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AWACS and Arms Sales, 1981.



AWACS And Arms Sales  
Daniel Jeremy Silver  
October 25, 1981

Sometime this coming week, unless the Reagan administration withdraws its proposal, the Senate of the United States will vote to approve or disapprove an eight and a half billion dollar arms sale agreement with the government of Saudi Arabia. The House of Representatives has already overwhelmingly voted to disapprove that sale and so that vote in the Senate has a degree of authority and finality to it and, as you know, there has been frenetic lobbying, great media concern about the vote over these past few weeks. Both proponents and opponents of the measure have told us that there will be cataclysmic consequences if their particular position is not affirmed. I confess that I cannot see this decision as having that kind of serious consequence. I don't think it will change much that exists, the tensions, the realities of the Middle East. I look upon this contest, this decision, rather, as one of a number of ongoing confrontations between the administration and the Congress, between any administration and any Congress over the control of the decision-making process in the area of foreign affairs. We are coming off of a period in which the Congress has asserted a certain degree of authority in this area against the imperial presidencies of Kennedy, Mr. Johnson, Nixon and this is another one of those, as I see it, tests of force, tests of authority, between the legislative and administrative branches of the government. And in that see-saw continuing battle this decision will have some consequences. It will either say that the Congress will continue to have a major voice in certain areas, particularly the area of military sales and procurement, foreign aid, or it will say that the Administration, this administration, at least, has for the moment at least almost decisive authority in these areas. I think that, in other words, that the lobbying and media buildup, the concern which has been shown is, to a certain degree, out of proportion to the real issues that are involved. If the agreement to the sale is reached and over the next several years the five AWAC planes which are its central feature but not its only



feature, are sent on and added to the Saudi arsenal the Saudis will not be at the end of their equipment any better prepared to deal with an external attack from Iraq or Iran or Yemen or even from the Soviets than they would have been otherwise. The AWAC planes are in the air at this very moment over Saudi Arabia. This Administration has given a blanket statement of our willingness to defend the Saudis at any cost to us if they are attacked, and that statement by President Reagan just three weeks ago was backed by that ultimate authority of international arrangements, that is, it is in our own national interest to do so; the West cannot afford to have the several millions of barrels a day of oil which are coming on to the Western markets. And we certainly can't afford to have one quarter of the earth's known oil reserve falling into enemy hands. And so the Saudis could rest confident that this administration means what it says. The planes are there and little will change on sight by this particular sale. If the sale is defeated, and it appears that it may in fact be defeated, the Saudis will not be weakened in any way for the truth is that they will be able to purchase equivalent equipment on the open market. We live in a world where if you have money you can purchase anything from atomic weapons to AWAC planes. The British have already indicated to the Saudi government that if this particular arms package fails to go through they will have ready for sale to the Saudi Air Force a plane known as the Nimrod which is roughly the equivalent of the spy plane, the communication center and the control craft which the AWAC represents. And so whether the sale is approved or disapproved the situation as far as the security of the Saudis will not be measurably affected. And if you doubt that any weapon that you wish to procure can be procured on the open market, I hope you have been following the disclosures of recent days about the arms purchase ability of the Libyan government. This rogue government which has sponsored terrorism around the world which we thought was equipped by and trained by Eastern block technicians and Eastern block armaments we now discover to be receiving through various channels large amounts of western military equipment and to have its military, to a very large degree, trained by and equipped by those who come out of our own military and intelligence establishment. In point of fact, in



recent days we have discovered that not only are Westerners, British, French and Americans training the Libyans in the use of arms and the use of very sophisticated equipment, but apparently many of them were involved in the invasion of Chad, the African nation to Libya's north and have been engaged in what would be equivalent to actual operations on behalf of this rogue government.

If the sale fails to go through the Israeli government, the Israeli military position will not be markedly improved because the Nimrods and other equipment will be there. If it goes through the Israeli position will not be markedly weakened because, at least in the short term, the United States will feel it necessary to maintain at least the posture of evenhandedness, to sell some jamming equipment and other kinds of equipment to the Israelis. And, in any case, given the world as it is once technology has been developed technology will pour into those areas, military technology where it is wanted, and each action by one side requires a counter action by the other. You can't keep today, atomic weaponry, AWAC planes, whatever, out of the conflicts of the world.

And finally, and I think most importantly for us to remember, if the sale is defeated the relationships between our own government and the Saudi government, or rather between our own government and Saudi oil and business contracts, will not change despite the shadows that are being predicted, the crises that are being predicted by those who are trying to sponsor the sale, it's a simple truth that neither Saudi self-interest nor American self-interest will permit the rupture of this relationship. We require Saudi oil, the recycling of the petro dollars. The Saudis require our technicians, our equipment, our man power. Saudi Arabia, when all is said and done, is a country in search of a population. Saudi Arabia is not defended by Saudi Arabians in any significant sense. It is defended by the West. There are forty thousand American technicians, equipment specialists and officers in Saudi Arabia today. The entire plan for the rearming of the Saudi government, the Saudi military, was drawn up by the Pentagon. And in addition to the forty thousand Americans, many of whom are not only in our active military



but are in other departments of our government who are building up the Saudi army, the Saudi infrastructure, the roads, the electricity, the airports, the ports, which are required for a modern military power. There are an equal number of English, French and West Germans, eighty thousand from the West in all who are essentially the hessions, the mercenaries, the man power which makes whatever effect the Saudi military may have effective.

So the Saudis cannot live without us and we cannot, we think, live without them and so very little will change on the sight, whatever be the decision taken by the Senate next week. Let me step back for a moment because I think it's important for all of us to recognize the background of this issue and what is really being talked about.

The present Saudi government represents the ascension of a group of once nomadic tribes called the ausaudis who came into power in the central areas of this vast sub-continent in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Saudi Arabia is a country three times the size of modern France. Only one percent of the Saudi Arabian territory is arable, cultable, and the large interior areas and most of the coastlands have traditionally been governed by fiercely independent tribes whose only bond of contact was the fact that they shared the Muslim faith and that there were temporary truces of God during the hejira, during they time when they made haj, when they made pilgrimages to Mecca, to the holy place, which is in Jahasz on the Red Sea in the western area of the Saudi Arabian peninsula.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, because of the increasing contact of Arabians, of these Muslims, with foreigners, particularly the British and the French, there developed among some of these tribes a form of Muslim revivalism, a kind of Calvinist Muslim position known as Wahabi. And the Alsoudis paramilitary tribal chiefs make common cause with this evangelistic and pietistic Wahabi Muslim approach, and this allowed them to create an institution called the fellowship which allowed the Arabs for the first time to come together, trans-



cending these narrow tribal loyalties and they created the Ifwan which is a sense of fellowship, military fellowship, from various tribes, people who came together, were drawn together by the love of booty, by the love of conquest and by the Wahabi missionary zeal. And over a period of thirty or forty years and much bloodshed this Ausaudi-led military fellowship established effective control over most of the sub-continent.

And then in the 1920's they felt strong enough to move down to the settled areas in the Hijaz where Mecca and Medina exist and they overran those cities and they gained effective control over that part of the world. But then the military fellowship fell to fighting among itself. The tribal traditions reasserted themselves, and though the Ausaudis were able by the late 1920's to reestablish their authority, they never forgot the fact that they cannot trust their own, that the tribal relationships are still powerful, and so even today there are two, not one but two, Arab Saudi armies. There is the so-called National Army which is centered in five great military centers around the country. It has the tanks. And there is the National Guard, another army, which is centered in the cities and it has the anti-tank equipment. And these two groups are constantly being played off against each other. And even today when these two groups are equipped with the most modern of weapons, and when we're talking about the repelling of an enemy attack and even the repelling of a Soviet attack, the numbers are so miniscule that it makes this whole issue almost one that's laughable.

They estimate that there are between thirty and forty-five thousand Saudis in the regular army; and the Institute for Strategic Services in London, which is the most prestigious of all the public intelligence agencies, opts for the lower number, that there are about thirty thousand men in the Saudi Arabian army. And there are between fifteen and thirty thousand men in the Saudi Arabian National Guard, and again the Institute for Strategic Studies in London opts for the lower of these two figures. Combine these two figures of an army which is now played



off one against the other, an army against the National Guard, and you have forty-five to sixty-thousand men under arms. That's the entire Saudi army.

Now, there's no chance, really, for the Saudis to build up this army of theirs in a major way. There is no known public census of the indigenous population of Arabia. Or, rather, there is a census, but it is a state secret, guarded and known only to the royal family. The census would seem to indicate, our intelligence sources tell us, that there may be four million indigenous people in Saudi Arabia - four million. Half of these, at least, are women, and that's a matter of moment when one talks about man power, human power, resource in that part of the world because the women are kept aside. Only forty thousand women in all of Saudi Arabia are gainfully employed outside of domestic service, and these women are employed only in activities which relate to other women. They are teachers in girls' schools. They are nurses in women's wards. They deal in shops in areas where only women purchase goods. They are very limited as to what they can do. And when a Saudi woman is allowed to go abroad for an education she is not allowed to enroll in the school of economics or in the school of government or in the school of business administration. She's not allowed to train herself in any of the so-called man's work, man's world activity.

And so there are maybe two million Saudis who are male, and that includes the most recently born infant, and the aged. Of these two millions of indigenous Saudis ten percent are bedouin who are still roaming the vastness of the desert which is the largest part of the sub-continent. Two-thirds are illiterate or semi-literate either because they're too young or grew up before the present intensive educational programs were undertaken. And so, brutally, clearly, the man power resource of Saudi Arabia is inadequate to deal with the economic, political, social and military infrastructures and structures which are being created. The result has been that the Saudis have had to import their man power. There are now approximately eight million people in the country, but almost all



of them they have imported or all whom they have imported are non-Saudis. They owe their interest, they are cultured by other traditions. They come from the West where you deal with the highest levels of technology. They come from South Korea, from Srilanka, from Bengal, from the Phillipines, when you deal with man power which is working on the roads and doing the heavy labor, they come from Egypt, among Palestinians, among Syrians and Iraqis when you talk of the middle level of the bureaucracy. And these two, three, four million workers, employees, mercenaries who have been brought in obviously have other interests, bring in other ideas, have other political attitudes and concerns, and this is particularly important when you deal with the northern Arabs who have come into the country. Sixty-seven percent of the teachers in junior high schools in Saudi Arabia are either Egyptians or Palestinians. Eighty-seven percent of all the teachers in the high schools are either Palestinians or Egyptians and a hundred percent of all the teachers in the non-yeshivot, non-Koranic schools, are either Westerners, Palestinians or Egyptians. Now, these people have other philosophies than that puritanical, feudal, autocratic philosophy which is that of the ruling class, the feudal aristocracy of Saudi Arabia, and obviously, covertly, subtly, they are transmitting a great deal of their concerns, their interests, and their philosophies to their Saudi students.

The Saudi government made no attempt to modernize its military, really, until the 1960's, and when it did so its concern was not Israel, its concern was pan-Arabism. This was the era of Nasser, and General Nasser, you'll remember, fomented a revolution in that southern area of Arabia which is called Yemen and a democratic republic of Yemen emerged which was revolutionary in its philosophy, a republic, by the way, whose army equals in numbers the army of the Saudis. And in Saudi Arabia itself, both among the Syrian and Palestinian and the Egyptian technical class who had been brought into the country, and among a small number of Saudis in the military, the lower ranks of the military who were not aristocrats, that is, not members of the El Saudi group, Nasserite ideas spread rapidly. There



was a rebellion in the air force in 1969 which effectively grounded the entire air force of the Saudis. There were rebellions in a number of the cities which were quickly suppressed. Fearful of the democratic republic of Yemen, fearful of Nasser's Egyptian army, the Saudis turned to the west for technicians, for experts and for equipment. And this was precisely the time when the British had decided to retreat from east of Suez and when Mr. Nixon and his administration proclaimed the doctrine that would find elsewhere in the world surrogate governments who could be the military force and replace our troops wherever they existed. And so we went into a period in which Iran and Saudi Arabia would seem to be as the forces which would stabilize the Middle East as far as the oil-producing areas were concerned, and we began pouring equipment, technicians, manpower, into these countries. It was a very happy solution. Alone among the underdeveloped parts of the world they were still not <sup>within</sup> the Soviet orbit. Iran and Saudi Arabia could pay for the equipment we were sending in. Our military-industrial complex was delighted with the contracts that they were receiving. Our military was delighted to be able to use its skills and to teach its skills to others, and in 1972, 1974 and 1976 the Pentagon and the CIA and our other government agencies developed for the Saudis major two, three and five-year plans which were designed at great cost to the Saudis to develop for them a modern air force, a modern navy, and to modernize their army and their national guard.

By 1978 intelligence reports coming back to the west began to use a term describing what was happening in Saudi Arabia and the term was saturation. You may recall that in 1978 the Carter Administration proposed to the Congress another multi-billion dollar Saudi equipment, arm equipment, bill. The major feature was sending to them sixty F-15's, the latest fighter bomber in our Air Force. And the opposition to the sale at that time was very much as it is today, that the Saudis might be able to use these arms against Israel, our staunch ally in that part of the world and, more importantly, that they lacked the pilots, they lacked



the skills, to fly, to maintain the arms that we were giving them. The Carter Administration's response was very much like that of the Reagan Administration. There would be guarantees that the planes would not be equipped so that they could fly all the way to Israel and back. The extra bomb racks and the extra wing tanks were not sent along with the planes and we would send sufficient technicians and sufficient manpower to see that these planes went back constantly operable.

In 1979 it became clear that despite our assertions and our promises we were not able to keep the equipment which had already been sent to the Saudis in operation. You may recall that in 1979 a small group, estimated between 300 and 500 desert Saudis, occupied the great shrine at Mecca and held off the Saudi National Guard for a number of days. During that period of time the Yemenees mobilized their army on the Saudi's southwestern border and the National Guard was rushed to the border, they wanted to rush the National Guard to the border in order to defend it. They found that they were unable to move their National Guard despite the fact that it had the most advanced English Rover armor personnel carriers in the world. It lacked sufficient number of men equipped to drive these armored Rovers, and where there were enough drivers the equipment was not serviced and was inoperable. And if they can't operate a truck or armored carrier how can they operate the most sophisticated aircraft in the world? And so what we have is a condition where a small country is being asked to undertake a military expansion far beyond its capacity to maintain in anything but cost, and where it is demanding equipment because it likes the most advanced playthings, it's an aristocratic country, which it really has no way of handling.

That's the problem. If saturation existed in 1978 imagine what exists when you talk about the new equipment in this eight and a half billion dollar new program which is being proposed. The Saudis have more equipment than they have skilled personnel on a one for one basis, and the very skilled pilots required must all come from the Saudis, that is from the small aristocratic upper class who insist that they want to be the flying cowboys, there's macho involved in all of



this, no one else may go into the cockpits. And so, in point of fact, the reality is that if it weren't for the eighty thousand western technicians who I'm confident are often operating these planes in the air and operating the communications equipment on the ground, the Saudis would find that all of this equipment would be stalled, inoperative and useless within a very short period of time.

If it were not so serious an issue one would wonder at the sechel of our administration, of our Pentagon, of our diplomats, of the Saudis themselves in terms of their approach; but the Saudis are a feudal aristocracy and they have money, and lots of it, and they have a paranoia about guns, they've always lived by the gun; and they want the best, and by God we can afford it; and if the Westerners are stupid enough to be willing to send it to us and they send us along the hessions and the mercenaries who will fly these things and keep them going for us, so much the better, we can afford it. There is a serious question whether they in fact can afford it. The present building up of the infrastructure and the equipment of the Saudis has cost them over two billion dollars in the last five years and the estimates are that it will cost them 391 billion dollars in the next four years. And if you wonder at the reason that Saudi oil exports have kept up with the nine or ten million barrel per day level it's because if they fall below that level at current market prices they will not be able to support the development projects which they have now in the works.

The idea that the Saudis can make a major contribution to the defense of the oil fields is laughable. They haven't the manpower. The Iraqi army which sits to the north is five to seven times the size of the Saudi army. The Jordanian army which sits to the west and to the north is three times the size of the Saudi army. The Syrian army which sits to the north and to the west is five times the size of the Saudi army, and these are armies which are fairly effective, well trained and not dependent upon foreign nationals. Indeed, they are armies whose own citizens sit in places of power within the Saudi army itself, and that's



one of the major concerns of many who are voting against this arms sale, not only that there might be a repetition of what took place in Iran where some of the latest American electronic and communications equipment fell quickly into the hands of a rebel government which took over from that of the king, but that it would be very simple for the Palestinians, the 350 thousand Palestinians, who are part of the bureaucratic and technocratic and military infrastructure or the 175 thousand Egyptians who are in similar positions simply to walk away with the blueprints or fly away with the planes themselves. The security of our own military establishment is a matter of concern. What I've been suggesting throughout this approach is that the issue is not an Israel-Arab issue. In point of fact, I think that the existence of the so-called Israel lobby, if there be such, has played in this connection a major constructive role in a very important domestic political debate because there was sufficient concern about Israel to cause a number of senators, a number of people who are not predisposed to support Israel in all things or in many things, Senator Hatfield of Oregon comes immediately to mind, to look hard at this issue and to recognize that ultimately the only defense of this whole program is that it is a way of supporting those hundred and forty American corporations who are now involved in the selling of electronic equipment, of military equipment, around the world, and on no other grounds can this sale be defended. They will not support the Saudis in any way, not give them the strength they lack otherwise. The oil wells which they control will be defended if they are defended by the American fleet, by American troops that can be transported into the area, that's the only way they can ultimately be defended, and the existence of this armament poured into a land where it can easily be transported some place else for whatever purposes is a destabilizing influence throughout the Middle East.

On the one hand the Saudis are so weak that they must pay hundreds of millions of dollars a year in blackmail to the Palestine Liberation Organization which is a group of terrorists. On the other hand we speak almost in the same

free its own foreign policy from the veto of a small group of Arab sheiks.



breath that the Administration speaks, of the Saudis as a major force to prevent the Soviet Union from moving down and taking over the oil fields. It's laughable. The Saudis cannot maintain their own security from subversion with any confidence and somehow they are going to sustain the west from Soviet movement south towards the ports, towards the oil lands.

It it is in fact in the national interest to protect Saudi Arabian oil fields from our enemies we'll have to do it ourselves. That's a very difficult decision that the Administration and others will have to make. To go about it this way is to delude one's self as to what is involved. Our government recognizing this, has argued that we need to keep up the ties of friendship with a moderate Arab state, implying that somehow the Saudis are a force for moderation in the Middle East and in the interest of our own interests. That was the position taken by the Carter Administration to defend the 1978 sale of the sixty F-15 planes, and the results of that are clear. After 1978, after the sale, we had the Camp David Accords and the Saudis sabotaged as best they could the Camp David Accords. They put pressure on Jordan not to enter. They decried the Accords in every way they could. They increased their contributions to the Palestine Liberation Organization and they organized an economic boycott of Egypt. If we're buying friendship there ought to be a quid pro quo and there's no evidence that we can buy that friendship. In point of fact, the Saudis are so weak that they cannot alienate any of the radical forces within the Arab world. They are few and the masses of the Arab world are many. They sit on wealth and the masses in the Arab world are poor and they know that they have to buy off the masses, they can't afford to stand against them, and masses, illiterate masses of people any place in the world are easily inflamed.

At issue, I believe, in this contest is not the stability of the Middle East and not the security of the Saudis, not even, really, the profits of our industrial military corporations, but, rather, the ability of the United States to free its own foreign policy from the veto of a small group of Arab sheiks.



I'll give the present administration credit for one accomplishment. Under the vacillation of the last years of the Carter Administration we allowed the Saudis to veto a program to put into the ground a strategic oil reserve. The Saudis said to us, we want to be able to control all production, we want to have the boycott power, and so we won't allow you to put into these caves that you've cut into the salt flats in the west millions of barrels of oil in reserve against the cutoff of oil deliveries. And, believe it or not, the Carter Administration succumbed and we stopped almost at the beginning the stockpiling of the oil reserve which we require for our economy and for our defense. The Carter Administration agreed with the Saudis that we would not publish or make known even to the departments of our own government the extent of Saudi economic activity in the United States even though the billions of petro dollars being sent over here for investment, if they were suddenly pulled back, might destabilize and do terrible things to our economy. Our own government could not discover because our own government was too cowardly to stand up against the Saudis, could not discover where the investment was, the magnitude of the investments, the consequences and, therefore, to make plans as to the consequences if these investments were withdrawn. And, finally, every time the Saudis have demanded arms, even though we know that they cannot have used these arms, they cannot possibly be put to useful use, we have kowtowed, bowed our heads, and agreed.

What is at issue here is the independence of our own policy from the oil barons of the world. That's the only real issue that's involved and the reason that I believe a majority of the Senate will this week, if the issue is submitted to them finally, vote to disallow the arms sale. And when they do it will not be because American Jews have mounted a powerful propaganda lobby, it will not be because Israel's defenses will be weakened. It will be because of the recognition of what the reality is in the Middle East, what the Saudi government really is and is not, its weakness and not its strength, and because of the recognition that we have to have if we are to assert ourselves in the world and play our legitimate



role as a major power in the world, we have to have independence to act in our own best interests. We cannot simply be told by a sheik who has billions of dollars, I want AWAC, I want atomic weapons, I want laser beams, I want the latest wrinkle. They are incapable of using them. Their ability to use them is questionable, and the final disposition of these weapons remains a matter of great concern.

We face, we live in a cruel world. We face difficult decisions, but the truth about the Saudis at least in the Middle East is that they are weak, not strong. They're underpopulated. They cannot for long really protect the booty on which the oil, on which they sit. They are protected now by others, by us, by western Europe, by northern Arabs, by Asians. But every one of the mercenaries who are there, and I include the United States among their mercenaries, every mercenary group that is there has its own purpose in being there and it's not identical with the Saudi purpose. And, ultimately, as the billions of dollars pour in, as the changes take place in the society, the dislocations which are inevitable, the Saudi situation will become a more and more complex and roiling convulsed one, just in terms of its own domestic dimensions. Ultimately, the country will be revealed, I think, to everyone to be the small, weak piece of geography in search of a population that it really is. Saudi Arabia is not a nation. It's a country of a few million people sitting on oil whose wealth knows that it cannot stay in power, that's why it's investing so much of that wealth abroad, involved in all kinds of development projects, some well conceived, some ill conceived, which presumably will bring it into the twentieth century but it's burdened by a philosophy, burdened by a religion which is medieval, and burdened ultimately by its inability to develop an indigenous culture, a concept of citizenship which would allow the sense of loyalty of a nationhood to develop. Ultimately, I'm afraid that America will discover that Saudi Arabia will go if not the way of Iran, it will become something beruled by others quite different than those who rule Saudi Arabia now and we'll have to make our peace with that. But for now, to place into their hands these weapons of



attack, control, destruction is really an ultimate fact of folly tempered only by the fact that if we were ever to withdraw suddenly our mercenaries, our technicians, the Saudis wouldn't know what to do with the equipment that was in place. It couldn't fly, it couldn't be shot, it couldn't be used. Perhaps in a sense that's our ultimate weapon against the oil weapon. If you boycott us we'll pull away from you, but I seriously doubt that the oil-dependent powers that control so much of the discussion<sup>of</sup> the personnel in the State Department and elsewhere would ever tolerate that kind of idea.

What;s in the future? What happens if, as seems likely now, the vote is against the AWAC sale? Will the American Jewish community be blamed? Will American Jews be accused of disloyalty? The answer is yes. And will it be significant in the social structure in our lives? The answer is probably no. We move on today from crisis to crisis so quickly that these crises tend to be forgotten. But yes, we will be blamed. The whole issue has been

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the rule was put on about - and 6  
year later - which was of idea - But  
now it is clear could be used quite  
in the operation and the idea was







1. and is no population problem & dependent on  
major local supply - main supply is  
definite supply -

There are 2-3 in my own family in  
Canada in Quebec - 63% of all for the 1950s  
Tories - 1 50% of all the Jewish families are  
also English in Quebec - 7 on an average in  
other countries. Some other new are also  
Levitt -

The Report shows correctly & clearly  
31T and 45T are not related  
as a single unit, the National Board  
on Immigration is not open and  
not subject to any form  
B2 order - SA will not any  
250T are not any -

The Scandinavian have not had any  
but a few are off - - of the  
have become to be - as  
Scandinavian are all of which are  
are in very great -



add to new series entries - to include (C)  
and ( notes to be added - new pages - new  
entries ) - - - see end of year -

[ Subject - Notes to pages - year - - -

S.A. End - Serial entry - new entry.

also ( any new ) new pages -

Notes and - new entry - new entry -

Truth notes - new entry -

to publish of an new series entry entry to  
new series new entry - new entry new entry  
introduction - Notes to publish to new entry  
pages - new entry - new entry new entry

OF THE WORKS

The agreed on an new entry entry  
between new entry new entry - new entry  
between new entry - new entry new entry - new entry  
new entry - new entry new entry - new entry  
new entry - new entry new entry - new entry



[illegible]

The above reports to see as with all  
need some further information as well

22 August 1972

- 1) Fayed any Dumb
- 2) any - but 4 left
- 3) 2 more - 100
- 4) Total

By reason of the / production -  
the 4th and 5th / 1st and 2nd



not possible and even 117 + 3910

and I am here + counted

The report will be made accordingly  
before provided - page number indicated  
which is <sup>name</sup> James Conrad Tracy ~~showed~~

and was with - article 9  
showing myself James - 6 cases in 6 months  
which are most days

- 1) <sup>status</sup> will James - <sup>page</sup>
- 2) investigate - C.S. - will  
to be investigate pages
- 3) investigate will will

James Jones -

25th in 020 N2 - To ANNOUNCE OF  
FOR OR will will will will will  
it will will will - 5 will will  
note will will will