



## Daniel Jeremy Silver Collection Digitization Project

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### **MS-4850: Daniel Jeremy Silver Papers, 1972-1993.**

Series III: The Temple Tifereth-Israel, 1946-1993, undated.

Sub-series B: Sermons, 1950-1989, undated.

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Beirut and Grenada, 1983.



Beirut and Grenada  
Daniel Jeremy Silver  
October 30, 1983

Our tradition is committed to peace, but not to pacifism. We are commanded to seek peace and pursue it. We pray, "Grant us peace, Thy most precious gift" and we name God as the source of peace. Our prophets envisaged the time when they shall beat their swords into plough shares, their spears into pruning hooks, and nation shall not lift up sword against nation nor make war anymore. And our yet our rabbis were quite willing to introduce Hanukah into the list of Biblical holidays even though it celebrates the military skills and the bravery on the battlefield of the Maccabees. Indeed, when we look back at our scripture we note that it is quite willing to identify some of the great spiritual founders with military skills. When a large armed troop of Amorites invaded the area which was then fertile around the Dead Sea and despoiled the cities of the plain as they were called and took many captives including Abraham's uncle, Lot. Abraham conscripted 300 of his kinsmen, the Bible tells us, and set out in hot pursuit and defeated the Amorites in pitched battle, destroyed their force, and recaptured those who had been taken captive including Lot. And David, the sweet singer of Zion, the man to whom so many of the psalms of our Bible are ascribed, was, after all, a warrior king who spends the better part of his years in active command of the troops.

There's a time for war and there's a time for peace, and those of us who are concerned with the wisdom of our tradition, who draw inspiration from it, find it difficult to be among those who rush to judgement either to join quickly with those jingoists for whom might makes right, the gun slingers of our society who believe that a taste of American power will resolve all of the complicated political and cultural and economic problems of the globe; or to join those who rush to judgement to condemn any and every use of American power on the grounds that it is immoral, on the grounds that the only way is the way of peacemaking, of reconciliation. Unfortunately, in the world that is, the world where there is a time for war and a time for peace, a world where the problems are complex and



the relationships between peoples and nations, between economics and politics complex, indeed, it's not so easy to be clear and certain which judgement, for war or for peace, for action or for inaction, is the right one. Our tendency, of course, is to assume that the best way is the peaceful way, but then all of us of our generation know that pacivity is sometimes spelled Munich, and that those who are unwilling at times to exert force, in fact condemn the world to a greater tragedy than the bloodletting which might have ensued earlier. We do not live in the best of all possible worlds. We live in a world where men and nations of all sides and of all stamps and colors are greedy and ambitious and quite willing to use means amoral and immoral to achieve what they conceive to be their national purpose or their national destiny.

And so what I want to do this morning after a week of war and of bloodshed and of tragedy is not so much to condone or to condemn but to speak to you of the difficulties that judgements of these kinds entail and the reasons why there are no absolute standards, no simple, clear measures, by which we can reassure ourselves that one way or the other is clear and right and the proper way to go. I'm not, by any means, an expert on the Caribbean, I know very little of its politics. I suspect that's true of most Americans. We thought of the Caribbean islands, if we've thought of them at all, as a spot where we might gain a week or two of sunshine during the cold of a Cleveland winter. We've not thought of them as states, as peoples with their own needs and ambitions, with their own economic problems and cultural traditions. And when we found the government, our government, invading the island of Grenada we recognized immediately that we were interfering in the life and the political activities of another country. Our world has, to a large degree, accepted the idea, rightly or wrongly, that non-intervention by outside powers in domestic affairs of another state is a desirable goal, standard. And we also had that sinking feeling that this was a case of a big bully in a small country, an uneven challenge, and I think most of us had the feeling almost from the beginning that had the only issue been the safety of the thousand or so



Americans who were on the island, including that large contingent of medical students, that other ways could surely have been found to bring them back to these shores. But I think as we have thought of Grenada, some of us for the first time, in these last days, we recognize that the issue is not that simple, that this wasn't simply another example of a wild West cowboy seeing if he could pull his gun out and chain down or shoot down someone who was in his way. Other kinds of issues were involved, issues which might, indeed, touch our national security. And so we began to look at the government of Grenada and we began to recognize that it was not simply a democratically elected government but a hunta which had come into power at gun point, taking power away from those who had been democratically elected to govern Grenada when the British had given that country back its independence. And we found that the government of Grenada was labeled Marxist which itself is not a danger to us, but it had given the Cubans and others authority to build a rather sizeable airstrip capable of landing the biggest and most effective of military aircraft. And then we began to discover that the Cubans were not simply building a great airport but seemingly a military compound and that there was something very secret about this compound where they were using only their own laborers on it, even though unemployment in Grenada runs at 25 percent of the total employable population and even though the building of an airport is not one of the most complex of activities for laborers. Then we began to look at our maps and we recognized that Grenada sits just off the coast of South America, that those who control Grenada might be able to exert a great deal of military and economic pressure on Colombia and Venezuela, some of the oil-rich countries of this part of the world, and that they were astride one of the major deep water channels leading from the Caribbean out into the Atlantic. And so the issues become more complex. And clearly, honorable men and women can differ on their judgement as to the decisions that the United States government made because our decisions, if they are not made on the basis that we are in favor of any and all use of force or opposed of any and all use of force must somehow be made on a



calculus of consequence. And history is unclear, obviously, none of us are prophets. None of us knows if the removal of this Cuban base which was being supported by people from the Soviet Union, a contingent of North Koreans and Libyans and Bulgarians, if this would have been a base which would have effectively undermined many of our interests and those of other countries in that part of the world and if by going in now we had diminished the dangers of subversion and external threat to those countries or if, in fact, we had undone our own interests in that part of the world by seeming again to appear the big bully, the man who will get his own way regardless, who's inconsiderate and unconcerned with the needs, the legitimate human needs, of the natives, the locals, the lesser breed without the law as Americans may consider those who are not white and not of our citizenship.

And then we found ourselves troubled, and there's no way to get beyond that troubling sense, that sense of uncertainty, was it right, was it wrong. And the judgement that we make will, to a certain degree, be made on the basis of what history turns out to be, the record of the future. Of this much I am clear, that in that confusing, that difficult, that gray world of competing national ambitions which we call the international forum, in that gray world there are no clear, clean, simple answers. And those who want America or any other country only to walk the high way, who are quite content to see America or any other country always take the low road, are people who are too innocent, too belligerent, too ignorant, to somehow guide a country with the very very difficult and complicated problems which every nation, particularly every great nation, faces. Shall we condemn? Shall we condone?

I know very little, confessedly, about the Caribbean, but I know a good bit about the Middle East, and America, as you know, has been undergoing these last several months a crisis of conscience, a great domestic debate about the commitment of our Marines and about the commitment of the multi-national force which consists of our Marines and soldiers from Italy and France and from Great



Britain, the so-called peace-keeping forces in the Lebanon. Our forces have been in the Lebanon since September of 1982, for over thirteen months. A debate has arisen in the last six or eight weeks or so as these forces for the first time began to have to receive significant casualties. It's well to remember that in the weeks preceding the tragedies of last Sunday over 30 Marines had lost their lives. When the Israelis, about two months ago, had finally begun their pullback from their advanced positions on the Beirut-Damascus highway and had built a new defense line along the Awali River some 20 miles further south, the Shuff Mountains became again a battleground between the Syrian Brabakduse forces and those of the Phalange, the central government based in Beirute. And the Syrians had provided the Druze with heavy artillery and modern sophisticated weapons. They're good fighters. They were aided by some members of the PLO, some Libyan troops, some Iranian troops, and they made rather short shrift of the central government's forces which had attempted to establish and extend their power into these mountains. And our forces began to fight back, or at least the ships off of Beirut began to shoot back only when the victory of the Druze threatened to overrun the last range of hills, the Shulf El Garb, if they'd gained control of that range would have given their gunners a direct eyeball site on our own troops. At that point, for the first time in a year, we began actively to defend our so-called position and interests.

Now, the question that troubles America, the question that led to that great debate over the War Powers Act, a Constitutional debate as to the degree of control that the Congress has over the actions and military decisions of the administration. It was really not so much a constitutional battle, but a response to the simple fact that the American people fail to understand how 1200 Marines and a thousand or more European forces can, in fact, impose peace on the ten-year old, multi-sided civil war which has been devastating the Lebanon. Americans are relatively innocent, most of them, of knowledge of the Middle East; but they recognize that a group of Marines sitting in their compound around the Beirut



Airport, rarely venturing out significantly into the countryside, a group of Marines who were not even given the power to go into the surrounding neighborhood slums of West Beirut and clear out those slums of neighborhood gangs who from time to time were sniping at our troops. This kind of commitment of our military and the restraints and limitations of that commitment were incapable of achieving the so-called peace-keeping ends which our Administration had announced as the purpose of the Marine commitment in the first place. And so the debate began to emerge because the popular opinion - we - began to question 12 months' commitment of America's good name, of our young men and of our power, commitment of the order which had been made up to that point. And then, of course, when 230 of our men were killed in the attack of last Sunday and some 45 French soldiers in another co-ordinated attack, the issue was raised again and more earnestly and more urgently. And the question here, too, is a complex one, and the issues are not simple.

And the major problem here, I think, is that the United States government has never honestly and openly declared the purpose and the rationale of the commitment of our troops in the Lebanon. We like to think of ourselves as always taking the high road and so last September when the troops were sent in, they were called peace-keeping forces, but in point of fact they have never attempted to keep the peace. There has never been an instance in the last thirteen months in which we or our allies have used our forces in the Lebanon to interpose themselves between one and another of the warring factions. The troops have remained in Beirut, in their bases. They have sometimes patrolled the relatively safe streets of Eastern Beirut, but they have not gone out into the mountains, and the clearest evidence I know of the limitations or the unwillingness, in point of fact the decision not to use our troops as peace-keeping forces occurred once the Israelis began their withdrawal. It was clear that there was going to be war. It was clear that our interest in expanding the authority of the Beirut government had led the Phalange into moving Lebanese forces into the mountains. It was clear that the Syrians had resupplied the Druze forces. Yet, when the Israelis withdrew, the



Americans and the British and the French and the Italians made no attempt to interpose themselves between the Christian vilalges and the Druze villages. They remained in place and the fighting took place. And as a matter of fact, when things got out of hand and when there was danger that the entire mountain range would fall under Syrian control, under Druze control, and when Beirut was being daily bombarded in a way which is as ferocious, if not more ferocious, than any bombardment that the Israelis had subjected Beirut to, the Lebanese government, at the urging of the American government, appealed to Israel to intervene and to send out its military aircraft to attack the Druze positions. Israel was to do the dirty work. Israel was to be the peac-keeping force, and Israel, after all this experience the last year, was, of course, unwilling to respond positively to this request..

The American commitment in Beirut is a commitment which is political in nature, which is designed because the West believes it is <sup>in</sup> its own national interest to see that an independent Lebanon exists, or rather, to see that Syria is not allowed to swallow up all the territory which is now called the Lebanon.

In September of 1982, when our troops were sent into the Lebanon for the second time, President Reagan said as much: "Our forces are returning to Beirut, he said, not to act as a police force but to make it possible for the lawful authorities of Lebanon to do so for themselves." Now, one may well ask how an encampment of two or three thousand Western soldiers and marines on the outskirts of Beirut would make it possible for this very weak central government to impose its authority on the rest of the countryside. Obviously, we were going to train the military. Obviously, we would resupply the army. Obviously, they brought over to the United States pilots whom we would train, people who would be useful as junior officers on the armed forces. But what did our presence there achieve? It was intended as a signal to the Arab world and to the Soviet that we were prepared to make a commitment to see to it that Lebanon remained or became, depending on how you look at it, an independent state. The problem with that commitment is



that in the intervening months when those who were opposed to our position took us up we were not prepared to make good on the commitment. We were not prepared to pay the price.

Now, why are the Allies, the West, so interested in an independent Lebanon? the answers are, to a certain degree, historic. The Lebanon is a Western creation. It was brought about in the late nineteenth century, largely under the aegis of France, as an attempt to have an area in the Middle East where the Christians who had lived for centuries in the Middle East could feel secure. The French understood that the Muslim-Arab world would tolerate a Christian enclave only if they were subservient, but here was a place where the Christian-Arab world could feel secure in power and where they could further the economic interests of the West by building up a Western type banking community, a Western type society. And our interests are more immediate. The West does not want to see Syria gain homogeneity over the entire northwestern section of the Arab world. Syria is a radical state, radical in its government, radical in its social policies, radical in the sense that it is economically and militarily allied with the Soviet Union. If Syria is given this homogeneity, if there is no countervailing force in that part of the world, if she can relieve the 37,000 military folk whom she maintains in the Lebanon and move them at her will, she will certainly move them against her southern neighbors, the border with Israel would heat up, and equally important for the West, perhaps more so, Syria could exert a force, persuasive force if not a military force against Jordan.

You may recall that in 1970 when the Jordanians attempted to put down the PLO, the Syrians mobilized their forces on the Jordanian border and only the mobilization of the Israeli forces at the request of the United States prevented the Syrians from attacking.

Jordan is relatively weak. Syria is relatively strong. And if Syria can gain that kind of authority in that part of the world where the Jordanians are afraid to move against Syrian interests, then Jordan becomes the narrow corridor between



Israel and the desert through which arms and subversion can move down and seriously begin to undermine the authority of the Saudis and the developed states, the feudal states of the south, on which we depend for our oil and in which we have invested so much of our wealth.

There is another concern in the West and that is, of course, the Soviet concern. The Syrians have already given to the Soviet a major naval base, Atladakia. It's one deep water port on the Mediterranean. If the entire Lebanese coastland is in the hands of the Syrians, and if the very good ports on that coast are essentially open to the Russians, the Soviet can maintain a significant permanent naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean which threatens, of course, Egypt and the Suez, which threatens another front against Israel, a sea front, but I think more importantly, which would bring pressure against Turkey because Turkey would then be surrounded by Soviet influence to withdraw from the NATO Alliance, to withdraw the permission that she now has given to the United States and to NATO to maintain very important listening bases, radar stations, on her own soil. If Turkey were to withdraw these bases then we really would not have close to the Soviet heartland any major sounding stations from which we could monitor Soviet military activity. The West is united in this. The West is disunited on the issue of Grenada, but the ministers of France and England and Italy and the United States met last week in Europe, Paris, and spoke of their determination to maintain this so-called peace-keeping force, the multi-national force, in the Lebanon. And they're not so much concerned with the Lebanese, big powers are relatively concerned with the human factor in the smaller nations; they're concerned with the military needs and capabilities of the West and, ultimately, with the survival of the West.

Now, the issue in the Lebanon, the issue of the military presence in the Lebanon is not so much is it there for a legitimate military reason, but is it there in sufficient force; has its mission been defined in terms of its purpose; is it capable of achieving the purposes for which it was sent? And here one



would have to say that the feeling which runs deep in America that its mission is unclear, that it has not been given either in numbers or in terms of the definition of its mission the ability to be a peace-keeping force, to effect the control of the Beirut government, is certainly correct. We have tried to buy peace cheaply, to buy our gains cheaply and the world will not allow us to do so.

The tragedy of the Lebanon is not only <sup>the</sup> human tragedy of the loss of life, but it's a tragedy which has been compounded by our own national ineptness. We are committed, we have committed ourselves, to the strengthening of the central government of the Lebanon. Our reason for this is not any particular love for Gemayel or for Wazam or for any of the other men who are involved in that government, but because we don't want to see Syria gain control over the Lebanon. And we know that both historically and in terms of her immediate interest Syria wishes to have such control. But our policies on a diplomatic front have contributed over the last year to the strengthening of the Syrian position, not to its weakening but to its strengthening, and to the creation of the very situation which we have tried to avoid. We committed a classic political international and diplomatic blunder in the Fall of 1982. And that is when we focused our diplomatic concerns narrowly on gaining a diplomatic arrangement between Israel and the Lebanon. Syria was clearly one of the invading forces in the Lebanon. There were more Syrian forces in the Lebanon than there were Israeli forces, and we spoke of that. We spoke of the need for all outside forces to lead the Lebanon, we meant by that the PLO in the north, the Syrians in the Bekka Valley, and the Israelis in the south. But in point of fact, we concentrated all of our diplomatic energy on some kind of Israeli-Lebanese arrangement, and we exerted great pressure against Israel which wanted in this arrangement to be one like its arrangement with Egypt which would be an arrangement, almost a diplomatic recognition, the end of the war, of the situation of war. And we made Israel settle for much less than that.



It took us months to achieve that limited goal, and we operated all of that time on the naive assumption that once Israel had agreed on paper to withdraw when the other forces in the Lebanon would withdraw, the other forces, namely Syria, would be willing to do so. But several things had happened. The Russians had immediately resupplied the Syrians after the bitter defeat that the Israelis had imposed on them in the summer of 1982. The Syrians had whipped the remnants of the PLO who were in the Becca Valley in the north into line so that they were no longer an independent force. They were the only effective force in eastern Lebanon, and the Syrians were now in a position of being able to say to the United States, you want us to do something, what are you going to do for us? And when Assad was visited Assad said very simply, we will not withdraw unless Israel now withdraws unilaterally, unless the Lebanese-Israeli arrangements are scrapped, and unless we are given effective hegemony over Lebanon. We don't insist on actual physical control of Lebanon, but we want to have a major say in Lebanese affairs. Now, the United States policy had been based, as so much of our policy has been based, on a weak reed - Saudi Arabia. Our diplomats knew that every year the Saudis and the Gulf States subvent Syria whose economy is poor, who spends as much of her national wealth on arms as does Israel, each year the Saudis and their allies subvent the Syrians to the tune of two billion dollars, 1.85 billion to be exact. And they assume that with this economic leverage the Saudis would be able to gain for the United States the agreement of the Syrians to withdraw once Israel had signed the agreement to withdraw.

What they forgot, these diplomats in Washington, was that the 2 billions of dollars which the Saudis give to the Syrians do not give them leverage over the Syrians. They are the kind of money, of protection money, that small storekeepers pay to the Mafia in order to keep the Mafia from bombing the store. In order to keep the Syrians from arming and equipping the poor Arabs, the Jordanians, the Palestinians, the Syrians, the Iraqis, the Egyptians, who are doing the work in the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States and making the billions of



dollars which are enhancing the economy of those states, and <sup>who</sup> ~~he~~ would like to share in some of that wealth but are not allowed to. In order to buy off the Syrians, in order to buy protection, this money is given. It's a sign of weakness and not of strength and the Saudis could not deliver, as indeed they cannot deliver on most things.

And so after the year, despite our casualties, despite our presence, we were no closer to resolving the problem of creating a strong government in Lebanon ruling from Beirut. Indeed, if anything, our goal was further away from realization than it had ever been. And so, as always is the case when something that is unhappy happens, we began to hear from Washington that it was all Israel's fault. If Israel hadn't invaded in the first place none of this would have happened. Of course, there was no strong central government in the Lebanon before Israel invaded. And if Israel hadn't withdrawn none of this would have happened. And, of course, the one thing America had been asking all along was for Israel to withdraw. But, no. Somehow, the rumblings began to come out of Washington that it was all Israel's fault.

Now, Israel destabilized the Lebanon when she invaded in 1982. Israel removed from the Lebanon one of the competing military forces, the PLO. The PLO army is out and the Syrians completed that task when they brought the remnants of the PLO under their effective control. But the other problems of Lebanon, the battles between the Shiites and the Phalange and the Druze between the various war lords are endemic and they are domestic and they are age-old. And Israel is not responsible for those nor, as Moshe Arenz reminded the world last week, did Israel ask the United States and the West to bring in a multi-national force in the first place. And as a matter of fact, you will recall that when this multi-national force was first introduced, the Americans went to great lengths to create dramatic incidents to prove how distant they were from Israeli interests. Remember those great confrontations, the American lieutenant who bare-breasted went out against the Israeli tank? We were determined to create world opinion,



Arab opinion in this case, which would understand that we were there for our purposes and not for Israel. And during the last thirteen months we have not coordinated in any way, shape or form our activities in the Lebanon with those of Israel. If we had we might be further along towards our goal, but we did not, and so Israel has pursued its own purposes and those purposes require the withdrawal from the northern most line, domestic reasons. Israel found itself imposed upon a Druze population, the Lebanese government and the Americans wanting that population not to fight the Phalange; the Druze fearful, the Druze determined to maintain their mountain stronghold. And in Israel itself there was another Druze population who had been among the most loyal citizens of the state who said, you can't do this to our brothers, if you do we will no longer be loyal, we will no longer be part of your army, we will subvert. And so America managed in the last twelve months to distance itself from Israel, and, to a certain degree, to alienate Israel, to distance itself, to back a government in name by the presence of a few thousand troops, but not with sufficient force in order for it to achieve control. It did not create peace in the Lebanon, and we find ourselves now, in the Fall of 1983, in the situation where the dominant Arab force of Lebanon is Syria, and where the best that America has been able to gain in the last few weeks is an agreement, signed in Damascus, which agreed to the creation of a national reconciliation commission, composed of all the warring forces in the Lebanon, in which the central government has only three of twelve places, in which the Syrians have demanded and gained ascent to the fact that none of the Muslim neighbors of the central government may participate in these deliberations so that they define essentially the central government as just another war lord group, the Phalange; not as the legitimate government of the Lebanon, and in which they have guaranteed for themselves a place at the table which is their way of seeing to it that these rather unpredictable war lords who have taken guns and men and money from them will operate the way they want them to do.

And so when on Monday, tomorrow, this national reconciliation commission



meets in Geneva, if in fact it does meet, the table will consist of these various war lord groups and of central government now defined simply as another such group, and the Syrians and the Saudis who finally were supposedly the brokers of this very pro-Syrian arrangement.

Should our troops stay in the Lebanon? Have we any chance of maintaining or gaining the strong central government we hoped to help to create? Are we willing if we stay to commit the numbers of troops which we require to, in effect, impose peace on these war lords? Are we willing to stay the distance, the years it would take for a strong central government to emerge? Those are the real questions, and if we do not stay what are the consequences? What does it mean in terms of our national honor? Do we show ourselves again to be a paper tiger? What does it say to the other small countries and small groups around the world who have depended upon America's professions of good will and of common concern?


It's not an easy situation. It's not a situation for which there is a clear answer or one which will satisfy our national ambitions or our personal interests. We've mismanaged the Lebanon diplomatically and militarily and, I think, even in terms of the security of our own men and their very limited purpose is badly mismanaged.

Shall we leave? Shall we stay? Again, I don't know the answer. History will determine whether the answer that our government makes is the right one or the wrong one, but let me assure you of this, that whether we stay or we leave Israel will not be the gainer or the loser. Israel has learned, to its own hurt and also to its own advantage, that her interests must be defined by her own strength and her own purposes. She did not ask for the multi-national force in the first place. It would not be the worst thing in the world if this multi-national force were to be taken out of the Lebanon. Israel will have to find ways to organize the southern Lebanon to protect her own borders. If the force is removed there may be what is in effect a de facto partition. Spheres of influence develop in the Lebanon. I don't know what will happen. It's a very complex



issue. But Jews should not feel called upon desperately, as a matter of community purpose, to defend the continuation of the multi-national force in the Lebanon. They were not put in there to defend Israel. Its removal would not necessarily weaken Israel.

There's a time for war and there's a time for peace. Which is it? Nearly 1900 years ago the great sage of the Mishnaic times, Akiba, said, don't be sentimental in judgement; and by that he meant that we ought not to be sentimental people about peace, that sometimes one must defend one's rights. And so Akiba defended Bar Kochba, defended the general who went to fight against Rome and for three years managed to deliver Jerusalem from Roman hands. He was not a sentimentalist, he was a realist, and Israel suffered at the end after those three years one of the most disastrous defeats in our history. Akiba was right, we must not be sentimental, but if we are realists there's no guarantee that our judgments will be successful. In these issues there is no certainty to be had. There are no guarantees. All we can do is to use our





Our old trad. is committed to peace, but not to pacifism  
The Bible does not hold back from demanding the military  
support of men of the Jewish people. We are required  
to keep of our own hands against the enemy - and we are  
to keep the - & keep the children's, and the best of the  
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in a successful campaign which brought the military  
army and found the best of the children. David - the great  
son of David - was a man who spent  
many years in the field as a soldier and  
of his troops.

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judgment self created.

was unintended consequence. We created a pretext  
the concern of Canada, unintended refuge - but  
claim we are not for an own purpose - it's a  
pretext created purpose that Canada should be  
allowed to run its own affairs without  
outside interference - but - these are things  
but - outside interference are always entering  
in Canada's affairs - it's not at all  
that Canada's affairs are run by the United States  
even though Canada is a sovereign state - it's not at all  
that Canada's affairs are run by the United States - it's not at all



1. We have found just the right person, for our study  
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 interfere. In fact, we will not interfere until we get  
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 Cuban group, including people who are used to  
 US - & have spent a little money & make  
 of them. - No one can see who are a  
 person - That case saved to the man and  
 days to the 1000 or so cases in the world -  
 We can see for the whole world as of  
 notice? We will see how ~~many~~ <sup>many</sup> of the cases  
 and several will be <sup>very</sup> small - & we  
 then statistically handle which? Do it right  
 to U.S. to try to present the spread of Cuban - South  
 in Latin - look a little closer? 2050  
 on unhappy cases & hundreds people may differ  
 in the joint - but at the very least we  
 include of the situation and the relationship to  
 also to understand of the unhappy situation  
 not be very good.

my purpose was to find the person  
subjected - said to place for patient &  
informed subjects -- and measure a ~~the~~



Don't forget that now means, Don't forget  
 to let them. The hands of Lord Dwyer's  
 boxing 225 of an outdoor sand - 45 inch  
 indoor sand - water was used for  
 the sand that was put in the sand -  
and on the side of the sand - Perhaps was  
 should - but little at least 1/2 of the sand  
 at least - at least. - - 7 to 8 as we need  
 to get back the moderately large to sand  
 on present has appeared some person -

Wang - from - the - 2 - from - several  
to MNP as a peace keeping force - a matter  
of time - but one which is clearly of the  
type - No indication of the MNP has been seen  
as yet to enter any border into my  
area of interest. Police, the MNP have  
been seen in some cases of Beirut -  
but clearly not in any of the key  
highly bordered in the short term future  
DP's interest to AWAL River  
area - the MNP is not in the area - The



Mumps ran Nany apud fine my order to sign  
 approved. Run across ~~the road~~ to seven to  
 the high country can come, place on ~~the~~  
 study in your year -

of the MNF and a peace keeping force under  
its at. It is a force designed to assist the UN's  
concern that Lebanon remain / be one a single,  
undivided state. President Reagan was quite  
open in his point is made as under in answer  
to the release of the Lebanese around "our  
forces are not going to desert not to act  
as a police force, but to make it possible  
for the LAIBAL AUTHORITIES OF LEBANON TO  
do so for themselves." It was felt that  
showing the joy - much better since 1960/  
the UN's intention from taking advantage of the  
UN's role and - Lebanon to reach  
future security in peace.

Can you - understand any of these words  
as interpreted from the  
last word under ~~the~~  
be in ~~the~~ <sup>our best</sup> interest. We do not want  
to reach such state - Syria - having also  
some influence to control Lebanon by way of







them to be seen -

5

It's an important fact we're going to pursue  
of an committee, because the committee had been  
asked to see some to feel that we are in  
Jelena not for Jelena's sake, but for Israel's -  
as most of them would be from before just  
a few days ago. In all and will call for the MNP  
as 1954 and has not ~~been~~ <sup>dependent on</sup> the presence of the  
MNP in the ~~situation~~ <sup>situation</sup> with Israel's party  
because of the ~~presence~~ <sup>seemingly</sup> of the military order with  
the intention of a serious Jelena -

Speaker of Israel - one of the and ~~members~~  
in fact of the ~~committee~~ <sup>committee</sup> has seen it  
attempt to have some, in fact, and the  
board of the Israel Vapers review, but the  
view of Jelena is made up of the U.S. - total  
policy has been to secure the withdrawal of  
all foreign forces - this idea has been  
on the first ~~step~~ <sup>review</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>incomplete</sup> ~~condition~~  
in the interim ~~stage~~ <sup>stage</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>will</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~seen~~ <sup>seen</sup>  
accusing in the ~~first~~ <sup>first</sup> ~~steps~~ <sup>steps</sup> - & ~~making~~ <sup>making</sup> ~~steps~~ <sup>steps</sup>  
in a ~~general~~ <sup>general</sup> ~~order~~ <sup>order</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~press~~ <sup>press</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>will</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~seen~~ <sup>seen</sup>  
has a ~~very~~ <sup>very</sup> ~~good~~ <sup>good</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~very~~ <sup>very</sup> ~~much~~ <sup>much</sup>



must, in some way, be connected - to U.S.  
power must be used to make sure  
to keep it under control - We must not allow  
the U.S. to be involved in this - it is not  
their job - I am sure the U.S. will  
understand this. Understand that  
this - the U.S. will have to make  
it clear - to be sure we are  
usually to do - I am sure -

The subject is not - I am sure  
MNF: there is a problem - it is  
a very serious problem - it is a serious  
problem - it is a serious  
my subject - the U.S. must  
be sure to be sure to be sure  
attended - I am sure the U.S. must  
I am sure of an important fact - the U.S.  
must be sure to be sure to be sure  
be at least not publicly known.

Personally, as you know - the  
U.S. must be sure to be sure to be sure  
I am sure / to be sure to be sure



withstand scrutiny as before - the power - nothing  
seems to change - but to use sign names in  
around 20 years for S.A. in local states - many  
desire to buy off all time - S.A. would be  
close to your sign's work to be conducted  
with speed -

My 17 are a rest - the United States  
Government has agreed - 8 years announced with  
the - the articles of constitution 327 trip -  
- some not including with down / is some  
Israel must work to make / and - just  
plans to give a message in Israel - some  
My sign officers - Kahan he goes - Tho  
very long multiple wanted to control -

- 1) The new united sign / some some  
defeated to Phlegm in the street  
signs of PLO and reported signed -  
included PLO in the Defense, Trade  
3) by - you would want to meet  
in person -

2 reports to see them - the U.S. in the world  
powerful - indeed, he already, in effect, given  
my own <sup>They</sup> - to protect values - The United



agencies would have many in common with  
elaborate in power in - in power in power -

11 and 34 and 12 member report to  
congressional committee - 'dubious case'  
3 years would have been offered about 1940;  
a number of cases to which has been  
over and - The power - to should come -  
of historical interest - and -

with more scope in the following words in "  
first line and we are - after almost - in office  
a system used with - - and - power to  
have the power made and report -

The word U.S. Govt - power in power to  
began - then for we are making big in addition  
congressional committee - then for we are  
making the in making power in power to  
interest? then for we are for - committee can  
long to support the federal case - in the  
agencies in power - 'the power can  
and the united of the power -

strong, making and power committee  
and the power of the power -



Every man & woman with a sense of  
responsibility - the people are not to be convinced  
present in the present misleading situation of the  
olympics

Every - is important - even in the committee  
should like to see the plan for the current  
Defenses  
future - committee of people to show - sound -  
last sound did not call for MNC - 7 sound  
to the center  
has been ~~the~~ present goal - the stage - is  
a small  
a ~~small~~ read - read

If we try - now must be changed &  
bounded - since have not - had now  
in present - the of the solidity - to call  
When only one man is - & we have that  
we don't have to leave of confront -

The word - please  
The every - agree  
The Q - is one of paying expenses