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Strategic Operations: Israeli-U.S. Relations, 1983.

Strategic Cooperation: The Israel-U.S. Negotiations
Daniel Jeremy Silver
December 18, 1983

Question: Mr. President, why are our Marines in the Lebanon? Answer: They are in the Lebanon as part of a multi-national peace-keeping force. Question: How can a few thousand Marines hunkered down in bunkers in Beirut, and particularly near the Beirut airport affect a peace-keeping mission in a country where warfare seems to be a national pastime? Answer: They are our symbolic commitment to the central government, the legitimate government, of Lebanon.

Now, this interview is imaginary and this is clearly the explanation which the Administration has given to the American people of our military presence in the Lebanon, and it is the reason that, among others, the American people are telling their representatives over this mid-winter week recess, bring the boys home, if this be the purpose for their being there they're clearly not accomplishing that purpose. They are to be a symbol of our support of the Gamayel government. No one is reading and responding to the symbol. They're simply sitting targets. And if they are, in fact, a peace-keeping force how are they carrying out their peace-keeping mission? If we have a peace-keeping force in our cities, and we do, the police force, clearly they can't keep the peace if all of the officers spend all day long in the police station. That's, in point of fact, what you're attempting to do, Mr. President, in the Lebanon.

Now, it doesn't take more than common sense and a cursory reading of the headlines to recognize that the explanations which have been given are not acceptable, and that the call to remove our troops from the Lebanon is not simply a matter of partisan politics but that there seems to be good reason that this should be done. They seem to be there for no particular purpose, at least none which most Americans can discern.

Now, I don't know if the marines should be removed from the Lebanon or not, but I do know it's a far more complex issue than this administration has made it out to be. One of the least pleasing, to me, features of this administration is that it has continued the policies of the immediate past administration, of

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attempting to present American policies in a most high-minded, purist and refined way. We didn't go into Grenada in order to remove a Cuban threat. We went into Grenada, according to this Administration, in order to save the lives of some 500 medical students. We are in the Lebanon for the noblest of reasons, for peace-keeping, but if this be so where is the peace-keeping mission? How are the Marines charged with moving in and separating out the various combatants? My point is that in this world, at least in the international sphere where international policies of jungle and where there are no laws, we have other reasons for what we do than those which are romantically moral, and the reason that we are in the Lebanon and the reasons which the administration ought to have presented to the American people are really very simple. We prefer to see the Lebanon as an independent state rather than a state completely dominated by its more radical Syrian neighbor and, therefore, heavily under the influence of the Soviet Union. And that's the reason that we're there. Our presence there, we believe, prevents the Syrians from completing their takeover. Syria is a radical Arab state whose politics and whose policies are anathema to the more conservative, some would say feudal Arab states to the south, whose black oil we covet, and whose requests for military purchases we are so happy to fulfill. Syria is a radical Arab state whose army is trained, equipped, and supplied by the Soviet Union, whose harbors at Ladakiya are used by the Soviet fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, and whose influence in the Arab world is one which, by its very nature, would support the growing influence of the Soviet Union in a part of the world which we believe to be of importance economically and strategically to us.

And there's more to it. The Lebanon is a creation of the West. The Lebanon was carved out of Turkish Syria by the French in the middle of the 19th century. It was designed to be a base from which Western business could operate in the Middle East. It was designed to be a country which would protect that small minority of Arabs who were Christian from the demands and the impositions of their more powerful Muslim neighbors. Islam is not a world which readily tolerates the

existence of non-Muslim peoples. If the Lebanon cannot be sustained by the West, and you'll notice that it is not simply the United States that is in this multinational force but Italy, France and England as well, if the West cannot maintain its creation then the prestige of all of the Western nations suffers throughout the Middle East, and more and more of these states will question whether or not they ought to be trusting, American or English or French, interests to protect them, to sustain them, whether it would not be more advisable to go with the growing power of the Soviet bloc and of the radical Arab states.

The United States has committed the Marines to the Lebanon not at the request of Israel but at the request of the central government of Lebanon, such as it is, which felt threatened by the civil war which had broken out again, whose troops in fact control very little except the eastern half of the capital of Beirut. We went into the Lebanon hoping that our presence there would signal to the Syrians and to the Russians that they could not accomplish in the Lebanon all of their objectives.

Question: Can we pull it off? It's a high-risk operation. Whether or not it can be successful is very uncertain. The bottom line seems to be the American feeling that as long as our troops are in Beirut, Syrian troops will not be there nor Soviet advisers. But in adding up the plusses and minuses of this particular undertaking, we should recognize that many things are running against us. The Lebanon is an artificial state. In all of history it has never been a nation. There is no such thing as Lebanese national spirit. Lebanon has always been, at least in the last thousand or fifteen hundred years, a sub-prefixure of the Syrian province. Beirut has been under the dominance of Damascus. The Syrians have an historic interest in what happens in that part of West Asia because the Lebanon is, to a large degree, its face to the West, to the Mediterranean. And the Mecca Valley which it now controls is effectively the most defensible frontier in the West for the plateau which comprises most of Syria. We are then trying to create something, sustain it, which runs against the whole course of history.

We are coming in late. We have by many foolish acts encouraged the Syrians in their ambitions, in fact helped them along as I'll try to illustrate in a moment. We have allowed a situation to develop where there are over thirty thousand Syrian troops, and perhaps as many as eight thousand Soviet troops in Syria, maintaining the lines in the Becca Valley and spreading their influence north towards Tripoli, towards the center of the Lebanon in the Shufe area in the mountains. Finally, we have helped create a situation in which more and more of the militias which have been warring for turf in the Lebanon have turned to the Syrians and the Soviets for cannon, and advanced military equipment and have received that equipment. They owe their strength to the Syrians. And perhaps most ironic of all, we have put our forces that are in the Lebanon at a military disadvantage because we have equipped them with obsolete military equipment and we have provided them with inadequate military leadership.

Our troops were sent in to act as guards for their compounds for the American Embassy, for the Parliament of the Lebanese. Though they were given the name of peace-keepers they were not sent out in convoys to separate out the warring parties. They hunkered down in and around Beirut. The Marines are trained to be combat troops. They were given essentially a defensive mission, to be there and to take it, and their officers were clearly not able or trained in how to protect a defensive perimeter against terrorist attack and we have suffered heavy casualties as a consequence. And when very late in the game we decided finally to retaliate we sent out carrier-based bombers against the Iranian Amal terrorist sponsored by the Syrians near Balbek and we lost three planes. The Israelis have flown hundreds of Sortis over the last year and a half and they've lost three planes in all of that operation, but our carrier bombers are really simply air-borne trucks. They're very slow. They need fighter support. They're sitting ducks for the new lightweight ground to air missiles which can in fact be even shoulder held. They're inadequate for this kind of operation. In fact, they're inadequate for modern warfare, and yet, this is the kind of equipment, ironically that the most

advanced technologically advanced state in the world has in that part of the world.

And then when we found that our A6E and A7E bombers were not militarily equal to the task for which we were sending them out, we began to retaliate with the big guns from our battleship New Jersey. Now, you may remember that the United States wisely mothballed all of its battleships over a decade ago. In an age of the guided missile the battleship is a sitting target as the British discovered in the Falklands. You can from hundreds of miles away from a very small firing platform on a patrol boat or in a submarine or from land launch a guided missile which will hone in directly on the battleship and very quickly, with two or three hits of such kind, send the battleship to the bottom. And one of the nightmare images which our admirals must have is that at some point the Syrians will simply launch a few of these missiles and this weapon which is being touted again as so potent, able to send tons of explosives hundreds of miles with very great accuracy, will quickly find itself on the bottom of the Mediterranean.

We have equipped our troops inadequately for this kind of operation; perhaps our own military establishment is inadequately prepared for something less than a sophisticated nuclear war. Whatever be the reasons, our own lack of military preparation is a compounding factor which must be put into the equation when we decide whether or not we ought to maintain the Marine presence there and perhaps redefine their purposes.

So the question arises, how did we get into this mess? The answer is we got into this mess because we are innocents as far as the politics of the Middle East are concerned, because we have not had a consistent and intelligent foreign policy which set up an agenda, a set of realizable goals, a set of clear objectives. We wanted and have wanted over most of the last twenty years to woo the Arab world. We've not made very many sophisticated distinctions between the very many parts and parties and groups within the Arab world. We have recognized a long-standing historic relationship with Israel, but oil sales and the new wealth of the Arab world has, to a large degree, dazzled the eyes of many in Washington. And, as a

result, we have moved to put out fires when they came along rather than to move consistently along a plan which would see to it that whatever is reasonably conceived is in our national interest will, in fact, within whatever framework is possible be achieved.

Our problems began when the fragile set of relationships which has always dominated the Lebanon became unstuck with the introduction of the PLO. You may remember that the Palestine Liberation Organization was born in Nasser's Egypt. It was born in the early 1950's, but Nasser quickly realized that he could not tolerate an independent, uncontrollable army within his own country and so he suppressed the PLO. And the PLO supporters, the Palestinians and the mercenaries, spread out in the other confrontation states. The strong states simply coopted their local PLO cadres into their army. The Syrians have always had a division known as AUSAHA which represents the major PLO component which has had its base in Syria. The Jordanians, weaker than the Syrians, tolerated a PLO presence for a number of years and during the 1960's, but, finally, Hussein felt that their presence there threatened his throne, and remember that in 1970 he fought a major pitched battle against the PLO and drove them effectively out of his country, out of Jordan.

The weakest country among those that bordered Israel is the Lebanon, and the PLO naturally gravitated towards Lebanon, and over time, as they were pushed out of one country after another, increased their base in the Lebanon and by the early 1970's were beginning to create in the Lebanon what was in fact a de facto state of their own south of Beirut. And the presence of this powerful, armed, well-armed group of radical Arabs unsettled the relationships between the Shiites and the Druze and the governing bodies of the Phalange, and we had what became known as the 1975-1976 Lebanese civil war. The Lebanese Civil War caused hardly a ripple in the American conscience. More people were killed in that war, many more, than were killed during the Israeli invasion of 1982. But the war was hardly covered in the American press. It was as if nothing happened because it seemed to be a

fight between warring militias, we didn't want to know anything about it. But this war, created by the presence of the PLO which unsettled what were already fragile relationships, rekindled the blood floods of the Lebanon which had existed for centuries and brought into the Lebanon the Syrians who were always looking for a pretense to move into that area. They came in originally at the instance of the central government. The central government could not put down the insurrection. They came in as peace-keepers, but quickly, once they were in, they involved themselves in the politics of the Lebanon, supporting the more radical, increasingly anti-government groups, and when the government asked them to leave they refused to leave and they've been the man who came to dinner ever since. The Syrians have been in the Lebanon since 1975. Their presence in the Lebanon ran counter to American interests. One or another of our American State Department people visited Damascus in the hope that the Syrians could be induced to leave. They began to hear in the late 70's that we ought to cultivate a greater sense of interest, financial and otherwise, in Syria which would give us some leverage. Congress began to pass legislation giving the Syrians several hundreds of millions of dollars a year in foreign aid. But even with that carrot, the Syrians could not be budged and were moving in a direction which Syria has always considered to be in its national interest, to extend its range of influence and control over the Lebanon. And so a modis avendi came into being, a modis avendi which said that the Syrians could be tolerated if they controlled only the Becca Valley. The Israelis said they would not move as long as the Syrians did not bring in their ground to air missiles or SAM missiles into the valley which would have provided air cover for the Palestinian Army in being because the other factor that was not static in the late 1970's was the clear determination of the leadership of the PLO to move from being a de facto government to having a de facto army, from moving from being a guerilla band to being an army in place. And they began to purchase, with monies given them by the Saudis and the Kuwaitis and the other rich governments of the south, they began to buy themselves the equipment of an army, tanks, heavy

canon, advanced electronic and radar equipment, guided missiles and the like. This was, of course, threatening to the Israelis, but as long as the Israelis had control of the sky they could control an army in place because modern warfare is fought from above, not on the ground particularly.

But then in the Fall of 1980 the Syrians began to violate the de facto arrangement which had been worked out that they would not bring in the ground to air missiles into the Becca Valley, missiles which would effectively provide air cover for the PLO Army, and when the United States, under pressure from Israel, tried to encourage the Syrians not to take this step, then to remove these SAM II missile sets. You remember we sent Philip Habib several times to Damascus in order to accomplish this. We failed utterly. Asad, the strong man of Syria, would not have nothing to do with it, and our failure to be able to move the Syrians despite our increased giving of monies and support to the Syrians almost made the preemptive strike by the Israelis in the summer of 1982 inevitable because now the Israelis faced not only a growing PLO Army much more heavily equipped than ever before, but they could not count on the fact that they could restrain the PLO having complete control of the air. Had the United States moved more strongly in those years against the Syrians, found some way to force them to move out the SAM missiles, perhaps all this might not have happened. But, again and again, whenever we came up against the adamancy, the obstinacy, of a strong man, and Assad is that, we backed down. We found reasons to temperize and equivocate. We asked Israel to be understanding.

If the United States policy had in these years been consistent, if in fact we had recognized as we now seem to recognize very strongly the importance of an independent Lebanese government, however that government is organized to our national purposes, then we would have, I think, moved in quite different ways against the Syrians, but we did not.

The Israeli invasion took place. The Israelis moved quickly through the PLO Army. They were able to destroy the air cover, the SAM sites and the Syrian

Air Force, and once this had been done and the Israelis had moved to the control to Damascus to Beirut road, the Americans again intervened and they told the Israelis not to turn their forces East, not to move against the now uncovered Syrian forces in the Lebanon which would have effectively removed them from the Lebanon, but that Israel ought to be patient, ought not to enlarge the area of the war, world public opinion was already angered, and, in effect, the United States ordered Israel to cease and to desist. Again, we lost an opportunity, perhaps, to accomplish the end which we now say is so important.

And then, of course, the Syrians recognizing the inconsistency and the weakness of the American policy, the Syrians began to move in directions to extend their influence in that part of the world. The United States in the summer of 1982, after the Israelis had stopped and the Americans had succeeded in extricating Arafat from behind the civilian cover which he had built for himself in Beirut, the United States began to deliberately distance itself from Israel in the hope that in so doing it would score points throughout the Arab world. This was the time, you will recall, when Casper Weinberger was having his way in Washington, when it was made very clear to the Israelis that there would be no coordination between the Marine presence and the Israeli Defense Forces. It's the time when there was no exchange of intelligence, when the United States wanted unilaterally to be given by the Israelis information on the new weapons which the Israelis had captured from the Syrians and the PLO but was unwilling to coordinate the military activities. And the symbol of all of this was that famous contrived incident when an Israeli tank was moving around the outskirts of Beirut and a young American Marine Lieutenant came out with a revolver and ordered the tank to move.

It was a time of distancing. It was a time when America would achieve its goals alone. America withdrew Marines from Beirut. The Gamayel government was powerless when its own main support, the Phalange, went into the and Shetila camps and we had the massacre, and the Marines, at the request of Gamayel's brother who now became president came back into Beirut.

Now, the United States during these months of the Fall of 1982 and the winter of 1982-83 turned its attention from Syria to Israel, and instead of organizing what would have been logical, a program of negotiations aimed at the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Lebanon, the United States determined it would not pressure Syria at all. Mr. Weinberg and his Defense Department argued successfully in the councils of State that once agreement had been reached that Israel would withdraw, the Saudis would be able to pressure the Syrians into going along with that plan. After all, the Saudis were reasonable, and the Saudis were paying the Syrians several billions of dollars a year of economic and military support. In fact, the Saudis were paying the money which the Syrians transferred immediately to the Soviet in order to buy the more than two and a half billion dollars of new sophisticated aircraft SAM V missile sites and the like by which the Syrian army quickly resupplied and re-equipped itself and became a more dangerous army and instrument of war than it had ever been before.

And so we turned against Israel and we said, you are the problem, and there were the long negotiations towards an Israeli-Lebanese treaty. Israel has no historic interest in the Lebanon. Israel wanted only to protect its northern border against attack. The Israelis were quite willing from the very beginning to sign any agreement which would involve the coordinated withdrawal of all troops, but Israel would have liked to have a peace treaty with the Lebanon as it now has with Egypt in order to begin to, one by one, build some kind of relationship with the states on its borders. The United States, for reasons which will always escape my understanding, pressured the Gamayel government not to enter into a peace treaty with Israel. And instead of which on the 17th of May of this year there was finally signed an Israel-Lebanese treaty in which Israel agreed that she would withdraw her troops from the Lebanon in coordination with the withdrawal of all other foreign troops, code words for the PLO and the Syrians, and a state of belligerency was ended, a code word which means simply that the two armies would no longer fight each other, no political or commercial under-

takings were involved, and, finally, that the United States would use its good offices to secure the immediate withdrawal of the other Syrian and PLO forces. The United States turned the Saudis and said, now we'd like you to go and bargain with the Syrians, and we sent our own people into Damascus and Mr. Asad smiled and said no, the only thing that I will agree to is that the Israelis should unilaterally withdraw from the Lebanon, I'm not part of your negotiations, I'm not interested in your negotiations. And Casper Weinberg discovered what he should have known long since, that the two billion dollars and more which the Saudis pay the Syrians is not what we would call leverage money but protection money, the kind of money that a small shopkeeper will pay to the Mafia in order to prevent his door from being bombed. In this case the Saudis are deathly afraid that the Syrians and the other radical forces in the Arab world will subvert the northern Arabs who are the field workers in the oil fields, will send down saboteurs and arms and professional agitators, and that they will overthrow their feudal regime. And so the Saudis have made noises, but not very serious ones, and the Syrians responded with contempt, they refused to move, and they showed what they had been able to achieve in the intervening months, that not only had the Syrian Army replenished its resources, re-equipped itself with more advanced weapons, but that they had been able to equip those forces which have turned to them in the Lebanon. The Druze now had advanced canon ground to air missiles. The Druze were quickly able to move in the Shuf Mountains to remove the enclaves of Christian villages and to move to a point where in fact they control all of the high ground above Beirut. Her forces in the PLO who felt that Arafat was being too cozy with governments in the West moved against Arafat's troops in the Becca Valley, pushed them out of the Becca Valley, and then equipped with tanks and heavy armor surrounded Arafat's troops in and near Tripoli, and you are now this week watching the last saga of Mr. Arafat in the Lebanon. The Shiite Muslims, who are the largest single group in the Lebanon and the group which has been missed most denied power, were armed with sub-machine guns and explosives, and

they and some of the Iranian forces in the Lebanon, equipped and supported by the Syrians, were given the means with which to engage in constant fire against Marine and French positions and also the skills with which to create these booby trapped explosive trucks which have wreaked such havoc, destroying first the American Embassy and the general headquarters of the French and of the Marine force. The Syrians have used the time to good advantage. They had equipped those who were their potential allies, they had made them strong. We had tried to equip our allies, but clearly, they were not that strong, and the presence of our troops there were not adding very much to their strength.

Violence escalated in all parts of the Lebanon and the violence became more and more directed against the so-called peace-keeping forces. And it's in that frame of reference that I think we had best understand the recently agreed-on negotiations for strategic cooperation which took place between Israel and the United States when Prime Minister Shamir was in Washington during the last week in November.

The United States has turned to Israel not in order to support Israel but so that Israel can support the United States, and that's the truth of it. Our positions in the Lebanon are weak and they are being weakened daily. When the Israelis decided that they would not play the role of Americans and they would not try and be the peacekeepers between the Druze and Phalange in the Shuf Valley, suddenly the Americans began to plead with the Israelis not to withdraw but to stay because they didn't want the situation there to be exacerbated. But the Israelis withdrew to the Awali River which is about that 40 kilometer line which they had spoken of at the beginning of the invasion, and another area of the Lebanon became open to the fights for turf and power and control which characterize that country. The Americans have seen their impotence, their inability to act because they have not enough troops on the spot, they have not a consistent policy to guide their actions. And so Washington has turned to Israel, to a very large sense I suspect, to try and have Israel pull their chestnuts out of the fire, to

to have Israel, which has the largest and most powerful army in the area, do for the United States what the United States is unwilling or unable to do for itself.

Now, the Strategic Cooperation Agreement has three parts to it. One part is economic, and that part has been described in the American press as largely a section of economic benefit to Israel. There are some benefits to Israel in that economic package. The 1.8 billion dollars a year in military aid which is being given to Israel this year is given half in terms of loans and half in terms of grants. In the next year's allocation the entire foreign aid military assistance program will be in terms of grants, but Israel has agreed to accept less monies, 1.4 billion instead of 1.8 billion.

The United States has never engaged in foreign aid as a purely altruistic enterprise. One of the things we require all governments who receive military aid from it is that all monies given must be used for purchases of equipment in the United States, that is, foreign aid is a way of keeping our workers working and our factories profitable. The United States has in this agreement allowed Israel to manufacture, to use some of this money, about 15 percent, to manufacture materials domestically which will obviously strengthen a bit the Israeli economy.

And then there is an agreement that there is to be developed a trade-free zone for the United States and for Israel. And, interestingly, this agreement is more for the benefit of the United States than for Israel. There is already in being a trade-free zone in the Caribbean, but this is an agreement where these small Caribbean nations can bring in their goods to the United States without tariff but do not have to rescind tariff on American goods being brought into the island. The agreement with Israel is a two-way, bi-lateral agreement. American goods can come into Israel tariff free; Israeli goods can come into the United States tariff-free. There's about a 5 billion dollar a year trade between these two countries, and the balance of trade is heavily in the United States favor.

So the United States manufacturers will have an advantage and it's a particularly important advantage at this time because over the last several years Israel has negotiated with the countries involved in the European economic community, a similar kind of agreement, that their manufactured goods can come into Israel tariff-free and Israel's agricultural and manufactured goods can come into the European economic market countries tariff-free. The American manufacturers would be at a disadvantage unless the Israelis had agreed to this tariff-free agreement with the United States. And so this economic package is of about mutual benefit to the two countries.

There is also a second section which has to do with joint planning, joint military exercises, and the prepositioning of military equipment. This is a long range plan. It assumes that commissions will be established between Israel Defense Forces and the Defense Department which will plan jointly in areas which will affect the interests of both countries and that the United States will, over time, preposition some military and medical supplies in Israel. No one knows how this will work out or if, in fact, it will work out. There's a similar agreement with Egypt. The problem is for Israel that the working out of this plan depends upon the interests and the cooperation of the Defense Department, and I'm afraid that as long as Mr. Weinberg controls the Defense Department that cooperation will be slow and tardy and anything but forthcoming. But it is a signal, presumably, to the Arab world that the United States will now no longer operate by distancing itself from Israel, but will strategically and militarily work with Israel in terms of intelligence, in terms of equipment, and one would hope that this would reap benefit to the United States.

Perhaps the most tragic episode over the last year has been that involving the wounded Marines from Beirut. Israel hospitals, unfortunately, have a great deal of expertise in dealing with men suffering from battle wounds, particularly from burns. The military advanced hospital in Haifa is less than a half hour away by air and by ambulance from Beirut. Mr. Weinberg refused to allow the

Marines to send their wounded to Haifa despite the immediate offer by the Israeli government of beds and care, and they were instead airlifted to far less advanced hospitals where far less advanced surgery and care was available in Cyprus and elsewhere, and I'm afraid some may have died because of that decision.

The third aprt of this agreement, that which is most important to Israel and the United States, has to do with strategic cooperation in the Lebanon. The United States reaffirmed its commitment to the Israeli-Lebanese agreement of March 17, and this was important because at Geneva, at the Reconciliation Conference which had been organized at the instance of the United States, the United States having given in against Syria, and that in order for Syria to encourage her allies to attend had allowed Syria a major voice as a major participant in this Conference. At Geneva Syria had insisted that nothing could go ahead in terms of talks of reconciliation and political reform unless and until all parties had denounced the Lebanese-Israeli agreement of May. This would, in effect, have forced the Lebanese government to denounce the interests of the United States, its chief sponsor. The Syrians again proved that they are not interested in supporting an independent Lebanese government, but only in extending their own interests and their own sphere of interests. In any case, out of weakness now the United States agreed that it would not back down from the terms which it had helped negotiate in May, and it looked forward to joint activity and support between Israel and the United States to strengthen the positions that they share in the Lebanon. The first consequences of that you read of in the papers this last week. Our Marines are limited to their compounds, either out of fear or out of policy. The Israeli forces are not. When it became important this last week to disengage the remaining Phalange militia from various cities which they have beseiged in the Shufe Mountains and to bring out, along with some 2,000 Phalange militia men and about 5,000 Phalange Christian civilians, the Israelis were prepared to send in a convoy, to protect that convoy militarily, the militia have now been brought out. It will take about a week to bring out the 5,000 civilians. Israel can do certain things which will

help mitigate the situation which America, clearly, is not able to do.

But I must say to you that when the decision was announced in Israel it was not announced and received with great joy. Yes, Israel prizes the long term relationship which it has enjoyed of support and understanding with the United States, but Israel is today suspicious of U.S. policy and has good reason to be. There was a memorandum of strategic understanding not unlike this one signed in December of 1980. It was signed after Israel had faithfully, and to the letter, obeyed each and every item it had agreed to in terms of the evacuation of the Sinai under the Camp David Accords. It was, in a sense, the reward for Israel's actions. It was at that point that Mr. Begin felt it necessary to extend Israel administrative control over the Golan in order to placate those forces in Israel which were up in arms because of his decision to uproot the settlers in Yamid and really, totally, to agree to all of the terms that had been part of the Camp David Accord. That was the price Begin, for better or for worse, felt he had to pay to his own electorate in order to be able to carry out his international agreements. The United States seized on this action immediately as a pretext to unilaterally denounce this memorandum of strategic understanding, so the Israelis are not at all sanguine about the consistency of American commitments. They have seen in the Lebanon the weakness of American policies, and Americans sometimes know what they want to do but haven't the faintest idea of how to achieve it, and they are very very much afraid that what America really wants out of this memorandum of strategic cooperation is that Israel will do America's dirty work in the Lebanon and fight the Syrians for the Americans, and that, of course, the Israelis have no intention of doing. Israeli interests in the Lebanon are far different than those of the United States. This government is preoccupied with the super power battle. Its concerns in the Lebanon are Syria and the Soviet Union. Israel's concerns in the Lebanon are to protect its northern border and to see to it that there's no coalescence of forces which it cannot ultimately defeat. Those are similar concerns but not the same a concern. I suspect Israeli policy makers have assumed

that they could live quite easily with a partitioning, effective partitioning, of the Lebanon. They do not believe, I suspect, that Syria can be dislodged, and as long as they can maintain a sphere of influence in the south just over their northern borders I think they would probably find themselves satisfied.

The political future of the Lebanese is a problem of concern, but it's one which Israel knows it cannot resolve. One of the reasons that the Israelis withdrew from their most northern position to the Alwali River was because the area of the Shufe Mountains was the area in which the Druze claim the turf. And there is, as you know, a very strong Druze community in Israel, a community which has felt itself very much to be citizens of Israel, whose sons fight in the Israeli Army. And for the first time, because the Israelis sometimes were taking actions which seemed to be against Druze interests, the Druze vilalges in northern Israel were becoming restive. The Druze young men were refusing to serve in the military. Israel was caught up in its own set of problems because of the complex problems in the Lebanon.

Now, all this brings us back to the question, should the Marines be removed from the Lebanon? And I confess that the simple answer would be yes. At the very most the American decision to put the Marines in there committed us to a high risk policy, and that our actions over the last year have only increased the dangers and the risks. At the same time, it must be said that if there is any opportunity to create and sustain some sense of independence in an entity called Lebanon, this presence is the beginning of such a policy and the only chance that this policy may have.

Americans tend to react to the death of the 230 Marines and so on by saying let's leave Lebanon to the Lebanese, and if that's all the issue was then there would be a very simple and effective answer. But it's not a question of leaving Lebanon to the Lebanese. It's a question of leaving Lebanon to Syria and to the Soviet. That's the question which faces the planners in Washington. That's the question on which we must make, each individually, our own decision.

But, clearly, if we decide that we ought to give this program some chance, the Marines ought to be kept there a little longer, their mission must be redefined. There's no value in being there as a symbol when nobody's trying to pick up the signs which you're trying to send out. Clearly, we have to defend ourselves, and, clearly, we ought to if we are going to stay ought to take a more active policy, become police men. That's what a peace-keeping force is, to become police men, and to move out, to begin to enlarge the area which is under our effective control.

Will there be casualties? There are casualties already.

Will it require a larger commitment of man power? Clearly.

Can it be effective? There is no guarantee. But if it is important to our national interests to see that the Lebanon remains outside Syrian-Soviet sphere of influence, then it seems to me that is the policy which we must seriously consider.

Is Vietnam the inevitable model? To a certain degree.

Is the defeat that we suffered in Vietnam the inevitable conclusion? It may be, but it need not be. Defeat is not necessarily the conclusion of involvement in such an area unless we are unwilling to commit the forces necessary to accomplish our purposes.

How we come down on this issue will depend on our individual attitudes towards spheres of influences, our concerns about Soviet expansionism, our concerns about the good name of America, but I think we all must share at least this.

1) A sense of concern, of deep and abiding concern, about the ineptness and the inconsistency of American policy. However you judge what's happened, there is nothing in the events of the last several years which should give you much confidence in the wisdom of our generals and of our diplomats, of this administration in foreign affairs.

And secondly, that in the jungle which is international policy, unless you are willing to make a physical commitment, a military commitment, however reasonable your approach may be, you're not likely to gain your end. And when you're

dealing with a man like Asad, if he's still alive, when you're dealing with the strong men of the Arab world who sense the new power of the Arab world, a carrot of a few hundred millions of dollars, the advantage of being welcome at the White House, these are not effective selling points to winning people over to your side. These are ambitious, cold-eyed, calculating people who have very specific national policies and national goals in mind. If you oppose these goals you're going to have to pay the price for your opposition. America can't simply have its way any longer simply because we've had our way in much of the world for so long.



Perhaps the number should be taken out. It's not at all
clear that they have the equipment in the plan means
To carry out various policy - but before we make
such significant decisions it must be clear about the
communication's objectives - - and not only that
the "limit" is not a day but for a, because
the ^{weaker} ~~defendant~~ limit has been lowered and is.

Peacock is a whole nation - but Unlikely
never intended as means to be a rule for anyone
to make. He is a nation. One nation was
sent to deliver at the request of the General Staff -
the share up to Sho. Ky. Power - not to make one
have any particular share for General, and be more at
the heart of an international interest to the General
more in unhappy power - but it will be one a
depending of Source

Sigma is a national level student organization
and chapters are found by the University (provided)
and need state to the South on which are based
for each

Syria is a small land ^{now large} ~~where it~~
 studies are expensive, limited & supported by the
 Soviet Union. ~~the USSR has supported and~~
~~nowhere was in Turkey~~ We don't want to see ~~peace~~
 conflict ~~enough~~ is too much - the Soviet fleet goes

edit ending your to city limit and in not shown
any real political situation as the matter of political
reform. / 30T again there have been some changes for
many a decade / they are affecting more to better
valley part of Syria - in recent months, several cases
arrested. - chiefly, though also - in the N. and
Taurus / in the East and Balkans / in the
Hazy West - Dura & Syria from within the high ground
above Beirut

The situation of power has been changing in Syria,
directly of our hand for a central federalism now against
the policy of the new political parties - There were
an a federalism order until the French a military force
was there in - many a way /

Finally, in 1945, one must add that our
military may not see up to the college. The means Tull
Commander have not been able to prepare some
against Tammont attack. When 2 weeks ago, after
months of delays & the loss of over 230 men, we
decided to retaliate to the attack on our base.
planes - we sent 3 planes in a night by - more
planes in the end - 100% of our air force
1 1/2 years - our power based ACE - ATE's
are simply too slow for modern combat - but
series wanted to be NT. by far - But the
NT are well liked & should go into the
combat against East and a better way means

for weeks that weather was too -

From mid 70's up to should refer to 1960s

very - Trucks - some - election support - numbers - all

last 30 years in our line - a looked to the for the past

August - opened but not read most by a balance -

They understand - no 5000 - needed could regulate

small can last the 10 long - sign 1950 undated

against - again US total to from to turning - They

should to and it - cost 1000 thousand - it was and

with hundred - a year in long about around around

number of 1982

Could work good - could understand - should

understand - know and have 1000 can five - a year the

very - 1/2 out in million after could had understand

understand - Baron - a in understand from from

been understand understand in Trinidad

eye U.S. total age of not understand - from understand

signature - The from of understand understand - U.S. understand

can to over U.S. to understand all our understand

- 1) There understand understand. and to understand
- 2) was understand not to understand from - understand

understand understand our understand - understand understand

3) There understand understand - understand understand

1000

6. See ^{concepts} ~~that~~ ^{the} release ~~and~~ - not ~~ag-~~
negotiate ~~with~~ U.S. to get ~~back~~ to ~~middle~~ - ~~potential~~
and ~~to~~ ~~use~~ U.S. ~~interest~~ ~~at~~ ~~follow~~ ~~on~~ ~~Peace~~ ~~Deal~~ -
Demand ~~over~~ 1) ~~at~~ ~~4~~ ~~allowing~~
2) ~~unilateral~~ ~~unilateral~~ ~~and~~ ~~free~~ ~~from~~
3) ~~even~~ ~~right~~ ~~to~~ ~~put~~ ~~in~~ ~~1~~ ~~follow~~ ~~unilateral~~ ~~and~~
~~any~~

all ~~that~~ ~~can~~ ~~be~~ ~~achieved~~ ~~over~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~peace~~ ~~deal~~ ~~to~~ ~~reach~~
Soviet - ~~unilateral~~ ~~unilateral~~ ~~and~~ - ~~5~~ ~~cent~~ ~~in~~ ~~down~~
to ~~be~~ ~~of~~ ~~use~~ - ~~some~~ ~~not~~ ~~is~~ ~~negotiated~~ - ~~C.W.~~ ~~since~~
will ~~get~~ ~~can~~ ~~and~~ - ~~have~~ ~~cover~~ ~~2B~~ - ~~but~~ ~~2B~~
protection ~~may~~ ~~not~~ ~~be~~ ~~any~~ - ~~all~~ ~~will~~
strengthen ~~pages~~ ~~off~~ ~~Wife~~

Since ~~unilateral~~ ~~unilateral~~ - ~~by~~ ~~down~~
that - ~~peace~~ ~~deal~~ ~~is~~ ~~unilateral~~ ~~unilateral~~ -
Peace ~~will~~ -

San Antonio ~~in~~ ~~need~~ ~~in~~ ~~man~~ ~~and~~
Cuba's ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~given~~ ~~to~~ ~~Area~~ ~~1~~ ~~right~~ ~~to~~ ~~Level~~ - ~~but~~
border ~~of~~ ~~U.S.~~ ~~border~~ - ~~but~~ ~~use~~ - ~~all~~ ~~movement~~ ~~to~~
fully ~~and~~ ~~in~~ ~~to~~ ~~to~~ - ~~it's~~ ~~to~~ ~~re-achieve~~ ~~4~~
due ~~to~~ ~~Peace~~ - ~~given~~ ~~to~~ ~~Peace~~ - ~~Re-achieve~~
provided - ~~may~~ ~~percentage~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~used~~ - ~~then~~ ~~can~~ ~~be~~ ~~used~~
~~in~~ ~~law~~ - ~~in~~ ~~celebrate~~ - ~~Peace~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~used~~ - ~~which~~
means ~~to~~ ~~replicate~~ ~~U.S.~~ ~~interest~~ ~~to~~ ~~support~~

force couldn't be solved

as part of S.A. would not be good in respect of future

6. W - Unknown resin - white solid - Fr. - } 2

benzyl - ester by Paul - great. cut w/est rubies -

all the way East River

Werkstoffe nach ~~dem~~ Lössen der 4 mg auf einem -
hagen te rüchende - reage mit .4 Gd auch auf dem

rec - I D F - new security ~~control~~ panel vol 20

until one at Awali

2nd class for 1st to second class. Please -

to conduct secret dialogues

Shree - Hage - STAGG Representation

1) Some aquifers are also used as water / fuel

1) supra 1 set (2nd treaty) - US paper

• 1 set (del) trees
under cleared 1 cell for 1 common 6
• this just passing / no - planting
• treated in road

31 ~~was~~ ~~the~~ ~~of~~ ~~a~~ ~~bird~~ ~~when~~ ~~found~~ ~~in~~ ~~cave~~

[illegible]

all the rocks of strata in the
in Cape - when water level - kept down]

one essential thing - style is unique - last

Shells as fossils - on low ~~area~~ $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ - N. 1/2 sec - 1

Concerns - letters only given 15 that entered in the
and in the

