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The Captain and the Kings Depart, 1985.

The Captain and the Kings
Daniel Jeremy Silver
December 1, 1985

When the sages of the Talmud faced a particular problem, they suggested a particular kind of resolution. The problem had to do with a situation in which the public revelation of a fact would inevitably preclude a more important conclusion. The case that they cite is that of a priest officiating at an altar in the Temple who suddenly remembers that he is not in a complete state of ritual purity. If he admits to that fact, he can no longer officiate at the altar. If he admits to the fact and can no longer officiate at the altar and there is no priest there to take his place, the sacrifices, the worship cannot continue. What to do? And the Talmud's advice is a very simple one, be clever and keep your mouth shut.

I doubt that Mikhail Gorbachov and Ronald Reagan had consulted the Talmud when they made the decision to keep their mouths shut, but I think that the most important decision which was made before or during the recent Summit was to impose the news blackout. This was a Summit where, clearly, no arrangements could be made beforehand for any major agreement. There are several kinds of summit meetings. There are some which are called to ratify important negotiations which have been largely concluded by the experts on both sides long before the meeting of the major parties. There are some which are simply an opportunity for two leaders and their entourage to meet one another and to make clear to the other exactly how far each country will tolerate the elbowing, the pushing, the thrusting ahead of the others' interests and armies. And this summit was clearly of the latter kind and it would clearly have been destroyed, or any opportunity for it to come to any kind of meaningful resolution, had the media which was assembled in

Geneva in such numbers become a third party to this discussion. I am told that there were as many as fifty media people in Geneva for every single member of the official parties. And, obviously, they were there for a story, for news. Many of the newspapers and the TV stations had already set up for us agendas which were almost like box scores: here are the issues and here you check whether there is a successful resolution or not; here you check whether Reagan or Gorbachev hit the home run. And these media people were prepared to pounce, they needed to pounce on any given sentence, phrase, on which they could build something which would appeal to their editors and make a headline. And so I remember seeing in one of the newspapers, and this is what would have come out and more and more of this would have come out if there had not been the news blackout, a report of the photo opportunity which the President of the United States held when he first arrived in Geneva and the headline of this long column piece was, Mr. Reagan's Fourteen Words. And on the basis of fourteen totally inconsequential words which Ronald Reagan had spoken during the course of this photo opportunity, this particular pundit had expounded at length on every aspect of the international situation showing exactly what the President of the United States was going to do during the Summit.

Now, if the leaders of the two nations had had their agenda distorted by the need to constantly explain to the other that in point of fact they had not misinterpreted what the other had said when they spoke to the press or that in point of fact it was not their mission which had leaked a particular story to the press, if they had not been able to follow out what had been agreed upon long since as the timing, the agenda of the conference and had some

confidence that they could speak to each other without having every word picked up and broadcast and, inevitably, distorted, I doubt that even the modest accomplishments of Geneva would have taken place because the tensions between the two countries are real, the men, to use the vernacular which appears in their communique, spoke frankly and had they needed to raise the decibel of their frankness the whole conference might have been torn apart. Now, that's not to say that the media did not play a role in Geneva, they did. Any conference of this kind is not simply a meeting of two heads of states and two governments but, inevitably, the governments use the opportunity to create propaganda, to create opportunities to speak to parties that they would like to impress with their point of view. Mr. Gorbachov was eager to appeal to those forces in the west which would like to abort the President's strategic defense initiative. The United States is eager to remind the world of what it calls the aggressive actions of the Soviet in Afghanistan, in Cambodia, in Ethiopia, in Angola and places of that kind. And so you saw at Geneva the arranged meeting between Jesse Jackson and Mr. Gorbachov. One of the problems of any free society is that its citizens are free to allow themselves to be used by foreign governments for their own propaganda purposes and let no one believe that a meeting between Jesse Jackson and his entourage and Mr. Gorbachov was a chance meeting in the hallways of a hotel. You can't get within a hundred yards of the world leaders at these places; this was all arranged. But the other side of freedom is simply this, that you can't guarantee once you've decided to use someone outside your control for your own purposes what that person is going to say. And so what was to be a three, four-minute photographic session, a shaking of

hands, a smile, became something which lasted thirty minutes, forty minutes in which Mr. Jackson used the opportunity to inform Mr. Gorbachov of his agenda. It's fascinating. There was the agenda of the United States and the agenda of the Soviet Union and the agenda of Jesse Jackson, of all people, and his agenda included the usual concern with peace and civil rights in South Africa and also, somewhat surprisingly, a few words on behalf of the Jews of the Soviet Union, an issue on which Mr. Gorbachov is particularly sensitive. Obviously, Mr. Jackson had decided to use this opportunity to try and mend a few fences here in the United States among that group of Jews who might be considered to be natural partisan and supporters of his Rainbow Coalition and his foreign policy initiatives but who have been understandably put off by his association with Louis Farakahn and by the anti-semitic flavor of his Hymie town language. Here was a chance at very little cost and of glare of international publicity, of the television cameras and the radio, to appeal to these groups for their continued support. And we, too, found ways to use even such news opportunities as they were given the black-out for our purposes. A dissident who had been released from the Soviet Union just three weeks before had somehow or other gained newspaper credentials from a small Dutch weekly and she arose at one of the background conferences organized by the Soviet delegation and began to ask questions about political prisoners, about mental hospitals, about the gulag and, of course, created great consternation and what was probably the most interesting to come out of Geneva when the man who had the microphone, the Soviet official, made the categorical statement, "there are no political prisoners in the Soviet Union."

Now, this conference, this summit, like all summits, had its very own special and very unique flavor. There had been no summit in the past six years, in part because though Jimmy Carter was obviously in his administration interested in detente, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had shocked him and he had pulled back from further understandings of the usual Soviet explanations. And the American people then elected to the presidency a man who was determined to right what he felt was an imbalance in the rearmament programs of the two countries. He made clear to the American electorate that there had been a great leap forward in Soviet armaments which had not been matched by the United States and he was determined to have his four-year, eight-year plan to see that United States arms were up to, if they did not surpass, those of the Soviet Union. During this same period of time the Soviet Union had gone through a series of patriarchs, elderly gentlemen who had served in the various offices of the politbureau and who now deserved to ascend to the general secretariat but whose age and health made it that they would not remain long in this life. And, finally, eight months ago, for the first time in President Reagan's term of office, a more youthful and vigorous man had emerged, Gorbachov, and there was now a chance to meet with a man who would be presumably the leader of the Soviet Union for a number of years to come.

There was also the fact that the President, having been re-elected to a second term of office, clearly wanted to be seen by the United States electorate, our citizenry, the world as something more than a cold war warrior. There was clearly the desire of Mr. Gorbachov to be seen back home as a man of international standing

who could deal effectively with the other countries of the world. A great deal was made in these early months, yhou will remember, of his effectiveness as a spokesman for Soviet policy. And most of all, I believe, on the American side there was a feeling that we were now strong and could meet the Soviet on equal terms; and on the Soviet side there was a feeling that they could use the conference for effective propaganda advantages. States abandon the strategic

One of the imbalances which takes place at any summit is that the Soviet position can speak over the heads of the American president to the free world through the media and the American president cannot speak over the heads of the Soviet leaders to the Soviet people, not that some of what is said does not ultimately get through, but there's an imbalance in terms of publicity and propaganda. And it's clear that that once the President of the United States in 1983 announced the new strategic defense initiative, the idea that one could in fact, over a longish period of time create an impenetrable nuclear defense which, as the President put it, reduced the danger of nuclear war, the sense of utter catastrophe if such a war took place, the creation of this strategic defense initiative which had unsettled any number of groups in the west. It had unsettled the allies in Europe because they feared that if America created such a defensive umbrella would hide behind it and no longer feel the need to protect our NATO allies. It unsettled those who had become accustomed to mutual assured destruction and who felt that no defense system could be perfect and, therefore, a leader who had such a defensive system might be tempted to attempt an aggressive act which might lead to a nuclear war, feeling that his own country was inviolate. And, of course, it unsettled all those

in the west who are tense and unnerved by the whole prospect of a nuclear holocaust, of a nuclear winter. And Mr. Gorbachov felt, I am sure, that he could use this conference to appeal to these groups by holding out the promise of significant arms negotiations, you remember, he kept saying before the conference, we could cut nuclear arms by fifth percent if only a precondition is met and that precondition is that the United States abandon the strategic defense initiative, and that he could by emphasizing the strategic defense initiative as the key, the lynch pin to any further agreement in arms negotiations, he could essentially sweep under the rug all the other issues which have to be dealt with between nations, so many of which are the issues in which the Soviet Union does not stand tall - the invasion of Afghanistan, the support of the violent government of Cambodia, the support of the military government in Ethiopia, the support of the Cuban troops who support the government of Angola, and so on. Here was a chance to come, to create a situation where the world would focus on what is most desperately of concern to the world, nuclear arms limitations negotiations, and all the other issues in which Soviet aggressiveness plays a role essentially are reduced to minor concerns if not overlooked entirely because, after all, the Soviet missiles are at the ready within twelve, fifteen minutes of every major capital in the world and what happens in Nam Penh or what happens in Kabul is something which does not threaten the life of the average Frenchman or Englishman or American.

And so the whole thrust of the Soviet initiative before the conference right up to the very day of the opening of the conference was to emphasize that any future and further progress in the area

of arms negotiation depended upon one issue and one issue only, a decision by the President of the United States to abandon the the strategic defense initiative, the idea of building the nuclear defensive umbrella which would protect our country and the west. Now, there are technical questions as to whether such an umbrella can be built. There are cost questions, we're talking about trillions of dollars spent over a long period of time. These issues aside for a moment, this was the presentation which the Soviets tried to make before the conference and the basis on which they tried to organize the conference. Our president refused to budge on the strategic defense initiative and he reminded the Soviet and the world that the issue was not only arms negotiation but all those areas of regional conflict because it is from those regional conflicts ultimately that nuclear war can escalate.

I would remind you that the first World War did not begin with a direct invasion by the Kaiser's Germany of France or France of Germany but began with the assassination of a politically impotent nobleman of the Austria-Hungarian Empire by Serbian terrorists and because of this assassination of the Archduke of Sarjevo a whole series of complicated arrangements which were in existence began to unravel and the first World War emerged. And clearly, the danger of a third World War is far more real in, let's say Afghanistan than it is in terms of an aggressive decision by Gorbachov or Reagan to initiate a nuclear attack on the other country. After all, we have in Afghanistan the situation of Russian troops on foreign soil. We have guerillas who are Afghans who are fighting the invasion of their country. In the course of that fighting they have established safe bases, resupply points, in neighboring

elsewhere. I believe that the question of nuclear war, and Pakistan. China and the United States and other countries are funneling supplies through Pakistan to these guerillas. What happens if the Soviet search and kill missions begin to invade Pakistan, to attack the bases from which the Afghan rebels are moving back and forward into Afghanistan very much as we attacked the bases of the Communists in Cambodia during our invasion in Vietnam. And what happens in terms of the treaties written, known and unknown, between the United States and Pakistan if Pakistan decides to react to the Soviet invasion of its territory? It's in that kind of complex conflict that you have the seeds of a world war and there are conflicts and tensions of this kind in almost every part of the world. And so the president, I think, was well advised and correct to remind the world that a summit must deal with all of these issues, that the Soviet and We at least must be clear as to how far we will allow the other to go without making some kind of response so that there will be no fatal miscalculation in the course of the next months.

The world, however, tends, to a very large degree, to be responsive to the position which the Soviets have taken. We are so concerned, understandably so, by the urgency of resolving the nuclear nightmare, by the urgency of freeing ourselves from living within ten, twelve minutes of nuclear winter that we have become desperately involved in any and all kinds of approaches to the question of nuclear arms negotiation. As many of you know, I have not been particularly supportive of the Nuclear Freeze Movement and I haven't been particularly sanguine about the success of nuclear arms negotiations at Geneva or

elsewhere because I believe that the question of nuclear war, and I agree with the sense of urgency and I share it, but I believe that the sense of nuclear war which we all have, that this danger cannot be resolved by going about the problem directly. What if there were a nuclear freeze? Would the world be any safer? Each country now has in its arsenal the capacity to destroy the world many times over. And what if we had agreed with the Soviets at Geneva to a 50 percent reduction in many categories or in all categories of nuclear arms? Would the world really be any safer if we had the capacity to destroy the world five times over rather than ten times over? It's interesting when you look at the history of the two strategic arms limitation treaties which have been worked out between our two countries that at the end of each five-year period after the enactment and empowerment of that treaty the nuclear arsenals of the two countries have been more potent than they were before the treaty went into effect.

The problem is that until what President Reagan called in a speech to Congress after his return from Geneva, until the eternal competition between these two countries is reduced in its level of aggressiveness and belligerency and anger, until we can manage to admit to ourselves that we live in the same world and cannot simply elbow our way, each to his maximum advantage for whatever we want in this world, we will not, whatever we do at Geneva, whatever arms limitation treaties are created and enabled, we will not really remove from ourselves the threat of nuclear war. Diplomats and engineers can always find, if they want to find, ways around a text, ways to increase fire power even if certain kinds of arms and certain kinds of activities are prohibited to them.

I remind you of the Washington Naval Conference of the early 1920's and the subsequent naval treaties of the 1920's. The countries of the world after the first World War were concerned about the freedom of the seas and they entered into a number of agreements which focused primarily on limiting the number of what they call dreadnaughts, battleships which would exist and be free to move around the seas and obviously to cut off channels of trade and communication. And it all worked out very well until Germany began to rearm in the 1930's and wanted to challenge England's sea power. So what did they do? The treaty defined a battle ship, a dreadnaught, as a ship of a certain length. The Germans built dreadnaughts which were four inches shorter than the accepted length. The only problem was they had four times the fire power of the existing battle ships. And you may remember at the beginning of the second World War the Bismark and the Shanhost, those great German, they called them pocket battle ships, wrecked havoc for awhile with the British Navy and the sea lanes which tried to resupply the Allies.

What I'm suggesting is that until the issues, the open exacerbating issues which exist between the two nations are to a degree resolved, no negotiations on the question of arms which are achieved at Geneva will really remove from us the threat of war. Yes, if we could have a 50 percent reduction in the number of nuclear arms in the world that's a plus. And yes, if there were a verifiable nuclear freeze that would be a plus. But, even having said that, you cannot attack the issue of nuclear armaments and the danger they pose to us directly. The President put it in the vernacular: There are no quick fixes that will fix big problems.

And I'd add to that, there are no quick fixes that will fix little problems. We have to go at this issue piece by piece, conflict by conflict, competition by competition, region by region, and hope we will have the time to really come to a point where co-existence between the two nations is accepted as the primary concern of the two nations.

When Mr. Gorbachev had his concluding conference at Geneva after the Summit Meeting was over, it was a long discursive discussion, the Russian leaders are known to speak three, four, five hours to their national conferences, and this monologue went on for about two hours, in the course of which he quoted Lord Palmerston, interestingly, and he quoted Lord Palmerston, the English leader of the early nineteenth century, to this effect: England has no eternal enemies and no eternal friends, only eternal interests. Now, Palmerston was talking in terms of what the Germans would have called real politik, which is to say that there are so-called national interests, colonial interests, trade interests, economic interests, political interests, interests of influence which govern the activities of the nation. England, for instance, was always concerned in preventing one or another country on the continent of Europe from gaining absolute ascendancy on the continent because that protected her, ultimately, from invasion. She had other concerns of that kind.

Now, if one took Mr. Gorbachev's quote of Lord Palmerston on one level, that is that there was no reason that because we have been such bitter enemies for so many years that we cannot become good friends over a period of time, it's a hopeful statement. But

if we take this statement as a statement of real politik, that is that there will always be Russian interests, political interests, geo-political interests and these will determine Russian actions, and there are always American geo-political interests and these will determine American action, and we define national interest in this very narrow parochial way, then I'm afraid that however many summit conferences are held, we will not move closer to a more comfortable and more secure world because we continue to define national interest in parochial terms. The Soviet desire to expand to have more control of a sea coast, the United States need for oil, for other energy resources, etc., etc., and as long as we define national interest in those what-I-need terms, there's going to be elbowing and pressuring and the major powers of the world are going to try and manage the smaller, weaker nations of the world to their advantage, and each country is going to remain, to a degree, expansionist. Not until the major powers of the world accept that the primary national interest, each one's primary national interest, is survival, not in a parochial sense but in a simple, great elemental sense of human survival upon this earth, only then will we recognize that that is our eternal interest, ours and the Soviet's and everyone else's, not until then will we really begin to deal on a level which is meaningful in terms of security and peace with the problems that face us and we are, obviously, a long long way from that.

Geneva was interesting. Mr. Gorbachev came to Geneva saying we will not deal in nuclear arms limitations until America abandons the strategic defense initiative, that the concept of a defensive

It is just as, to a large degree, ours is. It is to say that the

shield against mutual sure destruction is destabilizing.

My mind went back, you may recall, the Glasborough Summit of 1967 in which President Johnson and Mr. Brezhnev met in New Jersey for another summit meeting. And at that summit meeting the arguments were exactly the reverse. The Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War had begun to build anti-ballistic missiles, a nuclear defense. And in the early 1960's she began to deploy a nuclear defense system around Moscow and around Leningrad. And when Mr. Brezhnev came to Glasboro in 1967 the United States delegation said to him, the creation of a defense system of your kind is destabilizing and Mr. Brezhnev said, not at all, we have a right to protect and the more we can protect the more we free ourselves from the danger of nuclear destruction.

In 1972 there was an anti-ballistic missiles agreement because in the intervening years both the Soviet and the United States had discovered that the technology of the times was not sufficient to create an effective anti-nuclear missile screen and the cost to create an effective screen seemed prohibitive. And so it was to their mutual advantage to sign the ABM treaty.

In the intervening years, military technology has leaped ahead and the American government, because the American President needs to go to the Congress in order to get the monies for this kind of research and development program, had announced a strategic defense initiative program in 1983. The Soviets immediately cried foul, that is not to say that the Soviets had not been exploring and researching laser weapons and pulsar weapons and space platforms and that their space program is not military oriented. It is just as, to a large degree, ours is. It is to say that the

Soviet system can finance itself in a quiet way, we have to go public, and so the issue was given to the Soviets which Mr. Gorbachev tried to exploit. It's not to argue that the President's strategic defense initiative is a good thing. It's costly. It does destabilize. Its success is uncertain. I do not know all of the reasons why the Russians have reacted so intensely to this initiative since they are doing, really, the same thing we propose to do. Some say that they lack the computer technology, that they fear we will get a jump of a year or two on them. Some have argued, and this is a popular theory, that the Soviet really would like not to have to afford the excessive cost of this program since in the last ten or twelve years their economy has been relatively stagnant and the estimates are now that there will be no way of improving the standard of living of the average Soviet citizen which is falling increasingly behind, the average standard of living of European citizens to the end of century if this kind of money has to go to a new program. The Soviets are now spending twice the percentage of their gross national product on arms as are we. But whatever be the reasons, the issue is not as simple as Mr. Gorbachev wanted to make it and the strategic defense initiative made by Mr. Reagan is not as secure as he would like us to believe it to be.

Which brings me back to the point which I've tried to emphasize throughout and that is the simple fact that the complicated arms negotiations which will continue now at Geneva even though the presidents and the general secretary have returned to their country, that whatever happens may it reduce the amount of nuclear arms, they are just deadly weapons of no use to anyone, but don't

believe, any of you, that that reduction whatever it is, will make you sleep more securely. We need to have a totally different approach to the definition of the national interest. We need to deal with the individual areas of conflict and competition. We need to approach these problems piecemeal and we need to find the way in which what Mr. Reagan called the eternal competition between our two countries can be a competition, perhaps, of violinists and ballets and cultural exchanges, the quality of our programs on that level, rather than the competition for the gold and resource and the power and physical control of the world.

The best thing that one can say about Geneva is that the captains and the kings departed and there was no bloodshed. They met. They talked. They heard each other out. The talks were, we are told, frank, open. Mr. Gorbachev told Mr. Reagan that Mr. Reagan was wrong when he blamed everything that was happening in the world on Soviet intrigue. Mr. Reagan told Mr. Gorbachev that the Soviet Union had no right to be in Afghanistan and Angola and Cambodia, there's a form of arrogance. The words were spoken. Presumably, the two countries know now a little bit more of what the other country will not tolerate. To a degree that is helpful. And to a degree it is also helpful that the leaders of the two countries are speaking with each other. They have agreed to have two more summit conferences. World events, of course, will determine whether those conferences take place. But the idea that at the highest level there is a reaching for some kind of understanding, is the most hopeful sign I can offer you because Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan are, after all, human beings. They are not ideologues totally.

Tjey believe that human life must survive and each must, in his heart of hearts, recognize that ways must be found to make this survival for which we all pray possible.

From the desk of—

RABBI DANIEL JEREMY SILVER

You Americans are always looking
at no longer as the cause of
the problems of the 3rd world.
We are telling you this is not
the case, there is not a Soviet aim
in every case.

You have no right to go in
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola,
no right. This is Soviet annexation.
It is destabilizing.

Quick Facts Point For by
Presidents

Cold War

PALESTINE
ENGLAND DOESN'T HAVE
ETERNAL FAITH OR ETERNAL
ENERGIES ~~ENGLAND~~ ONLY ~~ETERNAL~~ INTEREST

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5. 1. 1950

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 6. ~~the same kind of~~
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 8. ~~the same kind of~~
 9. ~~the same kind of~~
 10. ~~the same kind of~~

as it is small 1. long - lasting - impulsive connected (6)
to MADD.

A memo on 6-5-71 to Soviet by the Kennedy AFB, TX
on 6-5-71 1960's. The memo to the President - ~~the~~
and memo, dated - at the summit
meeting of June 1967 at Garmisch between Mr. Johnson
to SALT II, it was to ~~be~~ used as a model
for missile defense system now underway, & the
Soviet side rejected that concept. R. F. B.
Tuesday 4/1972 was signed with other US South & others
in our letter to Soviet about 7 January
capable effective missile defense system would be desired.

About the same size conference, M.C. held the
 important that the same size SDI, that in paper work
 the matter is also some repetitive work when
 to open SDI men - which - - on government matters
 that SDI men are a small team - usually to discuss
 all such work would be - including the
 37th man manager - before there is one handled
 with operational manager - + that there were
 my men arrive - including some 7 regional published
 conflict which ought to be done.

I believe that the President is the one who
 quite correct - I think, a very good man, and
 been an excellent supporter of the Republican Party
 movement, and I think it is well known to be

[illegible]

I was aware that it was N.C. and that
 under the 501(c)(3) "not a profit" name I was donating -
 The Trust & my wife - I'm sure we had just built
 at that - I'm not sure if that is how
 the funds - but, I will let you know

1/20 Americans are always looking at the
secrets and the cause of all the problems in
the world. We are telling you this is

under the dead bones now - last of race
of birds under wings and was killed - I can
under the sea and by itself - some family

