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Lebanon: to Be or Not to Be, 1983.



Lebanon: To Be or Not To Be  
Daniel Jeremy Silver  
May 1, 1983

I want to talk this morning about Lebanon. As you know, I intended to do so last week but I was levelled by a virus. I'd like to begin by reminding you that when the guns finally were silenced in September and when the PLO took its noisy and well televised exit from Beirut, our own government announced as its immediate aim policy to remove all foreign forces from Lebanese territory. There are, of course, three foreign forces in Lebanon. In the South the Israelis, in the East in the area known as the Becca Valley which comprises about half of all of Lebanon, the Syrians, and operating within the Syrian lines and also in the north around Tripoli and Latakia, a force of from 10 to 20,000 PLO regulars. All of the negotiations which the United States pushed were between Israel and the formal government in Beirut. The Israelis originally demanded, as you recall, that there be a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel and that there be some kind of guarantee of the southern area that would be free of infiltration by terrorists and not again be a base from which an army could launch an attack on northern Israel. The Lebanese, after a long and protracted debate over procedural matters, indicated that they were not all interested or willing to enter into any kind of peace negotiation. They claimed that this would forever cut them off from the Arab world which is their natural market, and as if to emphasize this point, the Saudi Arabian government which is presumably working on our side announced that it would embargo all goods that were originating in Lebanon. Lebanon also announced that it would not permit joint patrols or the return of major Hadad whose Christian militia forces had been patrolling the southern part of Lebanon before the summer war. That's where the negotiations have largely remained. As you know, our own Secretary of State is in the Middle East now in the form of shuttle diplomacy trying to get some kind of final agreement. What has been assumed by our government and I think innocently and naively, is that if an agreement is achieved between the Lebanese government and Beirut and the Israelis, the Syrians and the PLO will simply pack up their tents and leave. I frankly don't see any reason why they should. The



PLO simply has no other place to go. If it returns these forces to Syria, they will come under the Syrian National Army as already a full PLO division within that army, but they will have lost their independence. No other Arab state permits the PLO to act with any degree of independence on its own territory. As for the Syrians, I think it's important to recognize that Syria has never recognized Lebanon as an independent government. The Syrians consider Lebanon to be part of Syria, and indeed historically, they have good claim. For never in history has Lebanon been an independent state except in our century, and throughout history it has either been part of an empire ruling out of Syria or part of the province of Syria whether it was organized by Rome or by one of the Caliphates or by the Byzantine empire or by the Ottoman Turks. Moreover, in terms of cost, the Syrians have no reason to want to leave Lebanon. It is a profitable occupation for them, and like most occupations the <sup>Bekaa</sup>~~Becaa~~ Valley is one of the great harvest areas of hashish in the world. The selling of this harvest brings needed hard currency to the Syrian government allowing them to pay for some of the arms which the Russian government has given them through the years and is now giving to them in very large quantities and at very great cost. Syria is not an oil rich Arab country and it is a very radical Arab country whose basic ties are with the Soviet Union. It has absolutely no reason to cooperate in a policy which the United States government Washington, conceives to be in our interest and frankly I fail to see why given even an Israeli-Lebanese agreement for the removal of Israeli forces, it serves to do anything but perhaps a modest thinning out of their forces. I can't see why they would want to leave the <sup>Bekaa</sup>~~Becaa~~ Valley which is a natural western frontier of this plateau area which is Syria. The <sup>Bekaa</sup>~~Becaa~~ Valley area abuts the mountains of Lebanon and provides them a natural defense frontier. Moreover, they will have every excuse in the world given their language and their ideology not to withdraw because they will say we will not go any further until the last vestiges of Zionist western imperialism have been removed from Lebanon by which they will mean any kind of security agreement which Israel has negotiated and that kind Israel, of course, will not move out of Lebanon without



such agreements and will not remain out of Lebanon if these agreements are not, in fact, enforced. United States policy is one which has a large degree of acceptability in our own country. We don't like military occupation. We assume that a country should be independent. We have intended to go along with Washington because it seemed to be doing the right thing for once. But I'd like to ask a different question of you this morning. That is, whether in fact, Lebanon can be an independent country, whether we are talking about independence in any kind of constructive sense or whether or not the policy which we are adopting will not simply precipitate Lebanon back into the kind of civil strife which tore it apart between 1975 and 1978 because one or another of the 20 major militias which are the governments of Lebanon will fight with each other over turf, taxes, import, and custom duties and all the perquisites of a national power. I would remind you that between 1975 and 1978, 50,000 Lebanese and foreigners were killed in that civil war, and by the end of the war no one was sure who was fighting with anyone else. Lebanon had, in fact, become a series of <sup>quasi</sup> ~~quasi~~ independent futile states each governed by one or another ethnic religious force each supported by the taxes and customs that this force was able to devise and to take and often by monies that were coming from outside governments. During the 1960's and 70's over \$300,000,000 a year were sent by Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other of the Arab states to one or another of these forces and during the 1960's and 1970's these various militias each governing a particular piece of territory were able to receive in taxes and customs duties \$50 for every \$5 which the so called legitimate government of Lebanon was able to collect. The ports of Lebanon, outside of a small part of the Port of Beirut, are controlled each by a different militia, each by a different government, they collect the customs. Those militias engage in massive smuggling which is another source of major income. Each of them is well armed, far better armed than the so called former Lebanese army, and there is no reason to believe that the formal Lebanese army the nominal Lebanese government in which we are putting so much trust is able to effectively govern Lebanon. What is it governing today? A small piece of Beirut and nothing more. Its army was supposedly



responsible for the outside perimeter of security at our own embassy and we saw the results. I don't know how many of you noticed a very short piece that appeared on television a few nights ago which showed the Phalange, the militia of the President, which belongs to the party which supports the President of the formal government of Lebanon, <sup>? spelling</sup> Gymael, turning over to the formal government the man who had detonated the bomb which had killed Bashir <sup>?</sup> Gymael, the brother of the present President of Lebanon a few months ago and a number of other terrorists who had engaged in various activities inimicable to the Phalange. It was not the police force or the army of Lebanon which had discovered, uncovered, and arrested these men but one of the militias. None of the officials of the Lebanese government can act independently of the will of these 20 or so military forces. I titled this talk "Lebanon: To Be or Not To Be." It might very well have been entitled, "The Lebanon Which Has Never Been." We think of Lebanon as lines on the map, as a nation like <sup>any</sup> other nation, but the word Lebanon is not the designation of a nation or of a national culture. It comes from the Hebrew word, <sup>? spelling</sup> levun, white. In the bible it's always called <sup>? spelling</sup> halevun which means the same as when we speak of the white mountains. It's a description of a piece of land which is largely mountainous, the mountains of which are snow capped in the winter, and therefore quite unusual in that part of the world. The archeologists have uncovered settlements in Lebanon dating back to ten thousand years. The best known of the ancient settlers of Lebanon were the Phoenicians. They were a great seafaring and marauding tribe who in the first millenium before the common era sent their barks across the Mediterranean founded Carthage, Gibraltar, most of the ports along the Spanish coast, and in fact, controlled most of the Mediterranean trade. But if one looks carefully at the Phoenicians one discovers an interesting fact. They represent not a unified national empire but a set of futile city states Tyre, Cyden, Beirut, Abnet, each of which was always at war with the other. There was no such thing as a sense of national or cultural identity shared between them. One of the leading students of Phoenician history has written that at no time did the Phoenicians develop any sense of national unity or national consciousness, and I'm afraid that this is the



truth about those who have lived in Lebanon then and ever since. Lebanon is really the mountains, and the mountains of Lebanon have always been very much like the mountains of Tennessee and Kentucky, places to which families went who wanted to ~~live~~<sup>flee</sup> from the city, flee from civilization, flee from pressures of one kind or another who then in one mountain fastness or another zealously guarded their turf, their little valley, their little hillock against all intruders. You heard a great deal about the Maronite christians. This is the party of Amin <sup>?</sup>Gymael the President of Lebanon. The militia of the ~~Maronites?~~<sup>Maronites?</sup> Maronite christians, the Phalange, is probably the largest of the Christian militia in the country. They represent about 23% of the people of Lebanon. The ~~Maronites?~~<sup>Maronites?</sup> go back to the seventh century. They go back to a christian heresy. Christianity during the first millenium of our era was troubled by one great issue of theology. Jesus is in their testament both a man and a God, and a great deal of blood and a great deal of trouble was developed over the relationship between the nature of the man and the nature of the God. Was Jesus first a man who then became a God? Was he a God at birth who somehow had a human career? All these very complicated theological questions led to heresy after heresy during the first millenium. Heresy being defined simply as that group at a church synod which lacked the majority of votes. But once you were declared a heretic your life was in peril so the heretics, particularly in the east, would flee from the cities and a group of the heretics called the Monofolites<sup>?</sup> developed in the seventh century in the Byzantine world who were eager to devise some way to bridge the fact that Jesus was both man and God, and the fact that the church has already said that Jesus was separate in nature when he was man from the nature he had when he was God which removed mortality from the God. They declared that yes he was separate in his nature between his state as man and his state as God, but he shared a single will and for that they were declared heretic and they were persecuted. They were run out of Constantinople and they fled to the mountains of Lebanon where in time, they became the people we call the ~~Maronite~~<sup>Maronite</sup> christians. Then about four or five centuries later, there came to these mountains two other



larger groups now not christian heretics but muslim heretics. The first <sup>Shiites</sup> ~~Shiites~~, we become familiar with the <sup>Shiites</sup> ~~Shiites~~ because of Khomeini in Iran. The <sup>Shiites</sup> ~~Shiites~~ are a group of muslims who argue that the legitimate Caliph was Ali, the nephew of Muhammed, that there was a legitimate line of authority down for eleven caliphs until finally that authority in a war was disrupted and there was now what they call a hidden Eman, a hidden Messiah, a hidden Caliph who will come back in time, and when he does Islam will be returned to the true way. They look on the Sunnite majority, the Sunnite people who follow false leadership they are heretics in their eyes, therefore the kind of struggle we see between <sup>Shiite</sup> ~~Shiite~~ and Sunnite in the middle east. In any case, the <sup>Shiites</sup> ~~Shiites~~ fled to the mountains. Shortly thereafter, another group of muslim heretics called the Druse fled to the mountains. The Druse originated in Egypt. They originated in the eleventh century. Egypt, at that time, was ruled by a group called the Fatimids, one the caliphs called Ahakeem, the wise one, was a man who seemed to have been a bit paranoid, a little bit we would say, masugah??, but he also had visions. He was a wild man, he was vicious and violent, but he had visions of Allah, visions of God. He disappeared, he didn't die in any normal way, he simply disappeared; probably was poisoned and thrown into the Nile. He disappeared and those who believed in him and who followed him said that he is in heaven, he is the hidden Eman and when he returns he will do what the Messiah must do, renew the world and all will be returned to the state that it should be. So the Druse, the <sup>Shiites</sup> ~~Shiites~~ and the <sup>Maronites</sup> ~~Maronites~~, the <sup>Nanathalites</sup> ~~Nanathalites~~ came to the mountains, <sup>carved</sup> ~~carved~~ bits of territory in the mountains, and lived there sometimes warring with one another but relatively managing to keep the rest of the world out of their mountains. Lebanon then had two parts to it. A small coastal area which was governed by whatever major empire governed the Middle East, the Seljuks, the Mameluks or the Ottoman Turks, and the mountains where the empire preferred not to go, where by and large they let the mountaineering people to their own devices. Then in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, as colonial interests in Europe began to impinge upon the Middle East, the French decided that the Lebanese area represented a potential source of commerce and profit and they proclaimed themselves the defenders of the christians of this area. France is, of course, a largely Catholic nation and they decided to defend



the Catholic groups in the area, that is, they built for them St. Joseph's, a great university. They brought many of the sons of the sheiks to Paris, taught them about commerce and industry, and helped them to establish businesses to be their factors in the Middle East. The <sup>? on Maronites</sup> ~~Marianites~~, under French tutelage, became a much more powerful group than they have ever before. This, of course, unsettled this kind of vague balance of power which had existed in the mountains. In 1860 and 1861, the <sup>Z</sup>Druse rose up in rebellion and massacred thousands of the Marianites, and the French and other European powers felt it necessary to intervene, and a very interesting arrangement was inaugurated called the "regular <sup>?</sup> <sup>?</sup> <sup>?</sup>moi ordinaire," the ordinary rules. The very French title suggests the role that France had in establishing these rules. Normally, the Ottoman Turks controlled all of the Middle East but clearly they had no effective control in the mountains, and so largely under French guidance, the mountains became essentially a separate area and they were given for domestic purposes of their own government led by a <sup>Maronite</sup> ~~Marianite~~ christian prime minister with a council of twelve who had veto power over his decisions comprised largely of the other religious minorities who had escaped into the mountains, the <sup>Shiites</sup> ~~Shiites~~ and the <sup>Z</sup>Druse. From 1860 to the First World War, this area of the mountains was essentially an area <sup>?</sup> <sup>?</sup> <sup>?</sup>alawn to itself and managed its own business fairly well and except for an occasional Hatfield and McCoy kind of quarrel, blood revenge, the mountains were fairly passive. At the end of the First World War, when the West began to carve up the Turkish empire, the French made a critical, and I believe fatal decision, they were eager to gain the mandate over this area, but they were not willing simply to gain a mandate over the coastal area or over the mountains, and they bound these two very distinct areas together. They carved out at San Remo, where the mandates of the League of Nations were established, an area which comprised all that is within the present boundaries of Lebanon. These are arbitrary lines drawn by Europeans on a map in Italy having nothing to do with the realities of the ethnic, political, social, religious realities, power realities in the area. Against the advice of a number of experts in their own foreign office, the French brought under a single rule the lowlands which are entirely Muslim, which are almost entirely in terms of economics involved with the Muslim heartland in Syria with Iraq to the east, that's where their interests are and in numbers equal about to the



mountain people. The mountain people who want only to be free of the other Muslims, free from this majority from which they have fled long since and which they fear greatly. Beirut became the capitol. Between the two World Wars the French were able to enforce a kind of peace, but at great cost in terms of military presence. Then when the French found, during the Second World War, they could no longer maintain their colonial empire they freed Lebanon, both the mountain area which is so different from the plains area and the plains area. In 1943 Lebanon proclaimed a National Pact. Major parties came together in Beirut and they claimed a National Pact, and this Pact which is very brief suggested the problems which have destroyed the ability of Lebanon to achieve any peace ever since. Because the <sup>Maronites</sup> ~~Maronites~~, the christians, those peoples who attitudes and interests are to the West renounce their dependence upon the West, Lebanon announces it will establish itself with an Arab presence and Arab interests. Because of population growth, because of the pressures of the new resurgence of nationalism among Arabs throughout that part of the world, the mountain peoples, the peoples who want to escape these pressures will increasingly be forced under the power, the numbers, the population numbers of the larger majority. This 1943 Pact has three brief paragraphs:

1. Lebanon is to be a completely independent <sup>sovereign</sup> ~~sovereign~~ state. The christians to forego seeking protection or attempting to bring the country under foreign control or influence. In return, the Muslims will forego making any attempt to bring about any political union with Syria or any other Arab union. 2. Lebanon is a country with an Arab face and language, and a part of the Arab world; having, however, a special character. 3. Lebanon is to cooperate with all Arab states and to become a member of the Arab family, provided the Arab states recognize its independence and sovereignty within the existing boundaries. (end of Pact.) This kind of unstable arrangement, which clearly shows at least two people in one country with very diverging interests, lies at the basis of the fragile national unity which the French tried to create in Lebanon in the ~~twentieth~~ century. What happened? In the 1950's, with the resurgence of Arab nationalism which we associate with General Nassar, groups of people, from the lowlands particularly, who had



not had some of the advantages that the French had given to other groups began to demand union with the Arab world and all attempts to speak of Lebanon as having a special history and a special destiny be abandoned. You will recall that in 1957 Syria and Egypt combined into then what was called the United Arab Republic and millions of dollars were sent into some of the clandestine armies in Lebanon to encourage a revolt against Beirut. It was this time that President Frengia wrote to Eisenhower requesting the Marines, and in May of 1958, we sent in 10,000 marines to Lebanon to protect its "independence." We succeeded in doing so temporarily, but when the Marines were pulled out, the central government was no stronger than it had been before and the militias continued to receive money and arms from their various sponsors and sources. In 1975, Civil War broke out; vicious, cruel, brother against brother, interest against interest, rich against poor, Western oriented against Eastern oriented, christian against Muslim, sometime Muslim against Muslim, christian against christian. We have a feeling, because of the television coverage of last summer, that the devastation of Lebanon was unparalleled. The casualties between 1975 and 1978 are on the order of twenty times the casualties that Lebanon suffered last summer during the Israeli-PLO war. Now what is Lebanon today? Is there, in fact, a central government in Lebanon that could be effective? There is not. There is a government, which has all the appurtenances of a government. It sits in the United Nations, it has consulates and embassies in this country and around the world. It's treated by governments as if it is a government, but if government be defined in terms of effective power, I assure the government of Lebanon has less effective power than the police force of Beachwood, Shaker Heights, or Pepper Pike. It controls an area of only a few square miles, it would not control all of its own capitol if it were not for the multinational force which is there in place. One of the reasons that there is so much difficulty in making arrangements for the guarantees Israeli demands on its northern border is there is no way the Lebanese government can effectively guarantee the security of any such area at this time or at any conceivable time in the future. For the truth is, once people are armed, they do not willingly <sup>or</sup> easily give those arms up, particularly when

always to be the President of Lebanon, a Sunni Muslim was always to be the Prime Minister, and a Shiite Muslim was always to be the head of Parliament, and there



you are in a part of the world where the blood feuds are old and ancient and vicious. Within three days of the cease fire between the PLO, the Syrians, and the Israelis, the Druse<sup>2</sup> and the christians in the mountains of Lebanon were fighting with one another again, and the Israelis were losing their lives trying to separate the two forces. When I ask myself the question, "Who would really gain from the removal of foreign forces from Lebanon?" I come unfortunately to this answer. Israel seems to have, on the surface, a great deal to gain. The occupation of Lebanon is costly, both in terms of dollars and in terms of manpower, well over 100 Israelis have lost their lives during this eight months of the occupation. Israel would be quite happy if guarantees were forthcoming to return within her borders. The United States, on the surface of it, has something to gain from the withdrawal of foreign forces because it would show that we are not a paper tiger. That is, that we can twist arms and enforce something that we think is in our own interest in the Middle East. What has Lebanon to gain, Civil War? What has Lebanon to gain? Can a few thousand troops of the multi-national force enforce peace throughout Lebanon. In 1975, you will recall, there was a Arab force sent in to be a peace force in Lebanon--not 5,000 or 8,000 troops, but 30,000 troops. They quickly withdrew into small enclaves in Tripoli and in Beirut and admitted that they could not control the rest of the country. If there is ever to be the possibility of some kind of peace within Lebanon, it's going to take years and years of living together, the willingness to realize the value of a central government. It's going to take the forgetting of thousands of years of hate. It will not come about overnight. Indeed, I don't believe it will come about as the self interests of these groups is in maintaining its own independence, its own taxing force, its own source of revenues. If the United States or the Soviet Union were to say that we won't sponsor any more of our friends in that part of the world, do you think Libya or Algeria or Iraq or Iran would stop sponsoring theirs? Lebanon was an artificial creation from the beginning. In the mountains there was an artificial agreement as to the powers which would be divided between the sheiks, the feudal lords. In the National Pact of 1943, there was an artificial division. A Maronite christian was always to be the President of Lebanon, a Sunnite Muslim was always to be the Prime Minister, and a Shiite Muslim was always to be the head of Parliament, and there



was always to be a certain six, five, four representation on all government bureaus. That's artificial, and as populations change, as the birth rate changes, as one group wants more of the action, more power, more positions, more patronage, obviously there's going to be restlessness and anger, and when one is armed there is going to be bloodshed. I wish the United States Government had not rushed into this program which requires the elimination of all foreign forces from Lebanon, because I'd like to speak a bit of heresy this morning myself. That is, in many ways, the occupation of Lebanon by foreign forces is one of the best things that could have happened to Lebanon. The Israelis in the South can, in fact, control the South to the degree that they can protect their own borders. The Syrians, in the East, have a natural interest in the <sup>Bekaa</sup> ~~Beqa~~ Valley. The supply lines, communication lines, the people in the <sup>Bekaa</sup> ~~Beqa~~ Valley are one with the people of Syria. The Lebanese are really the people of the mountains, and they have a national interest from keeping themselves submerged by the tidal wave of Arab nationalists which is sweeping that part of the world. They are the minorities, they are the persecuted, they are the Jews of the Arab world, and they know they are exposed unless they have an army of their own. They have no chance, they will be destroyed because they know the Arab world has no patience with minorities unless they are totally subservient to their own ideologies. If the foreign forces had been allowed to remain in Lebanon, in time, some form of <sup>contonment</sup> ~~contonment~~ like Switzerland might have emerged. If this kind of division between the national interests of the Syrians in the East, the Israelis in the South, and the Lebanese themselves in the mountains had been allowed to develop, in various kinds of arrangements such as the Middle East is familiar with might truly have evolved. There might be some kind of possibility that the prosperity of Lebanon, which has been its major feature might continue. The other alternative, the one we seem to have embarked on is a guarantee that Lebanon, in not too long a time, become another radical Arab state exactly like Syria. Why, because the poor Muslim Arabs outnumber the people of the mountain, and because the radical Arab governments are committed to the proposition that all foreign influence, all that is strange, all that is not homogenous, shall be eradicated, the Arab worlds shall be one. What's going to happen once the



foreign troops are removed? Each militia will protect its own piece of turf, and then one will demand something more than the other is willing to give, and there will be renewal of the fighting as we saw in 1975 and 1978. This time the Marines will not return, and this time the radical Arab states which are the next door neighbors will move in more forcefully and more directly and with less apology than they had before. If there is any lesson to be learned from Lebanon, it's this. We cannot apply to the Middle East those concepts of the nation state, those concepts of government which apply in the relationships between the United States and Europe and even the Eastern Block. The Middle East has never known nation states in the modern form. The Middle East has since time and memorial, been a rich collection of what the sociologists call millet communities, self-governing communities, whose lives are governed by their own law, by their own traditions, by their own kaddish or Emans, or religious leaders, each one of whom fears everyone else and does what he can to protect himself. The overlapping (or arching) government being responsible simply for foreign affairs and for the larger issues of the state. That's the way Lebanon was until the end of the nineteenth century. That's the way Syria and Iraw were well into this century, and they still are because despite the tyrannical governments in Damascus and Bagdad, both governments are the governments of minority ethnic groups, minority millet communities, tribes, and in time they will be overthrown. We have to begin to deal, when we deal with the Middle East with a degree of historic perspective which we don't normally bring to the news, which we don't normally bring to the affairs of the world. In the essential asymetry which plagues Israel is, that for better or worse, Israel is a modern nation state operating in a world where those on her borders are politically of a different structure and construction. It's almost impossible to see how Israel can be guaranteed, by the Lebanese government, very essential security which she seeks. That's why the impasse. Only Israel can guarantee peace in southern Lebanon. There was a United Nations force there, and given the nature of the United Nations, Israel has no faith in the United Nations forces. The terrorists were able to pass through their lines almost at will, information of Israeli action was often transmitted back to the terrorists by Unifil, Israeli has no real feeling



that the Italians, the French, or the Americans can be trusted to police that part of the world. The Americans went into Beirut, as you recall, in September to guarantee the peace of the area. We were to be there for thirty days, we didn't stay there twenty. There is already in Congress noises about the need to limit the number of troops we commit to Lebanon, and to bring the boys home as quickly as we can. How long would an American force of size effectively patrol that Lebanese area? If America is not there, can Israel trust the United Nations force? If she cannot trust the United Nations force, what other force can she trust--the Lebanese government that can't even protect the American embassy. There is the puzzlement, there is the reason that the Israelis are being intransigent and difficult, and all those other terms which our newspaper columnists filed routinely from the negotiations. What will be the result? I suspect a poor result. I don't think Israel will stand up too long to American pressure on this issue. They will try and get other guarantees, arms, supplies, something of that kind. They will assume, if they have to, just as they moved into Lebanon three years ago, and moved into Lebanon last summer, they can move into Lebanon again. That's a nonsolution, it's a direction the negotiations seem to be pointing. The American government, what will we have gained? We seem so determined to prove to the Arab world that we can make Israel do certain things that the Arab world may deem to be appropriate. We've lost our ability to look to what is to our own selfish national interest. To what benefit is it for the United States to see developing in Lebanon another mini-radicalized Arab state. Lebanon, for better or for worse, for all its weakness controls a number of the major ports in the Eastern Mediterranean. One of these ports is already a major Soviet base. If more were to become so, our own security, our own ability to protect the oil fields in the Middle East would be markedly weakened, that seems to be the way we're going. It seems to me to be the result of the kind of impulsive, innocent, naive thinking which has governed American policy in the Middle East at least these last several years. Amen. (For me, too! I got every word. Learned much.)



period of Druze-Maronite symbiosis. Even so, such a tradition was not strong enough to preserve Mount Lebanon from the disorders of 1840-45 or the horrors of 1860.

Greater Lebanon, however, was devoid of any such tradition. As the French set it up, Greater Lebanon contained a large number of Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims who had never looked upon themselves as partners in a Lebanese polity, and who had no great traditional loyalty to such a state which, furthermore, had been set up by a foreign Christian power to further its own imperial policy. The Sunnis of Beirut and Tripoli, in particular, deeply resented being incorporated in the Lebanese Republic. For a very long time their leaders not only would have nothing to do with the Mandatory authorities or Lebanese politics, but also looked with longing on the prospect of being joined to Syria, where Sunnis were in the majority and where (so it was believed) they would be the undisputed masters. Such sentiments were manifested both before and after Lebanon had attained independence, most notably in 1928 and 1936 when Sunni leaders in Lebanon publicly demanded that they should be recognized as forming part of Syria, and in 1958 when the union of Egypt and Syria in a United Arab Republic directly led to a civil war which was fed and kept going not only by Nasserist intrigues from Damascus but also by the burning Nasserist fervour so widespread among the Sunnis of the Lebanon. These events together with the troubles that erupted in 1975 amply indicate that Greater Lebanon and the Lebanese Republic are politically incoherent, and thus unstable, entities. In 1958, and even more so after 1975, the Lebanese government was hamstrung and rendered impotent by the fact that the loyalty of an appreciable part of Lebanese citizens went to causes foreign to Lebanon, and inimical to its continued existence.

There is yet another difference between the Sanjaq and the Republic. Now there is no *Règlement* the functioning of which is supervised by an imperial government and guaranteed by the Great Powers. The Republic is sovereign and independent, and its rulers are on their own. And how dangerous such independence has proven to be! For the Lebanese leaders—and particularly for the Maronite among them—independence was, in fact, a gamble which in the sequel has proven quite disastrous. The gamble is embodied in the so-called National Pact of 1943. This was really an understanding between, on the one side, the Sunni Muslim notables represented by Riad al-Sulh, and a faction of Maronite notables led by Bishara al-Khuri and (ironically, in view of later events) Camille Chamoun. The Pact was a far-reaching and unprecedented departure in Lebanese politics without analogue in the political traditions of Mount Lebanon. The terms of the Pact were as follows:

1. Lebanon to be a completely independent sovereign state. The Christians to forego seeking protection or attempting to bring



the country under foreign control or influence. In return, Muslims to forego making any attempt to bring about any political union with Syria, or any form of Arab union.

2. Lebanon is a country with an Arab 'face' and language, and a part of the Arab world—having, however, a special character.
3. Lebanon to cooperate with all the Arab states and to become a member of the Arab family, provided the Arab states recognize its independence and sovereignty within the existing boundaries.

The National Pact thus meant that the Maronites were to give up French protection, indeed to make common cause with the Sunnis against the French, in return for their acceptance of Greater Lebanon. Present security was to be bartered against future performance. But covenants without the sword are but words.

This radical departure in Maronite policies, so fraught with dangers and so heavy with future disasters, was undoubtedly effected under British influence, which was then predominant. We do not know whether those Maronite leaders who set their community on this perilous path weighed the risks of this adventure, or whether in their eagerness for power they persuaded themselves that General Spears (the British Minister who egged them on) was an immortal god who would forever watch over their welfare.

Thus, it appears that the two rival powers of the time, France and Great Britain, had, unbeknown to themselves, co-operated in putting together the infernal machine that exploded first in 1958 and then in 1975-76: France, by setting up Greater Lebanon; Britain, by pushing for a Maronite-Sunni National Pact. As its tenor shows, this Pact irremediably involved the inhabitants of this unlucky area in the perils of an inter-Arab state system. This system, as is well known, has been highly unstable. Some of its members have been inordinately ambitious and quite reckless, and in pursuit of their aims wasteful of power and resources which the Lebanese Republic, in its military weakness and political incoherence, could not possibly withstand. Finally, if the story has a moral it is surely that independence can be as constraining as dependence, and sometimes perhaps even downright disastrous.



SUN	MON	TUES	WED	THURS	FRI	SAT
<b>1</b> MAY  <b>SERVICE</b> 10:30 a.m. The Temple Branch Rabbi Daniel Jeremy Silver will speak on <b>SHOULD SCIENCE BE STOPPED?</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>  TWA Activities 10:00 a.m. - Branch  Fellowship & Study Group Rabbi Jonathan S. Woll 10:30 a.m. - Branch  Temple Young Associates Board Meeting	<b>4</b>  Confirmation Rehearsal 4:15 - 6:00 p.m.	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>  Services - 5:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel  <b>FIRST FRIDAY</b> Bennett & Donna Yanowitz 8:15 p.m. - Branch	<b>7</b>  Shabbat Service 9:00 a.m. - Branch Confirmation Rehearsal 9:00 a.m. - noon Bar Mitzvah <b>ADAM KAUFMAN</b> 11:00 a.m. The Temple Chapel Bat Mitzvah <b>RACHEL KRAUSE</b> 4:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel
<b>8</b>  <b>SERVICE</b> 10:30 a.m. The Temple Branch Rabbi Daniel Jeremy Silver will speak on <b>LOOKING BACK ON A HARD YEAR</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>  Fellowship & Study Group Rabbi Jonathan S. Woll 10:30 a.m. - Branch  Temple Board Meeting 8:00 p.m. - Branch	<b>11</b>  TWA Annual Luncheon 12:00 noon The Oakwood Club  Confirmation Rehearsal 4:15 - 6:00 p.m.	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>  Services - 5:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel	<b>14</b>  Shabbat Service 9:00 a.m. - Branch Confirmation Rehearsal 9:00 a.m. - noon Bar Mitzvah <b>JONATHAN NORRIS</b> 11:00 a.m. The Temple Chapel Bar Mitzvah <b>BENJAMIN COWAN</b> 4:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel
<b>15</b>  Confirmation Class Parents Dinner 6:00 p.m. - Branch	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>  TWA Rally Tuesday 11:00 Browse and Shop 12:00 - Lunch 12:45 p.m. - Rabbi Jonathan S. Woll  Fellowship & Study Group Rabbi Jonathan S. Woll 10:30 a.m. - Branch	<b>18</b>  <b>SHAVUOT CONFIRMATION</b> 9:30 a.m. The Main Temple	<b>19</b>	<b>20</b>  Services - 5:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel  <b>THIRD FRIDAY SABBATH</b> 7:45 p.m. - Branch	<b>21</b>  Shabbat Service 9:00 a.m. - Branch  Last Day Religious School
<b>22</b>  Last Day Religious School	<b>23</b>	<b>24</b>  TWA Activities 10:00 a.m. - Branch  Fellowship & Study Group Rabbi Jonathan S. Woll 10:30 a.m. - Branch  TMC <b>ANNUAL MEETING</b> Cleveland Jewish Singing Society 8:00 p.m. - Branch	<b>25</b>	<b>26</b>  <b>TEMPLE SENIORS</b> 11:00 a.m. - Tanya Griffith 12:00 - Lunch 1:00 p.m. - Cleveland Opera	<b>27</b>  Services - 5:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel	<b>28</b>  Bar Mitzvah <b>REUBEN SHEPERD</b> 11:00 a.m. The Temple Chapel  Bat Mitzvah <b>ANDREA SINGER</b> 4:30 p.m. The Temple Chapel



When the gun fell silent last Sept. and the PLO made  
the moving about from Beirut - the U.S. embolled in  
a series of negotiations aimed at securing the withdrawal  
"of all Foreign Forces From Lebanon" - & the security for  
the Lebanese people, & effectively control over the Lebanese  
territory.

There are 3 foreign forces in Lebanon territory.  
The Israeli army is the largest - The Syrian army is 600  
men - in the Bekaa Valley and around Tyre from  
operating under Syrian law and independence - the  
N. is the Turkish Army.

So far the U.S. has focused its interest on Lebanon -  
includes negotiations, by the U.S. to the U.S. over the  
a number of procedures and black and white  
meeting <sup>begin</sup> to take place between the 2 groups. -  
These meetings have been frequently mentioned in the  
press usually under some such caption as Lebanon  
ROBERT F. SAMPSON'S DEMANDS - - Demand called  
at the beginning for mutual recognition and open  
border - Syrian withdrawal - security for the Lebanese  
law the could be reached (The S.A. does have the  
means to tempering further an embargo on all  
goods originating in Lebanon) - Demand has



invited for the regiment on junction but see YOK

buffer zone along the N. border would be needed off  
for <sup>Tonnesen</sup> ~~the~~ infiltration - - <sup>lead to Sy. Sheds</sup> ~~Discussions~~ <sup>see</sup> need  
to center on how this - to be accomplished

The American Senate has announced that one  
should agree to leave Lebanon, to Syria & the  
PLO <sup>field</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>let</sup> ~~go~~ <sup>here</sup>. A new ~~idea~~  
involves ~~the~~ conception including NALF -

Why should Syria PLO or Syria leave?

Re PLO for a time no place to go?

Syria is ~~also~~ <sup>also</sup> ~~involved~~ <sup>involved</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~Lebanon~~ <sup>Lebanon</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup>  
~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~past~~ <sup>past</sup> ~~part~~ <sup>part</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~his~~ <sup>his</sup> ~~national~~ <sup>national</sup> ~~history~~ <sup>history</sup> - &  
~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> ~~least~~ <sup>least</sup> ~~some~~ <sup>some</sup> ~~time~~ <sup>time</sup> - ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~area~~ <sup>area</sup> ~~see~~ <sup>see</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>will</sup>  
Lebanon be ~~will~~ <sup>will</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> ~~as~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~captain~~ <sup>captain</sup> ~~has~~ <sup>has</sup> ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> ~~found~~ <sup>found</sup>  
as part of the process of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~issue~~ <sup>issue</sup> -

Syria is a ~~no~~ <sup>no</sup> ~~land~~ <sup>land</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~state~~ <sup>state</sup> - ~~involved~~ <sup>involved</sup>  
a ~~border~~ <sup>border</sup> ~~dependency~~ <sup>dependency</sup> - ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~has~~ <sup>has</sup> ~~no~~ <sup>no</sup> ~~reason~~ <sup>reason</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup>  
confer to "imperialist" ~~arrangement~~ <sup>arrangement</sup> - and  
good never to ~~subjugate~~ <sup>subjugate</sup> ~~them~~ <sup>them</sup>. The ~~Bekeir~~ <sup>Bekeir</sup> ~~valley~~ <sup>valley</sup>  
~~after~~ <sup>after</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~very~~ <sup>very</sup> ~~same~~ <sup>same</sup> ~~method~~ <sup>method</sup> ~~as~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~past~~ <sup>past</sup> -  
It's harsh ~~harsh~~ <sup>harsh</sup> ~~unusually~~ <sup>unusually</sup> ~~rough~~ <sup>rough</sup> ~~Domestic~~ <sup>Domestic</sup>  
~~needs~~ <sup>needs</sup> ~~much~~ <sup>much</sup> ~~needed~~ <sup>needed</sup> ~~hard~~ <sup>hard</sup> ~~working~~ <sup>working</sup>. It  
presence in Lebanon ~~will~~ <sup>will</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~long~~ <sup>long</sup> ~~needed~~ <sup>needed</sup>







Israel is ~~not~~ a free state unlike and not  
from a largely occupied of the desert - The IDF has  
already lost over 100 men from the Gulf occupation -  
Israel has ~~no~~ need to want to control desert  
territory - only to secure the border - & of the  
desert - Israel needs to secure the  
border safely here -

But what about  
~~the~~ desert, desert, ~~etc.~~, The U.S. policy  
wishes that the desert ~~is~~ be better off under  
the no matter of use the ~~territory~~ needed the ~~territory~~

been interested border - The key word is  
desert has been in ~~the~~ - The ~~desert~~  
joint, ~~the~~ ~~has~~ ~~been~~ ~~not~~ of desert at least  
since 1957 - and ~~probably~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~time~~ ~~one~~

Israel's general obligation - 1943. -- The  
desert's long history part of desert & some of the  
enemies to the N. -- at least to the ~~same~~ ~~last~~  
the ~~present~~ ~~history~~ of the ~~present~~'s ~~own~~ ~~past~~

- The ~~present~~ - ~~address~~ it to -  
to the ~~present~~ ~~history~~ ~~present~~  
it's not an ~~affair~~ ~~present~~ ~~present~~ - at ~~least~~ ~~not~~  
even ~~every~~ ~~one~~ ~~present~~ ~~present~~ ~~present~~ ~~present~~  
U.S. ~~present~~ - 2 ~~present~~ ~~present~~ ~~present~~ ~~present~~ ~~present~~



remembering why on the TV a few nights ago - that it  
should be Phadisa - a possible copy. having sent  
the document sent to copy - the House of Borden changed  
after it had captured - & a number of other  
things

There are 20 ~~pages~~ <sup>pages</sup> minutes of 1/2 inch tape  
+ a recent episode in the same To. of - a number  
of the minutes and now a cast for the Aug - It  
is estimated that for each 1/2 of volume sent to the central  
just below it is part of the record - The present  
minutes about 70% is confined within at the  
part & within the minutes by central - -- ~~the~~  
Now ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~100%~~ <sup>100%</sup> of it is used a means with 6  
Loren requires to record a volume of 6 sections  
to cover some 12 hours volume rather over  
(Fr. - July - some - B.A. - Aug - Dec)

The 2 minutes must be used in an in  
in respect of the same - - on perhaps some  
the volume must be used for the same purpose  
the kind of planning & regular over (for  
Guthrie) currently and the same in  
the same - a need to renew  
all four for in effect turn over with



4. I believe to have undoubtedly witnessed the scenes of the  
murder & suspect as must have been any person  
repeated 1 to 1225-78 (Bred Wm) — UNLESS ANOTHER  
and the most on <sup>AN OUTRAGE</sup> ~~way~~ to keep the MULTICULTURAL  
FOR US IN PLACE almost indefinitely — it seems to  
me that ~~there~~ <sup>policy policy</sup> ~~policy~~ open to see to  
Belgium becomes a mini-Syria — and then  
be seen in the republic of CANTON NORTH — Sunday  
a non-~~early~~ <sup>young wife</sup> ~~into~~ <sup>detached</sup> ~~induced~~ ~~would be~~  
being ~~unaffected~~ — ~~T~~ <sup>to the age of 7-10</sup> ~~pushed~~ ~~any~~ ~~any~~ ~~any~~  
~~murder~~ ~~one~~ ~~no~~ ~~best~~ ~~to~~ ~~see~~ ~~refugee~~ ~~sign~~ ~~would~~  
return after a long stay — ~~since~~ — ~~to~~ ~~such~~ —  
the ~~western~~ ~~central~~ ~~and~~ ~~in~~ ~~France~~ — ~~member~~ &  
could ~~not~~ ~~right~~ ~~and~~ ~~and~~ ~~and~~ ~~and~~ — &  
at least be done for confusion — ~~confusion~~ ~~would~~  
be avoided.

THE IDEA OF NOT THOUGHTLESSLY LEAVING AS  
A COUNTRY HAS SOLID HISTORICAL PRECEDENT. UNDERSTOOD  
CONTRAST HUMAN SUFFERING & THE USE OF FORCE  
NOT LEAST NOT YET — and ~~at~~ ~~no~~ ~~time~~ ~~in~~ ~~that~~  
long history has ~~shown~~ ~~even~~ governed itself  
as a self-governing entity in ~~understanding~~ ~~itself~~  
TO HAVE A SENSE OF NATIONAL UNITY







By the 7th when after much argument & not understood  
blended; it had been decided that he had been attacked  
Nathan - ~~from~~ <sup>from</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>on</sup> Channel - on a Sunday  
This case of separation troubles - & the maneuvering  
tried to study to get to know that Jew - but he  
too spoke, asked - but not enough -  
For reason that not at all - the man  
did not give unneeded answer - was delayed  
hesitated - & the maneuvering attacked & attacked  
to the defense not - when the two arrived

defense - route & maneuvering of case had to

find security <sup>ANA</sup> ~~at~~ defense -

4-5 Caroline data 2 data group of action -  
- not x at last maneuver - for case very not at

maneuver - Shirley maneuver - process of case

hedge man - with the process who to maneuver

a hedge maneuver - on man - last in case

came he in the case <sup>Filled</sup> maneuver at defense

Local man was known for the "maneuver" -

& man discovered in case - & man very

hedge maneuver man to maneuver maneuver

man do - man do maneuver

To maneuver maneuver man - man - man  
Base - man - man maneuver man maneuver man











as I have given - the police -

The Part 1943 - boy, under history - because  
it might be the former record have recorded under  
history - The next chapter for publication - last  
page was below recorded have an and cleared -

The subject of privacy vs the public good & regulation  
are involved - The old rules were not as much  
under 60% X was not 1200; 60% median - under  
massive influence - as power and under  
local interests had - and of UAN (Sgt. - 1944)  
main - Grants of privacy - just evidence  
and - LOT privacy

Turning back - justice - last of survey -  
15 year data - as 100 cases known & evidence  
justice - my in the records - a list - 8  
several cases - which were - 50T cases  
300T records - W.A. for 1001 of 1000

An investigation was made - The - days old  
it could have - undoubtedly been  
with quick fact to - open of and also -  
Produce little evidence ( Pub. Justice Director -  
Dawn Philadelphia newspaper - as even )  
The police in Heaven has been 14 6



For instance - read in appearance with on an  
side - 2000 - in view -

If used in land with you - (see - under  
need not - more of water , close to own supply -  
(Apply to U.S. waters - (S. - U.S.N) & 2 - under) - Under  
is identified - Continued  
Spoken of subject . - Signs appear  
again

Don't - Hold a book  
Convinced instead - fact

Have again of new unit of universe  
of physics - new overt -

