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What's Left of Anti-Semitism?, 1981.



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The Temple Bulletin

FROM THE RABBI'S DESK: WHAT'S LEFT OF ANTI-SEMITISM?

Many have asked for copies of the talk by Rabbi Daniel Silver which concluded the American Jewish Committee-Temple Symposium on "What is Right? What is Left?" We are pleased to include it in this Bulletin.

Let me begin with a confession. I am not an anti-semitologist, a word I recently coined to describe a professional in the area of anti-semitism. The other day I looked at the index of the more than seven hundred and fifty lectures that I have given from the Temple pulpit these last twenty-five years and realized that at no time had I discussed anti-semitism as a detached and separate phenomenon. Anti-semitism is involved in many of the issues that affect Jewish life and I'd discussed these; but I'd never approached anti-semitism as a distinct phenomenon. When I ask myself why, I answer that I've always looked on anti-semitism as a Christian, not a Jewish, problem. My task as a rabbi is to worry about the soul of Jews. I leave anti-semitism to my ministerial colleagues whose task is the soul of non-Jews. Anti-semitism is lodged in their souls, not ours. We have other prejudices, and I have other agendas.

You will not be surprised then if I propose to deal here not with anti-semitism as a discrete phenomenon (there would be little benefit in such an approach for this audience) but with a more immediate and personal question: why many in the American Jewish community seem to have lost their cool about anti-semitism. Why have Jewish Community Centers, synagogues and Federations organized hand-wringing panels about anti-semitism, what I call *oy gevalt* meetings? Swastika dubbings, cross burnings and nasty graffiti are no novelty. They've been around for centuries. Why all the tension just now? Is there a real threat? What does our reaction suggest about our state of mind and emotional set?

I take it as a given that we live in the real world. Utopia is not here or around the corner. Last year's presidential election suggests strongly that most Americans have recognized that our national power and prosperity is not unlimited. It has finally dawned on us that God has not guaranteed to us that our children will live more amply than we have. With the acceptance of a society of limits has come the recognition that many of our more

romantic hopes will not be realized. In the real world economics is a dismal science and prejudice is not readily eradicated. Anti-semitism will be a reality in 2181 and 2381 just as it is today. There is, I believe, a herd instinct built into the emotional makeup of the animal species. Spiritually we are created in the image of God, physically we are of the earth. All animals perceive the stranger as a potential danger. I can conceive of no situation in which human beings would not organize themselves into reference groups (by nation, language group, tribe, religion or family), and as long as there are families and communities, loyalties, there will be insiders and outsiders and anti-Jewish, anti-Catholic, anti-Vietnamese, anti-Ibo, anti-you-name-it prejudice. Prejudice, I am afraid, will last until God creates, as Jeremiah once prophesied, a new breed of human dowered with a new heart and a new spirit, and since I really do not expect that to happen I expect anti-semitism will be around for a

long time and will be exacerbated by society's frustration.

There is anti-semitism. At times one can and should discuss what particular tactic might be most useful as a response to a particular anti-semitic incident. I would not necessarily dissuade a group of young people who were determined to oppose a march through their neighborhood by the wandering band of American Nazis. I'd warn them that they could get hurt, but every human has the right to defend his dignity and his turf. At the same time, I am not convinced that the Jewish Defense League's program to organize camps where young Jews can learn to use firearms as elements of a para-military unit is a useful response to the problems we face. I am not convinced that the United States in 1981 is where Germany was in 1931 or even 1921. I wouldn't rule self-defense

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*A Reception
To mark the official release
by the State of Israel
of a postage stamp to honor the contributions of
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
on Sunday, March 29, 1981
at The Temple Branch
between five and seven o'clock*

*Presentation will be made by
Consul Asher Naim
on behalf of the State of Israel*

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out as a tactic if America were to change radically from what I perceive it to be. I am not a willing victim; but I simply don't believe that America is on the brink of housing another holocaust. "Never again" is a powerful slogan, but not necessarily an appropriate one. At this time, indeed, I find it in almost every way counter-productive.

Why then have many reacted to a few anti-semitic incidents with such tension and emotion that the JDL approach begins to seem somewhat creditable? I have come to the regrettable conclusion that some of us are paranoid. A young lawyer in the Temple came to me the other day and reported that a non-Jewish colleague had told him that his next door neighbors, Jews, had come to him and said: 'we can't be friends any longer because we can only trust our own.' That's paranoia.

I am also convinced that many of us have adopted a convenient double standard. Meir Kahane was in town this week. Kahane was convicted by Israeli courts for his leadership of a conspiracy designed to frighten, if not to kill, the Arab leaders of Hebron. He served time in Israel for that crime and for advocating anti-Arab violence. Yet, synagogues opened their halls to him. Several rabbis greeted him and was described in *The Cleveland Jewish News* simply as Rabbi Meir Kahane, "a controversial figure." Had a member of the Ku Klux Klan spoken at a local church I doubt those who welcomed Kahane would have been satisfied by the minister's explanation that the speaker was a God-fearing Christian and that freedom of speech required that he open his hall to the Klan. They would have written angry letters to any paper that described a Klan leader simply as "a controversial figure." Meir Kahane is a terrorist and, unfortunately, many Jews are not in the habit of calling a spade a spade when it applies to our own. We become exercised and demand government action when the Ku Klux Klan organizes camps in the south where young Christians can learn to bear arms to make sure that blacks, Vietnamese and Jews do not take over their turf. Can we overlook the fact that Meir Kahane is involved in the same kind of recruitment? When Kahane made this appeal to the young people of our Jewish community, and he did so at Hillel, apparently one of the staff encouraged enrollment in Kahane's camps.

I am also convinced that many of us have gotten into the habit of jumping to conclusions. We often see vandalism as an anti-semitic incident and part of a deep-seated conspiracy. If I were to say to you tonight that two Cleveland synagogues were torched this past week and that the Congregational Plenum or our Jewish Community Federation had been approached by the arsonists and told that a third synagogue would be burned unless a large amount of money were paid, many would decry an anti-semitic conspiracy. I have described precisely what has happened in the Roman Catholic community over the past three days. The diocese did not quickly relate these acts to re nascent anti-Catholicism. Indeed, they recognized that they might be dealing with a Roman Catholic extortionist. If synagogues had been burned the arsonist might well have been a member of our community, yet, until this was discovered, many would be sure, given the mood that we're in, that we were under attack.

Two years ago the silver implements with which we dress the *Torot* in the Ark of the Main Temple were stolen. When the staff person who discovered their loss called to report the theft to me, he related it to other anti-semitic incidents. It was not. I am a member of a group of the senior ministers of the town who meet together and I knew that ritual silver was disappearing from churches all over town. As a matter of fact, many churches were also losing their stained glass windows. What we faced was simple theft, ugly, but not resurgent anti-semitism.

We live in a violent world. We live in a violent city. We're part of a violent society and many Jews fail to place the various incidents in the context of the kind of society we live in. We are conditioned to see ourselves as victims, but the question is whether there is a large scale, broadly based political or social conspiracy against Jews abroad in the land or whether what we are seeing is conventional society pathology and more of the all too familiar American savagery.

These have not been good years for America. We've had to accept defeat, frustration in Vietnam. We've had to accept limitations on our prosperity. Frustration breeds violence; but violence, however dangerous, is one thing and an organized, widespread conspiracy against Jewish survival in these United States is quite another. Yes, there has been an increase in anti-semitic incidents. There has been an increase in racist incidents of all kinds; but have we been selected as a special target? As yet, I think not. Is Auschwitz the standard by which we ought to be developing our social and political response? I think not.

You know me well enough to know that I don't believe in playing the ostrich, but I also don't believe in crying wolf. I'm convinced that many of us are on a rather childish emotional binge which is clouding our judgment and causing us to take a number of unwarranted and irrational actions.

Why am I concerned? In the first place, fear-born judgments tend to be both injudicious and self-defeating. In the second place, fear exudes a special aroma which the predator can sense and which whets his appetite. When Jews run to the newspaper and the media to denounce anti-semitism after a single incident of some kind with all of the hyperbole of which we are capable, when we see every incident as part of a Nazi-like conspiracy which threatens the Jewish people with genocide rather than for what it may be - in some cases professional thievery or juvenile delinquency or an erratic paranoid act - then we suggest to the paranoids in our society, to all those little people who know that the only way they'll ever be noticed is if they commit a crime which will make the headlines, that here's a way to make somebody cry out. Here's their headline.

It's time for a passionate people to practice some self-control. The evidence against a broad-gauged conspiracy theory is considerable. In 1973 the Arabs proclaimed an oil embargo and the oil costs began to escalate. OPEC claimed that all this was due to American support of Israel. Jews feared that a rash of bumper stickers would appear blaming us for the oil embargo. They did not appear and have not appeared. Over the last years this country has spent over a billion dollars a year in direct support of Israel, a billion dollars which might have been allocated to domestic uses. If the large pressure groups fighting for their funds

had been motivated by anti-semitism, they could have tailored a campaign to gain their funds. They did not. Just a few years ago the United States put its trade agreements with the Soviet Union in jeopardy in order to secure the release of Jewish prisoners of conscience. Commercial interests in the United States were deeply involved and unhappy that this embargo would lose them contracts and profits. Again, they could have orchestrated an anti-semitic campaign. They did not. For Jews this is not the best of worlds and this is not the worst of worlds, but it is certainly not the end of the world.

Let me try then to put recent events in what seems to me an appropriate context. Our reactions are related to the prevailing national mood of fear. When I came back to Cleveland twenty-five years ago few of the people I knew bothered to lock their homes. Today most homes have intricate and expensive electrical sensor devices. When I go to make a call in an apartment building I enter a cubicle, the kind I am ushered into when I visit somebody in prison. A voice identification is required. I'm screened by closed circuit television. Then I must decipher, as if I were a CIA agent, the number code which will tell me how to dial the telephone, and then, perhaps, somebody tells me the number of the apartment where I'm going. Many people I know are afraid to use the city.

Add frustration to fear. We were frustrated by the inability of our troops to gain their objectives in Vietnam, and that frustration continues over the inability of the government to gain its objectives in Afghanistan or El Salvador. We're frustrated that Washington isn't able to handle the nation's economic problems. We're frustrated by inflation which threatens the security which underpins our families and the institutions on which we depend.

Liberalism is dead not because Americans have suddenly become less socially conscious but because we were never as humane or altruistic as we considered ourselves. We looked on ourselves as a new and better breed of citizens when, to a large measure, our decency was simply a reflex of growing prosperity which created a situation where we could allow the poor and the blacks, and even our women, to share in greater measure in the American dream. No one had to give up anything.

The era of good will is over. The period of no cost social justice is over. We face a long, bitter political fight over who's going to give up the least. The issue is no longer can we allow the cuts to enjoy what they think is right or even what we agree is their right; but how can we hold on to what we now have which we know to be right because we have it. If it weren't that issues of justice and principle were involved, I'd suggest that the image of American political life today is of a group of dogs squabbling over scraps; and I'd remind you that when dogs scrap over scraps there's a lot of howling and a few animals get hurt.

There's going to be a lot of howling over the next years and, inevitably, a lot of anger and bitterness. Many genteel reserves will break down. People are beginning to say openly what they've always felt, and some of that bile we won't want to hear. But before we get too self-righteous let's remember that the same pressures operate on us and the same breakdown on reserves takes place here. If you've listened to your friends, as I have, you'll perhaps agree with my observation that there's been more

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open anti-black talk than a few years ago.

When dogs fight over scraps, when there's competition, there are winners and losers and, to quote the sportscaster, "the flush of victory and the anguish of defeat." Competition is supposedly a great American virtue. It keeps us lean and well-muscled. We are forced to stay in condition, but under pressure we do not always play by the rules. The old truism has a certain truth to it, that anything's fair in love and war. When competition heats up the rules of fairness begin to dissolve. Prejudice is an unfair but effective way of excluding competition.

In its medieval form anti-semitism was a religious phenomenon based on religious narrowness and a totally unfair image of Jews and Judaism presented in the New Testament. As a social mechanism anti-semitism had a flaw. It could be avoided and rather simply. Jews had only to allow themselves to be sprinkled with holy water and anti-semitism could no longer exclude them. Theodore Herzl, before he came to Zionism, at one time imagined that he would go and see the Pope and promise this worthy that on a certain day all the Jews would go to a cathedral where the young would be converted en masse. There would be only one requirement. The Pope must give his assurance that the church would no longer be responsible for any anti-semitic activity. Herzl didn't take this dream sequence seriously, but it helped him understand that if Jews were baptized they would undermine the virtue of anti-semitism and that, therefore, assimilation would not solve "the Jewish problem."

Prejudice is an eminently useful survival mechanism. Why is the Klan burning crosses in fishing villages in Louisiana? Because refugee Vietnamese fishermen have settled there and quickly proven that they are better fishermen than the red-necks who, until now, have monopolized shrimping in Louisiana waters. One of the virtues of anti-anythingism is that it precludes competition. If Jews can't be admitted to the university then Jews can't enter the professions which require licenses and non-Jewish lawyers, dentists and doctors have the field to themselves. But when Jews don't play fair, go to the baptismal font and get into the university, then a Jew has to be a Jew even when he is a Christian, and those eager to restrain trade develop a theory of race that makes it clear that a Jew is a Jew whatever he is.

We're going to be competing all over the place in the next decades, and as the pressures of competition mount a lot of people aren't going to play fair. When people don't play fair, well, a black remains a black even if he's a Harvard graduate, and many will be working hard to impose a quota system skewed in their favor. Because of this a warning must be sounded to Jews, blacks and others who tend to be on the wrong side of quota systems: think twice before espousing a quota system which seems to offer some short-range, immediate gain. Once you open the door to quotas it becomes awfully difficult to close it when the majorities decide it's time to jigger the quotas in their favor.

My conclusion: given the world we live in then, the real world, we must accept the sad truth that the ease and openness which has characterized

social relationships during the prosperous years will not necessarily continue to exist.

I can almost hear you say: what about all these human relations classes in schools. The problem of anti-anythingism will not be resolved by our schools. Well-designed education can help, but no one has ever shown that learning about another tradition overcomes the prejudices of one's culture or conditioning. Some of the worst anti-semites of the nineteenth century were university professors, some of whom were experts in Judaism. Knowledge makes a professor, not a saint.

Until we resolve our many serious political, social and economic problems we will make little headway on prejudice-related problems; and since I do not believe that we're going to resolve the national problems in a way which will satisfy most Americans, that is by guaranteeing most of us that we will be able to enjoy more and more of the so-called good life, I remain convinced that our first priority must be to initiate a reorientation of national values and a restructuring of the national spirit, a spiritual revolution if you will, which would raise human over material values and social goals over personal advantage. I have no doubts that such transformation will take a long time and a lot of doing - and may be beyond our reach.

At this point in most analyses it is customary to offer a broad social justice solution to the problem of anti-semitism on the assumption that if we solve our social and economic problems, anti-semitism will wither away. I wish it were so. One problem, of course, is that most political and economic problems are not resolvable, at least not in a way which will satisfy the expectations of many people. It is for this reason that I believe that there needs to be a dramatic change in our whole value orientation and that's not going to come overnight or easily.

How can I illustrate my analysis? A number of months ago a member of the Klan won the Republican nomination for Congress in the Dearborn, Michigan area. Many Jews have cited this vote as proof of resurgent anti-semitism of the European type. Here was proof that blue-collar America was willing to get involved in anti-Jewish programs. I don't doubt that the people who voted for this scum were anti-semitic any more than I doubt that many whom we don't recognize as anti-semitic are; but again, events require context. Did you see yesterday's reports about the auto workers in Dearborn who have begun a broad-gauged tax rebellion? I think we can safely assume that these workers are the same people who voted for this hate monger for the Congress. Was their vote in the first instance anti-Jewish or simply a broad gauged frustration? Was prejudice the issue or the loss of high-paying jobs, uncertainty about their future and their inability to adjust to an increasingly complex society?

A great deal has been made from any number of platforms about the President of the Southern Baptist Association who delivered himself of a speech at his denomination's national convention in which he said, among other things, that God does not hear the prayers of Jews. Parenthetically, I must say I almost agree with him. How can God hear prayers that are never said? The serious question we must ask is why reports of the speech were delayed nearly two months. His remarks had been known to Jewish sources during that whole period but were released by one of our

national defense agencies only when they became engaged in their annual membership campaign.

Question: why would a Jewish organization publicize such drivel? Answer: it served their purposes. What purpose? To establish the importance of continuing membership. Jews have a symbiotic relationship towards anti-semitism. Some Jewish institutions and activities require anti-semitism to survive. Many annual drives depend on it. For some Jews there is no other reason for being Jewish than the fact that they, the enemy, don't want us to be Jewish. Their Jewish identity lacks all positive content. This sobering thought leads me to the conclusion that rather than beat our breasts about anti-semitism the first priority of the American Jewish community should be to bend its energies towards a reorientation of priorities and structures so that there is some positive content to Jewish identity.

In this connection let me talk for a moment or two about the Holocaust. The Holocaust is another issue I rarely talk about. I am disturbed whenever a speaker, after a good meal, stands before an audience and begins to pull at the heartstrings about Dachau and Auschwitz. I myself am reduced to silence by it. Unfortunately, one of the realities of contemporary American Jewish life is that the Holocaust has become for many Jews the sum and substance of their faith. Ninety-three courses on the Holocaust were offered in American and Canadian universities last year. One-half of these courses were scheduled in universities which had no other offering in Jewish Studies. There are now three magazines in the United States devoted to the Holocaust. I sit as Chairman of the Academic Advisory Council of a national Jewish foundation which gives fellowships for graduate Jewish Studies. This year half of the grant proposals which I reviewed involved a projected doctoral dissertation in some area of Holocaust research.

There's a man named Irving Greenberg, a rather nice man, a traditional rabbi who has made something of a name for himself with Federations around the country and has now created an institution called the Holocaust Resource Center. I for one am disturbed at the thought of the Holocaust as an educational tool. Greenberg has suggested that we ought to have a ceremony where we eat the potato peelings of Bergen Belsen and the apple cores from Dachau. Such ideas derived from the bread of affliction which we eat on the Passover; but I remind you that the bread of affliction is a symbolic element of a ceremony which commemorates not slavery but freedom and is centered on redemption, a promise of the future rather than fixated on death.

The Bible commands us to "choose life", not to dwell on death. What is the positive content of the Holocaust? What does the Holocaust say about social concerns? What does it say of human development? What does it say about our civic and human duties? I am afraid that one reason for our communities' interest in the Holocaust is that it gives the Jew a sense of his specialness. He is chosen because other Jews were chosen. We will hold a special torch aloft. Well and good, but light is to see by, not simply to hold up. There are six hundred and thirteen commandments in the Torah and the rule, "remember Amalek", never forget man's capacity for evil, is only one of these; the six hundred and twelve others deal with social

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concerns, justice, respect for parents, the avoidance of all idolatries, caring for our neighbor as we care for ourself.

This Holocaust fixation in some ways explains why many lost their cool, and so does the last election. The country has moved right and many Jews, for quite understandable reasons, are afraid of any move towards the right. Most Jewish families came to the United States because the governments of the privileged in Europe persecuted Jews. Our enemies were the established privileged classes, the established state churches, and all who were determined to maintain long established privileges. Once here American Jewry discovered that the domestic left consisted largely of ethnic and immigrant groups like ourselves struggling to escape the ghetto, and so was responsive to our needs.

Without in any way minimizing the long, sorry record of anti-semitism created and dispersed by the right; let us recognize that the left is not innocent. It's not a question of one being good and one being bad. They're both what they are.

In 1881 five young Russian revolutionaries, children of the privileged class, led by a twenty-eight year old girl who was the daughter of the former commanding general of the military garrison in St. Petersburg, assassinated Czar Alexander II. Russia immediately reacted by blaming the Jews. Russia was a country which had only one outgroup, and that outgroup were the five million Jews who lived in the undesirable western parts of the country. Jews were held responsible for the anarchism and socialism which these Russian-Orthodox young people turned terrorist espoused. The pogroms began and the great exodus of the Jewish community from Russia followed. I cite these events not to remind you of the obvious, that the pogroms were begun by and supported by the right, but to recall for you that the young leftists in the Soviet Union, the group who had assassinated the Czar, applauded the pogroms. Here, they said, was evidence that peasants were beginning to become politically conscious. If they beat the heads of a few Jews, so be it. It was in a good cause and they were only Jews.

Among the scriptures of the left is Karl Marx's scurrilous pamphlet, *The World Without Jews*. Post-war Communist Poland has known several bloody pogroms and vicious anti-semitic purges organized by and stimulated by its government. Need I remind you of Soviet anti-semitism. The Socialist Workers Party and the National Labor Party, the extreme left wing groups in the United States, have been circulating virulent anti-semitic and anti-Israel literature. We have all seen pictures of the signs that are held aloft outside the Federal Courthouse where Demjanjuk is being tried as a Nazi camp guard: "The Holocaust is a Hoax", "Six Million Lies", and most of us have assumed that these were the scrawls of the local Ukrainians doing their worst. These particular signs were not devised by Ukrainians but by Trotskyite National Socialist Workers Party members who joined the demonstration for their own purposes. Europe's radical left have provided many of the terrorists who have attacked Israelis from Munich to Entebbe. It is the left in America which has the most 'trouble' understanding Israel's right to survive.

Anti-semitism is not limited to the left or to the

right. It exists. It was not the right-wing which devised the phony refugee solutions of the late nineteen-thirties, it was the Roosevelt government. It was not the left which imposed the immigration restrictions of the nineteen-twenties, it was the Coolidge government. As long as we live in the real world much will happen we don't like. The question is how dangerous is the hour and what should we do about our situation.

My own analysis is that it is a serious mistake to see America 1981 in the light of Germany 1921 or 1931. Generals are always prepared to fight the last war and Jews are always prepared to fight the last Nazis.

The obvious must be said: constitutional democracy is well established here. There are statutory limits to what a legislature can do. There are legal limits to what a police force can do. Why is this important? Because, fanned by flames of frustration or fear, the popular mood can swing rapidly in one direction or another. In America the mood can't always carry all before it. This leads me to suggest that Jews should be very careful before they sponsor any constitutional amendment because once the nation gets in the habit of amending its basic law almost any amendment can go through. We ought particularly to be leery of any constitutional convention where the agenda is opened-ended and ought never underestimate the Constitution as a safe-guard of our rights.

We should also not forget that our society is infinitely complex. I've never quite understood the term, cultural pluralism, but, at the very least, it suggests that the antis have a problem. Whom should they blame? There were Huguenots in Catholic France and Puritans in Anglican England, but across Christian Europe everyone was a member of the mystic body of Christ except for gypsies and Jews. We were the omnipresent outsider, hence the favorite scapegoat and target. There was no other.

Here there are many outsiders. Today the Klan has a real problem. Whom to target? They have had to exclude Catholics from their hit list because it was just too complicated to include them any longer. But even so, their attacks remain scattergun. In the southwest Klan burnings are now directed against Mexican Americans. They have blacks, Jews, Vietnamese and the Cambodians and many others to attack. Hate groups have a problem agreeing on the target which will pull the most converts. There are too many targets for a scapegoat consensus to develop readily. American society is different to this extent: no one really knows any longer who the majority is. I have some WASP friends who claim they are a minority, and I think in many ways they are. In France you know when you're talking about a Frenchman you know whom you're talking about. He speaks French. He likes wine. He's Catholic. When you talk about an Englishman you know you're not talking about a Welshman or Scotsman but an Anglican member of the establishment. What image comes to mind when you talk about the quintessential American? There is no one image, and so those who are prejudiced, and everybody is prejudiced to a certain degree, have a terrible problem, thank God. In the excess of targets lies some of our safety.

I have suggested that we should loosen up a bit about anti-semitism and concentrate more on the positive aspects of being Jewish. When being

Jewish is compelling and satisfying, an anti-semitic incident is not likely to be a shattering experience. Let's shape our lives and our communities so they stand for something. Ask yourself if you were a Jew brought here from the Soviet Union what would you feel about this community? I think you would be extremely grateful to be here and warmed by the hospitality of this city. You wouldn't be put off by the Cleveland winter because in Moscow it's worse, and you would be thankful for a job provided by a Jewish businessman, for the English lessons provided by the community and for the activities to which your children were welcomed by this city's Jewish children. Yet, you'll be left with a real problem; what does being Jewish mean to all these Jews? How is this Jewish community Jewish? What does it stand for? Scholarship? Learning? Piety? Social consciousness? The other day I picked up the *Cleveland Magazine* and read a story about the Cleveland Jewish community written by a nice man, a born-again Christian. What did our community represent to him? Some able rich men and some socially concerned women who were get-up-and-go types to whom it was a matter of great moment that a rabbi said a *matzi* in a once restricted social club. Remember Judaism's symbiotic relations with anti-semitism. What do we stand for? Survival? Survival for what? If somebody's going to hate me I want them to hate me because I stand for something. I want them to hate me because I believe in justice and democracy and that they were not entitled to special privileges.

I suggest that many lost their cool in 1980 because as a community we're not so sure what we are anymore. We've been worrying about what they think, what they like not who we are as Jews and what being Jewish means to us. The confused and the empty are the easily panicked.

These incidents suggest that the real world is not as nice as we'd like it to be. I've always known that. One of the truths about the real world is that much of it is anti-semitic and anti-a-lot of things, and that if we're going to live in that world we should do so with becoming paid and as a meaningful presence. Our reactions to evidence of the real world suggests that we've got a lot of soul-searching to do and a lot of seeking to do. We've got to establish the positive content of our Jewish commitment. When we do, a nasty word, a closed door or graffiti on the wall of our synagogues will not shake us. As Jews we have prided ourselves that our tradition is not a pie-in-the-sky tradition but a realistic tradition for real people who live in the real world. I espouse a civic agenda and a spiritual agenda which is constructive, not defensive, long-sighted and not mesmerized by shadows which were and might be again; but are not now indicative of a major storm front.

Daniel Jeremiah Silver

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
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social class movement | social class movement social class movement

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International Insight



Winter 1981 InIn

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**Israel and American Public Opinion
Continuity and Change**

Lawrence S. Kaplan

Myth and Reality in the Middle East

James S. Lipscomb

Lebanon Today:

No Peace, No War

Milt Fullerton

The KURDS—An Eternal Puzzle

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The Afghan Question:

A Comparative Study

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Economic Insights:

**Egypt now second biggest market
for United States in Arab World**

Yemen Arab Republic

Book Review

Saul S. Friedman

Syria-USSR

Document



International Insight

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RUNNING FOR COVER

An unidentified youth runs for cover carrying his AK-47 rifle in Beirut's Chiyah District as right-wing Christian militia men and leftist Moslems and Falestinian guerrillas continued battling each other. (pg. 12) (AP—World Wide Photo)

The purpose of International Insight — InIn — is to encourage study and analysis of the social, political, economic, and historical issues underlying the conflict areas of the world with special focus on the Middle East. The views expressed in International Insight are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinion of International Insight. InIn is open to diverse viewpoints and encourages analysis, dialogue and debate on issues of public significance.

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Editor's Note

Iraq's war against Iran, whatever its short-term implications for the Persian Gulf region, seems to mark another historic turning point in the most crucial area of the world. The Middle East crisis was depicted as fundamentally the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is now clearer that chronic instability and fragility of Gulf politics and the threat of Russian expansionism place in jeopardy the West's oil supplies in the Gulf. So far, Iraq and Iran have been the only victims of their multi-billion dollar war. The Soviet Union, with serious problems regarding China, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Poland, considers it too risky at this moment to take advantage of the Iraq-Iranian war.

Two major facts govern events in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East generally.

First, the area is strategically vital to the world's power centers, now primarily because of its oil but still, as before, because of its geography, astride the crossroads between Europe, Asia and Africa, and bordering the nervous Soviet empire. The people who happen to live in the region are not responsible for everybody else's sensitivity. Like all of us, they prefer to put their own needs and aspirations first, but they cannot avoid being of intense concern to the rest of the world.

The second fact is that the societies in which these people live are too fragile, unstable, and riven with deep feuds and hatreds to provide a reliable base for the burden of their importance to others. However, they can no longer be pressed into subordinating their own interests to those of distant countries. The super power rivalry, the industrial world's dependence on oil, and the powerful modern armaments delivered to shaky regimes by East and West have put an end to the possibility of gunboat diplomacy and imperial rule.

The fighting between Iraq and Iran may die down rather than escalate. Yet there are sure to be many more political and military crises in the weeks and months ahead in the volatile and arms-choked Persian Gulf region and the Middle East generally. In the meantime, the West and particularly the United States should not just wait and see a Middle East trapped in its own conflicts and miseries and intervene only when these fights threaten our own security and

survival. There is still some time for us to prevent a major blowup in that region.

1. Recent events have brought home to us — and to the rest of the world — that a purposeful, strong, and involved America is essential to peace and progress. Our leadership of the free world is perhaps now more essential than before.

2. The Camp David agreement was a significant step in the process that must be continued toward a just and durable Arab-Israeli peace. The achievement owes much to the courage of leaders on both sides. President Sadat and his government moved Egypt on the path of moderation and development. Credit is due equally to the courage of Prime Minister Begin and the government of Israel in giving up strategically valuable territorial assets.

A peace agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors is needed more than ever now. The core problem of that is a solution to the Palestinian problem. A Palestinian settlement will not cure the problems of the Gulf, but it will make it easier for most Arab countries to co-operate with America in the Gulf.

3. Since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, experts on energy and the Middle East have been warning that a major disruption of the international oil supply is a near certainty sometime in the 1980's. The war between Iraq and Iran is yet another reminder of Western vulnerability. Together, they account for more than 10% of world oil exports. Whether or not Iraq and Iran pose any immediate threat to our oil supplies, we should seize upon this crisis and finally do something about energy security. If not, we may watch the price of oil double or triple again, and it is doubtful if the world economy can afford \$100 a barrel crude.

The choices are not easy ones. A coherent policy, taking account of the importance and the complexity of the region and not entrapped by an assumption that lasting stability can be found in the resolution of single issues, might yet be hoped for. Each of the many complex issues — the Arab-Israeli relationship, the build-up of Saudi Arabia, opposition to the Soviet Union — poses distinct problems. Hurried stop-gap measures may make headlines; they will be no substitute for policies which may, hopefully, generate positive opportunities.

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Israel and American Public Opinion Continuity and Change

BY LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN

Dr. Larry Kaplan is professor of history at Kent State University and Director of The Center for NATO Studies. His most recent book is A Community of Interests: NATO and The Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951.

There are two conflicting images which Americans often hold simultaneously about Israel. Neither is accurate.

One image is bifocal and is the favorite of American Jews and their friends. It contains within its frame both a hostile State Department and a friendly Congress. The former is seen to be populated primarily by Arabists and Anglophiles, influenced by oil magnates tied to Middle East investments, and by churchmen concerned about their Arab constituencies. They each pursue an anti-Israeli policy to further their separate purposes. Over every part of this policy lurks the spirit of anti-Semitism either as a commonly held emotion among policymakers or as a weapon to achieve their objectives with an unsuspecting public.

Against this multi-faceted hostility stand friendly congressmen outraged by the slaughter of Jews in Europe, or by the insensitivity of Britain in Palestine, or by the Arabist strategy of elitist State Department figures in Washington, and prepared to challenge the administration for its waffling over partition in 1948 or for veiled threats over Suez in 1956 or for its unfair tilting toward Egypt in 1975 or in 1978. For the most part the presidents have clucked sympathetically but ineffectually over Israeli problems in the manner of Roosevelt and Johnson or have been influenced excessively by their anti-Israeli advisers as in the case of Eisenhower and Carter.

In this view American policy toward Israel totters constantly at the brink of hostility to the Israelis, to be saved at the last minute by the friendship and support of the American people through their congressmen, Zionists and non-Zionists alike. Whenever Israel is in serious trouble significant numbers of legislators can be mustered to oppose an executive policy or to raise a congressional allotment, with a public opinion which according to polls invariably back Israel in a lopsided majority over the Arab enemies. Israel is here the Promised Land for fundamentalist Christians, the land to rescue the remnants of World War II for the casual liberal, the staunch democratic ally against Communism and autocracy for the cold warrior, and the country of pioneers in the American image who made a

garden out of the wasteland. Such is one view of Israel and the United States, and one that is a comfort to Jews who once in the 1930's and 1940's had worried about the charges of dual loyalties. In the first generation of Israel's existence it was not only possible but desirable to be both an American and a Zionist. The two coincided in the best American tradition.

There is another view very different from this which received enormous attention in 1946 and 1947, and once again has surfaced with considerable vigor. In this the stigma of dual loyalties is a major element. It postulates a United States locked into an Israeli or pro-Israeli foreign policy against the national interest because of the enormous power of the Jewish lobby in America. Any attempt by the executive to formulate a rational policy in the Middle East is doomed to failure once the Congress and the Jewish-influenced media discovers and denounces it. The difficulty, according to this thesis, is in part the distribution of Jewish population in America, located as it is in key states such as New York, Illinois, and California. Presidential elections, let alone congressional and senatorial elections hangs on the goodwill of a powerful, organized Zionist pressure group. Moreover, the financing of electoral campaigns particularly in the Democratic party, is the work of Jewish business leaders, all in thrall to the Zionists. This approach explains congressional response to any apparent deviation from a rigid pro-Israeli policy and the frustration of the State Department as it tries to deal with an Arab world or with the Soviet attempt to use its influence with the Arabs.

This interpretation of American foreign policy has long antecedents under the pejorative name of "hyphenated Americanism." The charge of dual loyalties implicit in this behavior punctuated domestic politics during World War I when it was applied against the American Irish anxious to prevent an alliance between the United States and Great Britain, the oppressor of Ireland, or against the German-American opposition to an American entry into the war against the Fatherland. Further, the Bolshevick hysteria of the post-World War I, the rise of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920's, and variety of native anti-Semitic organizations encouraged by the Nazis in the 1930's all hastened on the putative dangers of ethnic influence on foreign policy. Fears for their perceived patriotism and of anti-Semitism helped to still the Jewish voice during the Holocaust as much as did wartime imperatives which projected other priorities. Jewish leadership with respect to Zionism or a Jewish homeland was divided about the role it should project. Until the mid-

1930's and the spread of Nazism, important components of the Jewish community attempted to maintain the position that Judaism was only a religion, a stance that the American Council for Judaism continued into the 1940's. Not until the end of World War II did American Jewry fuse into a united pressure group that called upon a strong American support for a Jewish state.

How then to separate fact from fiction, reality from myth? A first step would be to look closely at the legitimacy of Zionist loyalties on the part of American Jews. Is dual allegiance the problem that opponents of Israel and fearful Jews themselves raise from time to time. The answer would have to be negative. Zionism in the American context of the Brandeis tradition is not a prelude to immigration, to *aliyah*, but to the identification of American Jewry with its spiritual source. It is the ultimate measure of Jewish philanthropy: the maintenance and the succor of homeless Jews in their own state. For Americans there is a linkage of American interests with Israel's, whether as a bastion against Russian influence or as an inspiration to the world. The mobilization of sentiment in support of the Jewish state created a pressure group on foreign policy. There is nothing new or opprobrious about this phenomenon. American foreign policy was traditionally influenced by interest groups acting upon a relatively passive executive that in the past had paid little attention to foreign affairs. Business organizations engaged in cultivation of commerce abroad, missionaries concerned with the well-being of their overseas churches, as well as ethnic and religious communities have expressed themselves vigorously throughout American history as they identified their special interests with the national interest.

The prototype of Zionism was the Irish movement for a free Ireland which deepened the Anglophobic cast of American policy throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. Illustrative of the power of this particular pressure group was the reservation in the 1920 Treaty of Versailles which would have permitted the United States in 1920 to join the League of Nations only if Great Britain freed Ireland. And in a more current context one has simply to look at the remarkably successful Greek lobby in operation in 1974 when the Congress tied the presidential hands with respect to aid to Turkey until the Turks should retreat from their occupation of Cyprus. What connects all pressure groups is their conviction that the special interests they promote—for example, oil concessions in Saudi Arabia, the liberation of Ireland from British control, the protection of missionary operations in China—and the survival of Israel—are all to the advantage of America. There is never a conflict; what is good for the interest group is good for America without necessarily accepting the vice-versa. The Jewish identification with Israel lies squarely within this tradition.

The trouble for friends of Israel and to a far lesser extent for all advocates of a special foreign policy for the United States stems from the changed circumstances of the United States in the middle and late twentieth century. In the days of isolationism foreign policy was a minor element on the American scene, secondary to domestic concerns. Then foreign affairs was essentially a *tabula rasa* upon which an interested party

could impress its own stamp, at least as long as it did not disturb the body politic. When the United States assumed the mantle of world leadership everything changed. The Cold War, much as in a hot war, with the Soviet Union seemed to require a mobilization of all Americans behind a national policy.

In this context special lobbies become an irritant to the new body of policymakers who arose after World War II, and possibly a threat to the national interest. In ascending order of significance the friends of the Irish Revolutionary Army disturb Washington leaders for the damage the IRA might do to our British ally. Since the damage at this point is slight, the State Department's concern is correspondingly so. The Greek lobby's effectiveness in hobbling executive initiative with respect to our NATO ally Turkey is more grievous, but is containable. Of all the foreign interest groups the Zionist lobby has the reputation of being the most troublesome. Its activities affect not only our relations with the Soviet but our friendship with the powerful Arab world. There long has been a modd among leading diplomatists and their journalist allies, such as George Kennan and Walter Lippmann, that foreign affairs is too important and too sensitive for democratic politics for Congress to be allowed the scope they had in the past. One certainly senses in the impatience of Brzezinski today and Kissinger a few years ago the distress with their inability to solve vital problems with the Soviet Union, or with Cuba, or with the Arab world, which would be soluble if only such influences as the Jewish lobby could be curbed.

It is a questionable premise that closet diplomacy conducted by privileged elites yields a better foreign policy than the traditional American system of shared Congressional executive authority, which is responsive to popular will. There is no doubt that over the years the State of Israel has captured over the years the imagination, and that Congress has responded to American identification with Israel. The beginnings may have grown out of a sense of guilt over the Holocaust and American inability to rescue European Jews; but the spectacle of a handful of people with democratic ideals and practices battling against odds to make their society live became in the past generation an extension of the American dream. Public opinion polls have held steadily in favor of Israel for thirty years. Whenever a crisis arose, as over the Roger's plan in 1969 or the Palestinian outburst in Jordan in 1970 or the threats from the administration under Kissinger in 1975, 70 to 75 signatures could usually be counted on from senators to protest a policy unfavorable to the State of Israel. This activity is not simply the work of subtle Jewish propagandists or a proof of Zionist domination of the American mind; it is a reflection of a widespread appreciation of Israel's position in the world and a willingness to associate the United States with Israel's struggle for survival. Morally and politically the United States public seems to stand on Israel's side.

Having said that the weight of Congress and the public presses the administration does not exhaust the subject. A cursory reading of newspapers will tell us of the basic sympathy of the American people for the Israeli cause over a generation. They rejoiced over the miraculous victory of the Jews in 1949 against the

combined armies of the Arab invaders; they looked with suspicion upon Nasser's imperial ambitions in the 1950's, and disassociated the Israelis from the French and British in denouncing the Suez fiasco of 1956; they acclaimed the Six-Days War as a victory of the West against Soviet intrusion in 1967, and applauded the air lift of arms in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. And much of the anger against and contempt for the United Nations stems from the obscene treatment of Israel in the past half dozen years. All of this and more is true. But there is a question of just how strong this support is, and how effectively it binds the actions of any presidential administration.

All the administrations from Truman to Carter have been able to circumvent the apparent will of the people. Despite public opinion in the spring of 1948, the Truman Administration was prepared to scrap partition, and refused to lift the arms embargo in the face of mounting Arab attacks. If Truman recognized the state of Israel in May, 1948, he was recognizing the fact that a war had begun before that time which was being won by the Israelis, neither by the United Nations nor the United States. We were recognizing a *fait accompli*. When peace failed to follow the armistice agreements of 1949, the most that a friendly American would do in 1950 was to guarantee to all the powers of the area, in concert with France and Britain, that independence and security would be our goal for the Middle East. But there were no teeth to that guarantee; in fact, the United States undermined it first by assuming that peace was the Arab objective, and secondly by accepting Dulles' policy of catering to Nasser in the Eisenhower Administration. Public opinion may have supported Israel but the Eisenhower Administration in 1956 and 1957 not only equated Israel's fight for its life with France and Britain's fight for the Suez Canal but applied greater pressure upon the Israelis than upon the British or the French for a return to the status quo. In 1967, when it was so obvious that a *casus belli* had been established by Nasser's expulsion of United Nations forces from the Sinai and by his blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba the most that President Johnson would do for the Israelis was to talk about testing the blockade. Only Israeli military response relieved the United States from the embarrassment of failing to honor the Eisenhower promises of 1957 and from the danger of a successful Soviet penetration of the Middle East. In 1978 the "even-handedness" of Dulles or Kissinger had become the "intransigence" of Brzezinski, and both code terms reflect American pressures which may disregard the vital interests of Israel.

What of the pro-Israeli public opinion, whether indigenous or Zionist inspired? It appears to have had a limited impact upon executive behavior over a thirty-year period. Part of the answer must lie in the brittleness of public support. It is genuine but with several limits. Would public support involve American troops as in Korea or in Vietnam? A negative answer here has been clear for a generation. One of the reasons why the wisdom of both the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom in 1948 demanded abandonment of the United Nations partition resolution of the previous year was the fear that American troops would have to come to the rescue of poorly-armed outnumbered Jews against the large well-equipped forces of the Arab invaders. The same

fear, which also has been echoed in public opinion polls, inhibited proposals that the United States make a security alliance with Israel as had been made with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The experience with Vietnam has made it all the more unlikely that a NATO-style treaty or a security guarantee such as Senator Fulbright proposed in 1970 would be possible even if it would be fully acceptable to the Israelis. There always have been important limits to American support of Israel—and the Arab world has always known this.

But there is another aspect of Israeli-American relations which has given the presidents a relatively free hand to ignore congressional resolutions. It is the existence of powerful counter-lobbies. The Zionist lobby has never operated in a vacuum, working against little or no opposition, as has been the case of the Greek lobby, and earlier in the case of the Irish lobby. There are no significant Turkish forces to promote a Turkish point of view in the Congress and in public; and in the nineteenth century the idea of a British lobby would only have fed the normal Anglophobia that generally characterized American attitudes prior to World War I. But with respect to Jewish Palestine there was and is a powerful array of forces to speak against the Israeli interest. Before the state was ever established one could listen to arguments against an independent Jewish state on the same terms that one can hear in 1978 against American identification with Israel.

It begins with a strategic problem in 1948, which like the others have continuing application: namely, that Israel is located in the midst of a hostile Arab society whose good will is more important to the United States than the prosperity or even the survival of Israel. From the military came the cry that our bases in Saudi Arabia or in Libya would be jeopardized by excessive sympathy for the Zionist cause. From the representatives of the powerful new oil interests, notably ARAMCO, there was the hysterical concern that their investments would be lost if Israel came into being. Both issues were distressing to Secretary of Defense Forrestal in 1948 as they are to elements in the Pentagon today. The West is dependent upon oil and the Arabs could shut off the supply if support is given to Israel. The military-industrial phalanx against Israel then and now had some supporters among American clergymen whose churches had labored long and hard to serve in Lebanon and in Egypt. Important centers of education such as the American Universities in Beirut and Cairo also have been threatened by Arab nationalists that blamed American denominations for the American aid to their enemy.

All told, a powerful combination of counter-pressure groups held forth and still hold forth against pro-Israel forces. The wonder in the face of their wealth and power and influence in Washington is not that the United States failed to be responsive to Israel's needs; the real surprise may be that the public has remained as steadfast as it has in its favor to the Israeli positions.

Today public support for Israel is being tested as never before. The challenges have been mounting over the past decade, ever since the Israeli victory in the Six Day War removed for many the underdog position that

the embattled Jews held in the first twenty years of Israel's history. Some of that role fell to the Palestinian nationalists, with Yasser Arafat as the romantic hero. Witness the pictures and stories in *Time* and *Newsweek* over the decade as well as the accolade in the United Nations in 1974. But despite the pampering of much of the world the ugly face of terrorism continues to disfigure the Palestinian image in America; the most recent polls continue to place the PLO as the spoilers of potential peace. But the rise of the power of the petrodollar since the embargo of 1973 has had its eroding effect. Europe's desertion of Israel then and now, the enormous increase in size and sophistication of Arab propaganda, and the increasing dependence of the United States, as well as the West, on Middle Eastern oil place strains on the American-Israeli connection. Americans will not accept a military alliance that will place their troops in Israel. Will Americans accept another embargo with all the implications it would have on the economy to support the commitments which the United States has made to Israel? It is not an easy question to answer, and it should be hoped that it will never have to be posed in practice in this simplistic way.

Where the Administration and the public may come together as it has never done before is over the place of Anwar Sadat in peace negotiations. There was obviously no sinister American involvement in Sadat's new position. In fact, some of the official reaction reflected discomfort with Sadat's initiative, as if it had sidetracked the United States' peace plans for Geneva and more important diminished the centrality of the American position. But the Sadat breakthrough, interpreted as proof of Arab willingness to live at peace with Israel, has become a means of exerting pressure on the Israeli government to modify its policies according to American precepts. Begin's style, statements, and general posture contrasted unfavorably with the apparent frankness, reasonableness, and willingness to change which characterized Sadat's overture. It did not matter that the theatrics of Sadat's behavior encompassed implications dangerous to Israel, or that Begin's own plan for the occupied territories held a genuine promise for a peace settlement. The fact is that Sadat emerged as the hope of the future and Begin the relic of the past. Public opinion polls in 1980 all attest to the dramatic rise in prestige of the Egyptian president, higher in fact than Israel itself enjoyed. Although this surge for Sadat was not matched in any way by increased American appreciation of the PLO, Israel's hold on American popular support is at its lowest turn.

What then does the change in the political atmosphere since Sadat's move in November 1977 portend for Israeli-American relations? On the basis of the foregoing account the record shows that the Administration had a far freer hand in fashioning policy than a pro-Israel public opinion would have suggested. The rise of Sadat's popularity not only indicates the importance of style where public opinion is involved, but also facilitates the Administration's ability to manipulate that opinion as it develops new initiatives in the Middle East. Now that the broad but thin level of support is being eroded by the Sadat visit and by the increasing acceptability of the Administration's sniping at the Begin government, will the

United States abandon all pretense of friendship and support of Israel?

Such an outcome is unlikely for a variety of reasons. Leaving aside the strong base in the American Jewish community which remains a cautionary force behind an excessive tilt to the Arab side, there is no evidence that the Carter administration intends to undermine Israel's survival any more than did his predecessors in office. Most of the charges against Carter and Brzezinski were applicable to predecessors. The difficulties have always come from a differing perspective. As far back as 1948 Harry Truman, a widely publicized friend of Zionism, shared with his advisers the need to renege on partition, because the vast majority of the men he trusted, including General Marshall, believed that the new state would be a liability to the Western efforts to save the world from the communist menace. It is too often forgotten that the struggle for Palestine coincided with the intensification of the Cold War, and that the first arena of the Cold War was on the edge of the Middle East, in Greece and Turkey, at the same time the fight for Palestine began. Whatever the sympathies of policymakers—and not all were enemies of Israel—the first priority was the Cold War. This was true in 1948, and it remained true throughout the next generation.

Yet, American concerns for its worldwide responsibilities occasionally have placed Israel high on its list of priorities. It is ironical that in the 1970's when Israel's strategic position has declined in almost direct ratio to the rise of Arab power is also the decade in which the United States poured into Israel arms and military supplies in quantities never contemplated in the 1950's or 1960's. The Jordanian-Palestinian conflict of 1970 even precipitated an unstated but meaningful entente between Jordan-Israel and the United States which resulted in the banishment of Palestinians from Jordan and the inhibition of a Syrian invasion of Jordan. In 1973 it was the American airlift that resupplied Israel at a moment of crisis which permitted the Israelis a smashing military victory over its enemies even as they perceived a diplomatic defeat. The official language of Washington affirming Israel's survival is not simply lipservice to voters or meaningless obeisance to custom. It reflects a genuine sentiment, made all the more credible because the destruction of Israel would destabilize the Middle East and put a new and even more dangerous face on our relationship with the Soviet Union. The Administration's pressures for peacemaking are based on an assumption that what is good for the United States will be equally good for Israel. Indeed, there is the sense that Israelis are too close to the scene to recognize the opportunities offered by Sadat and should accept the probability that Americans know better than they what is good for them. This explains the eagerness of the Carter Administration to use Sadat's positive image and Begin's negative image to press Israel for significant concessions. The alternatives to Sadat's invitation would be the increasing isolation of Israel and the temptation to the ever stronger Arabs to make war once again, with potentially disastrous results for both Israel and the United States.

What we see then is no clear stereotype of insensitive Americans or intransigent Israelis but a symbiotic

relationship of long standing, in which the voice of American Jews is but one element. As the Carter Administration's position on Israel in the UN in 1980 revealed, the Begin government or its successors cannot take unconditional American support for granted. Unconditional support has never been there. At the extremes there are intemperate loyalists to Israel and vindictive enemies of Israel, but both are marginal elements in the relationship. In the great middle lies an American public opinion that has been favorable to Israel since World War II. Its identification rests on the

ability of American Jews to convince Americans at large of the special affinities between Israel and the United States. While this friendship is subject to important reservations in the translation of sympathy into action, its existence on balance has been a vital asset to Israel's survival. The defection of public opinion, either through the superior weight of counter pressure groups or through the deficiencies in Prime Minister Begin's projection of Israel's current positions, would damage the interests of both countries.



Myth and Reality in the Middle East

BY JAMES S. LIPSCOMB

The author served as representative of the Ford Foundation in Egypt during 1963-1968 and directed a broad-ranging program of technical assistance projects in that country. Since 1955, he has traveled in Israel and many Arab countries. In 1964, he joined the staff of a philanthropic foundation in Cleveland, Ohio.

In 1970, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC — the main national Quaker organization) published a study entitled, "Search for Peace in the Middle East." It continues to be considered by many people most familiar with this part of the world as the most accurate, compassionate and balanced summary of the history and problems of Arab-Israeli relations, with the primary focus on these relations in the 20th century. With a distinguished record of service to European Jewry commencing in the 1930's and to Arabs starting in 1948, AFSC's traditional commitments to justice, human rights and peace have been well exemplified in their work with both peoples.

With a primary goal of advancing peace generally, the AFSC was one of the first major national bodies in the United States to advocate a withdrawal of American military involvement in Viet Nam in the early 1960's. Since 1975, these peace efforts have been focused on public education in our country about the roots of Arab-Israeli conflicts, the conditions required for a comprehensive settlement, and the role of the United States in encouraging such an outcome. As part of its Middle East Peace Education Program, the AFSC invited 12 Americans with a special interest in that part of the world to participate in a four-week tour to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Israel in May-June, 1979, and I was fortunate to be one of this group.

The schedule was arranged by the AFSC regional representative, James Fine (a 1969 graduate of Kenyon College), stationed in Jerusalem. It included meetings with a variety of government officials, foreign service officers, organizational leaders, media representatives, and private citizens, and all designed to provide insights into the political, economic, and social climate in each country and prospects for a comprehensive peace settlement. Some with whom we met included in Egypt: Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Boutros Ghali; former Egyptian representative to the Arab League, Tahsein Bashir; BBC Middle East correspondent, Robert Jobbins; and Azziza Hussein, current president of International Planned Parenthood. In Lebanon: several prominent members of the Christian community in Beirut — Charles Ghosine, Nehme Tabet, and Father Gabriel Malik; chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yassir Arafat; vice

commander of Fatah (PLO) forces in southern Lebanon, Col. Mahed; Manchester Guardian Middle East correspondent, David Hirst; and Rev. Gabriel Habib, Director of Middle East Council of Churches.

In Syria, those with whom we talked included: vice rector of Damascus University, Assad Lufti; president of Lawyers' Union, Sabah Rikaabe; chairman of Palestine National Council, Khalid Fahoum; and Archbishop Illias IV of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. In Jordan: Crown Prince Hassan (brother of King Hussein); president of Consultative Assembly, Ahmed el Louzi; Mrs. Inam el Moufti, a leading social services planner and women's affairs advisor to the Queen Mother; American Ambassador Nicholas Veliotis; and Rami Khouri, former editor of The Jordan Times. In Israel: five members of the Knesset and of several political parties; former Foreign Minister Abba Eban; former general of Israeli Army and current Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon; a former general of Israeli Army, Matti Peled and Knesset Member Uri Avneri, both leaders of the "Peace Now" movement; and West Bank Arab mayors of Hebron, Rammallah and Halhoul.

In this report I can provide only a summary of my primary, personal impressions as to the prospects for peace based on this trip, my travels in the Middle East starting in 1955, and work in Egypt from 1963 to 1968.

Egypt

President Anwar Sadat has broad public support for his peace initiative with Israel, but his bargaining position is perceived as weak because he has made so many significant concessions in pursuing the present Egyptian-Israeli agreement. As one Western diplomat commented, "He has already given away the store."

It is difficult for Westerners to grasp the significance of Sadat's decision to publicly acknowledge and accommodate to the reality of Israel. His gamble for achieving peace and risking political ostracism by other Arab countries, while forfeiting most of their substantial economic assistance, represents an extraordinary opportunity for a major breakthrough in the seemingly intractable Arab-Israeli impasse, which has existed since Israel's creation in 1948. But the success of Sadat's efforts is largely based on the effectiveness of American support in the peace process and on economic development within Egypt. In neither respect am I optimistic about the outcome.

American economic assistance commitments for Egypt, while large (\$750 million in 1978-79, but less than 20% spent to date), will produce little measurable progress for the vast majority of the 39 million Egyptians during the next few years. Lack of such progress

will certainly erode Sadat's popularity and support among his countrymen, probably more than a potential breakdown in the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations. The latter may be concluded without a meaningful agreement on Palestinian autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza and subsequent self-determination. If Sadat settles without establishing a process which would lead to a resolution of this central issue, the treaty, already viewed by other Arab countries as simply a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli agreement, will produce increased hostility toward Sadat and more severe sanctions by Arab countries, actions which will likely lead to his overthrow and replacement by a far less conciliatory leader. I would guess that Israel and the United States have 1-2 years to take advantage of Sadat's remarkable leadership in the peace process. After that we return to the frustrating confrontation which has persisted for 30 years, but with far greater cost to American national interests and Israel's long-range viability.

Lebanon

This is the country most devastated by Arab-Israeli conflicts. The contrast between the Lebanon I remember so well from my many trips there in 1963-1968 and the condition of this country today leads only to tears and despair. The 1975-1977 civil war has not only resulted in the loss of well over 30,000 lives and considerable physical destruction (large areas of central Beirut are almost wastelands), but the animosities and suspicions among the Christian, Moslem, and Palestinian communities are very deep and will take years to heal. When the 350,000 Palestinians (4% of the total population) now present in Lebanon have a homeland to which they may return, I would be much more optimistic that the indigenous Christian and Moslem communities could reach agreement on reconciliation and another workable restructuring of their democratic government. Such a development would permit this admirable little country to once again return to the freedom and prosperity it enjoyed from 1943 to 1975. With the unusual creativity and industriousness of the Lebanese people, I believe the vigor and wealth of their country could largely be restored in 5-10 years.

Two of our days in Lebanon were spent with officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), one touring southern Lebanon down to within a few miles of the Israeli border and the other visiting PLO sponsored civilian educational, industrial and health facilities in the Beirut area. Included in the southern Lebanon tour were visits to four Palestinian refugee camps, the cities of Sidon and Tyre, and Damour, which is 30 miles south of Beirut and a town frequently bombed by Israeli planes. Of the normal Lebanese population living in this beautiful and rich agricultural area prior to 1977 and the period of regular Israeli military attacks since, over half have fled north to safer parts of the country. Sidon and Tyre now have no more than 40% of their normal population, and the latter has often been reduced to 10% during periods of intense Israeli bombing. The Palestinian refugee camps appear crowded, however, for their inhabitants have no better alternatives. As has been true

since 1948, life in these camps is meager, indeed, not only in the low standard of living but in the very limited employment opportunities and the apparent lack of hope for any improvements.

Life for some Palestinians living in the Beirut area is better than in southern Lebanon, although almost all continue to live in refugee camps or restricted areas of the city. The PLO has developed an impressive number of work opportunities for Palestinians in a few labor intensive industries, such as clothing and furniture manufacturing, but the vast majority are unemployed or under-employed.

In Lebanon, there is ample evidence that practically all of the 350,000 Palestinian refugees support the PLO and consider it their primary organized government in exile. It is not a monolithic structure, however, but is made up of about a score of separate and diverse entities, including primarily moderate elements but some radicals. The leadership of such an organization required unusual abilities and much flexibility and patience. That the chairman, Yassir Arafat, has survived in this role since 1969 is a testimonial to his talents. Unlike his typical portrayal in our country, his thinking and demeanor during our visit with him were reasonable and compassionate. He is clearly a person of substantial intellect and perceptiveness.

Palestinians refer to the forcible expulsion from their homeland starting in 1948 as "the Catastrophe". Given the tragic nature of these events, the exceedingly restricted and deprived existence of most Palestinian refugees since (about 1.8 million) and the widespread lack of understanding and concern for redressing this sad injustice in the West, I believe it is a tribute to the character and intelligence of Palestinians that most remain relatively moderate in their views and so few are willing to resort to violence.

The frequent and often severe bombing attacks in southern Lebanon by Israel and, recently, in concert with their Lebanese Phalangist allies, do not appear to have undermined the morale of those Palestinians who have suffered the most. Rather, we had the sense of even greater determination and confidence that these attacks would bring further world attention to their plight and the injustices which they have suffered in their "Catastrophe".

What does the future hold for the Palestinians? Of the educated with whom we talked, including Arafat and his advisors, all seemed resigned to Israel's strength and long-range, indefinite existence in the Middle East. They are understandably bitter about this "reality", and given the history of Palestine during the past 100 years and the conditions which led to Israel's creation, it will require extraordinary magnanimity to overcome such feelings, probably several generations. Any expectations of most Palestinians of returning to their pre-1948 homes within the original borders of Israel are now recognized as fanciful dreams. The PLC position since 1974 of advocating a secular state within the pre-1948 borders of Palestine, with equality for Jews, Moslems and Christians is understood to be unrealistic. This leaves only the minimally acceptable alternative of a Palestinian homeland within the present Israeli occupied territories (in 1967) of the West Bank and Gaza.

An agreement for increasing autonomy for Palestin-

ians now living in these territories for a period of up to five years appears reasonable, with a process for self-determination, including the alternative of an independent, self-governing state at the end of that time. How many of the Palestinian refugees would return to settle in such a homeland is difficult to predict, but it seems unlikely that more than 25%-35% would so choose, with the balance having better job opportunities in other Arab countries, particularly Jordan and the rapidly developing oil-rich states.

The emotional and practical advantages to Palestinians in having their own sovereign state represents an almost irresistible goal for the substantial majority of Palestinians, who have been dispossessed from their homeland since 1948, and the balance, who have come under Israeli rule in 1967, the attraction if not imperative, of a homeland in a small part of Palestine, also represents a fulfillment of, at least, partial justice for 31 years of suffering and general neglect by the Western world, particularly the United States, and in some respects by their fellow Arabs. The advantage of being a citizen of your own country; of having an available home when needed; as a place to invest savings; and with the international legal status and respect such citizenship can bestow are especially convincing to a people who have been deprived of such rights for many years.

Syria

With 250,000 Palestinian refugees living in Syria and Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights in 1967, Syria has been an active and sometimes unstable participant in the Arab-Israeli confrontation since 1948. Soviet Union influence in Syria has fluctuated over the past 20 years but has never exerted significant control in the domestic political and economic structure. It appears at a low ebb currently with the government of President Hafez Assad having provided relative stability for the past five years.

The present government highly values current American economic assistance, though modest, both for its practical contributions to the country and its symbolism of Syrian independence from the Soviet Union. While relying heavily on large-scale Soviet economic and military assistance for many years, with the massive Toghba Dam project (on the Euphrates River), financed primarily by the Soviets, being almost as important to Syria as the Aswan Dam project is to Egypt, the Syrians stress the importance of their political independence and desire not to be overly reliant on the Soviet Union.

Rivalries between leading Moslem sects (Alouites, 14% of the population, and Sunnis, 60%), however, have escalated and could result in new leadership and a new government within the next several years. About 14% of the population is Christian, and they tend to be supportive of the current Alouite Moslem leadership in the government. In meetings with three leaders of major Christian denominations, they reported good relations between the Christian minority and Moslems, with generally equal opportunities available for the former. A visit with a leader of the Jewish community in Damascus (a total of approx. 5,300 in Syria) indicated that religious, cultural and

economic freedom available for his people were, with a few exceptions such as greater difficulty in emigration, comparable to that of most Syrians.

The Syrian Army "peace-keeping" role in Lebanon is unpopular in Syria, and a gradual "phase-down" of this presence in Lebanon over the next year appears likely. In many ways Arab-Israeli affairs weigh heavily on life in Syria, and the climate for a comprehensive peace settlement is favorable. The presence of 250,000 Palestinians is in some respects destabilizing, with conditions of high unemployment, a low standard of living, and restrictions on movement for most of these refugees for 30 years. Naturally, the Syrians are anxious for the return of their sovereignty over the Golan Heights, with a willingness to accept demilitarization of the border areas with United Nations supervision. They are opposed to the present Egyptian-Israeli treaty talks because they are convinced the negotiations will produce no resolution of the Palestinian goals. Overall, I left Syria optimistic that it would be willing and even anxious to pursue a general settlement with Israel based on an eventual Palestinian homeland and the return of the Golan Heights.

Jordan

The progress of Jordan since my first visit there in 1955 is remarkable, not as broad and well-ordered as in Israel, but neither did Jordan enjoy the massive external assistance furnished to Israel. Improvement is primarily evident in Amman, the capital, and in the Jordan Valley, where agricultural expansion, experimentation, and cooperative organization has meant better living conditions for over 80,000 Jordanians, and preparation for doubling this population over the next ten years.

The population of Amman has increased three-fold since 1955, and construction of new homes, apartments, offices and commercial buildings is evident everywhere. Economic activity is at a high level, and a sizeable middle class is developing. One key to such progress is the stability achieved by King Hussein's government in recent years. Another is a successful and growing private enterprise sector, composed primarily (75%) of Palestinians, who form 60% of the country's approx. 2 million population and many of whom became Jordanian citizens after fleeing the newly-created Israel in 1948.

With Jordan's limited cultivable land and natural resources, its recent economic prosperity has been based primarily on foreign aid from a number of oil-producing Arab countries and the remittance of earnings by its citizens working in many Arab countries. About 250,000 Jordanians (80% Palestinians) are employed in other Arab countries, most in skilled and management-level jobs, and over \$1 billion annually of their earnings are being returned to Jordan to assist families and for local investment.

In the government's current annual budget of \$1.5 billion, excluding military expenditures, over half is provided by support from Arab oil-producing countries (less than 10% from the U.S.). With such dependency on external Arab support and being a relatively small country, Jordan exercises very limited political influence in the Middle East. Rather, it must be responsive

to the wishes of its primary supporters. Because of this reason and the high priority given to justice for the Palestinians, King Hussein cannot endorse the present Egyptian-Israeli treaty and join the negotiations.

There seems to be no question about Jordan's leadership being strongly motivated to advance an Arab-Israeli settlement which could bring peace and clearly defined borders, including a Palestinian state, in the Middle East. With its majority Palestinian population, half of whom continue to live under the very limited conditions of refugee camps, the internal stability of Jordan is related very closely to the future status of the West Bank. Government controls are, therefore, strict and understood by the people but do not appear to be harsh or repressive.

While it is likely that Jordan would welcome close cooperation and some ties with an autonomous or independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, there is no expectation or desire by Jordanian government leadership to dominate such a relationship. Rather, there appears to be a preference for a Palestinian entity which would be able to develop its own independent government and institutions, without dependency on either Jordan or Israel.

Israel

Not having been in Israel since 1955 but having heard and read much about its extraordinary progress economically and in other areas during the past 24 years, I was still not prepared for the remarkable growth and development I observed. While massive support from external sources, primarily the United States, has been a crucial factor, such progress could only be achieved by the dedication, industriousness, and highly skilled talents of the Israeli people. There is no question that Israel, in a relatively short 30 years, has provided a unique example of what can be accomplished in building a democratic, technologically advanced, prosperous, stable state and society in the 20th Century.

The frequent observation that so much of the Israeli experience could be shared to the great benefit of its Arab neighbors is undoubtedly true, and, hopefully, the next few years will bring the peace and growing sense of trust which will make these mutually-productive relationships possible. Before the peace and normal ties which could create the base for such Arab-Israeli cooperation, however, some fundamental changes in the perspective and motivations of Israeli political leadership must take place. This could be illustrated by a question I was asked by several friends upon my return from this recent Middle East experience. "Of the people you met and talked with during the trip, who was the most impressive and who, the most disappointing?" After considerable thought, I concluded both were Israelis, with General Matti Peled being the most admired and former Foreign Affairs Minister Abba Eban, most disappointing. In a sense, this personal judgment represents my overall conclusion about the need for change in the thinking of Israel's political leadership.

General Peled fulfilled a distinguished career in the Israeli Army and was a top general and architect of the Israeli victory over the Arabs in 1967. Feeling strongly

the justice and need for Israel to be conciliatory and seek peace with its Arab neighbors immediately after this war, he became disillusioned with the leadership of the Israeli government, when he concluded that their policies gave a higher priority to retaining control over Arab land occupied in June, 1967 than seriously pursuing a peace settlement. He retired from the Israeli Army in 1969 and joined the faculty of Tel Aviv University.

A person of strong moral convictions, General Peled possesses a rare sense of human compassion and historical perspective about how Israel's highest destiny can be fulfilled. You left with the feeling that if his perceptions about Israel's future could be translated into official government policy, a comprehensive peace and productive Arab-Israeli interaction in many areas could be achieved in the next few years and Israel's security assured for generations.

Perhaps, my disappointment in Mr. Eban resulted from unreasonably high expectations. His superb command of the English language has not diminished, but I concluded that, in part, it masked a superficial logic and distorted perspective in his reactions to questions about some of the critical issues related to a meaningful and just Arab-Israeli settlement.

I was particularly perturbed by Mr. Eban's response to a question about the danger of strained Israeli-American relations, as an energy shortage grows and the U.S. becomes more dependent on Middle Eastern oil. He almost appeared resentful and incredulous that such a question would be raised. His response was to review the history of U.S. support for Israel since World War II and explain how it was broadly perceived by the American public, Congress and each President since as being primarily related to U.S. national interests, such as creating a bulwark against Communist influence in the Middle East.

In essence, Mr. Eban's thesis is that America's substantial "investment" in Israel since 1948 has provided one of the highest rates of return of any of our overseas assistance during this critical period of history, and we are very fortunate to have Israel representing so well our national objectives in that part of the world. While this has long been the consistent position of Israeli supporters in the U.S., my experience in the Middle East since 1955 suggests that the results of this relationship have been in most respects just the opposite, with exceedingly adverse effects on our national interests. It appears that questions are increasingly being raised in our country about the cost of our one-sided, massive support for Israel militarily, economically and politically, if not the counterproductiveness of this policy in relation to the long-range interests of both the U.S. and Israel. Mr. Eban is apparently unaware of this reassessment or chooses to ignore it.


While possessing a superior intellect and broad experience in foreign political affairs, Mr. Eban appeared to be a most a captive of the unproductive, unimaginative, and relatively inflexible, "hard-line" policies vis-a-vis the Arabs of the Likud Party leadership of Prime Minister Begin. Instead of being a central influence in developing new foreign policy alternatives for his opposition Labor Party, I sensed that Mr. Eban had elected to "play it safe" and acquiesce in policies which he should know are likely to fail.

Two days of our time in Israel were spent on West Bank tours and meetings with prominent Arab leaders, including the mayors of three of the largest cities, and discussions with a few residents of two Israeli settlements on the West Bank. The impressions conveyed generally by Arabs with whom we talked were hostile, if not bitter, towards Israeli government occupation policies. They were certainly resentful and pessimistic about their future in a territory governed by Israel, where they are convinced that at best they are "third class" citizens. Based on many experiences since 1967 recounted to us, they foresee more and larger Israeli settlements on the West Bank, a continuing process of Israeli confiscation of Arab-owned land, diversion of critically important water rights for Israeli agricultural use, prescribed and inferior education for all but a few Arabs, and job opportunities limited primarily to low-level and unskilled work. As for autonomy likely under Israeli rule, their expectations are minimal. As one West Bank Palestinian reacted to prospects for autonomy, "We don't consider deciding where the bus stops should be located as meaningful to our freedom."

Within Israeli settlements on the West Bank, the pioneering spirit seems to prevail. Agriculture and

light manufacturing provide the livelihoods of most settlers, and there is a strong and admirable spirit of sacrifice, dedication and hard work. We had no indication that the settlements were temporary, rather a strong sense of mission and conviction that the West Bank was historically and justifiably part of Israel. A housewife, with whom we talked at the Ofra settlement near Ramallah and who had immigrated to Israel from New York City two years before, observed, "We need this land more than the Arabs and will make it far more productive. Why should we leave?" Almost everywhere we went, we were asked by Arabs why the American government did not stop Israel from establishing new settlements. With some 60 now created, and most justified "for security purposes", there are now over 55,000 Israeli citizens living on the West Bank, including 47,000 in an arc of apartment blocks around Arab Jerusalem. As these numbers grow and the investment in the settlements increase, both Arabs and foreign observers foresee very little Israeli intention to respond in any meaningful way to an independent status in the West Bank and Gaza for the Palestinians.

The conclusion of this article will appear in the next issue of *INTERNATIONAL INSIGHT*.



The Middle East

Lebanon Today: No Peace, No War

BY MILT FULLERTON

Served as ABC Radio/Television correspondent in Beirut from early 1978 until mid-1980, covering the Arab world for ABC News, the Atlanta Constitution and two English newspapers: the Birmingham Evening Mail and the Yorkshire Post.

Lebanon is not so much a country as it is a battlefield. It has been fought upon and fought over since the first hieroglyphic was scrawled on a sheet of papyrus. It still is dotted with forts, temples and other remnants of early invaders — Phoenicians, Romans, Crusaders among them. Until recently, the French controlled Lebanon as part of "The Levant". Today, Israel runs free in Southern Lebanon, the stronghold of the Palestinians, whom many also equate with "invaders" and "occupiers". Others pin the same label on the Syrian peacekeeping force that is responsible for security in most of the country.

As of this writing, Lebanon has only a hint of actual government. It has the President, Cabinet and diplomatic machinery that countries must have as proof of "government". But, the current leadership is nothing more than a shadow without substance. It simply cannot govern. It is impotent and its members are trapped in a quagmire of religious strife, political anarchy and social stagnation. Its forces can defend themselves but not the country.

Lebanon, in short, is in the hands of and being torn apart by dozens of opposing factions. Some are loyal to political motives, some are formed along religious lines and others profess allegiance to a large variety of social, national and ethnic causes. The most common traits they share are greed and hatred.

Wealthy Lebanese, the educated and the trained have abandoned their country in droves, packing their money, college degrees and talents and emigrating to other countries. Some, including political leaders like the famous Paris-based Raymond Eddé, try to have it both ways by living comfortably and safely abroad while exhorting their political followers or business colleagues back in Lebanon to fight on and to endure in the face of bullets and other intimidating factors. Unfortunately, the exodus of the moneyed, educated and talented leaves Lebanon increasingly in the grip of street gangs whose strength increases proportionately to the rate of emigration.

Also, the old men of Lebanon — those "warriors" of old — are on the verge of dying off. On the Christian side, their sons are poised to take over and they appear as doctrinaire and narrow-minded as their elders. And, though they profess that tribal ties and instincts are a trait of "the Arabs" and other "savages", one need only

witness the blood feud between Pierre Gemayel and Beshir Gemayel's Phalangist Militia and the "Marada Brigade" of former President Suleiman Franjeh in Northern Lebanon. That, plus the overrunning by Phalangists of former President Camille Chamoun's "Tiger" Militia, smack very much of "tribal" bickering.

Indeed, in the past five years, the Phalangists have been at the center of every major conflict. They have fought against the Palestinians, against various leftists and Moslem groups, against the Syrian peacekeeping force, against Franjeh, against Chamoun and even against the neutral Armenians.

They have done nothing to assuage fears and predictions that they are determined to establish a separate Maronite Christian state — that is, if they cannot push non-Maronites out of Lebanon altogether. It even is possible that, in cooperation with Israel, the Phalangists will seek to drive a wedge through the Leftist-Palestinian territory of South Central Lebanon to link up with Israeli-supported Christian renegade Major Saad Haddad. He controls, with Israel's assistance, a narrow strip of southern border territory called "Free Lebanon". A link-up with the Phalangists would give the ultra-rightists — "The Christians" — a band of territory stretching from North Central Lebanon all the way to the border with Israel, which, presumably, would emerge as patron and protector of the new "Christian" state.

Lebanon's leftists and Moslems appear powerless to prevent such a move. They are united only by religion and the political label "Leftist". They are divided into countless factions, only a few of which are considered serious political forces. The rest are street gangs more interested in macao swaggering through neighborhoods extorting money from citizens and shopkeepers, promoting drugs and collecting money from gambling enterprises than they are in helping rebuild Lebanon.

Their Palestinian allies are much better organized and much more serious, but are too wrapped up in their own survival and in-fighting to get too deeply involved in Lebanon's affairs.

Add to all this, the seeming determination of various outside powers to air their dirty laundry through their Beirut outlets and Lebanon becomes a battlefield in the true sense of the word. Israel uses it to fight Palestinians. The Palestinians fight each other as well as the pro-Khomeiny Shi'ite Muslims. Leftists tangle with leftists over gambling territory. Pro-Iranians battle pro-Iraqis. Syrians challenge their enemies in Beirut. The Phalangists fight anyone who comes along. Even Muslim zealots in Iran have tried to send Iranian "volunteers" to Lebanon to fight alongside Palestinians (who never wanted them in the first place). American singer Pat Boone and religious activists

Twisted steel and blackened stone was all that remained of the old souks which used to give Beirut much of its special character. They were the melting pot where Beirut's working people rubbed shoulders.



from California have poured money into Major Haddad's rebel enclave in Southern Lebanon. Israel and its allies fight with United Nations peacekeeping troops there. The Syrians are blamed for an attempt to murder a Reuter correspondent whose reports angered Damascus and for using threats to send two BBC correspondents and a French reporter fleeing for sanctuary in nearby Cyprus. This all happened after two anti-Syrian Lebanese journalists were murdered in Beirut. And, the list goes on. Lebanon no longer is a playground for the rich; it is a battleground for fanatics.

It used to be that Beirut was the perfect meeting place for London or Chicago bankers who would be ill at ease in Riyadh and for sheikhs and other Gulf leaders who then could not be comfortable in British or American board rooms. That attraction vanished with the 1975-76 fighting and the Arabs and Westerners since have discovered they can meet on each other's turf. In fact, they are busily trying to outdo each other in buying or investing in the other's economy and business enterprises.

Back in Beirut, the struggle continues, with each faction supposedly fighting for the "True Lebanon". The only problem is that each has its own, often selfish, idea about what Lebanon should be. And, outsiders rarely care.

The problem of fractionalization wasn't so acute centuries ago, despite the bother of occasional invasions and migrations such as those by the Phoenicians, Crusaders and Romans. Formidable mountains that form Lebanon's backbone thwarted the early visitors and tended to isolate Lebanon's various religious and ethnic groups. It was modern transport and communications that brought them together where they could argue and fight face-to-face. One basic problem is that part of Lebanon — the Moslem/Arabic half — faced eastward toward its tribal roots and allegiances. The other half — Maronite Christians — looked westward to "enlightened" Europe for guidance and support. This basic division is evident even today in a school system in which French-oriented Christians study the

arts, language and related European subjects, while the Arabs and Moslems still concentrate on the agricultural heritage of their "tribes".

Restaurant patrons in Christian Aschrafieh revel in escargot, red wine and "viande flambe", all served by tuxedo-clad waiters and eaten with fine silver. All the while, in Moslem Manarah, restaurants are more likely to specialize in the hand-grabbing, finger-licking experience of "Mezza", a tableful of salads, crushed bean dip, hommos, Arabic bread, "tabbouleh" and baked fish, all spread out family-style across the table. Despite the insistent denials of Lebanese PR people, there is a difference between East and West Beirut. One need only try driving across the so-called "Green Line" to realize that.

The East is virtually purged of Moslems and already is a Christian enclave. But, things appear to work there . . . including security and city services. Dining with Christian militia leader Dany Chamoun, son of former President and National Liberal Party Chief Camille Chamoun, is no more complicated than phoning him and saying, "Dany, how about lunch at the Vieux Quatier?", or calls by him to friends being invited to join him at his mountain resort at Faqua northeast of Beirut.

By contrast, an estimated one hundred thousand Christians live in predominantly-Moslem West Beirut where an encounter with a political leader involves, at best, running a gauntlet of vicious-looking thugs passing as "companions" of the leader in question or, at worst, a tedious, humiliating body-search by machine gun and grenade-toting "security" people. (It escapes me how Yasser Arafat's goons ever determined the innocent nature of our cases of complicated and sophisticated electronic and TV gear; but, we always made it into his office and home.)

Rightfully or not, the Maronite Christians seem to feel superior and act it. The Leftists and Moslems present an inferior, divided, indecisive image, whether due to a true sense of inferiority or to tribal and other divisions that keep them from achieving any degree of

unity. This very basic difference is evident in the goals and organization of Lebanese Maronites on the one side and Leftists and Moslems on the other.

The Maronites appear to have a single, almost maniacal goal: Creation of an all-Christian Lebanon. The Leftist-Moslem community, on the other hand, can point to no specific aim and its various allegiances are so varied that they become increasingly embroiled in international — as opposed to Lebanese — events and find themselves increasingly under the control of foreign masters. The only country in the Middle East openly supporting Lebanon's Maronite community is Israel. Meanwhile, Moslem-Leftist factions profess loyalty — on a faction-by-faction basis — to such divergent "puppeteers" as Iran and Iraq, Syria and Libya, the Soviet Union and the Palestinians. And, even then, they might be divided further with pro-Iranians, for instance, practicing allegiance to opposing backers in Iran.

The third major community in Lebanon — the Palestinians — also suffer from exacerbating divisions within, but their battle for a homeland is as maniacal as that of the Maronites and this helps give the Palestinian Movement a certain unity regarding basic aims, despite the procedural disputes that so often send them into battle against each other. It is this semblance of unity that allows Maronite and Palestinian alike to organize better than the others — to build a conventional army, to elect viable leaders, to formulate laws for their communities and enforce them.

The Moslem-Leftist community, by the same token, is a jigsaw puzzle of alliances and factions. There is no central leadership, no single code of conduct, no decreed method of enforcement and, most importantly, no agreed upon goal for the future of Lebanon. Instead, those parts of Lebanon and Beirut "controlled" by non-Palestinian Leftists and Moslems are, in most cases, dens of lawlessness — a Wild West-like free-for-all in which bands of armed, often ill-trained and leaderless thugs roam their neighborhoods at will living on money extorted from residents, stealing what they can't or don't want to buy and — most ominous of all — killing those who dare disagree with them. And, as more and more of Lebanon's educated, talented, wealthy and otherwise influential citizens flee for safer havens, the dominance of such animal control increases.

That is not to say the Maronites are heroes. They are just as narrow-minded and tyrannical as anyone else. It's just that they are organized and appear more able than the others to achieve anything of note for their community as a whole, though perhaps not for Lebanon in general.

Lebanon, however, is just a tiny member of a sprawling Arab world and much of its trouble may lie in the psyche of Arabs in general. And the tribal influences are the strongest of all. It is less evident in the Levant than in the Gulf, but only because the Mediterranean area has become developed and populated much more quickly than the desert lands of the Gulf. But, the tribal roots are evident, nonetheless. Often, the animosity among tribes is interpreted by the novice as religious strife, which, incidentally, was only one of many divisions involved in Lebanon's 1975-76 Civil War ("The Events" as it is known to those victims who

realize their insurance policies don't cover losses caused by "war").

When one Lebanese is introduced to another, he invariably asks what village the new acquaintance comes from. An outsider automatically thinks, "Aha, he is trying to find out what religion the other has." However, more often than not, the interest is in the other's family roots — the old tribal instinct.

Avarice — or greed — is another trait that can be traced back to tribal days and which is a very key element in Lebanon today. This was noted by British-born author Wilfred Thesiger who spent nearly a lifetime wandering the deserts of Africa and Arabia with bedu (often mistakenly called "bedouin") tribes. In his writings, he expressed exasperation with the greed of the tribesmen for material things, though he also refers to — and this too is part of modern Lebanese society — an unwavering generosity when it comes to hospitality and the sharing of food and other basics. A Lebanese opens his door on a moment's notice to a total stranger and a literal feast materializes if it should be meal-time. By the same token, money is the major topic of conversation and the all-consuming goal of most. This, while primarily a native instinct, also helps to explain some of the conflicts and jealousies that keep many of Lebanon's factions from uniting. At the very basic level, Gang A doesn't want to share extortion and gambling proceeds or "territory" with Gang B. So villages, towns and neighborhoods become armed fortresses in a jungle of mistrust.

There is, of course, the international influence that plays so heavily on Lebanon. Every country or group with an interest in the Middle East is represented to some degree or another in Lebanon. And, Beirut seems to be their favorite battleground for settling their countless disputes and squabbles. There are pro-Israeli, pro-Libyan, pro-Iranian, pro-Soviet, pro-American and pro-Iraqi elements in Lebanon, to name just a few. By the same token, there are those who are anti-Israeli, Libyan, Iranian or whatever. And there are some with no specific allegiance. There are Shi'ites and Sunnis thrust at each other's throats by recent events in Iran. There are pro- and anti-Syrian Maronites. There are Ba'athists and Alawites torn by the political divisions of neighboring Syria. And the list goes on interminably without even getting into a breakdown of the loyalties of the dozens of Palestinian factions based in or represented in Lebanon.

In addition to all this, there is no effective central leadership. The constitution provides for a division of government along religious lines. And, this only serves to aggravate the very wounds that government leaders are trying so hard to heal. Great steps have been made toward creating a religiously-balanced military force to dominate the various splinter groups in the country. However, the appointment of a Christian general triggers claims of religious favoritism by Leftists and Moslems. By the same token, Maronite tempers flare if a Moslem achieves significant rank. The Maronites also complain about what they see as a threatening dominance in Lebanese government decision-making by Syria whose troops ended the 1975-76 conflict and remain as the major security force in most of Lebanon. In addition there is a certain reluctance — by Moslem and Maronite alike — to give up control of profitable and



United Nations troops in south of Lebanon.

strategically important neighborhoods and enclaves to a "mixed" army whose allegiance is questionable.

Even the day to day operation of the newly-rebuilt army is proving to be a problem because of sometimes conflicting ideas of its officers who have completed foreign training. The United States and France are at the forefront of equipping the new Lebanese army and training its members. However, the training techniques of France and the United States are quite different and this sometimes proves to be troublesome when a Paris-trained Lebanese officer teaches his men one way and a Washington-trained officer teaches his men other techniques. And, that's even before they begin trying to coordinate the use of different weapons and equipment.

If and when that Lebanese army finally is fully deployed, its major task undoubtedly will be to try bringing fringe elements and area under control. Otherwise, it could run smack into the strongest military force of the region: Israel. If the Lebanese army should try to seize control of Maronite areas it would have to face the awesome array of tanks, artillery and "army" of the Phalangist party, many of whose troops are Israeli-trained and most of whose weapons have been provided by Israel. Should the army put Beirut on the back burner and try to seize control of the narrow border strip controlled by Lebanese army deserter Major Saad Haddad, it would only prove to be another confrontation with Israel. It arms, supplies and trains Haddad's militia and helps keep alive his "Free Lebanon", the name Haddad has given to his border enclave. Israeli troops roam at will throughout the six mile wide strip. They use it occasionally as a staging point for raids against Palestinians in South Lebanon. Haddad goes

nowhere without an Israeli officer at his side; an officer who feeds Haddad most of his replies to reporters' questions. At last word, Haddad's Israeli "companion" was one Colonel Yoram Mizraki, a poet, sometime journalist and former NBC Tel Aviv cameraman whose wife did reports from the border area for Reuter and the Jerusalem Post newspaper.

The Israeli influence is so pervasive in South Lebanon and in the Maronite community of East Beirut and the nearby mountains, that one must seriously wonder if perhaps there is a plan to link those two bastions of Christianity. That possibility has been mentioned in the past . . . sometimes in light of a map submitted by the Zionist Organization to the 1919 peace conference. Copies of that map being circulated by the Arabs show that as far back as 1919 — nearly 30 years before Israel came into existence — the Zionists were proposing that the Jewish state's border be drawn from Sidon, midway up Lebanon's coast, across to Rashaya in the Bekas Valley and southward through what now is Syria so that the Golan Heights and Kuneitra would be well inside Israeli territory.

The idea of linking the two "Christian" parts of Lebanon also is believed by some to have gained credence in the past year when the forces of Camille Chamoun were overrun suddenly by the Phalangists who then proceeded to reinforce an earlier declaration vowing to push the Palestinians out of Lebanon. The Palestinians and their Leftist allies are deployed in a band across South Central Lebanon, smack dab between the Haddad enclave to the south and the Maronite stronghold to the north. A vise-like move by Haddad and the Beirut-based Maronites could squeeze the Palestinians out and, in effect, leave a north-south strip of "Christian" territory stretching from Jounieh to Metulla.

In short, Lebanon remains on a short fuse and nothing more than a tiny spark might prove enough to make it explode anew. Beirut's security is at the mercy of diverse elements and a dispute as politically remote as that between Libya and Iraq could become a bloody cause celebre among Libya's and Iraq's followers and supporters in Lebanon. Continued Israeli terror attacks against southern villages could trigger an explosion by anti-Israeli and Palestinian factions. Any attempt at a linkup of the two Christian enclaves could plunge the country back into the throes of hatred and civil strife. Even the attempted deployment of government troops into a sensitive neighborhood could send tempers flaring. And, beneath it all, lies an undercurrent of greed, animalistic anger, a fascination with guns and death and the old parochial tribal instincts. The exodus of the educated and wealthy only exacerbates an already critical situation.

Lebanon is at the mercy of so many; yet so few of them have the interests of Lebanon at heart. Unfortunately, that assessment by a foreign correspondent who has worked and lived in Lebanon for years sounds all too much like an epitaph.

The KURDS—an Eternal Puzzle

BY EDWIN M. WRIGHT

Edwin M. Wright is a member of the Board of Governors of the Middle East Institute, a former principal of American High School, in Iran, a visiting professor, Dept. of International Studies, Universities of South Carolina, and Columbia. He has been widely published in leading journals and a frequent lecturer at the Naval, Army, Air and Armed Forces staff colleges.

In news items, there are frequent references to the Kurds of the Middle East but little accurate or detailed knowledge about them. Yet what is called Kurdistan is larger in area than several states and there are more Kurds than citizens in many Middle East states such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Israel or Lebanon. Why then such obscurity? The answer lies in geography. They inhabit one of the most mountainous areas in the world where four great mountain ranges overlap and merge in a tumultuous heap which geographers have called the Armenian Knot. They form the eastern terminus of the Taurus chain in southern Turkey. On the north they are linked with the Caucasus Mountains of southern Russia by the twin majestic volcanic peaks of Ararat rising to 17,500 ft. In Iran, the Zagros Range marches northwest from the Gulf and meets the range called Aras-Baran which twists southeastward and becomes the Elborz range whose highest peak is the volcanic Mt. Demavend, northeast of Tehran rising to over 18,000 ft. These volcanic peaks of Ararat, Savalava, Demavend and Kubi Taftan mark the northern overthrust of the Iranian plateau over the depressed tectonic plate which is featured by the Caspian Sea. These four extensive ranges meet and create a massive jumble of lofty mountain peaks, deep gorges, precipitous cliffs and ridges favorable to penetration by only one type of transport—the mule. Men and women carry lesser packs on their backs. This inhospitable land on edge has given birth to and maintained the Kurdish people. World conquerors have avoided penetrating these forbidding heights, preferring to go around them. One of the earliest descriptions of the area is the remarkable campaign of Sargon II of Assyria in 714 BC. He started from Nimrod, south of Mosul, cut a path up the nearly perpendicular ascent of the Smaller Zab to the Iranian plateau where he turned north, followed the eastern shore of Lake Urmia around the spur of the Sahend Mountains, which he says were so high that birds could not fly over them (they rise to 12,000 ft.), then at a point called Tawri (probably modern Tabriz), he turned west, entered the land of the Urarti (from whence the name Ararat), captured the capital at Van and finally found the source of the Euphrates, which he followed past

Diarbekir and Mosul back to his capital. This circumnavigation of Kurdistan is the first written record of the land.¹ It was then a part of the land of the Powerful Medis and Urarta. Kurds are not mentioned by name. They appear in the *Katabasis* of Xenophon who led his 10,000 mercenary Greeks from Babylon in 402 BC up the Tigris where, at the modern site of Zakho, he discovered a wild and uncivilized tough mountaineer group called the Karsbuchi. He followed the Tigris to one of its sources, then crossed the upper Euphrates and finally reached Trapezium.² What these two military campaigns proved is that there are no north-south or east-west roads through Kurdistan. The peaks and chasms form an impenetrable wall. In 1923, Roger Cumberland (later killed in Dohuk) and I decided to try a summer's trip as far as possible up the Greater Zab to find the central massif of Kurdistan. To go five miles forward we had to walk ten miles up and down till we got to Tiyari in the Hakkari region, a small plateau at about 8500 ft. elevation, surrounded in July by snow-covered peaks in all directions. From this plateau streams flow into the Aras, the Tigris and Euphrates and smaller streams into Lakes Van and Urmia. It is the top of the Kurdish world. One must experience this terrain to understand the Kurds. The mountains have protected Kurds from invasion but also make unity impossible. They can never get together.

Where the rivers debouch on the surrounding plains are found Kurdish trading towns. They are not large but it is in these the Kurd meets his trading partners—Arab, Turk or Iranian. In the central areas, the Kurd is primarily a shepherd, producing meat, wool skins and cheese for sale. In the deep valley bottoms are small land plots where tobacco grows profusely. On the gentler slopes are vineyards, fruit orchards and grazing lands where special breeds of horses are developed. On the traditional level, the Kurdish economy is practically self-sustaining. In the trading towns are weavers, skilled metal workers and merchants who take his raw exports and supply what he needs—such as Kurdish clothing (practically all wool), cooking ware made from iron, knives, sickles, daggers and guns. It is the lack of the latter item that has destroyed hopes for Kurdish independence in this century.

That the Kurd is a warrior is well known. Neighboring powers have frequently recruited Kurdish troops because of their toughness, bravery and discipline. In fact one of the greatest of all Islamic heroes was a Kurd. During the Second Crusade, there appeared one of the great Knights of the Middle Ages. In 1187 AD Saladin recaptured Jerusalem for the Muslim World. He was the son of Shir-Kub (Mountain Lion) of Takrit, the Kurdish Chief of Staff of Nur-ed-Din of Mosul. He adopted the name Salah-ud-Din and cap-



Kurdish Villagers

tured Aleppo, Damascus and Egypt, becoming Sultan from 1174-1193 AD. Noted for his honesty, leadership, magnanimity and humane treatment of his defeated enemies, he was the outstanding romantic character of his age. He drove back Richard the Lion Hearted in the Third Crusade and is now buried in Damascus. He is known as an Arab but he was an Arabized Kurd. Kurdistan is short of iron and since the introduction of gunpowder warfare, the Kurd has no chance for independence. So the last century has marked a series of Kurdish independence efforts, all doomed to fail. Each one is local, lacks manpower, military hardware and foreign allies.

KURDISH REVOLTS SINCE 1878 AD.

While the Ottoman central government was powerful, the Kurds were relatively quiet, but in the latter half of the 19th century, under attack from Russia and internal disintegration, some Kurds saw hope of self-rule. In 1878, the Ottoman State came near collapse and had it not been for Lord Beaconsfield (Benjamin Disraeli), it might have disappeared. The Armenians revolted, stimulated by Russia and bloody massacres followed. Russia attacked, both in the Balkans and in the northeast. Bismark suggested dividing up the Ottoman Empire but Disraeli had recently acquired the major part of the shares of the Suez Canal and, in return for supporting the Turks, acquired Cyprus. He was interested in safeguarding the route to India. So the Ottoman Empire was temporarily given an extension of time. But three Kurdish groups seized the opportunity to revolt. In the Jezirah-Botan area, a federation of several tribes, led by Bedr Agha Mibli, declared independence. The revolt lasted but a short time but the two sons of Bedr Agha appeared at the League of Nations and later at the United Nations, trying to get recognition for an independent Kurdistan—in vain. In the Iranian border area, east of Erbil and Amadia, Shaykh Obeidullah declared an independent Kurdish state and invaded Iran south of Lake Urmia.

This met the same fate—a short period of victories, then defeat. The revolts were ended by 1883 AD.

The third revolt was by a strange sect called Yezedis or Devil-worshippers which occupies a strip of territory northeast and northwest of Mosul. The two centers are in Jebel Sinjar west of Mosul and Shaykh Adi, east of Dohuk. They resisted conversion to Islam and preserved a pagan and primitive form of the worship of a Snake and a Peacock (Malik Tawooz). At Shaykh Adi, a copious spring bursts out in a canyon and here is preserved the Sacred Shrine. The religion contains a mixture of elements borrowed from Animism, Zoroastrian Dualism, Christianity, Astral worship of the Seven Planets with an occasional term found in Islam. The claim is that they worship Satan, so as to ward off his Evil designs, therefore Satan protects them. God is called Yazdan (old Persian) who is Merciful and therefore will forgive them their apostacy. They have a sacred book, hidden from all outsiders. When I was in Mosul (1921-1924), Shaykh Ismail of Sanjar asked me to allow his son, Abdul Karim, to live in my house while he went to school. His daughter Wanda, he placed with Dr. and Mrs. Edmund McDowell in Baghdad. On one of his trips Abdul Karim carried the Sacred Book to Shaykh Adi and allowed me to see it. It was written in Arabic and contained a number of primitive folk legends. Very few Yezedis can read. Their religious leaders are called "Pir" and claim oracular and miraculous powers. Though they numbered only in the tens of thousands, they too revolted in 1880. The Ottoman suppression in 1882 was severe and great numbers were massacred. They are a negligible element in Iraqi society now.³

World War I shattered the Ottoman Empire and Kurds were temporarily "without outside masters". The boundary between Iraq and Turkey was not established till 1923. The Kurds reverted to their ancient way of survival but two ambitious leading families hoped to gain independence—the Iranian Shakak Kurds whose center was at Chehri, west of Lake

Urmia on the Turko-Iranian border. Jaafar Agha, the elder of two ambitious brothers, had tried in 1904 to rule independently. The governor of Azarbaijan Province in Tabriz, invited him to that city, promising some sort of deal which would legalize his position. At a banquet in a garden, troops hidden in ambush, suddenly poured rifle fire onto the Kurdish guests. Jaafar Agha and several of his associates were killed but others cut their way out and returned to Chehri, vowing revenge. The moment came in 1917 when Russia collapsed and Iran was in chaos. Ismail Agha, the younger brother, occupied all the area west of Lake Urmia and for 3 years ruled as a local king. In 1922 Riza Khan (later Shah) sent a capable Iranian general (Tahmasih) who drove Ismail Agha (nicknamed Simko) back into Turkey. In 1932, Riza Shah arranged with Turkey to expel Simko, on the promise of amnesty. As he crossed the border back into Iran, he was promptly surrounded and killed. Treachery is a way of life.

In Iraq, Shaykh Mahmood of Sulaimaniyah, following the war and the establishment of Iraq, hoped to negotiate some form of self rule for the Kurds. Iraq had no army of its own at the time and the discussions on autonomy continued till 1929. Shaykh Mahmood demanded more than King Faisal would grant and finally Iraqi troops, strengthened by the fierce Assyrian "Levies," defeated Shaykh Mahmood. His son Baba Khan accepted a place in the Iraqi Parliament and hoped thereby to obtain favorable terms for Kurdish autonomy but failed—only to repeat another revolt in the next generation.

One of the bloodiest revolts took place in Turkey. As early as 1711-30 far as Islam is concerned, the Kurds have their own variety of charismatic leaders and they have few, if any, theological schools. Mosques are few and unimposing. The men who gain religious prestige are more like oracles and mystics, who have dreams and revelations. They grow up in local soil and adapt Islam to local traditions. Kemal Ataturk's efforts to secularize political life and to unify central authority caused deep unrest in several areas, but most notably in the province of Dersim. Kemal Ataturk in 1925 began a series of drastic laws to secularize the state. Religious courts were abolished, the Turkish language was stressed, central authority replaced local traditions. All these undermined Kurdish culture, traditions and self-rule. From 1925 to 1935, there were numerous signs of violent unrest which burst into large scale revolt in Dersim. In 1935-6 Turkish troops broke the power of the Kurdish Aghas, moved the Kurds in small groups to other areas and replaced them with Turkish villagers. The name of Dersim was wiped off the map and writers were ordered not to use the name Kurd but to refer to them as "Mountain Turks." After Ataturk's death in 1939, the rule was gradually forgotten.

World War II spread to both Iran and Iraq. In 1941 Soviet forces occupied northern Iran and British forces forced Riza Shah into exile. Soviet agents immediately proceeded to organize two puppet regimes in Azarbaijan. The larger was in Tabriz under Mir Jaafar Pishavari, who organized the Turkish speaking population. The smaller group, promised Kurdish independence, were led by Qazi Muhammad, Chief of the Mukri Kurds in Mehabad. I personally knew Qazi Muhammad and was his guest in Mehabad for several days in

1927. His father was the leading Kurd of the area and had trained his son for leadership. He was a very courteous and attractive person, largely self taught, and had studied Russian, English and Esperanto. He had ambitious dreams for improving the lot of the Kurds, who lived under lax and often rapacious Iranian officials. During 1942-6 the Soviet authorities promised him support and he fell into their trap. He organized a "Kurdish Independent Republic" but in actuality the USSR gave him no real aid. When the USSR withdrew its troops in May 1946, Qazi Muhammad tried to negotiate with the Iranian government but to no avail. He was captured and hung along with several of his associates. Just before his capture, Archie Roosevelt visited Mehabad and in an early issue of the Middle East Journal wrote an article on "The Kurdish Republic of Mehabad".

In Iraq, the war disrupted normal life, especially in north east Kurdish areas. An odd religious visionary Mollah Mustafa of Barzan protested mistreatment by Iraqi provincial officers. In 1944, I was US Army Intelligence officer and went to Rowanduz to write a study on the Kurds. I found the British officials quite sympathetic to Kurdish complaints and Mollah Mustafa was most vocal in listing graft, violence and prejudice against Kurds. He vacillated between full scale rebellion and negotiation with the Iraqi officials to get better treatment. The Iraqis finally sent an expeditionary force to capture him but Mollah Mustafa eluded them and escaped north to the USSR. Iraq and Iran are traditional foes over the question of boundaries, the Iranians claiming they should have equal rights to half of the Shatt al Arab while the 19th century boundary gave the whole Shatt al Arab to Iraq. This and other minor disputes between Iraq and Iran, led Shah Muhammad Riza Pahlavi to invite Mollah Mustafa to come back to Kurdistan. The Shah would support his rebellion and thus put pressure on Iraq. Israel, in close association with Iran, also promised to help so as to keep the Iraqi army busy with a Kurdish rebellion. Mollah Mustafa probably never understood USSR methods of operation and showed no interest in communism, so the Soviets allowed the Kurdish rebel to slip back into Iraq in 1970. Using the rocky and lofty peaks as his base of operations, the Mollah established his rule in Iraq between Sulaimaniya and Rowanduz. Though the Iraqi army was far better equipped, it could not dislodge the Mollah's forces, supplied as they were from Iran. Hans Admas Schmidt of the New York Times was smuggled into the battle area and gave a first hand description of the war. But all of Mollah Mustafa's efforts, sacrifices and hopes came to naught. At a meeting of the OPEC powers in Algiers in 1976, President Boumedienne of Algeria offered to mediate the Iran-Iraq dispute. Iraq was willing to accept mid-stream of the Shatt al Arab, thus increasing Iranian prestige in "security" patrols on the river and the Shah agreed to withdraw support for the Kurdish rebellion. Kurdish resistance collapsed. Mollah Mustafa sought refuge, at first in Iran, then came to Washington, D.C. to plead his cause. He died in a Washington hospital of cancer in 1979.

Conclusion: The Kurds as an ethnic, cultural group will last as long as they continue to live in their mountain fortresses, for their life style is adapted to sur-



Major Towns of Kurdish Population

vival in that environment. But it also denies the Kurds of hope for an independent state. Lack of internal communications, manpower, economic resources and political cohesion are near-impossible obstacles to overcome. The latest experience in Iran in 1979-80 is a case in point. Upon the collapse of the Shah's government, the Kurds of Mehabad to Sarnandaj seized the opportunity to demand autonomy but the new Islamic Republic wanted no erosion of centralized authority. Enough of the Shah's army remained to lay waste half of the two towns where the Kurds gained temporary hold. Hundreds of Kurds were killed and their leaders led before firing squads. The rest retired to their mountains — where they can survive till another day.

Some facts about the Kurds

Kurds are of Iranian origin and their language is a branch of the Indo-Iranian family. But lacking any classical base, the dialects vary greatly. Kurds of Suleimanya in Iraq speak what is called the Kermanji dialect with a limited literature. In the northwest in Turkey, the dialect is called Zaza and is little understood by other Kurds. Statistics are hard to find and

inaccurate. The Encyclopedia Britannica quotes a census of 1965 which gives a total of 7 million Kurds. Some Kurds refer to 10 or 12 million Kurds. A good guess is probably near 8 million with near 4 million in Turkey, two and a half million in Iraq and one and a half million in Iran. About 50,000 live in the Armenian SS republic around the foot of Mt. Ararat. A few reside in N.E. Syria.

Literature on the Kurds, in English, is scattered and hard to find. Kurds are mentioned in books on Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The strange Yezedi sect is well covered in a book, "The Cult of the Peacock Angel" by RHW Empson Witherby Press, London 1928. My information was gained by trips into Kurdistan and by a "Survey on the Kurds and Kurdistan" which I prepared for the US Department of Defense in 1944. Only limited copies were printed for intelligence purposes.

Notes:

- 1) E.M. Wright "The Campaign of Sargon II of Assyria in 714 BC" Journal of Near Eastern Studies 1941
- 2) Xenophon "Katabasis" Loeb Classical Library.
- 3) R.H.W. Empson, "The Cult of the Peacock Angel" Witherby Press London 1928.

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The Afghan Question: A Comparative Study

BY DR. GEORGE KULCHYCKY

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The overthrow of the government of Mohammed Daoud in Afghanistan ushered in the "Sow" or April Revolution which, it may be said, compares to the October revolution in the former Russian Empire. Clearly, the April Revolution brought Afghanistan into the Soviet orbit. This fact became especially apparent during the Non-Aligned Nations Conference held in Havana in September of 1979. But while the Afghan leadership solidly backed the Kremlin, the "gains of the April Revolution" were far from being assured. Peasant rebellions, desertions from the Afghan Army, as well as popular discontent in the cities promised to put an end to the "progressive" revolution and its leadership. This, combined with the assassination of Afghan strong man Taraki by Hafizullah Amin, caused the Russians to exercise their "option" to apply the Soviet Afghan Treaty of Friendship signed in December of 1973.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not a surprise, at least, it should not have been. Concern for such a possibility was expressed by Pakistani strongman Zia-ul-Haq in 1978. The invasion could have also been foretold from the "smokescreens" released by Radio Moscow and the reshuffling of Soviet diplomatic personnel in Kabul. When the invasion finally occurred, Soviet officials and western analysts gave the following explanations for this incursion: 1) the Soviet Union was "invited," in keeping with the Treaty of Friendship; 2) they invaded because they "feared" the U. S. military presence in the Persian Gulf; 3) they attacked because they "feared" the Islamic Revolution which threatened to spread to their Moslem territories; 4) they invaded to "protect," in keeping with the "Brezhnev Doctrine" their investments in the country; and finally, 5) they invaded because the strategic-economic consideration of placing Russia 300 miles from the Indian Ocean, were too much of a temptation and worth the risk. The result was, as one Afghani official put it "virtual annexation" of the country.

The obvious cause of Soviet trepidation was the Afghan Insurgent movement. A majority of the Afghans were untouched by the Revolutions of 1973, 1978 and 1979. But now, in 1979, the government began to impose its will on the fiercely independent Baluchi, Pashtun, and other peoples of the country. Land reform, marriage laws, as well as the teaching of athe-

ism, alienated the major portion of this Islamic nation. The Afghan communists were initiating a frontal attack similar to "War Communism" of the Russian communists in 1918. The end result of this aggressive policy was insurgency in the former Russian Empire, as seen in the Basmachi and Ukrainian insurgent movements, and the rise of the insurgent movement in Afghanistan.

The Afghan rebels call themselves "Mujahids" or Holy Warriors and are loosely united in six major umbrella organizations. Their ideology and goals tend to differ but on the question of Soviet presence in Afghanistan they are agreed: they want them out. Their attempt to unite in Peshwar in January of 1980 failed. Their attendance at the Islamabad Conference on January 29, 1980 did not see any concrete commitments to unity other than the promise to raise 100,000 men.

To date, and this varies because of the nature of the movement, the government controls 8 out of the 26 provinces. Although the Soviets control the cities, which is essential if they are to be victorious, the lines of communications are disrupted between them and the city population remains defiant as seen especially by the strikes in February. The Afghan army has all but disappeared and what remains are ragtag units commanded by Soviet officers. The government of Babrak Kernal relies mostly on a newly formed militia made up of Afghan communists, Soviet units, in the early stages of the invasion, were made up of Moslem elements who sympathized with the Afghans and were therefore unreliable. These units have now been replaced by more reliable troops from European territories. Although the Soviets remain tight lipped about their casualties the estimate is from 3,000-10,000 dead. To deal with the insurgents, according to many estimates, the Soviet Union will have to commit another 120-400,000 additional troops.

Many would be analysts naively point out that the Soviet troops are not capable of conducting anti-insurgency warfare. In this day and age such a statement is simplistic. Between 1918-1926 the Russians fought two insurgent movements, that of the Basmachis and Ukrainians, which were almost carbon copies of the Afghan movement. During World War II the Russians perfected their anti-insurgency tactics and this is attested to by the publication of a great number of books dedicated to insurgent warfare during the "Russian" Civil War in 1918-1921 and the "Great Fatherland War" in 1941-1945.

The Ukrainian insurgent movement in 1918-1926,

especially, attracts the student of guerilla warfare as it compares to the Afghan situation. It is usually difficult to make generalizations and apply those generalizations to other areas but in the case of Ukraine the situation in 1918-1926 is very comparable to the Afghan case today. In both areas, in their respective periods, you have an ignorant, conservative, almost primitive peasantry. Their units are chieftain oriented and do not wander far from their villages. They use outmoded cavalry warfare and primitive obsolete weaponry which is reminiscent of the 18th and 19th centuries. In both cases the village is alienated from the city. The city is in the hands of the Russians who were in both cases "invited" to those countries. In both countries one can observe the lack of a strong central government supported by foreign bayonets, anarchy, banditry, and desertion. This lack of authority causes each village to become an independent "republic" willing to defend its rights and freedoms. Some of these "republics," as was seen in Ukraine, could muster as many as 10-20,000 men when needed. Finally in both areas, when considering border nations, the neighbors have much to gain in case of their demise. In the case of Afghanistan the border interests, however, have to play a secondary role in view of the Russian threat.

While pointing out the similarities, and there are more than the ones that I enumerated, one has to also recognize the differences. The cities, while occupied by the Russians are essentially Afghan and sympathetic to the Afghan cause. This may be crucial. The Ukrainian cities were Russian or pro-Russian because of colonization and Russification in the past two hundred years. The Afghan situation is different because it has the moral and material support of outside nations. Such was not the case of Ukraine. Western powers were interested in restoring "one and indivisible" Russia and viewed the Ukrainian movement as "separatist." In the case of the Ukrainians their enemies were many (Poland, Rumania, Communist Russia (Reds) and Anti-Communist Russians (Whites), the German Army and the Allied Intervention), while the Afghans have only one visible enemy — the Russians. The Afghans have one all-embracing Islamic ideology while the Ukrainians, although pursuing the goal of independence, were ideologically disunited. Also different are the reasons of insurgent activity and terrain. The latter is very much to the advantage of the Afghans.

When applying the Ukrainian insurgent experience to Afghanistan one is forced to come to grips with the reality, as much as one would hope against it, that the Afghani movement is doomed to failure. One may already observe some "typical" methods tried in Ukraine, being used in Afghanistan. One of the most common methods is disinformation and deception. Babrak Kernal publicly states that his government is not Marxist, but "progressive." Radio Kabul assures the Afghans that Soviet presence is temporary. It often talks about the creation of a "Cabinet of Unity," respect for Islam, inclusion of the "Sharia," the Moslem law into the new constitution, and declares "amnesties" to the insurgents. Such "amnesties" were well known in Ukraine. Just prior to the date that the amnesty was to go into effect Russian executioners

were busy eliminating the captured insurgents so that by the time of the deadline there were no prisoners, with the exception of harmless individuals, to release. One such amnesty which promised the release of 2073 Afghans, fell far short of the number (only about 500 released) and ended in riots in Kabul.

But the promised "amnesty" did not come free. Individuals released were given the job of assassinating their chieftains or joining the insurgents to spread disinformation. Such physical assassination is combined with character assassination. In many cases whole units take advantage of the amnesty and surrender only to be physically eliminated. There are many such cases recorded in the Ukrainian experience. One such recent assassination is that of Afghan leader Gulain Shaer who was willing to negotiate with the Russians, and was murdered in front of his men near the Kunar River.

Other methods used in Ukraine and are to some degree being used in Afghanistan are well documented. Afghan villages are totally destroyed by Soviet bombs and artillery as was the case in Medvyn and other villages in Ukraine. Here and there "provocation units" calling for anti-Russian activity are sued to eliminate possible insurgents. Special units to combat insurgency, as well as 5,000 Afghan speaking officials were brought in from Moscow. Such BB (Borba s Banditismom — Struggle with Banditism) units in Ukraine together with the Russian secret police were in the forefront of the fight against, as is also true in Afghanistan, "banditism." It is only a matter of time that, perhaps under a different name, the KNS (Committees of Poor Peasants) will be organized to split the village into two hostile camps and bring "class warfare" into Afghan society. (The Marxist Allende in Chile used this tactic before his overthrow.) Finally "prodzahony" (food collection units) will be used to confiscate peasant food supplies (vykachka) and in this way prevent them from cooperating with the insurgents and thus assure the destruction of the movement.

The tactics used by the Russians in Ukraine are endless. These tactics were or are being used in Afghanistan today. The similarity of the Afghan-Ukrainian situation is too great for the Russians not to notice.

What then, in light of the facts, are the prospects for Afghanistan? Can one expect primitive Afghanistan to humble the "Russian Bear?" I tend to be optimistic even though general pessimism surrounds the Afghan question. My optimism is prompted by Afghan circumstances. The Afghans, unlike the Ukrainians, have one enemy — Russia. The Ukrainian insurgents were able to throw the Germans out of Ukraine, throw the Entente forces into the sea, destroy the Russian Volunteer Army, and, on three occasions throw the Red Army out of Ukraine. In the end the overwhelming odds took their toll. Ukraine, exhausted collapsed.

The Afghans enjoying the all embracing ideology of Islam, with the cooperation of their cities, with the moral and material support of their Islamic brothers and the West, with the creation of a "United Front" can and should be strong enough to overthrow the Russian "guests" Neprokhani Hosti (uninvited guests).

Egypt now second biggest market for United States in Arab world

Special to International Insight

Before the end of 1980, the American economic aid program will have offered Egypt's 42 million people as much per capita help in real dollars as the United States spent to reconstruct Europe after World War II, Christopher S. Wren recently wrote from Cairo in *The New York Times*.

The extent of the aid effort, Wren noted, was hardly visible five years ago when former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger made the political decision to shore up Egypt economically. Since then, the United States has allocated nearly \$4.6 billion in economic assistance, of which Egypt has spent barely half. Even this program of \$1.1 billion annually, Wren emphasized, is but a fraction of what Cairo anticipates from an arrangement it hopes will continue at least until the ravages of three decades of regional belligerency are left behind. The \$1.1 billion annually does not include American military credits to rebuild Egypt's armed forces. American aid is just part of the \$2.5 billion Egypt receives annually from developed nations and international agencies.

Rather than concentrate on a few pressing problems such as housing or food production, Wren reported, the United States has undertaken the staggering task of rehabilitating the Egyptian economic infrastructure which deteriorated almost beyond repair during the war years. American aid is building new power stations and cement plants, updating the textile industry, installing drainage pipes and irrigation systems and repairing sewers. The effort is so diffuse, Wren noted, that with the possible exception of a microwave system to improve telephone communications, not one major project is finished.

Recent commodity imports

from the United States have included 600 buses, already showing signs of wear from overuse, and 1.5 million tons of grain a year, which is said to provide one in three loaves of bread in urban bakeries.

One of Egypt's biggest problems is the population explosion. The country is experiencing an annual population growth rate of 2.8%, or four times that of the developed world, while domestic food production is increasing by only 2% annually. At this rate, Wren wrote, Egypt will have a population of 70 million in 20 years and, according to one disturbing government report, will have become so dependent on foreign food that a halt in imports would cause widespread famine.

Subsidies a problem

Another big problem involves government subsidies for food and other basic consumer items which have swollen to an annual \$1.7 billion. According to Wren, the trauma of the riots that broke out in 1977, when attempts were made to trim some food subsidies, has left the government timid about cuts. The subsidies contributed to a 40% jump in last year's budget deficit, which totaled \$3.5 billion. The government, Wren wrote, tried to narrow the deficit on paper by printing 30% more money but Egypt still forfeited \$600 million from the International Monetary Fund because it exceeded an agreed deficit ceiling.

Wren found a certain degree of complacency, encouraged not only by the safety net of foreign aid but also by rising revenues from oil production, Suez Canal traffic, tourism and remittances from some 900,000 Egyptians working abroad.

"They have a window of rather good foreign exchange resources," an American economist working in Cairo told Wren. "If they use this two- or three-year period to make the adjustments that have to be made, one can be optimistic about the future." Conversely, if more progress is not made in tackling the country's more severe problems, Egypt could remain dependent on American aid for a long time to come.

Donald S. Brown, the American aid administrator in Egypt, pointed out to Wren that Taiwan and South Korea also received heavy infusions of aid that tapered off when they were able to stand on their own feet. "I can't predict how long the political perception will justify the current aid magnitude," Brown said. "I've told Egyptian officials that they shouldn't keep counting on this large a program."

Meanwhile, the American Embassy in Cairo is optimistic about prospects for U.S. companies in trade and investment. The Cairo International Fair, held March 8-22, was particularly encouraging — bringing \$8,400,000 in actual sales to 63 exhibitors at the American pavilion. It is estimated that follow-up sales could reach \$60 million.

Not only did such multinational giants as Ford, Du Pont, Coca-Cola, General Electric, Xerox, PepsiCo, Westinghouse and International Harvester display their products, but a wide range of other large, medium-sized and smaller American companies was on hand to seek a share of the Egyptian market. For some it was their first Cairo fair. Many came because the U.S. government had launched its biggest campaign to date to get American firms to participate in the annual event.

As reported by *The Journal of Commerce*, the representative of McDonnell Douglas showed off his company's new solar energy system and enthused that the recent \$200 million sales of four DC-10's to Egypt was "the biggest financing transaction since the building of the Aswan High Dam." The man from Carrier International was careful to point out that, "President Sadat's three houses have Carrier air conditioners and the American Embassy also uses Carrier." And the representative of Snap-on International duly noted that, "President Sadat's son, Gamal, still has the Snap-on tool kit he bought last year." Enthusiasm pervaded the atmosphere.


The theme of the American exhibit was *The Building of Cairo* and much interest was shown in U.S. construction technology. One exhibit that drew particular attention was that of Pullman Swindell International which featured prepackaged plants for producing load-bearing bricks. Egypt has a housing shortage of more than one million units, compounded by acute shortages of concrete and reinforcing rods. Egyptians, therefore, found the bricks to be "too good to be true."

The following is a review of conditions and prospects in Egypt, based on a report prepared by the American Embassy in Cairo and published by the U.S. Department of Commerce:

Summary — In 1979 the Egyptian economy continued on the path toward recovery which began in 1974 and sustained moderate growth of about 8% in real terms. The balance of payments showed considerable improvement in 1979 as the current account deficit dropped to just under \$1.5 billion — the smallest recorded in the last six years. Capital inflows were less than in previous years, reflecting the loss of Arab assistance transfers in the wake of the signing of the peace treaty with Israel. Capital requirements were met from other sources and for the first time in six years Egypt did not borrow in the Eurocurrency market.

Management of the domestic

U.S.—EGYPTIAN TRADE 1969/1979 (in billions of dollars)



budget remains the government's most pressing short-run problem. The deficit between revenues and expenditures has tripled in the last two years and is equivalent to about 22% of GNP. Since slightly more than half of the deficit is bank-financed, increasing public sector expenditures have resulted in considerable monetary expansion, fueling inflation which is now estimated in the range of 25% to 30%. The government will have to continue its efforts to reform the subsidy system if the deterioration is to be halted, but this will be difficult because of the political sensitivity of price increases.

Talks with the International Monetary Fund continue on economic reforms. The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) agreement concluded in mid-1978 is now acknowledged to be defunct and it is hoped that a new agreement will be reached soon. Additional measures to reduce the budget deficit will almost certainly be required if Egypt is to qualify for EFF drawings.

'Open Door' is central

The "Open Door" policy remains central to the government's efforts to attract foreign (non-official) participation in Egypt's development. Joint ventures are being encouraged and

new companies qualify for benefits under Law 43, enacted in June 1974 to stimulate investment. The private sector, which includes joint ventures, now accounts for 15% of gross fixed investment and its share is growing. Foreign exchange availabilities in the private sector are higher than ever and privately held foreign exchange now finances about one-fifth of imports.

Current situation — The Egyptian economy entered 1980 with favorable prospects for continuing the moderate rate of real growth achieved over the last few years. On the external side, foreign exchange earnings continue strong, having reached \$6.6 billion in 1979. They are expected to reach \$7.6 billion this year, due largely to increased oil revenues. The current account deficit was reduced by nearly \$300 million in 1979, dropping to a six-year low of just under \$1.5 billion. On the internal side, for the second year in a row the fiscal situation deteriorated as the budget deficit grew to \$3.5 billion.

As noted earlier, one of the principal development issues facing Egypt is its 2.8% rate of population growth. While domestic production of basic food commodities has grown in recent years at an annual average rate of about 2%, utilization of com-

modities has increased at a rate about twice as great. Per capita availability of domestically produced foods is about 10% lower than it was 15 or 20 years ago. Given the limited agricultural base and high current yields, the imbalance between domestic supply and demand is expected to remain a feature of the Egyptian economy. Nevertheless, it should be possible to increase growth rates in the agricultural sector if priority investment needs are met. Even so, Egypt is likely to be a net food importer indefinitely.

Effects of treaty — The signing of the peace agreement with Israel commanded more attention in Egypt than any other single event in 1979. The first (and so far only) economic gain for Egypt was the return of the remaining Sinai oil fields in November. The resulting addition of some 30,000 barrels per day enabled Egyptian oil production to reach nearly 600,000 barrels per day by year's end. Weighed against such benefits must be the effects of the economic sanctions taken against Egypt by other Arab governments after the Baghdad summit last April. Aid transfers from Arab governments have ceased, which accounts for the considerable drop in official aid flows in 1979. Arab governments also ended their participation in the pan-Arab military industry (AOI) and withdrew from the financing of certain military items that were to be co-produced.

Measures taken against Egypt were largely confined to official channels and have remained consistent with public statements by Arab officials that current politi-

cal differences with Egypt should not result in harm to the Egyptian people. Egyptian expatriate workers remained in other Arab countries and new contracts for additional workers were signed during the year with a number of Arab governments.

Arab private investment has continued to flow into Egypt at the same level as in previous years — about \$150 million annually or about one-third of total private foreign investment. Arab citizens have participated in nearly half of the projects approved by the Egyptian Investment Authority over the last few years.

Arab tourism, by contrast, dropped visibly in 1979. Arab visitors represented only about one-third of total visitors to Egypt in 1979, compared with over one-half in 1978. While some of the drop in mid-year was attributed to the signing of the peace agreement and uncertainty over how Arab governments would react to continued travel by their citizens to Egypt, Arab tourism did return briefly to traditional levels, only to fall off again, possibly because of perceived instability in other parts of the Middle East.

Balance of payments — Despite the loss of Arab government transfers in 1979, Egypt's balance of payments fared well — recording the smallest current account deficit of the last six years. Export revenues were recorded at \$2.7 billion, up one-third from 1978 with the growth led by petroleum. Actual petroleum production rose only 5% in 1979 but the average per barrel price of Egyptian crude increased 100%. Gross

petroleum receipts for 1979 are estimated by the World Bank at \$1.3 billion or half of total export receipts.

Agricultural production increased at a rate greater than population growth for the second consecutive year. Raw cotton exports in 1979 reached \$370 million with receipts one-third higher than in 1978. Production of rice, Egypt's second largest agricultural export, was up by 7% and contributed to other agricultural export earnings of \$230 million.

On the services account there were signs of a slowdown in 1979 though the potential for growth remains high. Suez Canal revenues climbed to \$600 million for the year. Recorded tourist receipts accruing to the unified (official) market registered a decline from \$700 million in 1978 to an estimated \$650 million in 1979. It must be noted that officially recorded tourism understates actual receipts because the free market — where the Egyptian pound is offered at discounts of 8% to 14% in exchange for foreign currencies — also acts as a channel for tourist expenditures. Since overall tourism rose in 1979, it is not likely that foreign exchange receipts actually declined as the unified market figures suggest.

Remittances from Egyptian expatriate workers rose to just under \$2 billion in 1979, up from \$1.7 billion in 1978. The rate of growth was down considerably from the previous year when remittances nearly doubled. Official remittances come into Egypt in two forms: cash transfers through the unified exchange market to any of the four public sector commercial banks, and imported goods brought in under the *own exchange* market — a system introduced in 1974 whereby Egyptians are able to use foreign currencies earned or held abroad to finance the purchase of goods for importation into Egypt. In 1978 remittance transfers were split almost evenly between cash conversions and *own exchange* imports. In 1979 the relative share changed dramatically with nearly two-thirds of the transfers represented by incoming goods.

Currency transfers also are

EGYPT'S POPULATION EXPLOSION (in millions)

1966	30.1
1978	36.0
1980	42.0
2000*	66.5
2010*	92.8
2025*	143.4

*Projection based on current rate of 2.81 percent annual growth

believed to be considerably higher than recorded receipts would suggest, again because of the premium in the exchange rate offered in the free market and because of a large group of private money-changers who are known to be involved in the collection (and subsequent transfers) of remittance earnings at their source. These funds find their way into foreign exchange balances held by private Egyptians, many of which are held in Law 43 banks and loaned locally or placed abroad. Because of the private money-changers, direct access of the public sector commercial banks (the designated recipients of cash transfers) to remittances has been reduced. Foreign exchange available to the private sector, however, has increased considerably.

\$6.3 billion in imports

Total imports in 1979 are estimated at \$6.3 billion, up nominally from the previous year because of price increases averaging 13%. In real terms imports showed a slight decline. Imports of agricultural commodities accounted for most of the nominal increase. Price increases on wheat and flour alone averaged 20%. Intermediate and capital goods imports rose nominally by less than 3% and the drop in real terms was considerable.

On the capital account, Egypt made debt repayments of just over \$900 million, leaving \$2.5 billion in total financing requirements. Debt service has been reduced from 33% of the earnings on goods and services to just under 15%. Under capital inflows, official non-Arab assistance accounted for the largest share at just over \$1 billion. For bilateral flows, the United States is by far the biggest aid donor. France, West Germany, Great Britain and Japan also have provided considerable amounts of assistance and supplier credits. The World Bank has increased its loans to Egypt with annual commitments totaling close to \$400 million.

As indicated earlier, official aid disbursements were down considerably in 1979 for two reasons: capital inflow from Arab donors

ceased — these had been used primarily to finance imports of capital and intermediate goods — and Egypt faced lower starting pipelines for commodity aid as well as delays in new commitments. Entering 1980, Egypt had roughly \$5 billion in the official aid pipeline, about 60% of which is in the form of project assistance. This year the Egyptian government anticipates accelerated drawdowns to a point where donor disbursements would equal new commitments.

Economic reforms — Since the introduction of the "Open Door" policy in 1974 and subsequent large assistance commitments from friendly governments, the International Monetary Fund and major donors have urged Egypt to undertake comprehensive economic reforms to deal with the imbalances caused by the last 30 years and reduce the overwhelmingly dominant role of the public sector. Limited progress was made during 1979 in the areas of reform charted with the IMF in 1978 under the EFF.

On the fiscal side, major revision of the structure of public finances is needed, along with rationalization of the system of subsidies — which have escalated to 11% of GDP — and increasing the resource generating capacity of the public sector. The Egyptian government introduced some price changes in 1979 — notably for cement, gasoline, cigarettes and soft drinks. Further increases are possible in 1980. The government plans to introduce a 5% sales tax on manufactured items and a major customs tariff reform that would strictly limit exemptions. These measures should have a positive impact on revenues but may prove insufficient to halt the growth of the budget deficit unless the distributive prices for basic commodities are brought more in line with world prices.

On the monetary side, large fiscal deficits have contributed to substantial growth in the money supply, estimated at about 30% in 1979. The high inflation rate has had an adverse impact on the mobilization of private savings in Egyptian pounds — due in large part to exceptionally low interest

rates averaging 6% to 8%. Since private Egyptian citizens are now free to hold foreign currencies, many have shifted their savings to hard currencies which earn Euro-currency returns of 13% to 16%.

The Egyptian government's reluctance to raise the interest rate offered on the Egyptian pound has been attributed to the increased burden that would fall upon public sector companies — the main debtors in Egyptian pound loans. If monetary growth is to be slowed in the future, the fiscal deficit must be reduced and more private domestic savings mobilized.

Investment — Egypt enters the 1980's still suffering from economic policies that resulted in underinvestment and low productivity. The "Open Door" policy has sought to meet these difficulties by encouraging private sector initiative and promoting foreign investment while still retaining a major role for the public sector.

Within the context of economic liberalization, institutional decentralization has also occurred. The individual governates have been allocated a larger share of investment resources — LE 215 million in 1980 compared with only LE 20 million in 1979. Public enterprises are expected to be given greater direct control over the management of their operations.

Within the public sector there has been a noticeable shift in investment priorities as the government emphasizes infrastructure, housing and food production. In the old development plan, industry and mining received the highest share of resources (24%), followed by transportation and communications (23%) and housing and utilities (12%). In the new plan, beginning in 1980, the share of resources going to industry and mining dropped by 4%. The share for housing and utilities rose 6.5% and the share for agriculture rose 3% to 11.5% of the total.

The "Open Door" policy has had a stimulating impact on the private sector. In 1974 the private sector accounted for less than 10% of gross fixed investment; it is now estimated to account for just over 15%. By the end of the year it should reach 16%.

Consumption is soaring

Of total consumption, real growth in the private share (60%) has far outstripped real growth in the government share (20%) — a trend that has caught the eye of critics who charge that the "Open Door" policy has contributed only to widespread availability of consumption goods. A partial explanation is that the propensity to import consumer durables — TV sets, refrigerators, washing machines, cars, etc. — was very high in the aftermath of the austerity and foreign exchange controls of the 1960's and 1970's. There is evidence, however, that while in absolute terms the value of consumer durable imports has increased, privately held foreign exchange has been increasingly used for the importation of investment goods.

Available data on the own exchange market suggest that intermediate and capital goods account


for about 68% of imports financed by privately held foreign exchange, with consumables accounting for the remaining 32%. The share of the latter has declined steadily over the last three years. Smuggled goods, however, are believed for the most part to consist of consumer items, which may offset to some extent the trend suggested by the own exchange market statistics.

By 1979 the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones had approved 1,006 project licenses with estimated total capital of nearly LE 2.5 billion. Most of these have had some element of foreign participation with citizens of other Arab countries accounting for the largest share. Project completion moves slowly and contractors have frequently faced supply bottlenecks, such as shortages of cement, as well as administrative difficulties.

In stimulating the private sector, the government's emphasis

has been on pushing public sector companies gradually into the private sector rather than generating competition with the public sector. Companies in the public sector are being encouraged to form joint ventures (which qualify for Law 43 benefits) with foreign firms on new projects by incorporating new firms and selling shares to the public.

In 1979 public sector companies under the control of the Ministry of Commerce were reported to have formed 10 joint ventures with foreign participation — and total investment of LE 288 million — for the production of cotton yarns and fibers, rubber, beet sugar, automobiles, tractors, refrigerators and washing machines. The mixture of public and private enterprise is not always without problems, however, and it would be exaggeration to suggest that such joint ventures operate in practice like private firms.



Yemen Arab Republic offers opportunities for U.S. business

Although the Yemen Arab Republic has been described as one of the world's 25 least developed countries, its average annual real growth now exceeds 8%—creating opportunities for American business in direct sales, participation in a variety of government-sponsored development projects, and partnership in all kinds of joint-venture companies.

Economic development is encouraged by remittances, which are funds that more than 800,000 Yemenis working abroad send home to their families. These remittances have meant more discretionary income for nearly all of the country's five million inhabitants—money used for building houses, improving farms, and establishing or expanding businesses. They remain the country's major source of foreign currency, even though they have reached a plateau of approximately \$1.5 billion per year.

In the past, remittances accounted for balance-of-payments surpluses and growing foreign exchange reserves despite ever greater foreign trade deficits. In 1979 the picture began to change. Imports grew 57% and, given no increase in the level of remittances and insignificant exports, there was a current account deficit of \$64 million in Fiscal Year (July through June) 1979. Foreign exchange reserves reached \$1.6 billion in March 1979 but then began gradually to diminish, dropping to \$1.5 billion by October 1979. However, the Yemen Arab Republic still has substantial foreign currency reserves and the capital account rose 111% over FY 1978, reaching \$135.2 million in FY 1979. In spite of this, it is probable that the country will experience a slight balance-of-payments deficit in FY 1980.

Increasing trade deficits have great impact on the balance of payments. Because of the nascent industrial sector and present inadequate agricultural output, almost everything must be imported. Efforts to expand industry and agriculture continue but local production simply cannot meet demand.

Another factor influencing both the balance of payments and economic development is the country's labor shortage. Although wages for Yemenis at home are as high as those they can earn in Saudi Arabia, most continue to work abroad believing they can make more money. Even though laws enacted in September 1979 have somewhat limited the numbers of Yemenis who can legally go abroad, the only real solution has been increased use of expatriate labor. There are approximately 5,000 Indians and the same number of Pakistanis working in the Yemen Arab Republic. In addition there are Sudanis, Somalis, Egyptians, Koreans, various Westerners and numerous other foreigners. These people in turn send money back to their own homelands, increasing the outflow of currency and affecting the balance of payments negatively.

Five-Year Plan—The country's five-year plan is the framework for economic development. It envisions 8.2% average annual real growth accompanied by an increase in fixed capital investment from \$170 million in FY 1976 to \$1.23 billion in FY 1981, with an overall investment figure of \$3.5 billion. Results are somewhat below expectations and the plan has been criticized as being too ambitious. However, tremendous development and growth have taken place and the plan remains

an outline of the country's hopes for its future.

Foreign assistance plays an extremely important role. The Yemen Arab Republic receives technical assistance, concessional loans and outright grants from a variety of countries including the United States, as well as from the United Nations and various development funds including the Kuwait Fund. In 1979 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided approximately \$19.6 million, while Saudi Arabia provided an estimated \$250 million in budget support alone. The United Nations Development Assistant Program in the Yemen Arab Republic is among the largest in the world. The current value of all loans available to the country is roughly \$1.1 billion and the terms are so concessional that it repaid only \$9.8 million on the capital account in FY 1979.

The people and government continue their pragmatic support of the free enterprise system. Because of limited resources, the government encourages the private sector to act on its own initiative, provided it stays within the broad industrial development guidelines of the five-year plan. Foreign companies are seen as sources of technology, expertise, management skills and capital, as well as products. Both government and private companies welcome and seek out joint ventures and equity participation with partners from around the world who can deliver know-how and training.

Book Review

BY SAUL S. FRIEDMAN

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Edward Said's *Orientalism* (Pantheon Books, 1978, \$15.00) is so marred by faulty methodology and interpretation, personal bias and invective that it is difficult to decide where to begin a critique.

The book's premise is that the Western World (originally Great Britain and France, but now the United States) has been foisting its own cultural perceptions of the Orient upon people who for several centuries have been victims of what Said terms "the hegemonism of possessing minorities." Distortion, lies, paranoia have been the hallmarks of the 60,000 books dealing with the "Near Orient" which have appeared in the West between 1800 and 1950. That Orient has been misrepresented as a living tableau of queerness, defeated, distant, arcane, while the West is portrayed as powerful and articulate. The Orient (which at the beginning of Said's study encompasses everything from North Africa to Japan, but which is gradually refined to the Arab World and ultimately to Palestine) is nothing but a theatrical stage, the product of self-containing, self-reinforcing Western magic and mythology. Hence the contemporary stereotype of the Arab as a lecherous, bloodthirsty, but colorful, scoundrel.

Said, Parr Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia, labels himself a humanist, a title which purportedly attests to "the unlikely eventuality there might be anything political about what I do in that field." However, from the first page, it is clear that this man who serves as the resident intellectual on the Palestine National Council can never detach himself from his emotional involvement with his Palestinian people. As a result, *Orientalism* is less a study in objectivity than a tirade against all real or fancied enemies of the Arabs.

Those guilty of debasing the civilization of the East include a veritable who's who of the world's great. The list of "Panglossian Orientalists" includes antiquarians Thomas Carlyle, Ernest Renan, Thomas Macaulay, Silvestre de Sacy, and Leopold von Ranke; novelists Albert Camus, Gustave Flaubert, Francois Chateaubriand, and George Eliot; anthropologists Ed-

ward Lane, Alexander Kinglake, Richard Burton, Raphael Patai, and Sania Hamady; missionary societies, the Royal Asiatic Society and the editors of the *Cambridge History of Islam*; philosophers John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx; "Orientalists cum imperial agents" T.E. Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, Ronald Storrs and Harry St. John Philby; politicians Lord Balfour, Evelyn Baring, and Henry Kissinger; and contemporary scholars H.A.R. Gibb, Morroe Berger, Gustave von Grunebaum, Bernard Lewis and Gil Carl Alroy.

None of these offer a legitimate picture of the Middle East because they are all restricted by "unshakable abstract maxims" about Islam, Muhammad, and the "uncomprehending, hence degenerate natives." Equally unreliable (though for no explicable reasons) are the various guidebooks (Baedeker's, Cook's, etc.) which served for so long as bibles to tourists and pilgrims in the Middle East. And finally, the personal reminiscences of the travellers themselves have all been corrupted by "the sheer egoistic powers of the European consciousness" which compels all western publications to conform to the conventional fantasy of what the Middle East ought to be. In such a web of racism, political imperialism and dehumanizing ideology, it is little wonder that the Arab in general, and the Palestinian in particular, has been consigned to a "uniquely purishing destiny."

In a statement reeking of self-pity and inaccuracy, Said declares, "No person academically involved with the Near East—no Orientalist, that is—has ever in the United States culturally and politically identified himself wholeheartedly with the Arabs." Said does concede that some former State Department Arabists and/or oil company representatives have held chairs at universities (a lamentable situation chronicled by Professor Arnold Ages in *Current History* more than a decade ago.) But he deliberately ignores the prestige and power of such "sympathetic" historians as Princeton's Philip Hitti, Johns Hopkins' Majid Khadduri, Georgetown's Hisham Sharabi, Villanova's Fred Khouri, Macalester's Yahya Armajani, W.F. Alwashi and others.

Lest anyone gain the impression that Said demands loyalty or "sympathetic identification" with his people, he offers a late (p.322), limp caveat that "I certainly do not believe the limited proposition that only a black man can write about blacks, a Muslim about Muslims and so forth." Yet the only authors who pass his muster today are Noam Chomsky, Jacques Berque, Roger Owen, Abdel Malek, and Maxine Radinsson. For the most part, these men are linked to their espousal of

violent Third World liberation movements, messianic images of Marxism, and strident anti-Zionism. And none of them would be regarded by any accredited scholarly society as paragons of objectivity.

Were Said only concerned with combatting what he considers to be prejudicial treatment of the Arab past, this book would be bad enough. Repeatedly in his writing, however, his own brand of chauvinism emerges. There is more than a germ of puffery when he speaks of the "fear and awe" engendered in Europe by an Islam that was unconquerable till the 15th century. The Islamic world, the center of civilization during the Middle Ages, a world which could not be subdued like India, China or Japan, presented a "lasting trauma" for Christianity. Echoing the views of Arab League propagandist Clovis Maksoud, Said suggests that world power is shifting back toward the East again. And though he is fully cognizant of the economic stranglehold which Middle East oil has over the industrial West, and though he himself is a beneficiary of the many technological comforts of that same West, Said blithely asks why the Western consumer should believe himself entitled to own or expend the majority of the world's resources.

Chauvinism is only one fault of the book. Since Said is a distinguished semanticist (he has offered lectures at Harvard, Stanford and Princeton) one might expect some dignified use of language in his work. Specificity, at least, should not be unexpected, as Said denounces anyone who is not perfectly fluent in Arabic. And yet we have the spectacle of Bernard Lewis (a scholar whose impartiality has never been challenged in the profession) being accused of "strident Cold Warriorism," of a U.S. intelligence report authored by Harold Glidden for the *American Journal of Psychiatry* being dismissed as "absurd," of Carlyle being faulted for deficiencies in lucidity and stylistic grace. And most of all, we have the spectacle of a semanticist who does not approve of linguistic invention (Said refers to "area study" as an ugly neologism) engaging in that same loathsome practice. Not only is the reader introduced to the concept of "Orientalism," he has to suffer through such neologisms as "the Near Orient," "dis-Oriental" (a term born of the Bandung Conference) or "the White Man" (that villainous object which has tyrannized over blacks, women, and members of the Third World community.)

Said's most flagrant misuse of language, unsurprisingly, comes when he deals with the concept of anti-Semitism. The term (notwithstanding a recent *New Republic* editorial) has only one acceptable dictionary definition, and that is Jew-hatred. It was coined in the 19th century by the racist Wilhelm Marr, who was not disturbed by the conjugation of Arabic verbs or the origins of the Ethiopic language, but by the presence of Jews attempting to assimilate in German society. For the next century, anti-Semitic leagues throughout the world persecuted and pogromized not philologists or Iraqis, but Jews. The result of this animosity was the Holocaust. Said knows this. But as he sees it, and as many contemporary propagandists hasten to point out, Arabs are Semites too. Arabs, the litany continues, cannot then be anti-Semites.

For Said, dislike of Arabs, expressed by Schlegel, Renan or Kinglake is nothing but pure anti-Semitism.

He denounces Leon Poliakov for failing to make this clear in *The Aryan Myth*, Poliakov's study of European racism. And finally, he affirms that Western anti-Semitism today is now anti-Islamic or anti-Palestinian anti-Semitism. Thus we have another indecent example of Jewish martyrdom being expropriated for personal gain by the enemies of the Jews.

It is not surprising that Said should intrude into the special agony of the Jewish people. What is astounding is that a semanticist like Said should concede, even in passing, that there is such a thing as a Jewish people, as he does on page 146 of his book. His reference to Renan's monumental "histories of Christianity and the Jewish people" is a glaring violation of the Palestine National Covenant which denies the existence of anything but a Jewish religion.

Despite Said's affirmation that Islam is not anti-Semitic, his book abounds with snide references to Jews, Israel and Jewish culture. We are told, for example, that the Hebrew's "divine pedigree" was supplanted at the end of the 18th century. Zionists are painted as obstipants to the Wilsonian program of self-determination at the close of World War I. A statement about Arabs made by Chaim Weizmann is somehow transmuted into a section of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Said denounces the "simple-minded" dichotomy in the minds of Westerners where Israel is represented as a democratic, freedom-loving state, while the Arabs are evil, totalitarian, and "terroristic." For Said, the Israelis know only "good" Arabs, who do what they are told, and "bad" Arabs, who refuse and are terrorists. Such free-wheeling statements are consonant with Said's previous condemnations of Zionism, Israeli labor policies, and the Law of Return uttered at the Tripoli Symposium on Zionism and Racism in 1977.

Said, the semanticist, is totally out of his element when he plays historian. His methodology is more than a little suspect. At one point, noting the sparse and inadequate treatment of Arabs and Islam in textbooks, he fails to warn his reader in the body that the survey cited deals with grammar school texts. Elsewhere, in one paragraph he refers to Bernard Lewis and then to "a renowned contemporary Orientalist," as if citing two distinct authorities, when in fact the two citations refer to Professor Lewis. When Said proclaims no Oriental was ever allowed to see a Westerner as he aged and deteriorated, he is oblivious to the presence of many retired colonial officers and their families who took up retirement residence in the East. For two full pages, he regales his readers with Napoleon's motivations for a strike against Egypt at the end of the 19th century. Yet nowhere is there a hint of Napoleon's audacious scheme (noted in Barbara Tuchman's *Bible and Sword*, with which Said is familiar) to issue a Balfour Proclamation for Palestine in 1799! The reader is also told that Islamic civilization is responsible for Europe's knowledge of philosophy, and immediately thereafter referred to the "Arab" view of the world — as if the Arabs alone preserved Graeco-Roman philosophy, as if Europe during the Dark Ages were devoid of thought.

But it is when Said denounces Bernard Lewis (one of his favorite whipping boys) for Lewis' evaluation of a riot in Cairo in 1945 that Said's true historical character emerges. By what right, Said demands to know, can

this "anti-imperialist" riot be labelled "anti-Jewish." Had the Columbia professor bothered to inquire, he could easily have ascertained that his so-called anti-imperialist riot occurred on November 2, 1945, the 28th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, that the Ashkenazi synagogue in Cairo was burned, as was a Jewish home for the aged, a soup kitchen for children, a shelter for indigent transients, a Jewish hospital, the quarters of a Jewish art society, and numerous other Jewish public buildings. (See Joseph Schechtman's *On Wings of Eagles*, p.187.)

That Said failed to check the facts on the Cairo riot is not remarkable. His book is rife with glaring omissions. Although his predecessor as literary spokesman for the Palestinians, George Antonius offered up a lengthy section on Reverend Daniel Bliss, Eli Smith and the Protestant Syrian College (now the American University of Beirut) in his *Arab Awakening*, there is not so much as a thank you for the civilizing and

educational activities of these men in *Orientalism*. Though American imperialism, manifest in Rand think tanks and Middle East institutes, is scored, there is only a passing reference to Russian goals and activities in the region.

Orientalism is a torturously-written book, with labyrinthine asides, irrelevancies, and lengthy sado-masochistic pieces excerpted from the works of Flaubert, Lane and others for no purpose other than the very titillation which Said claims he opposes. It is a book permeated with anger, projection, mythopoeism, and partisanship. Its transparent purpose is to win support for the Palestinians in their dispute with Israel. As such, it is part of a growing anti-Israel literature that claims to enlighten and that itself has a "cumulative and corporate identity." *Orientalism's* one valid point is that a lie repeated often enough gains credibility among the gullible and spiteful. The world did not need Edward Said to offer that revelation.



Document

Syria-USSR

Syrian-Soviet Friendship Treaty. Syria and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow on October 9, 1980 a 20-year friendship and cooperation treaty, which basically secured Syria a greater commitment by the Soviet Union for the defense of the Arab state. The following is an unofficial translation of the provisions of the treaty as published in the Arabic press Oct. 10th, and as circulated by the Soviet news agency, TASS:

"The USSR and the Syrian Arab Republic, motivated by a desire to consolidate and develop the existing relations of friendship and complete cooperation between them in accordance with the interests of their two peoples, the cause of peace and security in the world, the consecration of international detente and development of peaceful cooperation among nations,

"and absolutely determined to confront and firmly deter the aggressive policy of imperialism and its agents, and to pursue the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations, including Zionism, and in support of national independence and social progress,

"and in view of the great importance of pursuing the coexistence between the two countries in support of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

"and reaffirming the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter, including the principles of respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations,

"decided to conclude this treaty and agreed on the following:

"Article 1: The two signatories declare their intention to develop and consolidate the relations of friendship and cooperation between their two states and peoples in the political, economic, military, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of equality, mutual interest, respect for sovereignty, national independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

"Article 2: The two signatories will work with all means to consolidate international peace, the security of peoples, and to reduce international tension by translating that into tangible forms of cooperating among nations, settlement of disputes through peaceful means and deterring practices of hegemony and aggression in international relations. The two sides will cooperate actively towards stopping the arms race, complete and global disarmament, including nuclear weapons, under effective international supervision.

"Article 3: The two contracting parties, inspired by the belief in equality among all peoples and nations regardless of race or creed, condemn imperialism, racism and Zionism, which is one form of racism, and reaffirm

their intention to join in the struggle against it relentlessly. The two sides will cooperate with other nations in supporting the legitimate aspirations of other peoples in their struggle against imperialism until it is completely liquidated, and against foreign domination for the sake of freedom and social progress.

"Article 4: The USSR respects Syria's non-aligned policy, which constitutes an important factor for the preservation and consolidation of international peace and security, and the reduction of international tensions. The Syrian Arab Republic represents the USSR's peaceloving foreign policy, which aims at consolidating friendship and cooperation among all states and peoples.

"Article 5: The two contracting parties will develop and expand the regular exchange of views and consultations regarding their cordial relations and international issues that concern them, primarily the Middle East problems. The exchange of views and consultations will take place at different levels, especially through meetings between the leading official personalities of the two countries.

"Article 6: In case of conditions that threaten the peace and security of either of the two sides, or jeopardize international peace and security in general, the two contracting parties will immediately hold contacts aimed at coordinating their positions and cooperating to remove the threat and restore the peace.

"Article 7: The two contracting parties undertake to cooperate closely and totally in creating conditions conducive to the preservation and development of the social and economic accomplishments of their two peoples, and respect for each other's sovereignty over its natural resources.

"Article 8: The two signatories undertake to consolidate and expand their cooperation in the economic, scientific and tactical fields, and exchange expertise in the fields of industry, agriculture, irrigation, water resources, petroleum and other natural resources, as well as in transport and telecommunications. The two sides will expand their trade and shipping on the basis of mutual interests, equality and reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment.

"Article 9: The two signatories will continue to develop cooperation and exchange of expertise in the fields of education, science, art, literature, health, information and cinema, tourism, sports and other areas.

"Article 10: The two signatories will continue to develop cooperation in the military sphere on the basis of existing agreements and according to their interests in consolidating their defense capabilities.

"Article 11: Each of the two signatories undertakes not to join or take part in alliances or groupings, or

participate in actions or measures directed against the other.

"Article 12: Each of the two signatories affirms that his commitments under existing international agreements do not contradict with the provisions of this treaty, and undertakes not to conclude any international agreements that would conflict with this treaty.

"Article 13: Any disputes that might arise between the two signatories regarding the interpretation or application of any provision of this treaty will be resolved in a spirit of understanding, friendship and respect.

"Article 14: This treaty will be valid for twenty years starting from the date it is put into effect, and for five-year intervals thereafter, unless either of the two parties declares, six months before the treaty expires, its desire to terminate it.

"Article 15: This treaty is subject to ratification and will become effective on the day the instruments of ratification are exchanged in Damascus."

The treaty was signed by President Leonid Brezhnev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and President Hafez Assad of the Syrian Arab Republic.



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