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After Lebanon, 1984.

Lebanon
Daniel Jeremy Silver
March 11, 1984

Recent events in the Lebanon have shown that Lebanon as a nation is among the walking dead. Lebanon is a definable geographic unit, but, as you know, that area has never in all of its long history effectively coalesced into a single nation state. The most recent attempt was imposed from the outside. In the middle of the nineteenth century Kadosh, the French foreign office, had two purposes in trying to shape a Lebanon, a nation, out of this area. The first was that the French were eager to find a base for themselves and a support group for themselves in West Asia, particularly if they could find a base that was on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. They could see that oil would be of importance. They could see that the markets in the natural resources in the Middle East could be developed to French advantage and that in order to do so there would have to be a group in the Middle East to whom they could turn who would be their agents and a place where they could plant in West Asia Western institutions, French-oriented institutions.

The second reason for the French choosing to create, to shape, a Lebanon was their desire to protect the Christian minorities in the Lebanon. As you know, the Lebanon, as an area, has been a refuge since the early Middle Ages for a variety of minority groups, both Muslim minorities and Christian minorities, who fled into the valleys of the Shufe highlands and were able to protect themselves there from the intermittent militant imperialism of Islam.

Some four centuries ago the Maronite Christians, the largest of these Christian groups, accepted the authority of the Roman Pope and Rome, in the middle of the 19th century, was eager to do what it could to protect its disciples in the Middle East and it turned to a Roman Catholic country, to France, and France was quite willing to combine commercial and religious goals. And even while the Turkish Empire was still in control of this area, France began to develop a Lebanon which was under French influence, and with the breakup of the Turkish Empire at the end of the first World War France brought Lebanon as a nation into being

and French soldiers maintained the sovereignty, if you can call it that, of Lebanon as a nation until August of 1946, until the end of the second World War. Now, the French were able to prop up this rather artificial creation because the boundaries of Lebanon are nothing more than lines drawn in European diplomatic Cabinets on a West Asian map by their soldiers and by the patently successful, economically successful achievements of their presence. Beirut, which had been in the 19th century and for many centuries before just a sleepy little coastal town, became a capital, but more importantly, it became a great commercial and banking center, the greatest banking center in the Middle East. French influence was seen throughout and because of the manifest prosperity which France had brought and because any number of the sons of the war lords of the dominant classes in the Lebanon were able to go to Europe, to be trained in Europe, and because the war lords saw advantage to them, that is money, power, fame, accruing to them through this arrangement they allowed a kind of nominal central government to come into being, provided the government did not interfere, intrude into their turf, the particular feudal area of this area which they controlled, each of them, since time immemorial. And when the anti-colonial movements of the mid-century were at their fullest, basking in prosperity, these war lords felt that they could manage, somehow, on their own, free of French dominance. The French were pressured out and for several decades they were able to maintain the semblance of a government because the government in Beirut did not intrude into the various areas controlled by these war lords, and because all of them tended to benefit financially from the prosperity which Lebanon as a whole was enjoying. But there were a number of conditions that were simmering outside of the Lebanon which would quickly rip aside this mask of prosperity and destroy this house of cards. In 1947, as you remember, the United Nations decided that there could be a partitioned Palestine. There would be an Arab Palestine and there would be a Jewish Palestine. The Arabs rejected the 1947 decision. War broke out and during that war, you will recall, some tens of thousands of Arabs fled from the

northern parts of Israel and they went into the Lebanon and they camped there. And the Lebanese government at that time knew that this was a dangerous act. These large encampments of Palestinian refugees could be a cancer in their body politic, this very weak control which they had established, but being always weak and recognizing their own inability to stand up to the Nassers of the day, the great Arab leaders of the day, they kept their silence and they were protected by the fact that the West said that through UNRA, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, those who were in these camps would be fed and clothed and sheltered, monies provided. They allowed these camps to remain.

The second event that took place outside the borders of the Lebanon was the fact that Syria at the end of the second World War gained her independence, and after a period of political unrest a strong man emerged, Mr. Asad, representing the Alowite minority, and he imposed a strong autocratic rule on Syria. And Syria has always felt itself to be a major power in the Middle East, and Syria recognized that the borders which had been drawn by the Frency at the end of the first World War were borders which made the defense of her own country very difficult. The Becca Valley of which we have all now heard is really the most natural western defensible border for Syria and besides, Beirut had always been a very small provincial center ruled out of Damascus, and so the Syrians began, in various ways to assert their authority. They tried in Nasser's day to create a United Arab Republic in which they would be the great northern bastion and be able to control the northern area. They began to move people into the Lebanon to try and incite the Muslim minorities, who were the least financially successful groups in Lebanon, to protest against the more conservative groups that were established there because, of course, Syria has been from the beginning a state-oriented more to the Soviet bloc than to the West.

And then, finally, in 1970 the Palestine Liberation Organization which had its birth in Egypt and had been quickly brought under control there by Nasser, which had spread into Syria and into Jordan, had been controlled by the Syrians

which coopted the brigades of the PLO into the Syrian Army and finally had made such trouble in the Jordan that the Jordanian government fought a bloody war in 1970 to expel them. The PLO military arm came and settled on top of the Palestinian camps, and in early 1970 began to create in the Lebanon a de facto independent state and the beginnings of a standing army which every state seems to require. When this happened the PLO simply came in and shouldered aside whichever of these minority groups seemed to stand in its way, and if you can imagine a crowded, very sensitive billiard ball table filled with balls, when you began to put in motion another ball demanding its piece of turn all the other balls were hit against one another and ultimately ancient rivalries were rekindled, ancient agreements obviously were breached. The PLO itself became a source of danger, of extortion, of taxation to many of these groups. The fragile arrangements of the past were ruptured and shattered, and the civil war of the mid 1970's broke out. And what we have been seeing these last weeks and months has been one of the penultimate acts of that civil war which clearly will end with a redistribution of power among these minorities, but not necessarily with any significant power going to a central government, but most importantly will end with the transference of authority from western influence to eastern influence, that is from French and then Western NATO and American influence to Syrian influence, Arab influence and influence from the Soviet Union. I'm not a prophet, but it's almost inevitable that we will begin to see in the Lebanon that, first of all, the Lebanese government, whatever facade it managed to develop, will speak with the tongue of Damascus. We've already seen that the war lords, all of them, have had to go to Damascus in order to get their marching orders, how the government will be reorganized. The meetings which are taking place this week in Lozanne are being orchestrated from Damascus, meetings trying to reconstitute a Lebanese government and we will see that the voice of Lebanon, not necessarily the voice of the people of Lebanon but the voice of this government of Lebanon such as it will be, another of the voices of the radical rejectionist Arab front. Already Libya

this week announced that she was reestablishing political relations with the Lebanon and you'll see the Lebanese voice again being one which demands the rejection of the Camp David agreements, which demands the rejection of U.N. Resolution 242 which is the basis of the Camp David agreement. And Syria has never accepted either of those propositions, which is to say that the Arab position as far as the West Bank and Gaza are concerned will be not simply a demand for autonomy but it will be a demand for a Palestinian nation and that it will not be clear whether the Palestinian nation is limited to the West Bank if it is not in fact one which is to include all of what they still call Palestine. You're likely to see Russian ships beginning to dock in Tripoli and Beirut and you're likely to see refitting operations allowed to this fleet. Russia desperately wants, besides Latakia in Syria, anchorage for the fleet which it now keeps operational in the eastern Mediterranean, a fleet whose presence under the southern belly of Turkey threatens the NATO bases, the radar advanced warning bases which we have there. And you're likely to see, you will inevitably see, that the economy of the Lebanon, such economy as survives this period of carnage, will be directed to the benefit of the east of Syria rather than to the benefit of the West. Syria, of course, has won. And for Syria the immediate consequences are decisions she must make whether or not to extend her troops' control of the Becca Valley, that is from the eastern valley between Syria and the Lebanon into most of Lebanon itself. My own feeling is that she is unlikely to do so. She has very little to gain to intrude her authority which is already self-evident into actual physical presence and to become the policemen between the Druze and the Amal Shiites and the Palestinians near Tripoli and the Phalange in east Beirut and all the other groups that are armed and encamped throughout that country. She will have, however, effective control of Lebanese policy. She will have effective control of the major decisions affecting the Lebanese economy, and she will keep in the Becca Valley the advanced missile and radar bases which are now manned by some 5,000 Russians for several reasons. First of all, the Russians want these

listening posts because it gives them some control over the air space and over Israel and even as far as Egypt; and secondly because it is a defense in depth for her capital, Damascus. We tend to forget that just as Jerusalem is close to the West Bank so Damascus is close to the Golan Heights and is only 30 miles away from the Bekka Valley. For Syria this is a natural defense for her most precious city. You're likely to see then that Lebanon is effectively a country ruled by the separate groups that we've now learned to name, that the Bekka will be controlled militarily by the Syrians, and that parts of southern Lebanon will be under effective Israeli control. Whether the Israelis maintain their present line, river line, or move south to the Latani stream, a move of a few miles which will free them from the necessity of policing the city of Sidon, the one small urban area which is still under their control remains to be seen. But clearly, it remains Israeli policy now, as it was before the invasion, has been since 1973, to maintain a buffer zone in southern Lebanon to protect the Galilee, to protect the northern cities of Israel. And Israel is likely increasingly to do this with a minimum of her own troops. You remember there was the free Lebanese Army which was under the command of Major Haddad, largely a Christian militia, which acted as a buffer police force for Israel north of what we used to call the good ^{de}fense. Major Haddad died during the summer and there was some feeling that this army might disintegrate. On the contrary, this group which numbered about 1500 under Haddad, has grown rather remarkably during the last months and it has changed its composition from being a group of 1500 largely Christian military people, carefully trained and armed, it now numbers about 2500, about 40 percent of whom are Druze and Shiite Muslim. It is becoming in a fact apparently an army of the groups of the south who are determined to accomplish several things. One is to prevent the reintroduction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization because that's the area that they dominated and these groups suffered under the area; and because the presence of the PLO and the activities of the PLO caused Israel to strike back and they suffered from these counter strikes. And so they are

eager to police their own area to keep it free from this old battle back and forth. This army, in other words, has grown, is growing, and in all likelihood Israel will continue to provide for it and continue to think of it as a way of being able to thin out, I believe the military term is to thin out its own military commitments in the Lebanon which are both expensive in financial terms and which have cost Israel a number of lives each month since they've been responsible for this territory.

In effect, then, Lebanon will be partitioned. In effect, then, whatever central government Lebanon had will be a shadow, will have, in effect, no real power. What has really happened in the Middle East goes beyond the Lebanon, of course. And what has happened is that for the moment the Syrians are cock of the walk and they are able to exert a great deal of authority, suasive and otherwise, throughout the Middle East.

The American government, trying to picture defeat as something other than defeat, has not been inactive, and what it has tried to do is to turn people's attention away from the tail under our legs withdrawal to the sea by reintroducing some interest in the President's summer of 1982 peace initiative which was, really, simply to revive the Camp David agreement and to extend that part of the agreement which involves the West Bank and Gaza. We encouraged Mr. Arafat after he had been thrown out of Tripoli by other elements of the PLO to visit President Mubarak and when Mubarak was here he was, as you recall, encouraging the meeting of Arafat and King Hussein in order to get the Camp David agreements rolling again, thus Mubarak. Hussein and Arafat met ten days ago for several days; they're meeting again this week, but it's all a pointless charade because neither of these worthies can do anything which is effective without now the agreement of the Syrians. And interestingly, the Syrian government said very simply after the first meeting of Arafat and Hussein, "after the failure of Washington and Lebanon the next American stop will be in Jordan to pressure it to start negotiations with Israel. What it failed to achieve in Lebanon Syria will be able to prevent it

from achieving in Jordan. Syria will speak for the will of the Arab nation as it did in the Lebanon and will be able to impose that will on Jordan." And in point of fact, in all reality, for the moment at least, Syria can impose her will on Hussein. Hussein is not a risk taker. He is shown that over a twenty-year period. He is not likely to move not only without Arafat's agreement, Arafat accounts for very little now, but without the agreement of the Syrians who control the military arm of the PLO as well as who now have shown that they can beat to its knees the greatest power in the world, at least in the Middle East.

The United States, in order to encourage Hussein to have courage, has tried again to use the carrot and the carrot which we have used is to offer to Hussein several thousand very advanced hand-held surface-to-air missiles. That submission was made again to the Congress just two weeks ago, and we are also reviving that idea of Casper Weinberg's of a month ago of a rapid deployment force, the training of some 15,000 Jordanian soldiers to be a very effective, ^{modern} Green Beret kind of operation, presumably to defend the oil fields. The lesson which we militarily think we have learned in the Middle East is that we have very sophisticated advanced weapons, but we don't have the kind of man power to go in and small mission and slug it out, and so we're trying to create mercenary groups who will do this effectively for us. The problem with the rapid development for us on a non-military base is that historically it makes no sense, that is to say it is a proposal which is done without any recognition of the realities of feelings, of attitudes, of ancient rivalries in the Middle East. Who will the rapid development force protect? The oil fields. Who controls the oil fields? The Saudis. Why is Saudi Arabia called Saudi Arabia? Saudi Arabia is called Saudi Arabia because a tribe of the Saudis fought a 200-year war, a very bloody war, against the people who controlled Mecca and Medina, the great centers of Arabia, over the 16th, 17th and 18th century, a group known as the Hashomites, Who are the Hashomites? They are the grandparents of King Hussein.

In 1924 King Faisal, the Saudi head, was able to defeat, finally, the grand-

father of Hussein and the Hashomites went to exile. And the princes of the Hashomites were resurrected from exile by the Western governments because at the end of the first World War we wanted to put Arab lordlings over the colonial powers which we ruled, so we put one of the princelings over Iraq; we put another of the princelings over Jordan; and the Hashomites have ruled in Jordan as a group from the outside ever since. Now, the rivalry between the Hashomites and the Saudis is one like the rivalry of the Hatfields and the McCoys. It's been going on for 250 years and it's not likely that the Saudis are going to want to have the McCoys come in and to defend them from even real enemies. So the idea of arming a rapid deployment force in order to protect the Saudis and to make that force a Hashomite force is a contradiction in terms. And when the Israelis protest this intrusion of modern arms and modern training to its most immediate neighbor as a danger to itself, in this case the concern is well placed because it is again a tribute to the ignorance of the American government of the realities or the unwillingness to come to grips with the realities of the Middle East.

There's a long article in the New York Times this morning which I commend to you. It is a review of the failure of our American military personnel in the Lebanon to train an effective army to defend and to work for the central government. And what was the basis of our failure? Not that we couldn't teach men how to shoot or how to use new weapons, but that no one took upon himself the responsibility of thinking through how to bind into a single army the Druze, the Shiite, the Sunni, the Phalange, the Greek Orthodox, all these groups which have fought for centuries in the Lebanon, who had been in the army up to 1975 and who had disappeared to their various factions during the Civil War and who were now being brought together again, presumably into an army of a central government. We simply trained these people without thinking, without being willing to come to grips with what was the real problem if we could create a central government. And now we are again compounding the problems by innocence or ignorance or worse.

The United States has been greatly weakened by the events in the Lebanon. We have been weakened on several levels. In the first place, all the states of the Middle East, Syria, Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Egypt, must wonder at the folly of which the American government is capable. How could we have spent eight months trying to force the Lebanese and the Israelis to come to some withdrawal agreement without recognizing that Syria was an essential ingredient in that withdrawal agreement? How could we have gone ahead with this on the vaguest assumption that somehow the Saudis, because they gave a billion dollars' of money to the Syrians, would be able to force the Syrians to withdraw once we had worked out this agreement among two of the three actors in the peace? We did not want to recognize that the billion dollars the Saudis gave to the Syrians was protection money, it wasn't money that gave them suasive power. We simply bulled ahead without thought that ultimately what we were really doing was giving the Syrians even greater veto power than they had before. Again and again we have shown our incompetence on a strategic level. We put our troops into the worst possible strategic position we could, as sitting ducks in low land below a high land from which people could shoot down on them with relative ease. So whether we are talking on a political level or whether we're talking on a strategic military level, the governments in the Middle East wonder at the good sense, at the knowledge, the capacity of the United States. Prime Minister Shamir, the other day, gave an interview. The most interesting part of that interview, to me, was the fact that he said that the Israelis had offered the United States to go in and to act as those who would train the central Lebanese army. We, he said, know the Lebanese. We know the terrain. We know what kind of fighting, what kind of military discipline, is required in this area, and bright young lieutenants, fresh out of West Point, from Wisconsin and North Dakota simply do not know what they're doing in this part of the world, but the United States, as you recall, turned bitterly against Israel after the invasion. We had that famous scene of the lieutenant standing up to the tank, you know, saying, thus far shalt thou go and no further, and

wanted nothing of this kind of support, so we went it alone and in doing so we only proved our incapacity. Now, the most dangerous fact which emerges from this is that in the complicated Byzantine political machinations, the calculations, which govern policies in the Middle East you have to be able to make commitments and make good on these commitments. And America had made many commitments over the last four years and has made good on none of them, and so in the future when a little country, a little power, a little group, whoever it may be, is told by the United States if you do this we will guarantee that, they have no reason to trust the American guarantee. In 1980 Israel and Syria were at loggerheads. The United States went in and guaranteed to Israel that it would not attack. They would see to it that Syrians would not move the advanced surface-to-air missiles into the Bekka Valley. The Americans told the Israelis they had an agreement. The Syrians went ahead and moved the missiles into the Bekka Valley. The United States sent Secretary Haig and others to Damascus who were not able to secure the withdrawal of those missiles. Again and again we have made professions and when push comes to crunch we have been unable to live up to those professions, and so as a negotiator we will be able to do much less than we could have done before. If, in fact, there had ever been a chance for some kind of agreement on economy in the West Bank I think it went out in the Lebanon. Why so? Because whatever agreement would be worked out would have to be a complex one. America has long recognized that it has some legitimate security concerns along the Jordan River. There would have to be some kind of arrangement which would allow for the maintenance of a number of Israeli forward positions. There would have to be some kinds of guarantees that there would be no intrusion of major arms into that area after the autonomy agreement goes into effect. Any number of these kinds of arrangements would have to be in being and they would be very complicated, you can be sure of that.

Now, what would happen if America's word could be counted on would be that if in fact the Palestinians, the PLO or the Jordanians or the Syrians violated

these terms, America would be responsible either economically or otherwise to turn the screws on these countries, and if Israel went in to do it itself America would have to support that action. Now, one can no longer count on the American strength, and what is in fact the case now is the Israelis face a long, American-sponsored negotiation over the West Bank, complicated negotiations over which, in effect, Syria has a veto power. Let's say that these negotiations are completed, that Israel's arms are twisted and some negotiation emerges, autonomy is established. As sure as I am standing here, guns will begin to come into the West Bank. There will be incidents in the West Bank. The militarization of the West Bank will proceed faster than it was intended. What can Israel do? She'll be restrained by America's always fearful of moving ahead, and the Syrians can simply come in and say to the Palestinians, you had no right to enter into an agreement with Israel, Israel is not a state; we demand that you renounce that agreement and if you don't we will take military action. And as the strongest power in that part of the world, that threat carries a great deal of weight.

So the defeat of the West in the Lebanon will have long range consequences in terms of the whole relationship between Israel and her Arab neighbors. It's going to be a much more difficult time and it's going to be one in which America's desires to see some kind of arrangement will have to be moderated if Washington is wise by a recognition that America has made it more difficult because of our actions in the past to achieve that. This Administration has not been wise in the Middle East. It has not been wise because it sent its Marines into the Lebanon without a clear mission. It has not been wise because it made professions to the Lebanese government which is now having to withdraw, back away from. It made professions to the Israeli government which ^{it} was not able to live up to. It's a tragedy, but the domestic opposition here in the United States as well as the Administration must bear, I believe, its share of the blame. Why did our troops go into the Lebanon as a peace-keeping force when anybody could have seen that if they were to be effective at all they would have to interpose themselves

actively between the Druze and the Phalange, between the Amal and the Christian militias. They went in because the United States government and the opposition domestically ever since Vietnam has demanded that Congress have a veto over foreign policy commitments enacted the War Powers Act and has made it so that we have to moralize every single military action, every single active foreign policy statement that we make. Moralizing foreign policy is very difficult. Obviously, all of us would like to see a world which was free and just and democratic, but it's a jungle out there, and in the jungle it's often the predator like Asad who comes off the victor. And one of the things that the democrats in America have tried to force through is a position which requires that all those who are our client states, all those with whom we have relationships of one kind or another, live up to the highest standards which we try to live up to here in America where we have a very special set of political conditions. In the Lebanon we impose on Gemayel the requirement that he reform in a democratic sense a government which in fact did not exist, and one of the explanations that Tip O'Neil and others gave for the opposition to the continuance of military presence in the Lebanon was that Gemayel had not been able to affect, he'd been tardy in affecting this political reform which, in fact, could not have been done.

Unfortunately, throughout the world, we have a tendency to demand that those whom we support do two contradictory things: that they receive our arms and prosecute our aims, and at the same time that they somehow recreate themselves in the image of the United States. And sometimes what we end up doing in consequence of this benefits neither the country nor the United States. I'm not prepared to admit at the moment that our having on a human rights basis attacked the Shah of Iran who could certainly be attacked on that basis, and helping to destabilize his government has in any way benefited the people of Iran. They are under greater autocracy, more of them are imprisoned, more of them have been killed under Khomeini than were ever imprisoned or killed under the Shah.

I don't know if you noticed in the paper a few days ago that Morris Udall was

quoted as saying that he never felt he would hear himself saying this, but he really wished that Richard Nixon was in charge of arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. In the sea of sharks you need a killer shark, and in a sea of sharks the saints are often eaten. And what I'm suggesting to you is simply this, that to try to impose upon the rest of the world, particularly a world like the Middle East, the kinds of values and traditions which we have developed here in the United States over several centuries and which we drew, to a certain degree, from Europe, from Western Europe which had fought wars for several centuries to create the kinds of democratic and republican values which went into the founding of this country, that these things will not happen overnight if they happen at all in places in the world of very different culture, of very different background and of very different history. And if we have legitimate economic or military or political concerns, and I think they are legitimate real politik military political and economic concerns elsewhere in the world, we cannot at the same time stabilize these to our event and demand that the governments that we deal with become mirror images of our own country. It simply cannot happen. And this tendency of moralizing foreign policy in the largest scheme of things is, I think, the greatest weakness of American policy today. When we try to impose this kind of ethic in which we all believe today, tomorrow, on countries going through an industrial revolution and trying to emerge out of poverty, going through the tortures of the damned to try and create some kind of stable society, we are putting ourselves in a position where we are defeating in many ways the very thing we are trying to establish.

What's the future then for Israel? What's the future then for Lebanon? What's the future for Syria?

Israel is going through, as you know, economic troubles. It's going through a crisis of conscience. When history is written in all probability the decision to send the troops into the Lebanon will be written down as unwise, but it has a strong army. The threat that it faces is an interesting one. The most immediate

threat that it faces is from the United Nations because in order to stabilize its northern border, to have this buffer area in the southern Lebanon, it must have effective control of that area. The French this last week submitted a request to the Security Council that a U.N. force be sent to the Lebanon. The Russians vetoed it. Why did they veto it? They vetoed it because they wanted that force to be located not simply in Beirut but in the south. And the Israelis have had a long experience with U.N. forces which presumably are neutral, which in fact become forward observation points for the PLO and allow easy infiltration through their lines into Israel itself. So the Israelis fear this kind of U.N. intervention in southern Lebanon. It would weaken their security, not strengthen it. On a longer term the Israelis will have to maintain the amount of monies they pour into their defense budget and they are threatened by the West by its great desire to add to the arms that the Soviet Union is pouring into Iran and into Iraq by pouring in their own advanced arms into Jordan, into Saudi Arabia, into Egypt and into these other neighboring countries.

Syria? Syria is strong today. Syria's economy is weak. Syria has a great enemy to the east in Iraq, and if Iraq ever frees itself with the war in Iran she has a terrible score to settle with Syria. Syria, as you know, has cut the oil lines which run from Iraq to the Mediterranean and, therefore, has unsettled in a major way the economy of that country, and at some point in time there will be a day of reckoning between these two radical states in the north. For awhile, however, she will be able to assert her authority. She will see to it that whatever emerges in the Lebanon suits her fancy. She will be able to keep Hussein on a short lease and she will probably try to force Mubarak and Egypt to distance themselves even further from the Israelis.

The United States? The United States will continue to try and force some kind of agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. We have a terrible sense of urgency which I've never understood in terms of accomplishing this. The great danger in the Middle East to the West lies not in the Palestinians or the Israelis

but lies in the oil supplies that are up for grabs between Iraq and Iran. Somehow, however, we are convinced that if this little problem is solved everything else falls into place. Tens of thousands of lives have been killed in the last four years in this bloody war between Iran and Iraq. They're fighting for domination of that part of the world now, and whoever dominates that part of the world will control the oil supply on which Western Europe and Japan depend. That's the major field. Israel is concerned and Israel and the Palestinians are concerned to the United States for one reason only and that is that America's relationship with Israel complicates her other relationships in the Arab world. But aside from that, this is not where the real world war three concerns should lie, but we can pressure Israel to a certain degree, Israel is economically dependent upon the United States in an increasing degree, and so this is an area through which we try to buy friendship in Arab capitals. It is an area in which we try to show how effective we can be internationally, and we're not effective. We have not been over the recent past.

Russia? Russia will be given through Syria greater influence in the Middle East. Remember that this whole chain of events started way back when, before Sadat and Begin met and we had the Camp David Accords because the Egyptians and the Israelis were both concerned that the Geneva Conference which the United States had established with Russia would increase Russian influence in the Middle East, and now the Russians have increased influence through the Syrians and they will find ways to move ahead after they get their own governmental problems of succession in order.

What I'm suggesting to you is this, that the issues in the Middle East have become more difficult to manage, The amount of give and take has been reduced. Syria is a rejectionist state. Syria is not interested simply in some kind of Palestinian presence on the West Bank, and anybody who goes ahead now, assuming that there can be some kind of reasonable Palestinian presence, something called Palestinian autonomy which is less than Palestinian statehood, is whistling in

the dark. It will not happen, at least not as long as Syria maintains her present strength.

My great hope? The reality of the Middle East. The Middle East is in convulsion. The Middle East is going through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and the Reformation and the religious wars and all that Europe went through for 300 years and is doing it right before our eyes. Who is cock of the walk today is often beheaded tomorrow. There is no guarantee that Syria six months from now will have the power that she has now. There is no guarantee that the Middle East will not have plunged further into the Iraq-Iranian war than they have now. The Saudis' future depends upon the Iranians not winning that war. And so much will happen, and my prayer, that as far as Israel is concerned and the United States are concerned, the two democracies who are involved in this brouhaha, that they will both recognize, particularly the United States, that there are times when it is best not to pressure and not to do. Israel will have to bear the cost of the Lebanon, the cost of the Lebanese occupation. The United States, hopefully, will be patient and recognize that despite its defeat it cannot snatch some victory out of defeat by pressuring Israel into an arrangement in the West Bank which cannot be sustained or maintained. Whether Washington will have that patience or that wisdom remains to be seen. They may have the wisdom which lasts till November, but it may not last much further.

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In my view the central point is the plan is unrealistic
 the U.N. - I am not sure that the U.N. had a part in
 S. Sudan - I am not sure 70's - a few years ago
 accused accused to PLD to infiltrate all countries - a final
 proposal to negotiate a UN Force with the British Government
 was defeated 10 days ago by a Russian veto - the Russian
 makes it clear that they wanted the markets of oil
 going to include the countries - - To spread a U.N.
 force is not a realistic body at the circumstances of peace
 a body into the Sudan ~~and to~~ see a peace
 plan to make peace: before of the over more definite
 make peace on peace the advantage to
 spread such a more peace to be seen.
~~of peace a better way, improved peace peace~~

Point out in the diagram how the use of the π -approximation
is useful in vector oriented motion, Point: values small
the small change of pressure

With which Dams etc. The ~~to~~ present cost is
less of the value, the in fact does the present price
 to sell, and forces it to ~~be~~ up ~~with~~ = deficit.
~~the~~ ~~del~~ ~~the~~ to put it by higher and more - in
 " we ~~will~~ ~~the~~ ~~change~~ ~~the~~ ~~ways~~ ~~to~~ ~~put~~ ~~the~~ ~~value~~
~~interdict~~ ~~after~~ ~~assessing~~.

in 1950 he could not find needed U.S. - not to
 studies advanced models - to Belknap - to
 U.S. needed first direct transmission. states - in
 1980 he had some of models to Belknap and
transmission U.S. quest - the has not been
 use a simplified model - the advantages
 of C.W. model can be used to
model model

He suggested to C.J. that if we were
to use the PLO as a basis for a
allied - some would comment on a
with, some of the for a present -
at the same time, we could use C.J.
presented a good to you and a document -
it was very advanced with some
would not be based to it

other found some out to side of Road -
and the yellowish green. near about to
average size of clay the size of
Bosho Co. found under in a number

a. The second rule "one" - second name
 should go in the column to under the
 second column of the 1st. number & the 2nd. Area
 H.A's.

the next month to show how the package cost of 60¢ was
really lower than expected -- and also how much the
development had done and how much more work was
needed and unplanned - known as - Baker's move -
and Canaan relocation affected - with work to
be done can now.

and need to be done well after it is
 pulled 7 to 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120, 122, 124, 126, 128, 130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 152, 154, 156, 158, 160, 162, 164, 166, 168, 170, 172, 174, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184, 186, 188, 190, 192, 194, 196, 198, 200, 202, 204, 206, 208, 210, 212, 214, 216, 218, 220, 222, 224, 226, 228, 230, 232, 234, 236, 238, 240, 242, 244, 246, 248, 250, 252, 254, 256, 258, 260, 262, 264, 266, 268, 270, 272, 274, 276, 278, 280, 282, 284, 286, 288, 290, 292, 294, 296, 298, 300, 302, 304, 306, 308, 310, 312, 314, 316, 318, 320, 322, 324, 326, 328, 330, 332, 334, 336, 338, 340, 342, 344, 346, 348, 350, 352, 354, 356, 358, 360, 362, 364, 366, 368, 370, 372, 374, 376, 378, 380, 382, 384, 386, 388, 390, 392, 394, 396, 398, 400, 402, 404, 406, 408, 410, 412, 414, 416, 418, 420, 422, 424, 426, 428, 430, 432, 434, 436, 438, 440, 442, 444, 446, 448, 450, 452, 454, 456, 458, 460, 462, 464, 466, 468, 470, 472, 474, 476, 478, 480, 482, 484, 486, 488, 490, 492, 494, 496, 498, 500, 502, 504, 506, 508, 510, 512, 514, 516, 518, 520, 522, 524, 526, 528, 530, 532, 534, 536, 538, 540, 542, 544, 546, 548, 550, 552, 554, 556, 558, 560, 562, 564, 566, 568, 570, 572, 574, 576, 578, 580, 582, 584, 586, 588, 590, 592, 594, 596, 598, 600, 602, 604, 606, 608, 610, 612, 614, 616, 618, 620, 622, 624, 626, 628, 630, 632, 634, 636, 638, 640, 642, 644, 646, 648, 650, 652, 654, 656, 658, 660, 662, 664, 666, 668, 670, 672, 674, 676, 678, 680, 682, 684, 686, 688, 690, 692, 694, 696, 698, 700, 702, 704, 706, 708, 710, 712, 714, 716, 718, 720, 722, 724, 726, 728, 730, 732, 734, 736, 738, 740, 742, 744, 746, 748, 750, 752, 754, 756, 758, 760, 762, 764, 766, 768, 770, 772, 774, 776, 778, 780, 782, 784, 786, 788, 790, 792, 794, 796, 798, 800, 802, 804, 806, 808, 810, 812, 814, 816, 818, 820, 822, 824, 826, 828, 830, 832, 834, 836, 838, 840, 842, 844, 846, 848, 850, 852, 854, 856, 858, 860, 862, 864, 866, 868, 870, 872, 874, 876, 878, 880, 882, 884, 886, 888, 890, 892, 894, 896, 898, 900, 902, 904, 906, 908, 910, 912, 914, 916, 918, 920, 922, 924, 926, 928, 930, 932, 934, 936, 938, 940, 942, 944, 946, 948, 950, 952, 954, 956, 958, 960, 962, 964, 966, 968, 970, 972, 974, 976, 978, 980, 982, 984, 986, 988, 990, 992, 994, 996, 998, 1000, 1002, 1004, 1006, 1008, 1010, 1012, 1014, 1016, 1018, 1020, 1022, 1024, 1026, 1028, 1030, 1032, 1034, 1036, 1038, 1040, 1042, 1044, 1046, 1048, 1050, 1052, 1054, 1056, 1058, 1060, 1062, 1064, 1066, 1068, 1070, 1072, 1074, 1076, 1078, 1080, 1082, 1084, 1086, 1088, 1090, 1092, 1094, 1096, 1098, 1100, 1102, 1104, 1106, 1108, 1110, 1112, 1114, 1116, 1118, 1120, 1122, 1124, 1126, 1128, 1130, 1132, 1134, 1136, 1138, 1140, 1142, 1144, 1146, 1148, 1150, 1152, 1154, 1156, 1158, 1160, 1162, 1164, 1166, 1168, 1170, 1172, 1174, 1176, 1178, 1180, 1182, 1184, 1186, 1188, 1190, 1192, 1194, 1196, 1198, 1200, 1202, 1204, 1206, 1208, 1210, 1212, 1214, 1216, 1218, 1220, 1222, 1224, 1226, 1228, 1230, 1232, 1234, 1236, 1238, 1240, 1242, 1244, 1246, 1248, 1250, 1252, 1254, 1256, 1258, 1260, 1262, 1264, 1266, 1268, 1270, 1272, 1274, 1276, 1278, 1280, 1282, 1284, 1286, 1288, 1290, 1292, 1294, 1296, 1298, 1300, 1302, 1304, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1312, 1314, 1316, 1318, 1320, 1322, 1324, 1326, 1328, 1330, 1332, 1334, 1336, 1338, 1340, 1342, 1344, 1346, 1348, 1350, 1352, 1354, 1356, 1358, 1360, 1362, 1364, 1366, 1368, 1370, 1372, 1374, 1376, 1378, 1380, 1382, 1384, 1386, 1388, 1390, 1392, 1394, 1396, 1398, 1400, 1402, 1404, 1406, 1408, 1410, 1412, 1414, 1416, 1418, 1420, 1422, 1424, 1426, 1428, 1430, 1432, 1434, 1436, 1438, 1440, 1442, 1444, 1446, 1448, 1450, 1452, 1454, 1456, 1458, 1460, 1462, 1464, 1466, 1468, 1470, 1472, 1474, 1476, 1478, 1480, 1482, 1484, 1486, 1488, 1490, 1492, 1494, 1496, 1498, 1500, 1502, 1504, 1506, 1508, 1510, 1512, 1514, 1516, 1518, 1520, 1522, 1524, 1526, 1528, 1530, 1532, 1534, 1536, 1538, 1540, 1542, 1544, 1546,

لکھنؤ میں ۱۸۸۷ء



Mr. Neuberger - for much help - confident in large
united to the . Mr. Good's name is the 100 united as
living in the field and Neuberger has never seen come to work
a part time.

6 weeks ago The Director sent y Mr. Good back
with y case letter & demand ~~the~~ act y hand:

AFTER THE ENCLAVE OF Washington
in Lebanon, the next American stop
could be in London, to ^{proceed} ~~proceeding~~ it
to start negotiations with ISRAEL.

Washington will not achieve in London
whit it failed to achieve in Lebanon.
Syria, which was able to import the
will of no ~~major~~ nation in Lebanon
will also be able to import it in
London.

There is doubt that America has ever needed
per John & David for the, Neuberger has already passed
the case of for - Side side just to
an record to the hard disagreement Force - that
for the must to large of steps the area with to
hard & David's area - the A.O.F. considered has
been passed by an important body of high level &
the case noted.

There is the A.O.F. to defend - The and just - the

Sign no official in the as present - r Sign
is part of the registered part. Sign to be made by Durr
& VP Resolved 242

The state of the world needs some more at
center of the as just. - foundation needs to be at
signs as document ~~which~~ ^{much} also needs and
- ~~also~~ - ~~needed~~ ^{needed} by a ~~has~~ ^{not} ~~with~~ ^{full} committee
needs to -

Some of the to ~~dispute~~ ^{dispute} of the ~~state~~ ^{state} - ~~then~~
action - - ~~with~~ ^{with} ~~under~~ ^{under} ~~by~~ ^{by} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~purpose~~ ^{purpose}
of a ~~small~~ ^{small} - ~~just~~ ^{just} ~~action~~ ^{action} - - ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~same~~ ^{same} ~~small~~ ^{small}
and ~~no~~ ^{no} ~~under~~ ^{under} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~needs~~ ^{needs} ~~for~~ ^{for}

Pub. action - ~~needs~~ ^{needs} ~~all~~ ^{all} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state}
- ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~small~~ ^{small} ~~will~~ ^{will} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done} -
last ~~action~~ ^{action} ~~needs~~ ^{needs} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state} - ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ
action ~~needs~~ ^{needs} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state}
and ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done}
Gives ~~new~~ ^{new} ~~action~~ ^{action} - ~~by~~ ^{by} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done}
part of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~action~~ ^{action} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~needed~~ ^{needed}

The ~~most~~ ^{most} ~~important~~ ^{important} ~~change~~ ^{change} ~~is~~ ^{is}
in ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~US~~ ^{US} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~done~~ ^{done}
will ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done}
where ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~action~~ ^{action} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~needed~~ ^{needed} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done}
for ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state}

Wanted ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done}

for ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done}
that ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~state~~ ^{state} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~done~~ ^{done}

2. The course full of obstacles - reasoned and well known -
good intention - reason of the process used of no interest to
 to each of us. - - - - - then principles used
 to guide of clear cut in the direction

The 5th man on continent - said in 2nd or
6th man said 4th he was circled
to her detached -



There is a lot of money - we are not - PAN - just -
we need to see what we can do - we are not -
just a lot of money - we are not -

2 to about eight cases - no immediate progress
- good case (never a piece of paper) and seen
very small, unprotected - as child's foot -

**CONTINUED ON
NEXT ROLL**



THE WESTERN RESERVE
HISTORICAL SOCIETY
10825 East Boulevard
Cleveland, Ohio 44106



0 12x 16x 20x 24x 28x 30x 36x 40x 48x

SHOULD MEASURE .25" AT REDUCTION

REDUCTION RATIO:

REDUCTION
RATIO 13X