met with Hussein and Aman; he met with the ruling prince in Riyadh, with the Saudis; he wanted to meet with Asad and was turned down for awhile, and finally had a very quick meeting with the Syrian president. And he began to explain to these dignitaries and rulers what it was that the American government felt could be accomplished if they would only now

come into the negotiating process. King Hussein then submitted fifteen questions to the American government to which he said he wanted answers. And the questions really had to do with what the American final position was since they are now a full partner in the negotiating process. They had to do with the West Bank, with Gaza, and with sovereignty, with the removal of Jewish settlements with East Jerusalem, with sovereignty over the holy places, with the Golan and a number of other issues. Now these questions and their answers have not yet been made public, but it's very clear that the American government was most eager to move ahead speedily; it's very clear that the American government in a sense reiterated the positions that Mr. Carter had before Camp David, positions which argue that the West Bank and Gaza ought to be an independent community, self-governing, perhaps linked to the Jordan; that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are negotiable which implies that they can and perhaps should be removed; that no country has the right to acquisition of territory by force, that this applies to East Jerusalem, that the city of Jerusalem should not be physically divided again; there was no reason to believe that some kind of sovereignty could not be and should not be arranged for Jordan or for the West Bank government over the East Jerusalem community; that Israeli's legitimate needs are strategic, military and that alone. There can be some forward warning points for Israel along the Jordan River but essentially this must be the limit of Israel's intrusion into the sovereignty of an Arab community.

After Mr. Vance's visit the State Department decided to answer explicitly these fifteen questions. They did not demand a quick pro quo, that is that once the answers having been given King Hussein enter into the negotiating process. Mr. Athetan, the Under Secretary of State, was sent throughout the Middle East. Shortly after Mr. Afetan, Mr. Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern affairs was sent to the Middle East, and as every delegate went to the Middle East they began to essentially promise the Arab states more and more in order to have them come into the negotiating

process. Mr. Saunders' visit seems to have been the most disastrous for he seems to have begun to speak of East Jerusalem as occupied Jerusalem, and he seems to have begun to have said explicitly that the Israeli settlements in the West Bank are removable. Now, for Mr. Begin, these are totally unacceptable positions and they are clearly not positions which the Israelis agreed to at Camp David. Mr. Begin has said explicitly again and again that he is very proud as a Jew that a Jewish State proposed autonomy for the West Bank, that by autonomy he means self-government in a domestic sense, a police force, control of the social institutions of the community, but no parliament, no power to deal in international affairs and no army because he says that if the West Bank and Gaza people have control of their foreign policy and an army of their own they not only control their destiny but they then are in a position to control our destiny.

And Mr. Sadat, and many in Israel, would argue that the Israeli settlements in the West Bank quite apart from the question of autonomy or sovereignty are not removable, that the Israelis, Jews, lived in the West Bank long before 1947 and 1948, that just as any number of Arabs live in Israel as Israeli citizens there is no reason that Jews cannot live on the West Bank and Gaza as citizens of whatever that community will be called; and that no part of the world, specifically no part of the Holy Land, can in the years after Hitler be Judenrein, utterly without Jews by fiat. And furthermore, it is a statement of all the major parties in Israel that Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel, Jerusalem will not be divided again, ^{that} there will be no grant of sovereignty back to anyone else who might claim it. And in point of fact here the Israelis have a strong case in law because Jerusalem was never intended to be part of a partitioned Palestine. It was to be Vatinized, that is, it was to be created as a separate community under United Nations control and government, and when the United Nations proved it could not enforce its authority in 1947 - 1948 upon Jerusalem, then the divided city emerged. And the Arab States themselves had no claim under law for sovereignty or

control over East Jerusalem.

And so these issues, as they began to be sold to the Arab States, particularly to Jordan and to the Saudis in an attempt to bring them into the negotiating process, began to worry the Israelis because they saw again the danger that the United States was undermining their ability to negotiate what must be ultimately negotiated before negotiations begin. It's one thing to say, as the Israelis have said from the very beginning, we will sit down, but whoever will sit down with us and negotiate everything that needs to be negotiated, but it's another thing to sit down with people who have already been promised by a third party that it will get their ultimate demand and then be told go and negotiate. That's not negotiating, that's simply signing your name to something over which you have had very little control.

Now when the West Bank and Gaza protocol was agreed upon at Camp David the assumption was there would be a five-year period once a local council of Palestinians had come into being during which it was hoped that Egypt and Israel and Jordan and anybody else who was a confrontation power who was willing to come into the negotiations would come in to work out what would be the end result after this five-year transition period. And all parties would have a say in terms of what would emerge after this five-year period. The time table for the Israeli Egyptian Peace Treaty was quite different: a peace treaty within three months; the major removal of Israeli forces from the Sinai within nine months; and upon that removal the immediate exchange of diplomatic relations and ambassadors and the opening of the borders.

The attempted linkage, then, the pressure for linkage is a pressure that Israel fears on many counts, but, most importantly, on the count that it can undermine and undo and provide an excuse for undermining and undoing on the part of the Egyptians the treaty which is most important to Israel, that treaty which removes Egypt as a confrontation state. Israel recognizes and must recognize that there is little margin

for error. Israel recognizes and she must recognize that Sadat has a record for renouncing treaties. He had a treaty of eternal friendship with the Soviet Union which he renounced just four years ago. He had a treaty of partnership in international government with Syria in the creation of United Arab Republic which he renounced unilaterally six years ago. Those of us who lived through the 1930's know that it is very easy for nations to renounce non-aggression pacts and peace treaties when it is in their self-interest to do so. And though it's easy to renounce a treaty once Israel has given over the Sinai, the air fields, the oil fields, once Israel has pulled back the settlements that are in the Rafia sector outside of Gaza, once she has pulled her troops off the islands of Sharmasheh which control the access into the Gulf of Akiba, once all these physical changes have taken place there is no way short of war for Israel to pull her troops back in to control the air fields again, to have early warning radar stations where they are now positioned and so on. If Egypt, a few years out, having gained all of the military and economic advantage, the strategic advantage and the natural resource which she will gain in the next year or two as Israel pulls back according to the Israel Egyptian agreement. If she has an excuse to renounce that treaty, and does so, there is very little Israel can do about it short of war. She will have gained nothing but her gamble on peace.

And so Israel wants, as best she can, to keep these two treaties unlinked because whereas she can live up to the treaty she has with Egypt, she's bargained with Egypt, she knows what Egypt's interests are and what her interests are, they've sat down, they've talked them through, there's been communication, there've been visits to Egypt, to Jerusalem. There's been only silence from Jordan's part. There's been only silence and anger on Syria's part. There's only a reiteration of the we will ultimately overcome argument from the rejectionist camp. And so she cannot give as easily

or be as pliant or certainly negotiate ahead of time what she will give with these others more obdurate enemies, these enemies for whom the same set of circumstances does not operate as operate in the case of Egypt. It is not necessarily in Syria's interest to make peace with Israel. In fact, it may be in Syria's disinterest to make peace, because only anger at Israel justifies the continuation of a central government in Damascus which otherwise might be very easily split into competing lands and tribes.

So Israel has every reason to go slowly. And Israel has every reason to be angry or to take symbolic actions as they did this last week when the United States moved so fast that it seems to be undercutting Israel's position. You don't run down a mountain. You walk slowly. You take care. Unfortunately, the United States has tried to run down the mountain. Mr. Carter is not a patient man. Mr. Carter became President of these United States because he ran a campaign which admitted no obstacles where no demand on his energy or his time went unanswered, where you simply pushed ahead regardless of the obstacles, regardless of the possible fallout or the consequences. And that's his way of operation. It works some time and other times it doesn't work as in his attempt to bulldoze certain of his bills through the Congress. The problem is that in dealing with a delicate situation in the Middle East this administration both recognizes the importance of process and of patience, and fails to live up to its own understanding of the importance of process and of patience.

If you read the speeches which have been made by Secretary Vance and Mr. Afetan you will quickly come to understand they are speaking in terms of process. We need time for Israel and for Egypt and the other countries of the Middle East to learn that they can trust one another, you can't overcome thirty years of distance, four bloody wars, all of the memories of devastation, of sudden attack, which are behind these wars overnight. It's going to take a long time for people psychologically to

reposition themselves so that the possibilities of peace, the flexibility which peace demands, emerge. The American government is saying this, but it is not acting upon its own understanding because I firmly believe that both Sadat and Begin signalled again and again that they are eager if they would only be left alone to work out the Israel Egyptian Peace Treaty. And if the Israel Egyptian Peace Treaty works itself out then in time Hussein, Asad, have really no other alternative but to make some kind of grudging arrangement with the Israelis, but if the United States tries to force the issue now, at a time when every promise that America has made becomes a new baseline of demands for the Arab negotiator, she is putting pressure on Egypt to insist on strong wordage in terms of linkage because this will increase the Arab pressures on Egypt and she is increasing the pressures on Israel to dig in her heels, to say no, no, again and to take these kinds of actions which only disturb the peace process.

Mr. Begin does not want sovereignty for a West Bank Arab state. Mr. Begin and those he represents in Israel are not prepared to concede of the removal of Israeli settlements, farming settlements and other in the West Bank. Very few, if any, Israelis are ready to concede that East Jerusalem is occupied territory which needs to be given back to the Arabs. If the United States tries to force this down the throat of the Israelis now it will force the Israelis into a position where they will kick over the milk can, where they will destroy what is really possible now, an Israel Egyptian peace and the beginning of a new process which will take time in the Middle East.

I began by talking of the Nobel Peace Prize and of the kinds of people who win the Nobel Peace Prize. I guess the ultimate truth is that there is no such thing as peace in our world. What there are are temporary arrangements where it is to the self-interest of competing nations to live together in some degree of amiability or commercial co-operation. We have come in the Middle East, I think, to a time when it is to the interests

of two major powers of the Middle East, Israel and Egypt, to live together and cooperate together economically and to have a measure of peace. I would hope and pray that the United States, in its impatience, the rest of the world for its other very special ideological reasons will not make it impossible for this process to begin to unfold. I hope we will not try and do too much, that we will recognize the significance of time. You can't run down the mountain. You take the same kinds of precaution coming down as you did going up. I hope that our own government which, through President Carter, did so much to understand that the need to separate the two issues at Camp David will not forget the lesson of Camp David and return to the policies of last summer and last spring and last fall, dangerous self-defeating policies, which aimed at what cannot be achieved now, a comprehensive settlement rather than at what can be achieved now, an Israel Egyptian treaty, the beginning of a new day, a new balance of power, balance of forces for the Middle East.

No one can guarantee that if there is an Israeli-Egyptian treaty the other things will resolve themselves. We can guarantee that if the whole issue is forced now nothing will be resolved because Egypt will be forced to a more and more adamant position; Begin will be forced to be more and more adamant; there will be confrontation instead of cooperation.

So the end of the matter all having been said, where are we? I don't know. I don't think Mr. Begin knows and I don't think Mr. Sadat knows, and I am confident Mr. Carter doesn't know. We're on our way to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. I think there are enough reasons and reasonable people in Cairo and Jerusalem who will see to it that whatever happens somehow they will keep their eye on the main chance, because, to a very large degree, the survival of these two governments depends upon an Israeli Egyptian Peace Treaty and that's the best reason to have hope in the weeks that lie ahead.

When you read of Israel being intransigent try and read behind the lines, behind the headlines. Try to understand the pressures that exist in Israel, some domestic. Menachem Begin may be a difficult character but he has to his right some people who - some of those on the American right - who wanted to bomb Hanoi off the map. Israel is a democracy and Begin must deal with these, but the mood in Israel is a mood that wants to have peace with Egypt, and wants to see the process of peace begin. And clearly the mood in Cairo is of the same nature. Understand that if Israel is pressured too far she has very little she can do but to act symbolically in such a way as to indicate to the Arab world what she will do and what she will not do.

And remember this, too; that five years of a transition government for the West Bank, once the time clock begins to tick, once some kind of West Bank Council, is a long time. And if Mr. Begin will not accept the idea of anything but the most limited autonomy, five years may see one, two, three new governments in Jerusalem, one, two, three new governments in Cairo. Time is of the essence, and those who are trying to abbreviate time are really doing the cause of peace in the Middle East a disservice.

Kaddish

Friday

Sunday

OCTOBER 29, 1978

Those who passed away this week

SAMUEL ANGART
HAROLD M. CHATTMAN

ADA WEINGARTEN

Gahrzeitz

HANNAH C. KOBLITZ
BELLE GURSS
BENJAMIN A. KAATZ
SOL H. SCHACHTEL
BENJAMIN F. KLEIN
HELEN K. WULIGER
SAMUEL C. WERTHEIM
NAN SCHWARTZ SELTZER
SAM H. GRIFF
ISAAC E. SPERLING
JENNIE REITER KLEIN
MAX FRANKEL
LILLIAN R. CHERTOFF
CLARA SCHWARTZ
PAULA GREENBAUM
WALTER PAUL DEUTSCH
MAX M. ROTHSCHILD
MORRIS VERNON BROWN
HELEN M. SILBERBACH
CHARLES KRAMER
EUGENE ROSENBAUM
ROSE RICHMAN UNGER
ESTHER LEBBY
LEONORE SPERO BASSICHIS

RACHEL COPELAND
HELENE R. HIMMEL
SAMUEL STERN
SOL DORSEY
HILDA W. KROHNGOLD
DR. JACOB SIEBERT
SADELLE KLEIN
SAM HARRIS
HENRY G. SEED
RACHEL MILLER ELLBOGEN
JACOB H. ALTMAN
FLORA J. BRATBURD
COLEMAN SPITZ
HEDWIG HENRY
BECKY ROSENTHAL
EDWARD W. BEECHLER
ALTA LIEDER

Your TEMPLE Calendar — Clip and Save

SUN	MON	TUES	WED	THURS	FRI	SAT
22 3rd Grade Retreat	23 Last Day Sukkot Services CONSECRATION 10:30 a.m. - Branch	24 TWA Activities 10:00 a.m. - Branch Fellowship & Study Group Rabbi Stephen Klein 10:45 a.m. - Branch No School	25 Pre-Confirmation and Confirmation Classes	26 Pre-Confirmation and Confirmation Classes	27 Services - 5:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel	28 Shabbat Services 9:45 a.m. - Branch Bar Mitzvah ROBERT STERN 4:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel
29 FIRST SUNDAY SERVICE 10:30 a.m. The Temple Branch Rabbi Silver will speak on AFTER CAMP DAVID	30 COPING I COPING WITH LOVE Roy Schlachter 8:00 p.m. - Branch	31 TWA Activities 10:00 a.m. - Branch Fellowship & Study Group Rabbi Stephen Klein 10:45 a.m. - Branch Begin Tuesday Pre-Confirmation Class	NOVEMBER 1 AMERICAN JEWISH ARCHIVES	2 Services - 5:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel FIRST FRIDAY DR. BERNARD MARTIN "That Man from Smyrna" 8:15 p.m. - Branch	3 Services - 5:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel	4 Shabbat Services 9:45 a.m. - Branch Bar Mitzvah DAVID LAMBERT 11:00 a.m. The Temple Chapel
5 SERVICES 10:30 a.m. The Temple Branch Rabbi Silver will speak on Crime and Punishment 4th Grade Retreat Yiddish, I.B. Singer & The Noddy	6 COPING II COPING WITH TIME Dr. Daniel Deutschman 8:00 p.m. - Branch	7 TWA Activities 10:00 a.m. - Branch Fellowship & Study Group Rabbi Stephen Klein 10:45 a.m. - Branch Mr. & Mrs. Club Board Meeting - 8:00 p.m.	8 TWA EVENING WITH HERB KAMM 8:00 p.m. - Branch	9 Services - 5:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel SEVENTH SABBATH 8:00 p.m. - Branch	10 Services - 5:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel	11 Shabbat Service 9:45 a.m. - Branch SENIOR YOUTH GROUP SHUL-IN 8:00 p.m. - Branch
12 SERVICES 10:30 a.m. The Temple Branch Rabbi Silver will speak on Yiddish and the Nobel Prize ISRAEL BOND DINNER Dr. & Mrs. Jerome Gans 8:00 p.m. The Temple Social Hall	13 COPING III COPING WITH CHANGE Dr. Paul Abels 8:00 p.m. - Branch	14 TWA Activities 10:00 a.m. - Branch Fellowship & Study Group Rabbi Stephen Klein 10:45 a.m. - Branch LUNCH WITH THE RABBI Commerce Club 12:00 - 1:30 p.m. Temple Board Meeting 8:00 p.m. - Branch	15 TWA Board Meeting 10:00 a.m. - Branch TMC Board Meeting 8:00 p.m. - Branch	16 Services - 5:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel	17 Services - 5:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel	18 Shabbat Services 9:45 a.m. - Branch Bar Mitzvah ERIC WHITMAN 11:00 a.m. The Temple Chapel Mr. & Mrs. Club Theatre Party 8:45 p.m. - The Palace Hebrew Camp Weekend Hiram House

just when the action & the action started
the "real" world? Boy, seemed to have
Vale, 1st time he'd been seen for his
connections. Represented by 3 sub. notes
not for sure was a mistake - Beau beau usually
and never acted moving to appear
the conclusion of A house truly below applied
the fundamental for the house truly below applied

so-called Swiss ground.

The house truly below applied the fundamental for the house truly below applied
but the house truly below applied the fundamental for the house truly below applied
the house truly below applied the fundamental for the house truly below applied
as from first truly below applied the fundamental for the house truly below applied
progress on the house truly below applied the fundamental for the house truly below applied
and below the house truly below applied the fundamental for the house truly below applied
Truly below the house truly below applied the fundamental for the house truly below applied
at the house truly below applied the fundamental for the house truly below applied
on the house truly below applied the fundamental for the house truly below applied
came down the house truly below applied the fundamental for the house truly below applied



Egypt was reported to have proposed
 intending to send persons - the British subject
 to Egypt seems to be one of the 13 cases
 - They were very anxious under the prospect
 of an Egyptian Trade Delegation coming into the country -
intended to rescind the order made in 1906 -
 as the Egyptian proposed to link up 2 lines
agreed to the limit to the area of the country
of the country to be used as a base for the British army -
subject to the British army to be used as a base for the British army -
a Review was made and it was found that the British army was not needed in the country -
of the country was not needed in the country and it was found that the British army was not needed in the country -
however as the British army was not needed in the country and it was found that the British army was not needed in the country -
 & c.

Document was referred to Criminal
 Process. Document of C.D. - J.C. and
 C.D. to Amman & Riyadh - Maintenance
 Certificate, Incident, Police - Police

may lead to peace. Sweden has concluded
 several agreements in the past years
 - which will lead to peace
 in the future - the main idea is to
 bring the country into the C. O. Council,
 especially, the U. S. people are to be helped
 in self defense and peace and the
 W. B. & Co. - which will be helped
 to lead the people to peace and the
 U. S. - which will be helped
 to lead the people to peace and the
 people will be helped to lead the people
 to lead the people to peace and the
 not by the people to lead the people
 to lead the people to peace and the
 to lead the people to peace and the
 to lead the people to peace and the
 to lead the people to peace and the
 to lead the people to peace and the

to 1600000 15 2 - [1 - unaccounted for]
 House's interest to order regulations before
 coming to U.S. as you are handling
 so much business papers is not good.

But's interest: ~~nothing~~ in the
 expedited & predictable way to be created &
 show many important needs ~~which~~ ^{which} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~needed~~ ^{needed}
 1) ~~Policy~~ to ~~Understand~~

2) ~~covered~~ | ~~way~~ to ~~more~~ P.D.



But's idea you at in to more
and -- last week in most important
as can handle it all then can be noticed
intending in person last as policy in
was for Israel.

Now 2 days ~~about~~ ^{about} ~~calculated~~ ^{calculated} -
 Davos - should ~~had~~ ^{had} ~~been~~ ^{been} - ~~also~~
 Israel's ~~modern~~ ^{modern} ~~7-forg~~ ^{7-forg} - General Adia

People we respect Temperament of child
Dance is a quality - - Intellectual -
social experiences -

If all new cell - but don't know
from - a Person Teacher - a person / Person -
by 7 or 8 who learn about the 30's more low
early Peace Teacher - War Gravestone Part in

Don't Up - War Gravestone Part in
Teaching as Teacher just 5 years
in the low as the



Teacher / multiple Gravestone Part

There's more about the Gravestone Part in
the multiple Gravestone Part in

to multiple Gravestone Part in
to multiple Gravestone Part in

to multiple Gravestone Part in
to multiple Gravestone Part in
to multiple Gravestone Part in
to multiple Gravestone Part in

Therapy in the Central

[illegible]

Y. C. Confell

But now the situation has changed

under ~~present~~ ~~existing~~ ~~status~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~

man to the Egyptian - must be done

Shum al Shukla - 6000 - 1000

Shore and Street
and field are covered over - - - - - 7 1/2

and sum

66 adults 9

The Journal

submitted A unsubstantiated

See page 1 - every column - not

[Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, possibly reading "found a small ..."]

found a note to go to the
for company's work - ~~the~~

The country is

very rich in

oil & gas.


But many a night

Secret

~~low~~ Egypt - ~~Cat~~ ~~and~~ ~~from~~, ~~under~~

book sent (Tenth 4 Ept's pages per 1
Gould & Pearson - - - - - some days to
Source [Source] and Unit [Lodge]
Trail Book - - - - - Sh. B. B. - - - - -
to select Lodge plant on - - - - - top -
Source Book - - - - - U.S. - - - - - to
very U.S. B. B. - - - - - only M. B. B. B. B.

Unit - - - - - to Palestine: Ept (Source)



Source - - - - - and merged
very a book

Egypt - - - - - and merged
very a book

but Egypt has places to see of 4 years work
also and - - - - - made complete
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4 may be able to be done on somebody

Don't forget to mention on the President


F.C. found me at C.D. to point to the end

to provide to complete what was left under

to do - by intention process - 2 cases

in Frankfurt - language usage usage to

which was made - have point | take at the



U.S. under

last - see under

have under under for under

eye - under under under under

Shells - under under

under under - under under

under under under under

LINKAGE - under under under under

under under

10/10/10

Part of our class - middle Time
Please read on now - political Time
Is not in the republican country house
where house should not imply to
president - very old to us - US has
never been just - two and one old
explain a complicated account
from Israel should be in the end -
the middle house should be in the end -
which is in the end - in the end of the end -
now immediate middle - country -
Bey's and - land of the end

WE PROPOSE AUTONOMY NOT A STATE
IF THEY HAVE A STATE - THEY WOULD
DETERMINE NOT ONLY THEIR OWN
FATE, BUT OURS

54 - ~~under~~ - P.C. - ~~again~~

Case 572-4 ~~Warrant~~ to ~~see~~ rule

57 ~~am~~ - ~~am~~ - ~~am~~ / ~~am~~ ~~am~~ ~~am~~

leaves - by grass - ~~by grass~~ ~~by grass~~

4th reaction 7 Carbon Radical

1) Under - Ground - High 6 feet 4

"covered for all"

12 Q answer

~~y - 0.0001~~



36 y —————

7. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 8

luna - luna la luna

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