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The Shah and the Mullahs, 1978.

The Shah and the Mullah
Daniel Jeremy Silver
December 17, 1978

I want to talk this morning about the recent events in Iran. I want to concentrate on the religious dimension of that struggle which is in many ways its most dynamic dimension. To a large degree we of the West have lost sight of the power of religion in the affairs of men. In our world the power of the traditional faiths has become attenuated. We assume that men do not need the help of their gods, science, our religion, will move us towards the messianic age. Consequently, we are somewhat surprised when, as in Iran, religiously inspired anger topples kingdoms and changes the course of history.

Suddenly the word mullah has become a familiar title. The press tends to define mullah as an Islamic priest; though Islam, like Judaism, has no priests. Islam's religious leaders, as the rabbis of old, work as teachers, judicial officers and notaries. They are responsible for the organization and the application of the shariah, Islam's halacha, the all-embracing religious law.

Traditionally, all Muslim boys enroll in a parochial school, a heder. There they memorized the basic text of their tradition, the Koran, and were/are exposed to the Kadith, the accepted traditions about Mohammed's teachings. When boys graduate from heder they go to a yeshiva, from mughtar school to Madrassa where they gain advanced training in the shariyah. At that point most students simply go out into the work-a-day world. The mullah elects to stay on and prepare himself as a religious official. He secures a job as a teacher in elementary school or as a local notary in a community where he organizes the forms and legalities of marriage, inheritance and adoption. The closest parallel I can suggest to the role of the mullah is that of a rebbe in a shtetl in eastern Europe. All male Jews went to heder and learned Torah. Some went on to the yeshiva. Of those who go into the yeshiva, many end their studies

by going into business. A few are ordained and seek jobs of a religious nature in the community. These are the rebbe. The rebbe taught children in the heder. They ruled on kashrut for housewives. They acted as scribes in preparing marriage contracts and bills of divorce. They were the living presence of the halacha in their neighborhood.

In eastern Europe there were rebbes and there were ravs. The rav shared the same training as the rebbe but he was better at it and went further. The rav, by virtue of his competence, gained an authority beyond that of answering notarial requests or kashrut questions. He was indispensable to the life of the larger community because its entire being - judicial, educational, governmental - was organized around the halacha and he served as its consultive authority to whom major questions as to the organization of community life were addressed. The rebbe worked in the neighborhood. The rav was a member of the elite, part of the governing structure, indispensable to it. The rebbe is to the mullah as the rav is to the ayatolla, the major religious figures of Iranian Islam.

What has led Iran's mullahs to catalyse the current wave of demonstrations and strikes aimed at toppling the Shah? Why is a leading ayatolla, Khomeini, currently in French exile, determined to pull down the Pahlevi dynasty? To answer this question we have to go back fifty years to a time when a young general in the Iranian army, a northerner from Azerbaijan, Reza Khan, organized a relatively bloodless coup which overthrew a weak government and established him as the head of Iran.

During the early 1920's there was a power vacuum in Teheran. Iran had been ruled imperially for centuries, but during the first decades of this century the dynasts had been reduced to figureheads and effective power was enjoyed by the British in the South and by Czarist Russia in the North. The British Navy guaranteed that British commercial interests enjoyed favorable trading privileges in all Iran south of Teheran.

The Czar's armies guaranteed Russian privileges in the Caspian ports and fisheries. British and Russian control remained the reality of power until the end of the first World War. At that point the British were faced with a new and disliked Soviet government. Though they were, if anything, increasingly interested in maintaining their colonial authority, the war had taught the Admiralty the importance of Iranian oil. The British wanted the Communists out. In its own way Moscow returned the feelings and such was the level of mutual distrust between the two colonial powers that various Iranian prime ministers were able to play one off against the other and arrange for both Soviet and British withdrawal at a price. Iran gained independence at the cost of ceding exploitative commercial rights to England and Russia. The British received concessions for their oil companies which allocated to Iran only a minority share of immense profits. The Soviets received similar concessions in the fisheries and oil fields of the North. There were now no foreign armies on Iran's soil, but there were armies of foreign merchants and commercial officers and Iran lacked control of her economic destiny.

At this junction Reza Khan came to Teheran and took power. He was determined to create a strong government which could bring Iran into the twentieth century and thus make it possible for the Iranian people to achieve effective independence and not simply the appearance of it. His basic argument was that the Iranians must learn to work. Medievalism was Iran's curse. Men must be productive. Religious study could no longer be an end in itself. Education could no longer be limited to the traditional curriculum. Iran's people must educate themselves for the challenges of the day with the knowledge of the day. Reza Khan's model was Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish leader who, some ten years before, had created a new country out of remnants of the Ottoman Empire by breaking the stranglehold of the past. Ataturk had gained control of the educational and judicial systems and, in doing so, had brought

about a revolution in national attitudes and in goals. He had attacked the monopoly of the mullahs over the educational and the judicial system. In Islam, as in rabbinic Judaism, the tradition of the separation of church and state was unknown. Theoretically, at least, religious law governed every aspect of one's life. Ataturk separated church and state by imposing French law upon the Turkish courts in all matters save those of personal status and by creating a school system along western lines.

Reza Khan was determined to duplicate Ataturk's feat. He removed the control of the mullahs over education and the courts. Schools were to be on the European model. The sciences were to have a major role. The tradition-bound mullah stood in his way, so Reza Khan stripped the Islamic religious establishment of most of its power. The Dervishes, the mystics of Islam, could no longer appear in public. Women were no longer required to wear veils. When his wife was publicly condemned by an ayotollah for appearing in public unveiled Reza Khan entered the pulpit of the sacred mosque in Kum and publicly took a whip to the offending ayatolla. He expropriated much of the land which had been given by the faithful to the mosques over the centuries. As in Catholic Europe, this wealth had been used by the religious establishment to glorify their cathedrals and to maintain their institutional power as well as for welfare and educational purposes. Now these monies were used for the modernized educational system, for hospitals and for public works. Reza Khan also ordered that schools be open to women as to men and that their curriculum be determined by the State. Mullahs who continued to teach in the schools were to be paid by the State and, therefore, under its control.

In other words, the first Pahlevi Shah deliberately catalyzed a revolution in the social habits of Iran, a revolution which struck not only at the mullahs but at most of the ancient beliefs and habits of the ninety-eight percent of the population who are Muslim. There are many old scores to settle between the Pahlevis and the

mullahs. Indeed, these groups have been in a rather continuous battle. Khoumeini fled Iran in 1963 when an earlier, religiously-motivated demonstration which he stimulated against the rule of the Pahlevis was aborted.

The ayatollas and mullahs of Iran are Shiite Muslims. The Shiite tradition is a variant of the normative Sunnite tradition. Shiite Islam, which is accepted by some thirty-five or forty million peoples, is centered in Iran, though it has centers in Yemen, Iraq and North Africa as well. This sectarian tradition broke quite early with the majority on the question of religious authority. After the death of Mohammed most Muslims accepted the authority of caliphs nominated by the community. In practice this meant that the caliph proceeds to establish an hereditary dynasty. There were those who were not satisfied with this purely political basis for succession. They argued that Mohammed had been invested with divine power and that this divine power was hereditary in his family. Mohammed's sons had died young, but he had a daughter named Fatima. Fatima had married one of the first disciples, Ali, and their sons were Mohammed's nearest heirs. The Shiites believe that Ali was the legitimate successor to Mohammed. Ali was assassinated in an event unrelated to the Shiite majority conflict. His eldest son, Hasan, had no interest in power and renounced all claim to his younger brother, Hussein. Hussein raised an army which marched against the Sunnite caliph in Baghdad, Muawiya. It was a futile gesture. In 641, at a place called Kerbella, in what is now Iraq, Hussein was defeated and killed.

Among the Shiites the legitimate religious leader is called Imam. Imam describes the authorized head of the Islamic world, the man who has within him the inherited divine spirit. Since the man is possessed of divine spirits, he is infallible and must be given complete deference.

The demonstrations of the last several weeks are related to the Kerbella defeat. Hussein was killed during the month of Maharan and these days are devoted by Shiites to a memorial of his death. Hussein is looked upon as a martyr much as the Christians look on the Christ's death, that is, he suffered and died to atone for the sins of his people. The flaggelations and the wailings you have been reading about represent ritualized attempts by the faithful to show their grief and remorse by lacerating themselves for having caused the Imam the necessity of sacrificing himself for them.

According to most Iranian Shiites there were twelve legitimate Imams in direct succession. Then the line disappears into mystery. While still a young man the twelfth Imam went into a cave where he remains until this day. He is the hidden Imam who will return at the end of days as the Mahdi, we might call him the messiah. When he returns a new and better age will dawn.

The idea of the Imam was/is particularly attractive to Persians for political as well as religious reasons. Iran enjoyed twelve hundred years of imperial glory under Persian, Parthian and Sasanid kings before this last dynasty was overwhelmed by the Muslims. Though they became Muslim, the Persians have long felt the tug of nationalism, a desire to feel separate. Hussein is said to have remarried the last of the Sassanid princesses and so the old Persian line was bound into the hereditary Imamate. Because they believe that the Imam is the only legitimate head of Islam, the Shiites have not felt the need to pledge total allegiance to whoever happened to be caliph in the Arab world. For centuries Persia has been irreversibly Muslim, but largely governed by its own rulers. Many Shiite rituals are designed to allow Persian Muslims to exhibit their love of Islam without leaving Persia. Every Muslim is

encouraged to make at least one pilgrimage to Mecca. The Shiite may fulfill this duty by visiting some of the graves of various Imams which are located in his own country, Persia. From the beginning Shiite Islam has included an expression of Persian nationalism and, as such, has been an effective vehicle through which the Persians could express their faith in their people's special future.

Unlike the major trends within Islam, Shiite Islam tends to be racist as well as chauvinist. The Sunnite position is simply that those who are not Muslims must be kept subservient. Jews, Christians, Parsees, cannot have power within the Muslim world. The mosque must be taller than the church or synagogue; but the dhimmi, the non-Muslim of an advanced faith, may live within the Muslim world and go about his business as long as he shows proper deference to the religion of the state and recognizes his tolerated position. He is a non-believer but not a pariah. In the Shiite tradition the non-believer is a social outcast. The touch of the non-believer is unclean. If a Jew goes into a grocery store in Teheran or Isfahan and touches an orange to see whether it is fresh the grocer will run up and push his hand away. Fruit or vegetable touched by the non-believer is rendered unclean to Shiite Muslims. The uncleanness of the non-believer became a staple of Shiite folklore much as the anti-semitic stereotypes of the Jew became central in the folklore of Europe.

Particularly during the last four centuries when Shiite Islam has been the faith of the rulers as well as of the majority of population, the position of the Jew, the Bahai and the Christian has been an unhappy one. There was no talk of equality or brotherhood. Once the Safavid dynasty, a Shiite house, attained power in 1502 Jews were forbidden to engage in most occupations. They were forbidden to have their own schools, to touch food in the markets and to live in most parts of the city. Jews had to wear a special badge, a colored turban, which proclaimed them as untouchables.

During these centuries the Jewish community of Persia became financially and culturally impoverished. Contact with the outside world was limited. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the approximately hundred thousand Jews of Persia were a deprived and outcast group who lived mostly on a hand-to-mouth basis. Most were illiterate. At the turn of this century illiteracy ran above ninety percent, not only among women, but among men. There were no leaders trained to give competent guidance in the tradition. There was no yeshiva, though there had been great yeshivot here in the past. These communities suffered various attempts to convert the Jews by force. A group of those who were forced to accept Islam, but in their hearts remained Jews, grew up in Persia not unlike the Marannes of Europe.

About a hundred years ago, as the colonial powers began to interest themselves in Persia, Persian Jewry was rediscovered. Then the Alliance Israelite Universale and the Board of Deputies of British Jewry, together with other groups, sent out teachers, nurses and people trained in vocational guidance. When Reza Khan came to the throne and began, in the name of modernity, to attack the privileges and customs of the mullahs, the two percent of the population who were non-Muslim quickly saw the identity of their interests with those of the Pahlevis. Reza's policies gave them some hope of improving their situation. The Alliance brought a number of young bright Jews to France for training; the Bahai who are a large community in Persia sent some of their young to Oxford and Cambridge; and these young men, trained in modern ways, were among the first Reza Khan recruited to his country's service. Since his day the future of the Jewish community of Persia and of the other minority communities have been intertwined with the future of the Pahlevis. Whatever be the excesses of the Pahlevis, and they were/are many, the fact that they were willing to allow all Persians, not just Shiite Muslims, to be useful to the State attracted the

minorities and allowed them to work out with the Shah.

One of the thrusts which explains the drive of the Shiite majority today is a desire to recover the majorities' dominance of power. If the Shah is pushed out the minorities who have been close to the throne will be shunted aside and the recently trained young men of Shiite faith will find, or so they hope, that the oil monies and better jobs become theirs.

Khomeini has argued that Iran must become an Islamic democracy. He means that Iranian life must again reflect the traditional rules and values of Islam. The mullahs must again control the school curriculum. Muslim law must be the rule in the courts. Traditions believed basic to Islam must be reenforced. Parental authority within the family must be strengthened. Women must know their appropriate place. The old values are to be supported. I suspect that he knows that he cannot completely roll back the clock; but, clearly, his is a protest against all that modernism represents, incidentally, one of many appearing in our world. Khomeini is against the Shah and for the Koran. He is against tolerance of non-belief and for Shiite dominance. His is a demand that all that he calls Western influence be eliminated from Iran.

What does he mean by Western influences? Western influences include central planning, an emphasis on technology above tradition, the weakening of the family, an exaggerated demand for individual freedom, scanty dress, lack of courtesy, lack of consideration to elders, lack of generosity for the traditional charities of the Shiite community, the questioning of Muslim teaching and lack of respect for the religious leadership.

It is doubtful that Khomeini will be entrusted with political power if the Shah is overthrown or that his demands that Iran become an Islamic state will be fully

realized. For most of this century whenever one powerful group in Persia has wanted to remove another group they have used religion to uncork popular passion. Once demonstrations have secured their end, they recork that bottle. Clearly, Iran must westernize, accept technology, must find ways to adjust its oil wealth for the people's long range benefit and deal with folk of differing persuasions. The world the mullahs long for is as unrecoverable as the stabilities of feudal Europe.

What we are seeing in Iran is the second act of a drama that began in the early 1950's. You may remember Dr. Mossadegh, a Shiite Muslim, who then became the leader of the Iranian Majlis or Parliament. Just after World War II the present Shah reigned but did not rule. Reza Khan had been impressed by German efficiency and was impressed with German efficiency so much that exiled by the British in 1941 they could guarantee the movement of supplies across Persia from the Gulf to Russia. Mossadegh had two purposes: to nationalize the oil companies; and to reassert the Iranian quality of the nation's life, by which he meant the removal of the last vestiges of colonialism. Mossadegh tried to achieve his ends by combining the various "progressive" forces of Iran into a National Front. He gathered under his banner everyone from the Tudeh Party, the Communists to groups of neo-Nazis which shared the Socialist attitude of Egypt's Nasser and non-organized groups of university people who sought various changes in the social and political structure of the country. The popular energy of Mossadegh's National Front was provided by the religious group, the Fedayim-al-Islam, the devotees of Islam, led by Khomeini of the day. Religion brought the demonstrators into the streets and fueled a general strike which, for a while, neutralized the army. But it was an odd-couple marriage. The fanatics of Islam were conservative. The Tudeh Party, the Communist and many of the liberals were anti-clerical. Mossadegh could not keep all these groups

bound into a National Front. There were internal quarrels until Mossadegh had little alternative but to make a bold personal bid for power. The Shah was forced to flee Iran, but the army quickly turned against Mossadegh and in the end he had to flee over the back fence until he was caught and disposed of.

The Shah began to rule; but the forces of Mossadegh, the many National Front interests, are still there. Most of the political prisoners whom the Shah had released with great fanfare about three weeks ago were men who had served with Mossadegh twenty-five years ago. The policies which motivated Mossadegh motivate them: Iran for the Iranians, anti-colonialism, social reform and Shiite dominance. They have announced that they will create a government for Iran in which no one who has served during the past twenty-five years when the Shah ruled will be given office.

Since 1958 a generation of young Iranians have gone to the university and learned something about the modern world. They want their share of the action. They want to be close to the centers of power. They want to remove the two percent minority and control all of the pie. For the moment nationalism, social reform and self-interest are joined into a religious cloak. Women college students have, for the moment, adopted the old-fashioned dress; but their interests as women and the mullah's attitude towards women are not congruent.

Behind the religious front lies an unfinished social revolution. Iran has received great wealth because of its oil. That wealth has been used by the Shah to build a great military complex and to begin a modern industrial complex. Many Iranians think as little of their military-industrial complex as many Americans do of ours. They are afraid of it and of the power that it gives to a few. They believe that too much money is going into ambitious industrial projects which Iran may or may not have use for and that not enough money is being put into social welfare, education,

public health and raising up the masses.

There is a large group of students who have been educated abroad or at the University of Teheran and who now feel impotent. The Shah has ruled the past twenty years quite high-handedly. Iran has been, what is called euphemistically, a controlled democracy. The Shah decrees there will be two political parties and that one political party will believe this and the other political party will believe that and that members of Parliament may debate whatever the Shah allows them to debate. Those who overstep the bounds are taken in by the secret police. There has been arbitrary imprisonment, exile, and even torture. A whole generation has grown up who are educated and impotent; who sense the power of oil but have no share of that power. The whole Muslim world rejoices in a new sense of power and many in Iran seem to want to bring Iran closer to the Baathist, Naaserite, progressive political attitudes which their brothers in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Egypt have been espousing these last twenty-five years.

What will happen no one knows. I suspect we will see a prolonged period of destabilization while the various factions struggle for power. Then I suspect one group or one person will emerge with real power and the reshaped Iran will be much less than a democracy. Iran has a long tradition of absolutism.

Clearly, two other things will happen regardless of who wins. The West will have less influence on Iranian policy than before. Iran is on its Nationalist muscle. There is now no guarantee that the oil will flow or that if it flows it will flow at prices we can afford. It is clear that when countries such as Israel, which are in bad repute in the Arab world, want to buy oil the Iranians will say no. The Socialist youth of Iran want to share Pan-Arab power. They want to feel fraternity with their brothers and sisters with whom they have been in schools throughout the

world, with whom they share many ideals and, to a very large degree, a common fate. For the West the future will see a diminution of influence in Iran. I think this will be true also for the Soviets. This revolution is an assertion of nationalism and Russia always has been perceived in Iran as a colonial power. Finally, this revolution is an assertion of Islamic passion. The Jews of Iran will suffer as will members of all minorities. If they are allowed many will go to Israel. Whether Iran will be the better off or the worse off for the changes only the future will tell.

I am not a prophet, but I suggest that everywhere in our world a voice, a religious voice, is rising to challenge many of the values of the twentieth century. You hear it in America when people say: "We did not have much when we were children but we had it better." I never locked my door. I did not feel as lonely, as cut off from others as I do now. Then I did not feel rootless. People are looking for roots. They are hard to find here, so give me the old-time religion and the old-time social order.

Turning back the clock may give you an extra hour of sleep; but, at some point, you have to face the morning and the longer you have slept the harder the getting up and going to work. Hard times are ahead for Iran.

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
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