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American Zionist Emergency Council,
1944 November - 1945 May.

11-1-44

Dr. Israel Goldstein
270 West 89th St.
New York, N.Y.

MANSON TELEPHONED ME REGARDING RESOLUTION TO BE PRESENTED AT BALFOUR MEETING. STOP STRONGLY URGE NO DEVIATION WHATEVER FROM ACTION TAKEN ON CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS AT ATLANTIC CITY CONVENTION STOP. NEITHER THE EMERGENCY COUNCIL NOR THE EXECUTIVE OF THE ZOA HAS AUTHORIZED ANY OTHER PUBLIC DECLARATION STOP WE ALL AGREE THAT AMENDMENTS WILL BE SOUGHT TO IMPROVE RESOLUTIONS WHEN CONGRESS RECONVENES STOP IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS IF IN THE SLIGHTEST DEGREE THE SUGGESTION IS GIVEN IN PUBLIC THAT WE ARE ABANDONING PENDING RESOLUTIONS. ANY REVISION WILL NOT ESCAPE THE ATTENTION OF OUR ENEMIES NOR OF THE PRESS WHICH WILL BEGIN AT ONCE A PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT AT PRESENT ENTIRELY UNDESIRABLE. ^{50%} I WARNED AGAINST THIS AT THE MEETING OF THE EMERGENCY COUNCIL ~~XXXX~~ MONDAY NIGHT. SURELY A BALFOUR DAY CELEBRATION IS NOT THE SUITABLE OCCASION FOR ANNOUNCING A NEW FORMULA WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SANCTION ^{ld} BY ANY AUTHORIZED ZIONIST BODY AND BY THE EMERGENCY COUNCIL.

ABBA HILLEL SILVER



AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Administrative
Committee

FROM: I. L. Kenen

SUBJECT: URGENT

DATE: November 1, 1944

Attached is a draft of the report of the Interim Committee which will serve as a preface to the reports of the three Commissions in the printed report of the Conference. At the last meeting of the Interim Committee, the Administrative Committee was authorized to prepare such a report.

Will you please read this in advance of tomorrow night's meeting of the Administrative Committee so that we may act on it, if possible. If you are unable to attend the meeting, will you please send in any suggestions or comments that you may have. We are hoping to go to press with the entire report in the next few days.

D R A F T

INTERIM COMMITTEE REPORT

The Interim Committee, created at the first session of the American Jewish Conference to implement its decisions, herewith submits to the delegates a report of its activities and the activities of the three Commissions established by the Committee on October 17th, 1943 "to carry out the mandates of the Conference with respect to rescue, post-war reconstruction and Palestine."

Composition of the Committee

The Resolution on Organization provided that:

"The Interim Committee shall be selected on the same proportional basis as now prevails among the groupings in the Conference on the 'key of ten' or major fraction thereof, and that a number of members at large, not in excess of eight, shall be chosen by the Interim Committee for addition to its membership."

The Interim Committee met for the purpose of organization immediately upon recess of the first session on September 2nd, 1943, its membership composed of the nominees of the various groupings in the Conference. These included:

Maurice Bisgyer, David Blumberg, Gedaliah Bublick, Sigmund W. David, J. David Delman, Rabbi William Drazin, Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath, Mrs. Moses P. Epstein, Prof. Hyman J. Ettlinger, Rabbi Simon Federbusch, Prof. Hayim Fineman, J. George Fredman, Daniel Frisch, Frank Goldman, Dr. Solomon Goldman, Mrs. Samuel Goldstein, Mrs. Samuel W. Halprin, Rabbi James G. Heller, Herman Hoffman, Edgar J. Kaufmann, Charles P. Kramer, Sidney G. Kusworm, Hon. Louis E. Levinthal, Dr. Louis M. Levitsky, Louis Lipsky, Julius Livingston, Rabbi Irving Miller, Louis J. Moss, Dr. Samuel Nirenstein, Harry A. Pine, Dvorah Rothbard, Hon. Morris Rothenberg, Isidor Sack, Louis Segal, Hon. Carl Sherman, Herman Shulman, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Mrs. Archibald Silverman, Hermann Stern, Robert Szold, Mrs. Maurice Turner, Mrs. Joseph M. Welt, David Wertheim, Benjamin Winter, Mrs. Stephen S. Wise, Baruch Zuckerman.

In addition to these, the Interim Committee later co-opted for membership Naomi Chertoff, Hayim Greenberg, Mrs. Hugo Hartmann, Mrs. David de Sola Pool, Adolph Rosenberg and Justice Meier Steinbrink. Two places were reserved for representatives of organizations unaffiliated with the Conference, in the event of their future participation.

The Resolution on Organization provided for not less than three co-chairmen and accordingly, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Henry Monsky and Dr. Stephen S. Wise were elected.

Several changes occurred in the composition of the Interim Committee during the year: Dr. Joseph Tenenbaum succeeded Benjamin Winter (deceased); Benjamin Samuels replaced David Blumberg because of the latter's illness; Leon Gellman served as an alternate for Gedaliah Bublick because of his illness; Dr. Samuel Margoshes served as an alternate for Mrs. Archibald Silverman when she was overseas; and Rabbi Robert Gordis and Samuel Rothstein replaced Dr. Louis M. Levitsky and Louis J. Moss, respectively, reflecting changes in the organizations they represented.

Duties of the Interim Committee

The Resolution on Organization adopted by the Conference vested in the Interim Committee the following duties and functions:

"1. To implement the resolutions and decisions adopted by the American Jewish Conference at its session of August 29th to September 2nd, 1943, and in so doing shall cooperate with other organizations and agencies, so far as such cooperation may be deemed desirable.

"2. To reconvene the Conference at such time as it may deem necessary and expedient, but in any event, not later than twelve months following the adjournment of the present session thereof."

The Executive Apparatus

The Interim Committee conceived that its functions were twofold: one, the stimulation of all action possible to assist in the realization of the Conference program and to mobilize public opinion to that end; and two, the establishment of the necessary machinery to implement the Conference resolutions by way of appropriate representations to our own and other governments in the areas of the Conference program.

At a meeting of the Interim Committee on October 17th, 1943, it was determined to establish three Commissions to act as the executive machinery of the Conference. These were the Commission on Rescue, the Commission on Post-War, and the Commission on Palestine. The resolution creating these bodies authorized them "to utilize the service and seek the cooperation of existing agencies in their respective fields." This policy, which had been indicated in the Conference Resolution establishing the Interim Committee, (quoted above) has been pursued by the Interim Committee from its inception. The Committee recognized that a number of organizations were engaged in activities in the three areas of the Conference's scope. Manifestly, it was intended that the Conference should stimulate and coordinate the activities of these organizations in conformity to the Conference program. It has been the policy of the Interim Committee to avoid establishing duplicating apparatuses. Where no agency existed for the implementation of the Conference program, the Interim Committee considered it necessary to establish one.

In the field of rescue and post-war reconstruction, the Interim Committee, through its Commissions, assumed the initiative in making all representations to the governments, inasmuch as no over-all agency existed for that purpose in these fields. It was deemed, moreover, the duty of organizations affiliated with the Conference in the interests of a "program of common action" to submit data and information to the Conference and to abide by the principle that representations in these fields shall be made in the name of the Conference.

In the implementation of the Palestine Resolution, the American Zionist Emergency Council, representing the principal Zionist bodies, was engaged in day-to-day political and public relations activities and, accordingly, the Palestine Commission did not seek to duplicate this work. The task of the Commission was to cooperate with this agency and to make such representations as the Conference considered advisable in its own name.

The Commissions consisted of nominees of the groupings, in addition to a number of persons co-opted by the Commissions because of their special qualifications. The Commissions have reported regularly to meetings of the Interim Committee through the year for approval and direction, and with this report there are transmitted reviews by each of the three Commissions of their activities and interests during the past year.

In addition to the Commissions, the Interim Committee created an Executive Committee to function between meetings of the Interim Committee, and an Administrative Committee to execute the decisions of the parent body. The Executive Committee consisted of Maurice Bisgyer, Gedaliah Bublick, Sigmund W. David, Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath, Mrs. Moses P. Epstein, J. George Fredman, Frank Goldman, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Judge Louis E. Levinthal, Louis Lipsky, Rabbi Irving Miller, Henry Monsky, Louis J. Moss, Dr. Samuel Nirenstein, Louis Segal, Carl Sherman, Herman Shulman, David Wertheim, and Dr. Stephen S. Wise. The Administrative Committee consisted of Mrs. Moses P. Epstein, J. George Fredman, Leon Gellman, Charles P. Kramer, Louis Lipsky, Herman Shulman and David Wertheim.

Subsequently, the executive machinery of the Conference was re-organized in May and a new Administrative Committee was established to prepare for the second session of the Conference, to function as the executive organ of the Interim Committee, and to act in place of that body in between meetings of the Interim Committee. The Administrative Committee is headed by Louis Lipsky, and consists of the following: Maurice Bisgyer, Samuel Caplan, Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath, Mrs. Moses P. Epstein, Jane Evans, J. George Fredman, Leon Gellman, William Gerber, Hayim Greenberg, Charles P. Kramer, Sidney G. Kusworm, Rabbi Irving Miller, Samuel Rothstein, Max J. Schneider, Herman Shulman, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Meyer W. Weisgal and David Wertheim.

The Interim Committee met regularly during the year. Immediately following the recess of the Conference, the Resolutions adopted at the first session were submitted to our Government. On September 18, 1943, a delegation acting for the Conference and consisting of Dr. Stephen S. Wise, Dr. Solomon B. Freehof, Frank

Goldman, Louis Lipsky, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, and Jane Evans for the Secretariat, presented the text of these resolutions to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

Meetings of the Interim Committee were held on September 2, 1943, October 17, 1943, November 7, 1943, November 23, 1943, December 15, 1943, January 25, 1944, March 21, 1944, May 12, 1944, June 29, 1944, August 1, 1944, September 12, 1944, and October 24, 1944. At these meetings, the Committee reviewed the work carried on by the three Commissions to determine policy and give directives for future action. Since its organization in May, the Administrative Committee has met fortnightly and more frequently as the occasion demanded. It has coordinated the work of the Commissions and arranged for the implementation of their programs. It has carried on the preparations for the second session and has assigned the duties of the staff.

The American Jewish Committee

Since the recess of the first session, all organizations which participated in the Conference have continued adherence with the exception of the American Jewish Committee, whose Executive Committee voted to withdraw on October 24th, 1943, setting forth its reasons in a public statement. The Interim Committee published a reply to the American Jewish Committee on November 7th, 1943, copies of which were distributed to the delegates and to the public. During the year, in line with the policy of the Interim Committee to achieve the Conference objective of unity, efforts were made to secure the cooperation of the American Jewish Committee on a number of occasions. The subsequent relationship between the American Jewish Conference and the American Jewish Committee is described in detail in the reports of the Commissions.

The Jewish Labor Committee

The Executive Committee of the Jewish Labor Committee on November 30th, 1943, adopted a resolution "to remain in the American Jewish Conference, to work with the Conference on all matters that are within the scope of the activities of the Jewish Labor Committee in accordance with its decisions, but not to participate in the Interim Committee."

The Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe

The activities of the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, and a number of related bodies, all of which had been projected by the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation, created much confusion in the minds of Christians and Jews alike during the year, and it became necessary to inform the

American public of the irresponsible and unrepresentative character of these bodies. Accordingly, on December 31, 1943, the Interim Committee made public a memorandum to the delegates detailing the status and character of these organizations and their activities. The reports of the Commissions treat of this in greater detail.

Agreement with the World Jewish Congress

While not affiliated with the Conference, the World Jewish Congress extended its cooperation to the Commissions and the relationship between the Congress and the Conference was formalized with the adoption of a working agreement on September 12, 1944. Text of the agreement follows:

"It is agreed that both organizations are to place at their mutual disposition the respective facilities and exchange information to the end that there shall be a constant exchange of confidential information between appropriate departments of the two organizations in all matters touching post-war plans and rescue efforts.

"A joint planning committee is to be set up for the consideration of post-war problems and to advise on the drafting of statements and proposals. The committee is to be composed of an equal number of members from each body and is to have at its disposal the results of the studies made by the Institute of Jewish Affairs. The recommendations of the joint committee are to be submitted to the appropriate organs of the World Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Conference, for their consideration.

"The World Jewish Congress retains its right to represent all the communities and organizations affiliated with it in its dealings with all foreign governments and inter-national agencies. In the case of this country, it is recognized that in any representations to the American Government or any of its departments and agencies within the program of the American Jewish Conference, the American Jewish Conference has a special position as regarding the Jewish Community of the United States of America. Representations to the American Government or its departments or agencies shall be made through the American Jewish Conference unless after consultation it is regarded necessary by either one of the two parties that separate representations be made."

Public Relations Activities

As a public and democratically constituted body, the Interim Committee maintained close contact with its constituency throughout the year. Publication of the Conference Record, which was issued as the journal of the proceedings during the first session, was resumed in January on a monthly basis, and was widely distributed to the delegates, to community leaders, and to interested persons. A Bulletin of activities of the Conference was issued weekly to the delegates beginning in May. A "Statement on the Organization of the Conference" was published shortly after the recess of the first session and was distributed widely throughout the country. The Proceedings of the First Session of the Conference, a 407-page volume, was published in July.

Finances

At the first session, the Conference voted that its activities should be financed by the communities. The budget for 1944 was fixed at \$148,500. Expenditures for the year will be well under that sum. The Interim Committee designated Sidney G. Kusworm of Dayton, Ohio, as Chairman, and Max J. Schneider of New York as Co-Chairman of the Finance Committee. A condensed summary of the financial operations follows: (Insert)

Convening of the Second Session

At its meeting on May 12th, 1944, the Interim Committee voted to convene the second session of the Conference on September 2, 1944, at Chicago. Subsequently, the Office of Defense Transportation requested a postponement and in compliance with this, the Interim Committee voted to convene the second session on December 3rd, changing the location to Pittsburgh because facilities were unavailable on that date in Chicago.

Personnel

The Secretariat of the Conference, consisting of Maurice Bisgyer, Jane Evans, Lillie Shultz, and Meyer W. Weisgal, continued to serve the Interim Committee until December 1st, 1943, when staff appointments were made. The Secretariat was invited to continue as members of the Interim Committee without vote. Members of the executive staff include I. L. Kenen, Meir Grossman, Dr. A.S. Kohanski, and Mrs. Ann Jarcho. Mr. J.S. Pearlstien served as Administrative Secretary from December 1st until June 15, 1944, when he resigned.

Necrology

The Interim Committee records with deep regret the death of four of the delegates to the American Jewish Conference: Edwin J. Schanfarber of Columbus, Ohio, Mrs. Adolph Sieroty of Los Angeles, Calif., Judge William M. Untermann of Newark, N.J., and Benjamin Winter of New York.

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This report and those of the Commissions in the succeeding pages are confined to a review of past action. Recommendations to the second session by the Commissions and the Interim Committee will be presented at a plenary session.

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

WESTERN
UNIONA. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

1220

SYMBOLS

DL=Day Letter

NL=Night Letter

LC=Deferred Cable

NLT=Cable Night Letter

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1944 NOV 2 PM 8 04

DR ABBA HILLEL SILVER=
THE TEMPLE=

I HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL NATHAN IEP L GOLDSTEIN, WHO YOU WILL REMEMBER PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART IN BRINGING ABOUT THE ADOPTION OF THE REPUBLICAN PRO PALESTINE PLANK, TO CONVEY TO YOU, DOCTOR WISE AND DOCTOR GOLDSTEIN THE DEEP RESENTMENT AND INDIGNATION OF REPUBLICAN LEADERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, OVER THE POLITICAL REMARKS OF SOME ZIONIST LEADERS SPEAKING AS HEADS OF ZIONIS ORGANIZATIONS. ATTORNEY GENERAL GOLDSTEIN SAID THAT REPUBLICANS WHO HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN BEHALF OF OUR CAUSE HAVE BEEN ALIENATED BY WHAT THEY REGARD AS THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE AMERICAN ZIONIST MOVEMENT AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE INDIGNANT ATTITUDE OF SUCH MEN DOES NOT AUGUR WELL FOR OUR FUTURE ACTIVITY IN WASHINGTON REQUIRING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT. I AM HASTENING TO RELAY ATTORNEY GENERAL GOLDSTEIN'S REMARKS TO DOCTOR WISE DOCTOR GOLDSTEIN AND YOURSELF WITH KIND REGARDS=

HAROLD P MANSON DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION.

American Zionist Emergency Council

CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS

Hadassah, Women's Zionist Organization of America
Mizrachi Organization of America
Poale Zion-Zeire Zion of America
Zionist Organization of America

342 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.
Murray Hill 2-1160

November 2, 1944.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

A reply to the Westerman memorandum is at present being multigraphed. We are having it done outside in more attractive form than would be the case if it were mimeographed in the office. We should be able to send it off tomorrow or Monday.

Berkson and I had a full discussion with Voss about the reaction of the Christian Council to the bulletin of the Federal Council. Voss was dead against any bulletin which would give the impression of being directed specifically at the bulletin of the Federal Council. He was of the opinion that this would serve to establish in the minds of many people who, on a cursory reading would not realize the implications of the Federal Council bulletin, a feeling that a struggle was going on between the Federal Council and the Christian Council on Palestine. It could only do us harm. A comprehensive statement of our case, however, dealing at the same time with the various topics raised in the Federal Council bulletin and similar in length might, he thought, be very useful. This, I believe, coincides in general with the action proposed at the meeting of the Executive Committee, and Dr. Berkson has undertaken to prepare a first draft for Voss to work on.

Incidentally, Voss mentioned that he and Atkinson have in mind the writing of a book to deal with the question of Palestine from the point of view of a Christian. He had seen Harlow's manuscript, which he considers altogether inadequate - as I am afraid it unquestionably is. He says that he has collected a good deal of material and, of course, we are ready to help him in every way possible.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur Lourie
Arthur Lourie

AL:LB

November 2, 1944

PERSONAL

The Hon. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Morgenthau:

I am deeply grateful to you for your kind letter of October 31. I knew that I could turn to you as to a wise and understanding friend.

Yesterday, I received a letter from Dr. Chaim Weizmann. In it he requests me to show you some extracts from his letter which I am very happy to do.

In another letter from Dr. Weizmann, dated October 18, which also reached me yesterday, he refers to "a statement on the policy which we would like to see implemented after this war," which he "transmitted yesterday (October 17) officially to H.H. Government." In this letter Dr. Weizmann writes: "I don't know whether you are keeping in touch with Mr. Morgenthau, to whom I am also sending a copy of the enclosed document. As you know, he is very helpful indeed, and I feel it should be made clear to him that the President and the Prime Minister can implement the statement, but that it will require an effort, and may lead to some initial trouble. But then that is almost inevitable, whatever course is taken."

I do not know whether you have already received the document. If not, I shall be very happy to send you a copy of the one which I received.

With all good wishes and hoping that after the elections I may have the pleasure of a quiet talk with you touching the subject raised by Dr. Weizmann's letter, and the statement of policy which he submitted, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK
Enc.

AHS File

re: conflict
with
Jewish Agency
Bureau

November 5, 1948

Dr. Nahum Goldmann
American Zionist Emergency Council
41 East 42nd St.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Dr. Goldmann:

I received today the memorandum of the conversations which you had with Judge Samuel Rosenman on November 3 and with Congressman Bloom on October 29. You will recall that we formally agreed that you were not to make any contacts in Washington without first apprising me of them. You have evidently forgotten this arrangement. You will recall that I had visited Judge Rosenman and also Congressman Bloom and that I was to contact Judge Rosenman again as well as Congressman Bloom. In fact I have been corresponding with Congressman Bloom about Ibn Sa'ud. I had been waiting to receive the revised draft of our Economic Memorandum before submitting it to Judge Rosenman. Your calling upon both gentlemen, and covering the same ground, simply creates an impossible situation. Whether it is advisable or not to send friends to see the President is certainly a matter which you should not have raised with Judge Rosenman without consulting me; nor for that matter, some other things.

I am afraid, my dear Dr. Goldmann, that I shall have to bring the entire matter up before a meeting of the Emergency Council. I had hoped to avoid the unpleasantness which it would cause. But clearly there cannot be two independent political bureaus working for Palestine in the United States, and I do not intend that you should unilaterally define the scope and authority of your functioning.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Weisgal and to Mr. Montor who attended our meeting in Washington when as I believed we had reached a working arrangement.

Very sincerely yours,

AHS:BK

MUSEUM 3815.

77, GREAT RUSSELL STREET,
W.C.1.

8th November, 1944.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
c/o Jewish Agency for Palestine (Washington Office),
1720 Sixteenth Street NW,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

My dear Silver,

I sent you a letter yesterday through the Embassy, with an account of my interview with the Prime Minister. You will no doubt receive it in due course - but I am enclosing a copy herewith which may possibly reach you sooner.

Since dictating that latter, we have received the terrible news of the assassination of Lord Moyne. There is very little doubt in my mind at present that this foul murder was committed by the same gang responsible for the outbreaks of terrorist acts in the last year or so. I need scarcely tell you what a most dreadful blow it is. It is just catastrophic. I can only hope that the efforts which the Yishuv is making to stamp out this gang will prove successful, though I know all the difficulties and dangers which they themselves are facing - and am glad that I shall very soon be sharing them. I hope you will do all you can to lend your moral support, and that of the American Jewish Community, in this struggle against our internal enemies. X

There is little to add to what I said in my earlier letter, except to emphasise once again that unless we do our utmost to put an end to this criminal gangsterism (I know that success may not always
/depend

77, GREAT RUSSELL STREET,
W.C.1.

8th November, 1944.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
c/o Jewish Agency for Palestine (Washington Office),
1720 Sixteenth Street NW,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

My dear Silver,

depend entirely on us), I see very little hope of achieving any positive results from our negotiations.

together with Mrs W.

I leave for Palestine this time with a very heavy heart, but I am sure that your prayers will follow ~~me~~ us.

With kindest regards, I am
As ever,

Yours,

Ch. Weizmann

There is little to add to what I said in my earlier letter, except to emphasise once again that unless we do our utmost to put an end to this criminal persecution (I know that success may not always

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

7th November, 1944.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
Jewish Agency for Palestine (Washington Office),
1720 Sixteenth Street NW,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

My dear Friend,

As you may know, I shall be leaving in a very few days for Palestine. Before leaving, I have been trying my best to ascertain something of our position. This had become all the more necessary as all sorts of rumours are circulating, particularly from NZO quarters, which seem to have all the inside knowledge. I therefore asked the secretariat at 10 Downing Street whether there was any possibility of my seeing the Prime Minister before I left. To my great satisfaction I received, already from Moscow, an intimation that the Prime Minister would be happy to see me on his return to London. The interview took place yesterday at Chequers.

I had almost two hours' conversation with the Prime Minister, and I should perhaps add that this time it was really more of a conversation - with both of us taking part. You will probably get a minute in due course, but here I would like to give you an idea of the salient points:

- 1) There is no definite decision as yet, and nothing will be decided until the war with Germany is over. So that all the rumours you hear about it are without the slightest foundation. I believe we still have about six months in front of us.
- 2) The Prime Minister emphasised very strongly that America ought to take a hand in the solution of the problem: it would make everything much easier. He repeatedly said that here we have a great many opponents to our policy, particularly among the Tories and the military people, so that he had sometimes to fight a lone battle. But he added that such opposition usually only hardened his heart. I pointed out to him that those who oppose us are the same elements who have always opposed him - and he fully agreed. He also added that we had many good friends in the Labour and Liberal camps - but apparently for him their weight does not compensate for the Tory opposition. So, as he put it, "If Roosevelt and I come together

(d)

7th November, 1944.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
Jewish Agency for Palestine (Washington Office),
1720 Sixteenth Street NW,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

My dear friend,

ther to the Conference Table, we can carry through all we want."

- 3) There is some talk going on about partition, but no territorial project has yet been formulated, and the Prime Minister fully realises that it will be essential for the Jews to bring at least one-and-a-half million people into Palestine in something like ten years.

- 4) He also mentioned that he had been very much struck by the uncompromising opposition to Zionism which he had found among some American Jews. He mentioned only Baruch in this connection, however. But he came back to it several times. Of course I told him that the opposition is limited to a very small group of very rich people, who play no real part in our affairs. But apparently Baruch has made a deep impression on him. As you know, he is an old friend of Churchill's.

I gave the Prime Minister our reasons against partition, and he has read our official memorandum (of which you have a copy).

Briefly, that is what happened. And I think it points to certain action on our part:

- (a) It is most essential that men like Baruch and one or two others should make it known that they are as anxious as we are for the gates of Palestine to be opened for a large Jewish immigration, even if they do not share our political views about a Jewish State, etc. I believe that men like Mr. Morgenthau, Eugene Meyer, Felix, B.V. Cohen, should now really take some trouble to make their views perfectly clear to the President. We shall try and do the same with our friends here. I think it is a terrible thing that an old man like Baruch, rich and sheltered, should try and make it more difficult for us to establish a sanctuary in Palestine for Jews who sorely need it.

/(b)

The Jewish Agency for Palestine

New York Office: SUITE 708, 41 EAST 42ND ST., NEW YORK 17, N. Y. • MUrray Hill 2-5967

Washington Office
1720 SIXTEENTH ST., N. W.
Michigan 4480

November 9, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver,
The Temple,
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

I have your letter of November 5th. To begin with, I should like to put you straight on the facts.

I met with Judge Rosenman last week for the purpose of securing his help in connection with my priority for Palestine. He had offered such help some time ago. When we met, however, he was anxious to discuss some of our problems, which we did. I do not see what possible harm was done by discussing them nor how I could avoid such discussion, once the issue was raised by him. If I had thought that this was "unilateral" activity, I would not report thereon nor would I send you a minute of the conversation. Such mutual information, I think, ought to be considered quite useful.

As for Congressman Bloom, I told you that he had asked me to give him a draft of a memorandum which he desired to submit, in his own name, to the son of Ibn Saud. You will recall that I had discussed this with you and you had agreed that it would be useful. Ibn Saud's son was in Washington last week and is about to leave for London. It was therefore deemed urgent that the draft be given to Mr. Bloom. The memorandum itself was prepared by Mr. Lourie and corrected by you.

So much for the facts.

Since you have raised the question, I think it would be useful to have some clarity on the subject. You seem to be under the impression that every conversation in Washington constitutes a state affair. I think that everyone of us, having developed friendships and acquaintances in Washington, should endeavor, as often as they can get access, to meet with these people even if Zionism is not always the subject of discussion. The fault, I am afraid, is not that these people are seen too often, but too little. Their memories are not very enduring. It is quite another matter when these people are met officially for some specific purpose resulting from previous discussion and decision of our committee when it is definitely determined who should be seen and by whom. In the latter category, I am afraid, that your visit to Lord Halifax is a case in point. Such

The Jewish Agency for Palestine

New York Office: SUITE 708, 41 EAST 42ND ST., NEW YORK 17, N. Y. • MUrray Hill 2-5967

Washington Office
1720 SIXTEENTH ST., N. W.
Michigan 4480

November 9, 1943

- 2 -

an audience certainly should have been discussed in advance and determined upon. I am not questioning the wisdom of seeing him alone although I venture to say that you should have given consideration to the continuity of our association with him both on the part of Dr. Wise and myself. But certainly, whatever the decision, it should have been taken in advance and in consultation with us.

There is another difficulty which is inherent in the long intervals between your visit to New York and Washington. It is a very serious problem and the sooner you will face it, the better it will be for all of us and the less friction there is likely to be. It is not a question of "jurisdiction" or in keeping with arrangements. For my part, I am scrupulously trying to avoid anything that might give the impression of "independent" action. Everything I do or say is part of the record before and after the event. With the best of good will, it is not possible everytime a situation arises to phone to Cleveland to ascertain your views on the subject.


I do not want to prolong this letter unnecessarily. But if we had adhered to the arrangements of meeting at least once every two weeks (and that is very little) to outline a program of action such a situation would not arise. Even then it may be necessary for you or Dr. Wise or myself to depart occasionally from the course of action decided upon if the exigencies of the moment require it. There must be sufficient mutual confidence to realize that none of us is "running" to see people just for the pleasure of seeing them.

I have no objection to your bringing up the matter before the Executive Committee although I fail to see what useful purpose it will serve. We have problems far more serious than this seeming "jurisdictional dispute." I suggest, that as arranged, you, Wise, Lipsky, Montor, Weisgal and I meet next Monday morning to thrash this business out. If we cannot find a modus satisfactory to all, of course, there is no other alternative than submitting the whole question to the Executive Committee. I personally would regard it very regrettable.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Messrs. Montor and Weisgal.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,


Nahum Goldmann

FRANZ J. KATZ

61 East 95th Street
New York, 28, New York
November 9, 1944.

Mr. Harry L. Shapiro
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Shapiro:

Ira Hirschman's Reactions

The following observations were conveyed to me tonight by a very brilliant and capable young journalist who is also a very enthusiastic Zionist (laborite) and who, quite accidentally, spent several days at a resort where Ira Hirschman happened to stay.

Obviously, the impressions reproduced below are rather sketchy. A systematic questioner, no doubt, would have been in a position to elicit somewhat more detailed and definite points. However, the party who listened to Hirschman who seemed to be very "steamed up" about things Near Eastern is no skilled political interviewer.

Under the circumstances, I wish to convey the following to you which may be of significance in any contacts which you may have with Hirschman in the near future. I might add that the young journalist who conveyed these points to me is in the employ of a national Jewish organization. It goes without saying that I cannot assume any responsibility for the accuracy of this information.

Hirschman's Feelings and Experiences:

1) With the British

Hirschman allegedly stated that there are unquestionably many persons in the British services in the Near and Middle East who have a sincere intention of aiding the Jews; but their sentiments and actions, he is alleged to have claimed are being more than nullified by the camarilla of determined Jew-baiters and anti-Zionists who are hell-bent on undoing Israel.

In support of this contention, Hirschman cited an incident involving the British Embassy in Ankara. The case involved the fate of three-hundred Jews in Roumania who could have been rescued by rendering available the corresponding number of Palestine Immigration Certificates. The British Ambassador in Turkey denied having such certificates and professed ignorance as to who might have such certificates, &c. This led Hirschmann to proceed to Jerusalem and make a personal representation to the Government of Palestine. There, he was told that these certificates were no longer there and had been dispatched as customary to British agencies entrusted with their issuance to applicants for immigration visas. Hirschmann returned to Ankara and finally was "tipped-off" about the identity of the Embassy official there in whose hands these certificates allegedly were. That man, in turn, allegedly was of anti-Jewish inclinations. He admitted holding these certificates which were stacked away in a ~~ink~~ desk drawer. Hirschmann, subsequently, went to see the British Ambassador who insisted that the thing was both incredible and impossible and phoned for the afore-mentioned official. The latter, after some initial and unsuccessful hedging finally admitted holding these certificates! In the course of Hirschmann's representations, and investigations leading to the "location" of the Palestine immigration certificates, a period of approximately three months elapsed, the most turbulent period of German and Antonescu terror in Roumania and what it implied for Roumanian Jewry.

In Cairo, Mr. Hirschmann, contrary to advice extended by the U.S. Ambassador there, but in implementation of instructions from Washington, ~~Hirschmann~~

called upon Lord Moyne, the late British Cabinet Minister Resident in the Near East. At this occasion, Hirschmann had a rather bitter falling out with the latter. My informant did not gather from Hirschmann's remarks what the case involved was. However, though this point was not pressed by the informant, Hirschmann allegedly stated that he regarded Moyne as one of the most dangerous enemies the Jews had and as a diplomat infinitely superior to any U.S. diplomatic representative stationed in that region.

(Unless I am mistaken, the U.S. envoy to Egypt is Kirk, formerly with the American Embassy in Vichy. Kirk is regarded as a rather mediocre person.)

2) With the Russians

According to my informant, Hirschmann made it his business to listen to the Russians. With respect to Palestine and Zionism, according to my informant, Hirschmann gathered from his conversations with the Russians that they regarded the Near East as their future sphere of influence. It would be in their interest to maintain the Near East in a state of dependency maintained by a political structure of friendly disposed satellites akin to the Soviets' relations with the new Czechoslovakia. A Jewish state would not fit into this scheme and would be nothing but an irritant.

3) With the State Department in Washington

Upon his return, Hirschmann was asked to convey his impressions to the Near Eastern section's personnel which he did in the course of a two-hour talk.

Hirschmann said that, in his opinion, the paramount duty facing us is to do a good job of convincing State Department and other key government elements of the identity of American and Jewish interest in the Near East.

4) Zionist Political Prospects

As the result of his mission to Ankara, Hirschmann is convinced that the Colonial Office influence is still sufficiently formidable to accomplish a maintenance of the present status quo and that only U.S. pressure upon the British can achieve a change of policy. This, in turn, he regards as being largely dependent on skillful personal liaison with appropriate government personnel and agencies which is fairly immune to public pressure, &c. and is unlikely to become responsive to traditional Zionist pleas, remonstrances, &c. of the traditional character.

Naturally, I asked many questions as the result of these revelations. However, it turned out that my informant was not of a calibre to have gone further in getting a more detailed and rounded-out picture than the fragments related above.

Hirschman intends to write a book on the things he heard and saw. The problem will be to get a clearance for it from the State Department. He seems to be optimistic in this respect.

Hirschmann, according to my friend, has immensely impressed and moved by Palestine Jewry and seems to have become a convinced Zionist, with all the failings of a newly won convert. However, he is severely critical of and somewhat antagonistic to the regular Zionists. I assume that this is due to his original association with the Bergson crowd.

May I re-iterate, in conclusion, that I submit all this with reservations, as previously stated.

Cordially yours

CC: Rabbi A.H. Silver, Cleveland, O. ✓

Mr. Emanuel Neumann, New York, N.Y.

Franz J. Katz.

MEMORANDUM

FROM Mr. Leo R. Sack

TO: Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

SUBJECT:

DATE: November 9, 1944

Attached herewith is a list of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. Of the above list, Senators Robert R. Reynolds of North Carolina, Guy M. Gillette of Iowa, Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri, Democrats; Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, James J. Davis of Pennsylvania will not be members of the next Congress.

Attached herewith is the membership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Of the above members, Representatives Howard J. McMurray of Wisconsin, J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, and James A. Wright of Pennsylvania, Democrats; Foster Stearns of New Hampshire, Andrew C. Schiffler of West Virginia, Republicans, will not be members of the next Congress.

Mr. Fulbright, as you recall, has been elected to the Senate.

It is tragic but true that Representatives Wright of Pennsylvania, and Compton of Connecticut, the sponsors of our Resolution in the House, have been defeated.

LRS:sbr

November 10, 1944

Mr. Arthur Lourie
299 Riverside Drive
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Lourie:

In getting up the letter which is to be sent to Judge Rothenberg and Judge Rosenblatt by Dr. Wise and myself, the following items may be of help to you. The letter should cover the high points and should be about two pages long.

We understand that a joint meeting of the committees of the Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemeth is scheduled this week to act on the budget of the Emergency Council. We regret that we cannot attend in person to present our budget and to explain it. The budget was submitted by the chairman of the Budget Committee of the Emergency Council, Mr. Charles Rosenbloom, at its meeting on September 24, and was unanimously approved. The budget follows closely the actual expenditures of the Emergency Council for the last fiscal year and makes no provisions for unforeseen contingencies which might arise and which probably will arise. It is a minimum budget for the job which should be done during the coming year, which will be the decisive year for our movement. The following facts relative to our political activities for the coming year should be borne in mind.

1) The White Paper is still in force. No new decision on Palestine has been announced. The latest information from the State Department is that no decision has as yet been reached. Everything is still in a state of flux and anything might happen to our movement between now and the time when the final decision will be announced. Mr. Bernard Joseph at the meeting, last night, pleaded with us in the name of the Palestine Executive, to continue intensively our fight against the White Paper.

2) Favorable action on the Palestine Resolutions in Congress has not yet been taken! If we get the green light soon from the State Department, it will require intensive activity on the part of the Emergency Council during the months of November and December to put the resolutions across. If we do not proceed now, and we decide to re-introduce the resolutions in the New Congress, it will necessitate a renewed intensified activity early next year. It would be a serious political defeat for us if after all the focusing of public opinion on these resolutions both here and abroad, Congress fails

to take action on them.

3) Organized opposition to our movement is growing in the United States in spite of the extraordinary success which we have had in political circles. Arab propaganda is becoming increasingly active in our country. An Arab drive against Zionism will be launched on November 25 at the conference which is to be held in New York to which Arabs of the United States and of Canada have been invited. An Arab Information Bureau is being set up. Hitti, Malouf, Rihbany and al-Kahtib are members of an Actions Committee which is aided by certain individuals attached to the Arab States' Ministries and Delegations in Washington, and is becoming extremely active, working indirectly through numerous American groups and institutions not friendly to us.

4) The British are carrying on a very active and skillful propaganda against us in the United States. Unfavorable articles such as those which appeared recently in the Readers' "Literary Digest", "Pertinax" in the New York Times, articles in the Christian Science Monitor, radio broadcasts from Cairo, etc. etc., when traced down, all seem to have but one origin.

5) A very disconcerting factor in the situation is the increasingly negative and even hostile attitude of powerful Protestant Christian Church circles to our movement. The leaders behind this opposition are graduates of the Beirut University which is fons et origo of most of the bitter anti-Zionism in the Middle East. The recent Bulletin published by the Department of Research and Education, of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, sent to tens of thousands of Christian clergymen in the United States, is distinctly harmful to our cause and would have been altogether vicious had we not had conferences with the representatives of the Federal Council prior to the publication of this Bulletin. As you know, the "Christian Century" has been sniping at us quite regularly. The only way to counter this propaganda is to intensify our activities through our Committee on Christian Clergymen and the American Palestine Committee. We have only scratched the surface here. We have concentrated, during the year, on political circles because this was an election year and it offered us a rare opportunity. But the election is over! If we are to win over and hold American public opinion during the coming critical months, we must do far more than we have done, and that immediately, among church groups, large organized Christian bodies, college and educational circles, etc. etc.

The two meetings held under the auspices of the American Palestine Committee and the Committee on Christian Clergymen in Philadelphia and in Washington during the past year did more for our movement than a dozen Zionist meetings under Jewish auspices. During the coming year we should hold eight or ten such regional meetings. Four have already been scheduled. Each one of these meetings, by the way, cost about \$10,000.

6) Another area which must be more intensively cultivated is the

11-10-44

field of American magazines and periodicals where unfortunately we have made very little headway in all these years. Hardly a pro-Zionist article ever makes its appearance in an important magazine of the type of the Atlantic Monthly. Hostile articles do, however, appear quite frequently. Neither in the popular magazines nor in the "intellectual" magazines have we had our case presented properly.

7) We have built up, during the past year, a series of important departments which are just getting into their stride. Any curtailment in the budget will mean the dismissal of some of their most valuable personnel and the crippling of their activities. We refer to such indispensable departments as our Research Department, headed by Dr. Berkson, which is rendering invaluable service by way of presentation of the numerous vital memoranda which we are called upon to submit to government and other circles constantly and which provide all of our departments with the factual and scientific data upon which to build our educational campaign and to fight our opposition.

The scope of our Publications Department should be expanded. We have published during the year numerous tracts, pamphlets and brochures as well as the highly important volume "Palestine and the United States," Frankenstein's "Justice To My People" (to be issued in the next week or two) and the monthly magazine, "Palestine." We have subsidized a number of other Zionist books such as Lowdermilk's "The Land of Promise," (expand)

8) This is not the year in which to force a curtailment of our political activities by a reduction in the budget. We do not know of a single important Zionist body or Jewish organization generally that is curtailing its activities or its budget. Certainly our political work which should be geared to its maximum power and effectiveness during the twelve months ahead should not be harmfully dismantled by false economy. In passing, it might be mentioned that the Bergson group, by its own admission, collected and spent during the past two years, nearly a million dollars -- a sum far larger than was spent by the Emergency Council representing all the political activities of all the organized Zionist bodies in America during the past two years.

9) It should also be borne in mind that the income of the Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemeth for this year is far in excess of its income during the past year. The budget which the Emergency Council submits is the same as last year, thus calling for a sharply reduced percentage allocation from the funds.

10) We should also request the acceptance of the budget for the entire year. The Emergency Council cannot operate on a partial budget from hand to mouth as it were. It must plan its activities far ahead. The principal men on our personnel can not be employed on a month to month basis. They have their own careers to think about. We are operating on an economical basis with a full realization of our responsibilities towards the expenditure of public funds -- funds, which by the way we all have a hand in raising.

Mr. Lourie

-4-

11-10-44

Approval of this budget is already long over-due as the fiscal year of the Emergency Council begins on October 15. We strongly urge prompt and favorable action on the budget so as to enable our movement to carry on on the political scene with maximum efficiency and we hope success during the coming year.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK



AHS File

November 10, 1943

Dr. Nahum Goldmann
American Zionist Emergency Council
41 East 42nd St.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Dr. Goldmann:

Permit me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 9. I should like to set you straight on a few facts.

If you will consult your calendar, you will find that meetings of the Emergency Committee have been held regularly as agreed upon, every first and third Monday. The only deviation from the practise was Monday, November 1, when no meeting was held because a special meeting of the Emergency Committee was held five days prior to that time, on Wednesday, October 27, at which time we discussed the action of the American Jewish Committee.

Furthermore, I should like to remind you that while it is not possible every time a situation arises, to phone Cleveland to ascertain my views, you haven't been particularly burdened with such long distance conversations to my best knowledge. Nor is it necessary. You can always contact Mr. Montor who is in daily communication with me, and sometimes two and three times a day. All that I want is that we have a central clearing house for contacts which members of our Emergency Council make with public officials in Washington so that we know beforehand who goes to see whom, and why.

As to the matter of my visit to Lord Halifax, over which you seem to be exorcised, and exorcising others, I will have occasion to speak of it when we meet next Monday.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK

WALTER F. GEORGE, GA., CHAIRMAN

DAVID I. WALSH, MASS.
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, KY.
TOM CONNALLY, TEX.
JOSIAH W. BAILEY, N. C.
BENNETT CHAMP CLARK, MO.
HARRY FLOOD BYRD, VA.
PETER G. GERRY, R. I.
JOSEPH F. GUFFEY, PA.
EDWIN C. JOHNSON, COLO.
GEORGE L. RADCLIFFE, MD.
SCOTT W. LUCAS, ILL.

ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, JR., WIS.
ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG, MICH.
JAMES J. DAVIS, PA.
HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR., MASS.
JOHN A. DANAHY, CONN.
ROBERT A. TAFT, OHIO
JOHN THOMAS, IDAHO
HUGH A. BUTLER, NEBR.
EUGENE D. MILLIKIN, COLO.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

CHRISTIE B. KENNEDY, CLERK

November 11, 1944.

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver,
The Temple,
Cleveland, Ohio.

Dear Dr. Silver:


Now that the election is over, I wish to thank you again for your very kind assistance, particularly in the speech which you made to the Zionist meeting in Cleveland and the quotation which was used in Jewish newspapers throughout the state. I have no doubt that it had a substantial effect, and this was a year in which I needed all possible assistance.

I have had to delay my return to Washington until Thursday, but I hope we can proceed with the Palestine Resolution immediately.

Please call me if you hear anything which I should know about.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,



Robert A. Taft.

RT:CJ

November 12, 1946

Dr. Felix A. Levy
Emanuel Congregation
710 Buckingham Place
Chicago 13, Illinois

My dear Felix:

Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of my presidential message which I delivered at the Convention of the Zionist Organization of America in Atlantic City.

With reference to the Presidency of the College — quite a few of the Alumni have spoken to me about it and I can only say to you what I said to them, I don't believe that I am the person for it. I am too controversial a personality today on the American-Jewish scene and I am too prominently identified with the cause of Zionism. The College needs at its head a person who is far less controversial and who, while friendly to our cause, is not as prominently and officially identified with the movement as I am.

The Zionist movement is reaching its critical stage. Historic decisions will soon have to be made. I should like to give to the movement whatever time and strength I have. It would not be fair to the College — even if it were agreeable to the Board and to the Alumni — for anyone to take over that important post and not give to it complete and undivided application.

To my best knowledge you are still a member of the Committee on Relief and Subvention.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:GR

Nov. 13, 1944

PRESS RELEASE

AMERICAN PALESTINE COMMITTEE
1720—16th Street, N.W., Washington 9, D. C. • MI 4480

NEW YORK OFFICE:
41 East 42 Street
New York, N. Y. MUrray Hill 2-4917

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO MEET IN CHICAGO FOR CONFERENCE ON PALESTINE

- - - - -

A Regional Conference on Palestine, at which non-Jewish leaders of public opinion will discuss the Palestine question and formulate a program to aid the development of the Jewish National Home, will be held on Tuesday, November 21, at the Stevens Hotel in Chicago. This was announced today by Dr. Howard M. LeSourd, director of the American Palestine Committee.

The Conference is being sponsored by the Christian Council on Palestine and the American Palestine Committee, in cooperation with the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Free World Association, the Unitarian Fellowship for Social Justice and the United Christian Council for Democracy.

Speakers at the Conference's two sessions will include Dr. Carl J. Friedrich, Harvard University; Rabbi Solomon Goldman, Congregation Anshe Emet, Chicago; Dr. LeSourd; Dr. A. William Loos, Chicago Church Federation; Dr. Francis E. McMahon, University of Chicago; Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, Union Theological Seminary; Col. Albert A. Sprague, Chicago business and civic leader; Dr. Carl Hermann Voss, Executive Secretary, Christian Council on Palestine, and William B. Ziff, author and publisher.

The American Palestine Committee, which is headed by Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York, is the vehicle for the expression of the sympathy and good will of Christian America for the movement to re-establish the Jewish National Home in Palestine. 260 Members of Congress, 26 Governors, as well as outstanding leaders in the fields of education, journalism, radio, industry, commerce and labor, are included among the Committee's more than 4,000 members.

The Christian Council on Palestine is headed by Dr. Henry A. Atkinson, and represents 2,000 Christian ministers and religious educators.

November 15, 1944

Dr. Stephen S. Wise
40 West 68th Street
New York, N.Y.

My dear Dr. Wise:

After you have read Dr. Weizmann's letter and thought through his recommendations, you may wish to call me up or give me your reactions in writing. There is a meeting of our Committee in New York next Tuesday. We might wish to discuss the contents of these letters before the afternoon meeting of the Executive.

Have you any suggestions as to the best methods of reaching Mr. Baruch? I think an interview with him is imperative, and long over-due. Who are the best people to sit down with him and talk over the whole subject? I have never met Mr. Baruch, and I should be very happy to join one or two or three people to discuss the subject with him. Is Morgenthau the man to make the contact for us? Or Frankfurter? Weizmann has written about Baruch before, and Churchill's concern with Baruch's opinion on the subject of Zionism.

With reference to our Congressional Resolutions -- if the objection is only pressure of time, then we ought to do our utmost to overcome that objection. Hearings on our resolutions in the House have already been held. It is only a question of getting the Foreign Affairs Committee to approve of it. Sabath will see it through quickly through his Rules Committee, and the matter can be disposed of in record time. I do not believe that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will want to hold any hearings. Action there would be very quick if clearance is given by the State Department, that is to say, by the President.

We have nothing to worry about the attitude of Congress. It will pass the resolutions overwhelmingly. To re-introduce the bill in the next Congress will require again tremendous work, new hearings, etc. etc. For Congress to adjourn without action on our resolutions would be a political defeat for us, and would be picked up by both Arabs and our Jewish foes, and made much capital of.

With all good wishes, I remain

Cordially yours,

AHS:BK
Enc. - 2

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

CHAIRMAN
DR. STEPHEN S. WISE

Office of Dr. Wise
40 West 68th Street
New York 23, N.Y.

November 15, 1944

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
East 105th Street and Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio

My dear Dr. Silver:

Through an inadvertence these papers were buried at the bottom of a bag which I did not empty until last night upon my return from Washington.

Let me tell you briefly about Washington. I got this telegram Monday evening from Bloom. I did not reply to it because I knew I could see him the following day in Washington. I did see him yesterday, and he is very much chagrined over Celler's outburst, after having acceded to ~~his~~ request not to touch the thing until we had the assent of the State Department. He telephoned in my presence to Stettinius, who said he had not yet had a chance to see the President, but he hoped to in the next day or two.

And now I go back to these letters of Dr. Freehof and the enclosures. There is nothing I wish to say about it. I am ready to face trial, if there is to be a trial. I do not find it my duty to retract anything of what I said. I considered, as I believe you do, the conduct of Fineschreiber and Wolsey to be treasonable to every high Jewish interest, and therefore I consider both men utterly unworthy to occupy the places of their great predecessors, including most especially Hirsch.

With cordial greetings,

Yours,

Stephen S. Wise

ssw:eh
enclosures

(SEE NEXT PAGE)

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 17. N. Y.

CHAIRMAN
DR. STEPHEN S. WISE

Abba Hillel Silver
Cleveland, Ohio

November 15, 1944

-2-

P.S. Stettinius telephoned just before night,
saying "I have seen the President, and I
want you to know at once what his opinion is.
He urges that nothing be done about the Bill,
and that the matter be left in his hands a lit-
tle longer. He implied, without directly saying,
that he would soon see the heads of other govern-
ments."

I rather think, though he did not say so,
that Stettinius will arrange that we meet with
S. before the President leaves for Europe, but
it is not certain.

h

November 20, 1944

The Hon. Robert A. Taft
United States Senator
Washington, D.C.

My dear Senator Taft:

Mr. Leo Sack reported to me the conversation which he had with you. I was very happy to learn that you will appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to urge the passage of the Palestine Resolution. I understand that you were to appear this Wednesday, but that the meeting has been postponed to the Wednesday of the following week. Senator Wagner will then be back in Washington and will attend the meeting.

In view of all that has happened during the past few months -- Secretary Stimson's letter to you, the inclusion of Palestine planks in both of the Party Platforms, and the declaration of President Roosevelt on October 15 favoring the Jewish Commonwealth and promising "to help to bring about its realization" -- there should be no difficulty in getting favorable action from the Foreign Relations Committee.

I received, a few days ago, a letter from Dr. Weizmann, in which he reported on a two-hour interview which he had with Prime Minister Churchill at Chequers on November 6. In this interview the Prime Minister "emphasised very strongly that America ought to take a hand in the solution of the problem: it would make everything much easier. He repeatedly said that here we have a great many opponents to our policy, particularly among the Tories and the military people, so that he sometimes had to fight a lone battle. But he added that such opposition usually only hardened his heart." Prime Minister Churchill would welcome an expression from the Congress of the United States. It would strengthen his hands.

I am enclosing herewith the official Memorandum on Palestine Policy recently submitted by the Jewish Agency of Palestine to His Majesty's Government. It is a concise and excellent statement of the official position of our movement, and you may wish to have it as background for your presentation at the meeting next Wednesday.

Our people have been anxious to have the word "ultimately" eliminated from the Resolution: "and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth." They feel that the word suggests indefinite postponement. In neither of the planks, nor in the President's or Governor Dewey's declarations

November 20, 1944

was the term used. To avoid misinterpretation, it may be desirable to have the word "ultimately" dropped.

It would be highly desirable to avert a public hearing on the Resolutions in the Senate. The House held extensive hearings which received widespread publicity. Every phase of the subject was covered and the proceedings have been printed. It would not be helpful to start another public discussion at this time.

With all good wishes, and trusting that you are well,
I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK



C
O
P
Y

THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

342 Madison Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.

November 21, 1944.

Dr. Stephen S. Wise
Dr. Abba H. Silver
Co-Chairmen, American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver:

Enclosed is a copy of the Resolution unanimously adopted by the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem, with myself abstaining from voting. It refers to the agreement between the American Zionist Emergency Council and the Jewish Agency office.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Nahum Goldmann

ההנהלה קבלה לתשומת לב את ההחלטה בדבר סידור
הפעולה המדינית בין חבר דר. נ. גולדמן והמועצה לשעת חרום
בארצות הברית

ההנהלה מציינת במיפוק רב את ההישג של איחוד הכוחות
הדרוש לנו בשעה זו עוד יותר מאשר בכל זמן אחר כי על התנועה
הציונית באמריקה מוטלת עכשין אחריות יחידה במינה ופעולתנו
המדינית באמריקה היא בעלת מישקל מיוחד בשביל כל עתידנו.

יחד עם זאת מובן שההנהלה שומרת לה הזכות המלאה
לפנות לממשלה ארצות הברית בשם העם היהודי בכל עניני
ארץ ישראל והציונות - בהתאם לחוקת ההסתדרות הציונית
והסוכנות היהודית ובהתאם למנדט.

29. 10.44

November 21, 1944

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

At the request of Dr. Weizmann as President of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, we have the honor to transmit to you herewith a Memorandum recently submitted by him to the British Government, which deals in succinct form with the question of the future of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. We realize how deeply occupied you are with other matters, but nevertheless dare to hope that, recognizing the importance also of this issue, you will find time to give it your consideration. We are informed that the Memorandum has been placed before Mr. Churchill and has been discussed with him by Dr. Weizmann.

We venture to add a brief comment on one particular aspect not dealt with in the Memorandum. It is our conviction that the British authorities are not sufficiently aware of the strength and scope of American support for the Zionist program.

The Jews of this country have, of course, in particular through the American Jewish Conference, put themselves clearly on record as overwhelmingly favorable to the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. The Conference represents sixty-three national Jewish organizations and every important Jewish community in the country; it speaks for some two or three million American citizens of Jewish faith. The American people as a whole have likewise indicated their support of the Zionist program in clear

and unmistakable terms, through the planks adopted by the two great political parties, through the action of more than twenty State Legislatures and through the resolutions of the two major national labor organizations. That support is evidenced, too, both through the American Palestine Committee, whose membership includes more than two-thirds of the Senate and over two hundred members of the House of Representatives, and through the ever-growing Christian Council on Palestine, headed by men like Rev. Daniel A. Poling and Rev. Henry A. Atkinson and representing thousands of leading clergymen throughout the United States.

If Mr. Churchill can be made aware of the fact that, in the words of your recent message to the Zionists of America, "the American people give their support" to the Jewish Commonwealth aim, and if it can be made known to him further that America is willing to take a hand in the shaping of Palestine's future, it would be of tremendous help towards securing an early and favorable decision. The urgency for such a decision was indicated in our recent letter to you and is becoming daily more apparent. It is our earnest hope that you may at this time see fit to lend the aid of your great name and office to this historic act of national restitution and regeneration.

Yours sincerely,

Stephen S. Wise

Abba Hillel Silver

Co-Chairmen

American Jewish Trade Union Committee for Palestine

Room 2500 • 245 Fifth Avenue
Murray Hill 3-1881 New York 16, N. Y.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CIO CALLS FOR PASSAGE OF PALESTINE RESOLUTIONS

PENDING IN CONGRESS

- - - - -

URGES ESTABLISHMENT OF JEWISH COMMONWEALTH

- - - - -

Chicago -- The CIO Convention today urged Congress to pass the pending Palestine resolutions (H.R. 418 - 419 and S.R. 247) which call for unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine and the reconstitution of that country as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. This was announced today by Irving Abramson, state chairman, CIO of New Jersey, who introduced the resolution on Palestine at the convention.

Demanding that "steps be taken to effect the immediate rescue of Jews in Axis-dominated countries," the CIO resolution urged upon Britain "the unequivocal removal of the White Paper policy, and the full implementation of the Balfour Declaration towards the ultimate establishment of a Palestinian Jewish Commonwealth in accordance with the principles of democratic action."

The resolution endorsed the "expressions of support for Jewish rights in Palestine which have come during the past year from leaders in all walks of life in the United States, the most notable of which were the stirring and historic declaration of the President of the United States giving his complete endorsement of the movement to reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth, and the forthright and unequivocal declarations in support of Jewish aspirations in Palestine adopted by both the Democratic and Republican parties and included in their platforms."

(more)

A pledge of support for the program of the American Jewish Trade Union Committee for Palestine was also included in the resolution.

The text of the resolution follows:

"WHEREAS, the decisions reached by the leaders of the United Nations provide for the self-determination, the independence and the physical survival of all peoples, great and small, and

"WHEREAS, the Jewish people, who for more than a decade have been singled out for persecution and murder by the fascist butchers, received in the years following the last war pledges from Great Britain, the League of Nations, and the United States, for the recreation of Palestine as the National Homeland of the Jewish people, which pledges were incorporated in the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine, and the Anglo-American Convention of 1924, and

"WHEREAS, the 550,000 Jews of Palestine have demonstrated their unflagging devotion to the democratic cause, have accelerated the production of vital war materials, and have sent their manpower into the armed forces and the factories to help speed the victory of the United Nations, and

"WHEREAS, the Chamberlain White Paper of 1939, which was denounced in a resolution passed by the 1943 convention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations as 'discriminatory, unfair, unjust and a hindrance to the war effort,' and which utterly disregards the pledges made to the Jewish people, now prohibits further Jewish immigration into the Jewish National Home and curtails land sales to Jewish colonists, thereby threatening not only the existence of the Jewish Homeland, but the very lives of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees in Europe, therefore be it

"RESOLVED, that the Congress of Industrial Organizations, meeting in National Convention in the city of Chicago, strongly urges that steps be taken to effect the immediate rescue of Jews in Axis-dominated countries, and be it further

"RESOLVED, that we join most heartily in the expressions of support for Jewish rights in Palestine which have come during the past year from leaders in all walks of life in the United States, the most notable of which were the stirring and historic declaration of the President of the United States giving his complete endorsement of the movement to reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth, and the forthright and unequivocal declarations in support of Jewish aspirations in Palestine adopted by both the Democratic and Republican Parties and included in their platforms, and be it further

"RESOLVED, that we call upon the Congress of the United States to adopt the Palestine Resolutions (H.R. 418-419 and S.R. 247) now pending before it, thus giving positive expression to the will of the people of our nation, and be it further

"RESOLVED, that we call for the immediate redress of the great wrong committed against the Jewish people, and urge upon the Government of Great Britain the unequivocal removal of the White Paper policy, and the full implementation of the Balfour Declaration towards the ultimate establishment of a Palestinian Jewish Commonwealth in accordance with the principles of democratic action, and be it further

"RESOLVED, that we approve the program of the American Jewish Trade Union Committee for Palestine, organized by our fellow Jewish workers for the purpose of crystallizing the sentiments of American Labor in behalf of a free, democratic Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, and herewith affix our signatures as sponsors of said Committee, pledged to its support and the carrying out of its program."

MEMORANDUM

To Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

Date November 22, 1944


From Harry L. Shapiro

Mr. Louis Lipsky spoke with Congressman Sol Bloom this afternoon at 4:45. Mr. Bloom told him that he will see the President on Monday, November 27. He could not see him before that date, because the President was out of Washington and would not return until Sunday night.

In his conversation with the President Mr. Bloom will indicate that the green light should be given to the Resolution in order that he (Mr. Bloom) may be helped. He will indicate to the President that Congressman Celler is attacking him and also that there is a possibility that if the green light is not given serious repercussions will emanate from the American Jewish Conference, which is scheduled for December 3rd, in Pittsburgh.

The Congressman told Mr. Lipsky that he could have had his Committee approve the bill by this date, but since he had been asked by Dr. Wise to refrain from any action, he was abiding by Dr. Wise's wishes and awaiting word from him as to when he should move ahead.

Kindest regards.



HLS:HH

November 26, 1944

Mr. Sidney Hillman
15 Union Square
New York, New York

My dear Mr. Hillman:

It was kind of you to call me on Friday and I was happy to know that you are giving the matter which I brought to your attention serious thought. You are in a position to render us a truly historic service.

The situation is this. The Palestine Resolutions which were introduced last February must be acted upon at this session of Congress, if they are to be acted upon at all. Hearings on the House Resolution were held before the House Foreign Affairs Committee early last spring and the Resolutions would have been adopted overwhelmingly -- if it were not for the intervention of the Military who asked deferment of action on the Resolutions for military reasons. Last month Secretary of War Stimson officially withdrew the military objections. The coast is now clear for quick and favorable action. You will recall that both political parties at their conventions included splendid planks endorsing the Jewish Commonwealth, in their Party Platforms. On October 15th, President Roosevelt put himself squarely behind a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth and stated that: "I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if reelected, I shall help to bring about its realization." The Presidential candidate for the Republican Party, Governor Dewey, likewise endorsed the "reconstitution of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth." Four hundred members of the present Congress are on record through personal statements which they sent us and which have been published in the volume "America and Palestine", endorsing the principles of the Resolutions.

It remains now for President Roosevelt to give the "green light" to Congress. Undoubtedly the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Relations Committee will want to know the mind of the President before they proceed. From what we learned, the President has not yet given clearance, so to speak, to these Resolutions, and unless urged he is likely not to. He would probably like to handle this matter on a more or less personal basis between himself and Prime Minister Churchill.

2-Mr. Sidney Hillman, 11/26/44

The American Zionist Emergency Council feels that it would be for us a serious political set-back, if these Resolutions which have been so publicized throughout the world during this past year were shelved by Congress. The Arabs would regard it as a great victory for them inasmuch as they had protested officially to Washington against the passage of these Resolutions. It might have serious political repercussions in London where the opinion is widely held that our State Department is opposed to the Zionist program and where the pre-election party platforms on Palestine and even the statement of the President were more or less discounted as by-products of a political campaign. The Jews of America will feel terribly let down about it all and the criticism will undoubtedly be made that now that the election is over the Palestine Resolutions were scuttled -- and by President Roosevelt himself. For no valid explanation can be given why the Congress of the United States should not have been permitted to express itself on the Jewish Commonwealth now that the President himself has come out for it and the both political conventions had endorsed it.

The American Jewish Conference which adopted the Commonwealth Resolution last September after an historic struggle, and worked for it throughout the year, will hold its second session in Pittsburgh next week. They will want an explanation as to why these Resolutions were pigeon-holed in Congress, since the military objection had been removed, and unfair and unjustified criticism may be launched against the President who, as you know, has been very sympathetic to our cause, but being absorbed in so many grave duties has had to be prodded from time to time in matters which concern Palestine.

I am persuaded that President Roosevelt, being a fair-minded and reasonable man, would quickly get the point if someone close to him whose judgment he values would bring to his attention the above facts.

I have just received a letter from Dr. Chaim Weizmann in which he gives an account of a two-hour interview which he had with Prime Minister Churchill at Chequers, on November 6th. Churchill is very anxious for American support. He told Weizmann of the terrific resistance to the cause in his Cabinet in the Tory party and among the military. Very often Mr. Churchill said he finds himself fighting alone. He feels that a clear expression on the part of the American Government would greatly strengthen his hands and Dr. Weizmann urges us to do all we can to make it clear that the American people and the American Government are prepared to take a hand in the solution of the Palestine problem.

The passage of the Palestine Resolution this week or next week in Congress would be a powerful and most welcome reinforcement for

3-Mr. Sidney Hillman, 11/26/44

Mr. Churchill and I believe also for President Roosevelt, ~~for~~ *also*,
coming on top of the tragic assassination of Lord Moyne and all
the repercussions unfavorable to our Movement which it has set
in motion, this action of Congress would give the morale of our
own people here and in Palestine a tremendous lift.

I do hope that you will communicate with the President in
whatever way appears most effective to you. Time is of the essence.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has called a meeting for
this Wednesday. If Senator Connally could get an indication from
the President to move forward, these Resolutions could be acted
upon this week. That is true also of Congressman Bloom, as Chair-
man of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He too is waiting for a
word from the White House. It is rumored that the President might
be leaving the country any day now. If therefore, my dear Mr.
Hillman, you could communicate either by telephone, wire or letter
with the President today, it would be a great service and our
Movement and our people would be forever indebted to you.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours

Abba Hillel Silver

ANS:CK

P.S. I am leaving this evening for Washington and will be at the
Statler Hotel for the remainder of the week.

November 27, 1944

Hon. Sol Bloom
House Office Building
Washington, D. C.

My dear Congressman Bloom:

It was with deep satisfaction that we read the letter of Secretary of War Stimson of a few weeks ago in which he stated that the military objections, which were responsible for the deferment of action on our Palestine Resolutions last spring, were no longer factors in the situation, and also your own announcement that you were prepared to bring up the Palestine Resolution before the Committee on Foreign Affairs for action.

Now that the days of the seventy-eighth Congress are rapidly drawing to a close I strongly urge that these Resolutions be acted upon promptly. Since they were introduced both political parties have endorsed them by including two splendid Jewish Commonwealth planks in their party platforms, and the presidential candidates of both political parties also issued hearty endorsement of the Jewish Commonwealth. On October 15th the President of the United States stated that he is convinced that the American people give their support to the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth and that, if re-elected, he would help to bring about its realization.

The Resolution, if adopted, would back up and reinforce the position taken by our President, as well as that of our friends in Great Britain, and would give eloquent voice to what is in the hearts and minds of the American people which has always been sympathetic to the rebuilding of the Jewish National Home.

As Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council I urge prompt action on the Resolution, and in so doing I am confident that I voice the sentiment of the Jews of America and of the hosts of non-Jewish friends of Palestine who have, through this last year, indicated their support of this Resolution.

With all good wishes and thanking you for your unfailing interest and devotion which you have manifested throughout, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS,

AHS:sbr

MEMORANDUM

To Chairmen of Local Emergency Committees Date November 27, 1944

From Harry L. Shapiro

On Saturday evening, November 25, Lessing J. Rosenwald, president of the American Council for Judaism, aired the views of his organization over the Columbia Broadcasting System. This broadcast represented another attempt by Mr. Rosenwald and his group to discredit the views of an overwhelming majority of American Jews and to create the impression that the Council for Judaism speaks for our people. It is of the utmost importance that letters and telegrams go forward immediately to those radio stations which carried Mr. Rosenwald's address, so that the network may understand that Mr. Rosenwald's remarks constitute an affront to the Jews of America. You can help us obtain radio time to refute Mr. Rosenwald's damaging remarks by doing the following:

Ascertain whether or not the address was carried by your CBS station. If so, have as many wires and letters of protest as possible sent to the local station or to the Columbia Broadcasting System office in New York. You must urge that an equal amount of time be afforded a leader of American Zionism -- one who has a right to speak in the name of the Jews of America.

The following quotation indicates how Mr. Rosenwald has perverted Zionist philosophy. This, as well as the actual facts as presented in Emanuel Neumann's statement on the Jewish Commonwealth (quoted on the following page), may be used by you as source material for letters of refutation.

Mr. Rosenwald said: "We oppose the establishment of Palestine or any locality as a Jewish state or commonwealth. The procedures involved in such an establishment call for a preferred status in immigration to those of one religious faith and an arbitrary and indefinite postponement of self-government. We regard these procedures as fundamentally undemocratic, and, therefore, destructive. Such proposals will, we believe, embroil Jews now in Palestine in continuing civil strife. What is more, they will place in jeopardy the equality of status of Jews everywhere who are integrated in their respective homelands and do not wish to be parties to a Jewish state or commonwealth, and that means the vast majority of the Jews of the world. Our emphasis, therefore, is on the attainment of the status for Jews of full equality of citizenship, its rights and its responsibilities. In Palestine it would mean that Jews would be Palestinians of Jewish faith, just as we, in this country, are Americans of Jewish faith."

Once again Mr. Rosenwald and his small group have emerged with the all-too-familiar red herrings. He expresses concern over the "undemocratic" aspects of Zionist aspirations. Out of the fear and escapist philosophy which motivate his own thinking, he conjures up bogeymen to frighten freedom-loving peoples who may be moved by the tragic plight of European Jewry to act favorably on the only permanent solution to the Jewish problem -- the Zionist solution.

To set the record straight, let us quote once again from that invaluable document containing the testimony on the Palestine resolutions delivered before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. On Page 315 of that book, the meaning of the term "Jewish Commonwealth" is set forth succinctly and impressively by Mr. Emanuel Neumann, who says:

"By a Jewish commonwealth we certainly do not mean a state which is exclusively Jewish. We do not mean to drive the existing Arab population into the desert or cast it into the sea. On the contrary, those who choose to do so are to remain. Moreover, their civic and personal rights shall be inviolate. There shall be a full and complete equality before the law. Not only that, but the Arabs shall have every right and possibility to preserve and develop their cultural and religious heritage. Their language shall be recognized and their traditions respected. And in addition they shall share fully in the economic advantages and opportunities and the prosperity which will come with the modernization of the country and the development of its resources.

"Indeed, this has already been the case in a substantial measure. If, then, we are asked what do we mean by the adjective 'Jewish' as applied to the future commonwealth of Palestine my answer is that it is a short and abbreviated way of saying that through the repatriation of large numbers of European and other Jews, the Jewish people will attain a numerical majority in Palestine and thereby permanently guarantee the open door for others who may follow; so that Palestine shall never cease to serve as a sanctuary and homeland for any and all Jews from whatever part of the world who may choose to go there in the future. It will also be a Jewish commonwealth in the vital sense that in that country, in that little corner of the world, the Jewish people, no longer living under minority conditions but as a majority, will be free to apply their talent, their industry, their genius and leave the intangible impress of their civilization upon their ancestral land as in the days of the kings and the prophets.

"But the development of this Jewish commonwealth shall take place under democratic institutions and in a democratic spirit. The Jews will preponderate and lead in the development of the country without dominating or oppressing the minority. Jew and Arab devoted to their respective cultures and traditions shall cooperate as free and equal citizens and jointly contribute to the prosperity and welfare of a common single unitary state. The Arab citizens of the Jewish commonwealth will be as favorably situated as are the French-speaking citizens of the British Dominion of Canada. It will be a free and democratic Jewish state composed of Jews, Moslems, Christians and, if there are any, Buddhists, as well -- compatriots, all. All shall be eligible to public office, even the highest."

Would Mr. Rosenwald call that undemocratic? Or is he perhaps concerned, not with the problems and the status of our persecuted people, but with insuring the continuation of the "status quo" for the comfortably situated members of the American Council for Judaism?

200R-13

November 28, 1944

The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ
297 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Gentlemen:

I am directed on behalf of the American Zionist Emergency Council, representing the organized Zionist Movement in this country, to communicate with you in regard to the October 7th Information Bulletin issued by the Information Service of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and entitled "Conflict Over Palestine".

The purpose of the Bulletin, it is to be assumed, is to present to the uninstructed reader a fair and detached account of the Palestine question. It appears to us, however, that the Bulletin falls short of the standards of objectivity and scholarship which might have been expected in a publication emanating from the Federal Council of Churches. By its omissions, by its misplaced emphases, and in one or two instances by errors of fact, the Bulletin does injustice to a cause the historic significance of which has been recognized by great Christian as well as Jewish leaders - namely, the cause of restoring the Jewish people to its ancestral home in Palestine where they may live as of right and not on sufferance.

Letters dealing with a number of specific points of criticism have been sent to the Federal Council - one addressed to Dr. Samuel Cavert by Dr. Israel Goldstein, President of the Zionist Organization of America, and another addressed to Dr. F. Ernest Johnson by Dr. I. E. Berkson, head of our own Research Department. With these letters we associate ourselves and accordingly do not propose to go into detail here.

Great as its defects of balanced and accurate statement may be, the main defect of the Bulletin, as Dr. Goldstein points out, is in its failure to grasp the broader and international aspects of the issues involved. The Bulletin fails even remotely to convey the far-reaching social, religious and historical forces which have impelled the Jewish people to seek in our day the realization of the Biblical prophecies of the return unto Zion. A disproportionate stress is placed on the opposition to Zionism of a numerically small Jewish group in this country, and an exaggerated impression is created of disunity in Jewish ranks, when, as a matter of fact, the overwhelming majority of Jews are united in the demand for keeping the gates of Palestine open to Jewish immigration, and for a free and secure Jewish development in Palestine unrestricted by political considerations. Most remarkable

2-The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ,
11/28/44

is the failure to indicate what Moslem predominance in Palestine might mean for the future of the Jews, as indicated by the Mufti's activities in Palestine, by the intransigence of the Supreme Moslem Council, and by the attitude of the Moslem ruling majority toward minorities in Iraq when international control was removed.

May we conclude with the hope that this Bulletin does not reflect the attitude of the Federal Council of Churches as a whole to the great work of national rehabilitation and reconstruction in which the Jewish people is engaged in Palestine. The Nazi massacres of millions of Jews weigh heavily on the conscience of mankind. They manifested in most brutal and tragic form the century-old problem of a scattered people which, a minority everywhere, remains without a home of its own. That problem antedated Hitler and will not end with the destruction of Nazism. The solution envisaged in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine and approved by 52 nations of the world, of the reestablishment of the Jews as a people in their own never-forgotten land, was only part-way to realization when the Nazi holocaust broke upon the Jews of Europe. It is our belief and hope that humanity will not readily let perish this urgent aspiration for the restoration of the Jews to Palestine, without harm to its Arab inhabitants, and that we may continue to look forward to the sympathy and support of the Christian world in this historic undertaking.

Sincerely yours

Arthur Lourie

AL:CK



PRESS RELEASE from

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL

Associated Organizations:

Zionist Organization of America • Hadassah • Mizrahi • Poale-Zion
342 Madison Avenue • New York 17, N. Y. • MU 2-1160

[Nov. 29, 1944]

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE APPROVES PALESTINE RESOLUTIONS

- - - - -

**DR. SILVER HAILS ACTION AS "MILESTONE" IN
JEWISH PEOPLE'S EFFORTS TO REGAIN NATIONHOOD**

- - - - -

Washington, D. C. -- The House Committee on Foreign Affairs today approved the Palestine resolutions (HR 418-419), which had been referred to the Committee following their introduction in the House of Representatives on January 27, 1944 by Representatives James A. Wright (D., Pa.) and Ranulf Compton (R., Conn.)

The resolution, as reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, of which Representative Sol Bloom (D., N. Y.) is chairman, reads as follows:

"Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the United States on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved 'that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected'; and

"Whereas the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated the need for a Jewish homeland as a haven for the large numbers who have become homeless as a result of this persecution: Therefore be it

"RESOLVED, That the United States shall use its good offices to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization, so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic commonwealth."

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver of Cleveland, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council, hailed with satisfaction the approval of the resolutions. "I am delighted," he declared, "with this action which reflects

(more)

the overwhelming sentiment of the American people who have time and time again manifested their profound interest and sympathy in the upbuilding of Palestine by the Jewish people.

"This action climaxes a series of historic pronouncements made during this year by the National Conventions of both major political parties and by their standard-bearers. Most significant was the declaration made on October 15th by the President of the United States, in which he said that the American people give their support to the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth, and that he would help to bring about its realization.

"This action will greatly hearten the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees throughout the world, who are looking towards Palestine as their sole hope of re-establishing themselves in freedom and dignity. It will strengthen the hands of those who at tremendous sacrifices have been pioneering in the rebuilding of the Jewish National Home. Another milestone has been reached in the historic effort of the Jewish people to recover its just place as one of the nations of the world," Dr. Silver said.

American Jewish Trade Union Committee for Palestine

Room 2500 • 245 Fifth Avenue
MUrray Hill 3-1881 New York 16, N. Y.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

WILLIAM GREEN TO CALL ON ROOSEVELT TO IMPLEMENT PALESTINE PLEDGE

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ZARITSKY URGES CONGRESS TO ACT NOW

- - - - -

New York -- Congress was urged to act speedily and favorably on the Palestine resolution (HR 418-419) which was approved this week by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in a statement issued today by Max Zaritsky, president of the United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers International Union, who introduced the resolution on Palestine which was unanimously adopted by the Convention of the American Federation of Labor.

Mr. Zaritsky emphasized that the A.F. of L. Convention adopted a special committee report instructing its president, William Green, "to call upon the President of the United States to use his good offices to the end that the declaration made concerning the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth be implemented, the pledges made be fulfilled, and the Government of the United States assume its share of responsibility in the carrying out of the pledges and assurances given."

This action by the A.F. of L. will receive the hearty endorsement of the American people, Mr. Zaritsky declared. He added: "We have every confidence that President Roosevelt will take whatever steps are necessary to effectuate the noble sentiments contained in his own great statement of October 15th, in the American Federation of Labor resolution, and in the Wright-Compton and Wagner-Taft resolutions on Palestine. The American people have voiced their determination to end Jewish suffering and homelessness. They now look to Congress for effective action."

(more)

Mr. Zaritsky also pointed out that the A.F. of L. resolution on Palestine is "more than a reaffirmation of the Federation's traditional policy of support for Jewish aspirations in Palestine, or a declaration of sympathy with the plight of Europe's oppressed Jews. In clear and unmistakable terms, it calls for speedy and favorable action by Congress on the pending Palestine resolutions, HR 418 and 419 and SR 247. Now that the House Committee on Foreign Affairs has approved the Palestine resolution, there can be no deterrent to the early passage of this measure, which is a matter of life and death for the Jewish people," he said.

The text of the A.F. of L. resolution on Palestine is attached.

#127 - 12/1/44



TEXT OF RESOLUTION ON PALESTINE UNANIMOUSLY
ADOPTED BY THE CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF LABOR, NOVEMBER 30, 1944.

"WHEREAS, The inhuman slaughter of European Jewry continues unabated, and the Nazis -- intent upon completing their program to annihilate the Jewish people -- are devising new and more horrible methods of mass murder. The documented reports of the unparalleled crimes committed in the death camps of Maidanek, Oswiecim and Treblinka, in the ghettos of Poland, in the market places of Rumania and Hungary, have outraged civilized humanity. To date, approximately 4,000,000 innocent Jewish men, women and children have suffered horrible death by shooting, asphyxiation, starvation, strangulation and fire, and

"WHEREAS, We are determined that those Jews who have survived the holocaust shall be rescued and rehabilitated by the United Nations, and are equally determined that such rescue and rehabilitation shall conform to the particular needs and problems of uprooted European Jewry, and

"WHEREAS, Decisions affecting the future of the homeless Jews of Europe are being made daily by international agencies, such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, agencies which derive their authority from the peoples of the United Nations, and

"WHEREAS, The people of the United States have demonstrated their wholehearted sympathy with the plight of Europe's Jews and have expressed America's determination to bring about a just solution of this most pressing of human problems -- a solution which will take into account the real needs and desires of the Jewish people. During the past year the American people have called for the fulfillment of the pledge contained in the Balfour Declaration. An overwhelming majority of our people desire the opening of Palestine's doors to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and the re-establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. These sentiments have been voiced through the forthright Palestine planks included in the platforms of both major political parties, and through the notable statements endorsing Jewish aspirations in Palestine made by a large majority of the membership of both Houses of Congress, and

"WHEREAS, The President of the United States, in a historic declaration made on October 15th, 1944, re-affirmed our country's traditional policy of support for the Jewish National Home in the following words: 'I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if re-elected I shall help to bring about its realization,' and

"WHEREAS, The American Federation of Labor has followed a policy of staunch and unwavering friendship for Jewish Palestine and has throughout the years supported the Jewish National Home and admired the magnificent accomplishment of Palestine Jewry, and

"WHEREAS, The American Federation of Labor has always had deep respect for and a feeling of kinship with the Histadruth, the General Federation of Labor in Palestine, and has during the past year supported the program so admirably carried out by the American Jewish Trade Union Committee for Palestine, and

"WHEREAS, Jewish Palestine has demonstrated its willingness and its ability to rehabilitate Europe's persecuted Jews and has, despite the Chamberlain White Paper of 1939 and other obstacles, fought the war against the common enemy with almost unparalleled devotion to the democratic cause, and

"WHEREAS, Resolutions, reflecting America's conviction that at long last justice must be done to the long suffering Jewish people, have been introduced into both Houses of Congress: These bi-partisan measures (HR 418-419 and SR 247) call for the free entry of Jews into Palestine and full opportunity for colonization, so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth, and

"WHEREAS, The Secretary of War has recently announced that no military reasons stand in the way of action on the Palestine resolutions, therefore, be it

"RESOLVED, That the American Federation of Labor, in convention assembled, urges the passage at the earliest possible moment of the pending Palestine resolutions, and, be it further

"RESOLVED, That the American Federation of Labor calls for the reconstitution of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth and urges upon the Government of the United States to take speedy and definite action on the Palestine question -- action which will be in conformity with the historic, but as yet unfulfilled, pledges made to the Jewish people, and with the present needs of the persecuted Jews of Europe."



[Dec. 2, 1944]

PROPOSALS FOR THE AGENDA OF THE SECOND SESSION
of the
AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE

SATURDAY NIGHT - DECEMBER 2nd

1. First meeting of the General Committee.
2. Registration of delegates.

SUNDAY AFTERNOON - DECEMBER 3rd - 2:00 P.M. - FIRST SESSION

1. Opening of the meeting by a temporary chairman to be named by the Interim Committee.
2. Submission of Credentials Report by Charles. P. Kramer, Chairman of Committee on Elections. Motion to be made to accept report and to refer to a special Committee on Credentials all contests and claims.
3. Proposals of the General Committee for the election of a praesidium.
4. Chair to be taken by a member of the praesidium.
5. Report of the Interim Committee by the Co-Chairmen.
6. Proposals of the General Committee for the naming of the committees of the Conference.
7. An address by , reviewing the general Jewish situation as it appears today.
8. Adjournment.

SUNDAY EVENING - DECEMBER 3rd - 8:30 P.M. - SECOND SESSION

1. Proposals of the General Committee with regard to rules of procedure.
2. Report of the Rescue Commission by one of the Co-Chairmen (the other Co-Chairman to answer in behalf of the Commission during the general debate.)
3. Report of the Post-War Commission by one of the Co-Chairmen (the other Co-Chairman to answer in behalf of the Commission during the general debate.)
4. Report of the Palestine Commission by the Chairman.
5. General debate on the reports.

MONDAY AFTERNOON - DECEMBER 4th - 2:00 P.M. - THIRD SESSION

1. Continuation of the general debate.

MONDAY EVENING - DECEMBER 4th - 8:30 P.M. - FOURTH SESSION

1. Resolutions reported by the Committee on Rescue of the Conference. Discussion and action.
2. Resolutions reported by the Committee on Post-War of the Conference. Discussion and action.

TUESDAY AFTERNOON - DECEMBER 5th - 2:00 P.M. - FIFTH SESSION

1. Resolutions reported by the Committee on Palestine of the Conference. Discussion and action.
2. Resolutions reported by the Committee on Organization of the Conference. Discussion and action.

TUESDAY EVENING - DECEMBER 5th - 8:00 P.M. - SIXTH SESSION

1. Resolutions reported by the General Resolutions Committee of the Conference. Discussion and action.
2. Resolutions of the Finance Committee of the Conference.
3. Elections.
4. Final addresses at the closing of the Conference.

PROPOSALS FOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN
AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE AND WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS

"It is agreed that both organizations are to place at their mutual disposition the respective facilities and exchange information to the end that there shall be a constant exchange of confidential information between appropriate departments of the two organizations in all matters touching post-war plans and rescue efforts.

"A joint planning committee is to be set up for the consideration of post-war problems and to advise on the drafting of statements and proposals. The committee is to be composed of an equal number of members from each body and is to have at its disposal the results of the studies made by the Institute of Jewish Affairs. The recommendations of the joint committee are to be submitted to the appropriate organs of the World Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Conference, for their consideration.

"The World Jewish Congress retains its right to represent all the communities and organizations affiliated with it in its dealings with all foreign governments and international agencies. In the case of this country, it is recognized that in any representations to the American Government or any of its departments and agencies within the program of the American Jewish Conference, the American Jewish Conference has a special position as regarding the Jewish Community of the United States of America. Representations to the American Government or its departments or agencies shall be made through the American Jewish Conference unless after consultation it is regarded necessary by either one of the two parties that separate representations be made."

C O M M I T T E E .

Herman Shulman

Rabbi Irving Miller.

Maurice Bisgyer

STATEMENT ON RESTORATION OF RIGHTS TO JEWS IN EUROPE

Submitted by
American Jewish Conference

1. After World War I, the Jews in Europe legally possessed equal citizenship status with the rest of the population. They also enjoyed the right of community organization and in some countries certain specific rights that were derived from the Minority Treaties.
2. In several countries, however, some of these rights were later abridged or abrogated, despite the guarantees stipulated in national constitutions and international treaties. The Nazi regime in Germany in particular has pursued this policy unrelentingly and has destroyed Jewish citizenship and group rights first in Germany and then in those countries which came under its domination or occupation.
3. Apart from future measures to improve the status of Jews, the American Jewish Conference believes that the immediate restoration of all rights formerly enjoyed by Jews is a prerequisite to the reconstruction of Jewish life in Europe, and it therefore recommends the following measures to the governments of the United Nations:
 - A. As soon as an area in Europe is liberated or occupied by the Allied forces, the government or governing authority in that area shall declare null and void, with retroactive effect, all discriminatory laws and measures enacted against the Jewish population by the German civil and military authorities, their allies and their satellites. The governing authorities in the liberated areas shall restore to the Jewish populations in those areas all the constitutional and treaty rights which they formerly enjoyed.
 - B. Citizenship shall be restored to all those who have been deprived of it. Restoration of citizenship shall also be extended to persons displaced from their former countries, unless they themselves refuse such restoration.
 - C. The governments or governing authorities of the liberated areas shall restore without delay all the rights of communal, religious and cultural organization, which the Jewish populations in those areas enjoyed after the first World War. These authorities shall further facilitate the early re-establishment of Jewish community organization, which is indispensable to the rehabilitation of the uprooted Jewish population.

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PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

WANT A REPLY?

"Answer by WESTERN UNION"
or similar phrases may be
included without charge.

Copy

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Dec 3 1944

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
STATE DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D.C.

IN VIEW OF YOUR MEETING MONDAY WITH SENATOR WAGNER, I WISH TO MAKE MY POSITION AND THAT OF MANY ASSOCIATES UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR. WE WOULD OF COURSE ALL BE HAPPY IF THE CHIEF AND YOU COULD SEE YOUR WAY TO GIVE APPROVAL TO ADOPTION OF PALESTINE RESOLUTION IN BOTH HOUSES. POSTPONEMENT LIKELY TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD BY PUBLIC OPINION WHICH NATURALLY CANNOT BE INFORMED CONCERNING REASONS FOR DELAY. IF HOWEVER CHIEF AND YOU SHOULD STILL FEEL THAT SOME POSTPONEMENT FOR REASONS ALREADY GIVEN, I TOGETHER WITH MANY ASSOCIATES DO NOT WISH TO HAVE ACTION TAKEN CONTRARY TO YOUR AND PRESIDENTS RECOMMENDATION. SITUATION SHOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES BE PERMITTED TO ARISE IN WHICH SENATE COMMITTEE WOULD BE INFORMED OF CHIEF'S OPINION COMMUNICATED THROUGH YOU TO US IN CONFIDENCE. IN THAT CASE IT WOULD BE BEST FOR SENATE COMMITTEE TO POSTPONE ACTION THROUGHOUT THIS SESSION. THIS TELEGRAM IS FOR YOU ALONE. WILL TELEPHONE TOMORROW. AFTERNOON AT YOUR CONVENIENCE TO LEARN ABOUT RESULT OF YOUR TALK WITH BOB.

STEPHEN S. WISE
WM. PENN HOTEL
Pittsburgh

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL

MINUTES OF MEETINGS HELD DECEMBER 7 AND 9, 1944.

Meetings of the American Zionist Emergency Council were called by Dr. Wise at short notice for Thursday afternoon, December 7th and for Saturday evening, December 9th, and were held at 342 Madison Avenue, New York City.

Appended are the lists of those attending these meetings and of the decisions taken. A stenographic record of the discussion is available on file.

Thursday, December 7, 1944, 4:30 P. M.

PRESENT

Dr. Stephen S. Wise (presiding), Miss Julliet Benjamin, Maurice Boukstein, Philip Cruso, Daniel Frisch, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Chaim Greenberg, Mrs. Rose Halprin, Rabbi Irving Miller, Emanuel Neumann, Mrs. Tamar Pool, Samuel Rothstein, Louis Segal, Herman Shulman, Mrs. Rebecca Shulman, Robert Szold, Herman Weisman.

Dr. Nahum Goldmann.

Dr. I. B. Berkson, Arnold K. Isreeli, Arthur Lourie, Harold P. Manson, Harry L. Shapiro.

The meeting adjourned at 8:00 P. M. and resumed at 10:30 P. M., when the following additional members were present: Mrs. Judith Epstein, Leon Gellman, Rabbi Wolf Gold, Mrs. S. Goldstein, Rabbi Max Kirshblum, Captain Abe Tulin.

It was reported that the Resolution had come before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the previous day, when Mr. Stettinius had appeared and requested that the Resolution be deferred for the time being. The Senate Committee had decided to hold over a decision until Friday. Discussion centered on what action, if any, should be taken in view of the further consideration to be given by the Senate Committee to the Resolution the following day and the renewed indication of the President's wish that the matter be left in his hands and no action taken on the Resolution at this time.

It was resolved:

- 1) to send a delegation on behalf of the Council to Washington that night;
- 2) to advise Senator Wagner and, if necessary, Senator Connally, that in the light of the circumstances the Council is willing not to raise any objection to the resolution remaining pending at this time;
- 3) that prior to such action the delegation confer with Dr. Silver and ask him to concur and to lead the delegation in this action.

It was also agreed that the delegation be given discretion to consider any compromise proposal that might be worked out in Washington.

Saturday, December 9, 1944, 8:30 P. M.

PRESENT

Dr. Stephen S. Wise (presiding), Maurice Boukstein, Philip Cruso, Mrs. Judith Epstein, Daniel Frisch, Moshe Furmansky, Leon Gellman, Rabbi Wolf Gold, Paul L. Goldman, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Mrs. S. Goldstein, Chaim Greenberg, Mrs. Rose Halprin, Benjamin Itzkowitz, Rabbi Max Kirshblum, Jeannette Leibel, Judge Louis E. Levinthal, Louis Lipsky, Marvin Lowenthal, Israel Mereminski, Isaac Naiditch, Emanuel Neumann, Mrs. Tamar Pool, Mrs. Rabinowitz, Judge Bernard A. Rosenblatt, Judge Morris Rothenberg, Mrs. Bertha Schoolman, Louis Segal, Herman Shulman, Mrs. Rebecca Shulman, Robert Szold, Captain Abe Tulin.

Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Dr. Bernard Joseph.

Arthur Lourie, Harold P. Manson, Harry L. Shapiro, Hans Lamm.

Dr. Joseph Cohn, Mendel Fisher, Robert Silverman.

At the meeting on Saturday night members of the delegation reported on their visit the previous day to Washington, where they had met with Dr. Silver and Dr. Joseph. They had failed to reach agreement with Dr. Silver on the line of action to be pursued. Later they had seen Mr. Stettinius and Senators Connally and Wagner. The Senate Committee had subsequently given consideration to the Resolution, and had adopted an amendment proposed by Senator Vandenberg, which concluded with the clause "..that the people may reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Commonwealth." This wording had apparently been protested by Senator Wagner, with the result that it was agreed to defer a final decision on the wording until the following Monday.

Dr. Silver's protest against the calling of what purported to be an official meeting of the plenum without the notice required by the By-Laws was recorded.

The following decisions were taken at this meeting:

It was decided that the decision previously taken by the Emergency Council which had never been revoked still stands, namely that we do not proceed with the Resolutions without the green light from the President. It was agreed that an effort be made at the Executive Committee meeting in Washington on Monday morning to get Dr. Silver to concur in action for deferment of the Resolution, but that the Council's position remains unchanged.

On request for a ruling, Dr. Wise said that in view of the fact that a motion to reconsider the whole decision was defeated, the Executive Committee has no right to change the decision of the plenum.

Mr. Segal's motion that this body leave the final decision as to procedure and action to the Executive Committee, which is to meet in Washington Monday, without any instructions from this body, was tabled, by a vote of 9 to 8.

Mr. Segal's further motion that in view of the fact that the Executive Committee cannot change the decision of the plenum, and in view of the fact that some members feel that the decision of three weeks ago should be changed, that we reconsider that decision, was defeated, 6 for, 10 against.

A. L.

Application cards - 200
Daniel A. Levin

Public Meeting - January -
Sol Goldman - Treblebe -

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-SSW

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LIPSKY
JACOBS
SILVER
ROTHENBERG

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9

Silman
Kuschblau
Mrs Goldstein

THERE IS AN ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION THAT I CONSENTED TO A FORMAL MEETING OF THE EMERGENCY COUNCIL FOR TONIGHT. I HAVE GIVEN NO SUCH CONSENT. I INDICATED NO OBJECTION TO ANY INFORMAL DISCUSSION ON THE PART OF THOSE WHO DESIRED IT. I HAVE CALLED A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THIS MONDAY MORNING IN WASHINGTON AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE DELEGATION WHICH WAS SENT DOWN FROM NEW YORK. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO ATTEND A MEETING IN NEW YORK BECAUSE I MUST BE IN MY OWN PULPIT SUNDAY MORNING AFTER AN ABSENCE OF TWO WEEKS FROM CLEVELAND ON ZIONIST AFFAIRS. THE PROGRESS IN CONNECTION WITH OUR RESOLUTIONS IS SATISFACTORY AND NOTHING CAN BE GAINED BY ANOTHER FULL DRESS DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION WITHOUT MY PRESENCE. CERTAINLY NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CHECK UP ON THE SITUATION WITH ME AND ON THE DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE WEEK END.

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

Above Telegram sent to:

David Wertheim
Chaim Greenberg
Leon Gellman
Mrs. Moses P. Epstein
Mrs. S. W. Halprin
Dr. Israel Goldstein
Louis Lipsky
Judge Morris Rothenberg
Louis Segal
Mrs. David De Sola Pool
Rabbi I. M. Kowalsky
Rabbi Irving Miller
Robert Szold
Judge Levinthal



AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
MEETING OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HELD IN WASHINGTON

December 11, 1944.

A meeting of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council was held Monday morning, December 11th, at 1720 - 16th Street N.W., Washington. The meeting was called for 8:30, but Dr. Silver's train was late, and the meeting opened at 11:30 a.m.


PRESENT

Dr. Silver(presiding), Maurice Boukstein, Philip Cruso, Mrs. Judith Epstein, Leon Gellman, Rabbi Wolf Gold, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Chaim Greenberg, Mrs. Rose Halprin, Rabbi Max Kirshblum, Louis Lipsky, Emanuel Neumann, Mrs. Tamar Pool, Louis Segal, Herman Shulman, Dr. Stephen S. Wise.

Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Dr. Bernard Joseph.

Israel Mereminski, Elihu D. Stone, Judge Bernard A. Rosenblatt, Mrs. Denise Tourover, Zorach Warhaftig.

Arthur Lourie, Harold P. Manson, Harry L. Shapiro.



Dr. Silver regretted the delay of three hours due to the lateness of his train.

Dr. Wise urged that the meeting go into executive session. Seconded by Mrs. Pool. Dr. Silver indicated that there are certain people who are entitled to attend meetings of the Executive. Dr. Wise therefore urged that the proceedings of the meeting be regarded as in executive session and that no statement be issued except by a committee to be named with the authorization of this body.

Dr. Silver said there will be no statements issued except on the authority of this body.

Dr. Silver: I don't know where we are. Several meetings have been held in New York, some without my knowledge, some without my consent. The by-laws of the Council, ARTICLE 5, Section 1, reads:

"...MEETINGS - Regular meetings of the Committee shall be held at least once in every month. Special meetings may be held from time to time as may be determined by the Committee, or upon call of the Chairman or upon written request of seven members of the Committee. Notice to all members of the Committee. Notice to all members shall be sent three days in advance of each special meeting....."
(I shall set out)

The situation at the moment with reference to our resolution, as I see it, and indicate what I believe is the proper course of action from here on, regardless of what has transpired up to now, which will be a subject of discussion at a full plenum meeting later on, when I shall make a full statement and ask for a vote of confidence, and for a reorganization, because it is clear that under the present set-up we cannot operate without drifting into anarchy.

The situation at the moment is as follows: Our resolution was voted out from the Foreign Affairs Committee a week ago Wednesday, and it is now awaiting a rule from the Rules Committee to come onto the floor of the House for a vote. This resolution which was voted out was welcomed by the Jewish people of America and hailed with approval by the Zionists, including the heads of the three organizations, including a member of the Jewish Agency, Mr. Lipsky, and including the members of this committee. The Jewish press welcomed it in the highest terms. When read to the American Jewish Conference it was hailed by Mr. Monsky in a public statement.

Passage of the resolution in the House will depend on what we get from the Senate. The Rules Committee is awaiting the action of the Senate Committee.

As far as the resolution in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is concerned, the status is as follows: Nearly three weeks ago, and before we had our final official meeting of the Emergency Council, Senator Taft asked Mr. Connally for the privilege of appearing before the Foreign Relations Committee. A date was set for the meeting. I announced it at the last meeting of the Emergency Council. When it was learned that Senator Wagner was out of town, the meeting was postponed to accommodate him. The meeting was held; Sen. Taft appeared and presented his case. He asked for amendments - "as soon as practical" instead of "ultimately". There developed a very friendly discussion. And then Sen. Connally announced that they had heard from the State Dept. that they have certain objections. The objections were not stated. Some of the Senators said that if the State Dept. has any objections....different from the President's statement six weeks ago, Mr. Stettinius must come and tell them. Otherwise they would insist on taking action. The meeting deferred action to give the State Dept. an opportunity to come in. In the meantime Senator Wagner and I called on Mr. Stettinius, at 12:30 last Monday. In this interview, which I will report in greater detail when we have our meeting, and also the telegram from Dr. Wise which Mr. St. had on his desk, St. said that under no circumstances would he appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At the meeting which took place Wednesday last, St. did not appear at first; and Sen. Connally tried to force a delay by repeating that the State Dept. was opposed. He was reminded that they would not proceed without Mr. St.'s approval. They telephoned him and he came over. He made a statement which was so weak that he himself was embarrassed. He was asked why if the President was permitted to make his statement of six weeks ago, was the Committee not permitted to do so. He said the President would make a statement. They said that unless he did they would act. So the meeting was postponed until Friday, waiting for word from the President. The President did not make a statement, nor did anybody in his right senses imagine that he would. Nor did St. appear; instead he sent a letter. I have not seen the letter. The letter, like his personal statement, made no impression on the Senate Committee. It is a

mistake for you to imagine that the only people who are ^{for}...this resolution are the Republicans. The one who is pressing it most is Sen. Wagner himself. He went into the meeting Friday confident that he had the full vote. He had checked over the full committee. At the meeting Vandenberg moved an amendment. That was after your committee came down and did all sorts of things. Unless you understand the mood of the Committee you will involve yourselves in bootless argument. That Committee is determined to act. It is our job to see that they act to our interest. Vandenberg's amendment was a bad one; it eliminated reference to the Jewish people and the Jewish Commonwealth. It did retain what some of us thought was good: the reference to the 1922 resolution.

That resolution was adopted by a vote of 10-9. The ones who voted against it were men like Wagner, Clark, Murray, LaFollette - all our friends who wanted to see our resolution adopted. I was of course unhappy about that resolution and I went to see Vandenberg and asked him why he eliminated the word "Jewish". He said: "You have the word "Jewish" too many times -- that was provocative. We thought that by softening the wording it would satisfy the objections of the State Dept." He thought we had got what we wanted. I told him that the resolution adopted by the House Foreign Affairs Committee was the minimum. TC said he thought we were making a mistake by pointing up too much. I suggested "they" instead of "the people." He agreed. But I said I would come back to him on it.

This resolution was voted on. It was only left to Vandenberg and Wagner to polish up the wording. That vote taken Friday is a vote of the Committee. V. said, out of generosity, that it could be delayed until Monday afternoon. But the Committee is determined to go ahead.

I called Sen. Taft yesterday. He agreed that the words "Jewish people" would be better and he was getting in touch with V. I am now waiting to hear from them.

That being the case, if we get the resolution out of the Senate this afternoon, and assuming that we cannot stop it (you can go to Connally, he voted with Vandenberg; he will not stop it), unless you want to go to every Senator and tell them: no action. They have been flooded this week with telegrams urging action. The American Jewish

Conference, the American Federation of Labor, etc. sent them telegrams. Unless you go now and tell them you do not want action. What can you tell them? They know that the President does not want action and they insist on going ahead. They heard the Secretary of State, and they insist on proceeding. You will be kowtowing to the State Dept. How can you take such a position vis-a-vis the Jewish public, the Zionist movement?

Assuming that mistakes were made, that I am a guilty person, (a fact that I do not agree to and I will tell the whole story when the meeting takes place - there has been a lot of lying propaganda), but at this moment we are concerned with the Zionist movement in America and our resolutions, not Silver. Silvers come and go. I am not tied to you and you are not tied to me. In my judgment it will be a colossal stupidity. If the Senate Committee is prepared to come out endorsing a position which the President took six weeks ago and you come out and tell them not to go and do it.

The wise thing to do, if you wish to follow my judgment (I think I speak as a responsible human being and a responsible Zionist), is to do nothing. You are not voting on these resolutions. You have made your position clear to the State Dept. that you are not pressing for the resolution. You sent a delegation to the State Dept. Your position should be that it is the Senate Committee which is pressing for the resolution, which in fact is the truth. You stand by and see what happens. Any other position than that (I regretted that you went to the State Dept. because I thought it a great blunder).... The State Dept. does not want the resolutions. They are our bitter enemies. The reason we introduced them was to force them to change their minds. Ten months ago they were able skillfully to bring in the military. Today they have no argument, as was proved by St. going to the Senate Committee and sending the letter. So their last resort is to get the Zionists to withdraw their resolutions. So the Zionists are falling into that trap.

At 2:30 this afternoon the Senate Committee goes into session. That Committee will act. I hope that before then we can persuade Vandenberg and his friends to put in the words "Jewish people." Even without that the resolution is a good one (with the change "they" instead of "the people").

Mr. Shulman: Does Vandenberg speak for his group? Did Austin and others accept

his recommendation?

Dr. Silver: Exactly. What does that resolution with the word "they" say now? What will it mean to the people whom you wish to influence, to the Colonial Office and the Arab world? Any peice of legislation that comes into a Congress does not come out exactly as you put it in. The important thing is to get it so that the heart is left in. What does that resolution say: It reaffirms the action of 1922. It proceeds to say that that means the right of the Jewish people to reconstruct Palestine as a Commonwealth. It asks for that "as soon as practical." It asks for free mmigration and full opportunity for colonization. If the Senate of the U.S. is ready to go so far, have we not a tremendous gain, a powerful weapon, for our propaganda? Remember there are two resolutions. The one in the House retains the words "Jewish people."

You feel that you have a problem with the State Dept. and the President. I think you have a grave problem with the State Dept. and the President, which has nothing to do with these resolutions.

The letter from the Pres. to R.W. is a very disheartening one, which revealed, in my humble judgment, a complete ignorance on the part of the Pres. of the position in Palestine and of his understanding of the entire problem in the Near East. I understand there have been other communications which have come in which are more ominous.

On this I am rather to stand or fall: Our position vis-a-vis the State Dept. and the White House is not strengthened by our show of conciliation and subserviance. Everybody will tell you the only way the Pres. acts is when he is needed. Unless you are prepared to take strong measures, mobilizing public opinion, through the press, etc. and focus that pressure on the Pres. and the White House, you will get nowhere. It will be collapse if you say: The Pres. does not wish us to act...What was got was gotten by force, and Dr. Wise, you know it. That statemnt on March 9th was gotten by putting down a barrage on the W.H. The fact is that the Pres. is a far better politician than most of us know. When he heard from the public in March demanding that the Pres. speak up, then the military stopped us. You, Dr. Wise, do not assume that you got the statement of Oct. 15th because you are a friend of his. He gave it under pressure, knowing what the people wanted.

Do not be manoevered into the position that if you do not offend the Pres. and St....It is unrealistic, and we will be losing good friends, like La Follette, Murray, etc. For 10 months we urged them to move. Now because the State Dept. expressed their opposition (we stop, ourselves). The State Dept. will build up the kind of case as reflected in the Pres.'s letter. That was the line used before, by the British Intelligence, Hoskins, etc. You are falling into 'Hoskins' trap.

Think what a wonderful thing it will be if this resolution comes out. It will be coming out after the elections. This is now the deliberate action after the elections. Think of it, after the situation created by the Moyne incident, etc.

Whatever you want to do with me, I beg you do not interfere with this great (act). We should have these resolutions voted out as sweetly as want them. How will it look to our constituency who have been asked to press for the resolution if they read that the Pres. of the ZOA went to the State Dept. and said: defer. Moreover, you will be doing the President a disfavor, because it will be said tomorrow that it was the Pres. who prevented the Senate from declaring themselves for a Jewish Commonwealth. If ever, the word "betrayers" and "double-crossers" will be bandied about. If you think he is embarrassed now, you can go to him and sweeten him up.

You will be having a few Senators this afternoon who will be coming out of the room. If they come out and say to the press: We have postponed action because the Zionists of America do not want it because of the opposition of the....

Mr. Shulman: Sen. Wagner wants word from us by 12:30. I think I am correctly stating the opinion of the committee that there is no intention of sending a delegation to the Senate Committee. We are concerned with what are our chances of putting it through Congress assuming that the wording is improved. The thing for us to appraise is what are the chances of our putting the resolution through in the Senate. If a proposal is made that will bring us back to the Vandenberg amendment. ~~Dr. Silver~~

Dr. Silver: I made it clear to V. that unless it is in a revised form they should not push it. That we do not want his unrevised formulation.

Mr. Shulman: Everybody then agreed to the terms of a minimum resolution. It

was also proposed this morning that an attempt be made to see whether there can be an expression of opinion from him.

Dr. Silver: You are likely to get a better statement from St. after the resolution is passed, not before. If you want to make a scapegoat out of me and to have me go to St. and say that I, on my own responsibility, did it, I will do so.

Mrs. Pool: I would not disregard that possibility.

Dr. Silver: If you want somebody to serve as a lightning rod, I am willing to do it.

Mr. Shulman: That is not what was proposed, but what was, was that somebody see St. and try to get a statement from him such as the following. (Mr. Shulman read the statement to be submitted to Mr. St. which he would be asked to send to Dr. Wise.)

Dr. Silver: Think some such statement should be obtained from St. after the resolution is acted on.

Mr. Lipsky: Assuming that the resolution is gone through with and a majority of the Committee reports it out, is there any assurance as to what might happen on the floor of the Senate?

Dr. Silver: I have no answer to that. My own feeling is that they are willing to do something good for the Jewish people. If there does not develop any sharp cleavage and the two groups come to an agreement, it is likely that it will go through in five minutes. In the House we know that Hamilton Fish intends to introduce an amendment to include the words "without involving our country in war."

Mrs. Halprin: If we know that the Administration does not want the resolution passed, do you assume that they will do nothing when it comes out on the Senate floor? If so, how much effect will that have?

Dr. Silver: I think very little. One or two (Senators will speak against it).

Mr. Shulman: What do we know of Hill's position (Hill was substituting for the majority leader.)

Dr. Silver: Think it would be wise to check up. (His card was seen and it was indicated that he had stated to his constituents that he would vote for the bill and would do everything in his power to have it passed).

Dr. Goldstein: Wish you would not dismiss without further consideration the suggestion that we discussed last night and this morning. Most of us felt that if we could avoid defying the President it would be a help to us and not a hindrance and therefore a statement from St. referring to the Pres.'s statement and referring to th "will of the Jewish people" (should be sought). Some of us felt that it would be something we could rescue out of this situation, and would be more than a resolution we could get in defiance of the President. Since it is the Pres. who is to get something for us, and not the Senate, this will put the State Dept. on record. (then we could work for a better resolution in the next Congress);

✓ Dr. Silver: If these resolutions are not acted upon, please get out of your mind the thought of getting a resolution in the next Congress. There are not many changes in the Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee. If you come back in six weeks and ask them to take it up then, because the State Dept. now agrees, they will think we are foolish.

Dr. Wise: What about the decision of the Emergency Council meeting of Saturday night?

Dr. Silver: I feel that meeting was illegal. I am familiar with the action.

Dr. Wise: Most of us felt it was a legal meeting.

Mr. Shulman: That action required the representatives of the Emergency Council to state their decision to Senators Wagner and Connally. That was done.

✓ Mrs. Pool: We were bound by a resolution at the last meeting at which you (were present) and Dr. Wise presided, that we would not proceed without the green light.

Mr. Shulman: The subject of the decision of the....^{SFRC} We now have to get into touch with RW in ten minutes. He is waiting for suggestions as to the wording. He is meeting with Vandenberg.

Dr. Silver: (Sen. Wagner will move ahead).

Mr. Shulman (continuing): He wants to know whether he should insist on holding out for something more. Also whether if he cannot get a better resolution he should use that as a basis for delay.

Dr. Silver: I can only give you the benefit of my contacts here, during the last two weeks, when I saw everybody that should be seen. My composite judgment is: You have a definite understanding between Wagner and Vandenberg that the word "they" goes in. We are now trying to get Van. to include "Jewish people." If they do not include it or not, if Van. comes in and says Wagner and he have agreed, the resolution will pass overwhelmingly.

Mr. Shulman: While we do not intend to send a delegation to (Senator Connally and Sen. Wagner.....

Dr. Wise: Proceeding with the resolution will be regarded as a violation of an agreement we had with St. Dr. Silver said to St. we do not mean to press for the bill unless there is clearance. We said: We have come to you to ask for clearance.

Dr. Silver: We only said we would prefer to get a green light from the Pres. None of us made such a statement that we would not proceed without the green light. Furthermore, I had a talk with St. afterwards, with Sen. Wagner, when I presented the whole situation with regard to these bills and urged him to speak to the Pres. He said then: "Your case is unanswerable." He had not known about the President's letter of October 15th.

Dr. Goldmann: It is true that we did not say in those words that unless we get the green light we will not go ahead. But you both told him that we do not want a situation to repeat itself as in March, and therefore before taking another move we would like him to give us clearance. St. said: I cannot give you an answer; I will take it up with the President. The Pres. was then at Hyde Park. He said that in a few days he would inform Dr. Wise. He had the full right to infer that we would not proceed without the green light from the President.

Dr. Silver: This matter of the green light was taken out of our hands. I will go into that and all the facts, dates, etc. at another meeting.

Dr. Goldstein: My interpretation of a decision of the plenum Thursday night re the two courses: 1) to vigorously oppose passage of the resolution; and 2) not to press one way or another, (is as follows:

I believe that under all the circumstances we ought now to make clear again, if it

is necessary, to St. that we are not pressing for the resolution and to let it go at that. Perhaps it was not made clear enough Friday.

I want to urge Dr. Silver to give further consideration to the proposal of getting a statement from the Secretary of State which would be a commitment on his part, and which we could explain to our Zionists and which they could understand. That would be a way, on the one hand, of not antagonizing the President, and getting such (a statement....

Dr. Silver: Perhaps you can get both.

Mrs. Halprin: The motion at the plenum Saturday that the whole matter be left to the Executive was tabled. We came down to persuade you, Dr. Silver. Whether we had to persuade you or press for deferment.

(It was) to serve three purposes: 1) to put us on record again with the State Dept.; 2) it sought to attack the statements of St. and get him on record more positively; 3) it was a way for us not to appear before the committee.

The statement is still under consideration only if we decide to press for deferment.

Dr. Goldman: Agree we should concentrate on the merits of the case. Dr. Weimann was in the position for many years of having to yield to Governments and I opposed him on that. The line of thinking of Dr. Silver is clear, that we have to go on fighting because the Pres. and the State Dept. will not do anything unless they are pressed. It would be foolish to say that this line of thinking is not correct. For a whole year we agreed our line should be pressure of public opinion. The question is how far you can go. As I said, if we did not have the President's Statement of Oct. 15 (this might have been the right thing to do). When we introduced the resolutions in March one reason was to get an expression of opinion from Congress; but the more important one ^{was} that the man who carries out the policy would take a position. I do not attach much importance to R's March statement, but on Oct. 15th he made the best Zionist statement in 20 years.

It is a question of evaluation. Dr. Silver thinks that by going on and pressing against the wishes of the President and others, we will achieve more by lining up the

Congress of the U.S. against the Pres. I believe this is a great political blunder, because I do not think the pressure would be strong enough to make the President sit down with Ch. and St. and negotiate for us. Knowing that the Pres. and not the Senate will be the negotiator (and I also deplore the colossal power of the three men), but in the next six months this situation will prevail (after that the small nations may assert themselves.)

After we went to St. to ask, and he gave us his reply, first gently and then in a letter to RW,...By acting in this way I am afraid that we will antagonize the President and that in the next few months when he will sit down with Ch. and St. he will be so resentful against us that we have much less chance that he will press on Ch. The argument that was brought forward that the Pres. is not a convinced supporter of ours, is an argument in favor of my thesis. (I regard Ch. as a greater friend. He had been for 20 years, and is generally a very firm man). The President is vague about the whole matter. He is friendly, but is not touched deeply. If I were convinced that he is a firm friend of ours, the opposition in the Senate would not change him.

I would therefore propose that because the President is weak in his opinion of Zionism this action will make it worse. If we can get a commitment from St. in which the State Dept. says that they will not oppose a resolution at another time, I say that this would be more valuable than the resolutions.

Since Dr. Silver and others were here in Washington during the last two weeks, working on wording, etc. ^{of} ~~the~~ resolutions, this will do away with the effect of the visit of the delegation to the State Dept. If we can get a statement like that to be made public, that the State Dept. is for the line set down by the President (that would be a good thing.)

Dr. Silver: 1) Draw your attention to the fact that the resolution has been voted out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

2) In spite of this statement that you may get (it is hardly possible that you will get it before 2:30 this afternoon), still the resolution will be acted upon this afternoon.

Mr. Shulman: Are we not agreed that no further delegation is going to see Sen. Wagner (can I tell him that * I must get in touch with him at once); and 2) with respect to the wording, is it agreed that we tell him to try/^{to}get in "the Jewish people" instead of "they"?

It was agreed that Mr. Shulman convey this to Sen. Wagner.

Dr. Silver: This statement that Mr. Shulman has just made is a logical position to take with regard to RW. If Mr. Shulman is not the proper one to do it, I will do it. All I ask of this committee is not to interfere at this late moment with the passage of the resolution. Give us the opportunity to work out the best kind of resolution.

Dr. Wise: (who was called to the telephone at this point): In the light of the decision of the plenum, I must convey it to Mr. Stettinius.

Dr. Goldstein moved that we go to St. and convey the kind of statement that was read by Mr. Shulman that we want deferment of action (and such a statement from him.)

Dr. Silver: There was no action taken Saturday night to be committed...

If there is assent that we say we will do nothing to interfere with postponement of the passage of the resolution this will destroy the resolution. If you ask St. for that kind of letter, he will say you will get a reply in ten days. What you are doing will defeat the resolution. That will be a calamity. You should go to Stettinius if you think you have not made your position crystal clear that you had nothing to do with pressing the resolution. You should also tell him: your appearance before the Senate Committee was grossly misinterpreted and is likely to embarrass the President. Therefore you think a letter is in order saying that when he (St.) appeared before the Senate F.R. Committee there was no objection in merit, but because they felt it was untimely. But I beg that we say nothing of deferment.

Dr. Goldstein: Your suggestion is contrary to what was intended when the statement was drafted.

Mr. Segal: What are the possibilities of Dr. Silver joining Dr. Wise in the visit to Mr. Stettinius.

Dr. Silver: If Dr. Wise wishes to go with me or anybody else to St. to say: 1) that the Zionists have not pressed for the resolution. We tried to protect the

President in this thing. It is out of our hands; the pressure has come from the Senate Committee and the country. Unfortunately the appearance of Mr. St. before the Senate Committee is subject to misinterpretation. Therefore it is highly desirable that he send a communication to Dr. Wise or anybody else stating that his position was not an indication of a change in the attitude of the President, but merely as an expression that it was not timely.

Mr. Greenberg: If you feel you (Dr. Silver) are in a position to appear before the State Dept. to day and say: the Zionists did not press for the passage of this resolution, not referring to deferment, that would be the best thing.

Dr. Silver: Yes. If Mr. Stettinius will ask me I will tell him exactly what I did.

MOTION that a delegation, consisting of Dr. Silver, Dr. Wise and Dr. Goldstein go to see Mr. Stettinius.

Mr. Silver adjourned the meeting at 12:45

Mr. Boukstein protested that the meeting was adjourned without giving him an opportunity to speak.

8

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
MINUTES OF MEETING OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Monday, December 11, 1944

A meeting of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council was held Monday morning, December 11th, at 1720 - 16th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. Owing to delay in the arrival of Dr. Silver's train from Cleveland, the meeting began at 11:30 instead of 8:30 as scheduled. Full record on file.

PRESENT

Dr. Silver (presiding), Maurice Boukstein, Philip Cruso, Mrs. Judith Epstein, Leon Gellman, Rabbi Wolf Gold, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Chaim Greenberg, Mrs. Rose Halprin, Rabbi Max Kirshblum, Louis Lipsky, Emanuel Neumann, Mrs. Tamar Pool, Louis Segal, Herman Shulman, Dr. Stephen S. Wise.

Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Dr. Bernard Joseph.

Israel Mereminski, Elihu D. Stone, Judge Bernard A. Rosenblatt, Mrs. Denise Tourover, Zorach Warhaftig.

Arthur Lourie, Harold P. Manson, Harry L. Shapiro.

Dr. Silver reported briefly on events to date. He urged that the wise thing to do was to do nothing. The delegation had made clear on Friday the position that the Council was not pressing for the resolution. The Senate Committee would act that afternoon at 2:30. Senator Vandenberg had agreed to a change in the wording of the Resolution and he hoped that further changes might still be obtained. He urged that there be no interference at this stage.

Reference was made to a discussion that had taken place earlier that morning, before Dr. Silver's arrival, and a statement was read which it was proposed should be submitted to Mr. Stettinius for his approval. In this connection, a telephone call had been put through to Mr. Stettinius with the object of obtaining an immediate appointment to see him.

Dr. Goldstein said that the statement would make it clear that the State Department was not out of accord with the declaration of the President to the Zionist Organization of America convention, and that having put the State Department on record in this way we could work for a better Resolution in the next Congress. Given this, we should not press for the Resolution.

In the course of the further discussion a telephone call came from Mr. Stettinius saying that he was prepared to see Dr. Wise at once. Dr. Silver again urged that nothing be said to Mr. Stettinius about deferring the Resolution. All they should do was to say that the Zionists had not pressed the Resolution and that it was out of their hands; that the appearance of Mr. Stettinius before the Senate Committee in opposition to the Resolution was the subject of misinterpretation and that it was highly desirable that he issue a communication to Dr. Wise, or anyone else, stating that his position did not indicate a change of attitude on the part of the President, but merely that an expression by the Senate at present was not timely.

It was agreed that Dr. Wise, Dr. Silver, Dr. Goldstein and Mr. Shulman should go to see Mr. Stettinius.

The meeting resumed in the late afternoon, when Dr. Silver reported on what had happened at the Foreign Relations Committee. It was decided:


1) to send to Mr. Stettinius without delay the text of the proposed message from him to Dr. Wise which had been discussed at the interview that morning;

2) that for the present no statement be issued to the press with reference to the action of the Senate beyond a statement that we are withholding comment at the moment pending further explanation.

It was further decided to hold a meeting of the plenum Wednesday evening, December 20th.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Dr. Silver said that he wished to correct the erroneous impression that only the plenum could act on political matters. The Council was a political body and everything that it did had a political character. The plenum met normally only once a month. If a change was proposed whereby the Executive Committee would not be entitled to make political decisions that could be done, but he did not think it would be right. Dr. Goldstein suggested, however, that it was for the plenum to decide on questions of major policy.

A. L.



[Dec 11(2), 1944]

36 (2)

MONDAY AFTERNOON SESSION

PRESENT: Dr. Silver (presiding): Maurice Boukstein, Philip Cruso, Mrs. Judith Epstein, Rabbi Sold Gold, Rabbi Israel Goldstein, Mrs. Rose Halprin, Rabbi Max Kirshblum, Louis Lipsky, Mrs. Tamar Pool, Louis Segal, Herman Shulman, Dr. Stephen S. Wise.

Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Dr. Bernard Joseph, Israel Mereminsky, Judge Bernard A. Rosenblatt, Elihu D. Stone, Mrs. Denise Tourover, Zorsch Warhaftig.

Arnold K. Isreeli, Arthur Lourie, Harold P. Manson, Harry L. Shapiro.

Dr. Silver (who had just come from the Hill) reported on what had happened:

While the Committee was still discussing our resolution, Mr. Stettinius arrived. He brought a personal appeal from FDR not to act on the resolution. He stated that if favorable action were taken by the committee then the State Dept. would have to issue an appeal to the Senate not to vote on it. He read reports sent in by the American Legation in Cairo, where groups of Arabs presented an ultimatum in which they said they were prepared to discount pre-election statements but action by the Congress of the U.S. is something else and now they are likely to take action.

You can imagine what effect that had on the Committee. The State Dept. will issue a statement assuming full responsibility for the action of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The amazing thing is that after the appearance of Mr. Stettinius and after he made this statement, the vote to postpone action for this session was 11-8. 8 Senators still insisted on taking favorable action. About the 11 -- there were two proxies, one for Senator Glass and one that was manipulated by Tunnell, who had previously given his proxy to Wagner. Thomas left the room so as not to vote: Gillette asked to be recorded as not voting.

The vote was to postpone for this session. There was a previous vote taken, as I understand it, on a suggestion (on that I am not very clear) that a sub-committee be appointed to meet with the State Dept. to work out a formula that would be acceptable to the For. Relations Comm. and the Senate. This was opposed by a group of our friends and by some who were favorable to postponement.

Mr. Manson went to the State Department to get a copy of the letter issued by the Dept. taking responsibility for the postponement. They wanted it to be known that it was they, of their own free will, that action was postponed.

I would draw your attention to the fact that when we saw Mr. Stettinius at 1 o'clock he said nothing about having to speak to the President.

It is a little too early, under the impact of what has happened, to evaluate what has happened, re the kind of public statement that we should issue, that will depend on what kind of statement has been issued by Mr. Stettinius.

One good thing out of the situation is that we kept our own skirts clean and that we did not commit the colossal mistake today of asking the Senate to defer action. We pushed our resolutions as our people wanted us to. The State Dept. assumes responsibility. Let the public judge. We will not be blamed... To that extent I am appreciative that after the stormy session this morning there evolved a solution.

It is all to the good that the failure to act is not the fault of Congress. The House did act; and the Foreign Relations Committee, which met four times and each time wanted to act. The Secretary of State appeared twice in person and the third time sent an official communication, and the interest in our case is so strong that four times the Senate wanted to act. It is a sense of satisfaction to know that we were not defeated in Congress, that it was a dictum from higher up that forced them to force a delay. It puts the responsibility publicly at the door of the State Dept. and it is a responsibility on which we will be able to capitalize later.

Pressure was also put on the Rules Committee of the House. St. made a telephonic call on Cong. Sabbath.

The statement that Stettinius (is to make public) is to the effect that the President is friendly to the Jews, as evidenced by the fact that he created the War Refugee Board, but the time is untimely because of the international situation. He promised that within an hour of receiving our statement, he will send it to the President. The statement he is issuing is the position of the State Dept. The other statement will be a supplementary statement.

GWC
by GWC

statement will be a supplementary statement.

St. said that the statement which he is issuing now was approved by the President (when the session of the Senate Committee broke up Sen. Connally told the reporters to go to the State Dept. to get copies of their statement.)

St. said he was going to issue another statement than the one he sent to the For. Relations Committee.

Rep. Sabbath was called away to Illinois, so as not to act.

The situation is that the President does not want the resolutions. Our State Dept. is willing to have difficulties with England over Greece, but not over Palestine.

We know now rather more clearly where we stand. We ought to take stock of our position. If we have lost any illusions it ought to help us in our work for the future.

Mr. Shulman: The first thing to consider is whether we should issue any statement. I think it would be a mistake to issue any statement on the State Dept. statement until we get the other statement. Since it is a matter of a few days, it would be the part of wisdom to wait until we got the other statement.

Dr. Silver: St. said he would get into touch with the Pres. within an hour. St. himself thinks favorable of it. I rather think that we ought to draft that statement this evening and put it in the mail so that it reaches him tomorrow morning.

Mr. Shulman: Dr. Wise is redrafting it on the train this afternoon. We ought to give him the benefit of our changes. If he gets it tomorrow morning it will be the same thing.

.....

At this point Mr. Manson arrived with a copy of the statement issued by the State Department which Dr. Silver read to the meeting:

"The department has the utmost sympathy for the persecuted Jewish people of Europe and has been assisting them through active support of the work of the War Refugee Board in every possible way.

"The department considers, however, that the passage of the resolution at the present time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation and has so informed the Committee on Foreign Relations."

5.5 Wise
(TELEGRAM)

DECEMBER 12 1944

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
STATE DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D C

IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR CONVERSATION OF YESTERDAY THE SUGGESTED STATEMENT FROM YOU TO ME MIGHT READ AS FOLLOWS QUOTE WITH RESPECT TO THE PALESTINE RESOLUTION THAT WAS PENDING IN CONGRESS I INFORMED YOU THAT THE POSITION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS THAT ACTION ON THE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE DEFERRED FOR THE TIME BEING BUT I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT THIS POSITION IS IN NO WISE TO BE CONSTRUED AS INDICATING THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE POLICY ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT ON OCTOBER FIFTEENTH IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA THROUGH SENATOR WAGNER. AS THE PRESIDENT MADE

(continued on next page)

Page 2

(December 12, 1944)

(Telegram to the Secretary of State, State Dept., Washington, D.C.,
continued from Page 1)

CLEAR THAT POLICY REPRESENTED THE WILL OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE UNQUOTE IN VIEW
OF THE SENATE ACTION AND YOUR STATEMENT TO THE PRESIDENT I WOULD MOST EARNESTLY
URGE THAT FOR THE REASONS WE GAVE THE PROMPT ISSUANCE OF YOUR STATEMENT TO ME IS
ALL THE MORE DESIRABLE

STEPHEN S WISE

SSW:LCX



MEMORANDUM

To Chairmen of Local Emergency Committees Date December 12, 1944

From Harry L. Shapiro

By this time you have learned through the press of the decision of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to defer action on the Palestine resolution, so far as this session of Congress is concerned. This decision was taken at the insistent request of the State Department.

We feel that you should have fuller information on the events which transpired in Washington. As you will recall, the first intimation that favorable action might be taken on the Palestine resolutions came early in October when Secretary of War Stimson, through a letter to Senator Taft, lifted the ban on behalf of the War Department. This was promptly followed by Congressman Bloom's public announcement that he would convene a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House on November 15th in order to take action on the resolution. His announcement stimulated our friends in the Senate to move in a similar direction. A number of public declarations in support of the Zionist program followed immediately, the most notable of which was the historic declaration of President Roosevelt on October 15th. This pronouncement constituted a complete and unequivocal endorsement of Zionist aims and a forthright pledge to help bring about their realization. In conveying the President's statement to the Convention of the Zionist Organization of America, Senator Wagner stated that this clears the way for the passage of the Palestine resolution.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House took favorable action on November 30th and the resolution went to the Rules Committee, with Congressmen Bloom and Wright urging swift and favorable action. Even before this favorable action by the House Committee, the Senate Committee, at one of its meetings, proceeded to consider the Palestine resolution. To the best of our knowledge, Senator Connally, chairman, stated that there was some objection on the part of the State Department. This occasioned surprise in view of all that had taken place, and particularly in view of the President's declaration of October 15th. The reaction in the Senate Committee was that it would be necessary for the Secretary of State to appear in person and explain the Department's position. Accordingly, a few days later -- on December 6th -- Secretary Stettinius made a personal appearance before the Senate Committee to urge deferment of action. It would seem that his statement did not present convincing ground for deferment of action to the satisfaction of the Committee, but that on the contrary, the Committee decided to consider the resolution again at a third executive session which was set for Friday, December 8th. At this meeting the State Department repeated its objection in the form of a written statement, which again apparently failed to convince the majority of the Committee. A proposal was made to table the resolution, but this proposal was defeated and the Committee proceeded to consider the wording of the resolution. Variations on the original text were suggested, and one version by Senator Vandenberg was tentatively adopted. It was decided to hold off final action on this version, with the understanding that there would be conference between Senators Wagner and Vandenberg on the final wording which was to be voted on at a fourth meeting, set for Monday, December 11th.

By Monday afternoon the text of a resolution, agreeable to both Senators and satisfactory from our standpoint, was submitted to the Committee with every prospect of affirmative action being taken. While the Committee was deliberating, Secretary Stettinius appeared once more, accompanied by an aide, and for the third time urgently pressed the Committee to defer action at the request of the President.

Subjected to such repeated pressure, and without an opportunity for any representative of the Zionist movement to appear, it was inevitable that the Committee would weaken. But it is instructive to note that it yielded only on the understanding that the State Department assume full responsibility for deferment. The final vote, according to our information, was 11 to 8.

As part of the same situation, the resolution already approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House had been tied up in the House Rules Committee, likewise at the insistence of the State Department.

As you have undoubtedly read, Secretary Stettinius issued a brief public statement to explain the stand taken by the Department because of "the general international situation." In addition to the formal statement issued in the name of the Department, a press relations officer of the Department furnished newspapermen with so-called "background material" on the Palestine question which limited itself to the activities of Jewish terrorists and the difficulties facing British officials.

There are many additional facts and other phases of the situation that cannot be included in this memorandum, which gives only a bare outline. When we first learned that the Executive Branch of the Government was again averse, as it had been early this year, to the passage of any pro-Zionist resolutions in Congress, prompt steps were taken to clarify the situation and to induce the Administration to withdraw its objections. In view of all that had happened -- the inclusion of the Palestine planks in the Republican and Democratic platforms, the lifting of the military ban on the resolutions, and the October 15th declaration of the President himself -- it seemed incredible that the Administration should take a position so radically inconsistent with the President's pronouncement, and persist in opposing the Congressional resolution with all the power at its command. Accordingly, prompt steps were taken to remove such misunderstandings and objections that seemed to exist. Approaches were made both to the President and to the Secretary of State. These efforts were met by counter-efforts on the part of the Administration to induce the Zionist leadership to request deferment of action on the resolution. It was actually suggested to Zionist leaders that they approach Congressional leaders with this request. Fortunately, better counsel prevailed.

It was an impossible position in which to place the Zionist leadership, in view of the history of the resolution -- the repeated commitments, the tremendous campaign carried on throughout the country, and all that was at stake. Renewed pledges to pass the resolution had been secured from Congressmen and Senators only a few weeks ago, and they were being pressed by you and other constituents to act. They felt morally bound to honor their pledges. Clearly, the Zionist leaders could not assume the role of lobbyists against the resolution which was designed to further the achievement of Zionist aims. Moreover, action had already been initiated by our friends in Congress who were resolved to go forward, and once they initiated action, it was essential that they be guided and encouraged.

We should be heartened by the fact that again it has been demonstrated that Congress is with us. Both Committees in the House and Senate were anxious to act positively, and many of our friends are determined to introduce a Palestine resolution when Congress re-convenes after the first of the year. In the Senate Committee a stubborn and gallant fight was waged in our behalf, and resistance was offered to the mounting pressure of the State Department to the very last. This augurs well for any future situation in which the aid of Congress may be required and this has served notice on the Executive Branch of our Government that our movement has powerful friends in Congress who will zealously watch over the interests of the Jewish people when final decisions are made.

Our battle is far from over, and the fight we have waged to date has been a good one. We are confident that the Zionists of America, who during the past year have breathed new life and vitality into our movement, will not allow this setback to dissuade them from continuing to shoulder the sacred responsibility which is ours. The fight for the reconstitution of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth goes on!

HLS:MBP



December 12, 1944

The Honorable Edward R. Stettinius
The Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing herewith the draft of the statement which we discussed yesterday morning and copy of which you requested at the earliest moment. You were to receive this copy from Dr. Wise by telegram from New York. Your secretary informed me that you have not yet received it and I am, therefore, dispatching it to you by messenger.

I believe, Mr. Secretary, that the issuance of this statement promptly to the public will help to allay some of the misgivings and resentments which have already made their way into the public press. The Jewish press particularly is reacting bitterly and violently to the intervention of the State Department in the situation, and the President's position is being laid open to grave misinterpretation in view of his public pronouncement on October 15th.

Should you wish to reach me, I shall be at the Willard Hotel until this evening. With all good wishes, permit me to remain,

Very sincerely yours,

Enc.

C
O
P
Y

AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, N. Y.

December 12, 1944

American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, N. Y.

Dear Friends:

I cannot remain Chairman of a body one of the leading officers of which has, in a matter of supreme importance, deliberately and persistently contravened the decisions of the Plenary Council, with the resultant hurt which has thereby been inflicted upon our sacred cause.

I herewith tender my resignation as Chairman of the Emergency Council, and ask you to present this letter to the Council at its next meeting.

Faithfully yours,

ssw:eh

(signed) Stephen S. Wise

[Dec. 14, 1944]

CONFIDENTIAL

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1943, at 4:00 P.M.
AT THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
41 East 42nd Street, New York City, 17.

- - - - -

PRESENT: Stephen S. Wise, presiding; Abraham H. Cohen, Sol Cohen, Joshua S. Epstein, Mendel N. Fisher, David Freiburger, Abraham Goodman, Samuel Markewich, Abraham Mazer, Irving Miller, Mrs. David de Sola Pool, Herman Zvi Quittman, Sol Reiter, Louis Rimsky, Bernard A. Rosenblatt, Charles J. Rosenbloom, Mrs. Dvora Rothbard, Morris Rothenberg, Israel Sachs, Louis Sachs, Louis Segal, Abba Hillel Silver, Robert Silverman, Rudolph G. Sonneborn, Sigmund Thau, Abraham Uslander, Harold M. Weinberg.

Samuel Blitz, Baruch Braunstein, Mrs. Israel Goldstein, Mrs. David Greenberg, Henry Montor, Martin Rosenbluth, Alex Rothenberg, Meyer Steinglass and Herman P. Taubman.

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MINUTES OF LAST MEETING

The minutes of the last meeting of the Administrative Committee, October 4, 1943 were approved as circulated.

COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS AND WELFARE FUNDS

Mr. Silverman presented to the meeting a communication from H.L. Lurie offering the help of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, if found necessary, in the negotiations for the 1944 United Jewish Appeal campaign. (Appendix A)

The letter was ordered placed on file.

UNION REQUESTS

Mr. Silverman presented two communications under date of November 26, 1943 from Mildred Naum of the United Office and Professional Workers of America:

(1) With regard to safeguarding the seniority rights of employees of the United Palestine Appeal who have been temporarily transferred to the American Zionist Emergency Council.

It was moved, seconded and unanimously voted that the seniority rights of employees of the United Palestine Appeal who have been transferred to the Emergency Council should be maintained.

(2) With regard to the negotiations for the 1944 agreement.

It was moved, seconded and unanimously voted that the officers of the UPA be authorized to negotiate a contract for 1944 with the Union.

AUTHORIZATION FOR OPENING NEW BANK ACCOUNT

The following resolution authorizing the opening of a new bank account at the Manufacturers Trust Company was read and approved:

"RESOLVED that the United Palestine Appeal is hereby authorized to open and from time to time reconcile an account or accounts for and in the name of the UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL for the year 1944 with the Manufacturers Trust Company, 43rd Street and Fifth Avenue, New York, and from time to time to deposit the funds of the United Palestine Appeal therein, the same to be subject to withdrawal by check, drafts or orders, when signed by any two of the following officers:

"Abba Hillel Silver, Charles J. Rosenbloom, Abraham Liebovitz, Jacob Sincoff, Israel Goldstein, Louis Lipsky, Abraham Goodman, Abraham Mazer, Morris Weinberg, Sigmund Thau. The said bank may rely upon the authority herein conferred upon said designated persons until delivery to it of a certified copy of a resolution of this Committee revoking or modifying the same, and that such authority shall include checks drawn to the order of any said persons."

REPORT ON 1944 UNITED JEWISH APPEAL

Dr. Silver described the prolonged negotiations between the J.D.C. and U.P.A. for the continuation of the United Jewish Appeal in 1944. He reported that there was a general desire for the continuation of a united effort. The principal difficulty in the negotiations centered on the subject of traditional collections of the Jewish National Fund.

The J.D.C. point of view was that when the United Jewish Appeal was first formed, the traditional collections of the JNF amounted to a relatively small sum and that the J.D.C. was prepared to agree to its exclusion from the U.J.A. But since that time, the JNF collections had risen to a substantial amount. Resistance of the J.D.C. has increased. During the past few years it has made increasingly more determined representations against the traditional JNF funds, which in 1943 amounted to some \$1,000,000. A special source of irritation has been the large functions presented by the JNF in local communities which have been regarded by some as full-scale campaigns not in accordance with the basic agreement.

The J.D.C. has been maintaining that all the JNF traditional collections should be thrown into the common pool of the U.J.A. This argument was the subject of discussion for many long hours. Dr. Goldstein had spent four hours on that very subject in a conference with the J.D.C. He then referred to negotiations that had been held that very morning with Mr. Fisher of the JNF present to give an outline and a description of the traditional collections.

The final proposition that was made with an eye to saving the JNF traditional collection organization in America and to permitting it to carry on in what have always been regarded as legitimate ways was as follows:

An initial distribution between the three organizations of \$15,000,000, of which \$1,000,000 is to go to the NRS, in contrast with \$1,500,000 of the year before; of the remaining \$14,000,000 the J.D.C. would be allotted \$8,640,000 and the U.P.A. \$5,360,000.

A question has been raised as to what will happen to sums above \$1,100,000 raised by the JNF, since the JDC has insisted on that as a ceiling. That question is still to be disposed of.

Any amounts above \$15,000,000 would go to an Allocations Committee. No definite word of acceptance had come from the JDC, but he believed that the proposal would be accepted.

Mr. Sonneborn referred to a newspaper statement issued by the J.D.C. with regard to a proposed budget for the year of \$17,000,000. He asked about the source of additional income for the JDC above the amount it receives from the United Jewish Appeal. Dr. Silver explained that this was a budget of needs and not a statement of expenditures.

In response to Judge Rothenberg's query as to whether the proposition made to the J.D.C. would place no restrictions on JNF traditional collections up to \$1,100,000, Dr. Silver reported that the J.D.C. is insisting upon the appointment of a control committee made up of two representatives of the J.D.C., two of the U.P.A. and a fifth to be selected by these four. The task of this committee would be to see to it that conflicts which have arisen will not arise in the future with reference to JNF activities especially in the launching of efforts at the time when UJA campaigns are under way.

Dr. Silver, in response to inquiries, suggested that there should be an avoidance of such affairs as public banquets and large-scale meetings which take on the character of a campaign because those enterprises irritate not only a few people in the JDC, but many friends all over the country.

Mr. Fisher expressed his deep sense of appreciation to Dr. Silver and to all the representatives of the UPA for handling the negotiations in a splendid manner. The proposal to which Dr. Silver referred had been placed before the Administrative Committee of the JNF which had made only one request: that the matter of a ceiling be eliminated if possible. Mr. Fisher said that the proposal sounded very satisfactory to him and was logical. He was in favor of approving the report of the committee.

Rabbi Miller inquired whether the J.D.C. includes in the U.J.A. pool all the contributions it receives from outside the United States. Dr. Silver replied that it does not and pointed out that insofar as Palestine funds are concerned, the UPA deals only with income raised in the United States.

It was moved, seconded and unanimously voted that the report on negotiations for 1944 presented by Dr. Silver be unanimously adopted and approved with an expression of deep appreciation to him for his service.

FINANCIAL REPORTS

Mr. Rosenbloom presented reports on the financial status of the UPA as of December 14, 1943 (Appendix B) and of the U.J.A. as of December 15, 1943 (Appendix C). The reports were accepted as read.

Judge Rothenberg expressed gratification over the results of the 1943 campaign, the UPA having received a very substantial amount - some \$2,500,000 more than last year. He thanked the UPA representatives on the Allotment Committee, headed by Dr. Silver, and the members of the staff, headed by Mr. Montor, for the excellent manner in which the campaign had been conducted.

It was moved, seconded and unanimously carried that record be made of the deep appreciation of the United Palestine Appeal to Dr. Silver and Charles J. Rosenbloom on the Allotment Committee and to the members of the staff under Mr. Montor for their efforts in the past year.

YOUTH ALIYAH COMMITTEE

A report on the negotiations conducted by the sub-committee of the UPA with the sub-committee of Hadassah on the question of Youth Aliyah was presented by Mr. Sonneborn. He referred to the multiplicity of campaigns based on youth immigration into Palestine. His committee had been animated by the desire to establish an instrumentality to coordinate the appeals under the aegis of an advisory committee. He pointed out that Youth Aliyah during its years of existence had brought over 10,000 children to Palestine and that the Hadassah under a UPA franchise had been responsible for the work in the United States. More recently, other organizations have come into the field. In some communities there have been three and sometimes as many as five campaigns on the basis of child immigration into Palestine, all appealing to the same community.

Mr. Sonneborn then read the draft of an agreement which had been arrived at between the UPA and Hadassah (Appendix D).

Mrs. Rothbard observed that exactly the same report had been presented at the last meeting of the Administrative Committee of the UPA. She asked why the other organizations working in this field had not been invited to join in the formulation of the agreement. She felt that the resolution should be sent back and that the other organizations should be invited in to help formulate the agreement. The Pioneer Women had gone on record as being ready to send its money to the Jewish Agency which it had been doing. She felt that as the resolution now reads it is not acceptable, because it makes only the UPA and Hadassah partners and disregards all other organizations.

Mr. Sonneborn pointed out that the Jewish Agency has assumed an overall obligation to cover the immigration certificates. The UPA is the fund-raising agency in this country of the Jewish Agency and therefore it has the primary responsibility in facing the total problem. His committee had suggested the formation of an Advisory Committee to include all agencies dealing with child immigration. If that plan is acceptable, it will be the duty of the Chairman to appoint four representatives of the UPA to serve on that Advisory Committee.

Mrs. Pool recalled the history of child immigration work. She said that up to the present time Hadassah had been the sole agency for Youth Aliyah. However, Hadassah recognized that with the change in conditions, there will be immigration in much larger numbers, and only for that reason does it envisage a different setup. Therefore, with the United Palestine Appeal, it is setting up this coordinating committee, inviting the other organizations to join. Hadassah does not want to do more than one organization should do. So long as the work comes within the framework in which Hadassah can meet its responsibility, it is against the public interest to have a multiplicity of appeals, which confuse the public and endanger the cause. She therefore urged that the agreement as read be accepted by the United Palestine Appeal. She felt that the supporting agencies that want to work, should be given an opportunity within a well ordered program, just as Hadassah accepts the discipline of the Keren Hayesod, Jewish National Fund, etc. She said that the Jewish Agency has recognized their position, as has also the UPA.

Mrs. Israel Goldstein asked whether Hadassah is a part of the United Palestine Appeal or whether it is an equal partner. She felt that Hadassah is a constituent part of the United Palestine Appeal just as any of the other organizations are, and therefore she did not feel that a resolution, already drawn up, should be presented without the help of the other organizations. She admitted that the public was confused, but she believed that this confusion stemmed from the fact that Hadassah continually told the public that it was the sole agency for child immigration. Naturally then, when other organizations asked for funds, the public was confused. Referring to Mr. Sonneborn's remark that Youth Aliyah was a part of Hadassah, Mrs. Goldstein said that this was confusing, as Hadassah is a part of Youth Aliyah. Hadassah has a Youth Aliyah Committee in this country, but Hadassah is a part of the whole international movement called Youth Aliyah, and that the 10,000 children brought into Palestine were brought in by the whole Youth Aliyah all over the world. She felt that a coordinating committee should be formed by the United Palestine Appeal, of which each organization interested should be a part.

Mr. Montor said that in 1935 the Jewish Agency entrusted to the United Palestine Appeal the sole and exclusive right to determine how funds for Youth Aliyah should be raised in the United States. The leaders of the UPA at that time turned over to Hadassah the franchise that it had, and Hadassah exercised that franchise under the United Palestine Appeal. The United Palestine Appeal, however, does have the responsibility, and has it only because it is the fund-raising instrument for the Keren Hayesod, and that is how it derives its relationship to the Jewish Agency. The United Palestine Appeal has two things to determine: (a) how to distribute that franchise and (b) how to preserve the interest of the Jewish Agency and of Youth Aliyah in this country. He felt that the United Palestine Appeal, as the major body, had the right to take such action as seems warranted to protect itself and the name of Palestine, which had not been done by the appeals that have been made. He pointed out that Hadassah is not a constituent of the United Palestine Appeal, but is an entirely separate fund-raising organization which does not remit its funds through the UPA, and the UPA does not claim the funds. It is merely because the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth have the support of all elements of the Zionist movement that Hadassah and others are represented on the Board of the UPA. The UPA could have taken this position: that it ride roughshod over everybody to protect the Jewish Agency and the good name of Palestine. It did not do that because it recognized that for the period of eight years Hadassah had been the sole fund-raising agency in the United States which had the only charter from the only recognized body to raise funds for Youth Aliyah. The UPA therefore approached Hadassah to arrive at some understanding. Mr. Montor emphasized that in taking this action it is very likely that the UPA is yielding the legal rights which it acquired in 1935 from the Jewish Agency, but he felt that that was a risk well worthwhile taking in view of the greater achievement of a coordinated fund-raising effort. He urged that the United Palestine Appeal accept the recommendation presented by Mr. Sonneborn as a means of safeguarding youth immigration. He also said that, in accordance with a cable of December 4, 1943 addressed to the United Palestine Appeal by Henrietta Szold, Eliezer Kaplan and Georg Landauer, Hadassah could, if it wished, completely ignore the United Palestine Appeal.

Mr. Taubman expressed agreement with Mrs. Goldstein.

Mrs. Greenberg felt that the UPA and Hadassah had a certain right to parity -- the UPA because of its stewardship of fund-raising, and Hadassah

of the because/\$4,000,000 which it had raised, and the fact that it had carried 80% of the Youth Aliyah budget could not be ignored.

Mr. Segal felt that the only problem involved was to eliminate the fear of the other organizations that they may be prohibited from raising funds. He did not think that anyone was interested in stopping any organization from carrying on campaigns in a legitimate way.

Judge Rothenberg did not agree entirely with Mr. Segal's thought that all we are interested in is to have everyone who can render service to Palestine, render it. We are also interested in having some form of discipline. He did not know whether the other bodies had the right to go out to raise money for Youth Aliyah, but certainly, he felt, there can be no question about the fact that Hadassah is the authorized body for collecting money in America. No one wanted to stop the other organizations, but when it came to the point where the public mind was being confused, the United Palestine Appeal thought it was necessary for something to be done. Apparently what is resented, Judge Rothenberg said, is the fact that an advisory committee has been set up without the cooperation of the other organizations and that the representation is 4 for the UPA, 4 for Hadassah, and one each for the other organizations. He, therefore, suggested, that, since time was not pressing, the committee should not be discharged and that it should call together representatives from all the bodies and discuss the matter further.

Motion was made and carried that the present committee be continued and that representatives of all organizations raising funds for child immigration be invited to join in the discussions.

NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING IN NEW YORK

Mr. Silverman advised that the United Palestine Appeal representatives on the United Jewish Appeal felt that it is important that a meeting of the National Council of the United Palestine Appeal be held in New York, similar to that held last year at the Biltmore Hotel. It is suggested that this meeting include a session for the Council of Palestine Organizations. This body has been somewhat neglected and it is felt, Mr. Silverman stated, that this would be a good opportunity to revive it, since it has taken very intensive action with regard to the protest against the White Paper and in favor of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. Mr. Silverman said that it is planned to have an all-day session, with a dinner in the evening, to be held on January 30, with Senator Alben W. Barkley as the main speaker.

After a discussion, it was the consensus that this meeting of the National Council of the United Palestine Appeal should be held, and the organization should proceed to build up the finest kind of meeting possible.

CINCINNATI CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

Mr. Silverman advised that a U.P.A. Regional Conference, embracing Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, West Virginia and Tennessee was scheduled to be held in Cincinnati on January 9, 1944. This was approved.

UJA \$300,000 ALLOCATION TO JEWISH AGENCY

Dr. Silver referred to the \$300,000 allocation made to the United Palestine Appeal by the Allotment Committee of the United Jewish Appeal. This

money was specifically earmarked for the purpose of wiping out the deficit of the Jewish Agency dating back to 1939 which amounted to about \$290,000. Dr. Silver advised that actually the Allotment Committee cannot directly allocate money to the Jewish Agency; it can allocate it only to the United Palestine Appeal, and the latter is bound by its contractual agreement as between the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth. However, the United Palestine Appeal accepted the \$300,000 with the instructions of the Allotment Committee, and the matter should be adjusted as between the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth, and whatever arrangements they arrive at will be satisfactory. The records must show, however, that the money has gone to the Jewish Agency to meet that specific obligation.

Mr. Goodman expressed surprise that this matter should have reached the agenda of the United Palestine Appeal, as he was under the impression that the money belonged to the Jewish Agency and that there was no question of dividing it between the two funds. He said that he had spoken to Dr. Goldstein on the matter and that the latter was of the same opinion. Since there is a question, Mr. Goodman suggested that a committee should be appointed of the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth, and if they cannot straighten it out, an impartial person should decide it.

Judge Rosenblatt felt that it was not a question for the Joint Committee, because that would create a 50-50 opinion, and he referred to a precedent when the United Palestine Appeal accepted money for Palestine from the JDC for a special purpose.

Dr. Silver said that the UPA representatives did not ask for the money. It was a suggestion of the Allotment Committee.

Mr. Montor agreed with Dr. Silver. He felt that the Keren Hayesod should be the first to question the wisdom of accepting this specific allocation, as, once the right of the Allotment Committee to determine how funds are to be distributed within the organization is accepted, there might be repercussions in the future.

It was agreed that the question of the \$300,000 allocation to the Jewish Agency be handled between the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth.

1944 UPA ORGANIZATION

Dr. Silver said that the agreement between the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth as regards the UPA setup for 1944 should have been completed by now. In this connection he said:

"I should like to request of the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth to relieve me of the responsibility of the chairmanship as of the first of 1944. I have now served in this capacity for a number of years and I would be most happy to continue but for the fact which is known to you: that I have accepted some very heavy and serious responsibilities in connection with the political work of our movement, which responsibilities take up a great deal of my time and my energy; and I am not in position frankly to carry both important tasks.

There are some splendid people who can step in and carry on the work of the United Palestine Appeal. The setup for 1944 is practically completed as far as negotiations are concerned. The machinery is here and has been built up very competently over quite a number of years, and I believe that it ought not be difficult to get someone of standing and character and reputation in this country to head the work. And so I should like to pass that thought on to the Joint Committee of the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth who are to select their official family for the coming year. I should like the privilege of remaining a member of the Administrative Committee of the United Palestine Appeal, and I will do all I can to help with the work".

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

In response to an inquiry by Mr. Segal as to whether it is planned to hold a National Conference this year, Dr. Silver said that such a Conference would be held, but that it was not planned as yet. He mentioned that the National Council meeting in January has always been a sort of preview of the National Conference later on.

THE MEETING WAS ADJOURNED AT 5:15 P.M.



(APPENDIX A)

COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS
AND WELFARE FUNDS
165 West 46th Street
New York City

C
O
P
Y

November 10, 1943

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman
United Jewish Appeal
E. 105th Street at Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Rabbi Silver:

The Board of Directors of our Council held a meeting in Pittsburgh on November 6th and 7th. One of the subjects considered was the United Jewish Appeal and the desirability of a renewal of the UJA for 1944.

We understand that negotiations are going on for a renewal of your annual agreement and the Council is cognizant of the great interest of our member agencies in this program for joint fund-raising for overseas and refugee work which has been continued from year to year since 1939. If during the processes of negotiation the help of the Council, representing the Jewish welfare funds of the country, would be of assistance, our president, Sidney Hollander, is authorized to appoint a committee to represent the Council.

We will take no further action until we receive word from you that our interest and participation in your negotiations is indicated.

You will also be interested to know that the General Assembly of the Council will be held from February 4th to 7th, 1944, in Pittsburgh. Monday, February 7th, is available for meetings of interest to our membership which may be arranged by the major overseas and national agencies. If you have any desire to plan for such a meeting, please let us know at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

H. L. Lurie
Executive Director

Same letter to: Mr. Rosenwald
Rabbi Wise
cc: Mr. Montor

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

Appendix B

DECEMBER 14, 1943

Bank Balance as of January 1, 1943

\$ 56,942.39

INCOME:

United Palestine Appeal	- 1943 (Bequests	\$4,175.51	
Jewish National Fund	- 1943 (thru Sept.)	771,359.58	
United Jewish Appeal	- 1943	3,390,000.00	
United Jewish Appeal	- 1942	1,711,000.00	
United Jewish Appeal	- 1941	57,476.02	
United Jewish Appeal	- 1940	9,894.24	
United Jewish Appeal	- 1939	3,138.91	
Prior Campaigns		<u>760.56</u>	<u>5,947,804.82</u>
<u>Total Cash Received</u>			<u>\$6,004,747.21</u>

DISBURSEMENTS

Jewish National Fund	- 1943	\$1,915,075.00	
	- 1942	791,755.00	
	- 1941	70,600.00	
	- 1940	9,643.02	
	- 1939	1,075.00	
	- 1938	139.87*	
	- 1937	177.11**	
	- 1936	<u>140.00</u>	<u>\$2,788,605.00</u>
Palestine Foundation Fund	- 1943	\$1,915,075.00	
	- 1942	791,755.00	
	- 1941	70,600.00	
	- 1940	9,643.02	
	- 1939	1,075.00	
	- 1938	139.87*	
	- 1937	177.11**	
	- 1936	<u>140.00</u>	<u>\$2,788,605.00</u>
Mizrachi Palestine Fund	- 1943		<u>125,000.00</u>
			<u>\$5,702,210.00</u>

SERVICE PAYMENTS

Zionist Organization	- 1943	\$ 54,000.00	
Mizrachi Organization	- 1943	9,800.00	
Poale Zion - Zeire Zion	- 1943	9,800.00	
Hashomer Hatzair	- 1943	<u>1,200.00</u>	<u>\$ 74,800.00</u>

Executive Committee Grants	-	4,853.41	
National Administrative Expenses	- 1943	<u>97,056.44</u>	<u>101,909.85</u>

Total Cash Disbursements

\$5,878,919.85

Bank Balance as of December 14, 1943

\$ 125,827.36

National City Bank	\$120,827.36
Public National Bank	<u>5,000.00</u>
	<u>\$125,827.36</u>

*Includes \$47.62 for 1938 Palestine Emergency Fund

**Includes \$59.04 for 1937 " " "

STATUS OF 1943 UNITED JEWISH APPEALAs of December 13, 1943

	<u>Pledges</u>	<u>Cash Received</u>	<u>Disbursed 1943</u>
I 1943 National	\$ 10,744,266.73	\$ 7,151,383.60	J.D.C. \$5,610,000.
N. Y. C.	4,150,000.00*	4,150,000.00	U.P.A. 3,390,000.
	\$ 14,894,266.73	\$11,301,383.60	N.R.S. 1,500,000.
			\$10,500,000.
			Expended 407,008.
			\$10,907,008.
II 1942 National	\$ 9,893,836.92	\$ 9,759,816.56	J.D.C. \$6,896,500.
N. Y. C.	4,557,696.16	3,719,800.00	U.P.A. 4,028,500.
	\$ 14,451,533.08	\$13,479,616.56	N.R.S. 2,000,000.
			Allocation Comm. 5,000.
			\$12,930,000.
			Expended 496,550.
			\$13,426,550.

*This figure represents actual cash received from N.Y.C. and does not take into account total of pledges.

ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE ALLOCATIONS FOR 1943

(On the basis of \$15,800,000 - being available for distribution)

J.D.C.	\$ 5,610,000.00	\$ 2,750,000.00	8,360,000.00
U.P.A.	3,390,000.00	2,550,000.00	5,940,000.00
N.R.S.	1,500,000.00	--	1,500,000.00
	<u>\$10,500,000.00</u>	<u>\$ 5,300,000.00</u>	<u>\$15,800,000.00</u>

(APPENDIX D)

DRAFT OF AGREEMENT

Hadassah and the United Palestine Appeal have taken note of the multiplicity of appeals which have been launched in the Jewish communities in connection with the certificates for European Jewish children to enter Palestine. Confusion and chaos have resulted.

Hadassah which has been recognized as the sole agency for Youth Aliyah in the USA by the U.P.A. since 1935, has been responsible for the collection of funds for this project. However, Hadassah recognizes that, should the greatly increased immigration implicit in the large certificate grant be made possible, there must be a change in the status quo and a new machinery set up to meet the new circumstances. For the present, however, in order to avoid further confusion in the minds of the contributing public, the following proposals are put forth by Hadassah and the U.P.A.

- 1) that an advisory coordinating committee be created consisting of an equal number of representatives from the U.P.A. and Hadassah to which shall be added one representative of each of the recognized organizations participating in youth immigration;
- 2) that this committee shall attempt to coordinate and integrate all fund-raising efforts in the field in order that a clear picture of the project be presented to the public;
- 3) that the coordinating committee - should the situation change and immigration in excess of 2,000 a year become a fact - will be entrusted with the task of working out the ways and means of meeting the new situation and setting up the machinery for the collection of the necessary funds.

[Dec. 19, 1944]

Keep. unclassified

Confidential

EX. No. III

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE Z.C.A. HELD TUESDAY
EVENING, DECEMBER 19TH, 1944 AT 8:00 P.M. AT THE NEW YORK OFFICES, 41 EAST
42ND STREET, NEW YORK CITY.

PRESENT: Dr. Israel Goldstein, presiding; Robert M. Bernstein, Maurice M. Boukstein, A. K. Epstein, Hon. M. Malwin Fertig, Jacob Fishman, Daniel Frisch, Dr. Solomon Goldman, Abraham Goodman, Rabbi Simon Greenberg, Rabbi William Greenfeld, Dr. James G. Heller, Judge Louis E. Levinthal, Rabbi Israel H. Levinthal, Irving D. Lipkowitz, Rabbi Irving Miller, Emanuel Neumann, Abraham Redelheim, Louis P. Rocker, Judge Bernard A. Rosenblatt, Hon. Albert D. Schanzer, Herman Shulman, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Louis E. Spiegler, Saul S. Spiro, Robert Szold, Dewey D. Stone, Elihu D. Stone, William H. Sylk, Herman L. Weisman, and Dr. Stephen S. Wise.

Samuel Berson, Paul Z. Byne, Mendel N. Fisher, Herzl Fishman, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Mrs. Emanuel Halprin, Harry Levine, Leo J. Rosen, and Mrs. Herman Shulman.

STAFF: Ernest E. Barbarash, Dr. Shlomo Bardin, Dr. S. Bernstein, Oscar Leonard, and Dr. Ludwig Lewishn.

The meeting was called to order by Dr. Goldstein at 8:45 P. M. Saul S. Spiro, National Secretary of the ZOA, presented a report on the general status and progress of the organization for the period beginning October 1, 1944. A motion was made and seconded that the report be adopted, and was unanimously passed. (This report in comprehensive form will accompany the minutes of the Administrative Council meeting of January 7th, 1945 which will be mailed out shortly.)

The meeting then proceeded to the consideration of the recent events leading to the deferment of the Palestine Resolutions in Congress, and the developments in the Emergency Council in connection therewith.

The Chairman called upon Dr. Silver, Co-Chairman and Chairman of the Executive Committee Emergency Council to report on the situation. Dr. Silver stated that he was not prepared to present his report, since he had expected to do so before the Emergency Council at the meeting of that body scheduled for the following evening, after which he would feel free to discuss the content of his report with its constituent organizations, including the ZOA Executive. It was suggested by the Chairman that discussion of the matter had already been held by the other groups represented upon the Council, and that the Zionist Executive should also be fully informed and in a position to consider and discuss the problems involved.

A discussion followed, in which Dr. James Heller, Hon. Albert D. Schanzer, Mr. Herman Shulman, and Hon. M. Malwin Fertig, Mr. Herman L. Weisman and Dr. Silver participated. The consensus was that, whether or not Dr. Silver presented a report, the Executive Committee of the ZOA was under a duty to discuss

the matter. Dr. Silver was again urged to give a report and again declined to do so, upon the grounds already stated.

Dr. Goldstein outlined the salient facts, stating that at a meeting of the Council on November 21st, it was agreed that at this time the Palestine Resolutions were not to be pressed in Congress if the approval of the President and the State Department could not be obtained, since it was felt that another deferment would be hurtful to our cause. The Council was informed by the Secretary of State that President Roosevelt desired that Zionists leave the matter in his hands a little longer. Additional efforts were made to obtain approval, but these were unsuccessful. Shortly thereafter, a resolution worded in a manner unsatisfactory to many because it retained the word "ultimately" and removed the word "Jewish" before "Commonwealth", was reported out favorably by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Resolution then came before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with the result that it was once more deferred. The Chairman indicated that these facts were well known; the problem confronting most Zionists was how this result came about. In the ensuing discussion, it was brought out that Dr. Wise was tendering his resignation as Chairman of the Emergency Council on the ground that he "cannot longer remain the Chairman of a body, one of the leading officers of which is guilty of deliberate and persistent violation of its decisions, (namely of the Emergency Committee) conduct which has inflicted great hurt upon our sacred cause."

A number of ZOA members of the Emergency Council who were present joined the discussion.

Judge Levinthal pointed out (1) that the Emergency Council had consistently and repeatedly decided not to press the Resolutions until they were assured of the approval of the President and State Department; (2) that the Council had discussed the problematic value of the passage of the Resolutions, even with that approval, in view of the strong declarations of policy already obtained, and (3) in reply to a query, that it was highly improbable that the House and Senate Committees of Congress acted of its own volition, in the face of known presidential disapproval.

Mr. Herman Shulman pointed out (1) that prior to the Council meeting of November 21st there were apparent unanimous agreement; that on October 30th, after discussion the Council decided unanimously not to press for the reporting out of the Resolutions without the definite consent and approval of the Chief Executive and the Department of State, and that Dr. Silver on that occasion stated: "We will not go ahead with the resolution without fully canvassing the situation. If the answer from the State Department is at all vague, we will not recommend proceeding with it."; (2) at the meeting of November 21st it was reported that a committee including Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver has seen Mr. Stettinius, and that a few days later Dr. Wise had been informed by Mr. Stettinius that it was the desire of the Chief Executive that action be postponed. Dr. Wise so informed Dr. Silver. The Council, after discussion, concluded that this was a definite request not to press the Resolution; (3) Dr. Silver suggested that a further attempt be made to secure the approval of the President but the decision not to proceed in the face of his request was reaffirmed. This attempt was made, through Senator Wagner, and we were again advised not to press the matter at this time.

Mr. Shulman recalled that after the October 30th meeting, Dr. Wise communicated with Congressman Sol Bloom, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who agreed to take no action on the Resolution until further notice from Dr. Wise. It was further brought out that on November 27th Dr. Silver strongly urged Congressman Bloom to go forward with the Palestine Resolution in spite of the failure to obtain Executive approval, and on November 30th the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported the Resolution out favorably, in a form not acceptable to many Zionists, as previously indicated.

At this point Dr. Silver stated that he still felt that it was his duty to present his report first to the Emergency Council, and that it was pointless to remain, since he could not participate in the discussion. He thereupon left the meeting. 2

Dr. Solomon Goldman examined critically a report dated December 12th, issued by Mr. Harry Shapiro, Director of the Emergency Council, addressed to local chairmen. The facts as reported seem to indicate, Dr. Goldman continued, that one member of the Council took it upon himself to violate the agreement and decisions of the Council. In doing so he has violated discipline, has jeopardized the Zionist movement and proper sanctions should be imposed.

In a discussion, it was submitted that it had been difficult to consult with Dr. Silver who on several prior occasions had either declined to discuss the situation at a given time or had interposed technical objections of lack of due notice.

Dr. Heller summarized the difficulties confronting the Emergency Council as follows:

"The spirit of those of us who came together was that we were profoundly concerned and profoundly perplexed. We did not know what to do; we were faced first of all with the actual presentation of the resolutions. We did not know how the resolutions had come into the House. Then we did not know how the resolutions were coming before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate; we wanted to know what we should do. Should we agree to the changes in verbiage which had come to us through the press and through the address which Dr. Silver made at the American Jewish Conference which some of us disapproved of, and thought were perilous? Should we follow the same procedure in the Senate which had not yet had the meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee? We merely wanted to sit down and talk it over and were met with refusals upon technical grounds." Dr. Heller deplored the inaccurate and misleading statements contained in the December 12th report of the Emergency Council which had received wide distribution, and the false sense of security disseminated at the American Jewish Conference when predictions were made by Dr. Silver that "the resolutions would pass without any trouble in the House and in the Senate within ten days.

"A very false atmosphere was created by this address; false expectations were aroused. Nothing was said about the opposition of the President, although the opposition of the President had been expressed before the American Jewish Conference convened, on three separate occasions."

Thereupon the following resolution was moved by Dr. Heller and duly seconded:

(1) It is the sense of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America that the actions of Dr. Abba Hillel Silver in relation to the resolutions before the Congress of the United States were in contravention of the decisions of the Zionist Emergency Council;

(2) That the resignation of Dr. Wise is justified as a protest against these actions;

(3) That in the light of these facts and in the political interests of the movement it is our conviction that the services of Dr. Silver as Co-Chairman of the Emergency Council and as Chairman of its Executive Committee should not be continued.

Mr. Boukstein offered additional and recent facts to bring the Executive Committee up to date on the situation. He mentioned that on Thursday, December 7th, Dr. Stephen S. Wise convoked a meeting of the entire Emergency Council at which time the entire situation was canvassed again, and all present agreed that it was inadvisable, as well as a disservice to the movement to press for the resolutions in the face of the recommendations for delay made by the President of the United States and the attitude of the State Department. It was further decided that a delegation consisting of Dr. Goldstein representing the ZOA, Mrs. Judith Epstein, representing Hadassah, Hayim Greenberg, representing Poale-Zion, and Rabbi Gold representing Mizrachi, met with Dr. Silver in Washington. Mr. Boukstein further stated: Dr. Goldstein, Mr. Greenberg and Mrs. Epstein later reported that they were unable to dissuade Dr. Silver from pressing the resolutions in Congress, and therefore pursuant to instructions given them at the Emergency Council meeting, met with Mr. Stettinius and informed the Secretary of State that they do not accept the President's judgment in this matter, that they see no reason why the resolutions should not be passed by Congress, but that if the President's mind remains unchanged, they would not press for the passage of the resolutions at this time.

Mr. Boukstein also revealed that simultaneously with this visit of a delegation of the Emergency Council in accordance with official instructions, to Mr. Stettinius, Dr. Silver and Rabbi Gold visited members of the Senate and urged that the resolutions be pressed. When Dr. Goldstein, Mrs. Epstein and Hayim Greenberg in conformity with a decision of the Emergency Council visited the Senate they were asked "who represents the Zionist movement? Do you represent the Zionist movement or do Dr. Silver and Dr. Gold?"

Mr. Fertig urged that in the interests of harmony the resolutions proposed by Dr. Heller be tabled pending further consideration. He stated he was perfectly willing to leave this matter in the hands of our representatives on the Emergency Council tomorrow night and let them act....we ought not provoke an acute situation.... I think the thing for us to do is to compose our differences and not to cause further division.

Mr. Dewey Stone concurred in the opinion held by Mr. Fertig and expressed sufficient confidence in our members on the Emergency Council "to leave it to them to act as free agents in a mission which their own conscience and best judgment dictates tomorrow, at a place where I think this deserves to be finally adjudicated."

Judge Levinthal suggested that as a guide to the ZOA representatives on the Emergency Council a proviso be inserted in the pending resolution that "unless new facts be revealed tomorrow, this be the sense of this meeting; that we leave it to our representatives to decide if any new facts are presented whether the entire problem ought to be presented de novo to a special meeting of the Executive Committee. If we have confidence in our representatives we can leave it to their judgment. Certainly we all realize the value of keeping peace."

Dr. Heller accepted the amendment as offered by Judge Levinthal. A discussion then ensued in which Rabbi Simon Greenberg, Dr. Heller, Rabbi Greenfeld, Mr. Weisman and Judge Levinthal participated. Rabbi Greenfeld emphasized that "the Zionist movement stands above the question of judging the personal merits of someone as an orator, the personal merits of someone as a person who can influence others; I think that the Zionist movement in general needs people who can get along with other people, who are capable of getting along with the President of the United States, people who can abide by the discipline of the Zionist Organization, or of the Zionist Emergency Council."

Mr. Epstein concurred to the opinion with Dr. Solomon Goldman and Dr. Heller and expressed the view that "it is Palestine we are interested in primarily, not a question of the prestige of individuals or an organization involved." Mr. Robert Bernstein expressed himself in favor of the motion proposed by Dr. Heller.

Dr. Nahum Goldmann, member of the World Zionist Executive discussed the general position of Palestine in relation to world affairs and reviewed the part played by the Emergency Council. He warned that the continued use of such tactics as pursued by Dr. Silver which involved a fight against the president and his administration would lead to complete political disaster. "What we are doing here is what Revisionists have done for twenty years. It is exactly Revisionist tactics."

"Revisionists are very good Zionists. There has never lived in the world a better Zionist than Vladimir Jabotinsky, the incarnation of passion and devotion to Zionism but if we would have adopted his tactics we never would have had six hundred thousand Jews in Palestine; we would have remained with resolutions, protests, and emotional outbursts of the so-called Jewish masses and we would never have achieved the little or the much that we have achieved in Palestine."

Dr. Goldmann also dealt with "the difference between practical policies which want to achieve something tangible, and this was the classic aim, the underlying principle of Zionist policy for twenty years, and it gives up some spectacular successes which may appear very important to public opinion at the moment, but which doesn't add very much to the practical achievements in Palestine, if at the same time we lose the goodwill of those who decide the determined policies."

Dr. Goldmann further stressed the importance of the United States in the framing of the future policy regarding Palestine and suggested that "the American Zionists should bring their policies back into line with the classic policies of the Zionist movement for twenty years with which we have after all achieved what we have achieved in Palestine and laid the foundation for other achievements, if we will continue this wise policy."

Mr. Neumann addressed himself to the issues raised by Dr. Nahum Goldmann: "I am not participating in the discussion. I am grateful to Dr. Goldmann for raising the wider issues involved here, and I want to say that he has touched upon extremely important and vital and basic questions in Zionist policy. I had not intended to participate in the discussion but I feel it incumbent upon me I would like to caution against our committing ourselves to policies, against our reversing the whole course of action of the whole year in which we have all participated in the effect. I know that was implicit in some of the things which Dr. Goldmann said; he brought in all sorts of questions about revisionism and God-knows-what. I would strongly urge that we have a meeting in the near future, if we have no other reason for doing so, we should have a meeting in the near future to go into those questions, and I would like to say in conclusion, we are in a tragic situation, we are not the only ones in that situation. Every oppressed people that is now struggling for its rights, for its national rights which had lost its power, which has no power and which is confronted with external forces--what happens? Internal division; disintegration in the face of these external forces."

Dr. Heller proposed a modification to his original resolution as follows: "It is the sense of the Executive Committee of the ZOA that the actions of Dr. Silver in relation to the resolution before Congress were in contravention of the decisions of the Zionist Emergency Council; secondly, that under no circumstances shall the resignation of Dr. Wise be accepted. It is our sense that under no circumstances shall the resignation of Dr. Wise be accepted by the Emergency Council in-so-far as our representatives thereon can cast their votes; and thirdly, that our delegates or representatives, by whatever title they are known to the Emergency Council are instructed to use their own good judgment as to the manner in which the sentiments of the proceedings shall be implemented."

A discussion ensued in which the following participated: Rabbi Greenberg, Mr. Neumann, Rabbi Heller, Mr. Stone, Mr. Fishman and others.

Mr. Elihu Stone stated that "no violence will be done to the interests of the Zionist movement if we grant the request of Dr. Silver and do not take any action tonight, no definite final action, and we postpone this matter." He urged a postponement of the consideration of the motion and his position was supported by Mr. Fishman and Rabbi Irving Miller. Rabbi Miller stated: "We are preparing a record at tonight's meeting, a record which is an open record, a record which will become part of the record of this organization, and the record will show that a week after the Congress of the United States had taken a certain action which Dr. Goldmann very properly evaluated this evening, the Zionist Organization of America met in Executive session and instead of discussing the situation that is before us, instead of discussing ways and means of meeting the situation, instead of suggesting a certain line of action to be taken by its members on the Emergency Committee who are supposed to meet the following night, all that this Executive of the ZOA felt called upon to do to meet this grave and perilous situation was simply to pass a resolution asking for the resignation of the Chairman of its Executive Committee."

Mr. Fishman suggested that the entire matter be dealt with by a Jewish Court of Honor. He continued, "I say that we have not had that system of a Court of Honor to settle all Zionist questions; not only personal, all Zionist involved questions are settled by Courts of Honor, that is what I think we haven't got and we should have it, and perhaps from this point on we should find some such way, we should find some such means by which we should not cast out people, gifted people, but erratic people. We can't do that. How many have we got? And what will the Zionists say? Don't you think that Dr. Silver also has some people who think perhaps he is right?"

"I simply close with this: don't pass this resolution. This resolution has many more implications than you think. You have to think of the tomorrow, the outlook of the tomorrow, after you pass a resolution like this to my mind is that you make things much worse than they are now; you muddle them up worse, much worse."

Mr. Neumann in supporting the proposal to postpone the matter said: "I warn you, we are in a tragic situation. Anyone who thinks that you are going to solve it by a surgical operation is mightily mistaken."

"Therefore, I say, I am happy, if you can find a solution now, there is no question or difference of opinion among us here I take it that we do not accept Dr. Wise's resignation; a condition should be found which will make it possible for Dr. Wise to continue, but I do say that there are a great many other implications, policy, etcetera on which I am sure that Dr. Wise is in agreement with what Dr. Goldmann said or that I would be in disagreement with Dr. Wise on the subject. I say that we should make sure of one thing, that tomorrow evening no precipitate action is taken by the combined efforts of the groups, nothing is going to happen, in my opinion, tomorrow night, that is dangerous to the cause. I think by the conference of our representatives with representatives of other groups that can be guaranteed, and if the time comes after we have had our full discussion there, and our discussion here, that we want to press for the resignation of any officer of the Emergency Council, it can just as well be taken in a week or in a fortnight, as it can tonight."

Dr. Wise reiterated that he withdraws from the Chairmanship "because of the deliberate and persistent violation of the decisions of the Emergency Council which have brought great hurt to our sacred cause."

The Chairman summarized the general discussion as follows: "We have heard a great many appeals in the name of Zionist unity in America. We have not heard from some of those gentlemen whether if we follow their advice and do not precipitate action tonight, we shall have Zionist unity. I think that all of us ought to be aware of what is going on throughout the country, and ought to be re-assured that what is going on can perhaps be stopped."

"If I were convinced that this particular action that is being proposed by some of our friends would be the cure for whatever disunity there is, which takes the form of a huge fund that is being raised here, of \$100,000, \$250,000, to which one man I understand is contributing, or promised to contribute eight times as much as he has given to the expansion fund of the Zionist Organization- if that is the situation which we are confronting then I am afraid that the appeals in the name of Zionist unity are not as sincere as they appear on the surface."

"So far as I can see, unless I hear assurances to the contrary, gentlemen, what is being requested is a delay in the hope that the expressed will of the majority of the members here may somehow not come to pass, and they will continue this internal struggle and this agitation of communities throughout the country, and this approach to the press, to discredit the Zionist movement.

"We have to worry about the Zionist Organization, if one day after a convention, after generous assurances are given, the new campaign begins, to build up the opposition for the next convention.

"Dr. Silver acted tonight in a way that no member of any Zionist group would dare act that way toward his Executive, and if he would, he would be thrown out by the party, not merely out of the Executive, not merely out of a chairmanship. Dr. Silver has had facts in his possession all these weeks which he has not shared with his colleagues in the Emergency Council.

"Is it not conceivable that a situation may exist which would make Dr. Silver's retirement advisable at the present juncture? The fact remains that he is persona non grata with the one man that more than any other we need for the solution of our problem and that his position vis-a-vis the White House has been much worsened as result of the recent events. Perhaps Dr. Silver might feel impelled, as a matter of Zionist responsibility to come to his colleagues and say: gentlemen, this is the situation, if Mr. Dewey has been elected President of the United States it would have been proper for me to have the leadership. "I might say that Dr. Wise intimated that very thing to me, but under the circumstances now obtaining I believe it is my duty not to be in the leadership, and I shall work as a private in the ranks."

The following resolution was then presented for consideration in order to formulate and crystalize the opinions expressed at the meeting. "It is the sense of this meeting that on the basis of the facts as presented to us tonight, that Dr. Wise's resignation as protest against Dr. Silver's action in contravention of the decisions of the Emergency Council is justified. We believe that Dr. Wise's resignation from the leadership of the American Zionist Emergency Council would most seriously injure the interests of the movement and therefore conditions must be created to enable Dr. Wise to continue as Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council. We leave it to our representatives in the Emergency Council to act in accordance with these views." An amendment was offered to delete the words "as a protest against Dr. Silver's action in contravention of the decisions of the Emergency Council." Upon a vote this amendment was defeated.

Upon a vote on the motion as presented above, the resolution was adopted seventeen to four. Mr. Neumann, Mr. Fishman, Mr. Elihu Stone and Rabbi Miller stated for the record that they voted against the motion only because of the inclusion of the phrase, "as a protest against Dr. Silver's action in contravention of the decisions of the Emergency Council."

The meeting adjourned at 1:20 A. M.

[Dec 1944]

STATEMENT BY DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER

I have been requested to comment on the statements issued by Dr. Israel Goldstein which purport to give the facts connected with the controversy which developed in the American Zionist Emergency Council. Dr. Goldstein's facts suffer from deft distortions, twists and significant omissions, which give a false and misleading account of what actually transpired.

1) Dr. Goldstein states that at a meeting of the Emergency Council on October 30, it was unanimously decided not to press for the resolutions unless and until the preliminary approval of the Executive branch of the Government shall have been secured. No such decision was taken by the Emergency Council on October 30. In fact no decisions whatsoever were taken at that meeting. The minutes of the meeting quote me as saying: "We will not go ahead with the resolution without fully canvassing the situation. If the answer from the State Department is at all vague, I would not recommend proceeding with it." This precaution was suggested, not out of a desire not to offend the State Department or the President, but in order to protect ourselves against the kind of surprise which was jumped on us last Spring. The Council wanted to make doubly sure before it moved; but no one really expected any opposition in view of all that had transpired in the preceding months.

At that same meeting I reported (and I quote from the minutes of the meeting) "that in anticipation of the reconsideration of the resolution when Congress reconvenes, the Emergency Council has been engaged in stimulating afresh the interest of the members of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. The local emergency committees in communities in which these members resided had been asked to approach them again and to bring them up to date on recent developments and to suggest that early action on the resolution, when Congress reconvenes, would be desirable. The results so far are gratifying."

Thus the Council, on October 30, was fully informed that continued activities in behalf of our resolution were going on and would continue in Washington and all over the country. It is false to suggest even by implication that the Emergency Council at its meeting on October 30 ordered all of our activities in behalf of the resolution to be discontinued. It merely directed that we explore the mind of the State Department on our resolution, and there was a consensus of opinion that if the State Department attitude was found to be negative, we would then not proceed with the resolutions. Until such time, however, activities in behalf of the resolution were not to be discontinued, nor was word to go out that we were even considering a possible postponement.

Inquiries were accordingly made at the State Department, and at the meeting on November 21, Dr. Wise reported "that Mr. Stettinius had telephoned him and informed him that he had seen the President who urged that nothing be done about the bill at this time and that the matter be left in his hands a little while longer."

This, however, did not satisfy the members of the Emergency Council. Many felt that they had made a mistake in deciding to make inquiries at the State Department in the first place. We might have assumed that the withdrawal of the military objections, the party platforms which included Palestine planks and the statement of the President himself on October 15 were sufficient "green light" to go ahead.

At this meeting, and here again I quote from the minutes, "there followed a lengthy discussion, and it was finally decided that efforts be made once more to obtain clearance from the President through Senator Wagner, and perhaps others. It was

agreed to leave it to Dr. Wise, Dr. Silver and Mr. Shulman to take the necessary action with regard to an approach to the President." There was no other action taken at this meeting.

In other words, the Emergency Council, upon second thought, was not satisfied to have the resolution shelved just because the State Department and the President had indicated their objection to the resolution. They were not content to let it go at that. They wanted persuasive influence to be brought to bear upon the Administration to change its mind.

Dr. Wise strenuously objected to this line of procedure. He did not want the President "annoyed" by our insistence and our persuasion. He reluctantly yielded to the pressure of the Council and thereafter, far from using his energies vigorously to persuade the Secretary of State and the President, he seriously interfered with me in carrying out the clear mandate of the Council.

2) Dr. Goldstein forgets to mention the fact which I made known to the Council that the day following the November 21 meeting, I wired Dr. Wise urging him to get in touch with Congressman Bloom to see the President. Dr. Wise never replied to this telegram.

3) No one interested in the passage of the bill ever saw the President on the resolution at that time or since. He was out of Washington. All our information has come through Mr. Stettinius. The first and the only personal contact with Mr. Stettinius to carry out the wishes of the Council could not be made before December 4. It was made by Senator Wagner and myself. Senator Wagner was not in Washington before the preceding Tuesday and our appointment could not be made before the following Monday.

4) But by December 4 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had already met and had considered our resolution. In fact, at the request of Senator Taft, our Palestine Resolution was to have been considered by the Committee on November 22, but out of courtesy to Senator Wagner who was out of the city, the consideration of our resolution by the committee was postponed to November 29. I reported at the meeting of our Council on November 21 that such a meeting of the Senate Committee had been scheduled for the next day, but had been postponed to the 29th.

Senator Taft requested consideration of the resolution on his own initiative. He was neither requested nor urged by me. Already on November 11 (please note the date) Senator Taft wrote me: "I have had to delay my return to Washington until Thursday, but I hope we can proceed with the Palestine Resolution immediately." He was one of the co-sponsors of the resolution. He had resented the postponement of the resolution last Spring. It was he who had kept after the military until he obtained the letter from Secretary of War Stimson withdrawing their objections. As soon as Congress reconvened, he began pressing for his resolution, just as we all did, including the delegates at the Convention of the ZOA at Atlantic City.

5) Dr. Goldstein suggests that if I had not brought pressure on Congressman Bloom to take the matter up with his committee, no action whatsoever would have been taken in Congress. I did not arrive in Washington until November 27. By that time a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as I indicated above, had already been set for November 29, and the Senate Committee was prepared to act favorably on our resolution at that meeting.

It has been suggested that I should have asked the committee to defer action. Why? This was certainly not my mission nor mandate in Washington. I was there to see

whether I could persuade the State Department and the President to withdraw their objections to the passage of the resolution. Failing in that, the Council would then have to decide what to do, since the first report of the President's disapproval did not close the matter as far as the Council was concerned. I had not yet had the opportunity to contact either the State Department or the President. I was not to see Mr. Stettinius until December 4. Until I had had the chance to persuade them and failed, I could not go, nor did the Council obligate me to go, to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and ask them, many of whom had been critical of the State Department's intervention and of the President's action last Spring, to postpone action on our Palestine Resolution for which the Jews of America had so persistently pressed up to the very last. We were not pressing for the resolution. The pressure came from the Senate Committee itself which was so much interested in the Palestine Resolution that it met on four successive occasions to consider it and it insisted time and again on approving our resolution in spite of two personal appearances before it made by the Secretary of State and in spite of other pressure brought by the Administration against it. Even when the resolution was finally postponed as a result of the persistent pressure from the State Department and the President, two-thirds of the members of the Senate Committee signed a round robin in which they stated that they would have voted for the resolution were it not for this insistence of the State Department and the President.

Congressman Bloom had publicly announced right after the President's statement of October 15 that he would summon a meeting of his committee the day after Congress reconvened. He was eager to move forward. I called on him for the purpose of getting him to contact the President and State Department. He did not feel that the State Department had to be consulted about it. It was none of its business, he stated. Prior to my arrival in Washington, and in anticipation of the meeting of his committee, he had had printed as a House document, the Palestine endorsements made by the four hundred congressmen and senators which appeared in the volume, "America and Palestine," recently published by the Emergency Council. It was Congressman Bloom's own idea and all credit is due him for it. Congressman Bloom was somewhat concerned with the fact that he might be blamed if he moved forward and the resolution failed of passage in his committee. He wanted us to share in the responsibility for moving ahead. I reassured him on that score, and at his request, I wrote him a letter following our interview in which I backed him up. Congressman Bloom convoked his committee on November 29, the very day on which the Senate Committee met to consider our resolution. Bloom was undoubtedly encouraged to move forward rapidly by the fact that the Senate Committee had scheduled a meeting on November 29 and was expected to act favorably on the resolution.

6) When we finally got to Mr. Stettinius on December 4--and here Dr. Goldstein's memory again conveniently fails him--we were shown, right at the outset, that fatal telegram of Dr. Wise which was dispatched without the knowledge of either Senator Wagner or myself and without any authorization from the Council on the very eve of our interview, a telegram which was calculated to nullify the effectiveness of our mission to the Secretary of State. This telegram which in so many words told the Secretary of State, and through him the President, that Dr. Wise and many of his associates would readily and without protest accept their decision with reference to the resolution, broke the back of the entire effort which the Council had resolved to make in order to change the mind of the State Department and of the President. Our only hope lay in persuading Mr. Stettinius, and through him, the President, that the entire Zionist Movement and the entire Jewish people of America were solidly united in demanding action on the resolution which had been hanging fire for over ten months, and that their hopes, which had been raised so high by all that had transpired during the year, would be dashed to the ground if it became known that the President insisted on a second deferment. Dr. Wise's telegram which was sent

from Pittsburgh at the time of the sessions of the American Jewish Conference, and presumably with the knowledge of Dr. Goldstein, deliberately wrecked this effort and torpedoed the resolution.

7) Dr. Goldstein has another serious lapse of memory. On December 5, he sent the following telegram to every member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "We earnestly urge you report out favorably Palestine Resolution for adoption by present Congress ... Your Committee's favorable action would be deeply appreciated as fulfillment President's magnificent message to last Zionist Organization Convention and overwhelming American opinion as expressed recently in both party platforms."

Why did Dr. Goldstein violate the "unanimous decision" of the Emergency Council in urging Senators to act on the resolution when he knew full well that no "green light" had been given? If Dr. Silver is guilty of a breach of discipline, what about Dr. Goldstein? But the gentleman was playing safe! If the resolution passed he would share in the credit. If it failed - why he would see to it that the failure would all be blamed on Dr. Silver.

And having sent this telegram, why did he appear in Washington forty-eight hours later to urge the same Senators not to pass the resolution?

And having come to Washington to persuade the Senators not to pass the resolution, why did he permit himself to be persuaded by me not to carry out his mission? Instead, he and the other members of the committee went to Mr. Stettinius to tell him that the Zionists were not pressing for the resolution but that the pressure came from the Senate Committee itself (which, of course, was the truth). Is Dr. Goldstein unwilling ever to assume responsibility for what he does, or says, or writes? Is the fault always that of someone else?

8) Dr. Goldstein again has a convenient lapse of memory when he fails to mention that at the Executive of the Emergency Council which met in Washington on Monday morning, December 11 (and which by the way was the only authorized meeting of the Emergency Council since the meeting on November 21 -- the other meetings of December 7 and 9 being rump meetings called by Dr. Wise in contravention of the clear provisions of the constitution) it was agreed that nothing be done to interfere with the passage of the resolution on which the Foreign Affairs Committee was to act that very afternoon, but instead Mr. Stettinius should be asked to issue a statement that his appearance before the Senate Committee did not indicate a change of attitude on the part of the President. Nothing was to be said to Mr. Stettinius about deferring the Palestine Resolution. Dr. Wise and Dr. Goldstein concurred on this, and I joined in the delegation to Mr. Stettinius with that understanding and only on that basis.

9) Dr. Goldstein stated that the resolution which was approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee was regarded by many Zionists here and especially in Palestine as a "watered-down" resolution because the word "Jewish" was omitted before "Commonwealth" and the word "ultimately" was retained. How, then, is one to account for the fact that the presidents of Hadassah, Mizrahi and the Poale Zion, as well as Mr. Lipsky of the Jewish Agency Executive, hailed the resolution in public statements? Dr. Wise told Congressman Bloom and me on the very day that it was voted that it was "a very good resolution." The Jewish press likewise welcomed it heartily, and the American Jewish Conference, meeting in Pittsburgh, acclaimed it.

It might be in point here to recall that at the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs - on February 8 - Dr. Goldstein was asked by Congressman Schiffler: "You do not propose immediately to have a Commonwealth?" To which Dr. Goldstein

replied: "No; we could not propose it as an immediate step, because we realize there would have to be a Jewish majority in the land before we could act for the implementation of a commonwealth, and the achievement of a Jewish majority will undoubtedly take some time." (See p. 119 of the Hearings.)

10) Dr. Goldstein is guilty of a distortion when he states that at the final meeting of the Emergency Council, where I announced my resignation, I asked to be made the sole leader in the Zionist movement in America with absolute unconditional power. "When this condition was not agreed on," states Dr. Goldstein, I "handed in my resignation." There is not a scintilla of truth in all this. I stated at the meeting that the present set-up of dual or multiple leadership in the Council has led to serious conflicts in the past and had culminated in the present crisis. I advised a re-organization of the Emergency Council with an eye towards the elimination of conflicting leadership and the centralization of authority. In connection with that, I read at great length a letter which I wrote to Dr. Wise in 1943 at the time when he and Dr. Weizmann asked me to take over the leadership of the political work of our movement. In that letter I stated that if Dr. Wise wished to continue as the active political leader of the movement, no one was thinking of supplanting him. I assumed that he wished to be relieved of it. "If now you feel that you wish to retain that office, not in an honorary but in an active capacity, I wish you would let me know definitely and in making my reply I will say that Dr. Wise is head of the political work of the Emergency Council and there is no need for drafting me or anyone else."

Dr. Wise knew exactly under what conditions I assumed the office at his and Dr. Weizmann's urging. The purpose was to eliminate the very unfortunate overlapping and cross-purposes in our political work which brought the Emergency Council to bankruptcy two years ago.

My resignation, as everyone knows, was not prompted, as Dr. Goldstein asserts, by the refusal of the Emergency Council to accept my suggestions for re-organization. These suggestions were not even considered at the meeting and have not yet been acted upon. It was a motion to request all the officers of the Emergency Council to resign, a motion which the Council refused to table, which called forth my resignation.

THE FOLLOWING SECTION (#11) IS CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

11) Dr. Goldstein refers to a memorandum which Dr. Nahum Goldmann sent me purporting to be a report of what the Secretary of State had told him and Dr. Wise in reply to the request of the Council to issue the statement which is referred to above. I was a member of the committee which called upon Mr. Stettinius to request that statement. The reply of Mr. Stettinius was not given in writing to the Council, but orally to Dr. Goldmann and Dr. Wise who happened to be calling on the Secretary of State on another mission. Dr. Goldmann sent me the following memorandum a few days later:

"Mr. Stettinius called Dr. Wise and me into his room before meeting with the delegation. He told us that he had been in touch with the President about the statement which we had suggested he should issue. He said that the President was in a very bad mood because we had gone ahead with the Resolution and instead of acquiescing in his request to hold the matter up for the time being, had sought to bring pressure to bear through the Senate. He felt that the Zionists had lost confidence in him, and Mr. Stettinius said that in the circumstances it was difficult to discuss such questions with him at this time. It would not be possible for him (Mr. S.) to issue the letter suggested."

I was surprised and disturbed by this report, for in my two previous contacts with Mr. Stettinius there was no indication whatsoever given that the President was in a very bad mood or that he felt that the Zionists had lost confidence in him.

Dr. Goldmann did not treat that "information" as confidential. He conveyed this "information" to newspapermen in New York. A panic mood was being fostered among Zionists with the design -- as later events showed -- to bring about my resignation.

In preparation for my official report to the Emergency Council, which was to be given on December 20, and in order not to do any injustice either to the Secretary of State or to the President, I made inquiries as to whether this memorandum of Dr. Goldmann correctly represented what Mr. Stettinius had said, and whether perhaps he had been misquoted, or misunderstood.

I received a reply to the effect that Dr. Goldmann's memorandum "was not quite in accordance with the Secretary's record. The Secretary told Dr. Wise that he had been in touch with the President as he had offered to do regarding the statement which Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver had requested him to make. The reaction that Mr. Stettinius obtained was that the President felt that this group should have confidence in his handling of the matter and that it would not be appropriate for Mr. Stettinius to issue the statement. Mr. Stettinius asked Dr. Wise if he would be good enough to give this information to Dr. Silver."

This, of course, is a radically different version from that of Dr. Goldmann's. There is nothing here about the President being in a very bad mood, or feeling that the Zionists had lost confidence in him. But Rabbi Goldstein, far from being shocked at Dr. Goldmann's amazing misquotation of a most critical report and far from regarding it as something "scandalous," denounces rather my fact-finding inquiry as something "scandalous"...

12) There are many other things which this Rabbi chooses to forget. Already at the Zionist Convention in Atlantic City he and his little cabal were preparing the way for my elimination. The Resolutions Committee of the Convention had prepared a resolution which wholeheartedly endorsed my administration and called for a continuation of the dynamic and successful program of the Emergency Council "under the present leadership." At a subsequent meeting, Dr. Goldstein demanded the elimination of the words "under the present leadership." He made that request, he said, in the name of Dr. Wise with whom he had spoken by telephone in New York. I stated, of course, that as far as I was concerned, I intended to hold my office not a single day longer than the Emergency Council wished me to, and that, of course, I would agree to the elimination of the words "under the present leadership."

The ZOA Administration had a difficult time at the plenary session of the Convention to put through the resolution without the words "under the present leadership." I personally had to step forward and beg the delegates to agree to the omission of those words. But my friends and I knew all along what was in the mind of Dr. Goldstein and his clique.

13) Many will recall the fight which raged at the ZOA Convention in Atlantic City about my annual report which the administration was determined to schedule at the very end of the Convention when most of the delegates would have gone home, in order to make small change of it. Dr. Goldstein had to yield to the pressure from the delegates but the whole miserable affair was another result of the embittered and envenomed policy of undermining, belittling and discrediting which Dr. Goldstein and his friends had been carrying on throughout the year.

14) The Rabbi has since carried out a successful purge of Silver adherents on the Executive of the ZOA and among the representatives of the ZOA on the Emergency Council. His efficiency in perfecting his political machine should be the envy of Tammany Hall.

For further information write to:

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[Dec. 1944]

DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER'S RESIGNATION

A MEMORANDUM

The appalling and long festering situation within the American Zionist Emergency Council which led to the resignation of Dr. Abba Hillel Silver as co-chairman of the Council and as chairman of its Executive Committee is known to very few. Those of us who had been in daily contact with the political work of our movement but who could not in conscience continue after Dr. Silver and his program were ruthlessly sacrificed, have resolved that you shall have the facts. You who have done such a magnificent job during the past year, are entitled to the truth.

In a memorandum dated December 12th, you were informed of much that had transpired in Washington in connection with the Palestine resolutions. That memorandum avoided any reference to the shocking conditions which obtained in official Zionist circles during this period. But after all that has taken place, and with wild rumors agitating our people throughout the country, we regard it as a solemn duty to pass on as many of the important facts as can be encompassed within the space of this memorandum.

At a meeting of the American Zionist Emergency Council on October 30th and at a subsequent meeting, it was agreed that the "green light" should be obtained from the State Department and the President before we pressed for action on the resolution. This was done, not out of a desire to avoid offending the State Department or the President, but to protect ourselves against the kind of opposition which we encountered last Spring. No one anticipated any serious difficulty in view of Secretary Stimson's letter lifting the military ban, the President's own statement of October 15th, etc. Accordingly, Dr. Silver, Dr. Wise and Dr. Nahum Goldmann called on Mr. Stettinius on November 9th to get the "green light."

Mr. Stettinius had no opinion of his own, but said that he would consult with the President. It is altogether false to suggest, as has been suggested, that Dr. Silver or the other members of the delegation which called on Mr. Stettinius gave any promise, expressed or implied, that we would give up the resolution if the State Department or the President registered objections. If anyone gave such a promise, it was done before or after the interview with Mr. Stettinius - and not by Dr. Silver.

At a meeting of the Emergency Council on November 21st, Dr. Wise reported that on November 15th Mr. Stettinius had telephoned to him and had said that the President thought we should not proceed with action on the resolution and that the matter should be left with him for a little while longer. In the discussion that followed, it was clear that the Council was not satisfied that Mr. Stettinius' reply definitely closed the matter. On the contrary, it was felt by quite a few that a mistake had been made in going to Mr. Stettinius in the first place, that we should have assumed that the "green light" had, in fact, been given by President Roosevelt in his statement of October 15th. Dr. Silver urged that a strong effort should be made to induce the President to change his mind, but Dr. Wise argued against such action, declaring that the President was leaving the country almost immediately. Dr. Wise emphasized further that Congress would adjourn in a few days and that he had been assured that our resolution could not possibly be acted upon in the closing days of this Congress. Dr. Wise was badly misinformed in both of these matters.

The Council agreed that a strong effort should be made to reach President Roosevelt. It was clear from Dr. Wise's attitude that if the matter were left to

him, no earnest effort would be made to urge the President to change his mind. As far as he was concerned, the resolution might just as well die.

The President was not in Washington and could not be reached. It was not until December 2nd, 11 days after the meeting of the Council, that Senator Wagner, who was deeply committed to the resolution, wrote a personal letter to the President, in which he explained the situation as he saw it and appealed to the President to withdraw his objections. Meanwhile, important events had already taken place -- without any pressure on Dr. Silver's part. For many months your committee, along with the other local Emergency Councils, had been interviewing your Senators and Representatives, Congressmen-elect and other public officials, and obtaining pledges from them to vote for our resolution. All members of Congress received our book, "America and Palestine" which contained the printed opinions of nearly 400 members of the 78th Congress. Senator Wagner informed the Convention of the Zionist Organization of America that the President's statement clears the way for Congressional action on the Palestine resolutions. Secretary Stimson had lifted the military ban. The ZOA Convention called for speedy action on the Palestine resolution. Congressman Bloom had announced that he would summon a meeting of his Committee to consider the Palestine resolution on November 15th. In short, the Congress, which all of us had been cultivating for a full year, was set for action and the sponsors of the resolutions insisted upon discharging their obligations to the Jewish people.

Dr. Silver had wired Dr. Wise on November 22nd, the day after the Council's meeting, to this effect: "Because of strike here (in Cleveland) could not reach you by telephone. Strongly urge you to contact Bloom immediately and urge him to see the Chief and persuade him to give clearance to resolutions... Please inform me by telegram or telephone results of conversation with Bloom."

Dr. Wise never replied to this telegram.

On the very day that Dr. Silver arrived in Washington (Nov. 27) he went to see Congressman Bloom to urge him to get in touch with the President. Congressman Bloom, a staunch supporter of President Roosevelt, declared that he did not need any new "green light." He had already made his own soundings. He stated that he was going forward with the resolution. Congressman Bloom requested that Dr. Silver write him a letter indicating approval of the course he was following. Dr. Silver complied with Mr. Bloom's request in order that the resolution be kept alive pending negotiations with the Administration. As you know, favorable action was taken in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday, November 29th.

When Dr. Silver met with Senator Wagner on Tuesday, November 28th, the Senator had no plans to see the President to persuade him to remove his objections, despite the fact that Dr. Wise and Mr. Shulman had seen Senator Wagner in Atlantic City on November 26th. But Senator Wagner was, nevertheless, determined to go into the meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the next morning and have his resolution considered. On that same Tuesday, Mr. Shulman telephoned Senator Wagner's secretary in Washington and gave him many reasons as to why the Senator should use his efforts to postpone consideration of the resolution by the Senate Committee. This was not Mr. Shulman's mission. Three men -- Dr. Silver, Dr. Wise and Mr. Shulman -- had been authorized and directed to try to persuade the Administration to change its mind, not to urge Senators and Congressmen to desist from working for the passage of the resolution.

As on earlier occasions, our leaders were working at cross purposes. Dr. Wise and Mr. Shulman were pressing Senator Wagner to have his resolution shelved, and

Dr. Silver, following the clear line indicated by the Council, was urging the Senator to get in touch with the President. Senator Wagner found himself the victim of two opposing forces pulling in different directions. He was telephoned a score of times from New York by people, all of whom spoke in the name of the Emergency Council or of Zionists. Senator Wagner was baffled and confused -- and understandably so.

On Saturday evening, December 2nd, when Dr. Silver arrived in Pittsburgh to attend the American Jewish Conference, the situation was the following: the resolution in the Senate was hanging fire, pending word from Mr. Stettinius and a reply from President Roosevelt to Senator Wagner's letter. Senator Wagner and Dr. Silver were awaiting an appointment with Mr. Stettinius scheduled for noon on Monday. There was little doubt that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was determined to act -- without being prodded or pressed. The House Foreign Affairs Committee had already acted favorably and its action had been warmly hailed by the Jewish press, by the Jewish public and by most of the leaders of the Zionist parties.

When he arrived in Pittsburgh, Dr. Silver planned to call together the members of the Interim Committee, consisting of the co-chairmen of the Council and the representatives of the Jewish Agency, which, the Council had ruled, was to consult on urgent political affairs between meetings of the Emergency Council. To his amazement he discovered, upon his arrival, that Dr. Israel Goldstein had during the day called a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Z. O. A. to discuss the Palestine Resolutions, despite the fact that neither the Interim Committee nor the Council had as yet discussed the matter, and that Dr. Silver, who was closest to the whole situation, was not present to supply accurate information. The halls of the William Penn Hotel in Pittsburgh were buzzing with rumors, fragments of information and misinformation. What Zionist purpose Dr. Goldstein intended to serve by calling this meeting, at such a time and place, where hundreds of delegates including non-Zionists were gathered not for a Zionist convention but for the American Jewish Conference, is incomprehensible. Nothing but mischief could result from such hasty and ill-considered opinions expressed on insufficient and largely inadequate data. Here was the start of a campaign to "run down" the resolution passed by the House Committee and to discredit Dr. Silver, whose name had been so closely identified with the resolution.

Dr. Wise declined to attend the meeting of the Interim Committee which Dr. Silver had called in Pittsburgh. The other members of this Committee who did attend received all the essential facts from Dr. Silver.

Dr. Wise called an unauthorized meeting of the Emergency Council in Pittsburgh for Sunday evening, December 3 (the Council's Constitution clearly provides that no special meeting of the Council can be called without three days' notice.) This meeting resulted in nothing except a request that Dr. Silver meet with the heads of the four parties represented in the Council to consider what should be done in case the President persisted in his objection. Dr. Silver had to leave for Washington immediately after his report to the American Jewish Conference, and rushed from the platform to the train.

On Monday, December 4, Dr. Silver, together with Senator Wagner, had an interview with Mr. Stettinius. Both were shocked and amazed when they were shown a telegram sent by Dr. Wise from Pittsburgh to Mr. Stettinius, which in so many words stated that while Dr. Wise wished the resolution passed, he was prepared to acquiesce in its deferment if the Administration so desired. This, in effect, told the Administration that the Jews of America would quickly reconcile themselves to the deferment of the resolution, and that Dr. Wise, co-chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council, could be counted upon to defend the Administration's stand.

When considered in retrospect, it becomes quite clear that Dr. Wise's unauthorized telegram, sent without the prior knowledge of the Council or of Dr. Silver, sealed the fate of the Palestine resolution.

Mr. Stettinius told Senator Wagner and Dr. Silver that he would immediately transmit to the President the case as presented to him by them. (He characterized the case presented by Dr. Silver as "unanswerable.")

It must be borne in mind that every member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee received telegrams from the President of the ZOA, urging favorable action on the Palestine resolution. Similar telegrams were sent by the heads of the other parties. The telegram sent by Dr. Israel Goldstein on December 5th opened with the statement: "We earnestly urge you to report favorably the Palestine resolution for adoption by the present Congress." As of Tuesday, December 5th then, the presidents of the Zionist parties in the United States -- including Dr. Goldstein -- were officially urging the Senate Committee to act, not to defer action! If there was a decision against taking such steps and if the decision was binding and unalterable, then clearly the sending of such telegrams by the Zionist leaders was either a violation of these decisions or a reversal of earlier decisions. It is as clear as a pikestaff that if the resolution had been approved, all the Zionist leaders would have eagerly shared the credit for that achievement. Now that it has been deferred, the situation is, of course, quite different ...

What happened in the meetings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, you have learned from our earlier memorandum. It was quite clear to the State Department that the Committee was intent upon reporting favorably on the resolution. The State Department then adopted another method to achieve its end, the deferment of action on the resolution. They tried to get the Zionists themselves to withdraw the resolution. The Zionists were to assume the role of lobbyists against their own measure. Someone got in touch with Dr. Wise, presumably on Wednesday, December 6th or early Thursday morning, December 7th, for by Thursday noon Senator Connally was informing Senator Taft that the resolution would not pass the Committee, because Dr. Wise and the Zionists of New York would soon be heard from. On the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Stettinius telephoned Senator Wagner and asked him whether he had already heard from Dr. Wise and the Zionists of New York about withdrawing the resolution.

Dr. Wise lost no time in complying with the request made of him. He called two meetings, again in violation of constitutional principles, and at these meetings it was decided to send a delegation representing the 4 parties in the Council to Washington to arrange for the deferment of the resolutions. The Mizrahi Organization voted against this proposal and refused to participate in the delegation. The delegation, headed by Dr. Israel Goldstein, arrived in Washington on Friday morning, December 8th. It had been instructed to see Dr. Silver before going to the Capitol and that nothing was to be done until they had spoken with Dr. Silver. But by 8:30 A. M., Dr. Wise had already telephoned Senator Wagner, again urging him to ask for deferment.

The delegation was advised by Dr. Silver that it should not make the Zionist movement ridiculous in Washington by requesting the shelving of a resolution which all of us had been urging upon Congress for almost a year. Dr. Silver pointed out that the Senate Committee was pressing for it, that it was not the duty of Zionist leaders to press for deferment, that it was enough to indicate to the State Department that the Zionist leaders were not pressing the resolution but that the matter was in the hands of the Senate Committee, which was bent on action.

The delegation saw Mr. Stettinius, Senator Wagner and Senator Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and discussed various compromise proposals which had been considered in the discussion with Dr. Silver. The delegation made it clear to Mr. Stettinius that the Zionist leaders were not pressing for action. While the Secretary of State thought well of a compromise whereby the resolution would be voted out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with the understanding that it would not come to the floor of the Senate for final action at that session of Congress, this proposal was turned down by Senator Connally. The anti-Zionist elements in Washington who were anxious to see the resolution shelved, felt very confident -- the very presence of the delegation of Zionist leaders outside the doors of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicated that the plan to get the Zionists to disown their own measure was succeeding. Members of the Senate Committee saw what was happening. The Jews themselves were divided and did not know what they wanted after they had conducted an intensive campaign in behalf of the Palestine resolutions for almost a year -- and all this was happening only 48 hours after the very same Zionist leaders had sent telegrams to every member of the Senate Committee urging favorable action on the resolution!

The delegation of Zionists was actually invited by Senator Connally to come in and address the meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Fortunately, they refused this invitation.

What took place at the last two meetings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee you have learned from the earlier memorandum. You know that the State Department has assumed full responsibility for the deferment of action. You have seen the statement issued by the State Department. You know, too, the attitude of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as indicated by the statement which twelve of its members -- seven Democrats and five Republicans, constituting two-thirds of the Committee members who considered the resolution -- made: "... we wish to record our own personal approval of the Resolution."

When Dr. Silver presented a complete report of what had transpired in connection with the resolutions to the Emergency Council on December 20th, he made a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the present situation and submitted a program of action which he urged the Council to consider. He also urged that a sub-committee be appointed to make a careful study of the Council's organizational structure with an eye to the greater efficiency and the smoother functioning of the Council and the avoidance of such tragic pulling at cross purposes in the future.

Dr. Silver's statement and an account of what transpired at the last two meetings of the Council cannot be covered adequately in this memorandum. Suffice it to say that the small group which had been quietly opposing Dr. Silver and frustrating some of his most important efforts almost from the very moment he was named to lead American Zionist political work, refused to deal with questions of policy. They were out to "get" Dr. Silver. This clique, composed chiefly of the representatives of the Zionist Organization of America on the Council, created an "issue" -- Dr. Silver had "contravened" the Council's decisions. They could not wait to settle their score with him immediately. A motion to censure Dr. Silver was squarely rejected. However, a motion calling for the resignation of "all officers" of the Council was made, following which another motion to table this last proposal was defeated. Dr. Silver then resigned.

The ludicrousness of the trumped up charges against Dr. Silver becomes obvious after one surveys the account of what really took place in Washington. It should be added that there have been occasions when there was contravention of the Council's decisions, when Zionist leaders had acted independently and broken

discipline, and when such actions had damaging effects on our work -- but the gentlemen of the Z. O. A. in the Council not only refrained from censuring such acts, but condoned them, actually gave them moral support and encouragement. Dr. Silver was not one of the leaders whose actions were under fire. But that is a story requiring a chapter of its own.

Here, then, is an important part of this tragic story. We have dealt with first things first, and have given you an account of some important happenings in connection with the Palestine resolutions. Other important aspects of this critical situation, as well as a discussion of the basic and vital question of policy involved here (which is really the core of the problem) must be dealt with separately. This basic question of policy should be fairly clear to you from this memorandum and from Dr. Silver's statement of resignation: "I shall continue to advocate ... a policy in which timidity, appeasement and backstairs 'diplomacy' will have no place."

Harry L. Shapiro

Formerly Executive Director,
American Zionist Emergency Council

Harold P. Manson

Formerly Director of Information,
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INFORMATION ON THE OIL QUESTION

1944

Mr. Patrick Hurley is the third largest share-holder in the Sinclair concern. As far as he knew, the Sinclair groups are not involved in the Arabian oil business and there is no indication that they are trying to come in. There are rumors that Mr. Hurley wants to become chairman of the Government Petroleum Reserve Corporation, an organization which is to build the pipe lines, but nothing definite has been done about this yet.

The companies involved in the Saudi Arabian oil business are the Standard Oil Company of California, The Texas Co. and the Gulf Exploration Company. The leading group is the Standard Oil Company of California.

A Mr. Thornberg, who was formerly adviser on oil to the State Department, is now the representative of the Arabian-American Oil Company, which is owned by Standard Oil of California and Texas. The dinner to the sons of Ibn Saud in New York was arranged by Cal-Arabia and Tex-Arabia.

Dr. Goldmann then received the following review of the situation: Sometime ago, the President set up the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, as a division of the RFC (Reconstruction Finance Corporation.) The members of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation are Mr. Ickes, Mr. Knox, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Jesse Jones and Mr. Hull. At the suggestion of Mr. Ickes, the PRC decided to go into the Saudi Arabian oil business where private concessions are held by Cal-Arabia and Tex-Arabia. The original plan had been for the government to participate in the ownership of the concessions, together with private companies. This was violently opposed by the companies and Ickes had to give in. A plan was then formulated whereby the PRC should build the pipe lines which would go from Saudi Arabia to Haifa. The approximate cost is 150 million dollars; however, the gentleman thought that it would probably go up to have a billion dollars. The money is supposed to be repaid within twenty-five years by the private companies who own the concession. In addition, the private companies are to keep a reserve of one million barrels continuously for the government, and sell oil to the government at 25% below the market price.

The cost of transporting oil from Arabia to Haifa, where it would be refined, would amount to twelve to fourteen cents a barrel, of which twelve cents is paid to the Suez Canal Company for passage through the Canal. If, as a reverse lend-lease act, England would allow free passage through the Suez Canal, transportation would be two cents per barrel and would be much cheaper than building pipe lines through the desert. Moreover, Wallace E. Pratt, president of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and one of the great oil geologists, professes that by digging deeper in the United States oil wells, oil reserves for hundreds of years would be available. The

shortage of oil in America, one of the main arguments of Mr. Ickes is explained by the price policy of the OPA, which by its ceilings, makes it unattractive for the wild-catters who are digging oil, to dig deeper and find new resources.

Moreover, if the pipe-line is built, the royalties to Ibn Saud would amount to \$75,000 per day and would enable him to build an army and be a constant threat of blackmail to the American government and its pipe-line.

The oil adviser of the Navy is Commodore Andrew Carter who is connected with various Texas Oil Companies. The oil adviser of the Army is General Pyron, the former president of the Gulf Oil Company and one of the larger share holders of Cal-Arabia. The oil adviser of the Department of the Interior, Mr. Ralph Davies, is the Vice-President of the Standard Oil Company of California.



[fragment]

[Dec. 1944]

should be taken since we would meet on Monday in Washington and I would then have the opportunity to participate in the deliberations.

A meeting was accordingly held on Saturday night which I understand lasted to the wee hours of the morning. Attempts, I understand, were made to put through resolutions to repudiate me and my action. Actually no action was taken.

On Monday morning, ^{the} Executive of the Zionist Emergency Council met in Washington. At this meeting I gave a tentative report. I succeeded in persuading the members not to register any formal objection to the passage of our resolution! I need not now re-state the reasons which I gave. The Executive Committee agreed and, in so doing, reversed the decision taken at the unauthorized meeting of the Council, December 7! Instead, our Executive considered a proposal to request Stettinius (an appointment with him had previously been made by Dr. Wise) to issue a statement (a) that his appearance before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in opposition to our resolution is in no ^{way} wise to be construed as indicating that the State Department is not in accord with the line of clear policy laid down by the President on October 15, and (b) that if we agreed to the deferment of our resolution the State Department would raise no objections to it when it would be re-introduced in the next Congress. I approved the first part and strongly opposed the second part, and the Committee agreed to eliminate it. It was then suggested that I accompany Dr. Wise to the interview with Stettinius. Dr. Goldstein and Mr. Shulman joined the delegation. In the cab on the way over, Dr. Wise made sure to destroy that part of our draft proposal which suggested postponement of our resolution. Mr. Stettinius thought favorably of the suggested statement and said that he would take it up with the President. Dr. Wise said that he would send him a corrected draft of the suggested statement.

It was now an hour or two before the scheduled meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Committee met at 2:30. The version agreed on by Wagner and Vandenberg was presented, and while the committee was discussing it,

Mr. Stettinius made a second appearance before it. He brought a personal plea from the President not to act on the resolution. He read, too, a telegram which had been sent to the President on November 19, from a group of Moslem societies in Cairo. A copy of this telegram Mr. Stettinius, at the request of the President, forwarded to Dr. Wise and to me on December 13. It had evidently made a great impression on the President, for echoes of it are found in his letter to Senator Wagner.

The telegram reads as follows:

"To the President of the United States

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House

Washington.

1. The Arabs, who are anxious to maintain cordial relations with America, do not wish to attach great importance to certain declarations regarding Palestine which were made during the recent political campaign, for they realize, on the one hand, that these declarations were made in abnormal circumstances, and they consider on the other hand, that the declarations contradict the spirit of justice sponsored by you and by the noble American Nation, and are prejudicial to the cause of peace for which America is fighting. Moreover, they are contrary to the right of Arabs to live freely in their own country.

"The American political campaign is now over, and Arabs expect you, Mr. President, to dispel their fears, restore their faith in American justice, and draw closer the bonds of friendship planted by American schools and nurtured by American teachings and doctrines in the Middle East.

"2. No country in the world has suffered a greater injustice than Palestine. From time immemorial it has been an Arab country. Jews entered it as invaders and only occupied it for a short time; for they were constantly at war with the aborigines, and other invaders soon drove them out until the Arabs, more than thirteen centuries ago, finally liberated the country and settled it.

"3. Palestine is, by the will of God and the patriotism of its people, an Arab country and will forever remain so. Seventy million Arabs, supported by three hundred million Moslems, are determined to redeem it with their lives. Neither the Balfour Declaration, nor the declarations of statesmen and the power of Zionism employing various measures of force and coercion can change the course of history or dissuade Arabs from defending Palestine and checking the tide of Zionism.

"4. Arabs have always sympathized with Jews in their afflictions in past, mediaeval and modern times and history bears witness to this fact. But Zionism has met this kindness by conspiring against Arabs and attempting to wrest Palestine from them. This has naturally led to feuds and bitter feeling which have left no hope of reconciliation or mutual understanding.

"5. The project of installing Jews in Palestine will undoubtedly lead to permanent conflicts which will not only come to an end by one people destroying the other, not only in Palestine but in the whole East as well. This fact is worthy of your attention and the attention of all those who are anxious to establish universal peace and tranquillity in the future.

"6. Arabs cannot believe that Democratic America is capable of helping usurpers, encouraging injustice, sacrificing her reputation, repudiating her mission in this world, discarding her friendship with the Arab world, and foregoing the moral and material interests which she has in Arab and Moslem countries, all for the sake of a race which is widely scattered in the world, and which only relies on the power of money for the realization of its designs.

"For the above reasons, Arabs meeting in Congress hope that you will uphold them in their own country and that Zionism will be given no support by you, your Government or your people."

"(Signed)

"THE ARAB UNION SOCIETY,
Fouad Abaza Pasha, President
Assad Dagher, Secretary General

"THE YOUNG MEN'S MOSLEM ASSOCIATION
Dr. Dardiri, Secretary General

[1944]

THE AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL - A YEAR OF ACTIVITY

The American Zionist Emergency Council came into being a year ago, during the darkest period of recent Zionist history. At a time when certain official quarters went so far as to attempt a ban on open discussion of the Palestine question, the major Zionist bodies in the United States -- the Zionist Organization of America, Hadassah, Mizrachi and Poale Zion -- joined in re-organizing the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs and establishing the Council as the political and public relations arm of the entire American Zionist movement. Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Dr. Stephen S. Wise were named co-chairmen of the Council and immediately set out to mobilize public opinion behind Zionist aspirations through a broad public relations program.

A number of special departments, directed by experts in their respective fields, were established. These included departments dealing with Community Contacts, Information (Press and Radio), Publications, Speakers, Research, Intellectual Mobilization, Christian Opinion, American Jewish Religious Forces, Special Events, Labor Relations, etc. A permanent bureau was set up in Washington and almost immediately official circles began to recognize that a dynamic force was on the scene -- a responsible organization voicing the sentiments of an overwhelming majority of American Jewry.

More than 300 local emergency committees were formed throughout the country, and in December, 1943, the first conference of local committee chairmen was held in Cleveland, where detailed plans to enlist American public opinion in support of the Council's work were formulated. The heads of these local groups returned to their cities, inspired to carry out the most effective program of education in American Zionist history. Hundreds of editorials in papers ranging from country journals to metropolitan dailies, scores of resolutions, rallies, radio addresses and articles by Jewish and non-Jewish leaders resulted from the educational activities carried on in the local communities.

Another highly successful conference of local committee chairmen took place on May 23rd and 24th in Washington.

On the political front, the most important step was the introduction of the Palestine resolutions in both Houses of Congress. Of course this involved risks, but the Council was convinced that the risk of inaction was even greater.

During the hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Zionist leaders presented our case in a brilliant manner, and the local committees did magnificent work. From every state in the Union, thousands of letters, post-cards and telegrams were sent to the members of Congress. Seldom had Washington seen such amazing public interest in a piece of legislation.

While action was deferred at the request of the military, it should be made clear that these measures are not dead. When the proper moment arrives, the Council will press for action on the Palestine resolutions.

As a result of the widespread public agitation and education brought about by the Palestine resolutions, the "conspiracy of silence" on the Palestine question was broken, and on March 9th President Roosevelt authorized Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver to say that "the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939...and that when future decisions are reached, full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish National Home."

The Council's educational activity in Washington also helped to bring about the inclusion in the platforms of both major political parties of excellent Palestine planks. On June 27, 1944, the Republican National Convention declared:

"In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the Resolution of a Republican Congress in 1922, Palestine may be constituted as a free and democratic Commonwealth..."

This pronouncement was followed three weeks later, on July 20th, by the Democratic National Convention's declaration, as follows:

"We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth."

With both major political parties giving their unqualified endorsement to the Jewish people's efforts to rebuild their national life in Palestine, Zionism has become a declared objective in the postwar program of the United States.

While much has been accomplished in the past year, there are many obstacles to be overcome on our road to complete victory. The continued support of an overwhelming majority of American Jewry is required to bring this drive to a successful conclusion. With that support, victory is almost assured, and the day when Palestine shall be established as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth not too far distant.



1/16/44 - John 372N 1002 1944
People have forgotten the history of the establishment of the Agency Bureau in Washington.

Dr. Weizmann had become greatly dissatisfied with the work of the Emergency Committee as indeed had many other Zionists. He insisted upon its re-organization. He could not accomplish his purposes. He asked me, early 1943, at meetings attended by Dr. Wise, Mr. Lipsky and Nahum Goldmann to take over the direction of the Emergency Committee and the political work of our Movement. I demurred knowing of the determined opposition to me within the Emergency Committee. I told both Dr. Weizmann and Dr. Wise that while I was willing to fight for Zionism I was not willing to start a fight with Zionists for the privilege of serving the cause. When Dr. Weizmann realized that the re-organization of the Emergency Committee could not be accomplished, he decided to exercise his authority as President of the World Zionist Movement and announce such a re-organization on his own authority, a plan in which Dr. Wise, Mr. Lipsky, Goldmann and others concurred. A meeting was set for March 31, when this re-organization was to have been announced, but on the day before the meeting was called off.

Subsequently, negotiations began with Shertok and the Jewish Agency looking toward the establishment of a political office in Washington which would be controlled by a political committee of American Zionists. I was asked to be chairman of that committee, but a determined opposition on the part of those forces within the Zionist Emergency Committee, of whose opposition I was aware, made itself manifest. The political office was established in May, 1943, without the political committee being announced, but, as it was put, "in cooperation with Mr. Louis Lipsky and Dr. Wise." What this cooperation implied, was not defined.

When it became clear to some of my friends that the work of the political re-organization which, they, together with Dr. Weizmann, and Dr. Wise believed imperative was being sabotaged by a handful of people who did not represent the true sentiments of American Zionists, it was resolved to challenge the control of this group. It was then that the "Movement to Draft Silver" for the presidency of the ZOA was initiated, with the opposition backing the candidacy of Dr. Goldstein.

As a result of prolonged negotiations which went on throughout the summer of 1943, an agreement was reached and made public -- that I was to assume the leadership in the sphere of political affairs of the Zionist Movement in the United States by becoming Co-chairman with Dr. Wise of the Emergency Committee, and Chairman of its Executive, as well as Chairman of the political committee, if such were to be called into existence, which would supervise the work of the political office in Washington, of which Dr. Goldmann was the director.

Early in the process of the re-organization of the Emergency Committee, it was agreed that the Executive Committee of the Council should function as the political committee. Goldmann's political office in Washington should thus have come under direct authority of the Emergency Council, as it was originally intended.

But Goldmann by then had conceived of himself as the head of an independent political bureau in Washington subject to no American control responsible not to the Emergency Council but presumably only to Jerusalem. He has maintained this attitude ever since.

Had Dr. Weizmann succeeded in achieving the re-organization of the Emergency Committee early in 1945, he never would have established the political bureau in Washington. The explanation which was given by Mr. She tok to the public when he announced the creation of the Washington bureau was that the public in the United States knows little concerning Jewish aspirations and achievements in Palestine and that there was need for better presentation of the Zionist cause before the United States Government. The Emergency Council since its re-organization in September has done quite satisfactorily in both directions. It is equipped to do even better. There is no need for the Agency Bureau in Washington to carry on either of these two activities. It should limit itself to transacting business with Latin America and such other activities as do not come within the program of the American Zionist Emergency Council.



Wey

The Program Committee recommends to the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council for favorable action the following:

1) All approaches to the American Government or its officials on matters relating to the program of political activities of the American Zionist Emergency Council shall be undertaken by representatives of the Movement only with the prior approval of the Executive Committee of the Council.

2) Dr. Goldmann as a member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency has assented with this view and has expressed his desire to act in conformity therewith and in fullest cooperation with the Emergency Council.

3) Whenever matters related to the program of the political activities of the Emergency Council are brought to the attention of Dr. Goldmann in his capacity as a member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency between meetings of the Executive of the Emergency Council which call for an immediate approach to the American Government or to its officials, Dr. Goldmann shall consult with the co-chairmen of the Emergency Council, and together they shall agree on procedure as to who shall make the approach and in what manner.

4) The officers of the Jewish Agency in London and in Jerusalem shall be informed of this action of the American Zionist Emergency Council and shall be requested to communicate in the future directly with the American Zionist Emergency Council on all matters which relate to the political activities of the Council.

1944 Gol 15 חתום על ידי משה גולדמן
מחלקת המידע והפרסום

It has been agreed by the Program Committee that all the approaches to the American Government or its officials on matters related to the program of political activity of the Emergency Council shall be undertaken by representatives of the Movement only with the approval of the Executive Committee of the Council or of such sub-committee as may be designated by it.

Dr. Goldmann as a member of the Emergency Council has assented to this view and has expressed his desire to act in conformity therewith.

It is suggested that the co-chairmen of the Council alone or with additional persons designated by them confer with Dr. Goldmann with a view to the procedural implementation of these decisions.

In view of the action taken the Committee expresses the hope that Dr. Silver will withdraw the resignation he has tendered which shall not be made a matter of record.



[1944?]

STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE

The so-called "Hebrew Committee of National Liberation" is an irresponsible adventurer which comes to the American public without credentials and menaces the cause it presumes to espouse.

The committee pretends to speak in the name of the "Hebrew nation" in Palestine, but it has no mandate from the Jewish National Assembly, which is the authorized and democratically-elected spokesman of the Jews of Palestine. On the contrary, the leaders of this committee are linked with an extremist clique in Palestine, which amounts to less than one per cent of the Jews of that country, and which has been outlawed by the Jews of Palestine because of its anti-democratic and terroristic tactics. It pretends to see a distinction between "Jews" and "Hebrews," which no Jew would be able to appreciate or understand, but which is intended to divide and disrupt the Jewish people. The real object of the Hebrew Committee is to destroy the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the official and internationally recognized body created by the League of Nations to act with the Mandatory Power "to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home."

The great majority of the Jews of the United States favor the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine as the one positive solution for Jewish homelessness in the post-war world. This was made clear at the AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE last September.

The bizarre ideology of the "Hebrew Committee of National Liberation" would fragmentize the Jewish people instead of uniting them. Its separatist and undisciplined tactics aim to undermine established Jewish agencies and institutions. The Jewish cause is prejudiced and humiliated by such irresponsible enterprises on the part of a group that pretends to speak for Jews.

STATEMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

The Jewish Agency for Palestine is the only international body recognized under Article IV of the Mandate for Palestine by the British Government, the United States and the League of Nations, as representing the Jewish people in all matters concerning the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It is composed of all Zionist organizations the world over and numerous non-Zionists in various countries.

The attempt of a few persons who have come from Palestine to this country without any authority, without having been delegated by any group in Palestine, having played no role whatever in Jewish life in Palestine or elsewhere, to proclaim themselves as the "trustees of the Hebrew Nation's interest" is an act which, I am sure, will be rejected by all sections of the Jewish people as a fraud.

There is some danger that well-intentioned non-Jewish groups, eager to help the Jewish people in a time of tragedy, may be misled by the bombastic phrases and claims made by an insignificant group which substitutes noise for complete lack of standing, authority and influence in Jewish life. These well-meaning friends must be warned that by allowing themselves to be persuaded by these impertinent maneuvers they are harming the very cause which they wish to serve.

The insignificant group which the members of the new committee claim to represent has already done untold damage in Palestine by trying to break the unity of Palestinian Jewry and by introducing methods which the overwhelming majority of Palestinian Jewry has rejected with scorn and contempt. American public opinion should not allow itself to be fooled by the acts of a few men whom a normally organized people would deal with as traitors to the common cause and exclude from its community. There is not the slightest chance that any responsible group, Jewish or non-Jewish, not to speak of governments or the League of Nations, will pay any attention to this group, but as they have in the past, through various tricks, succeeded in misleading and confusing spokesmen of American public opinion, this warning is necessary. Whoever wants to help the Jewish people and the Zionist movement must do it by cooperating with the established and recognized organizations, the leading one of which is the Jewish Agency -- the only internationally recognized body authorized to act for the Jewish people in all matters affecting Palestine. By helping the self-styled Hebrew Committee of National Liberation, which purports to speak on behalf of Jews who never gave them authority to represent them, the prestige and influence of the Jewish organizations charged with the complex and responsible task of building the Jewish Homeland will be weakened and harm will be done to the Jewish people.

STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL

It is all fantastic and would be comic if it were not so tragic. A handful of young men are attempting to perpetrate a colossal hoax upon the American people, and we would warn the public, the press, and all official circles against being taken in by such a brazen fraud. The self-appointed "Hebrew Committee of National Liberation" is made up of half a dozen adventurers from Palestine with no standing, no credentials, no mandate from anyone unless it be from the Irgun Zevai Leumi in Palestine, an insignificantly small pistol-packing group of extremists who are claiming credit for some of the recent terror outrages. Every movement has its lunatic fringe and irresponsible splinter factions, and it is natural that they should exist also in our midst. The danger is that uninformed people may be taken in and may be led to believe that a new Moses has arisen in Israel . . .

For more than 40 years, Jews throughout the world have been concerned with the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. To that end, there were constituted on a democratic basis the World Zionist Organization, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine which for 25 years have been headed by Dr. Chaim Weizmann. The World Zionist Organization's representatives meet biennially as the Zionist Congress and elect their leadership, who constitute the Executive. Together with the representatives of the non-Zionists, they constitute the Jewish Agency for Palestine, officially recognized in the Palestine Mandate to represent Jewish interests and Jewish rights with respect to Palestine. The Jewish Agency maintains permanent offices in London, Jerusalem, Geneva and elsewhere. It carries on necessary political work and handles immigration and colonization into Palestine. For this work it spends annually about \$10,000,000 provided by regular contributions of Jewish communities.

In America, the Zionist movement is represented by the American Zionist Emergency Council, headed by Dr. Stephen S. Wise, of New York, and Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, of Cleveland, as co-chairmen. . . .

So far as the Jewish community of Palestine, which numbers approximately 600,000, is concerned, it is democratically organized and is represented by a National Council, the Vaad Leumi. This body is likewise officially recognized by the Palestine Government, controls and directs the Jewish school system, social welfare work, etc. It also has a limited taxing power under the law. The Vaad Leumi, of course, recognizes the Jewish Agency for Palestine and cooperates with it closely.

To complete the picture, it should be added that the overwhelming majority of American Jews, through a democratically constituted AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE in New York last summer adopted a post-war program with reference to Jewish rights in Europe, as well as to the Palestine question. Represented in the AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE are hundreds of local communities, as well as about 60 leading national organizations, including all the Zionist organizations, the B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Congress, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the Rabbinical Assembly of America, the Council of Jewish Women, etc. . . .

[fragment, 1944]

- 7 -

IV. The Resolutions in Congress

On January 27th, Representatives James A. Wright (Dem.) of Pennsylvania and Ranulf Compton (Rep.) of Connecticut introduced in the House a resolution calling for a reaffirmation of the declaration of the Sixty-Seventh Congress of the United States on June 30th, 1922, and resolving

On February 2nd, an identical resolution was fathered in the Senate by Senators Robert F. Wagner (Dem.) of New York and Robert A. Taft (Rep.) of Ohio. These resolutions were introduced with auspicious support. Upon their introduction, vigorous endorsements came from Majority Floor Leader John W. McCormack (Dem.) of Massachusetts and Minority Floor Leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (Rep.) of Massachusetts, and the leaders of the Senate, United States Senators Alben W. Barkley (Dem.) of Kentucky and Wallace H. White, Jr. (Rep.) of Maine.

The Palestine Commission of the Conference met on January 31st and voted to endorse the resolutions and to urge their support by its delegates and its affiliated national organizations. The Conference issued the following statement:

"The American Jewish Conference is highly gratified with the Palestine resolutions which have been introduced in the Senate and in the House of the Congress of the United States. These resolutions reflect the spirit of the Palestine Resolution which was adopted by an overwhelming vote at the great gathering of the American Jewish Conference held last September. The Congressional resolutions will, if adopted, be of utmost significance in securing the rights of the Jewish people in Palestine and the opening of the doors of Palestine for unrestricted Jewish immigration. The warm reception which the resolutions have received in both branches of Congress and at the hands of the leaders of both parties augurs well for their passage. The American Jewish Conference calls upon all its delegates and all the national organizations affiliated with it to lend their utmost support to these resolutions and to make heard the voice of American Jewry against the White Paper and in behalf of the Jewish Commonwealth in the halls of Congress."

The Co-Chairmen of the Interim Committee sent letters to the authors of the resolutions and to Congressional leaders who were supporting them, expressing the Conference's appreciation.

II

Taking stock of our situation as of to-day, following the postponement of our resolution I should like to make the following observations. We have suffered a set-back. There is no doubt about that. But it is not as serious as some have assumed.

Suppose what had transpired in the last few weeks had not taken place. Suppose nothing has been done in connection with our Resolutions in the House and in the Senate. What would have happened? The Resolutions would have died in the present Congress. It is naive to assume that nobody would have made any inquiries as to why the Resolutions were not acted upon. The whole country had been stirred up to the very last days of the present Congress to demand and to expect action. As I indicated earlier, to the very last days telegrams and petitions were pouring into Washington, many of them from the hands of Zionist leaders, pressing for action. Some satisfactory explanation would have had to be given. What could we say? That we regarded the President's statement on October 15 and the political platforms as sufficient and there was no longer any need for the resolutions? Then why in the world did we keep on pressing for the resolutions after October 15 with the full knowledge and approval of the Zionist Emergency Council? Why did the ZOA Convention in Atlantic City, following the President's statement, ask for Congressional action? Why did we ask Congressmen and Senators all over the country to pledge themselves before election to vote for our resolutions? No, that explanation would not hold water. We would then have to say that the State Department and the President had requested us to defer action and that we complied. This would have called forth indignant inquiries as to why the State Department and the President asked for deferment; the same

indignant inquiries which are now being made and on top of it the Zionist leadership would have been roundly condemned for having consented to such action.

Our enemies certainly would have made maximum capital of the situation. Congress, in spite of all the urging and prompting of the Zionists, refused to act. The Arabs would have hailed that as a great triumph, for they had appealed directly to Congress not to act on our Resolutions and Congress complied with their request. Anti-Zionists in the United States would have had a field day at this major defeat.

But how do we stand now as the result of what has transpired in the last few weeks? There was no actual rejection of our resolution by the Congress of the United States.

On the contrary. Every indication is conclusive that the Congress was prepared to approve of it. The House Foreign Affairs Committee actually approved of it, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as evidenced by the Round Robin, which the Senators signed, had a majority and more than a majority to approve it. The President, had the resolution deferred. We have not lost ground therefore with the American people, with American public opinion and with the legislative representatives of our country. The action of deferment has been severely criticized by the public press. There has hardly been anywhere an approval of its action. It has not convinced the American people. These are fact, and these true facts should be stressed and driven home to our people and to the American people generally. We should not talk of the defeat of our resolution - even if some of us are anxious to discredit this or that leader. It will do great hurt to Zionist morale. Every Zionist body will suffer.

X — As far as the President is concerned, future events will show that we have gained rather than lost ground. The report which has been widely spread that the President is angry at what has happened, as far as I know, rests on no evidence. It appears to be either a surmise or an interpretation calculated to create a panic

him best that he constantly takes these pressures and influences into account and his action is often the composite resultant of these various pressures. That is natural; that is human. This is true also in the matter of Palestine. Do not deceive yourselves. Apart from such pressure as we exert from time to time, there are always other pressures which our adversaries are exerting in one form or another. The Arabs, British influences, American anti-Zionists, Jewish anti-Zionists and the President's letter of December 3 to Senator Wagner clearly reflects this ~~xx~~ situation. Does anyone really think that if Zionist pressure were removed, we would gain by it? Or would not the inevitable result be that combined and continuous pressure from our adversaries would push the President further and further away from a pro-Zionist line?

I want to make it perfectly clear so that there may be no misunderstanding: I do not mean that we must attack him or that we deal with him tactlessly. Such pressure as we may find it advisable to exert from time to time must be well and wisely considered and we must be sure of our ground. It must be legitimate and appropriate. Surely no one will assert that the proposed action by Congress, repeating in substance what the President himself had said only a few weeks earlier, could be regarded by any reasonable person as being unreasonable or inappropriate. On the contrary, the veto imposed by the Administration was not reasonable in the circumstances. In this matter it is we who are the aggrieved party, not the President, and Mr. Roosevelt as a reasonable man must himself recognize this to be true. That is the only position which we can take as self-respecting men and representatives of a self-respecting movement.

X- submitted to his judgment with great misgivings, that the Zionists have a right to know what is in the President's mind and in the mind of the State Department with reference to Jewish aspirations in Palestine. The hour is late, the air is full of plans, proposals and counter-proposals. So far we have had nothing from our Government but two official prohibitions against a pro-Zionist resolution in Congress on the one hand, and his own statement, which he was unwilling to have Congress endorse!

X- Those who say that our political strategy is to keep the President always sweet-tempered, to explain away his every error and bad judgment in relation to our cause, and to say "yea" and "nay" whenever he says "yea" or "nay" are, in my humble judgment, terribly in the wrong. To criticize the President is not to attack him. He is being criticized by friends and by members of his own party frequently for what they regard as wrong policies or bad appointments, or political mistakes. So is Mr. Churchill criticized by his friends frequently. The President will gain respect for us and will lend a more attentive ear to us if we grow in independence and in dignified insistence on what we believe to be morally due us. The President must be made aware that there is a critical judgment to satisfy, an appraising eye and an uncompromising determination on the part of the Jews in the United States and non-Jews, as well, who want to see full justice to Jewish Palestine, and count upon the President because of the grave commitments he has made and the responsibility which he has voluntarily assumed to do his utmost to see that this justice is done.

XX X- We must always bear in mind that the President is constantly subject to conflicting pressures of all kinds from all quarters on all subjects. He is accustomed to it; it is his daily bread. Moreover, we are assured by some who know



SHOFARGRAM

תקע בשופר גדול לחירותנו

יום ז' לסדר אורח ולציון כלל היום וכו'

1944

ליום ורד זכרה למצוינת בלוי

ז' חמשה עשר סיון תש"ד

יום צאת מצרים ממצרים

זכר המלחמה האומללת. אמונה לך להשמיד את האויב חזק.
בטח קיבצו את המאמרים הראשונים בעתותיהם, ובעתותיהם היוצאות.
אנשיהם בלגיה לזכר הלידה לזכרם שחיה נפלאה בארץ חיים זו.

ע"ז אלו האנשים, המאמרים והעניינים ששלו פתח הסנסון למצוינת, כי לא
היה המה ציון אסון. גם היתה לי ההצמחות לעולם זו במסוק ולחיות
מה שהיה בו כיבול אצל האדם הפועל המלאכה זו שמה בשם הקולטנים

המאמרים "והצמח אלו שחיה אלו עם קרן חיים וקרן הקיימת. היתה
אז יחזק עם ליוב יטה בשליחות קה"ס, והיה צי בציין וקל.

דורש, אהיה העצור, כוכבים דמה האנשים את המלחמה והמאמרים
להם אצל אלו את המחקר את יצוק בשדה רבות אלוהות זו. גם ציון המלחמה "עולם
אחיו כהלכה. ישם במלחמה הנאצים לשמורם במסוק זה לשמורם ולשליחם, עשה לה
פוכחות ששליחת זה והיה למלחמה אחרת צדק ולחיה נפלאה.

היה מביק אורח, אלו חיות בני המסוקים וכל התנועה אליו בשם
ש"ה ואחיה אלו. בלגיה ובלגיה נפלאה שם מרדכי חזק.

January 5, 1945

PERSONAL

The Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Morgenthau:

May I send you the greetings of the new year and all my good wishes for the coming days.

On November 2 I wrote you a letter in which I included extracts from letters sent to me by Dr. Weizmann which he requested me to show to you. In the letter I also inquired whether you received a document which Dr. Weizmann was sending to you.

Mr. Chauncey, of your office, replied on November 4 that you were absent from Washington for several days and that my letter would be brought to your attention upon your return. Not having heard from you, I am wondering whether my letter was brought to your attention.

I should like, also, to refer to ^{your} ~~my~~ letter of October 31, following our conversation in your office, and my letter of October 26. In your letter you indicated that you would inform the President of our conversation. I am wondering whether you have had the opportunity to do so.

Since writing to you last, I have withdrawn from the chairmanship of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Emergency Council. You may have seen references to it in the public press. I am now a private in the ranks, but as deeply interested in the great cause as I have ever been.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK

Please Return

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CONFIDENTIAL

Bronxville, N.Y. Jan. 6, 1945
Tel. Bronxville 2:1036

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Rabbi
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Doctor Silver -

Your wire of a few days ago I found upon my return here. It will, unfortunately, not be possible for me to accept your kind invitation to address your congregation on the Sunday you mention. I am speaking in the Congregational Church of Stamford that morning on a union service of all the Protestant denominations. There have been a few cases of flagrant anti-Jewish discrimination in that town and the various ministers thought it best to have the thing thrashed out in the open, in God's house, as they said, in the good old American way of the Town Hall meeting. When it was put up to me that way, I dared not refuse. They are nearly all young men, terribly in earnest. To me talking about anti-Semitism is an awful bore, but I overcame my impatience and am now willing to suffer to the extent of wearing gown and bib and buckled shoes for a few hours. I hope you will excuse me.

I had intended to write you a few days earlier. What does Homer say? "I was on the point of knocking when you prevented me by opening the door." In fact I had written you a long letter, but I tore it up again thinking that it might seem presumptuous on my part, a non-Jew and therefore not a Zionist (officially) to mix into affairs which were not my concern. But then I was so ardently pressed these last few weeks by the Doctors Wise and Goldstein to come out with an act or statement in support of their particular attitude in the current diversity of opinion, that I got ~~me~~ myself into such trouble and vexation of spirit that I was almost decided to leave Zionism alone altogether. Now it was "dear Pierre, I want to be guided by you (Israel Goldstein) and we should (nota bene) have our pictures taken together for the N.P." And from Dr. Wise all sorts of flattering remarks, but behind my back they instructed the Christian Council not to have me speak as I am (contemptible argument!) more anti-British than pro-Zionist. If I am anti-imperialistically inclined, not anti-British, wasn't it for the sake of Zion and the Jewish people that I took this attitude? Do these gents think that I could not be basking in high favor with their FDR and their Churchill if I, as British subject, had taken an anti-Zionist point of view, which is so easy to take for the Gentile with anti-nationalist notions?

Now I am told "the Jewish masses listen to you," by both Dr. Wise and Goldstein, "and you must help repair the damage inflicted by Dr. Silver."

Well, I am not going to do it. That's all there is to it. Rather cast out, and muzzled and lied about, than betray the cause of Zion. I spoke in Washington last week. We had as large a crowd as in Severance Hall and 25 Protestant ministers on the platform. And there I defended your attitude, as far as I understand it, and your point of view. When I said this: "It is one thing for Dr. Weizmann and the leaders of the Agency to pursue a policy of trust and confidence in Britain and Churchill and to wait patiently for some concession after the war, they probably cannot do otherwise. But for Dr. Wise and Dr. Goldstein to pursue a similar policy of laissez-drift vis-a-vis of FDR is impolitic, un-American, and will lead to complete stagnation. On the other hand an aggressive, militant, American Zionist policy, a policy pursued by American Zionists, of determined criticism and impatienc

will immensely strengthen the hands of Dr. Weizmann. He can in that case point to the greatest Jewish community in the world as no longer satisfied with sacharine assurances of good will for after the war. I said I understood this to be the view of Dr. Silver and the house literally rose to its feet and cheered your name, the goyim, too, by the way! Significant!

The same thing to-night at the Brooklyn Jewish Center, which had the synagogue crowded to the rafters. There we had a question period. And I came out openly against Wise cum suis. In Louis I. Newman's Temple last Friday, too, the same thing.

After the meeting last night, I talked with the Brooklyn Zionist leaders. They asked my advice. They were boiling with indignation. They want to sweep the administration into the ash can. I think they will. The Jews are sick and tired of appeasement and whispers and dark hints. Their kinsmen are dying in Europe. The White Paper is in force. Tomorrow the British will tell us: there are no Jews clamoring to enter Palestine. The Jews are dead. Hitler killed them. Before this argument is advanced they want action. And they feel that you ought to lead them. They are waiting for word from you. They are deeply stirred.

The Mizrachi, who believe I am their particular chaver, called at my house here in Bronxville. I advised them not to quit yet, to wait till we hear from you.

And so it goes. But, the others are not sitting still. There is a furious, base campaign of slander going on. I will tell you more about that in detail when I see you, and of course, I am now to be silenced, too.

The trial of the Irgunist case (my case) is also taking a wrong direction. Bergson won the first round. The American Jewish Committee had a series of articles published in the W. Telegram wherein it was hinted that in addition to being anti-Catholic, I am also anti-Semitic, vide my slander of a reputable Jewish organization. Instead of defending me, Shulman let that go. They, the lawyers, have collected no data, have no material to present to the court. I suspect double dealing. An attempt to discredit me, kill two birds with one stone, so to speak. I don't put it past them after what I have learned in the last few weeks. But enough! I hope you can read this. I can't use a typewriter, having only one hand. The other one I gave for Mr. Churchill's Empire when I thought that England was the "mother of the free." Foolish Dutchman, wasn't I?

With regards and assurances of solidarity and my respects, please to the Rabina.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Pierre van Paassen
5 a.m.

P.S. I am told the meetings in Dayton, Columbus, Indianapolis and Cincinnati which I am scheduled to address are to be cancelled in view of my "anti-Zionist attitude in Washington." Quel toupet!

[April 8, 1945]

AMERICAN ZIONIST POLICY COMMITTEE
55 WEST 42nd STREET
NEW YORK 18, NEW YORK
TELEPHONE: LACKawanna 4-7319

Translation of a special dispatch by S. Dingol in The Jewish Day,
April 8, 1945. (Similar dispatches have appeared in the Jewish
Morning Journal and the Jewish Daily Forward)

PEACE IN ZIONIST RANKS COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHIN TEN MINUTES, SAYS DR. SILVER

- - -

ZIONIST LEADER ASSERTS THAT THE DISPUTE WITHIN ZIONIST LEADERSHIP
COULD BE SOLVED EASILY WITH GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES. - DOUBTS
WHETHER THE COMMITTEE NAMED BY DR. GOLDSTEIN WILL ACHIEVE THIS

- - -

The furor which has arisen in American Zionist circles over Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver's forced resignation from the leadership of the American Zionist Emergency Council, and the protests and demands for his return to leadership which have come from all parts of the country, have finally brought about a decision by the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America to name a committee which will explore the possibilities of restoring peace in the Zionist movement.

Dr. Israel Goldstein, President of the Zionist Organization of America, named a committee of five, with Judge Louis E. Levinthal as chairman, for that purpose. The four other members of the committee are: Daniel Frisch, Louis Lipsky, Ezra Shapiro, and Dewey Stone.

When the membership of the group was made public, the American Zionist Policy Committee, which supports Dr. Silver's policies, issued a statement expressing no confidence in the committee because, with one exception, it is made up of Dr. Silver's opponents, and "not a single member of the committee represents the forces in American Zionism which have publicly demanded the recall of Dr. Silver."

Dr. Silver was in New York on Friday afternoon and we made use of the occasion to meet with him and get his opinion on the possibility for peace in the Zionist leadership, and on the committee which was named by Dr. Goldstein.

Dr. Silver asserted that peace in the Zionist leadership can be achieved very easily.

"Peace in American Zionism can be brought about within ten minutes!" Dr. Silver declared. "If Dr. Wise and I were to discuss the matter and if it were made clear that the question of prestige is not involved, but that this concerns the best interests of Zionism, then I don't think we would have much difficulty in understanding each other, provided that outside influences will not be involved."

"And what is your opinion on the peace committee?" I asked Rabbi Silver.

"The American Zionist Policy Committee, with which I am in complete harmony, has already made a statement about that," Dr. Silver answered. "We are not opposed to a peace committee that really wants peace. But when such a committee is named, it should be made up of neutrals who are not involved in the controversy, or it should be a mixed group, representing both sides, who would arrive at an understanding among themselves. Unfortunately the makeup of this committee is such as would tend to prolong the dispute, rather than achieve early peace. One member of the committee, speaking from a Zionist platform, could find no better word than "Fascist" to describe me. Another member of the committee has travelled throughout the country to speak against me at Zionist meetings. Such a 'peace committee' can have only one interest--to keep the present ZOA leadership in control and to keep me as far as possible from the Emergency Council."

"Do you believe that the ZOA Executive was insincere in making this peace attempt?" I asked Dr. Silver.

"No, I would not say that. I believe that many members of the Executive were sincere in requesting that peace be brought about. But because the makeup of the committee was left in the hands of outspoken opponents of mine, what emerged was not a peace committee, but a group which will try to bury every possibility for achieving peace."

I
An Editorial
Indianapolis Jewish Post
National Edition
Friday, May 4, 1945

No Comment necessary.
H. P. Manson

THE FIGHT IS OVER. RABBI SILVER WINS.

It is not without a feeling of regret that the Post takes note of the incident at the mass meeting last Sunday at Lewisohn Stadium at which Rabbi Stephen S. Wise was made the victim of an embarrassing situation.

Unquestionably the one living U. S. Jew who has done most for all causes of U. S. Jewry, Rabbi Wise finds himself in a position for which he need not apologize and one faced often by men in the thick of political battles. Forsaken by the present hierarchy in the Z.O.A., most of whom are fighting among themselves, whether openly or not, for his mantle, the famous Jewish leader finds himself pitted against a young, vigorous opponent, who has behind him the best press agenting any Jewish man has had in recent years.

Translated into everyday politics, the Lewisohn Stadium incident indicates all these things: Rabbi Silver has already won his battle for leadership in U. S. Zionism. There is no need for any "peace" committee, or anything else now; Dr. Silver has the Zionist movement in the palm of his hand. The present regime in the Z.O.A. must certainly understand that they are living on borrowed and the sooner they step down time, the more lasting will their reputations be.

There is no denying that Rabbi Silver has captured the imagination of that part of the U. S. Jewish community interested in the fate of Palestine. That he has had excellent backing and behind-the-scenes guidance does not rob him of any glory. His fight and victory should be a lesson in "going to the people" after having been denied by the higher-ups.

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IX. The Political Platforms

An impressive manifestation of America's support for the reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth came this summer when the major political parties met in Chicago and for the first time in history, both parties adopted pro-Palestine planks in their national election platforms.

The Republican plank, adopted on June 27th, reads as follows:

X. The Roosevelt Declaration


The culmination of this impressive mobilization of American public opinion in behalf of the Commonwealth Resolution came on October 15th, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in a message to the 47th annual Convention of the Zionist Organization of America, declared that efforts would be made to effectuate the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Commonwealth and pledged his assistance to bring about its realization.

Conveyed by Senator Robert F. Wagner, Chairman of the American Palestine Committee, to the Convention, the message of the President declared:

"Please express my satisfaction that in accord with traditional American policy, and in keeping with the spirit of the four freedoms, the Democratic party at its July convention this year included the following plank in its platform: 'We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.'

This impressive declaration by the President, with its clear and explicit language, ended once and for all the misinterpretations of the past position of our government which have beclouded the future of Jewish Palestine.

It raised hopes that Jewish aspirations to Palestine, as voiced by the delegates to the American Jewish Conference on September 1, 1943, would be achieved and that the promise made to the Jewish people by 52 nations at the end of the first World War would be fully implemented at the conclusion of the present conflict.



In my judgment, political considerations now outweigh the military, and the issue should be determined upon the political rather than the military basis.

Sincerely,

(signed)

WRHS


Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War



AMERICAN ZIONIST EMERGENCY COUNCIL
342 Madison Avenue
New York 17, N. Y.

Ever since the military requested postponement of action on the Palestine Resolutions which were introduced in Congress, the American Zionist Emergency Council has been energetically working to have these objections removed. The Council made numerous representations to the War Department, and both Senator Robert F. Wagner and Senator Robert A. Taft, co-sponsors of the Resolution, exerted their efforts to this end.

Senator Taft wrote to Secretary of War Stimson a month ago urgently soliciting a reply as to whether the War Department's objections still prevailed in view of the changed military situation.

Senator Taft has authorized Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Executive Committee Chairman of the Council, to make public the following reply which Senator Taft received from the Secretary of War:

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington

10 October 1944

Honorable Robert A. Taft
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator:

I refer to your letter of September 12, 1944, regarding S.R. 247, introduced by Senator Wagner and yourself on the subject of opening the doors of Palestine to the free entry of Jews into that country.

At the time your resolution was being considered by the Foreign Relations Committee the endorsement of such a proposal by the Congress had grave implications which would seriously have interfered with the progress of the war. In response to your inquiry I have reviewed the considerations which applied at that time. I find that there is still strong feeling on the part of many officers in my department that the passage of such a resolution would interfere with our military effort. However, I do f