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Neumann, Emanuel, 1942-1944.

MINUTES OF MEETING OF AMERICAN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE
FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

March 4, 1942

A meeting of the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Wednesday evening, March 4, at 8:30 P.M., at 41 East 42 Street:

PRESENT: Judge Levinthal (presiding) Messrs. Boukstein, Bublick, Cruso, Gold, Goldstein, Greenberg, Grossman, Gurfein, ~~Ben Zvi~~ Kowalsky, Rosenblatt, Segal, Silver, Wertheim: Mesdames: Benjamin, Epstein, Leibel, Pool, Shulman.

Mr. Mereminski, Mr. Naiditch

Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Lourie, Mr. Neumann

ELECTION OF OFFICERS:

Mrs. Pool presented the following recommendations on behalf of the Nominating Committee:

1. Dr. Stephen S. Wise as chairman of the Emergency Committee; Mr. Robert Szold, treasurer and chairman of the Budget Committee. This recommendation was unanimously accepted.
2. Members of the Office Committee: Dr. Wise and Mr. Szold ex officio; ZOA: Judge Levinthal and Dr. Goldstein; Hadassah: Mrs. Halprin and Mrs. Pool; Poale Zion: Mr. Wertheim; Mizrachi: Mr. Gellman with Mr. Bublick as alternate with right to attend meetings but to vote only in absence of Mr. Gellman; Members at large: Mrs. Jacobs, Mr. Lipsky, Mr. Hayim Greenberg. In addition the by-laws are to be amended to provide for two additional out of town members at large: Rabbi Silver and Rabbi Solomon Goldman. Rabbi Gold protested, on behalf of Mizrachi, that there was no representative of Mizrachi among the members at large. The motion to accept the second part of the recommendation of the nominating committee was carried. Mr. Bublick, Rabbi Gold and Rabbi Kowalsky voted against it.

MR. GROSSMAN:

It was agreed to authorize the Office Committee to deal with the question of Mr. Grossman's membership of the Committee in the light of his position on the Committee for a Jewish Army, with power to act.

POLITICAL ACTION:

Dr. Goldmann reported on the following: More than 700 refugees of the ES "Darien" have been interned in a prison camp in Athlit for more than a year. Despite repeated requests by the Agency to the Palestine Administration and to London to have them released they are still interned. The Yishuv feels very strongly about the detention and a serious position had been created. The war-effort had need of these internees many of whom would be able to serve in the army or do their share as skilled workers in industry.

A delegation composed of Judge Levinthal, Dr. Goldstein and Mr. Neumann had called on Lord Halifax on behalf of the Darlen internees. He seemed to be impressed with the facts in the case and said that he would send a report to his Government. This was on Tuesday. On Wednesday we were informed of the drowning of 750 Rumanian refugees on board the S. S. Struma in the Black Sea. The passengers on the boat were refused entry by the Turks unless the Palestine Administration had agreed to give immigration permits to these passengers. Despite repeated warnings by the Jewish Agency that refusal would mean either death by drowning or starvation or surrender to the Nazis the Palestine Government rejected the appeals.

Mr. Neumann had seen the Turkish Ambassador who knew nothing about the case. He said that he would wire for further information. A letter subsequently received from him indicates that the Turkish port authorities would not permit the Struma to enter, since no result was obtained from "repeated actions with the diplomatic representatives of the countries which were deemed as most receptive to the idea of giving them admittance to their territories."

The reaction of the press in this country to the sinking of the Struma had been very weak. It was clear that this shocking tragedy, responsibility for which must be placed at the door of the Palestine Administration, could not be allowed to pass without an effective reaction in this country. It had been finally decided at yesterday's meeting of the Office Committee:

- a. To hold a memorial service in New York and to instruct the rest of the country to hold either memorial or protest meetings in accordance with the needs and wishes of the respective communities.
- b. To bring the matter to the attention of the President through informal channels.
- c. To have a delegation present a formal memorandum to the State Department. Steps have already been taken to arrange an appointment for a delegation to include the B'nai B'rith, and other organizations.
- d. Appropriate cables are to be sent to the Prime Minister and the President of the United States.

CABLE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Mereminski expressed the opinion that the cable to Mr. Churchill as drafted was not strong enough. Mr. Segal also suggested that the cable make more specific demands.

Mr. Grossman said he believed that the cable should explicitly cover the following points:

- a. The removal of the High Commissioner of Palestine
- b. A change in Administration
- c. Stay of execution of the White Paper
- d. The immediate granting of a considerable number of certificates

It was agreed that the cable be redrafted in the light of the discussions (see also below discussion on "meetings") which had taken place. The text of the cable is not to be released to the press before a lapse of an interval of one week.

MEETINGS:

Mrs. Pool moved that the recommendation of the Office Committee in con-

nection with the Struma incident to hold a religious service in New York and to instruct the rest of the country to hold such services. (She did not support the proposal for protest meetings outside New York even if the local community so desired).

There followed a lengthy discussion on the type of gatherings which would most effectively make known the indignation of the Jewish community at the Struma incident.

Mrs. Pool explained the reasons for the recommendation of the Office Committee. It had been felt that mass meetings could be overdone. This was an occasion of real mourning and memorial meetings could be very effectively publicized and would be in line with Jewish tradition.

Mr. Segal said he believed that a basic principle was at stake: namely, should we fight for our rights. He believed that we have a moral obligation to the Yishuv to take specifically political action on the Struma incident. In his opinion a religious service was not an appropriate form of expression for a political body such as the Emergency Committee, and he urged that the Struma incident be used for political action of the most decisive kind.

Mr. Gurfein pointed out that tragic instances in history such as the Boston massacre, the Kishiniev riots, etc. have always been used as a spring-board for political action. This need not detract from the tragic feeling of mourning felt by Jews throughout the world. The question is how far should we go. If we felt we had an opportunity for obtaining the abrogation of the White Paper at this time it might be appropriate to demand it, but we must decide whether we want to protest for the record or to accomplish something. He agreed with Dr. Goldmann who had pointed out that this was not the time to ask for the abrogation of the White Paper. But, Mr. Gurfein said, the Struma incident may be cited as the culmination of a long history of maladministration on the part of Sir Harold MacMichael. We can appeal to the moral sense of the British people who will understand the American reaction as being the same type of spontaneous criticism which arose in America after the Pearl Harbor incident. We will make it clear to the British people that we are solidly behind their war effort but that incidents such as the tragedy of the Struma and the entire policy of the Palestine Administration are a hindrance to the war effort. He suggested that we arrange public meetings and make the following demands:

1. The removal of Sir Harold MacMichael
2. The lifting of the ban on immigration and the immediate granting of certificates.

Mr. Gurfein said that such political action did not preclude the holding of memorial meetings which would be wholly appropriate and dignified under circumstances such as these.

Rabbi Silver agreed with Mr. Gurfein's suggestion but suggested that the blame be laid not only at the door of the High Commissioner but on the Colonial Office as well.

Concerning the type of meeting to be held Rabbi Silver said that he was in favor of a religious meeting because the American people was a religious church-going people and would be responsive to a meeting held against the background of religious tradition. He believed this was psychologically sound. However, if it were not effective he had no objection to a mass meeting of a political character.

Mrs. Pool's motion that the Office Committee's recommendation be accepted was defeated by a vote of five to seven.

The following motion made by Mr. Segal was carried by a vote of seven to five:

Action in the city of New York should be begun by a protest meeting. In addition, a memorial meeting should be organized. Similar instructions are to be given to Zionist districts throughout the country.

Mr. Neumann was authorized to proceed with the arrangements in accordance with this decision.

REPORTS:

(a) Interviews

Dr. Goldmann reported on the interview of Mr. Neumann and himself with Sumner Welles. Mr. Neumann also reported on his interview with Colonel Cunningham of the Military Intelligence Service and with Mr. Bullitt.

(b) Public Relations Department

Mr. Neumann reported the recent activities of the Public Relations Department and referred to

1. Editorial on the Struma incident in the Washington Post
2. The following papers have promised to carry editorials:
 - Washington Star
 - Chicago Star
 - Gannett chain
3. Various feature article writers had promised to write articles on the Struma case.
4. He had discussed with PM the possibility of sending a special feature correspondent to Palestine.
5. He was proceeding with plans for the program of the memorial meeting in connection with the Struma case.

Mr. Neumann pointed out that it was imperative to have a full time representative of the Emergency Committee in Washington. He had asked Mr. Kritzer of his department to stay in Washington temporarily, but this was merely a stop-gap arrangement. Mr. Neumann was authorized to recommend a suitable person for this post and it was agreed that the Office Committee had full power to act in the matter.

There was some further discussion in which the following points were made. Mr. Boukstein suggested that the maladministration in Palestine might appropriately be tied up with the whole system of English Colonial administration which had proved so disastrous in Singapore and Malaya.

Dr. Goldstein warned against using the argument that native populations should be given sovereignty to an extent where it might be used as a boomerang against us.

There was a general feeling that in any criticism of Great Britain's Colonial policy caution must be exercised not to fall into the trap of creating sentiment against Great Britain.

The meeting was adjourned at 11:40 P.M.

Arthur Lourie

File: UPA - UJA - 1941 - 1942
Folder: Emergency Committees for Zionist Affairs
March 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Members of the Office Committee

FROM: Mr. Arthur Lourie

AHS File

re: Amer. Zion.
polit. action
Struma

The effectiveness of the Committee is often gravely affected by the delays and confusion arising from the need for obtaining the individual approval of numerous persons and authorities before any final action can be taken. At times this procedure results in a virtual paralysis of action. An indication of what is meant may be given in connection with the "Struma" releases and cablegrams.

On Wednesday a week ago, February 25th, the morning press carried the report of the disaster. Mr. Neumann was in Washington that day, but following telephone conversations with him, with several members of the Committee and with Mr. Ben-Gurion in Chicago, it was agreed that a Statement for release to the press be immediately prepared on behalf of the Committee. This was done and after telephoning its contents to representatives of the groups Dr. Wise in Florida, approval was obtained, save that we were unable to reach Judge Levinthal, who was in court, until the latter part of the afternoon.

Judge Levinthal then expressed his doubts as to whether the Statement should be issued in view of the understanding in regard to publicity on the refugee question which had been reached in the course of the interview with the British Ambassador the previous day, but asked us to consult Dr. Israel Goldstein who had been a member of the delegation. Dr. Goldstein was at a meeting and was unable to give an immediate opinion. Pending a decision arrangements were made with The New York Times to hold space for the release beyond the usual time. In the end it was not possible to send out the release that day and the whole matter came before the Office Committee the following afternoon (Thursday). It was then agreed that a somewhat different Statement should appear, but naturally by that time it was too late to issue the new release to the press and it was only on Friday that the final version was sent out; it was no longer "hot news" however and received no publicity at all in the general non-Jewish press. In striking contrast very effective statements were issued by both the Executive in London and the Agency in Jerusalem on the same day that the tragedy became known. It should be added, however, that a full statement was prepared and sent out to the Yiddish press on behalf of the Committee on Wednesday.

A second example: At the meeting on Thursday afternoon (February 26th) it was decided that cables be sent to Mr. Churchill and to President Roosevelt. Owing to preoccupation with the statements for the press on the "Struma" and also on the Committee for a Jewish Army which were released late on Friday, it was not possible to prepare the cables until Monday last. The process of consulting the parties, individual members of the Committee and Mr. Ben-Gurion then began. A number of changes were suggested and were incorporated in a completely revised text which was ready next morning (Tuesday). Again there was the process of individual consultation with all concerned and the difficulty of reconciling different points of view where there has been no community of discussion. The Statement was held up for the meeting of the Office Committee on Tuesday Afternoon and with certain very minor changes the

text as proposed as accepted. The Secretary was later informed that Dr. Wise would be arriving in New York that night, and since the cables were to be signed by him they should be submitted to him before dispatch.

The telegrams were at Dr. Wise's office on Wednesday morning, but it was not until after five o'clock in the afternoon that Dr. Wise was able to let the Secretary know that he was unable to sign the cables in their then form. The cables were therefore again held up and came before the meeting of the full Committee on Wednesday night. At this meeting the text, which had previously received general approval, was subjected to severe criticism by a number of those present. In the result, the cables were once again held up for radical revision ~~and changes~~ and, as in the case of the press Statement, the advantages to be derived from an immediate reaction have been dissipated.

This sort of thing is obviously detrimental to Zionist interests. It tends to discredit the Committee, and creates the impression (as at Wednesday night's meeting of the full Committee) of inaction and laxness on the part of those responsible.

If I may venture the suggestion, what is required is that the Chairman of the Committee, perhaps with one or two other readily accessible members, be given authority to take immediate action in emergency situations.



FASCISM COMES TO AMERICAN JEWRY

or

DEMOCRACY TAKES THE COUNT

X
June 1942

By HENRY MONTOR

The world is enduring agony so that individual man may enjoy dignity and freedom that need not be bought. The American people are being warned of the dangers of totalitarianism which, through brute power, would enslave all. In the midst of these grave events, when the normal pattern of living seems so shabby and trivial, American Jewry is witnessing the institutionalization of a technique which we call Fascism and which we always ascribe to others, never to ourselves.

The generous and reasonable among American Jews--which means the predominant majority-- recognizing the common dangers confronting Jews counsel patience in the face of wrong because many feel that "unity" is a shield that can help protect a beleaguered people. But experiences in other lands in recent times warn us that "sweet reasonableness" is often an instrument of self-destruction when used by a people toward those who mislead it.

Let us examine a case history of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, an organization presumably representing many communities throughout the nation. Originally, the Council styled itself a body intended to give "service" to the communities which were "member agencies." More recently, the Council has assumed to be the "voice" of these communities, even before a whisper was heard from the localities themselves.

American Votes on a Referendum

From time to time an isolated voice had been heard to the effect that the funds of American Jewry might be budgeted from a central source. Under the aegis of Council officers this trend was accelerated until a committee was appointed to study national budgeting proposals. On the eve of the annual meeting of the Council in Atlanta at the end of January a program was presented for a national budgeting advisory service. Without ample discussion in the committee itself, with no adequate discussion at the Assembly of the Council, the Board of Directors, by a majority vote, directed that the proposal brought to Atlanta should be submitted in a referendum to the "member agencies" of the Council.

The referendum, among the 166 cities which the Council styled "member agencies", was on the proposition: "That the Council establish a national advisory budget service for national and overseas agencies appealing to local communities for support."

In brief, the advocates of the proposal wanted a small committee, picked by the Council, to analyze the operations and activities of all national and overseas organizations and then recommend how much each should receive from the available funds raised by American Jews. The proponents said this was wise and efficient; that it represented the overwhelming desire of American Jewry; that a small committee could gather information not available to individual communities; that such a committee could weigh all factors more intelligently than the average person in a local community entrusted with the disbursement of funds. The opponents of the plan said that it was undemocratic, inasmuch as there would be no adequate opportunity for the broad sentiment of American Jewry to express itself; that there were too many ideological factors involved in the various causes and that a small group of men, considering the present method of designating representatives in Jewish communal life, could not be expected to deal adequately and fairly with all the ideologies at issue; that until such time as democratic procedures more widely governed in national affairs, the individual communities and the particular causes should be the determining factors in fund-distribution.

An extensive discussion took place in the press and the council rooms of the country. It was assumed that when the Board of Directors of the Council would meet, the two principal questions it would have to answer would be:

(a) is the sentiment of the American Jewish community favorable to the establishment of a national budgeting advisory committee? and (b) who has the right to vote in the referendum to establish such sentiment?

But on Saturday, May 17th, a smoke-hazy, air-stuffy room at 71 West 47th Street in New York City heard no such discussion from the Board of Directors peopling it. Instead, the officers of the Council announced: (1) That, by a vote of 54 cities to 53, the proposal for the establishment of a national budgeting advisory committee had been passed; and (2) that in the light of this "victory", a specially designated committee was introducing, and expected passage of, proposals to carry out this "mandate". These proposals, far more far-reaching in actuality than those originally submitted at Atlanta, Ga. which provoked the nation-wide profound differences, were overwhelmingly passed by the Board of Directors. The few who spoke up in opposition were dismissed with derision or pained sufferance for their lack of manners in questioning the wisdom of the proponents of the measures.

Leaving aside for the moment the merit of any budgeting proposals, let us examine the honesty--and I use that challenging noun circumspectly--of the determination of this "victory".

There are here listed side by side, the cities voting for rejection of the proposal and for acceptance--as the Council counted them:

CITIES COUNTED BY COUNCIL OF FEDERATIONS AS VOTING

Voting for Rejection

Little Rock, Ark.
Los Angeles, Calif.
Bridgeport, Conn.
New Haven, Conn.
Washington, D. C.
Miami, Fla.
Rockford, Ill.
Rock Island, Ill.
Fort Wayne, Ind.
Sioux City, Iowa
Louisville, Ky.
Fitchburg, Mass.
Holyoke, Mass.
Lowell, Mass.
New Bedford, Mass.
Springfield, Mass.
Detroit, Mich.
Duluth, Minn.
St. Paul, Minn.
Joplin, Mo.
Omaha, Neb.
Bayonne, N. J.
Camden, N. J.
Newark, N. J.
Trenton, N. J.
Albuquerque, N. Mex.
Albany, N. Y.
Newburg, N. Y.
Rochester, N. Y.
Schenectady, N. Y.
Troy, N. Y.
Utica, N. Y.
Asheville, N. C.
Canton, Ohio
Columbus, Ohio
Dayton, Ohio
Steubenville, Ohio
Warren, Ohio
Tulsa, Okla.
Portland, Ore.
Easton, Pa.
Harrisburg, Pa.
Johnstown, Pa.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Reading, Pa.
Sharon, Pa.
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
Knoxville, Tenn.
Spokane, Wash.
Tacoma, Wash.
Madison, Wis.
Milwaukee, Wis.

Voting for Acceptance

Montgomery, Ala.
Sheffield, Ala.
Helena, Ark.
Vancouver, B. C.
Fresno, Calif.
Los Angeles, Calif.
Oakland, Calif.
Sacramento, Calif.
San Diego, Calif.
San Francisco, Calif.
San Jose, Calif.
Stockton, Calif.
Bridgeport, Conn.
Wilmington, Del.
Jacksonville, Fla.
Atlanta, Ga.
Chicago, Ill.
Peo Peoria, Ill.
Evansville, Ind.
Hammond, Ind.
Indianapolis, Ind.
Davenport, Iowa
Des Moines, Iowa
Wichita, Kan.
Alexandria, La.
Monroe, La.
New Orleans, La.
Baltimore, Md.
Saginaw, Mich.
Minneapolis, Minn.
Virginia, Minn.
Vicksburg, Miss.
Kansas City, Mo.
St. Louis, Mo.
Lincoln, Neb.
Atlantic City, N. J.
Buffalo, N. Y.
New York City, N. Y.
Winston-Salem, N. C.
Fargo, N. D.
Lima, Ohio
Hamilton, Ont.
Altoona, Pa.
Butler, Pa.
Eric, Pa.
Williamsport, Pa.
Chattanooga, Tenn.
Memphis, Tenn.
Nashville, Tenn.
Dallas, Texas
San Antonio, Texas
Salt Lake City, Utah
Richmond, Va.
Seattle, Wash.

An innocent public might have assumed that the referendum was designed to obtain an accurate cross-section of the American Jewish community on a fundamental revision of policy. Could a narrow margin of approval or defeat be regarded as a proper atmosphere in which to inject so controversial a program, was a proper question.

Now let us examine the validity of the affirmative ballots which are regarded as the "victorious mandate."

It should be noted that there are various categories of "member agencies" of the Council, concerned with different aspects of Council services. The 1940 Directory issued by the Council defines six different kinds of agencies: (a) administration of local social services; (b) administration of local social services and financial support of affiliated organizations; (c) coordination and support of local social services; (d) support of national welfare programs; (e) support of overseas welfare programs; (f) common counsel of Jewish welfare problems and needs.

In the first place, 54 communities constitute less than one-third of the 166 communities the Council listed as "member agencies". Is this a confirmation of the Council contention that there is an "overwhelming" desire for the national budgeting advisory service?

In the second place, included in the 54 communities are the following:

(1) New York City, which, through its Federation of Jewish Philanthropic Societies, voted for the proposal. The New York Federation does not have and never has had any relation to fund-raising in New York City for "national and overseas agencies." In fact, New Yorkers know that the New York Federation regards any effort to organize fund-raising in New York City for "national and overseas agencies" with alarm, because it might jeopardize or otherwise adversely affect the New York Federation local fund-raising machinery. The New York City Federation is dominated by the same group which dominates the Board of Directors of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds. In New York City, there is no Welfare Fund. There is a United Jewish Appeal. The latter did not vote and could not vote. Yet the Council will probably make the suave attempt to

convince the Jews outside of New York that 1,200,000 Jews in New York "voted for the referendum." In Brooklyn there was greater probity. The Brooklyn Federation of Jewish Philanthropic Societies had a meeting to vote on the referendum. Officers of the New York Federation came to Brooklyn to swing "another million votes of American Jewry." But in deference to the pleading of one member of the Board who pointed out that the Brooklyn Federation had nothing whatever to do with national and overseas fund-raising agencies and, therefore, had no moral right to vote on the issue, the Brooklyn Federation tabled the proposal.

(2) Vancouver, B.C. and Hamilton, Ont., two Canadian towns. With respect to the balloting in Vancouver, the Council officials admitted that they were not sure whether the community had the right to vote. But Vancouver was counted nonetheless. Canadian Jewish communities do not support the same kind of "national and overseas agencies" as American Jewry does. Yet the Council Board was willing to use any device to secure its "victory." How do the Jewish communities of Vancouver and Hamilton, whose sons are fighting the frustration of democracy in Europe, feel about being used as the tool with which to club American Jewry into submission to the will of a minority group in their neighboring country?

One would have expected that there would be serious consideration at the meeting of the Council's Board on May 18th of many factors leading up to an efficient, acceptable budgeting procedure that would have won the support of those who said the fact-finding facilities of the Council should be expanded but that the power of evaluation should be withheld. They might have asked these questions: does a "member agency" having no relation to "national and overseas agencies" in terms of fund-raising have the right to express a view and bind other member agencies which do have a direct relationship? In addition to New York City, there is Los Angeles, Calif., for example, whose Federation having no relationship to "national and overseas agencies" is regarded as having 3 votes in the Council, equal to those of the Jewish Community Council of Los Angeles which is the only body in the city controlling and directing fund-raising for outside agencies. In view of the statement of the advocates of the majority proposal that the American Jewish communities were "demanding" the establishment of a national budgeting advisory committee, were not votes to table the proposal or to take no action equivalent to votes of rejection?

(3) In addition to New York City, Vancouver, B.C. and Hamilton, Ont., the Council included among its "victory" votes the following member agencies among others, having no relationship to local fund-raising for "national and overseas agencies" (the foundation of the whole referendum): Los Angeles Federation, Oakland Jewish Federation, Bridgeport Childrens's Society, Atlanta, Ga. Federation of Jewish Social Service, Buffalo Federation all of which the Council 1940 Directory itself defined as having no bearing on "national and overseas welfare programs." It will be noted that many cities have two agencies, one dealing with local welfare and the other with national and overseas welfare. These, then, are the 54 votes by which American Jewry has been dragged into "victory."

The Rejection of the Proposal

Let us now consider the validity of the statement made by the Council officers to the Board of Directors that only 53 communities voted to reject the proposal.

The following additional communities, among others, had voted to reject the proposal but the Council office said it received no ballots or other information from them. The curious will, of course, wonder how that could happen to just enough cities to give a "victory" to the majority proposal: Selma, Ala., Long Beach, Calif., Waterbury, Conn., Pontiac, Mich., Niagara Falls, N.Y., and Scranton, Pa.--a total of six cities. Add these to the 53 and you have 59 cities which voted to reject, as against 54 voting to accept. The Committee in the referendum, which was organized in opposition to the majority proposal of the Council, offered evidence to the Council at its Board of Directors meeting that these cities had voted in rejection. The Board was urged not to accept merely the word or documents of the Committee but to establish contact immediately with the respective cities to determine their actual position. No! was the brusque answer. A tally that was not in the ballot box could not be counted. And so the most momentous decision facing American Jewry was to be adopted by the methods of precinct captains at a bitterly contested ward election for sanitary superintendent!

Cincinnati became a major issue at the Council meeting. On April 7th, the Jewish Community Council of Cincinnati had met and, by an overwhelming majority, approximately 5 to 1, had thrust aside the proposal offered by the Council and had instead voted a resolution which rejected evaluation but approved fact-finding. The vote was obviously in rejection of

the majority proposal and was so intended. But if Cincinnati were counted in the rejection column, that would be--in the Council methods of counting-- a tie vote: 54-54, so a unique decision was made by the Council. It was decided that Cincinnati had not voted at all! That further ensured "victory."

What about the other communities which weren't interested in the Council proposal or felt that it was much too controversial to inject into the community? Seven major cities voted to table the proposal. Twenty-six others decided to take no action. Was their point of view to be totally disregarded by the Council in introducing a program of such far-reaching significance? The answer is that the Council did disregard them. For the Council had determined to go through with its Messianic role, no matter who or what.

The Council might well have been interested in the reasons for the decision of many communities to table the majority proposal or to take no action whatever upon it. Obviously, the local leaders felt that a vote could serve only to produce needless friction and to impede constructive internal work. It was evident that the communities believed that they could function perfectly well without the service which the Council has insisted the communities "demand."

Why could not the Council take a leaf from the experience of the local communities which it is supposed to represent? If the local communities do not want to disrupt their unity, why does the Council insist on disrupting the unity of the whole of American Jewry by forcing through a plan which the country does not need and which the country has clearly shown it does not want?

WHAT WILL AMERICAN JEWRY DO?

The proposals which were ruthlessly adopted by the Board of Directors of the Council on May 18th to institute national advisory budgeting on the basis of the mythical "victory" were never examined in advance by anyone

opposed to the majority proposal for comment or counsel. There was no intention of arriving at a program acceptable to all elements of American Jewry. It may be said, on thorough reading of the proposals, that they not only repeat the original program submitted at Atlanta but give even broader powers to a central committee to be set up.

There can be and are honest differences of opinion as to the wisdom, the practicability and the efficiency of a national budgeting advisory service. But it is now fair to ask those who sincerely believe that national budgeting is a desirable process or objective whether they think that the methods employed by the Council to establish a "victory" are calculated to win to the Council program respect for its integrity or its impartiality? Has anything been done by the Council proponents of national budgeting to allay the fears of those who are suspicious of national budgeting and of the motives of some of those who would impose it? Did not the performance of May 18th in New York City strengthen those fears beyond all description by the boldness, the coldness and the stubbornness of those who conceive of themselves as having a mission to teach efficient budgeting to American Jewry even if they have to hurt American Jewry to do it?

There are more ominous dangers facing American Jewry than the institution of a national budgeting advisory service. But it is just because of those very real and imminent dangers that there must be careful examination of the leadership which must guide American Jewry in these anxious hours.

I have had the privilege of visiting scores of communities throughout America. The more I see of the leaders in these communities the more I respect their average integrity, generosity and vision. If anyone has doubts of the soundness of American Jewry merely because of the antics of national leadership one finds reassurance and faith in the daily deeds of the leaders in the local communities.

These are days to examine the credentials of our national leaders.

I disagree completely with a notion prevalent in some quarters that because a Jew is wealthy he must automatically harbor sinister motives. I have seen too many who, with modesty and dignity, have served and are serving the Jewish community well, nationally and locally. But it is just as dangerous a premise that because a Jew has wealth he is necessarily a man of unquestionable integrity, omniscience and omnipotence. It may be super-politeness to the wealthy Jew but it is dangerous to the Jewish community's interest to assume that solely because a wealthy Jew has agreed to take leadership his sincerity and his intelligence must never be questioned. Men of wealth have a place and a responsibility--very important responsibility--in the Jewish community: but not as men of wealth but merely as Jews. Their knowledge, their service and their intellect must be used on the same basis as any other Jew called upon to serve. But it is time that American Jewry stop weighing devotion to and knowledge of the needs of the Jewish people on the scales of Mammon.

These warnings are necessary because in effectuating the policy which it adopted on May 18th, and in beating down the opposition of those who honestly question the helpfulness of the national budgeting advisory idea, the Council will bring into play howitzers of wealth, in addition to the normal, equitable discussion. There will be some men whose testimony will be invoked not because it is valid and convincing but in order to impress certain Jews.

Without questioning the motives of any person, wealthy or poor, who believes that national budgeting advisory service is essential (what a luxury in these necessitous days of Jewry!), certain observations ought to be made for the benefit of those who think that wealth alone is a criterion of competence in Jewish leadership.

From among the Jews of wealth in Germany came support for Adolf Hitler before 1933.

From among the Jews of wealth in France came effective opposition to reasonable laws in France for the admission of German Jewish refugees.

From among the Jews of wealth in the United States was sent an emissary to Germany when Hitler came to power to promise silence in America on the Nazis in order to ease the oppression of Jews in Germany.

From among the Jews of wealth in the United States came vigorous and expressed hostility to the nomination of Felix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court bench, of Henry Morgenthau to the Secretaryship of the Treasury, of Herbert Lehman to the Governorship of New York.

From among the Jews of wealth in the United States has come the most panicky suppression of the rights of Jews--as American citizens--to express their views on America's relation to the war.

From among the Jews of wealth in the United States--only a few days ago--came the most incredible attempt to convince Great Britain that she ought not to permit a Jewish Army to fight by the side of Great Britain to defend Palestine!

It frequently happens that some men of wealth identify their personal fate with that of the Jewish people. They believe that what seems satisfactory to their beliefs and programs is best for the rest of the Jews. Because of their wealth they have a voice and power far greater than that of any single Jew or combinations of many Jews.

But it is--often, not always--these Jews who, by their wealth and their practises often contribute most to undermining the Jewish position in the lands in which they live. They bear an awesome responsibility to differentiate between what is best for them and what is best for the whole people.

American Jews should abandon their inferiority complex. Throughout this country there are Jews of great intelligence and a will to public service. Let them rise up and take their proper places which--in some instances--are occupied by men who, despite

their great wealth, have often debased the standards of generosity of their communities by their failure to equal the braggadocio of their talk with the breadth of their concrete deeds.

The referendum conducted by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds was a test of the intelligence of American Jewry. This observer believes that Jewry weathered that test with flying colors. But having won its test, it is to be cheated of its fruits. Is that not how, in larger affairs of society, the few dominate the many?

I If the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Council on May 18th was an exhibition of democracy in practice then a new word should be coined for the kind of government which has hitherto been called Fascism.



ICHUD PARTY ISSUES DECLARATION; NOT ANTI-ZIONIST BUT OPPOSES JEWISH STATE

JERUSALEM, Oct. 5. (JTA)-- A statement clarifying the aims of the newly formed Ichud ("Union") Party, emphasizing that the party is not anti-Zionist but opposes the policy of advocating the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish State, was issued here today by the leaders of the new group. The statement reads:

"After the publication of Dr. Magnes' article on 'Palestine and Arab Union' in the 'Ba'ayot Hayom' in June, it was thought by a number of well-known persons in Palestine that some organized expression should be given to the main idea contained in that article. As a consequence, a meeting of about a hundred persons was held on August 11. The invitations to the meeting were signed by Prof. M. Buber, Mr. Goldwater, Dr. S. Hirsch, Henrietta Szold, Mr. Julius Simon, Mr. M. Smilansky, Rabbi J. Unna and Justice A. Valero. Dr. Magnes addressed this meeting and as a result an interim committee was appointed to draw up a declaration to which those wishing to join the "Union" would adhere.

✓ "It is seen from the declaration that the "Union" is not at all an anti-Zionist organization. It is, however, opposed to the present policy of the official Zionist leadership in advocating the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish State. It is opposed equally to the establishment of Palestine as an Arab State. The "Union" is convinced that the problem of Palestine is inseparable from that of the Middle East, and that the problem of the Middle East is inseparable from the creation of a Union of Free Peoples in which America and England would play a leading part. The declaration is as follows:

"1. The 'Union' adheres to: a) The Zionist movement insofar as this seeks the establishment of the Jewish National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine; b) The struggle throughout the world for a New Order in international relations, and a Union of the peoples, large and small, for a life of freedom and justice without fear, oppression and want.

"2. The 'Union' therefore regards a Union between the Jewish and Arab peoples as essential for the upbuilding of Palestine and for meeting its basic problems. The 'Union' will strive for cooperation between the Jewish world and the Arab world in all branches of life - social, cultural and political - thus making for the revival of the whole Semitic world.

3. The main political aims of the 'Union' are as follows: a) Government in Palestine based upon equal political rights for the two peoples; b) The adherence of the steadily growing Yishub and of the whole Jewish people to a Federative Union of Palestine and neighbouring countries. This Federative Union is to guarantee the national rights of all the peoples within it; c) a covenant between this Federative Union and an Anglo-American Union which is to be a part of the future Union of the free peoples. This Union of the free peoples is to bear the ultimate responsibility for the establishment and stability of international relations in the New World after the war."

MEXICO ARRANGES INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROTEST AGAINST VICHY DEPORTATIONS

MEXICO CITY, Oct. 5. (JTA)-- The Mexican Government will ask all countries having diplomatic relations with France or Laval to join in an urgent protest against Laval's project to exchange 150,000 anti-Fascist refugees in unoccupied France for French prisoners of war. The endangered refugees include 70,000 Jews from various parts of Europe and many half-Jews.

The Government here, which received wind of this project some time ago from its Legation in Vichy, is particularly alarmed about the Spanish refugees who are under Mexican diplomatic protection by special treaty with the Vichy regime.

SULZBERGER OPPOSES JEWISH ARMY PROJECT; OUTLINES PLAN FOR POST-WAR PALESTINE

BALTIMORE, Nov. 6.(JTA)-- Jews and non-Jews in America were urged here last night by Arthur Hays Sulzberger, president and publisher of the New York Times, to discontinue their efforts for the formation of a Jewish Army in Palestine. He also suggested that the Jewish problem in Palestine should be solved after the war not by the creation of a separate Jewish State there but by amalgamating several Arab countries into one great State "so that the Arabs would welcome its might and never have cause to fear that the Jews who move there would upset the numerical balance of power."

Back from a visit to Britain, Mr. Sulzberger made these suggestions in the course of an address delivered here before the Brotherhood of the Madison Avenue Temple. He declared that the Zionist efforts were helping "to create problems in the Moslem world which merely add to the difficulties of the United Nations" and warned Zionist extremists that their insistence upon the formation of a Jewish national army would, if continued, result not only in embarrassment to the United Nations, but could also be "distorted by the Axis in the Arab world."

"Presumably the British government has decided," Mr. Sulzberger said, "that, all other things considered, it will not help win the war to meet the demand for a separate Jewish army. Furthermore, the United States government has evidently not felt it either wise or expedient to intervene with the British government in this matter. It seems to me, therefore, that since those decisions have been made - and I think made with a conviction that will not be changed - at least during this war - it serves no useful purpose to continue, at this time, a campaign which not only embarrasses the United Nations, but can be distorted by the Axis in the Arab world. I wish I had the ability to set that problem straight and teach my fellow-Americans who are not Jews that it would be wise to examine all the facts in that complicated situation before lending their names to the extreme Zionist cause, or the demand for a Jewish army."

Jews Want the Right to Call Any Place Their Home, He Says

Pointing out that the Zionist aims do not represent the desires of all Jews, Mr. Sulzberger declared: "If I, as a Jew, can help to impress the world that what Jews want far more than a home of their own is the right to call any place their home, that in finding new homes justice must be done those who already dwell where the newcomer would live - then I believe I shall have been faithful to the tradition of justice which is my heritage as an American of Jewish faith."

"I would not have you think that I am unaware of the need for refuge for many peoples, including Jews, after this war is over," he continued. "I know, too, that many Jews will seek the Holy Land. But let us keep it a Holy Land. Let us make sure that we do not transform it merely into another nation, jealous of its own national rights, heedless of those who for the past two thousand years have lived within its borders."

"It would seem to me that this could be done if, when the time comes, there is created a great State out of several of the countries in that section of the world. I would make it sufficiently large so that the Arabs would welcome its might and never have cause to fear that the Jews who move there would upset the numerical balance of power. And into this enlarged State I would welcome all who wish to come, and the Arabs would join in such a welcome secure in the knowledge that they would not be outnumbered. Such a plan would provide the refuge we all

PALESTINE'S IMPORTANCE IN MEDITERRANEAN WAR THEATRE WILL BE DISCUSSED AT CONFERENCE

NEW YORK, Nov. 16. (JTA)-- The strategic and military importance of Palestine in the Mediterranean campaign and the necessity of mobilizing American Jewry to help the Palestine community carry out its vital war tasks will be fully discussed at the National Council for Palestine at the Biltmore Hotel on Sunday, December 6, it was announced here today by Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, National Chairman of the United Palestine Appeal.

Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes will be the guest of honor at a dinner which will conclude the day-long deliberations, Dr. Silver said. Other speakers besides Mr. Ickes and Dr. Silver will include Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the World Zionist Organization, Pierre von Paassen, Dr. Stephen S. Wise, Judge Morris Rothenberg, Nathan Straus, Martin Agronsky and Sylvan Gotshal.

"The freeing of the Mediterranean from Fascist domination opens new vistas for the development of Palestine and the Middle East and at the same time places new responsibilities on the valiant Jewish community in Palestine in carrying forward the military plans of the United Nations," Dr. Silver said. "Palestine at the crossroads of the ancient world, now resumes its military role, the most important communications center. It is a pivotal point on the most direct route for aid to the Caucasus and Stalingrad. Haifa becomes the chief transit port for war materials to the Soviet Union via Iraq and Iran, saving the 4,000 mile voyage from Suez to Dandar Shahpur. If the traffic is too great for existing facilities, we can expect the early completion of the long-projected Haifa-Baghdad railroad. With the loyal Jewish population mobilizing all its resources to aid the war effort, Palestine will now be an important base for the coming invasion of Europe," Dr. Silver pointed out.

JEWISH RADIOMAN SAVES 13 CREWMEN OF NAVY PATROL BOMBER FROM DROWNING

NEW YORK, Nov. 16. (JTA)-- Leonard S. Edelstein, a New York Jewish boy serving as aviation radioman first class in the U.S. Navy, has been awarded a certificate of commendation for his "superhuman efforts" in freeing the life boat of a rapidly-sinking Navy patrol bomber and thereby saving the lives of the 13 crewmen, it was learned here today by the National Jewish Welfare Board.

Sergeant Maurice Londer, of Minneapolis, Minn., has been awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in action in the South Pacific, the J.W.B. also reports. General George C. Kenney, commander of the Allied Air Forces in the southwest Pacific, awarded the decoration to Sergeant Londer, praising his "cool and excellent marksmanship" in the course of a half-hour air engagement with Japanese Zero planes at New Britain several months ago.

First Lieutenant Harold Spire, of Los Angeles, is the recipient of a Purple Heart, earned as navigator of a Flying Fortress, it is also reported by the J.W.B. Wounded in an air engagement, he recovered completely and returned to action. Now his parents have learned that Harold is missing in action.

Chief Machinist's Mate Abe Kushman, of Oakland, California, is a holder of the Purple Heart and is to receive the Churchill award and the Grand Fleet medal, according to an official announcement. He is a survivor of the Wasp, which was his home for two-and-a-half years.

AHS File

Strictly Confidential

TO: MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE COMMITTEE

FROM: EMANUEL NEUMANN

SUBJECT: THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

November 10, 1942

re: a) U.S. policy
b) Zionist
political action

I am taking the liberty of setting forth a few observations on recent events as they affect our political situation:

1. American military operations in Africa and the Middle East.

The expected has happened and American forces in substantial numbers are now engaged in these parts. Apart from the large expedition in North Africa, 7,000 American troops have also been landed in Palestine and Syria, according to reports. The growth of American military commitments in the Near East obviously involves an increase of American political interest and political influence both immediately and in the post-war settlement in that part of the world. This presents not only a greater opportunity but also a renewed challenge to American Zionism. To date, our success in influencing American thinking and official policy with regard to the Near East has been very limited. Actually, that is an understatement. Anti-Zionist influences are strongly at work both in the State Department and abroad (Of. Wadsworth's appointment). The developing situation evidently calls for more serious thought and more effective action on our part than hitherto.

2. The victory in Egypt. If, as now seems probable, the Axis is

crushed in Egypt and North Africa, and the Germans are stalled in the Caucasus, the threat to Palestine and the Near East will, in the words of President Roosevelt, "be very definitely removed." As a direct result, the nuisance value of the Arabs drops almost to the vanishing point. If they have made no trouble in recent months while the danger was acute, there is extremely little likelihood of their creating trouble hereafter. This removes the most serious objective obstacle in the way of a more openly pro-Zionist policy on the part of Great Britain and the United States Government, as well as the only legitimate objection to the recognition of a Jewish fighting force. In my opinion, it would now be timely to press for a more forthright policy, particularly on the part of our own Government whose position in these matters vis-a-vis the British has been vastly strengthened by American military participation in the Near East campaign.

3. Results of the elections in America. One of the difficulties

under which we have labored for several years past has been the fact that the party in power has been so securely entrenched and in command of a substantial majority in both Houses of Congress. It is an axiom of practical politics that the responsiveness of the party in power to public pressure is in inverse ratio to its parliamentary strength. Moreover, the party in opposition is always more inclined to lend its support to groups like our own than the party in power which carries the burden of responsibility. The situation has now undergone a radical change. Not only are the two parties now almost evenly matched in Congress, but a general trend has been revealed in the whole country away from the Democratic Party and toward the Republican Party. Whatever misgivings one may have regarding the ultimate effects of this shift as it may reflect itself in post-war policy, the situation immediately resulting presents an unusually favorable opportunity from the point of view of Zionist action. Neither party can now dispense with Jewish support and both parties will be courting it. Secretary Hull's telegraphic reply of November 2nd in answer to the telegram sent him in Dr. Wise's name on October 31st probably reflects a certain nervousness among Democratic leaders. (Copies of telegrams attached.)

The Republicans, in my opinion, can in any case be relied upon, while they are still out of power, to give us fairly unreserved support; while the Administration forces will feel constrained to treat our representations and demands with far greater consideration than heretofore.

In my opinion, we should not hesitate to take the fullest advantage of this situation, but begin to press our claims more concretely and with stronger insistence than in the past. Subtly and tactfully, we should make full use of our improved bargaining position. In the light of this analysis our efforts may now go forward in various directions, including more serious and frank discussions than we have yet had with the policy-makers of the Administration.

The time is also coming when we may initiate the long-deferred action of asking for the adoption of a resolution by both Houses of Congress endorsing our program. It will be noted that I have used the word "asking". There is no doubt that while Republican leaders in Congress will be rather amenable to the suggestion, Administration spokesmen will endeavor to dissuade us on the ground that such action would still not be timely. However, if the ground is well prepared throughout the forty-eight states and sufficient pressure is built up, the Administration spokesmen will not be in a position to refuse us without offering something in return. If they will then be prepared to give us definite assurances regarding American policy in relation to Palestine and to give early tangible expression to a clearly pro-Zionist policy, we may gracefully yield to their request that we give up or postpone the effort to carry such a Zionist resolution through Congress. If, on the other hand, the Administration should refuse to make concessions or commitments, it would be such an indication of lack of sympathy or support as may well justify our pressing for the adoption of a resolution by Congress. But such a contingency is probably unlikely to arise in view of the political constellation. If we prepare properly and adequately, the Administration will be confronted with a situation which will most likely lead it to treat with us seriously and try to reach an understanding with us on Palestine policy.

There are, of course, essential prerequisites to a successful effort along these lines. We shall have to organize American Jewry effectively and to make it articulate. If our negotiations with the American Jewish Committee do not lead to agreement in the very near future, we should consider the convening of a national conference of all Jewish organizations as well as mass action by a petition or by other means. We must also organize the Jewish press so that it may be a potent force and instrument in our hands. Many other steps would have to be taken.

4. The general politico-military situation. If today's reports concerning Marshal Petain's break with Hitler and adherence to the Allied cause are true, the political and military consequences are incalculable, especially if the French fleet at Toulon follows suit. The resulting shift in naval ratios alone is of an importance difficult to exaggerate. Without falling into the error of undue optimism, we may nevertheless take account of the possibility of further Allied victories which may considerably hasten the conclusion of the war. Moreover, irrespective of the strategic and military realities, account should be taken of psychological and political realities, among them the undoubted fact that the public mind and to a lesser extent also the official mind, will be occupied more than heretofore with the problems of the coming peace. It is reasonable to assume that the problems of the post-war settlement will receive increased attention on the part of policy-makers during the coming months. This also imposes upon us the obligation and necessity of further crystallizing our views and plans as well as a speeding up and intensification of our political efforts.

5. Summary and Conclusion. Events here and abroad have created the most favorable opportunity for successful political action on the part of American Zionists since the outbreak of the war. This is due to four factors: (a) the growth of America's power and influence in the Near East resulting from her large-scale military operations in that sector; (b) the precipitous drop in the nuisance value of the Arabs resulting from Allied successes; (c) our improved bargaining position in America as a result of the recent elections; (d) greater preoccupation with the problems of the post-war settlement as a result of improved prospects for an Allied victory. The time is therefore ripe for a sharp stepping up of our political action and for pressing the Government for a clear-cut pro-Zionist policy. We have much to reproach ourselves for the inadequacy of our political efforts since the outbreak of the war and there is little comfort to be drawn from the acts of omission and commission by the British and American Governments during this period. The circumstances briefly indicated in this memorandum render it imperative that we make full and effective use of the extraordinarily favorable opportunity which now confronts us. Failure to act promptly and on a scale commensurate with this opportunity would be an unpardonable dereliction of duty on our part who are the bearers of a historic responsibility. It is suggested first, that the officers of the Emergency Committee consult with each other as well as with Dr. Weizmann; secondly, that a special meeting be called to consider a program of action previously prepared by the officers and submitted by them to the Office Committee or to the whole Emergency Committee.

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THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

A Brief Statement on its Origin and the Results Achieved Under it by Jewish Enterprise in Palestine

1. The text of the Balfour Declaration, issued on behalf of his Majesty's Government on November 2, 1917 by Arthur James (later Lord) Balfour, is as follows:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

2. The Balfour Declaration may be regarded as the point of convergence of two historic currents. The first is the millennial urge of the Jewish people for the restoration of their nationhood, a sentiment that came to birth with the destruction of the Jewish State and has persisted through more than eighteen centuries of dispersion and persecution. The second current was the profound sympathy, nourished by Biblical prophecy as well as by considerations of practical policy, which leaders of British thought and action had for more than a century manifested in the redemption of Israel on its ancient soil. Among the Englishmen who gave expression to this sentiment were Col. Charles Henry Churchill, a kinsman of the present Prime Minister; the philanthropist Col. George Gawler, the theologian A. G. Hollingsworth, the economist Dr. Thomas Clark, the explorer and archaeologist Sir Lawrence Oliphant, the eminent statesman and social reformer Anthony Ashley Cooper, Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, the novelist George Eliot, Lord Milner, Lord Robert Cecil and many others.

3. In America also, where, of course, the Bible has exercised a profound influence, the restoration of Israel to the Holy Land has always commanded wide sympathy. As early as 1818 this sentiment was expressed by John Adams, second President of the Republic, and it found powerful confirmation in 1891 when William E. Blackstone, a prominent clergyman of Chicago, presented a petition to President Benjamin Harrison, urging him to call a conference of representatives of the principal governments of the world to effectuate the restoration of the Jews to Palestine. In this petition the Rev. Blackstone said:

"Not for twenty-four centuries, since the days of Cyrus, king of Persia, has there been offered to any mortal such a privileged opportunity to further the purposes of God concerning His ancient people. A million of exiles, by their terrible sufferings, are piteously appealing to our sympathy, justice and humanity. Let us now restore to them the land of which they were so cruelly despoiled by our Roman ancestors."

Even more significant than the petition itself, are the signatures that were affixed to it. Among those who signed it were authorized representatives of

the newspapers of New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston and Washington; the mayors of those cities; members of Congress; Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller of the Federal Supreme Court; leaders of industry and finance, as well as numerous clergymen, educators and writers.

4. The Balfour Declaration, issued at a period of low ebb in the fortunes of the Allies during the First World War, was an act of prophetic statesmanship that stirred the imagination of the British people. Years later, David Lloyd George, head of the British War Cabinet in whose name the Declaration was issued, described the state of British public opinion as follows:

"Men like Mr. Balfour, Lord Milner, Lord Robert Cecil and myself were in whole-hearted sympathy with the Zionist ideal. The same thing applied to all the leaders of public opinion in our country and in the dominions, Conservative, Liberal and Labor."

The Declaration, moreover, was issued only after careful and prolonged consideration, and with the concurrence of President Woodrow Wilson. Among those who collaborated in its formulation was Mr. Justice Louis D. Brandeis, whose recent death has left so great a void among the liberal forces of America.

5. The Declaration received the official endorsement of the United States when in 1922 the House and Senate adopted a joint resolution of approval which was signed by President Warren G. Harding. The resolution stated

"That the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of the National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected."

Since then the cause of the Jewish National Home in Palestine has been publicly and warmly endorsed by Presidents Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

6. The sympathy and good will of the American people has within the past few months become still further crystallized. Under the leadership of Senators Robert F. Wagner and Charles L. McNary, the AMERICAN PALESTINE COMMITTEE has been formed "to give expression to the interest, sympathy and moral support of the American people for the Jewish National Home in Palestine." The Committee already has a membership of over 600, including 67 United States senators, 139 Congressmen, 22 Governors of states, 71 mayors, many clergymen, judges, educators, writers, publishers and civic industrial leaders.

7. The Balfour Declaration was made part of the Palestine Mandate which the

League of Nations entrusted to Great Britain to administer, thus charging the Mandatory Power to effectuate its intent and purpose.

8. Relying on the guarantees furnished by the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, the Jews have in the past two decades established the material and spiritual foundations of the National Home. The Jewish population has increased more than ten-fold from a little over 50,000 to 555,000, and the progress in land reclamation and rural and urban colonization is well summarized in the report of the Royal Commission, headed by Earl Peel, which investigated conditions in Palestine in 1936. Following are some brief excerpts from the Royal Commission report:

"Twelve years ago the National Home was an experiment: today it is a 'going concern'...The process of agricultural colonization has steadily continued...Wide stretches of plain-land, drained and irrigated and green with citrus trees or brown from the plough, are now the agrarian basis of the National Home. The country-towns have likewise grown and prospered...Yet more impressive has been the urban development. Tel Aviv, still a wholly Jewish town, has leaped to the first place among the towns of Palestine...Broadly speaking, the remarkable urban development in Palestine has been Jewish. (Palestine Royal Commission Report, London, 1937; pp.113-115).

"The wide manufacturing field now covers extraction of mineral salts from the Dead Sea, food products, drinks, cigarettes, tobacco, building materials, metal-work, furniture, textiles, leather goods, artificial teeth, matches, wearing apparel, and chemical and allied products." (Ibid., p. 209)

9. The Arabs in Palestine have benefited substantially from Jewish enterprise, Axis propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding; and in the absence of incitement and financial inducements by Axis agents to disturbers of the peace, Arabs and Jews have demonstrated their desire and ability to live together in concord. The same report of the Royal Commission states (p. 129)

"We have come to the following conclusions:

- (a) The large import of Jewish capital into Palestine has had a general fructifying effect on the economic life of the whole country.
- (b) The expansion of Arab industry and citriculture has been largely financed by the capital thus obtained.
- (c) Jewish example has done much to improve Arab cultivation, especially of citrus.
- (d) Owing to Jewish development and enterprise the employment of Arab labour has increased in urban areas, particularly in the ports.
- (e) The reclamation and anti-malaria work undertaken in Jewish "colonies" have benefited all Arabs in the neighbourhood.
- (f) Institutions, founded with Jewish funds primarily to serve the National Home, have also served the Arab population. Hadassah, for example, treats Arab patients, notably at the Tuberculosis Hospital at Safed and the Radiology Institute at Jerusalem, admits Arab country-folk to the clinics of its Rural Sick

Benefit Fund, and does much infant welfare work for Arab mothers.

- (g) The general beneficent effect of Jewish immigration on Arab welfare is illustrated by the fact that the increase in the Arab population is most marked in urban areas effected by Jewish development".

10. The Balfour Declaration has been called the Magna Charta of the Jewish restoration, and the policy it proclaims has in recent years become vastly more urgent for the Jewish people and the world at large. The wave of Jewish persecution set in motion by Nazi Germany, has made millions of European Jews homeless and destitute, and no other solution seems possible for them except emigration. It has been reliably estimated that, under further scientific development, Palestine in its historic boundaries could absorb millions of additional inhabitants. A way is thus indicated for the solution of one of the world's gravest problems in consonance with the dictates of justice and in harmony with one of the deepest sentiments of the Christian World.

STATEMENTS ON THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

And the Jewish National Home in Palestine

by

LORD BALFOUR
DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS
WINSTON CHURCHILL

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

BY LORD BALFOUR:

"For long I have been a convinced Zionist . . . I feel that on the whole what I have been able to do for the Jews has been the thing I look back upon as the most worth my doing."

BY DAVID LLOYD GEORGE (In 1927):

"Tested by the events of the past ten years the policy embodied in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 has been amply justified. A regenerated Palestine is in the making, and the Jews are playing their full part in the work of reconstruction. . . I am convinced that Jews will not falter in the work to which they have set their hands, and that in the fullness of time their aspirations in Palestine will be realized. The Balfour Declaration, now incorporated in the Mandate for Palestine, is a pledge of British sympathy and good-will. It is a pledge which will be strictly honored. The Declaration is accepted as binding by every party in the State, and no matter what Government may be in power, Great Britain will stand by her word. Let the Jews do their part and Great Britain can be relied upon to do hers."

BY JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS (In 1927):

"The Balfour Declaration is one of the notable events in history, and its true importance will be realized more and more in the decades to come, when much else that occurred in the Great War will have become but a dim memory. . . It is based on a sense of historic justice, and constitutes a great act of historic reparation and renews once more the promise which is basic to Jewish history. . . It was apparently a minor incident in the midst of a world of shaking events, but in reality it was one of the remarkable events of history, for it was a renewal and fulfillment of the promise, and it showed historic justice triumphant at last across the long stretch of centuries. . . View it as we will, the Balfour Declaration, in its great setting of history, is one of the most wonderful confirmations of the moral and spiritual principle operating in human affairs."

BY WINSTON CHURCHILL

"To whom was the pledge of the Balfour Declaration made? It was not made to the Jews of Palestine, it was not made to those who were actually living in Palestine. It was made to world Jewry and in particular to the Zionist associations. It was in consequence of, and on the basis of this pledge that we received important help in the War, and that after the War we received from the Allied and Associated Powers the Mandate for Palestine. This pledge of a home of refuge, of an asylum, was not made to the Jews in Palestine but to the Jews outside Palestine, to that vast, unhappy mass of scattered, persecuted, wandering Jews whose intense, unchanging, unconquerable desire has been for a National Home. . . I cannot believe that the task to which we set our hand 20 years ago in Palestine is beyond our strength, or that faithful perseverance will not, in the end, bring that task through to a glorious success.

BY FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (In a letter to the 44th Zionist Convention dated Sept. 4, 1941):

"I am happy to send my greetings to the Forty-fourth Annual Convention of the Zionist Organization of America to be held at Cincinnati.

"My interest in the Jewish national home has been expressed on previous occasions, and it is a matter of gratification to note that the danger to Palestine, which was felt to be not inconsiderable a few short months ago, at this time is measurably removed.

"It is hardly necessary for me to say that the threat to Palestine does not differ in essence from the threat to this country, and I am confident that this fact will find due recognition in your deliberations. I look forward to the day when the great work which has been accomplished in Palestine may be carried forward in peace and harmony."

1943-44
EXCERPT FROM THE JEWISH TIMES, BALTIMORE, MD., JANUARY 8, 1943

DOCTOR MAGNES CABLES EXCEPTION
TO MISSTATEMENT

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EDITOR'S NOTE: The Jewish Times received the following cablegram on Tuesday, January 5, 1943, from Dr. Judah Magnes in Jerusalem, Palestine, in which he takes exception to Rabbi Lazaron's statement published in these columns on December 4, 1942.

Jerusalem
December 23, 1942.

The Jewish Times,
Baltimore, Md.

"Rabbi Morris Lazaron's letter published your journal quoting unauthorized from my personal private letter to him seems according reports reaching Palestine, give misleading impression my position. Hence desire say am Jewish nationalist and believe in Jewish Nationalism but utterly opposed those debated manifestations Jewish Nationalism which regrettably have appeared in latter years. My attitude on Zionist policy fully expounded January issue Foreign Affairs.

Judah Magnes."

Rabbi Lazaron's statement in connection with this cablegram follows:

THE FULL STATEMENT OF DR. MAGNES

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I am extremely troubled that any act of mine might have brought misunderstanding of Dr. Magnes' position, portions of whose letters to me I published without his authorization. In order that he may not be misinterpreted, I desire to make public the entire correspondence.

After seeing the announcement of the IHUD organization in the general press, I wrote to Dr. Magnes enclosing a copy of the Statement of Principles of the group of rabbis and laymen with whom I am associated. This Statement of Principles declares, among other things:

"Realizing how dear Palestine is to the Jewish soul and how important Palestinian rehabilitation is towards relieving the pressing problems of our distressed people, we stand ready to render unstinted aid to our brethren in their economic, cultural and spiritual endeavors in that country. But in the light of our universalistic interpretation of Jewish history and destiny, and also because of our concern for the welfare and status of the Jewish people living in other parts of the world, we are unable to subscribe to or support the political emphasis now paramount in the Zionist program. We cannot but believe that Jewish nationalism tends to confuse our fellowmen about our place and function in society and also diverts our own attention from our historic

role to live as a religious community wherever we may dwell....."

Dr. Magnes in reply commented as follows:

"(a) I also have a universalistic interpretation of Jewish history. But this for me is not in opposition to the national elements and hopes of the Jewish people.

"(b) You are unable to 'support the political emphasis now paramount in the Zionist program.' What does the word emphasis signify here? I am opposed to the political content of that program, not because it is political but because I think the content under present conditions likely to provoke civil war in Palestine and confusion abroad. Politics is one of the great spiritual concerns of mankind, as the Prophets of Israel showed. They were not cut off from life and they therefore did not oppose politics as such. But they were concerned with the kind of political principles the State was based upon, and upon the quality of the political action of statesmen and peoples.

"(c) It is true that Jewish nationalism tends to confuse people, not because it is secular and not religious, but because this nationalism is unhappily chauvinistic and narrow and terroristic in the best style of Eastern European nationalisms. The factor of nationalism is also of great spiritual moment, and it cannot be answered by denying its existence. It depends upon what we make of it, and it is here where legitimate criticism is, unhappily, called for.

"It is well that you and your associates have spoken and I hope that you will keep on clarifying all aspects of your principles. 'Research' is in style these days. Could you not set up a research committee for further delving into the bases and implications of your principles?"

If my letter, written under extreme pressure, has placed Dr. Magnes in a compromising position, I most profoundly regret to have been the unwitting occasion for such a situation and I trust that this completer statement of his views will clarify the attitude of one whom I have regarded for years as a real statesman.

MORRIS S. LAZARON

Baltimore, Md., Jan. 4, 1943.

[Sept. 1, 1943]

RESOLUTION ON PALESTINE

ADOPTED BY THE PALESTINE COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE AND SUBMITTED BY DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER OF CHEVAND, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE PLENARY SESSION ON WEDNESDAY EVENING SEPTEMBER 1, 1943 at 8:30 P.M.

We, Jewish citizens of the United States dwelling in security in this our beloved land, which because of its democratic institutions and just laws "gives to bigotry no sanction and to persecution no assistance", and dedicated in undivided loyalty to the noble spirit of our country, are gathered here as an American Jewish Conference, a democratically elected body representative of ~~the~~ American Jewry to cope with the tragic problems of our fellow Jews all over the world. We make the following declaration of principles as to the relation between the Jewish people, the Homeland in Palestine, and the world need for post-war reconstruction.

The Jewish problem has been made one of the central elements in the present assault on civilization. In a world-wide Nazi-Fascist conspiracy its exploitation has constituted the initial phase of the assault. Its solution is an integral part of the conditions needed for an ^denuring peace.

In the first world war, the civilized nations pointed to a solution of the Jewish problem through the reconstruction of the Jewish Homeland in Palestine, with which the Jewish people has been bound up historically and religiously throughout the centuries. This was expressed in the Balfour Declaration issued by the British Government, after consultation between the Allied and Associated Powers, on November 2, 1917, and in the Mandate for Palestine accorded to Great Britain in 1922, with the consent of the fifty-one member nations of the League of Nations and with the unanimous approval of the Congress

of the United States.

On the basis of this international covenant the Jewish people set itself to the task of recreating its historic Homeland in Palestine. In the course of twenty-five years, it has demonstrated a constructive capacity which has already had a profound effect both on the hopes and outlook of the Jewish people, and on a country which had for centuries been regarded as one of the derelict areas of the world. The progress of all sections of Palestine, Arab as well as Jewish, under the stimulus of the developing Jewish Homeland is one of the most notable phenomena of our time; the contribution of democratic Jewish Palestine to the victories of ~~the United Nations~~ ^{of the} armies of the Near East has been a significant ~~vindication~~ of the policy initiated by world opinion and carried out in the labors and sacrifices of the Jewish people.

This period of reconstruction, however, has ~~co~~^{co}incided with a general deterioration of world order and international morality. Chief among the victims of this deterioration have been the millions of Jews in Europe. Yet despite the fact that the conditions which made imperative the re-establishment of the Jewish Homeland a quarter of a century ago have been intensified beyond the darkest forebodings, the rights internationally guaranteed to the Jewish people with respect to Palestine have been progressively whittled down on grounds of administrative and political expediency until, with the promulgation of the White Paper of May 1939, the solemn promise made to the Jewish people was virtually ~~annulled~~ ^{nullified} and the last hope of millions of homeless Jews threatened with extinction.

The American Jewish Conference, meeting at a time when the policies of the peace are in the making, and conscious of its historic responsibility and of its position as representative of American Jewry and spokesman for the silenced Jewish communities of Europe, calls for

the loyal and faithful fulfillment of the covenant entered into between the nations of the world and the Jewish people.

We call for the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration, and of the Mandate for Palestine whose intent and underlying purpose, based on the "historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine", was to reconstitute Palestine as the Jewish Commonwealth.

We demand the immediate withdrawal in its entirety of the Palestine White Paper of May 1939 with its unwarranted restrictions on Jewish immigration and land settlement. The White Paper ^{is} ~~consti-~~ ~~tutes~~ a violation of the rights accorded to the Jewish people under the Mandate for Palestine. It was characterized by Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons as a "breach and a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration." The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations refused to recognize ^{its} its legality, or moral validity.

The Conference demands that the gates of Palestine be opened to Jewish immigration, and that the Jewish Agency, recognized under the Mandate as the authorized representative of the Jewish people, be vested with authority to direct and regulate immigration into Palestine, to develop to the maximum the agricultural and industrial possibilities and the natural resources of the country, and to utilize its uncultivated and unoccupied lands for Jewish colonization and for the benefit of the country as a whole.

The measures here urged constitute the essential pre-requisites for the attainment of a Jewish majority and ^{for} the re-creation of the Jewish Commonwealth.

In the pursuit of its objective of a Jewish Commonwealth, the Jewish people has steadfastly held before it the ideals which shall

integrate Jewish Palestine within the new democratic world structure. The Jewish people pledges itself to scrupulous regard for and preservation of the religious, linguistic and cultural rights of the Arab population of Palestine, and to the civil and religious ~~equalities~~ equality of all its inhabitants before the law. The inviolability of the Holy Places of the various religions shall be guaranteed.

The Jewish people reaffirms its readiness and desire for full cooperation with its Arab neighbors in Palestine, and, in the work of its own national redemption, welcomes the economic and political development of the Arab peoples of the Near East.

On the basis both of the part it has played in the history of civilization, and ^{of} its present achievement in Palestine, the Jewish people believes that the Jewish Commonwealth to be established will represent another fundamental contribution to the social and political ideals of the world. It will finally answer the agonized cry of the most martyred of peoples, and enable it to take its rightful place in that progressive order of mankind which, we pray, may issue from the present struggle.

Abba Hillel Silver
Chairman of Palestine Committee

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

September 7, 1943

Dear Abba:

As I foresee a regular and rather heavy correspondence between us in the months to come, I propose to number my letters to you and suggest that you do the same in order to facilitate reference to them and the various items they will cover.

1. Boston. I have had a brief report from Bob Silverman. Too bad the arrangements for your meeting with the group were messed up. I understand you, nevertheless, made a start and secured some \$7,000. I intend to get Abe Goodman to make a substantial contribution, after which it should be possible to get some of the New England people to increase theirs. We ought to be able to have some \$50,000 by the close of the convention.

2. I have wired to Rabbi Wohl and I am enclosing a copy of my telegram.

3. I have replied to Philip Slomovitz and I am enclosing copy of my reply.

4. I am also enclosing a copy of my reply to Raymond Leslie Buell. He is an important man with a good political head on his shoulders. It occurs to me that we might get several of our non-Jewish friends who are politically minded to serve on a kind of Political Advisory Committee and meet with us occasionally. You might include Buell, Professor Carl Friedrich of Harvard, Reinhold Niebuhr, possibly Wilkie and others.

5. Following your advice, we are not trying to organize delegates and alternates at this time; but we do plan to insist that the Convention should have a political committee where we could have a thorough and frank discussion of the present political situation and Zionist political efforts to date. The purpose would be not only to have our constituents fully informed but to make them understand the nature of the situation which you are inheriting from the previous regime.

6. I have not yet received a copy of Weizmann's message of congratulations to you. I want to make a fuss about it in the press and propose that we should release it together with a message from you to Weizmann. I shall try to draft such a reply today and perhaps read it to you over the telephone.

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

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7. I have given further thought to the new setup in the Emergency Committee and will either write you on that especially or discuss the matter with you in Columbus.

I am just beginning to recover from the strain of the past weeks; I hope that you are. My affectionate regards to Virginia and the boys. As ever,

Yours,

Emanuel

EN:GCS



Dr. A. H. Silver
c/o The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
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TELEGRAM	ORDINARY
DAY LETTER	URGENT RATE
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Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise the message will be transmitted as a telegram or ordinary cablegram.

WESTERN UNION

1207

A. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

\$	CHECK
	ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
	TIME FILED

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

To E. Neumann
Sept 16 1943

Care of or Apt. No. 521 7th Ave.

Street and No. New York N.Y.

Place

WANT A REPLY?

"Answer by WESTERN UNION"
or similar phrases may be
included without charge.

Would appreciate if you would let me
return to me by airmail lists Emergency
Committee members which I gave you
Columbus

Alba

Sender's Name

Address

Tel. No.

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

September 17, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
19810 Shaker Boulevard
Shaker Heights, Ohio

Dear Abba,

Szold

Yesterday Szold was in my office and I had another chat with him. For one thing, I tried to warn him against being drawn in by B. G. into any anti-Weizmann front or activity. He agreed entirely, adding that he realized that there was not one responsible Zionist in this country who would approve of such an attempt. We talked again about the political bureau in Washington and he repeated that there is no need or point for such an Agency bureau now, but he thought you would have no difficulty in working with Goldmann. Regarding the Emergency Committee set-up, he said that if he were in your place, he would go slow about appointing people and delegating powers to them. He thought that you should manage, ~~it~~ if at all possible, to spend the bulk of your time in New York during the initial period and run things yourself. Only thereafter should you delegate to others. In the meanwhile, he thought the situation could be met by having a capable woman in the office to take care of the administrative work. However, he repeated it was entirely up to you. Similarly he did not warm up to the idea of the Vice-Chairmanships at this moment, but thought that, too, might be left to be considered later. As for himself, he expressed the desire to retire, as it were, from executive and operational responsibilities and be put in charge of a special committee on Zionist post-war aims and political planning. I believe he refers to a careful study and documentation of our case. He has already spoken to some persons who are willing to help in this particular piece of work, and I think there is no reason to object to his taking on such a committee. We also talked about your meeting with Frankfurter and Ben Cohen. Szold offered to telephone them and/or write them to pave the way for meetings between you and them. Our conference was very cordial and I believe we have established "friendship" or at least the basis for good working relations.

Concerning Schwefel

The more I think of it, the more I feel a strong effort should be made to secure his appointment as Montor's successor. The fact that Montor spoke to him earnestly ~~ad~~ the obvious man to succeed him is

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additional and almost conclusive proof of his fitness for the post. In reality Montor may prefer to have someone else since he did not suggest Schwefel's name himself until you put it forward: moreover, Montor has been mentioning other persons and sounding them out within the past few days. But whatever his reasons for possibly preferring others, he evidently recognizes Schwefel as a logical and desirable choice. Of course, it would have to be approved by the Board, but there is absolutely no reason why anyone should oppose your recommendation unless motivated by purely partisan considerations, namely Schwefel's energetic efforts and travels in connection with the "Draft Silver Movement." Israel Goldstein and, of course, Mendel Fisher and their close associates now look upon him askance though they had been good friends before the Silver movement was launched. If anyone should want to fish in muddy waters and eliminate Schwefel he might succeed. But to permit this to happen, to allow Schwefel to be penalized for exposing himself to opposition by his efforts and loyalty to you would be a great mistake and might be taken as evidence of weakness on our part. In short, I hope you will see your way to urging his appointment firmly. It would be most desirable and useful to have him in that key position for which he is fully qualified by ability, character and experience. Many of our people who have known Schwefel well, are more than enthusiastic about him as, for instance, Abe Goodman, Ben Rosenblatt and others. In 1941 Wise tried hard to get Schwefel to take the executive directorship of the Congress, and as far back as eight years ago Rothenberg wanted him to replace Margulies as executive director of the Z. O. A.

Committees and Departments

When we meet Monday morning I shall have further suggestions regarding the departments and committees of the Emergency Committee. For one thing, I would now definitely advise to have a committee on "Intellectual Mobilization" for activizing our intellectuals of all sorts. Steinberg would be the ideal chairman for this department. The committee or department to work out ideas and arguments for our political propaganda I am prepared to guide without necessarily taking the chairmanship. I can be its Vice-chairman or an ordinary member. In that case the committee on Research and Studies might safely be entrusted to Janowsky, though he is not quite kosher on our present official position. As for Schulman, Nahum Goldmann doubts whether he is the man to handle the American Palestine Committee. He proposes that I do it while Schulman undertakes the work which we have planned to assign to Gross. For myself, if I am to take on a definite responsibility at all, I would prefer to follow your original suggestion of supervising Washington activities as your deputy, provided we could have a really decent set-up there and the necessary budget.

Emergency Committee Meeting

If you think it advisable and time permits, I will be prepared to

September 17, 1943

render for the first time a report on the work of the Commission on Palestine Surveys before the full Emergency Committee (on Monday evening) or before the Executive Committee. From my point of view it may be desirable to do so.

Irving Miller

Abe Goodman came to see me today to plead for Miller's appointment as chairman of the J. N. F. and hoped you would put in a strong plea for him with Goldstein on the ground that several members of the Executive Committee have requested you to do so. Here, too, we ought to be able to get our way. The argument should be: no penalizing of people who stuck out their necks. If Rothenberg takes the U. P. A. there is really no better candidate than Miller, though I hear the others are talking about Daniel Frisch. Distasteful as it may be, I think you will have to give some attention to these matters which are hang-overs from the recent campaign. This for the sake of the future, and not only the past.

It is possible that you may be seeing other people before we have our talk on Monday. In that case, I would suggest that you make no final decisions on all questions of this sort, more particularly the set-up in the Emergency Committee and the successor to Montor, until we have the opportunity to discuss them again.

The other day Goldstein had a press luncheon. ^{Israeli} ~~the society~~ wants to arrange a press luncheon or dinner for you with the representatives of the Jewish Press, say Tuesday evening. Please consider it.

As ever

Yours,

Canwell

EN:PB

Letter #3

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

September 22, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
c/o The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba,

I am sorry I missed you last night. I was tied up with an appointment and when I got to the Commodore around 6:30, I could not find you.

Under separate cover I am sending you a letter I received from Slomovitz which I would ask you to please return for my file when you are through with it. Evidently Hoskins has been doing quite a bit of work against us. This is, of course, further corroboration of the vital importance of organizing our political work in Washington on the proper scale.

Jacob Richman was in to see me today and confidentially gave me additional information about large scale plans of Peter Bergson and his associates in launching a League for a Free Palestine. They have already engaged several full time persons of ability and intend to organize this as a mass movement by enrolling hundreds and thousands of members. Since this has a direct bearing on our plans for the American Palestine Committee and indeed on our whole program, we shall have to deal with it promptly. I take it that our plans with regard to the American Palestine Committee will have to take their program into account. I shall try to have a private, informal talk with Bergson and report to you. Also I intend to survey the situation in Washington discretely and report to you on that.

As ever.

Faithfully yours,

EN:PB

Emanuel Neumann

September 23, 1943

No. 5

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
521 Fifth Ave.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Emanuel:

I am sorry that I missed you prior to train-leaving time. I got your note from the porter just before boarding the train.

I was interested to learn about your talk with Peter Bergson. Perhaps you would like to arrange for a meeting between him, you and me some time next week here in Cleveland. We might then spend a few hours exploring the whole situation to discover whether a basis of cooperation can not be found with the Revisionists and the Army people.

Shulman was in to see me on Tuesday. He is evidently reconciled to the re-organization scheme which I suggested. He asked for the post of Chairman of the American Palestine Committee. I told him that that post had been assigned to you in view of the fact that you had created the American Palestine Committee and had developed it. I suggested to him in an indirect way that if the Hadassah and ZOA people would agree to having you become Vice-chairman of the Executive Committee and would recommend it, some arrangement could be made with reference to the American Palestine Committee. He took the hint and said he would explore the situation. I had in mind of course that you wanted the Vice-presidency in the first place. That would give you the opportunity to help along in the entire program and to deputize for me whenever I am away. I do not know whether Shulman will succeed. I am waiting to hear from him. He does not feel qualified for the post of Chairman of the Press and Radio Committee.

Montor is coming to Cleveland Monday to confer with me on the details of the re-organization plan - the setting up of the committees, etc. If you have any suggestions for membership on the various committees other than those which you already made, I would be very happy to hear from you before Monday.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

ARS:BK

Letter #4

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

September 24, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
c/o The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba,

Post Mortem

I have been getting some interesting bits of information regarding the convention situation. ~~Pointers~~ ^{Opinion} to the effect that Israel Goldstein had inquired of Mr. Spiro, who is Field Director for the Z. O. A., regarding sentiment among the Zionists, and that Spiro had replied that in a contest you would win three to one! Further, the other day Irving Miller had a talk with Wise in the course of which Wise said that he now understood that you would easily have walked away with the presidency. If he had known that in August he might have acted differently, but he had been led to believe that it would be at best a knock-down and drag out battle. It is a good thing that Goldstein, Wise, and the rest should be aware of that, but it is equally important that you should be aware of your own strength.

U.P.A., J.N.F., K.H., etc.

I understand that ideas are germinating in the minds of Mendel Fisher and others. Now that Montor is leaving the U.P.A. they feel it is the opportune moment to make a drastic reduction in the U.P.A. staff and to build up the position of the two funds as against the U.P.A. I believe that Mendel is selling the idea to the K.H. that they can now build up their staff and organization at the expense of the U.P.A. and that the two funds jointly may handle the U.P.A. and U.J.A. situation without the intervention of a first-rate executive director as the successor to Montor. My guess is that it boils down to this--that Mendel wants to play the part of executive director of the U.P.A. himself, without giving up his post in the J.N.F. and is playing for the support of the K.H. by holding out a bit of the aggrandizement ~~of~~ ^{to} the K.H. too. In this connection I hear that Rothenberg is again veering in the direction of accepting the J.N.F. presidency; and it is likely that the idea would be that he might at the same time be chairman of the U.P.A. On the other hand, a scheme is in the process of

September 24, 1943

being worked out tying up the K.H. more closely with the Z.O.A. ^{by} with a complicated plan for securing \$100 life membership for the Z.O.A., the money to be invested in K.H. bonds. It is also proposed that the K.H. advance the expenses for this campaign. I take it that Goldstein is postponing the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Z.O.A. for two reasons. First, to have it at a time when Sol Goldman and ~~Heller~~ ^{Heller} will both be in town, and secondly, to enable him to work out a number of these ideas in advance of the meeting. The Szold group or the "Young Turks," whichever one might call them, have not disbanded, but are holding a meeting on Sunday. They are undoubtedly trying to repair the damage they have sustained and retain or recapture control of the Z.O.A. and the funds. I shall keep an eye on these things as best I can.

Agency Bureau vs. Emergency Committee

Everything is now set for a meeting of a sub-committee of the K.H. on Monday afternoon to consider again the matter of the monthly payment of \$3200 for the Political Bureau and its relationship to the Emergency Committee and its budget. Barring surprises, the Committee will adopt a recommendation to the effect that the K.H. should make further payments only with the approval or on the instruction of the Emergency Committee. Such action will greatly facilitate your coming negotiations with Dr. Goldman et. al. Personally, I do not like to use such methods by way of pressure, but my scruples would have been stronger if Goldman and Weisgal had been less luke-warm and their position less ambiguous than it was in the "Draft-Silver Movement". In fact, Goldman himself admitted to me that he had advised Lipsky and Weisgal not to participate actively on the ground that it might incriminate (that was not his word) the World Zionist Executive. My feeling is that since Goldman got himself into ~~the~~ ^{that} position of being sole director of political work in Washington, he lost his earlier enthusiasm for drawing you in. On the other hand, he is nothing ~~but~~ ^{is not} a realist; and if he knows that the Emergency Committee as well as the K.H. will insist upon a new arrangement, he will readily accommodate himself by accepting some compromise. Now it has struck me that ~~it~~ ^{there} may be a ~~tactical~~ ^{tactical} advantage in your working out an agreed solution with Goldman and Lipsky, as representing the Agency Executive, and merely bringing it to the Emergency Committee for ratification--rather than having the Emergency Committee in the first place make proposals of its own; because such an agreed solution would have behind it the backing of the Agency, speaking through Goldman and Lipsky, as well as your own authority and prestige. Under those circumstances our Executive Committee would have little choice but to ratify it. Whereas starting with the Emergency Committee will provide the opportunity for prolonged discussion and jockeying for position on the part of Shulman and Goldstein or whoever else may be ambitious to have a hand in the political work. I still think the solution is one political bureau in Washington headed by yourself and including Goldman and two or three others. This would also obviate the creation of a political committee in the Emergency.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver


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September 24, 1943

I am now working on a breakdown of the Washington activities into their component parts and will send this on to you shortly.

As ever


Faithfully yours,



Emanuel Neumann

EN:PB

P. S. Have just received your letter
of the 23rd. Will try to get to Cleveland -
if possible.



Letter #5

September 26, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
c/o The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba,

Your letter of the 23rd came to my hand too late to answer it on Friday.

Peter Bergson

I have had one brief conversation with him and am to have a longer one probably today. He had just returned from Washington where he had had a long conference in the State Department. It was in connection with the prospective arrival of Ibn Saoud's son Feisal. According to Bergson, a good deal of pressure was being exerted upon his group to refrain from carrying on any political campaign during Feisal's stay here. He also had gathered that our people, Stephen Wise et. al., had promised to refrain not only from criticizing the Arabs, but also from conducting a strong pro-Palestine propaganda. This I told him, of course, could not be true; but he was anxious to confer with us at once regarding these matters because his group had made preparations for staging a considerable campaign in Washington. I spoke to Goldman about it promptly and expect that conversations will take place with Bergson before his departure for Washington tomorrow, Monday night. Goldman had also had a conversation with the people in the Near East Division and apparently had intimations from them about Bergson's plans and the necessity for mitigating them.

Next Visit To Cleveland

I tried to make arrangements to secure accommodations for a trip to Cleveland and return the latest Wednesday in view of the holiday, but found it most difficult. Moreover, it seems impossible for Bergson. I am afraid I shall have to give the idea up and plan to go over matters with you as early next Monday morning as you would care to make it. Perhaps 8:30 to 10:00 or something like that. In the meantime I will keep you informed of what transpires.

Lawrence Steinhardt

As you know he is an old friend of mine and a brother-in-law of Will Rosenblatt. We have had talks with him on his earlier visits. Now

September 26, 1943

I have been trying to arrange for a conference between Steinhardt, yourself, and one or two others, thus avoiding the necessity of his having to talk with several of our leaders individually. In the meantime, however, Nahum told me he had got in touch with Steinhardt or his secretary in Washington and was going to see him here in New York--whether alone or with Wise, Weisgal, etc., I do not know; nor am I, for the present, in a position to intervene in these matters unless on express instructions emanating from you.

Emergency Committee Set-up

I have had another talk with Milton Steinberg who said that his preference would be the Committee on Publications, concerning which he has certain ideas; but he is prepared to take the Committee on Intellectual Mobilization. I suggested that he might be chairman of one of the two committees and cooperate also with the other. He will be glad to do whatever we decide. I also promised to let him have some ideas regarding the business of "Intellectual Mobilization". Regarding the Committee on Research, I understood from Montor that he is thinking of Kohansky as a possible executive officer for that department. If Kohansky is technically qualified, I believe that he is sound on the side of his political views; and if we have a safe man like that, it may be O.K. to have Mrs. Jacobs chairman of the Committee or at least a member of it. I still think it is desirable to draw her in in some way for reasons I have already given. By the same token it would be extremely inadvisable to have either Mrs. Epstein or Mrs. Halpern in that Committee, for it would make for absolute non-cooperation between us and the Esco Foundation. If the worst comes to the worst I would even put Steinberg at the head of that Committee and look around for another chairman for Intellectual Mobilization, unless Steinberg would do both. Perhaps Steinberg, Rose Jacobs and Haym Greenberg could constitute the nucleus of the Research Committee. I think I told you that Mrs. Epstein was rather excited over the idea of her serving on a committee for "Political Orientation" which I had originally thought might consist of Greenberg, Mrs. Epstein and myself, with Nahum Goldman ex-officio. I have not got the list of members in front of me and so my present suggestions must be limited. I would add regarding the Finance Committee, that ~~it~~ should include Goodman as well as Rosenbloom. Goodman is on the spot and might for that reason be named as chairman; but it is also necessary to have at least one or perhaps two members of the Committee on the Finance Committee. In the past Wertheim has been signing checks together with Szold and it may be politic to have him express his point of view on the Finance Committee rather than raise questions in the Executive Committee itself.

Herman Shulman

It was clever to put up to Shulman the matter of my vice chairmanship in connection with his desire to have charge of the American Palestine Committee; but, of course, the Hadassah and Z.O.A. people are not likely

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

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September 26, 1943

to agree if they can possibly help it. In any case I need not tell you that I appreciate your effort in that direction.

Since it is unlikely that I can see you before Monday, might it not be possible to let me see the proposed set-up of committees sometime this week so that I might think about it in advance of our meeting Monday morning.

Did you see the write up in the New York Post? If not, I can send you a copy. What appealed to me most in that interview was the reference to the "Glorious Borscht". I am enclosing a little article which I wrote for the Bulletin of the Seventh Zionist District in Manhattan, the largest in the city. It is entitled "A Leader Emerges".

As ever,

Faithfully yours,

Emanuel

Emanuel Neumann

AMERICAN JEWISH
ARCHIVES

EN:PB
Enc.

WRHS

*I have just had a second talk with
Bergson. A third tomorrow.*

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

September 29, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
c/o The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba,

I received your letter of the 28th in reply to mine of the 26th.

Emergency Committee Setup

I hope there will be no ironclad rule against one person's serving on more than one committee if he is willing and able to do so; so that Steinberg, for instance, might make his contribution in more than one direction. I am glad you intend to appoint Mrs. Jacobs Chairman of the Research Committee but I believe it will be necessary to have written out terms of reference for that Committee and that she take it on that basis in order to avoid misunderstandings later. I may try my hand at a draft.

Your decisions regarding Greenberg and Gold are, I think, excellent. I would not call Greenberg's Committee the Committee on Post-War Political Planning, however. The latter is what Szold intends to take in hand eventually. Greenberg's Committee should, I think, deal with current political trends and developments and try to offer guidance to the Zionist press, speakers, and propaganda agencies, generally. He will be delighted to do so. Mrs. Epstein will be happy to serve on that Committee as well.

I don't know what to say about Shulman. I would not like to appear to be the cause of his dropping out. If they oppose the Vice-chairmanship, perhaps another task may be assigned to ~~him~~ ^{me} connected more directly with political activities in Washington.

Nahum Goldmann

I fully understand your concern over Goldman's ubiquitous activity. One of the troubles about him is that he is not tied down to any administrative responsibility and, therefore, spends his entire time in contacting people. He has a passion for carrying on what he considers to be political negotiations and political conversations. Just the

September 29, 1943

same, he has succeeded in impressing himself upon our people as being the man for political work and has been clothed with considerable authority. I rather hoped that any clash with him would be postponed until your regime has been fully entrenched and consolidated. At the meeting of the Sub-Committee of the Keren Hayesod the other day, he appeared together with Weisgal and pleaded that he planned to go to Palestine next month where he would work out with the Executive a new plan and new arrangements, and that in the meantime the payments should be continued for three months. Rothenberg then suggested that the request be granted and the recommendation was adopted, though it is still to be approved by the full committee of the Keren Hayesod. If there is a show-down with him I venture to suggest that a delimitation of his role as representative of the Jewish Agency is not likely to be practicable; and I still think the solution--at least the provisional solution--would be a setting up of a joint political bureau with yourself as Chairman and with provision for a day-to-day conduct of the work by two persons jointly: Dr. Goldmann, for the Agency, and someone else for Zionism. Lipsky seems to favor such a solution. The question would be who should constitute the Bureau or the Committee in charge of it. Lipsky's idea was three: yourself, Goldmann, and Lipsky, but readily agreed that it might have to be five. He thought Goldstein would expect to be named as one of them but I believe such a nomination is by no means indispensable. Shulman might be better, (especially if he takes the Chairmanship of the American Palestine Committee); and I might be one of them. Wise could be a member ex-officio in his capacity as Chairman of the Emergency Committee. If it is clearly understood that you are Chairman and are to give ~~instructions~~ ^{directions}, it might work. This may also obviate the creation of a "Political Committee" in the Emergency Committee. In such a set-up I think you would be able to count upon the loyal cooperation of Lipsky and probably Shulman and, of course, myself. Lipsky has always had misgivings about Goldmann's activity and as between you and Goldmann he would almost certainly follow you. Since Shulman's place in the picture is involved (and that involves apparently also the attitude of Hadassah) it would be fortunate if the Washington business could be dealt with and an understanding reached, not on Tuesday, but rather on Monday prior to the meeting of the Emergency Executive Committee.

U. P. A.

I understand that Goldstein has called a meeting of the joint committee of the Keren Hayesod and the J. N. F. for Monday morning at 11:30 in advance of your U. P. A. luncheon meeting; presumably on the theory that you are going to spring something regarding the new U. P. A. set-up and in order to confront you with a body of opinion representing the two funds. It may be smart not to submit proposals but rather to ask those present for their ideas and suggestions concerning the new set-up and possibly appoint a small committee to bring in recommendations. In this connection I want to report Lipsky's views. He has the most serious misgiving about offering the Chairmanship to Rothenberg on the ground that he is not the person to continue your policies and the type of aggressive leadership, ~~via-a-vis~~ the J. D. C. and other groups, which you represent. When I pressed him for his solution he suggested that

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

-3-

September 29, 1943

you retain for the time being the national chairmanship, but devolve the actual day-to-day management and direction upon someone else like Charles Rosenbloom or Joel Gross as Chairman of the Administrative or Executive Committee of the U. P. A. This would enable you to give general direction to its policy while being relieved of all administrative responsibilities. I must confess this plan appeals to me, particularly since there are signs of recalcitrancy on the part of our friend Goldstein. I am convinced that he has already embarked upon a course designed to build up for himself a dominating position by a system of controls which would include the funds and everything else he can lay his hands on. You will recall the resolution dealing with the Emergency Committee which we put through the Political Committee of the Z. O. A. Convention and the Convention itself; and it is rather ominous that the text of this particular resolution was not published in the New Palestine. I thoroughly believe we shall have to have a show-down with Goldstein at the very first meeting of the new Z. O. A. Executive.

I will be glad to meet you early Monday morning at breakfast at about 8:30.

With best wishes for the New Year, as ever

EN:PB



Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to read "Emanuel".

Emanuel Neumann

Executive Department
RECEIVED

September 24, 1943

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Neumann:

Rabbi Silver has requested me to
return to you the enclosed letters from
Mr. Slomovitz and Senator Vandenberg.

With best wishes, I remain

Very sincerely yours,

BJK

Secretary to Rabbi Silver.

STANDARD TIME INDICATED

RECEIVED AT

8:0150
(36)

TELEPHONE YOUR TELEGRAMS
TO POSTAL TELEGRAPH

Postal Telegraph

Mackay Radio

Commercial Cables



All America Cables

Canadian Pacific Telegraphs

THIS IS A FULL RATE TELEGRAM, CABLE-
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OR IN THE ADDRESS OF THE MESSAGE.
SYMBOLS DESIGNATING SERVICE SELECTED
ARE OUTLINED IN THE COMPANY'S TARIFFS
ON HAND AT EACH OFFICE AND ON FILE WITH
REGULATORY AUTHORITIES.

Form

H. NB304 MB56N (FIVE) 31=MB WUT NEWYORK NY 6 121P=

DR ABBA HILLEL SILVER=

CARE THE TEMPLE (CLEVELAND OHIO)=

1943 OCT 6 PM 1 52

HAVE TENTATIVELY BOOKED CARNEGIE HALL NOVEMBER 2. NOW LEARN
GOLDSTEIN PLANNING BALFOUR MEETING OCTOBER 31. IF YOU ARE
APPROACHED BY ZOA PEOPLE, SUGGEST WE DISCUSS MATTER BY
PHONE BEFORE YOU ACCEPT=

EMANUEL NEUMANN==

2 31 ZOA

NO *10-4* TO *B.K.*
BY *5* AT *250p* TO BE *mail*
CALLS

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

October 7, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

(1) Carnegie Hall: Since wiring you yesterday, I have learned that Goldstein has taken Carnegie Hall for Monday evening, November 1st for a Balfour meeting. Moreover, I had forgotten that Tuesday was Election Day. For both reasons, I am giving up the booking for November 2nd. I think Goldstein must have got wind of the fact that some of us were planning a meeting and hastened to beat us to it. What the program will be like I do not know as it is in the hands of a committee which has been appointed or will be appointed by Goldstein.

(2) UPA: My congratulations on the magnificent result you have achieved. I am sure you regard even that as insufficient. Just the same, it is tremendous and no one but you could have done it. It strikes me that now would be the psychological moment for you to secure a commitment from the UPA or of the two constituent funds for an adequate budget for the political work. At this moment no one will be able to successfully resist your request. Later, when the enthusiasm has cooled off, it may be more difficult. Why not propose that in addition to the \$250,000. previously agreed upon, a further sum should be at least reserved for the purposes of the Emergency Committee? Do it now!

(3) Research Department: I had a long chat at lunch the other day with Dr. Berkson. He had been approached through Lourie. I think he is rather excited at the prospect or the possibility of doing a real job, though he has certain hesitations. From our long conversation I am inclined to believe that he is prepared to go along with us fully on policy and to interpret the job in the sense that you have expressed. I think he would not, however, want to be a "candidate for a job". He is, after all, a man both of parts and position. He is a recognized scholar and as you know, was a member of the Jewish Agency Executive in Palestine for many years. I think that if you were to have a talk with him, satisfy yourself regarding his views and attitude

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

October 7, 1943


towards the task, and if he were satisfied that he is really wanted and that there would be a real understanding between you and him, he would come along. A great deal of the material that we want and need is already in his hands. All things considered, there are great advantages in drawing him in, irrespective of whether Mrs. Jacobs finally takes the Chairmanship of the committee or not, though I hope she will.

(4) Technical Mission to Palestine: Please read the attached copy of my letter to Frankfurter. There is a real problem. Nahum Goldmann thinks that the matter should be taken up with Felix next week with a view to getting him to pave the way for us with Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State; and that he (Goldmann), and I should join you in discussing this matter with Felix. However, I leave that to you. I plan to leave for Washington on the 7:30 train Monday evening from New York and arrive there towards midnight. I shall be staying at the Mayflower Hotel. I plan at present to make a train for New York on Tuesday afternoon though if necessary I could stay over until Wednesday morning.

(5) Peter Bergson: ^{Yiddish} ~~he seemed~~ The demonstration in Washington yesterday, ~~to have been~~ a success. The newspapers in particular played it up tremendously. Perhaps now our people may be more disposed towards cooperation with them. I take it you have fixed the appointment for Bergson next Tuesday. Incidentally, did you see Dr. Margoshes' column in "The Day" devoted to your statement on the fight against the White Paper? It is splendid.

With kindest regards,

Ever yours,



! 10/10 11:11 11:11

EM/M

October 8, 1943

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
729 West End Ave.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Emanuel:

Thank you for your letter of October 7. I, too, am very much pleased with the break which we got at the Allotment Committee meeting of the UJA.

Montor and Rosenbloom are busily engaged at the moment in getting up a tentative budget to be presented at the next meeting of the Emergency Committee. We are going to ask up to a half million dollars inclusive of the \$180,000 still due the Emergency Committee. In the meantime it would be a good think for you to talk to some of the people on the Emergency Committee warming them up on the proposal and suggesting that pressure should be brought upon me to ask for this amount. You might have a talk with Mr. Goodman about it, and Judge Rosenblatt. The Mizrachi might come to urge it very strongly if they are informed that their request for an allocation of \$250,000 in the 1944 campaign may be granted if the needs of the Emergency Committee are satisfied.

With reference to Dr. Berkson. He appeals to me very much. Montor has been in touch with him, and when I am in New York for the Emergency Committee meeting, I shall try to close with him.

As far as Frankfurter is concerned - I should like to see him alone. I have not seen him in many years and I should like to talk with him quite frankly and face to face not concerning only one particular subject such as you suggest, about the Technical Mission to Palestine, but the whole field, and I believe that he would feel freer to talk if there is no committee present. I think you can wait with this technical mission for another day.

As far as Peter Bergson is concerned - I have an appointment with him in Washington for 5:00 P.M. I should like to find out more about the relation of Bergson to Colonel Mendelsohn and to the New Zionist Organization (Revisionist). I have been approached by Colonel Mendelsohn seeking collaboration with us and fighting the White Paper. Is there division within the ranks of the Revisionists themselves?

I shall be most happy to see you in Washington. With all good wishes,
I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK

Letter #8

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

October 8, 1943

Dr. A. H. Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:


I am enclosing copies of two letters - one to Professor Carl Friedrich, and the other to Mr. Andre Meier, which speak for themselves. I can tell you more about these matters when next we meet.

I am busy with plans for the Department of Post-War Economic Planning. Above all, I am anxious to secure the services of a first rate professional man, preferably an economist, who has had planning experience.

When this work was first projected early this year, members of the Emergency Committee, or rather the Office Committee, were most enthusiastic about it and were prepared then to make liberal provision for it; and figures of \$50,000. and \$75,000. were freely spoken of. Actually I have as yet no notion of what kind of budget it will require but I assume that in any case an adequate budget will be granted. I think we can make a very big thing of it and should be able to utilize this activity effectively in strengthening our political position.

Best regards,

As ever yours,



! 706 744 746

EN/M
(Enc.)

October 7, 1943

Professor Carl Friedrich
M-31 Littauer Center
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Dr. Friedrich:

My comments may be divided into two categories, one of a general nature and then certain specific points.

In a general way, I have come to see the correctness and indeed the value of your approach to the subject, which is to stress the fact that the U. S. Government has not had a really affirmative or positive policy towards Palestine or the Jewish National Home - at least not in the active sense. Personally I accept this point of view even though it runs counter to notions long entertained by our Zionist leaders and including myself. Better a frank recognition of the true circumstances rather than ignoring them.

But having said that, I am frank to say that I am worried about the fact that your draft seems to go far beyond that conception and to insist upon the absence of an affirmative official policy not only in action but also in principle and in theory. At least that is the impression one may easily get. That raises two questions in my mind - first, whether the record on the whole justifies this view, and secondly, whether it is advisable to lay stress upon it. As to the first, I cannot help but feel that taking the record as a whole it seems that the United States, through the words and actions of President Wilson-to begin with-and by utterances of succeeding presidents, Resolution of Congress, etc. went squarely on record as being at least morally committed in favor of Zionism and politically committed, insofar as such moral and political commitment was not inconsistent with and did not involve a departure from other major lines of policy.

I am not competent to say how much of a locus standi the United States Government had or has in the matter of Palestine; but certain things do seem to me to be clear. First and foremost is the fact that the U. S. A. insisted that Palestine, like other mandated territories, could not be disposed of without the express consent of the U. S. A. because it had been acquired as a result of the military efforts of the Allied and Associated Powers. Our Government insisted upon giving its express approval to the administration of Palestine by Great Britain under the mandate despite the fact that we were not a member of the League of Nations, and it is of course a fact that

Dr. Carl Friedrich

October 7, 1943

the mandate, including its preamble, was incorporated in the Anglo-American Convention regarding Palestine.

It is also a fact that President Wilson had been consulted before the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and that it would most probably never have been issued if he had not heartily approved of it, despite the fact that America was at that time not at war with Turkey.

While I would not undertake to evaluate precisely the Congressional Resolution of 1922, it does seem to me that it could not be considered as having no moral or political validity whatsoever. As you say, it was adopted during a period when our policy was isolationist and it could not have been intended to serve as a means of involving us abroad, but I should think that the very least that it did mean was that the resolution, passed unanimously by both Houses and signed by the President, showed that the U. S. meant to give moral support and also diplomatic support insofar as it did not lead to actual involvement, and certainly it must have meant that the U. S. would ~~or should~~ refrain from pursuing a diplomacy inimical to the purposes of the Balfour Declaration or to encouragement on the part of others. It would not be conceivable, would it, that after the passage of such a resolution and its signature by the President in 1922 ~~that~~ our Government should have intimated to the British Government, say in 1925, that it would view with favor the termination of the mandate and the setting up of an independent Arab Government in Palestine? As it happened, the British Government did not attempt to do so at that time but if it had, would not our Government, which had given its consent to the establishment of a British administration in Palestine under the mandate, have been in a position to say the abrogation of the mandate and the setting up of an Arab Government or the annexation of Palestine as a Crown Colony was something that the United States had not agreed to and did not favor? And is it not conceivable that our Government might have said as much to the British Government if such discussion had arisen?

Now actually a situation similar to the hypothetical one did arise through the issuance of the White Paper of 1939 and so far as I know, our Government as a matter of actual fact did not intervene. It is true, as you say, that it has acted throughout as if the whole question did not concern the United States, and there, it seems to me, is where the positive value and positive content of your approach comes in. It lies in the fact that your analysis would stress the disparity between pious proclamations on principle and actual policy in action. The greater this disparity is shown to be, the stronger would be the central thesis of your analysis. It therefore seems to me that your memorandum would gain rather than lose in force the more sharply you bring out this antithesis.

If that is so, I would not minimize the significance of such affirmative acts ~~and~~ pronouncements as the record contains but rather emphasize their significance to the maximum degree consistent with objectivity, and then proceed to point out how utterly the Government

Dr. Carl Friedrich

October 7, 1943

(or the State Department) failed to act in a positive sense. That type of analysis would be in line, as you yourself suggested, with the spirit of Walter Lippman's analysis of our foreign policy. This is my principal criticism and is a point on which I feel rather deeply. No matter how cynical we may be about motives which lead statesmen on many occasions to make pronouncements of that type not only in relation to the Jews, but in relation to other oppressed peoples and other causes, where would we be if we were to say all such declarations and pronouncements are mere puff and piffle and not to be taken seriously?

Now as to some of the details: (1) Regarding Wilson's attitude, I refer you to a book on Louis D. Brandeis by Jacob de Haas. According to de Haas, Wilson from his sick bed had sent a vigorous warning to the British Government to the effect that the commitment given to the Jewish people in respect to Palestine could not be broken without involving Christendom in dishonor. I am quoting from memory but de Haas' book contains several references to Wilson's and Colonel House's role in connection with the Balfour Declaration.

(2) I am inclined to question the statement that the Balfour Declaration was issued "quite informally." It seems to me that it was rather formidably official and formal - a letter from the Foreign Minister on behalf of the Cabinet, addressed to the then President of the Zionist Organization in England, Lord Rothschild, in response to a formal petition which had been submitted to the Government by Lord Rothschild and Dr. Weizmann. The letter was sent after a long period of incubation during which reviews of the Allied and associated powers had been canvassed and various texts of the proposed declaration had been considered and weighed.

(3) I am not sure about the statement that Balfour and Wilson were lacking in candor in allowing the Zionists to make considerably broader inferences than need have been inferred from the Declaration. Any such Declaration should, I presume, be evaluated in connection with the background and the setting. If, therefore, Wilson during that period spoke about "laying the foundations of the Jewish Commonwealth" and if members of the British Cabinet in their public addresses spoke in much the same vein, is it not fair to conclude that the Allied statesmen, who were the authors and the sponsors of the Declaration, actually meant it that way? I should say that while the Declaration was cautiously worded, it was meant to render possible the full fruition of Zionist aspirations, and in fact Balfour's letter described the Declaration as an expression of sympathy "with Zionist aspirations." Everybody knew what these aspirations were, namely, the building up of a Jewish majority and the evolution of Palestine into a preponderantly Jewish Commonwealth.

Dr. Carl Friedrich

October 7, 1943

(4) I am happy that you included a quotation from the Memorandum of 1919 contained in Miller's diary and I think also in Lazarson's book. My suggestion would be that you quote it in full since it gives a very clear picture of the attitude in official circles at the time of the Peace Conference.

(5) Regarding the King-Crane Commission, there is much that might be said. I would certainly point out that of the three experts on Near East affairs who were supposed to guide the commissioners in their investigation, two actually dissented strongly from the findings of the two commissioners and were quite articulate about their views, Captain Yale in particular. There is considerable reference to Yale's views in Lawrence's Letters. Professor Howard refers to the dissenting opinions in his article on the King-Crane Commission which appeared in the "Moslem World" (a periodical published in Connecticut). There is little doubt that Messrs. King and Crane had preconceived notions before they set out and that their first action shortly after arriving in Jaffa was to send a cable to President Wilson in Paris, urging him to refrain from supporting the pro-Zionist policy. I believe it is also a fact that Wilson had warned them before their departure that so far as Palestine was concerned, it was a chose jugé, its disposition having been agreed upon between the powers. Nobody in his senses could have thought even at that time that the Balfour Declaration was consistent with the principle of self-determination if the principle was narrowly construed and applied since the Arabs were in an overwhelming majority and the Jews were still to come. To make the "discovery" that Arabs in Palestine and Syria would prefer an Arab Government rather than the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine did not require the sending of a commission of wise men.

(6) At the beginning of the memorandum, you define policy in terms of actions. I have no doubt that that is the correct definition or at least a correct definition. I am wondering, however, whether it is essential to adopt this strict construction of the term in connection with this memorandum or whether, in the light of what I have said in this long letter (too long, I am afraid), you might see your way to interpreting the term somewhat more liberally without, of course, abandoning the essential point about the divergences between pronouncements and actions.

(7) As I recall, you challenge Josephus Daniels' statement that the American Government and the American people have not wavered in their attitude towards the Jewish National Home. I have already discussed the attitude of the Government. So far as the attitude of the American people is concerned, I think Daniels' statement is fully justified so far as one can gauge public sentiment. Not only have there been repeated statements by people in official positions, leaders in both Houses of Congress, spokesmen for both major parties, resolutions repeatedly adopted by conventions of the American Federation of Labor, statements by many Governors, but also large numbers of editorials in newspapers throughout the country on every occasion when the whittling down of Jewish claims in Palestine became conspicuous. In this connection it may interest you to know that in the

Dr. Carl Friedrich

October 7, 1943

course of the past few months no fewer than ¹² State legislatures have adopted pro-Zionist resolutions. I will try to get you the actual material. There is no doubt in my mind that on this particular point Daniels' statement is well grounded. But of course this is not the first occasion when the people felt one way while the State Department acted differently.

These are all the points that I can recall. I have of course no copy of the memorandum and did not have the time to make ample notes when I read it but I think I have recalled the principal points which I had in mind.

Concerning instances of actual intervention by our Government, I have no material at present. I can however say this - in 1922, at the time of the riots, I personally headed a Jewish delegation which called on President Hoover and Secretary of State Stimson and handed a memorandum to the latter, asking for intervention and protection. I understood at the time that the State Department sent a note to the British Government calling attention to the sacrifice of rights and property of American nationals and the danger to other American nationals, and suggesting I believe the availability of American military or naval forces to help restore order. I shall still try to get other material from the Emergency Committee.

Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of the October issue of the "Jewish Frontier" which is devoted to the White Paper and contains some interesting material. One or more of the documents quoted points out that the policy enunciated in the White Paper envisages the termination of the mandate, the establishment of an independent Palestine state and the establishment of a special relationship between that state and Great Britain by treaty. The language of the White Paper on this score is as follows: "The objective of His Majesty's Government is establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine state in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future." What the provision regarding the "commercial and strategic requirements" signifies is pretty obvious. The question which arises in my mind is whether this objective as stated is not in direct contravention of the Anglo-American Convention of 1924 (?), the whole purpose of which seemed to be to ensure to America and American interests equality of opportunity in the mandated territory with Great Britain or any other country. The policy set forth in the White Paper points in precisely the opposite direction; Palestine is to be bound to Great Britain by treaties which will ensure to the latter special commercial and strategic advantages. What would happen then to the equality of opportunity for American nationals and American interests which the Anglo-American Convention was intended to safeguard?

In this connection it is interesting to recall that at the time when the Convention was being negotiated it was the British Government that insisted upon including the preamble to the mandate against the wishes of the American Government. The motives of both are clear. America

Dr. Carl Friedrich

October 7, 1943

wanted to ensure opportunities for Americans in the matter of natural resources, concessions, etc.; while the British Government wished to emphasize the special position of the Jews and the Jewish National Home as a good and sufficient reason for limiting or warding off possible claims of American interests or prospective concessionaires (oil?). Our State Department finally yielded and agreed to the inclusion of the preamble. Now under the White Paper, England blandly forgets about all these things and plans the creation of an Anglo-Arab-Palestine state. I would suggest your rereading the State Department pamphlet containing the Convention and the correspondence in the light of my observations. Seen in the light of British Imperialism, the whole development is clear. Britain first secured control over Palestine and got the consent of France and America on the ground that she was holding it for the Jews and had no selfish interest. Gradually the pretext is dropped and Palestine is to become nominally Arab and actually British, like Iraq, only more so. As I see it, America will definitely have been cheated in the process.

Please forgive this outpouring. I am afraid you asked for it.

With kindest regards, as ever

WRHS



Faithfully yours,
Emanuel Neumann

EM/M

October 8, 1943

Mr. Andre Meier
Hotel Carlyle
35 East 76 Street
New York City

Dear Mr. Meier:

I am writing to confirm the plans agreed upon yesterday as I understand them.

- 1) A study of certain chemical industries for Palestine along the lines which had been indicated by Dr. Ernst Bergmann will be undertaken by a special research group.
- 2) This group will consist for the present of Messrs. Andre Meier, Dr. Blumenfeld and Mr. Emanuel Neumann. Dr. Bergmann will of course participate in meetings while he is still in this country.
- 3) The three members of the group mentioned above, constituting themselves as a committee to be in charge of the study, shall be in full charge and make all decisions pertaining to it. They may, however, increase their number by inviting others to join. (In this connection, several names were mentioned in the course of our discussion, including Mr. Ralph Wechsler, Treasurer of the National Oil Products Co.; Dr. Merlub-Sobel, Research Director of the Virginia and Carolina Chemical Co.; Mr. J. Van Tijn, Industrial Engineer; Mr. M. H. Blinken, etc.). The group will act as an autonomous unit although for administrative convenience the work may be carried on in close contact with the Commission on Palestine Surveys. However, the eventual formal relationship of this group with other groups and more particularly with official Zionist agencies will be considered and dealt with in due course by the committee in charge.
- 4) It was agreed to accept tentatively and as a working basis Dr. Bergmann's estimate that this initial study would require about six months at an expenditure of approximately \$6,000. This envisages the services of a full time industrial chemist and of a full time or part time economist or research worker in the economic field.

Mr. Andre Meier

October 8, 1943

5) The question of inviting the cooperation of certain persons who had evinced interest in the previously projected Syndicate was considered, and it was agreed that the opportunity of helping this particular project be accorded to them in some appropriate manner. The establishment of a Research Fund or Foundation to which they might contribute was tentatively agreed upon, but it was left to Mr. Neumann to sound the gentlemen and to submit suggestions in more concrete form. It was likewise agreed that further discussion with Mr. Blinken, President of the American Palestine Institute, should be conducted by Mr. Neumann on behalf of the group.

6) Mr. Meier agreed to underwrite the budget of the study up to \$6,000. if necessary, with the understanding of course that a serious effort will be made to secure contributions from others and with the further understanding that the full extent of Mr. Meier's contribution to the budget be kept for the present as confidential.

7) The next meeting of the committee is to be held within a week or ten days after further preliminary work will have been done by Dr. Bergmann and Mr. Neumann.

I hope you find the above to be substantially correct. If there is any point requiring correction, please do not hesitate to advise me.

I need not tell you how pleased I am that this work is to be undertaken and how much I, as a Jew and as a Zionist, appreciate your interest and generosity.

Faithfully yours,

Emanuel Neumann

EN/M

Letter #9

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

October 13, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
c/o The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba,

Mrs. Jacobs was in to see me today to ask my advice whether she should take the Chairmanship of the Committee on Research. She is a bit worried about sniping on the part of some of the Hadassahs who are personally hostile to her, etc. I told her that she ought not hesitate to take the Chairmanship provided there is a full understanding reached between you and her. The fact that Berkson will be the director of the department gives a large measure of assurance; and I assured her, furthermore, that if there is an understanding between her, yourself, Montor, and Berkson, she would be fully protected by you against sniping or undo interference. She agreed, and asks that you give her an appointment some time Monday, prior to the meeting of the Executive Committee. She may see you alone or together with Berkson. In the course of the conversation she pointed out that the minutes of the last meeting of the Executive Committee, as circulated, contained the statement that after she had asked for the opportunity of discussing the question with you, you had replied that if she had any reservations on the scope of the department she should state them right then and there. I do not recall your saying any such thing. On the contrary, my impression is that you said you would be delighted to meet her to discuss the matter and that was where it was left. I do not see why Lourie should have put all of that stuff into the minutes.

Berkson has had his talk with Montor and is quite pleased with the way it went. He is already at work on a memorandum on Absorptive Capacity and I am cooperating with him.

I just had a talk with Israel Goldstein. At the meeting Saturday night he intends to raise the issue of the manner in which the public relations work in the communities is to be carried on. He understands that your point of view and that of Montor are not quite the same: that Montor favors complete centralization of the direction of that work through the Emergency Committee, while you are prepared to allow for greater scope on the part of the Z.O.A. I reminded him that at the last meeting of the Executive Committee held on the eve of the Convention,

Dr. A. H. Silver

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October 13, 1943

studied

the subject was considered and it was decided that it should be ~~stated~~ by ~~the~~ sub-committee of the Z.O.A., and the sub-committee should consist of the persons representing Z.O.A. in the Emergency Committee. In any case, you might as well be prepared for a discussion of this subject Saturday night.

I wish I knew what time you will be arriving in New York Saturday evening. I may possibly see you before the meeting.

As ever,

Yours,

Emanuel
Emanuel Neumann

EN:PB



Letter #11

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

October 25, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
c/o The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

Asia League
You will recall my having spoken to you about the Asia League. I am enclosing a copy of the platform which has been adopted by the League. I have spoken to Mrs. Halpern about it and have urged her to take the matter in hand.

I am enclosing also a column concerning yourself written by Margoshes in The Day, but please return it for my file of clippings.

ZOA meeting
As I told you on the phone, our business was put through with dispatch at the meeting of the ZOA Executive Committee Tuesday. At one point Goldstein did drop the remark that he had not been consulted by you regarding the appointments on various committees; and I interrupted with the retort that not to consult seems to be the general practice, and mentioned specifically his appointment of a Finance Committee with large powers, without informing us of its composition even after I had requested the information. He took the rap and did not pursue that line any further.

A.J.C.
At the same meeting someone reported on the impending withdrawal of the American Jewish Committee from the Conference; whereupon I made a big fuss over it demanding and insisting that Levinthal, Mrs. Pool, Rothenberg and others serve notice on Proskauer in advance that they and many others will resign from the Committee and, furthermore, that steps be taken at once to get others, even non-Zionists, to threaten to bolt the Committee. I think they were impressed and action was promised. The message you gave me in this connection on the phone I passed on to Feuer who promised to do what you suggested.

Economic Dept.
Wednesday morning Montor came to see me about my department. I told him what my ideas were, or had been, and also told him that I doubted whether we should go forward along the lines I had planned because of the large expense involved. I pointed out to him that a substantial budget for the Economic Department might mean a reduction of other parts of the general budget. To my astonishment Montor

October 25, 1943

expressed himself most enthusiastically about my plans and urged most emphatically that I proceed. It was, in his opinion, one of the most important things we could do and he requested me to ~~draw up~~ *draw up* a memorandum giving my ideas on the scope and operation of the Economic Department. I told him frankly that I hesitated to do so before the question had been discussed with you further, as I was determined to follow your views on questions which involved me as fully as I would on questions which involved other people. He pressed me, however, to submit such a memorandum and I finally yielded. I am forwarding to you a copy of the memorandum as I have drawn it up as well as copy of a letter to Montor and also copy of a letter to Herman Shulman.

Budget -

On the subject of the budget generally, I have this to add. At the meeting of the ZOA Executive Committee, Abe Goodman expressed some anxiety over the possible effect on the public of so large an appropriation from the K.H. and K.K. though he voted for it along with the rest. After the meeting he detained me for an hour setting forth his ideas which were to the effect that a large political fund ought to be raised. He startled me not only by insisting that large sums could and should be secured, but also by making a point that for large numbers of Zionists this would be an outlet for their anxieties and interests in the political effort. So many people, he urged, could do little or nothing in the way of political work, but would feel that they are helping if they are allowed to contribute and collect money for political funds.

I reported this to Montor the following morning and he startled me further by saying that he shared this view completely and that he liked the suggestion which Goodman had made that the funds might be asked to underwrite the budget up to \$500,000, but that a campaign be conducted as a feature of our political effort. I objected both to Goodman and Montor that raising a political fund might divert the energies of our leaders from political work to fund raising, but neither thought that should be the case. I must say that I was somewhat shaken and am not so sure but that they may be on the right trail.

Special Fund

Perhaps the thing might be tried out in a limited fashion by establishing a special Chairman's Fund to be at your disposal, ~~and~~ that it be tried in half a dozen selected communities as an effort to be carried on quietly and with small groups of persons. If it seems to catch on, it might be done systematically and on a large scale throughout the country and turned into a regular political fund. Otherwise we can still raise \$75,000, or \$100,000 or \$150,000 as a special fund to be at your disposal. This would probably entail

Dr. A. H. Silver

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
October 25, 1943

having a special person looking after this matter ~~of~~^{and} utilizing our contacts in various places.

You have probably seen the full page ad of the Bergson group in connection with the escape of Danish refugees to Sweden. They are holding a mass meeting at Carnegie Hall on October 31st. They are certainly quick to seize upon and dramatize every ~~instant~~^{incident} and to exploit it both politically and financially.

As ever,

Faithfully yours,



Emanuel Neumann

EN:PB
Enc.



Exclusive Document

Letter No. 12

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

October 27, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

I am leaving one copy of this letter for you at the Commodore and mailing another copy to Cleveland.

1) Re the Revisionists: I have had a conversation with David Wertheim, the upshot of which is as follows: Wertheim stated that the position of Poale Zion would be that the basis for an understanding with the Revisionists was defined and established by the international authorities, to wit, their return to the World Zionist Organization with a status of Zonderverband. However, recognizing the fact that these are war times and that the consummation of such a complete return to the fold would be difficult to effectuate, he thinks his group would favor the affiliation of the American Revisionists with the Emergency Council provided they agreed in principle to reentering the World ZO as a Zonderverband, with all the attendant privileges and duties, including of course Zionist discipline. If their position is made clear on that score, he thought it might be possible to consider as a provisional measure and as the first step in the right direction their affiliation with the Emergency Council. Of course he stipulated that he would have to consult some of his associates before taking an official position. I believe there may be a possibility of working out the problem substantially along the lines indicated.

2) ZOA representatives on the Emergency Council: Yesterday I wired you as follows: "Goldstein just advised me he is appointing ZOA representatives on Emergency Council. You may wish to consider advisability of telephoning or wiring him of your interest in the matter and desire to be consulted". I sent the telegram following a telephone call I had from Goldstein in which he informed me that he was reappointing me as a member of the Emergency Council. I took the opportunity of pointing out to him that I was still not a member of the Executive Committee though I attended meetings. I also asked him whether he was appointing Shulman as a regular member of the Emergency Council, though I did not go so far as to raise the question of appointing others such as Irving Miller or Elihu Stone or Milton Steinberg. So far as Shulman is concerned, Goldstein pointed out that he was "for the time being taking Szold's place". I suppose he was referring to the fact that Shulman had been designated as Acting Treasurer in Szold's absence, also an anomaly since according to the By-Laws only a member of the Emergency Council can serve as an officer of the Council. I thought it might be possible for you to communicate with Goldstein before he had made commitments to various persons.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

October 27, 1943

3) Plans and Programs: Milton Steinberg was in to discuss with me a program of work for his Committee, as others have done before him. I have the impression that considerable clarification is required regarding the detailed programs of the various Committees and Departments. They must not only be worked out in some degree of detail but must be reviewed from the point of view of the work as a whole. Otherwise there are bound to be duplication and confusion on the one hand and lacunae on the other. We ought to have a complete and integrated program of work, at least on paper, even if it is not carried out 100% in accordance with the paper plan. Such a program may either be worked out by an individual or a committee on the basis of certain definite conceptions; or it can be arrived at synthetically - by piecing together programs submitted by various committees. The latter would take longer. I therefore think that while the committees are at work collaborating their respective programs, concurrently someone ought to work out an overall and inclusive program and plan. It's a big job!

As ever yours,

Emanuel

Emanuel Neumann



EN/M

Letter No. 13

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

November 5, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

1) I was keenly disappointed that I could not have a good talk with you in Cleveland. Everything imaginable happened to prevent it. I got an early plane for Washington, had to rise at 4:30 though I had got to bed only at 2:30 because a gentleman from Columbus, an engineer, had to come in to see me and we were up half the night. Some day perhaps I may go out to Cleveland specially to have a long talk with you. It would be still better if some time when you come here we could go off for a day to the environs of New York. There are really a number of matters of importance I am anxious to think out and talk out with you.

2) Interview with Acheson: Goldmann and I had a very satisfactory talk with Acheson about the Technical Mission to Palestine. He informed himself rather fully and suggested that we see Mr. Stettinius and leave with him a memorandum, sending a copy to him, Acheson, after which he would talk with "Ed", as he calls him, and try to straighten it out for us. Acheson should be cultivated, decidedly. Now that Sumner Welles is out, he is regarded by some people as the ablest man in the Department. Whether he is correspondingly influential I do not know.

3) Lilienthal: I had two long talks with David Lilienthal, Chairman of the TVA, who was in Washington. He is deeply interested in our proposed economic activities, declared he was willing to collaborate with the group we might set up for this purpose, and we went into considerable detail on questions of program, personnel, etc. He is willing to speak to two groups of selected people, once in New York and once in Washington, on the subject of The TVA Idea and its Possible Application to Palestine Development. This may be a valuable contribution towards our effort at political education from an interesting and attractive angle. Incidentally, a book by him on the TVA idea and program is scheduled to appear in February or March, published by Harper's.

A meeting of the Consulting Board the following day, Thursday, was consumed almost entirely by sessions of our Engineering-Consulting Board at the Department of the Interior. Professor Wolman came in from Boston, Colonel Parker from Boston and Mr. John L. Savage all the way from Denver — to attend this meeting. They went into the problems thoroughly and it gave me a great lift to see these eminent experts, almost all Goyim, devote so much time and study to our problems without remuneration. Mr. Savage, in preparation for his trip to India, has collected a mass of valuable material in connection with dams, irrigation, etc., all of which he is putting at our

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

November 8, 1943

disposal gratis, and our engineers are going to Denver next week to pick out all material which is of interest to us. This is worth thousands of dollars and represents the accumulation of forty years of study and experience on the part of the Bureau of Reclamation and its engineers.

I also got from them some good advice and suggestions regarding the proposed economic studies generally.

I had thought you would be in New York on Monday but hear that you are scheduled to go to Washington. I do hope you will be here Tuesday; if not, I may go to Washington and meet you there Tuesday if you are staying over. I shall probably ring you up.

4) Economic Department - Montor: I have been having an exchange of letters and telephone conversations with Montor re the Department which for the present leave me somewhat in the air regarding his attitude. It seems to vary from enthusiasm to near-negation, to lukewarmness and back to near-enthusiasm again. I am suspending judgment and further commitments until I have had another good talk with him, perhaps on Monday. One commitment I did make with regard to a young and brilliant economist, who ~~was~~ already here and whom I have set to work reading up available material and orienting himself. *I have good reason to believe M. is "personalizing" me for suggesting a "reduction" of the budget to \$500,000 by cutting out all appropriation for the Ec. Dept.*

5) Campaign against White Paper: Judging by the crowds our meetings are drawing, the campaign is catching on. Personally I have little doubt and never did have it that the British Government will meet our attack by making a gesture: an announcement that the 30,000 unused certificates will be kept available for us to use later when travel can be resumed. This will undoubtedly be regarded by many as an important concession and something of a political victory, and in a sense it will be. Yet it would leave us politically speaking precisely where we were. Such a victory would also entail serious disadvantages: (a) An announcement of that kind would in effect reaffirm the White Paper by limiting the offer of certificates to the number included in the provisions of the White Paper: (b) It would present the British Government in a comparatively favorable light in the eyes of many - too favorable, in view of the limited nature of the "concession". There is of course also the danger that they may accompany such an announcement with a gesture in the direction of the Arabs by way of balance. As you know, the rumors are that in London they are preparing for further steps in the implementation of the White Paper, presumably with respect to its constitutional provisions. All of these considerations are undoubtedly present to your mind but I thought I would mention them just the same.

Internally in our circles here, there is continuing discussion about the line we are to follow. Some people (Boukstein, et al) are apparently spreading the rumor that the propaganda of the Emergency Council for the next half year at least will be all on the White Paper with little or nothing said about the Jewish Commonwealth. Moreover, this is already being related to Ben Gurion's resignation and his alleged difference with Weizmann on policy. Confidentially, I am told that Bob Silverman in a private conversation has expressed the view that all efforts should be concentrated on the White Paper and that it may have been a mistake to have fought as we did on the Commonwealth formula and that we can get greater unified backing by concentrating

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver


November 5, 1943

on the White Paper ^{and} ~~then~~ soft-peddalling the Commonwealth. Undoubtedly there are people who are trying to set up an antithesis between a "Weizmann line", i. e., anti-White Paper, and a "Ben Gurion line" for a Jewish Commonwealth and to involve you in this antithesis. If Montor plans to direct the propaganda strictly on the White Paper basis, it would I think be unfortunate. In any case it may be desirable for you to clarify this further and to scotch the kind of talk to which I refer.

Meanwhile the conversations which Rosenman and Meyer had at the White House are all to the good and certainly encouraging.

With best regards to Virginia and yourself, as ever

Yours,



Emanuel Neumann



EN/M

Letter No. 14

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS
Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE
ROOM 1903
NEW YORK CITY

November 9, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio


Dear Abba:

At long last I am sending you a copy of Dr. Petegorsky's memorandum on the Emergency Committee written last spring. I think it is still interesting.

Still no word from Montor regarding the proposed Economic Department; so that for the present I am doing nothing on that, or for that matter on any other phase of the work of the Emergency Council. Nor do I know what other committees or departments are doing, though I am sure some at least are on the job.

When shall we meet again?

As ever,

Yours,

Emanuel Neumann

EN/M
(Enc.)

Letter No. 15

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS
Administrative Office521 FIFTH AVENUE
ROOM 1903
NEW YORK CITY

November 9, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

At a meeting of our Commission yesterday, I reported on the sessions of our Consulting Board held last week and the encouraging opinions expressed by the experts concerning the feasibility of the projects under consideration. At which Judge Rothenberg was strongly of the opinion that we should no longer delay making use of these studies as political leverage. This, he pointed out, had been the intention from the beginning. A good deal of money and effort have gone into the work and the fullest advantage should be taken of the results thus far obtained and the encouraging opinions expressed. Moreover, he felt, no time should be lost since, apparently, policies are now in the making.

Concretely, Rothenberg suggested that the members of our Consulting Board, to whom Mr. Lilienthal might be added, should secure if possible an interview with the President, report to him directly, and try to impress him with the possibilities in Palestine as they now see them. A memorandum, he thought, might also be prepared and submitted; but one is never sure whether such documents are read and what effect, if any, they produce; whereas a personal interview in which eminent persons, some of them known to the President personally, take part may exert some influence.

Goldmann thought it was an idea worth considering, and I undertook to communicate the suggestion to you. We would of course have to find out if these experts are prepared to go before attempting to secure an interview. The Chairman of the Consulting Board, Professor Wolman, is a good Jew and a good Zionist. He is also a fluent and persuasive speaker. - Mr. Savage expects to go to India soon and since he is exceedingly important as an expert, no time should be lost if we want him to participate.

Don't you think this is an idea worth following up? And do you think it necessary or advisable to bring it up for consideration at the next meeting of the Executive Committee of the Emergency Council?

In the meantime ^{and} in any case I am planning to have Colonel

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver


November 9, 1943

Parker prepare a paper on the whole subject which could be put to use in various ways.

Please let me have your reaction.

As ever,

Yours,



Emanuel Neumann

EN/M



November 11, 1943

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

In Answer to your Letter #15

My dear Emanuel:

The question of a visit to the President is being approached from various angles. As you know we have prepared a memorandum on the absorptive capacity of Palestine to be presented to Secretary Hull and the President. Felix Frankfurter has seen the memorandum and has made certain suggestions. The question as to who is to see the President is now under consideration. Our original thought was that Frankfurter, himself, or Judge Rosenman, or the two of them together should see him, talk to him about the entire situation and present him with the memorandum, for it seems that what is bothering the President most is the absorptive capacity of Palestine. In this connection it might be advisable to add one economic expert such as Wolman or Mr. Lillienthal to the delegation. The matter will be discussed at the meeting of the Emergency Council next Monday.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK

November 12, 1943

Mr. Emanuel Newman
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

My dear Emanuel:

Have you a small pamphlet available on the economic development of Palestine in recent years, and its industrial and agricultural possibilities. It need not be too technical nor too comprehensive, but enough to disabuse a business man of the idea that Palestine lacks natural resources and therefore will not sustain a substantial population. There have been many articles on the subject, but I do not seem to be able to put my finger on a printed or a mimeographed pamphlet on this subject. If you have some such available, please let me have it.

With all good wishes, I remain,

Very cordially yours,

AHS:DB

December 6, 1943

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Emanuel:

Mr. Albert Epstein, of Chicago, made a special trip to Cleveland to spend Sunday with me and to discuss a project which he has in mind and which he may at some time or other have brought to your attention. This concerns the holding of an Economic Conference some time in March to which economists, experts of all kinds, financiers, businessmen, etc., say about seventy-five to a hundred all told, should be invited to talk over the Palestine problem from its economic aspects. I am very much impressed with the idea and its value to us both from an economic and political point of view. I suggested to him that the Post-War Economic Committee of the Emergency Council would be the proper body to organize this project, to which he agreed. I advised him to get in touch with you and with one or two of our friends of the "Heder" in Washington to talk the matter over, and if the project is found desirable, to proceed with the planning and the arrangements.

I think this would perhaps be one of the most important activities which your Committee could undertake. I am writing this to you so that when Mr. Epstein contacts you, you will have the background. I hope that organizational cross currents will not scuttle the project.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK

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:DR ABBA HILLEL SILVER=THE TEMPLE

(CLEVELAND OHIO)=.

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EMANUEL NEUMANN=

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COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

December 6, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

Here are a few items which have accumulated:

1) Interview with Stettinius: I found the Under Secretary very charming and very sympathetic. Almost at the start, he began to fire questions at me about Palestine in general: What were the British up to? Why were they behaving as they are? Oughtn't we (America) step into the picture? etc., etc. Not wishing to go into a long political conversation, I answered him very briefly and said that the present policy amounted to abrogation of the Mandate and the conversion of Palestine into a British Crown Colony in fact, if not in form.

In reply, he said "But that's all wrong; that is not what ought to happen. Don't you think we ought to have something to say on the question?"

I replied that America certainly had a right to intervene and told him briefly why, but added "Our Government thus far has declined to intervene, leaving the Jewish National Home to its fate." - He insisted on knowing why the British carried out such a policy, and again I tried to explain to him, *אחרי שכן כך*, about the different schools of thought - the one "pro-Zionist" and the other "pro-Arab" in orientation; and he kept repeating: "I can't see it; *it's wrong!*" etc.

As to the dispatch of our engineer, he could see no reason why anyone could possibly object since a former TVA engineer was certainly not going to engage in political activity. I warned him that the people in the Near East division have not been and are not likely to be particularly sympathetic, to which he replied: "They will have to do a lot of tall selling to convince me."

I left him a memorandum I had prepared, and he promised to go into the matter and let me hear from him next week, i. e., this week. As I was leaving, he told me that he was working for the establishment of refugee reception camps in Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and elsewhere in order to encourage as many refugees as possible to escape. He asked whether I thought it was the right thing to do, and I said "Of course; and also, and above all, Palestine." "Why", he asked, "hasn't it been done; why haven't arrangements for such camps been made." I replied: "I suppose there was no one with sufficient interest and determination

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

December 6, 1943

to see such measures through."

All in all, I got the impression of a very well meaning, human and impulsive person - and rather green. I suppose he will be indoctrinated in due course. For the moment, he is extremely receptive *decidedly friendly*. His attitudes are in the process of formation, and I would certainly urge cultivating him, getting him if possible outside the State Department for a couple of long talks on the Jewish question, the possibilities of Palestine, etc. I think you ought to try to do this personally. You are the best man for the purpose.

2) Economic Studies: I was somewhat taken aback by what I heard from Dr. Josef Cohn and Rabbi ~~Reyer~~ about Mr. Blinken's Washington group and the impression they seem to have gotten from their brief conference with you at the hotel. The feeling seems to be that they have become the non-official but recognized agency for carrying on the economic studies and planning; in other words, that they would carry out a program virtually coextensive and identical with the program which I am preparing to have carried out between the Committee on Economic Studies and Planning of the Emergency Council and the Commission on Palestine Surveys. Obviously, if that group is to undertake such a broad program with the blessing of the Emergency Council and with its cooperation - I understand from ~~Jesse~~ that they are to get a room or rooms in our Washington office - there would be no need for us to have a committee or a budget, or for me to be endeavoring, as I am now, to secure supplementary funds from private sources. I can only conclude that there must be some misunderstanding or confusion.

As I may be leaving tomorrow for a ten day trip to Mexico, it may be advisable for you to write to Mr. Marcy Blinken* to set him right before any complications arise. I think he should be made to understand that we have not abandoned our plans; and that while there is every desire to encourage initiative on the part of so splendid a group as they have, obviously they should adjust their activities to our plans and endeavor to reach an understanding with us, with a view to fruitful cooperation and coordination and the avoidance of duplication or conflict. A word of warning and good counsel now may avoid headaches later. - If for some reason I do not leave this week, I will perhaps write you more fully on the subject. *In any case, I hope you will write Blinken with the least delay.*

3) Isaiah Bowman: On reflection, I thought that a memorandum from Dr. Berkson or some other Zionist would be ~~a~~ little help. Besides, it became clear that the President had left long before we got wind of this matter. The proper procedure, it seems to me, would be to have a personal conference with Dr. Bowman, preferably on a constructive rather than negative approach, i. e., to solicit his cooperation in studying certain phases of the Palestine problem and coming to grips with him on the general issue, in the process.

4) Herzliah: I have been asked to intercede with you on behalf of the Herzliah High School here. There is a group of some of our finest people

* President, Am. Palestine Institute, 165 Broadway, N.Y. City.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

December 6, 1943

who are trying to place the institution upon a sound financial basis, including such generous men and fine Zionists as Israel Matz and William Salzman. The Herzliah is not just another Hebrew school. It is a potent influence for Jewish Nationalism and Hebraic culture and is now being conducted in the spirit of traditional Judaism. If you could see your way to speaking at their banquet, it would no doubt be deeply appreciated by wide circles here.

5) White Paper Campaign: There is a general feeling of satisfaction over the fact that you have cleared the air and indicated the proper line to be followed. Perhaps you might take an early occasion to make a speech or issue a new statement in connection with the White Paper Campaign, which will clearly indicate the line for American Zionism to follow.

With warmest regards to the family and yourself,

Faithfully yours,

EN/M



COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

December 7, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

I am wholly in agreement with you regarding the proposed Economic Conference. Epstein spoke to me about the matter on more than one occasion. He also discussed it with the Keren Hayesod people and I understand that they even passed a motion to the effect that they would be prepared to sponsor such a conference provided their doing so was approved by all concerned. I told them, of course, that nothing further should be done until the matter had been considered by the officers of the Emergency Council.


I agree with you that the Committee on Economic Studies and Planning is the proper group to handle this matter. I am writing to Dr. A. K. Epstein to suggest that he confer with me personally about the matter upon my return from Mexico. I am planning to fly this evening.

The Washington group will probably not wish to have anything to do with a public conference or to be in any way connected with it. I even doubt the advisability of Epstein's taking it up with them.

I will certainly tackle this matter upon my return.

With warmest regards, as ever

Faithfully yours,



Emanuel Neumann

EN/M

December 20, 1943

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Emanuel:

I am sending you a copy of a letter which I received from Mr. Blinken, and also my reply to him. I think the two of you should sit down and talk over the entire matter and arrive at a satisfactory modus operandi.

I am also sending you a letter which Mr. Blinken addressed to Mr. Epstein. I cannot follow Mr. Blinken on that point. I think the Economic Conference should be held, and as early as possible. We need it in our political work and we cannot delay valuable and necessary propaganda for three-quarters of a year until the definitive report of the economic potentialities of Palestine is completed. There is great value in such a study and it should be made. I am glad that Mr. Robert Nathan and his staff are at work. But I also think that a very effective conference can be held, such as outlined by Mr. Epstein. This matter, too, you should discuss with Mr. Blinken.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK
Enc. - 3

Emanuel Newman
749 West End Av.

h. 7 p.

Will be in New York ~~use~~ to-morrow Monday
morning. Please arrange to have ^{Rosenblum,} ~~alt~~
Godman, Lipsky, Silverman, Cohen, ~~reseller~~ and each other
~~all~~ are interested in VPA situation meet
with me Can modore before or at noon.
Regards.

ABBA

12-26-43

WRHS



COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

December 22, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

I have just returned from my Mexican trip and intend to report to you on it more fully in another letter. We had a busy time and on the whole, a successful visit. The Mexican Jewish community is growing up, is rapidly increasing its contributions to the Palestine funds and will, I think, effectively substitute for one of the European communities in that respect.

Mr. Lipsky and I called on Ambassador Messersmith and Ambassador Oumansky. A Mexican Pro-Palestine Committee was also launched. We managed to crowd quite a bit into one week's activity.


I will answer your letter presently about the Economic Conference. Robert Nathan's Outline of Economic Studies has not been sent to me and I have not seen it. Perhaps you can lend me your copy.

I was glad to hear that the Conference on the twelfth was a success and that your policy prevailed.

When do you plan to be in New York or Washington again?

With best regards, as ever

Yours,



Emanuel Neumann

Letter No. 20

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

December 23, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

I have now been here some twenty-four hours and am beginning to get the drift of what has been going on during the past fortnight. On one aspect of the internal situation I feel I should report to you promptly.

Months ago the opposition to you and your leadership was badly scotched and suppressed but not killed. The little group known as the "Young Turks" were temporarily demoralized but did not give up. The completeness with which Szold, who was supposed to be their leader, had made up with you also tended to remove the ground from under their feet; but Boukstein in particular made it his business the repair the breaches and to hold the fort until Szold's return. Far from giving up the ghost or disbanding, they resumed their meetings, clustering for the time being around Goldstein, with Boukstein as the *Polnink*. I understand they had a meeting very recently to "decide" matters and one of the things decided upon, as you probably know, is to make Heller your successor as Chairman of the UPA. The JNF position has not yet been disposed of because of Rothenberg's disinclination to accept the Presidency. He fears any such position may prejudice his chances in his juristic career.

Boukstein loses no opportunity to make capital of whatever happens. At the moment he and others like him are talking about the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Emergency Committee: the "extravagance", the "waste" of money, the "breach" between yourself and Montor, the likelihood of the Emergency Committee's "exploding in everybody's face". One might have thought that these people, professing to be Maximalists and staunch adherents of the Commonwealth policy, would rally to your support precisely at the moment when you are resisting any deviation and insisting upon a clear-cut policy. But principles are one thing and "politics" quite another...

All of this confirms my earlier opinion that we should not have disbanded or demobilized our following after the Convention. It was a mistake to assume that the opposition would accept the settlement sincerely and cooperate wholeheartedly. As things turned out, our people ceased regarding themselves as a group to uphold your leadership, while the others have been very busy mending their fences and reestablishing their shaken control of the movement. While we have undoubtedly lost some ground, it is not too late to retrieve it. I believe we shall have

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

December 23, 1943


to call our friends together from time to time and keep them on their toes and we shall have to give more attention to strengthening the internal front. This must be done not in order to emulate the others in playing politics but in order to safeguard larger interests of the movement. Unless the internal situation is taken in hand, we are likely to witness in due course a concerted attack upon your position and leadership and what is even more serious, upon the policy and program that you have set up.

I know just how you must feel about the whole matter. No one who, like yourself, is deeply concerned for the cause and our political struggle can help feeling disgusted by the necessity of fighting on the internal front as well. But no great statesman and popular leader, not even Roosevelt and Churchill, is exempt from this necessity. It is part of the business and an indispensable part at that. I have no doubt the situation can be mastered once you make up your mind to take necessary measures and to devote to it a fraction of your attention.

With best regards to Virginia and yourself, as ever

WRHS


Faithfully yours,


Emanuel Neumann

EN/M

December 28, 1943

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Emanuel:

I am enclosing herewith the resolution which was adopted by the rump meeting of Rabbis in Cincinnati, and a copy of my letter to Rabbi Heller. I would suggest that you make copies of them and show them to Mr. Goodman, to whom I promised to send one, as well as to Lipsky, Mr. Gellman of the Mizrachi, Mr. Wertheim or someone else of the Poale Zion, and to such other people as should see it.

I read your letter #20 and I am in agreement with it. Whenever you deem the occasion propitious, arrange for some informal gathering at a home where our group can be rallied.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK
Enc. - 2

Letter No. 21

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE
ROOM 1903
NEW YORK CITY

December 24, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

This is my third letter to you since my return from Mexico; but then you had a fortnight's peace before that.

This is about the Robert Nathan - Marcy Blinken project. Upon my return to my desk I found there had been no letter or message from Blinken or from anyone else connected with the group. However, in the course of a conversation which I had with Abe Goodman, he told me that he had just been approached by Dewey Stone on behalf of the Blinken - Nathan project. According to Stone, \$75,000 was needed for a wonderful piece of work and he wanted money from the Keren Hayesod. Goodman told him there was no chance, particularly since the Emergency Committee had established a Committee on Economic Studies, and whatever money could be provided by the Fund would go to that Committee. He also pointed to the existence of the Commission on Palestine Surveys. Goodman thought that I ought to have a talk with Dewey Stone, and accordingly I met him last evening, when we spent two or three hours together.

It seems that Blinken is now trying to raise money for the project: \$75,000. One of the people he wrote to was Mr. Louis Ruskin, one of Weizmann's friends in Washington, who is well-to-do and is also connected with the Washington group. It appeared from that letter that Blinken was counting on raising a substantial sum from the New England group: Dewey Stone, Harry Levine, Louis Foster, etc. Ruskin sent the letter to Stone, at the same time expressing his misgivings about the procedure. He questioned the validity of the argument that the work of this group will be credited by the Government with "objectivity" if they kept themselves technically outside the orbit of the Zionist movement. He feels that there may be aspects to the work having political implications and requiring close contact with the official agencies. He also expresses the view that if the program is approved by the official agencies, it had best be financed by the Zionist funds. Dewey Stone is prepared to consider contributing and raising money among other Zionists for this purpose but is not quite clear how the work is to be coordinated and related to official Zionist activities in the same field. He showed me a copy of the outline of the

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

December 24, 1943

proposed survey, which I read with interest.


It was clear at once that it was intended to include within the scope of the survey questions with which we are now dealing, such as water resources, agricultural possibilities, etc. The Jordan Valley Authority scheme is specifically mentioned in the outline. When I expressed some astonishment that this outline had been drawn up without any attempt at consultation with me, Stone told me that he understood that instructions were to be issued, presumably by Weizmann, to me or to the Commission, to place all our material and data at the disposal of Messrs. Blinken and Nathan so that they may incorporate the results of our studies in their over-all survey. A fine kettle of fish!

You will recall that when you told me about your meeting with the Washington group, I expressed at once my misgivings about the outcome. Blinken had succeeded in interesting Nathan, which is all to the good. He then proceeded to secure from you ~~the~~ tacit or half-expressed approval of their program; and, I said, on the strength of these two facts, he would begin to raise money among our friends and fellow Zionists for a project, the direction of which he would carefully keep away from Zionist influence or supervision. So there it is! Here are the very people upon whom I was relying to supplement the budget to be provided by the Emergency Council and who are being asked to give their money to be administered by Mr. Blinken and to help build up an Institute carefully insulated against Zionist contacts.

Shortly after I spoke with Stone on the telephone yesterday, I had a call from Mr. Blinken. He had probably heard that Stone was going to dine with me and was getting worried so he called me up and said he wanted to have a talk with me some time next week. I don't know whether you wrote him a letter as I suggested to you, but I shall receive him, of course, if he wants to call and see what develops.

My own view I expressed to Dewey Stone at the conclusion of our conference last night. I consider Nathan and the others very valuable and I consider it most desirable to utilize their services in appropriate form. I would go a long way to meet their wishes for autonomy, etc., but there are limits to the price we should pay. I do not believe that the organization should abdicate its position of authority and responsibility in the field of economic planning. They should be encouraged and even helped to go on, provided they agree to the establishment of the proper relationship which will avoid unnecessary duplication and waste of money, and also safeguard the political interests and requirements of the movement. It is all a question of Mr. Blinken, and if I read him aright, he will adjust himself if he finds a firm attitude on the part of the ~~Jewish~~ leadership and the reluctance of a part of our Zionists to finance his operations as a wholly independent proposition - a little kingdom of his own.

As ever yours,



Letter No. 22

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK CITY

December 29, 1943

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

1. You may have heard by this time from Abe Goodman that the Sub-Committee had agreed to meet with you some time Monday, although Boukstein put up a strong but losing fight to have Dr. Heller also invited to be present. That boy is a bit too clever! *He is systematically engaged in running you down as a "disappointment"!*

2. I received your letter of the twenty-eighth with enclosures and am getting them copied and distributed. I should like to arrange a get-together of our group of friends, possibly for next Tuesday evening, January 4th. Please let me know promptly whether that would be O. K. so that I may give the people sufficient notice in advance.

3. I am going ahead with the plans for the Economic Conference, provided I can get a number of really competent people to present worthwhile papers. I hope I will. In that case it may be desirable to publish the best papers in a collection - a little volume dealing with the Economic Aspects of Palestine and its Possibilities. A decision regarding this point ought to be made now because the prospect of publication may influence the decision of some people in favor of participating and undergoing the labor of preparing high grade papers. All in all, financial provision has to be made for a Conference, including traveling expenses for a number of the experts we would invite, possibly a few moderate lecture fees, and publication, to which I referred. I would suggest tentatively an allocation of \$2500., though I hope we will not have to expend that much. Please advise.

4. I see that my Cleveland speech has elicited comment on the score of heresy. I had a letter from Mrs. Epstein, though it was limited to a request for an explanation or amplification of my views. I did so in two letters, copies of which I am enclosing. On the other hand, Judge Levinthal sent me a letter expressing strong approval, and I am enclosing a letter of that too. As for Mr. Gellman, I am writing him and may send you a copy. I agree, of course, that discipline requires that no Zionist in a responsible position should express views which diverge or are in conflict with the official line. But then the question arises, of course, whether such a divergence or deviation actually exists. There is no point in muzzling our speakers or making them simply repeat themselves monotonously while forbidding them to elaborate their views on any point. The defect of Mr. Gellman's letter is that he fails to point out wherein my statements are inconsistent with the official stand.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver


December 29, 1943

While I am at it, I would like to caution against permitting questions regarding my Cleveland speech to be introduced into the discussion which you intend to have regarding the resolution of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. Such an attempt may be made in order to becloud and confuse that issue. I would have no objection whatever to having my speech discussed by the Committee; but then it should be discussed absolutely apart from Heller's resolution, as an entirely separate and distinct item.

Not having heard from Blinken, Monday, Tuesday or today, I am sending him a letter, copy of which I am enclosing.

As ever,

Yours,


Emanuel Neumann



EN/M
(Enc.)

Executive Parchment
BAG CONTENT

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
DOMESTIC	CABLE
TELEGRAM	ORDINARY
DAY LETTER	URGENT RATE
SERIAL	DEFERRED
NIGHT LETTER	NIGHT LETTER

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise the message will be transmitted as a telegram or ordinary cablegram.

WESTERN UNION

A. N. WILLIAMS
PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

\$	CHECK
\$	ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
F	TIME FILED

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

To Emanuel Neumann

Care of or Apt. No. 521 7th Ave

Street and No. N. Y.

Place

Dec. 31, 1919

WANT A REPLY?

"Answer by WESTERN UNION"
or similar phrases may be
included without charge.

Will be pleased to meet with our
group Tuesday evening

Abba

Sender's Name

Address

Tel. No.

December 31, 1943

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Emanuel:

At your request I sent \$250 to Chaim Greenberg. Inasmuch as the meeting was not held, I think the mezumah should be returned to me for other uses.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK

P.S. I read your letters in the "Jewish Frontier". They are exquisitely fine. Sulamith Schwartz had spoken to me about having them put in a little booklet, published, and widely distributed. I am heartily in favor of it. Please get in touch with her so that the thing can be attended to immediately. I received a letter from Dr. Taraknath Das this morning in which he also praises your letters to a British liberal in highest terms.



EPSTEIN REYNOLDS & HARRIS

CONSULTING CHEMISTS and ENGINEERS

5 South Wabash Avenue

Chicago 3

January 6, 1944

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

It seems that whatever you try to do in connection with the Emergency Committee -- whether it is in the political field or in the economic field -- you are meeting complications. In connection with the latter, I am endeavoring to assist you and straighten out the difficulties involved.

Both Mr. Blinken and Mr. Neumann seem to misunderstand their respective functions and hence have created unnecessary complications. Mr. Neumann believes that he ought to be the man to conduct this research and that it was up to him to retain Mr. Nathan on his staff; Mr. Blinken believes that this job belongs to him, but complains bitterly that he asked you for a copy of the preliminary survey made by the Survey Commission and did not get it.

In my attached memorandum I am making it clear to both gentlemen that they have nothing to fight about, that it is not necessary for Mr. Blinken to run to you for details, since after all you are the chief of fourteen committees, and Mr. Blinken can straighten this matter out with Mr. Neumann very easily. Vice versa, I am telling Mr. Neumann the limits of his committee and hinting very gently that he also must discipline himself.

I hope you don't mind the manner in which I have written that letter. I will do all I can to straighten matters out.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Albert K. Epstein

ea

P.S. I have not yet returned the book which I have taken from your library. I am not reading it but studying it. I am going on a vacation for two weeks and would like to take it along with me to make some notes. I hope your librarian won't mind. However, if she insists, I will return it.





EPSTEIN REYNOLDS & HARRIS
CONSULTING CHEMISTS and ENGINEERS
5 South Wabash Avenue
Chicago 3

January 6, 1944

Mr. M. H. Blinken, President
 American Palestine Institute, Inc.
 165 Broadway
 New York City

Dear Mr. Blinken:

I am recapitulating the subject matter of the several conferences I had with you and the discussions I had with Dr. Silver, Mr. Emanuel Neumann, Dr. Ernst Bergmann and others relating to the work of the Institute and the program which has been undertaken by Mr. Neumann. I am endeavoring to clarify the issues and reduce them to the simplest terms.

1. As I understand from you, your Institute has undertaken a Research Project under the guidance of Mr. R. Nathan and his associates and have committed yourself to a sum of \$75,000.00 to defray the expenses involved in the research and the money will be raised by your Institute from individuals. This project will cover the Economic Development of Palestine, its future potentialities, and general plans of implementing the potentialities in practice.
2. It is understood, although this project is being paid for by private contributions, that it is not a private venture in that the findings of the investigation will be turned over to members of the Jewish Agency.
3. We must also take into consideration the fact that the Jewish Agency has sanctioned the organization of the Zionist Emergency Council, which is headed by Dr. Silver. Dr. Silver has appointed fourteen committees, among which is a Committee for the Economic Planning for Palestine, headed by Mr. Emanuel Neumann. It is my understanding from Dr. Silver that the function of the Committee is to correlate the various activities in the field of economic planning for Palestine and to keep the Emergency Committee informed regarding various activities by your group as well as other groups in this field. In addition, Mr. Emanuel Neumann was appointed, as I understand, by Dr. Weizmann as Administrator of a Commission for Palestine Survey, which is carrying on engineering surveys in connection with the JVA Project.
4. In view of the fact that a project of your Institute cannot be considered a private venture although it is financed by private funds since you have committed yourself to present the findings to the head of the Jewish Agency, therefore your Institute must be in

COPY

contact with the various other official committees of the Zionist Movement which are carrying out work in this field. Your Committee, therefore, cannot disregard the Committee of Economic Planning appointed by Dr. Silver as well as the work headed by Mr. Emanuel Neumann in relation to the survey. By the same token Mr. Emanuel Neumann cannot disregard, in my opinion, the work which is being carried out by your Committee. Both Committees must, therefore, cooperate whenever possible and whenever necessary.

5. It was suggested that a Conference on the economic potentialities of Palestine should be held under the auspices of the Palestine Foundation Fund and the Zionist Emergency Council. In view of the fact that Mr. Emanuel Neumann has been appointed by Dr. Silver as Chairman of such activities, it is therefore necessary that your Institute should collaborate with him as much as possible to make this Conference a success. As stated in my previous letter, it may not be necessary for Mr. Nathan to deliver a paper, but there is no reason why other members of the group should not participate in the program if the Arrangements Committee deems it advisable.
6. I understand that your Committee has requested certain preliminary surveys which have been prepared by Mr. Emanuel Neumann's Commission. It seems to me that you should not contact Dr. Silver as he is Chairman of fourteen committees and therefore he has appointed sub-chairman,--in this case Mr. Emanuel Neumann. I am confident that if Mr. Nathan and yourself will contact Mr. Emanuel Neumann to discuss this matter, he will be happy to give you the information on hand, since this information is the property of the Jewish Agency and not private property.

In conclusion, we must clearly understand that there is no competition between the two committees. Some work may be overlapping, but this may be useful as the problem may be approached by the two committees from different angles. It is also suggested that from time to time members of the Institute should meet with members of Mr. Neumann's Committee to discuss the progress of research and keep each other informed of their respective activities.

In these difficult days we must mobilize all our forces for our final objective. I am approaching this problem objectively and am endeavoring to eliminate any possibility of misunderstanding on either side. I shall be very happy to collaborate with both Committees in whatever capacity I can.

Cordially yours,

ea

Albert K. Epstein

CC: Dr. Silver
Mr. E. Neumann
Dr. N. Goldmann
Dr. E. Bergmann
Dr. J. Cohen

Letter No. 33

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

March 7, 1944

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
Zionist Organization of America
1720-16th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Abba:

On February 25th I sent you a copy of a letter which I sent on the same date to Feuer, containing certain suggestions. I am reverting to that now.

As I told you on the phone, I am not dispirited by the events of the past few days. It is a head-on clash which had to come. We have certainly succeeded in lifting the Palestine question out of the hole in which it had been allowed to rest and placed it on the agenda as a great public issue. But I am gravely concerned over the state of mind of the Jewish public and our own Zionist co-workers who can't help feeling that we have suffered a serious defeat which may affect the situation in London most unfortunately. Doubts are already being expressed not only privately, but in articles regarding the wisdom of the course we have taken. Moreover, the internal "opposition", which is silent and quiescent when things are moving along, comes to life again at the slightest setback, and their criticism will be directed at you.

Quite apart, therefore, from the political situation per se, it is of utmost importance that something be done immediately to mitigate the widespread feeling of frustration and to give us some compensation for the failure of Congress to act.

I revert therefore to the idea that a statement should be signed by a majority of the members of the two Congressional committees, addressed to the State Department. Not even General Marshall's veto can affect the right of Congressmen to address this privately and directly to Secretary Hull. Nor would they be responsible if by a leak, or a series of leaks, the news should get out that such a round-robin was sent or presented to the State Department.

There may be reluctance on the part of Congressmen to do this and a good deal of pressure and persuasion may be required but it can be put, particularly to the Party Leaders, that they owe us at least this compensation. If our Representatives show sufficient spirit and indignation over the embarrassing position in which the Zionist movement had been placed, I believe we can get it through.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

March 7, 1944

Some such action is absolutely imperative from every point of view, including the situation in London. Indeed, I regret that I did not urge this action more strongly ten days ago before the attack by the Arab State was publicized. It would have been easier then, but it is not too late now. I still think it is unlikely that the President will make a public statement of the kind we need, and there is not a moment to lose in repairing the damage which has been done to us. I am trying my hand at drafting the kind of statement which I think Senators and Congressmen can be asked to sign and will try to enclose it with this letter. I may turn up in Washington tomorrow afternoon but I would not wish even a few hours to be lost in starting this work, if you agree with my suggestion, as I hope you do.

As ever,

Faithfully yours,

Emanuel

Emanuel Neumann



EN/M
(Enc.)

Letter No. 38

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

April 5, 1944

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

Yesterday I was the recipient of several phone calls from friends who were pleased as punch about the way the last session of the Council went. They seemed to feel happy that they were able to assert themselves and parry the thrusts; and almost everyone also expressed satisfaction over the fact that you maintained the attitude you did by keeping altogether out of the discussion.

Last night I attended a meeting of the members of the Actions Committee because Goldmann was reporting and I wanted to be on hand in case there was a discussion. Goldmann made a good job of it and certainly made a very excellent impression. I have been canvassing the situation further with regard to his status and I am increasingly doubtful whether there is any possibility of eliminating him from political activity in Washington. A proposal calling for the termination of the Agency's political office would not, in my opinion, command a majority in the Emergency Committee at this time. As one of our friends said to me - I think it was Gellman - referring to Goldmann: "He's there; he's very active and clever; what can you do about him? You can't just remove him."

As long as the problem is not straightened out between you and him, the situation will be used by the opposition; and I am more and more of the opinion that somehow a friendly entente and modus vivendi must be worked out at least for the next few months. I think he may even be gotten to drop Wise in fact, though not necessarily in appearance, if he can establish an alliance with you. At least that is my impression at the moment. Goldmann has expressed a desire to have a private talk with me ~~on~~ on the situation. I will keep you further informed.


For the rest, the spirit of last night's meeting was good. One or two of the speakers, for instance, cautioned Goldmann against discouraging the American Zionists from continuing their vigorous activity, which must be kept up at all costs. *He agreed.*

More hereafter! I hope you have a pleasant and enjoyable Seder.

As ever,

Faithfully yours,

EN/M



[April 1944]

Summary Report on Proposed Pipe Line from
Saudi-Arabia to the Mediterranean

Comparative Estimates of Oil Reserves

The oil fields of the Persian Gulf drainage area include deposits in Iran, Iraq and Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia, and Bahrein.

Some idea of the immense volume of these deposits may be obtained from the following unpublished estimates of a responsible government expert:

Ultimate potential reserves
in the United States 50 billion barrels
(equivalent to perhaps 35
years consumption)

Ultimate potential reserves
in the Persian Gulf area 200 - 300 billion barrels

Much exploration work has still to be done in the Persian Gulf area and the above estimate, which very greatly exceeds the proved reserves is admittedly speculative in character. It seems clear, however, that in this relatively small area of the world, inhabited by backward peoples and controlled by unstable governments, is concentrated more than three-fourths of the world's "free" oil. Its distribution is estimated by the same expert as follows:

Saudi-Arabia and Bahrein	about 40%
Iraq and Qatar	30%
Iran	20%
Kuwait	5-10%

Ownership of Concessions

Great Britain or its nationals own 100% of the Iran area, (through Anglo-Iranian); 56% of the Iraq area, (Anglo-Iranian owns a majority share holding in the Iraq Petroleum Company); and 50% of the Kuwait area.

Nationals of the United States own about 22% of the Iraq area, (i.e. through Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Vacuum as shareholders of the Iraq Petroleum Company); 50% of the Kuwait area, (i.e. through Gulf Oil Corporation); and 100% of the Saudi-Arabian area.

The Saudi-Arabian concession, which dates from 1933, is owned by the California Arabian Oil Company, which in turn is owned by Standard Oil of California, and the Texas Company. These two companies, together with Gulf, are the parties to the Arabian pipe line deal, the intention being that in addition to the Saudi-Arabian oil, crude oil from Kuwait will also go through the pipe to the Mediterranean.

Exploitation of the Saudi-Arabian area is still in its initial stages, whereas the oil fields of Iran and Iraq have been producing in quantity for some time.

Refineries

There are three "significant" refineries in the Middle East¹. The largest is that of Anglo-Iranian at Abadan which will shortly be handling over 350,000 barrels a day; the second at Haifa now handling 60,000 barrels a day and extensions to which will shortly increase its capacity to 80,000 barrels; the third of Bahrein, whose capacity by the end of the year will be 58,000 barrels a day.

It is anticipated that if the proposed pipe line from Saudi-Arabia is built to end at Haifa, additional refineries will be constructed at that terminus to handle 350,000 barrels a day. Standard of California will also construct a large refinery at Ras-Tamura in Saudi-Arabia.

History of Pipe Line

A proposal for the exploitation of the Saudi-Arabian fields by the construction of a pipe line by the United States Government from those fields to the Mediterranean, was made in the latter half of 1942. It was submitted to the Army and Navy Petroleum Board, which is responsible for making recommendations to the joint Chiefs of Staff on petroleum needs for the war effort. An important feature of that proposal was the stress placed by it on the need for effective government participation not merely in the construction of the pipe line, but in controlling the policies to be pursued in connection with the exploitation of the oil. It was pointed out that in the case of British oil interest in the Middle East, the British Government, while not operating the concessions directly, nevertheless was a majority shareholder and thus retained ultimate control. The scheme was rejected however by the Army and Navy Petroleum Board. A year later another proposal for a government subsidized pipe line - but this time without any provision for government participation in or control over the operating companies - was again submitted to the Army and Navy Petroleum Board. On this occasion the proposal was recommended by the Board to the joint Chiefs of Staff, and approved by them. An explanation for the change of front probably resides in the fact that the leading executives of the Army - Navy Petroleum Board had been long associated with the private oil companies whose attitude in opposition to public ownership or control they presumably share.²

A principal protagonist of the pipe line proposal is Mr. H. L. Ickes, Petroleum Administrator for War,³ and president of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation.

The Petroleum Reserves Corporation was founded in July 1943 as an agency of the Federal Government. The Board of the PRC consists of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Interior, as well as the Foreign Economic Administrator. Mr. Ickes was appointed President of the Corporation among the objectives of which, as stated by him, are "to explore and encourage the national interest of the United States in the petroleum fields of the world where private industry is willing to go, and to propose safeguards for those interests." The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized to lend to the P.R.C. up to \$30,000,000.00.

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1. E. DeGolyer in report to PRC as quoted by Major McNeil, 3/23/44.
 2. Executive Officer of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board is Commodore Andrew Carter, for years an official of the Shell Oil Co. Associated with him is General Pyron, for years President of the Gulf Oil Company.
 3. Mr. Ralph Davis, Vice-President of Standard Oil of California, is the Deputy Administrator.

On behalf of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, Mr. Ickes entered into negotiations with the Arabian-American Oil Company, ("Aramco" - the new name of the Californian-Arabian) and with the Gulf Exploration Company for the building of the pipe line from Saudi-Arabia by the United States Government at a cost estimated at about \$150,000,000.00. The private oil companies vigorously, and in the end successfully resisted the efforts of PRC to obtain government participation in the development of the Saudi-Arabian oil resources. An agreement was finally reached entitled, "Outline of Principles of Proposed Agreement, January 24, 1944,"⁴ which provided for government construction, ownership, and maintenance of a pipe line system "from a point near the presently discovered oil fields of Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait to a port at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. The size, capacity, location, and terminal points of the pipe line system shall be determined by the government." But the government acquired no interest in the oil companies themselves, nor any right of control over their policies except insofar as this is provided by Article 8 of the proposed Agreement.

This article entitles the United States Government to be informed of negotiations by the companies with any foreign government and to a veto power on sales by the companies to foreign nationals or governments, if such sales would militate against the interests of the United States. In addition Clause 8 provides that "the commercial and other policies and practices of the companies would conform to the foreign policy of the United States."

Clause II of the "Principles of Proposed Agreement" is also of interest. It reads as follows:

"In the execution and performance of this agreement, it is the desire and intention of the parties not only to promote and assist in the development of petroleum in the areas affected by this agreement, but also to promote the interests of the governments of such areas, and to respect their sovereignty and protect their rights. It is the desire of the United States that American nationals that enjoy privileges with respect to petroleum in countries under foreign governments shall have an active concern for the peace and prosperity of such countries and shall exercise their rights with due regard to the rights, including that of political integrity, of the governments of such countries."

It is clear that this clause which imposes active and affirmative duties is susceptible of wide latitude of interpretation; thus the "desire and intention of the parties" to "protect the rights" of any area affected by the agreement carries with it the possibility of local political intervention of a character determined only by the conception of the parties concerned, of what those rights are. The question may arise as to whose rights are to be protected, and what is the nature of the sovereignty to be respected. Or, to take a specific case, what would be meant by promoting "the interests of the government" of Palestine, for example. Would it include an insistence on the maintenance of the status quo, that is to say, including the policy of the White Paper. Similarly the proposal to "have an active concern for the peace and prosperity" of these countries may well have far-reaching political implications.

4. Signed by Harold L. Ickes for PRC; F. A. Davies as President of Arabian-American ("Aramco"); J. F. Drake, President of the Gulf Exploration Company; H. D. Collier, President of the Standard Oil of California; and W.S.S. Rodgers, President of the Texas Co. The officers of "Aramco" are Mr. Collier (Standard Oil of California) Chairman, Mr. Rodgers (Texas) Vice-Chairman, Mr. F. A. Davies (Standard of California) President, Mr. James Terry Duce (Texas) Vice-President in charge of geology and production; Mr. A. M. Martin, Vice-President in charge of manufacturing and Mr. J. Macpherson, Vice-President, Secretary and Treasurer. Other directors are Mr. J. H. MacGaregill of Standard and C. E. Olmsted of Texas.

On the other hand it is suggested that this part of the Article may be used, especially in conjunction with the concluding paragraph of Article 8 referred to above (requiring that the commercial and other policies of the companies conform with the United States foreign policy) as a peg on which to hang claims for appropriate economic provisions in the interests of the Jewish National Home, such as sale in Palestine of petroleum at reasonable prices, standard wage rates, etc. As was said by J. H. Carmichael in the New York Times of March 20th the third paragraph of Article 8 "apparently refers to virtually every phase of operation and could be interpreted as meaning that wage payments, working conditions and all operations generally would have to conform to a policy laid down by the United States Government."

Reactions to the Pipe Line Proposal

Public announcement of the pipe line scheme was made in the early part of this year. Proponents of the scheme laid stress on the alleged rapid exhaustion of oil reserves in the Western Hemisphere, and the suggestion was strongly made that oil reserves in this country would meet consumption needs only for another fifteen years.

It was urged that in present circumstances this country would be "unable to oil another war", and that its position in the world of tomorrow depended on the development of foreign oil resources.

Vigorous reaction in opposition to the pipe line scheme developed quickly and came in the main from two quarters. On the one hand those oil companies, some fifty-five in number, who stand to derive no benefit from the pipe line and whose interests are concentrated in this hemisphere, objected strenuously to the construction of any pipe line at all with the help of public funds. Essentially these companies are interested to sell their own product at the highest price. They are concerned about the effect on their interests -- primarily in the Western Hemisphere -- of the fuller exploitation of the vast oil deposits of the Middle East -- deposits which can in general be developed far more cheaply than can the Western Hemisphere deposits. Public opposition by these companies is, however, based on very different grounds. A Memorandum setting out these grounds in detail was prepared recently for the National Oil Policy Committee of the Petroleum Industry War Council, by Mr. George A. Hill, Jr., of Houston, Texas, and contains arguments which have been reflected in a good deal of the controversy in the press and on the platform which centers on this issue. In the first place exception is taken to the suggestion that sources of supply in the United States are likely to be exhausted within the reasonably near future.⁵ It is argued that no, or insufficient account, is taken of continuing discoveries of new deposits; that the same scare was raised at the end of the last war and proved likewise unjustified. In this connection it is worth noting that the President has given the pipe line his tacit support by stating⁶ that the United States can no longer depend on domestic wells for all the production it needs and that he is worried about United States supplies not for the next five years but for the next fifty years.

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5. Wallace Pratt, director of Standard Oil of New Jersey asserts that our reserves will last another 100 years. Others have offered much higher estimates.
 6. February 11, 1944 to March 4, 1944.

Next it is objected that in any case the pipe line is unnecessary since there will be ample tanker tonnage available at the end of the war. Also that the proposed governmental construction is in conflict with American ideas of free enterprise and that neither on grounds of security nor of public policy can the proposal be justified. Beyond this, great stress is placed on the argument that the pipe line involves a foreign commitment outside the Western Hemisphere in the midst of war, for strictly post-war purposes, and that it marks the commencement of an interventionist American foreign policy in the internal affairs of foreign countries. One clause of the Memorandum reads as follows:

"It is a foreign commitment by the United States involving the physical occupation and utilization of a part of the territory of certain kingdoms, sultanates, shaikdoms, mandates, protectorates, neutral territories and areas involved in boundary disputes, over 1000 miles in distance,.... and in which area there is embodied all of the political ailments incident to Arab nationalism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism, Koranic law, the Jewish-Arab feud, Zionism, remnant of Turkish influence in the old Ottoman Empire, Russo-Turkish-British relationship and rivalries, British foreign policy with respect to the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf..."

A second group which opposes the present pipe line agreement, does so on entirely different grounds. They include many representatives of liberal public opinion in this country and expression was given to their point of view in an important speech by Representative Jerry Voorhis of California, in the House of Representatives, February 21, 1944. This group accepts the need for building up America's oil reserves by development of oil reserves abroad, but fears the growth of an irresponsible oil imperialism, if the present proposal for exploitation by private companies goes through. The members of this group accordingly object to the PRC Agreement as written, on the ground ^{that} it is essential that an enterprise of this kind with all its international ramifications, should ultimately be controlled by the United States Government. They would accordingly favor construction of the pipe line but subject to effective governmental participation in the exploitation of the concessions.

Following the introduction of a resolution by Senators Brewster of Maine, and Moore of Oklahoma (a vigorous opponent of the pipe line), asking for the dissolution of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, a Senate Committee of eleven members was appointed to investigate the entire question of American foreign oil policy. The committee consisted of the following Senators:

Chairman: Maloney of Connecticut
Conally of Texas
Vandenberg of Michigan
Johnson of Colorado
Moore of Oklahoma
Brewster of Maine
O'Mahoney of Wyoming
Gurney of South Dakota
Lucas of Illinois
Maybank of South Carolina
LaFollette of Wisconsin

The committee has so far met in Executive Session and heard the evidence of Colonel John H. Leavell, Petroleum Attache' in the Middle Eastern Division of the State Department, who it is understood favors the pipe-line but subject to governmental participation and control of the whole development.

The Oil Deal and King Ibn Saud

The concession to the American companies was granted by Ibn Saud in 1933 and expires in 1999. It is stated that the grant to American rather than to British or any other foreign companies was the result of Ibn Saud's feeling that he had no reason to fear American economic and political penetration of his country.

A considerable portion of Saudi-Arabia's revenue is attributable to the sums paid for these concessions. Most of the balance comes from a subsidy from the British (a million pounds yearly) and from the revenues derived from the annual Mecca pilgrimage. The last named source of income was greatly reduced as a result of war-time transportation difficulties. This undoubtedly added considerably to the financial difficulties of the Saudi-Arabian monarch. According to reports in the New York Times ⁸, the United States and British Governments agreed to ^{help} finance his government. Since Saudi-Arabia was under the influence of the British the financing arrangement was carried out through an advance by the United States Government to the British with the understanding that (\$25,000,000.00 or according to another report \$10,000,000.00) would go to the king. A somewhat different version of this story ⁹ is that the amount of \$25,000,000.00 was paid by the United States Government to Ibn Saud to counter subsidies paid him by the British Government and to assist the American oil companies in keeping their monopoly. Whether or not this money was paid will probably form a part of the Congressional inquiry.

Public announcement of the visit to Ibn Saud of an American military mission under Major General Ralph Royce to study "economic, public health, military and communication problems" in Saudi-Arabia, was made last December, and subsequently (early in March) General Royce again visited Saudi-Arabia and delivered an initial "token" shipment of lend-lease munitions, as well as a payment of \$1,250,000.00 in Saudi-Arabian coins, minted in the United States. Prior to this, a delegation from Saudi-Arabia, headed by the two sons of King Ibn Saud, visited this country and were entertained by the Government and by the Standard Oil Company of California. Visits to Ibn Saud have also been paid by General Hurley. In this connection it is stated, reports to the contrary in the press notwithstanding, that the purpose of his visits have been in regard to lend-lease and not the pipe line. But the inference is not far-fetched that American interest in Saudi-Arabian oil and in good relations with the King are inter-connected.

British Reactions

The British have not issued any official statement with regard to their interest in the Saudi-Arabian oil development. According to one source ¹⁰, they have said flatly that they do not propose to seek oil concessions in Saudi-Arabia and that they do not wish to enter in competition for world markets or for American ones with Arabian oil. Clearly however, the construction of an American government-owned and operated pipe line in territories directly or indirectly controlled by the British has important political implications; and a number of reports ¹¹ suggest irritation that the plan should be developed without consultation between Allied Governments; anxiety is reported too over the strategic implications of the pipe line "with emphasis on a possible American naval base in the Mediterranean." What is probably a representative British reaction is that of the "Economist" of March 11, 1944. In a somewhat sharply worded article, the announcement by the P.A.W. (Mr. Ickes) without prior consultation with Britain, of the PRC agreement with Aramco, and the introduction of the Palestine resolution into Congress, are linked as examples of American "excursions" into Middle Eastern politics which "show little sign of forethought and even less of any desire to co-ordinate American policy with that of Great Britain." Reference is also made to

7: New York Times December 16, 1943.

8. New York Times February 11, 1944, March 18, 1944 and March 24, 1944.

9. New York Times March 18, 1944.

10. John MacCormack New York Times March 18, 1944.

11. New York Times March 23, 1944.

the wide scope of General Royce's Military Mission to Saudi Arabia, which covered petroleum extraction, communications and public health. The article concludes that there are solutions, military, political and economic for the difficulties of Middle-Eastern development but they will be found only in the abandonment of a "dangerous unilateralism and if America and Britain work together and plan their policies to meet the interests of the whole area."

Despite suggestions to the contrary there seems reason to believe that Britain and America are in fact engaged in a undercover struggle of some intensity in the Middle East. Further evidence of this comes in the statement recently made to a member of the Emergency Council by an authoritative American source that a principal aim of British propaganda in the Arab countries is to undermine American influence, and to that end that British agents are spreading the story that President Roosevelt is surrounded by people who favor a Jewish state, so that if such a state is established, the Americans will be to blame. Some significance too attaches in this connection to the report ¹² that Ibn Saud is seeking to establish close oil relations with Great Britain by the appointment of a British petroleum adviser.

With a view to reaching an Anglo-American agreement on petroleum questions a British delegation of oil experts under Sir William Brown ¹³ is at present conducting preliminary talks in Washington. Apart from this however it seems clear that a major point on the agenda of the Stettinius mission in London is the oil question. If an agreement is reached there, presumably any bargaining power which Ibn Saud may have enjoyed will be very greatly reduced. But the whole issue is still subject to Congressional approval which at the time of writing remains at least very doubtful.

Location of Pipe Line Terminal and Markets to be Served

According to the earlier reports ¹⁴ it was planned to have two terminals to the line, one at Haifa and one at Alexandria. Subsequently the Egyptian Government imposed a 15% duty on all oil exports from Egypt. In consequence of this it was decided to abandon the proposal for an arm to Alexandria. On March 25th last however the Egyptian Government rescinded the 15% export tax and it is stated that the original plan for an arm to Alexandria has now been restored.

The pipe line would furnish oil to the European and Near Eastern markets. According to Mr. Ickes its construction would take "all of two years." The effect of the pipe line would be to free Caribbean oil for Western Hemisphere uses. What result this would have on the price structure of Western Hemisphere oil is uncertain but is certainly a major factor in the objections already referred to of the Independent Companies to the whole scheme. A further element in this picture is the proposal of the Iraq Petroleum Company to duplicate the existing pipe line from the Mosul fields to Haifa. So far Mr. Ickes, as Petroleum Administrator, has not agreed to approve the allocation of steel for this additional line.

The Position of the Jewish Agency

The question has arisen as to the status of the Jewish Agency to demand that it be consulted on a question so vitally affecting the future of the Jewish National Home as does the pipe line proposal. In terms of Article 4 of the Mandate, the

12. New York World Telegram (Henry J. Taylor) April 13, 1944.

13. New York Times April 4, 1944.

14. New York Times January 28, 1944

15. New York Times February 10, 1944 and New York World Telegram (H. J. Taylor) April 14, 1944.

Jewish Agency is "recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country." Article 11 of the Mandate provides further as follows:

"The Administration may arrange with the Jewish Agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration."

Article 11, it is clear, is permissive in character and while clearly intended to give the Jewish Agency a preferential status, entitles the Administration to arrange or not to arrange, as it sees fit, for the participation of the Jewish Agency in the construction and operation of public works, utilities, etc., and in the development of any of the natural resources of the country.

Article 4 would seem to offer a stronger ground on which to claim the right to consultation, a right reinforced by the provisions of Article 11.

Economic Issues

It is clear that in the event that the pipe line is constructed, the character of the economic arrangements made in connection therewith will be of the utmost importance for the development of Palestine and the Jewish National Home. The future of Jewish industry in Palestine is closely linked with the question of cheap power, that is to say, above all, of cheap fuel. Experience with the Iraq pipe line is very revealing in this connection. No provision was made in the Iraq petroleum agreement for sale of the oil at the Haifa outlet at a fair price, or indeed of any oil at all, with the result that the British-controlled oil cartel maintains the price of oil in Palestine at a figure that is altogether excessive. Again, while in the convention with the Iraq Petroleum Company various special fees and privileges were granted the company, including freedom from all duties on transit of its petroleum and petroleum products, exemption from all duties on all imports which it requires, special railroad rates for its freight, and complete exemption from "property tax, income tax, or any levy or fiscal charge of any sort," no counter-balancing stipulations were made with regard to the use, where possible, of local materials, the wages to be paid to local labor, or the sale in Palestine of petroleum products with some relation to cost. It is believed, though this will require further investigation, that in Syria, by contrast, definite commitments were obtained from the IPC for the provision of oil and by-products at special rates.

The prospective construction of ^{the} Saudi Arabian pipe line to Palestine may provide an excellent opportunity for redress of the present intolerable situation which has very serious implications for Palestine's economic development.

May 8, 1944

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

My dear Emanuel:

I hope that your meeting with Hull will be successful. I am enclosing herewith an article which will interest you. You will recall that I smelled a rat when the matter was first broached at the meeting of the Program Committee.

I have been somewhat troubled about the movement to urge our government to establish "free ports" for refugees in this country. I don't know who originated the idea, or why. I rather think that very little will come of it, except that it will play in the hands of the British. The pressure of our propaganda in the last few years stemmed directly from the need of a place of refuge for our people, that Palestine was the proper place and the most readily accessible one for them, and that other countries do not want them. I did not personally ever favor our putting so much emphasis on the refugee angle in our propaganda and so little emphasis on the national solution which Palestine must offer to the Jewish problem which existed before Hitler and which will continue after Hitler is gone. However, our propaganda was based on Palestine as a place of refuge. As soon as these "free ports" are established, if only on paper, the ground is knocked from under our propaganda. The English line will then be -- there are now free ports for refugees in America which is far bigger than Palestine, etc., and refugee Jews should go there. Not that refugee Jews will actually be enabled to go there! Actually, the immigration quotas to the United States under existing laws have not been used up.

Our friends in Washington whom we have been pressuring to force open the doors of Palestine because of the great Jewish need will now by the mere announcement of the establishment of such "free ports" feel free to wash their hands of any responsibility in the matter of Palestine, the White Paper, the Jewish National Home, etc. I notice that the New York Times has come out for such "free ports"!.....

It is of course very difficult for Zionists to bring this phase of the subject to the attention of people and to ask why Jewish refugees should be moved five, six thousand miles from the Balkans to the United States for temporary shelter while Palestine is right next door and can certainly be used for temporary shelter, because we will be accused of being indifferent to the tragedy of the refugees

Mr. Neumann

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May 8, 1944

because of our exclusive absorption in political Zionism, etc. etc. I rather feel that another great stumbling block is being put in the way of the redemption of our people and that very little good will redound from this movement either to the benefit of Jewish refugees or Jewish Palestine.

I am glad that Mr. Hard has reacted as he did to the article in the Reader's Digest. I hope that they will soon publish an article reflecting our viewpoint.

I spoke, some time ago, to Lowenthal about seeing Pegler. Perhaps you are the man to see him. Talk with Lowenthal. I will try to arrange with the editor of the Local Scripps Howard paper for an appointment with Mr. Howard, head of the organization.

With all good wishes, I remain

As ever yours,

AHS:BK
Enc.



COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

June 12, 1944

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

I have done a little preliminary investigation regarding the idea of retaining eminent counsel. More specifically, three possibilities: (1) John Foster Dulles; (2) Charles Evans Hughes, Jr.; (3) John W. Davis.

Regarding the first: he is very close to Dewey, is reputed to be writing Dewey's speeches on questions of major policy, and is also reputed as slated to be his Secretary of State. For that reason it is believed by some that he would be persona non-grata with the State Department just now and they would probably suspect whatever he might do, assuming he were willing to accept a retainer from us.

Mr. Davis is by this time probably 67 years of age but still keen, vigorous and active in his profession. However, he is very close to the British, has served as the President of the English Speaking Union, etc. and would probably not wish to be mixed up with us. He would probably consult Halifax before accepting a retainer.


Hughes would seem to be the most available of the three. He is very eminent and highly regarded. Though he is a Republican by affiliation, he is not particularly active in Republic politics and would not be looked upon in Washington as having a Republican axe to grind. On the other hand, he is accustomed to charge very high fees. That would be about equally true with regard to the others. Under the circumstances, if we are prepared to go ahead, he would seem to be the best bet. At least he might be approached, though he too might have a reason for not accepting a retainer from us. - I will look into the matter further and write you again. *I shall not approach him, of course.*

Regarding the plank for the platform, I understand you have received from Shulman his draft version. I think it's all right and has one or two points that might be incorporated in your draft, as for instance, the reference to the holy places, etc. All in all, I would prefer to stick to yours as the basis, with perhaps some modification which you might consider desirable.

Thanks for your note about my article in the Contemporary Jewish Record.

As ever,

Faithfully yours,



EN/M

August 16, 1944

and conspiratorially out-maneuvered by a gentleman who presumes to speak in the name of a superseding body and whose actions are subject to no control by the American Zionist Emergency Council which is burdened with the responsibility of carrying on the work in the United States.

I am sorry that I must do it at this time and on the eve of momentous events. I should have liked to remain on with the Emergency Council until our new status in Palestine is defined and to help direct the Council toward maximum effectiveness in bringing about a satisfactory solution for Palestine, but it is impossible to work under the present conditions, nor do I feel justified in assuming the responsibilities of leadership when the authority which should go along with such responsibility does not exist.

XX/ It is bad enough to have to put up with the manipulations and the hysterical prestige-complex of Wise. You will recall that astounding incident with the President when without consultation with me or with the Council, he brought about a postponement of the critical interview with the President for more than two weeks because he had to be on the Pacific Coast and could not tolerate the idea of anyone seeing the President in his place. You will recall how hard he tried recently to force through a permanent political committee in an effort to curb and control my activities. I say it is bad enough to have to put up with one major source of aggravation and interference. With two it is utterly impossible.

I send you my best wishes.

Very cordially yours,

AHS:DR
Enc.

August 18, 1944

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
Commission on Palestine Surveys
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

My dear Emanuel:

I am sorry that you were unable to attend the meeting of the Emergency Council last Monday. Irving Miller who was there could tell you the story of how Goldman pulled another one of his shyster tricks, went to Stettinius last week on some phony excuse in anticipation of our appointment with him on August 15th, and messed up the situation in the same way he did with Judge Rosenman, you will recall, some months ago. As a result of his intrusion, Mr. Stettinius, who promised to see us on August 15th, will not see us until perhaps the end of September, and no announcement on Palestine will be forthcoming until the end of the war. These were the tidings which were conveyed by Goldman in a letter to Dr. Wise. I was kept in ignorance of the entire matter until Wise pulled out the letter at the meeting. I, of course, blew up and told them plenty. Everyone was shocked by the action of Goldman, and the only one who tried to excuse it was, of course, our friend Stephen, who undoubtedly has been in collusion with Goldman right along. It was voted to have the program committee look into the matter immediately and bring in a definite recommendation for the next meeting of the Executive Committee. I have been urging action on this, as you know, for a long time. I knew the situation would deteriorate very rapidly, knowing as I do the character and ambitions of this political gigolo, and the impossibility under any circumstances of carrying on a consistent political activity in Washington through two competing agencies. I wrote to Shulman as far back as May 25th about this matter. Prior to that I appointed a special committee to handle the matter, which never met. I also wrote to Dr. ~~Wise~~ about it some months ago, but of course he passed the buck back to us here, undoubtedly guided by Weisgal and Goldman. At the last meeting of the program committee, when this matter should have been brought up, it was again postponed on the slim excuse that the hour was late and that Goldman had to leave.

Under the circumstances I see no other way out of it for me than to send in my resignation, which I did this morning. I am prepared to put up with a lot of things and much aggravation to serve the cause, but it would be the height of folly for me to spend my time and energies day after day and to see my work periodically frustrated

August 22, 1944

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Emanuel:

I am sending you herewith a copy of the letter which was sent to you last Wednesday. I would suggest that you talk with Mr. Lipsky prior to the meeting as well as to the representatives of the Mizrachi and Poale Zion who are on the committee.

I am also sending you a copy of the letter which I addressed to Dr. Wise. You will note that he pulled another stunt like the one one which he did in postponing our interview with the President. He suggested the date of the 29th to Mr. Stettinius because he plans to attend the Emergency Council meeting in New York on the 28th. This will save him an extra trip from Lake Placid. The Zionist Movement in these critical war times must conform with the lecture schedule and the vacation schedule of Dr. Wise.....

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

August 29, 1944

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

As I said to you on the phone, I would have gone out to Cleveland together with Leon Feuer to see you tomorrow if I thought such a journey would make a difference in the situation. Even without such a hope, I would have made the trip anyhow but for the fact that Fan is ill in bed and has been so for a week and I am somewhat worried about her condition.

1) I fully understand the importance you attach to the issue we have been dealing with - Dr. Goldmann and his political activities. It should be crystal clear, however, that that is not the really basic problem. Even if this issue were settled to your entire satisfaction, another issue may arise tomorrow and probably will, just as there have been other issues before, not involving Goldmann. Such individual issues and conflicts as have arisen or would arise in the future if you remained at your post all stem from one basic situation; lack of loyal support and cooperation on the part of the groups in the control of the ZOA and Hadassah. This can in effect be limited to the ZOA because by itself and alone Hadassah would be utterly helpless and ineffective. But as long as the ZOA Administration constitutes an unavowed opposition and a focus of infection, the situation in the Emergency cannot possibly be satisfactory or even tolerable. On the other hand, if the ZOA situation were different and with the parties loyal to you as they are, you would have smooth sailing all around and neither Wise nor Goldmann nor anyone else would be in a position to stand up against you or give any real trouble. It is the knowledge that they can rely with complete confidence upon the ~~unfriendly~~ *hostile* attitude of the ZOA Administration towards you that permits them to do what they have been doing. Until and unless that basic situation is corrected, we are bound to have repetition of such conflicts at frequent intervals on various issues.

2) If that analysis is correct, then I doubt the course you are following of making the Goldmann situation the issue and occasion of your resignation; because even if there is a complete backdown on this point on the part of the Executive Committee, it will settle nothing really, and you may have to go through the whole painful business over again within a few weeks in connection with some other conflict which will probably arise.

3) It seems to me that the course you finally decide to take must depend upon your ultimate purpose and your fundamental attitude. If your

Dr. A. H. Silver

August 29, 1944

attitude is simply that you have had enough of aggravation and frustration and are not prepared to struggle with this internal situation any longer - then obviously there is only one thing to do and that is to quit, irrespective of any kind of formulation or any decision which may be forced from the Executive Committee on the Goldmann issue; because such a decision as you may force on this issue will not reduce the opposition in the quarters where it exists, but if anything, intensify it. It is bound to break out again in another form. In my opinion, therefore, if you are basically so fed up that it is impossible for you to continue, then you simply drop out without running this particular question down to earth to its last detail. It would then be advisable, I think, to inform the Committee that this is the last straw, coming on top of all the many things that have happened in the course of the year and that you see no possibility for discharging your mission as you conceive it to be.

4) On the other hand, if you are fundamentally ready to carry on despite all that has happened in the past, provided you are given the necessary support and freedom of action, then it is my humble opinion that a different course is indicated. Your strategy and effort must in that case be directed not to overcoming the Goldmann situation, but rather the underlying situation: to sterilize or emasculate the internal opposition. That can only be done by carrying the fight right to the ZOA and having a showdown there. Either you get the backing of the ZOA in such a decisive form as would make it impossible for its officers and representatives to sabotage your efforts or lend themselves to intrigues, or you don't. If you do, then you have the Emergency Committee completely in hand and can deal with everyone, including Goldmann and the World Executive itself, on a firm footing. If you can't win out and get such decisive support from the ZOA, then you quit and leave the responsibility to those who control it.

5) There is ample reason to believe that if the larger fundamental issue were to be fought out in the ZOA, you would win. Only yesterday Dan Frisch volunteered the information in a private talk with me that last year you had the Convention in your hands. The great majority of the delegates were with you. To some extent, the position may have been weakened by the lapse of a year during which Goldstein was in the saddle; but on the other hand, you have a record of a great year behind you. Those of us who have given thought to the question are convinced that you could get the decisive backing of the ZOA either through its Executive Committee, or if need be, through the Convention. The chances are that the leadership would rather give in before the Convention if they knew that a showdown was impending. You will recall that at the last two meetings of the ZOA at which you reported - one meeting of the Administrative Council and one meeting of the Executive Committee - in both instances you had quite obviously the support of the majority.

6) I believe that Goldstein and his friends are fully aware of the weakness of their own position and that it is for that reason that they are maneuvering as skilfully as possible. Their purpose, I fully believe, is to bring about your elimination; but to bring it about in such a way as will leave them exonerated on the record and put you in the wrong. They will therefore keep carrying with you, pay you compliments, make repeated ostensible efforts to induce you to withdraw your resignation,

1

Dr. A. H. Silver

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appoint one committee after another to persuade you to remain, raise all kinds of collateral issues, such as the "discipline of the World Zionist Organization," etc., all with a eye to the record so that they will be able to say to the Zionists "We have exhausted ourselves in attempts to meet Dr. Silver's wishes and induce him to remain without involving ourselves in a breach with the Jewish Agency, but to no avail. He is adamant, intransigent and determined to force us into a conflict which we must avoid. Silver is precious to us, but the integrity of the Zionist movement even more precious." In a sense they are counting on your "inflexibility" in their desire to eliminate you ~~and~~ ^{while} incur as little odium for so doing as possible.

7) But if your purpose is to sanctify the situation and carry on as the political leader of American Zionism, you should, to my mind, avoid this trap and make your fight at the point where it would be decisive and final, namely, in the ZOA. ~~There~~ ^{There} I am sure you would win and ~~lose~~ win or lose, you will know where you stand for the coming year. If you are to do that, however, if you are to carry the fight to the enemy's territory for a showdown, then you must invade it with the maximum strength. You cannot go as the ex-Chairman of the Emergency Council with a grievance to air, but with the full authority of the Chairman, who is carrying a heavy responsibility and demands loyal support in concrete terms. In that case ^{you} would liquidate the present crisis, as well as possible, or temporize with it and with the Executive Committee, while retaining your Chairmanship and your responsibility until you can have it out with the opposition in home waters. If that were your objective, the action taken yesterday could easily be interpreted by you as a recognition of the principle upon which you are insisting. You need not decline to meet with the Sub-Committee, ~~and~~ such meeting or meetings need not be held immediately, on the ground that there are most urgent tasks which cannot be set aside for a moment, which is the truth. You could at the same time call for a special meeting of the ZOA Executive or wait for the regular meeting set for September 12th, or set into motion individuals and groups in various parts of the country who are deeply involved in the political effort, and they can make their voices and influence felt. In short, you can compel Goldstein and his friends not merely to back down on this particular issue under the pressure of your resignation, but liquidate their organized opposition once and for all. That would require effort but would be worth doing, and you would have devoted support and cooperation in such enterprise.

As you see, I am not trying to influence your basic decision whether to stay or quit. That is for you to decide; but if your desire is to carry on and to complete the work which you have begun, then I think my analysis is the correct one. Otherwise the work you have started will be destroyed, and in addition your own reputation will be made to suffer heavily by those who will be in complete control and possession of all Zionist apparatus throughout the country and will be in a far better position than you to spread their version of the conflict and its denouement.

I have not written to Virginia, but if you have no objection, I would very much like to have her read my letter as well. I pray that your final decision will be the correct one.

As ever,

Faithfully yours,

Ananias

COMMISSION ON PALESTINE SURVEYS

Administrative Office

521 FIFTH AVENUE

ROOM 1903

NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

September 1, 1944

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

I want to report the following:

1) To round out the picture regarding yesterday's meeting: As I entered the building, 342 Madison, I met Robert Szold, who was leaving it. He was beaming, apparently in an excellent state of mind. As I later learned, a caucus had been held in Goldmann's office on the 12th floor just before the meeting of the Executive Committee, at which apparently strategy was agreed upon. My guess is that they decided to play for delay for the following reasons: (a) to give Goldstein time to line up the Executive Committee of the ZOA behind him; (b) to secure if possible a message from the Agency Executive backing Goldmann's stand; (c) to gain some time in which to spread some of their propaganda among the Zionists and prepare them for the shock of your resignation; (d) to take in hand the current business of the Emergency Council so that there would be a smooth and painless transition.

As a result of yesterday's meeting, I am more convinced than ever that Goldstein and his friends are definitely playing for your permanent elimination. It is common gossip that Goldstein was to succeed you as Chairman of the Executive Committee and he is trying to consolidate his support. *Another possibility is Shulman.*

2) I have been thinking all along that steps should be taken to enlighten public opinion. I have already had a long talk on the telephone with Mr. Meckler of the Morning Journal and he seems inclined to write something, but it was agreed that he would not do so until I have talked with him again. I also rang up Margoshes but have not reached him as yet. Smolar, in his column which was mailed out yesterday for next week's papers, has included an item, copy of which I am enclosing. Very much more could be done, of course, with the help of our staff, etc., but it will require definite plans and a clear lead on your part.

3) Wertheim has sent letters with a full account of the situation from his and your point of view to London and Palestine. At my suggestion, he also sent two cables yesterday. At my suggestion Rabbi Gold also agreed last evening to send two cables, one to London and one to Palestine, which I drafted for him. I am planning to send cables on my own today to Weizmann and Shertok in London and possibly to someone in Palestine.

Dr. A. H. Silver

September 1, 1944

4) Jacob Richman of Philadelphia, who you will recall wrote a number of excellent articles concerning you a year ago, is coming to see me during the week-end. I have suggested to him that he write a pamphlet reviewing the year and if necessary, discussing the present crisis, the pamphlet to be published at once in time for wide distribution before the ZOA Convention. About a fortnight ago I prepared an eight page memorandum to serve as background information for articles on the occasion of the first anniversary of your election as Chairman. Israeli and Manson have held off getting such articles placed, pending the outcome of the crisis, but the memorandum would prove useful for Richman if he writes the pamphlet. If you have any other suggestions, please don't hesitate to make them. I shall await further advice from you.

As ever,

Faithfully yours,

Emanuel

Emanuel Neumann

*dictated before
our telephone conversation.*



EN/M

Executive Board member
1944-1945

C O P Y

STORM ON THE HORIZON: There is a good deal of internal strife within the American Zionist Emergency Council ...- Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, chairman of the Council, insists that Dr. Nahum Goldmann not make representations to the State Department in behalf of the Jewish Agency as he does from time to time ...- Such representations should be made by the Zionist Emergency Council which is a body of the American Zionist groups established for this purpose, Dr. Silver argues ...- Supporting Dr. Silver are the Mizrachi and the Zionist Laborites ...- The Hadassah representative in the Emergency Council seems to oppose Dr. Silver's views ...- The situation has reached a point where Dr. Silver submitted his resignation ...- Many leading Zionists are trying to prevent a break in the ranks of the Committee, since this would inevitably lead to a serious split within the entire Zionist movement in the United States ...- As these lines are written the crisis is at its height, since Dr. Silver is determined to withdraw from leadership if his terms are not accepted...

September 8, 1944

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
749 West End Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Emanuel:

I am a little concerned about the nature of the cable which you said Goldmann sent to London or Jerusalem. He might have suggested an arrangement which would be altogether unacceptable and he might give the impression because of prior conversations with you that he was led to believe that it would be acceptable to you and to me.

If Goldmann consulted Goldstein before sending the cable I am inclined to believe that the proposal would be to set up a political committee made up of Wise, Lipsky, Silver and Goldstein. In the first place, this would immediately arouse the resentment of the other parties because they are excluded, and if the other parties are included, you will have, to all intents and purposes, a second Emergency Council in the field, or the re-creation of the political committee which we abolished, you will recall, when we decided that the Executive Committee, as such, shall be the political actions committee.

I believe I have placed the issue where it belongs, and on its merits, the matter should be decided. There must be direct communication between the Agency and the Emergency Council on all matters relating to our political activities in the United States, and Goldmann must refer any communication touching our work to us and should not on his own and on the plea of an emergency make contacts with government officials without consulting the Co-chairmen of the Emergency Council.

In this connection I am sending you three items which you might want in connection with the presentation of our case: (a) a statement on the history of the establishment of the Agency Bureau in Washington; (b) the agreement reached and signed last year in Dr. Wise's office which has never been lived up to in letter and spirit in which it was agreed that I was to assume leadership in the sphere of political affairs and in which the Zionist Emergency Council was to be regarded as the body responsible for the centralized direction of our political efforts; and (c) the statement which Feuer made in my behalf over the telephone to Mr. Shulman following the

Mr. Neumann

-2-

September 8, 1944

action of the Executive Committee on August 28th.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK

Enc. - 3



20167 "אנח אעב" געו
פאפולער און 3 וואנד
! "אנח אעב" 1/3 און

FRANZ JOSEF KATZ

61 East 95th Street
New York, 28, N.Y.
November 5, 1944.

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
c/o Commission on Palestine Surveys
Room 1903
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, 17, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Neumann:

As the result of an evening spent in the company of Dr. Habib Awad on November 3rd, I am submitting herewith a memorandum of fifteen pages on the Arab situation in this country. The memorandum contains

figures on the ethnic composition, religious affiliation and geographical distribution of the Arab population in the United States;
facts about the leading Arabic language papers in the U.S.;
list of the leading Arab agitators in the U.S.;
some facts about the Lebanese community;
a listing of leading Arab clerics in the U.S.;
the second report on the new Arab drive in the U.S.;
a sketch about our informant, Dr. Habib Awad;
some remarks regarding the Arab diplomatic establishments in Washington, D.C.;
my own observations on the facts related;
some suggestions of mine for coping with the Arabs in the U.S.

As agreed upon, I shall phone you on Tuesday morning, November 7th at your home.

Regards,

Copy

CC: Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, ✓
Cleveland, O.;
Mr. Harry A. Shapiro,
New York, N.Y.

Franz J. Katz

1) The Arabic-Speaking Community of the United States

Total Population: 500,000

Ethnic Composition:

100,000	Syrians
300,000	Lebanese
100,000	Palestinians, Iraqis, Egyptians and others

Religious Affiliation:

150,000	Moslems
200,000	Maronites and Melchites
50,000	Greek Orthodox
50,000	Protestants of various denominations

2) The Leading Arabic-Speaking Colonies of the U.S.

a) State of New York

1) City of New York: 50,000

25,000 Maronites
6,000 Melchites
10,000 Greek Orthodox
7,500 Misc. Protestants
1,500 Moslems

2) Buffalo, N.Y.: 6,000

5,500 Maronites
50 Moslems
450 Greek Orthodox and Protestants

3) Niagara Falls, N.Y.: 1,000

800 Maronites
200 Greek Orthodox

4) Syracuse, N.Y.: 5,000

1,000 Maronites
3,000 Greek Orthodox
1,000 Misc. Protestants and Moslems

5) Utica, N.Y.: 3,000

6,000 Maronites
2,000 Greek Orthodox and Protestants

6) Albany, N.Y.: 1,000

- Almost exclusively Greek Orthodox

7) Detroit, Mich.: 50,000

20,000 Maronites
15,000 Greek Orthodox
5,000 Protestants of various denominations
10,000 Moslems

8) Chicago, Ill.: 10,000

2,000 Moslems
500 Maronites
7,500 Greek Orthodox and Protestants

2) The Leading Arabic-Speaking Colonies in the U.S. (cont'd.)

b) Outside of the State of New York

9) Cincinnati, O.: 10,000

almost exclusively Maronite

10) Boston, Mass.: 6,000

3,000 Maronites

3,000 Greek Orthodox

11) Fall River, Mass.: 4,000 (?)

4,000 Maronites

number of others unknown to informant

12) Danbury, Conn.: 6,000

3,000 Maronites

3,000 Greek Orthodox

13) Wilkes Barre, Pa.: 20,000

15,000 Maronites

denominational affiliation of the others unknown to informant

14) Philadelphia, Pa.: 30,000

10,000 Maronites

20,000 Greek Orthodox, Protestants and Moslems

15) Eastern Pennsylvania: 5,000

Mostly Maronites of North Lebanese origin

16) Washington, D.C.: 5,000

4,000 Greek Orthodox

1,000 Moslems (of various sects: Shiites, Druzes, etc.)

400 ~~Protestants~~ Palestinian Moslems (majority of these 400) and
Greek Orthodox (minority of these 400)

100 others

17) Miami, Fla.: 15,000-

Religious affiliation not known to informant

18) Raleigh, N.C.: 3,000

Mostly Greek Orthodox

19) Chapel Hill, N.C.: 500

200 Maronites

300 affiliation of these unknown to informant

Community almost totally of Syrian origin

20) Rest of Virginia and North Carolina: 50,000

Religious affiliation unknown to informant

21) California: Total number of Arabic-Speaking People unknown to informant

30,000 Maronites known to be residing in San Francisco and Los Angeles

3) The Arabic Language Press of the United States:

3) The Arabic Language Press of the United States:

NEW YORK, N.Y.:

- 1) AL-HODA, 55 Washington St., New York, N.Y.
six times weekly
Publisher and Editor: Salloum Mokarsal (Lebanese Maronite)
15,000, if not more, subscribers
only U.S. paper in Arabic which is known all over the Near East and in South America
known as being pro-Jewish and pro-French
often accused of being "bought by the Jews"
Mokarsal is also president of An-Nahda, The Progress, (Lebanese Society), N.Y.
- 2) AL-Akhlaek, 58 (?) Washington St., New York, N.Y.
published irregularly, supposedly published thrice weekly
in order to defraud the Post Office Department, the paper's date of publication is given in such a way in the English language as to comply with the Post Office regulations, while the real date of publication is featured in the Arabic language; the latter remark may not pertain to this paper but may have been made with respect to one of the other papers which also appear irregularly though scheduled as published thrice weekly; I shall ascertain to which one of them this information applies
Editor and Publisher: YAKOUB RAPHAEL (Lebanese Maronite)
Backed Corp-Bishop Mansour Estephan
5,000 subscribers
pro-Jewish
pro-French
anti-Mokarsal (both the paper's publisher and Estephan are jealous of Mok.)
- 3) AL-ISLAH, 28th St. (?), New York, N.Y.
thrice weekly
Melchite
Publ. & Ed.: Breydi
8,000 subscribers
pro-French
pro-Jewish
- 4) ASSAYEH, 28th St. (?), New York, N.Y.
Nominal Editor and Publisher: Abd-el-Masih Haddad
Actual Editor and Publisher: Nadra Haddad
thrice weekly
3,000 subscribers
anti-Jewish
anti-French

Possibly, this is the publication which features false publication dates in defrauding the Post Office Department
You will notice that distinction has been made as to the publication's nominal and actual publishers and editors; while I may have confused which one is which one, this is the background: One of them is employed in the Near and Middle Eastern Broadcasting Section of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information; consequently, he turned the publishing and editing ~~responsibility~~ over to his brother, but only in name, he continues his nefarious activities anyway but protects himself legally.

3) The Arabic Language Press of the U.S. (cont'd.):

NEW YORK, N.Y. (cont'd.):

- 5) MIRAD AL GHARB, Washington St., New York, N.Y.
thrice weekly
12,000 subscribers
I forgot to mark down the publisher's name, but will do so subsequently.
Publisher is Greek Orthodox.
The publisher's sentiments are anti-Jewish, though he has not come out with them in his publication.
- 6) ASSAMIR, Fulton St., Brooklyn, N.Y.
Publisher and Editor: Elia Abu-Madi
10,000 subscribers
thrice weekly
Greek Orthodox
Publisher is known to be anti-Jewish and of an opportunistic character.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

- 7) AL-BAYAN, Michigan St., Washington, D.C.
5,000 subscribers
thrice weekly
Moslem
Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: AMIN DAWOUD. He is in the coffee business. The coffee business is his source of income. He has expressed himself that he has an almost exclusively Jewish clientele. He is bitterly anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist.
Contributing Editor-Columnist: Abd-Allah Al-Barri of Detroit, Mich.
anti-Jewish
anti-French
The paper's crowd is also anti-British but do not come out with it openly because of political fears.

DETROIT, MICHIGAN

- 8) AL-TAHAD, Detroit, Mich.
Publ. & Ed.: Yussuf Wakim
thrice weekly officially
appears actually very irregularly
probably 3,000 subscribers
Maronite
pro-Jewish
- 9) AD-DALIL, Detroit, Mich.
thrice weekly
Unknown to our informant were: publisher's name and denomination and the paper's approximate number of subscribers.
- 10) AL-ADL, Detroit, Mich.
thrice weekly
Publisher and editor: Kanhan (first name unknown to informant)
Maronite
number of subscribers unknown to informant
paper lacks a definite political policy on N.E.
publisher regarded as highly opportunistic
-

4) PAN-ARAB CHAUVINISTS ACTIVE AS LEADERS

7) HASTIB, Arida, New York. Also employed in O.W.I.'s Overseas Branch, Near & Middle-Eastern Radio Desk, N.Y.

Ex-contributor to Mirat Al-Gharb.
Greek Orthodox.
anti-Jewish.

8) HILWA, New York. Lawyer without clientele.

Moslem.
Violently anti-Jewish.
Contributes anti-Jewish poetry to local Arabic papers.

9) ZEIDAN, Amin. With the firm of Abu-Butrus, 5th Ave. merchants, N.Y.

Does home work for O.W.I.
Salesman by profession.
Writes for Arabic local press under pseudonym.
Contributes mostly to Al-Achleh.
Is anti-Mokarzal.

5) NEW LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE GROUP:

Recently, Mokarzal, on 'three days' notice, convoked a national Lebanese conference in the U.S. for the purpose of sustaining Lebanese independence and with the aim of voicing fears with respect to Arab-Moslem threats. Mokarzal's conference was held under the auspices of

Lujnat Al-Jamia' Al-Lubnan'at

in New York. Eighteen societies, with a range of 50,000 Lebanese were represented there. Twenty societies with a range of approximately 30,000 people sent letters of approval. Others remained unrepresented either for reasons of political disapproval or because they could not respond to a short-notice invitation.

Mokarzal's main antagonists in the Lebanese camp are the New York Arabic publication Al-Aklack, and to a minor extent the other New York Arabic papers, and the Maronite clerics, Corp-Bishop Mansour Stephan, Hicks St., Brooklyn, N.Y. and the Corp-Bishops George Zouein and Louis Zouein of Danbury, Conn.

6) Leading Arabic-Language Clerics and their Tendencies

This is a very incomplete list comprising Maronites mainly. A complete list of Maronites and Melchites in this country, listed in the various Roman Catholic diocesan directories will be composed shortly. Likewise, a list of the Greek Orthodox and Moslem "clerics" will eventuate from further work & contacts.

1) Maronites

Corp-Bishop Istephan Ad-Dweih, Boston, Mass.

Corp-Bishop Francis Whakin, 57 Washington St., New York, N.Y. (rich man) (St. Jos.)

Corp-Bishop Mansour Stephan, Hicks St., Brooklyn, N.Y. ("Our Lady of Lebanon")

Father Joseph Eid, Fall River, Mass. (very learned)

Corp-Bishop Francis Shemali, 41 Cedar St., Buffalo, N.Y.

Father Nematallah Shemaly, Olean, N.Y. (following of 5,000 Syrians, mostly Maronites, but also including Melchites and Greek Orthodox)

Father Francis Lahoud, St. Theresa Church, Utica, N.Y.

Corp-Bishop George Zouein, St. Anthony's Church, Danbury, Conn.

Corp-Bishop Louis Zouein, Danbury, Conn.

Father Al-Moualem, Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

Father John Khoury, Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

Father Joseph Awad, Innati, O.

6) Leading Arabic-Language Clerics and Their tendencies, cont'd.

2) Roman Catholic

Monsignor Ibrahim Assemani, Michigan City, Mich.
following of 3,000 of all denominations

2A) Probably Roman Catholic

Monsignor Ibrahim, somewhere in the State of Virginia
author of a book on minorities

3) Melchites

Monsignor Gossan, St. George's Church, Washington St., New York, N.Y.
very influential

Father Araktingi, pastor, Melchite Church, Brooklyn, N.Y.

4) Moslem

Abdallah Al-Barri (lay leader), Contributing Editor of Washington, D.C.
Arabic periodical Al-Bayan
residing in Detroit, Mich.
very anti-Jewish

5) Greek Orthodox

Archbishop Bashir, Brooklyn, N.Y. - Arab chauvinist, cooperated with Arab
National League

Archbishop Dawoud, Cleveland, O.

The above-mentioned two are engaged in a feud, based on pure personal jealousy. Bashir had been ordained by the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Syria and Lebanon. Dawoud was fought by Bashir and the Syrian-Lebanese Patriarch; consequently, Dawoud had himself ordained by the U.S. Greek Orthodox patriarch. This led to his excommunication by the Syrian-Lebanese Greek Orthodox Patriarch. Subsequently Dawoud made a collection and transmitted a large fund to the Syrian-Lebanese patriarch and was re-instated in his church.

November 5, 1944.

The new Arab Drive

Subsequent to their first meeting, held on October 27th at Washington, D.C. and reported by me on October 29th, the Arab Nationalists held their second campaign meeting and their third one on Tuesday, October 31st in New York.

I expect a report as to the locality of these meetings.

However, it is known that the two New York meetings were addressed by Professor Hitti and Mr. Malouf of Boston, Mass.

One of the difficulties which the new Arab drive is encountering is the hostility of Mokarzal and his AL-HODA. Thus, the drive, while being mentioned, is reported very tersely and vaguely. This enables Mokarzal to state that he is not keeping this type of news out of his paper, while at the same time handling them in such a way as to preclude great propagandistic effect for the pan-Arabs.

A translation of the last Al-Hoda item on this drive is being secured and will be reported ~~on~~ after receipt.



My Source: DR. HABIB AWAD.

He resides at present at 147 Willow St., Brooklyn, N.Y.

He is an educator by profession, at present engaged in governmental war work. After the war, he intends to return to educational or scientific work.

He is a citizen of the U.S. since 1935 and is a native of Ageltoun, Lebanon. He is of the Maronite denomination.

He is the holder of three doctorates of philosophy, all awarded by Vatican institutions of higher learning in Rome, Italy. (Ph.D. in Philosophy and Sciences from "The University of the Propaganda", Vatican, Rome, Italy; Doctor of Sacred Theology, do.; Ph.D. in Psychology, Roman Academy, Rome Italy.)

He studied at the (Roman Catholic) Vincentian School, Jerusalem, Palestine; at the (Roman Catholic) Lebanon-Missionary College, somewhere in Lebanon; the (Roman Catholic) Wisdom College, Beirut, Lebanon; the University of the Propaganda, Vatican, Rome, Italy; the Pontifical Oriental Institute, Rome, Italy; the Sorbonne, Paris, France; the University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain, Fordham University (Roman Catholic), New York, Catholic University (Roman Catholic), Washington, D.C.

He held teaching positions as professor and departmental head at the following institutions: Mt. St. Mary Normal School, Kenmore, N.Y., Stella Niagara Normal and Training School, Buffalo, N.Y., St. John's University, Brooklyn, N.Y., Canisius College, Buffalo, N.Y., D'Youville College, Buffalo, N.Y., Niagara University, Niagara Falls, N.Y., all Roman Catholic institutions.

For a while, he worked in the Division of Legislative Reference of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., under Dr. Griffith.

The son of his cousin, Awfik Awad, was one of the assistants of erstwhile High Commissioner of Palestine Sir Harold MacMichael. In all probability, he continues to hold that position.

The Awads are stated to be an old Lebanese family.

Awad knows well men and matters of the Iraqi, Iranian and Egyptian diplomatic establishments in Washington, D.C.

He strikes me as sincere and honest. I repeat this, since I am well aware of the characteristics of Levantines whom I know and with whom I have had a lot of experience, in many instances far from pleasant.

Awad says "I do not know" when he does not know. He does not pretend.

Contrary to many of the Arab agitators here, he made a modest living of his own, being in no way dependent on Arab associations or political activities for a livelihood. Consequently, he is and can afford to be politically independent and sovereign.

He is slightly indebted to me for some academic contacts which I established for him in Washington and New York City.

He is regarded as a good writer, according to his own statement, and is constantly being requested to contribute to the Arabic publications here, notably AL-BAYAN having unsuccessfully sought his contributions.

One of the causes contributing to his antagonism toward Hitti is the influence

My Source: DR. HABIB AWAD, cont'd.

which Hitti has developed which, in effect, renders him a job-dispenser in many cases and the decisive factor in terms of recommending people for jobs, notably with governmental and academic institutions.

Thus, according to Awad, Hitti's recommendation is likely to prove the decisive factor in the selection of the new Head of Islamic Studies to be appointed by McLeish for the Library of Congress.

Thus, insists Awad, the Arabic language personnel of O.W.I. was recruited.

I am wondering what the situation at O.S.S. and in the military and naval intelligence services, F.B.I. and State Department is! *And also F.C.C.*

While Hitti may not suggest or recommend all Arabic language personnel, Near Easterners of his following as well ~~him~~ as his own students are being pushed at the expense of others.



The Arab Diplomats in Washington, D.C.

The Iraqi, Saudi Arabian and Egyptian legations and embassies respectively in Washington give the impression of politically stifled and unfree satellites.

Political talk on issues of Arab foreign relations and nationalism is religiously avoided. Initial references made to it in the course of conversation by outsiders are generally countered by immediate pleas, "please, if you want us to avoid a lot of trouble, do not discuss such matters." This attitude is characteristic of all three outfits, but notably of the Egyptians.

When the Saudi Arabian princes were here as guests of the U.S., a reception was given for them by the Iraqis, if my recollection does not fail me. Both Hitti and Malouf, who were there, made anti-Zionist references, while the Princes skipped the issue in their replies.

At all of these diplomatic missions Britishers abound whenever social functions are held.

Nothing is known as to future diplomatic representations of the Syrians and Lebanese in this country. Whether there will be separate or joint outfits.

In the Syrian-Lebanese colony, there is much talk about the idea and possibility of Hitti becoming Syrian and Lebanese or Syrian or Lebanese envoy here. References to the fact that he is an American citizen are countered by a shrug, and nobody knows just what or whether there is anything to these tales.

Major Haddad, the deaf and limping Military Attache of the Iraqis, as stated previously, is a rich and independent man. He is maintaining his official quarters as military attache outside of the Iraqi Legation. Most of his time is being spent on, with and by women. He does not know how to write, and it is Awad's opinion that Haddad's anti-Zionist articles must have been written or re-written by one of his journalist-girl friends.

My Observations on the Facts Related on Pages I-XI:

The breakdown of the figures on the Arab population in the United States, according to ethnic origin and religious affiliation establishes that we may assume that from two thirds to three thirds of this group are likely to cooperate with Zionism for reasons political and religious, i.e., 300,000 Lebanese out of a total Arabic-speaking population of 500,000; and 200,000 Maronites and Melchites within that group.

I assume that "Lebanese" are predominantly friendly toward us, Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Egyptians and others predominantly hostile.

Likewise, I assume, that Maronites are friendly toward our aspirations in their totality, Melchites almost in their entirety, Lebanese Roman Catholics likewise, while Moslems, Greek Orthodox and Near Easterners of other denominations are completely anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish in general.

On the strength of these circumstances, we should encounter favorable conditions among the Arabic-speaking populations of

New York, Buffalo, N.Y., Niagara Falls, N.Y., Utica, N.Y., Detroit, Mich., Cincinnati, O., Boston, Mass., Fall River, Mass., Danbury, Conn., Wilkes Barre, Pa., Philadelphia, Pa., Eastern Pennsylvania, California,

while we are likely to run into trouble and difficulties in the following communities, sometimes the same as mentioned above (as underscored):

New York, Syracuse, N.Y., Albany, N.Y., Detroit, Mich., Chicago, Ill., Boston, Mass., Danbury, Conn., Philadelphia, Pa., WASHINGTON, D.C., Raleigh, N.C., Chapel Hill, N.C.

Washington, D.C., of all the places, is a Moslem-controlled anti-Zionist hotbed. Detroit, Mich., with all which certain people there imply, has an Arab community three thirds of which may be considered as being opposed to us a priori!

The outstanding Arabic language daily of the Western hemisphere is anti-pa-Arab and anti-Moslem, ~~AL-HODA~~ AL-HODA of New York. Of New York's six Arabic publications, three are pro-Jewish, one potentially hostile, two hostile.

The national capital's only Arabic periodical is Moslem, pan-Arab and bitterly anti-Zionist.

Detroit seems to represent a 50:50 proposition as far as its three Arabic papers are concerned.

The Washington Arab paper's owner seems vulnerable if the allegedly Jewish clientele on which he makes his living is really a fact.

Ayoub Risk of Risk Brothers, Washington, host and angel of the agitators, seems vulnerable for the same reasons.

With reference to some of the people of Arab National League, anti-Semitic newspaper publishing background who are now in government employment: a governmental investigation on the connections and recommendations which landed these jobs for them may result in the exposure of people now regarded as purely scholarly and simon-pure (Hitti and Paris).

Other points of vulnerability are the petty frauds of "nominal" publishing employed by one of the Arab agitators, now with O.W.I., and the faked publication dates, which may lead to fines or postal suspension if exposed.

The tackling of the Lebanese is difficult because of Mokarzel's rivals in the publishing, civic and religious field. Mokarzel's prominence in any given effort may lead to opposition for its own sake by other groups within that community.

My Observations, -cont'd.

It is apparent that the dormancy of the Arab National League, now being revived in essence by Hitti and Malouf, is due to fear of being labelled anti-British.

It is obvious that the entire effort revolves around a baker's dozen of smooth fanatics. In the past as now, they have been able to appear as "Arab spokesmen" because nobody else organized for the purpose and they remained unchallenged, the rest of the community remaining unrepresented by virtue of its own default.

It also seems that Hitti's influence as American Monarch of Semitology and his control of jobs and potential jobs has never been challenged systematically by Jewish and Christian scholars of the country in the same field. Is his academic standing real and merited or one of propagandistic origin?

The new Arab drive is still in its initial phase.

Does Princeton and do others know that Hitti, by appearing at these meetings, now takes over where the Muft had to leave off when he fled to Berlin?

The Arabic legations in Washington should prove a fertile ground for a lot of national columnists and radio commentators!



Practical Suggestions for the Development of Arab Activities by U.S. Zionism:

Dr. Habib Awad is ready and willing to work with us for the purpose of establishing an Arab pro-Zionist group in the U.S. which in effect would split the Arabs here and challenge the authority of the Hitti clique which has reigned by default of the others.

The Maronites, for reasons of religious and nationalist antagonism toward others would furnish the foundation for such an endeavor in this country.

I suppose I need not reiterate the traditional friendship of these people for ours which manifested itself even in instances of very recent history. The reception of refugees on refugee-liners whose passengers were denied entry into Palestine by the British but were taken into Lebanon upon insistence of the Maronite Bishop there, etc. (the 1860 incident at Damascus, etc.)

A decision should be made as to the initial steps to be taken and a modest program should be thought about.

Dr. Awad is ready to call a meeting of several keymen in New York City. He is also ready to write a letter to the entire Maronite clergy in this country.

These are my suggestions:

A letter on the common political interest of the Lebanese and Jewish Palestine, including denunciations of the Hitti-Malouf clique and references to the Fascist affiliations of the late Arab National League of the U.S. should be sent out. It should be signed either by Awad alone, or by him and a group of likeminded. In this letter the Arabs of this country should be warned against permitting the Hittites to appear as unchallenged spokesmen of the American Arabs and the loyalty of these people should be questioned in the light of the past activities of the Arab National League. A call for co-operation with the local Zionist or American Jewish Conference groups should be urged contained in this letter. Finally, it should be urged upon the local Arabs to align themselves with Zionist-Jewish, Christian Zionist and other bodies in favor of a Jewish Palestine for the sake of a thus safeguarded independent Lebanon. The local Arabs should be urged to communicate in co-operation with the local Zionists with their Representatives and Senators in challenge of the spokesmanhip and authority of the Hittites and in favor of the Jewish State movement.

Awad and some of those whom he may line up should be called upon to write Arabic-language features on the subject for the domestic Arabic press, and also for export circulation (after all, the British censorship does not control the entire world and a lot will slip through here and there!).

A modest Arabic language periodical, devoted exclusively to Arab-Jewish cooperation should be envisaged, or at least a newsletter.

Awad or somebody else, whoever may be available, willing and ready, should be sent around to address Lebanese and other meetings. Such a trip by him or such trips by him and/or others could be combined with his and/or their appearances before local Emergency Committee and/or Zionist groups.

Some articles on the special relationship of the Lebanese and their favoring of Zionism should be published in our organs, or a pamphlet should be written on this angle. Awad and/or others should be called upon to prepare such a write-up.

Lebanese articles with blunt or soft-pedalled advocacy of a Jewish State should be written and placed through our people in the general press and in publications. Awad and/or others may be available to write such articles.

We should organize local Arabic radio programs with pro-Zionist Arabs in various towns in this country.

We should establish Lebanese Arab pro-Zionist committees locally and foster Zionist and social gatherings with them. Also, perhaps, joint religious services.

Practical Suggestions, cont'd.:

If we really succeed in pursuing this endeavor we may eventually think of Arabic Language pro-Zionist overseas broadcasts to the Near East via NBC or CBS.

The establishment of some joint Lebanese-Zionist commercial corporations for business and development activities in the Near East but controlled and registered from, in and by U.S. citizens should also be envisaged in this connection.

Our domestic and the eventual overseas broadcasts should stress Arab-Jewish neighborliness and cooperation in the U.S. where they live as fellow-citizens, friends and neighbors and should suggest that nothing prevents the establishment of such conditions in the Near East except the interest of thirds profiting by Arab-Jewish strife. This angle will prove harmless for domestic broadcasts, if handled cautiously and skillfully, and will involve a certain policy fight in the instance of overseas broadcasts, where the caution will have to be even more rigid.

The Department of Justice should be appraised of the doings of the Arab nationalists of a record which seems to classify them as partisans of the enemy, of antagonism to our Allies, French and British and of the infiltration of such elements into government departments. Such facts action will be warranted only if the facts established by us are sufficient to express such suspicions and misgivings.

Some efforts should be made to ascertain the merits of Hitti's and Faris' regal reputation in the academic and public fields. If it should develop that ~~their~~ their standing is due to artificial, political self-promotion, this should be made known. An effort should be made to advise academic and Semitological circles of the sinister chauvinist activities of Hitti and Faris and to explain the harmful political effects of employing his henchmen and political stooges.

An effort should be made to investigate the political anti-Zionist activities of the American University of Beirut, Quaker (Ramallah) and American University at Cairo crowds who are behind much of our troubles and of undue influence in governmental agencies.

FRANZ JOSEF KATZ

61 East 95th Street
New York, 28, N.Y.
November 8, 1944.

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
c/o Commission on Palestine Surveys
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Neumann:

Arab Drive to be Launched in N.Y. on Nov. 25th

According to word received, the Arab drive will be launched on November 25th with a conference to be held in New York to which Arab-Americans and Arab-Canadians have been invited and which is aiming to line up support for the establishment of an

ARAB INFORMATION BUREAU IN THE UNITED STATES.

The preliminary committee which has been formed for the purpose consists of

Abdul-Basit al-Khatib, allegedly an "engineer",
Dr. Philip HITTI, of Princeton University,
Faris Al-Malouf of Boston, and
Simon Rihbary, referred to as "representing the Arab
American League there (in Boston)".

I am not informed as to the prospective locale of this conference. It is possible that notices announcing these efforts have been appearing in our domestic Arab papers.

It seems that the decisions made and the drive now initiated are the outcome of the recent New York meeting conducted by Hitti and Malouf. This, however, is a mere surmise on my part.

It is my opinion that things in the Arab camp are moving rapidly and that their activities are assuming weight.

I think that some efforts of counter-publicity or preventive publicity should be made.

Very truly yours

Franz Josef Katz
Franz J. Katz

CC: Rabbi Abba Hallel Silver ✓

Mr. Harry L. Shapiro.

4) PAN-ARAB CHAUVINISTS CURRENTLY ACTIVE AS LEADERS

1) HITTI, Philip K., Head, Department of Semitic Languages, Princeton, N.J..

Those more intimately acquainted with Hitti know that in spite of the high standing which he enjoys in U.S. academic circles as the Scholar Par Excellence in Matters Arabic and Semitic he knows allegedly neither Hebrew, nor Syriac, Turkish and Iranian.

He is a Lebanese by nationality.

He changed his denomination several times. Originally, he was a Maronite, then became Greek Orthodox, to become a non-denominational Protestant and is believed to be actually an atheist.

Recently exchanged several open letters on Zionism with Einstein in columns of Princeton local paper.

2) FARIS, Nabib, Instructor in Arabic, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.

Head, Near and Middle Eastern Radio Desk, Overseas Branch, Office of War Information, New York, N.Y.

One of the latter's Jewish stooges is Judah Magnes' son "Ben" (Benedict -Baruch-) Magnes, violinist by profession and a phlegmatic shlemihl extraordinary, also an employee of OWI's Overseas Branch, N.Y. Radio Production Dept.

1) & 2): The War Department, when making recordings in the Arabic language for the instruction of military personnel to be sent to Arabic speaking areas rejected both Hitti and Faris because of their faulty and inadequate pronunciation of Arabic, according to Awad.

3) MALOUF, Faris, lawyer, Boston, Mass. Ex-Commissioner of Streets (90-Day-Tenure) was previously active for Arab National League.

4) RIZK, Ayoub, of RIZK BROTHERS, Connecticut Ave., N.W., near 15th St., Washington

His palatial house, maintained frankly by his income from one of Washington's most expensive dress shops, serves as the scene of Arab anti-Jewish propaganda parlor meetings. Rizk is an unintellectual type, according to Awad, who is out for glory and recognition and is being used to the very limit by Hitti and Malouf for their own ends. Rizk stated at several connections, also expressing some apprehension because of it, that his income is derived from a predominantly Jewish clientele. (Is he related to Salom Rizk?)

5) AL-HAWA, K & 15th Sts., N.W., Washington, D.C.

Moslem; building contractor.

6) KATTIBAH, Nabib.

Now employed by OWI's Overseas Branch, N. & Middle East Radio Desk, N.Y.

Formerly Executive Secretary of Arab National League, N.Y. Always posed as "Christian Socialist". Renegade Greek Orthodox, now believed to be non-denominational Protestant. Never made a decent living, OWI providing him with first really-paid job. Always lived on Arab Nationalist activity. Violently anti-Jewish.

FRANZ J. KATZ

61 East 95th Street
New York, 28, N.Y.
November 12, 1944.

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
c/o Commission on Palestine Surveys
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Neumann:

Re: Arab Information Bureau in the U.S.

It is interesting to learn that, in an interview with the Baghdad, Iraq, newspaper Al Nida, which was broadcast by the Egyptian domestic radio, the Iraq premier stated that

"information bureaus are to be established in the United States and Britain the aim of which will be to reveal the truth concerning the problem of Palestine to both America and Britain",

and that

"these bureaus will be financed by the Arab countries",

and that

"Iraq will allocate in her coming budget a certain sum to be given to the fund of the Arab nations and to be spent in support of the bureau scheme in Britain and America".

According to the Egyptian home broadcast of November 10, made public by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C., the Iraq Premier stated in the same interview that

"the budgets as well as the diplomatic services of all Arab countries will be at the service of the problem of Palestine",

concluding that

"our belief in the justice of the cause of Palestine gives us confidence in its success".

Other points, mentioned in that interview were "the establishment of a strong and diplomatic front for the protection of the Arabs in Palestine" and "the strengthening of the planned Fund of the Arab Nations" in order to prevent

the transfer of land from Arabs to Zionist immigrants "who are out to purchase land which the Arabs are 'compelled' to sell. In this case the Fund of the Arab nations will buy the land in the name of the nation."

This broadcast raises the following points:

- 1) The plans of the British-controlled Near Eastern regimes for the establishment of "Arab Information Bureaus" in the U.S. and Great Britain STRANGELY COINCIDES with the plans and intentions of the revived Arab National "League of America. Is the Arab National League crowd, led by Hitti, a group ACTING ON BEHALF AND ON INSTRUCTIONS OF FOREIGN PRINCIPALS AND GOVERNMENTS?

Shouldn't this issue be raised with the Departments of Justice and State?

- 2) The Egyptian broadcast of the Iraq premier's statement, I think, makes a case for us:

The so-called "Arab Information Bureau" to be set-up here will NOT MERELY DISSEMINATE INFORMATION ON THE COUNTRIES THE GOVERNMENTS OF WHICH WILL OSTENSIBLY SET UP THIS BUREAU, BUT WILL DISH OUT PROPAGANDA ON PALESTINE, A COUNTRY OVER WHICH THESE GOVERNMENTS EXERCISE NO JURISDICTION!

Should we not raise this issue with the State Department and the Department of Justice A PRIORI? A clear definition of the Information Bureau-to-be's charter probably could eliminate Palestine from the ^{scope} province of their activity, as was done when the Saudi princes were made to shut up on the issue during their stay here.

If this aim would be accomplished, either an Arab Information Bureau of naturalized Arabs or the British themselves would have to tackle the issue.

A domestic Arab Information Bureau, run by naturalized citizens, could easily be exposed by virtue of their past political association, while anything emanating from the British would be discredited by that circumstance in itself.

At any rate, as this report shows, things are happening fast and cannot be dismissed, but have to be counter-acted.

Cordially yours

Franz J. Katz
Franz J. Katz

CC: Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, ✓
Cleveland, O.
Mr. Harry L. Shapiro,
New York, N.Y.

FRANZ JOSEF KATZ

61 East 95th Street
New York 28, N. Y.
December 17, 1944.

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
Commission on Palestine Surveys
521 Fifth Avenue
New York 17, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Neumann:

Re.: The Arab Conference of Nov. 25, 1944 in New York

The New York Arab semi-weekly Al Islah of December 8 featured a lengthy report on the Arab conference of November 25th.

The report constitutes a complete reproduction of the official report sent in by the conference's "Secretary General", Ismail Haghbi KHALIDI. The latter has been mentioned by me before. He is an Egyptian student, attending Columbia University. Formerly, he was employed by the O.W.I.'s Overseas Branch in New York. According to my friend Louis Lober, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's former Cairo representative, Khalidi is a close relative (nephew -?) of the Mufti and also related to the Jerusalem politician Khalidi who was deported by the British. The new organization's name seems to be "Al Mutamar Al Arabi", the Arab Conference, Khalidi signing himself as Secretary General of the "Committee of the Arab Conference."

Greetings were extended to the conference by one ALI MUHI-ED-DIN, not identified any further.

Political key note speeches were delivered by ISMAIL R. KHALIDI, DR. PHILIP K. HILTI (on the necessity for co-operation among the Arabs and to make Americans understand the Arab mentality and the needs of the Arab lands and the dissemination of truthful information to counteract the falsehoods which are being dished out to all countries), FARIS AL-MALOUF (who called for co-operation between the American and Arab countries).

Malouf was elected President and Khalidi Secretary General respectively of the conference. A letter of encouragement from Ahmed Nadjam of Grand Haven, Mich., was read by Nadjib Samra, delegate at the conference of the Arab American Committee for Democracy (sic!).

It was decided to form an "Agency for American Arab Affairs", on which the Arab organizations of the United States and Canada and persons prominent in the political and cultural fields will be represented. A special committee for the implementation of this decision was elected and will comprise at least seven persons.

It was decided to organize a drive for \$100,000; the office will be established after the collection of \$25,000 has been completed. Special district committees and the Arabic language press will be enlisted for the purpose. Monthly dues of \$10 were stipulated, \$10 to constitute the minimum amount.

Listed as belonging to the committee's Committee on Statutes is PETER GEORGE. The latter was one of the leaders of the now defunct Arab National League. He is a Syrian and lawyer by profession - however, it seems without a practice worthy of the name. According to my Lebanese friend, George now earns a livelihood by collecting funds for an Arab Hospital to be established in Palestine - after the war!

Among the organizations listed in Al Islah as having sent representatives or letters of approval are the following:

Arab American Committee for Democracy, Flint, Mich. (Hajib Samra);
Arab Fraternal Organization, Danbury, Conn. (Moh. Hamad, Mustapha Ghanim, Abbas Nazrullah);
Syrian American Club, Washington, D.C. (Jamil Ssaigh, Mohammed Yussef Abul Howa, Shukri El Khouri, Yussef Sa'ada);
American Conference for Justice to the Palestine Arabs, Boston, Mass.
(Saman (Simon?) Rahbani (Rihbani-?-), Zair El Malouf, Ghosni Mahfudh, Dr. Elias Sawabini, Saad Faris, Alkhas Shabli Al-Malouf);
Arab Organizations of Detroit, Mich. (Hana Nasr);
Arab Organization of Newport News, Va. (Shabada Mahmud, Issa Ali);
Arab Canadian Fraternal Organization, Montreal, Que., Canada (Mohammed Said Masud, Elias Karam, Elias Et-Tabba, George Zaghib);
Abdullah Ghanum, District of Toledo, Ohio;
Abdul Hafiz Mohammed Yussuf - Youth Organization Butunia, Chicago, Ill;
Arab American Organization for Democracy, St. Paul, Minn. (Hassan Abul Abbas);
Sheik Hussein Al Kharub
Tam Mansour, Flint, Mich.

A report rendered on the results of the first collection effort made stated that \$3,000 had been obtained, probably in cash. No reference was made to pledges.

The conference was attended by FOREIGN DELEGATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CONFERENCE held at Rye, N.Y.:

Nuri Fattah Pasha, Iraq;
Elias Trabulsi (-the Tripolitanian-), Lebanon;
Jean Sahnawi - Syria;

the EGYPTIAN DELEGATE AT THE INTERNATIONAL AVIATION CONFERENCE IN CHICAGO, ILL. also attended and spoke, being

MAHMUD BEK-ABUL FATEH,
member of the Egyptian Senate, co-chairman of the (anti-Zionist, Wafdist) daily AL MIZRI;

a letter of greetings and sympathy having been received from

NURI ED-DIN KAHHALA, Syrian Delegate at the Aviation Conference and Under-Secretary (of something or other) in the Syrian Government:

"The Arab cause in Palestine is a just and noble cause; and history will confirm it and the Arab world is behind it."

Subsequently, the conference decided to dispatch telegrams on Palestine to the President, the Secretary of State, members of both Houses of Congress; the conferees were urged to follow these messages up by personal ones and messages from their communities.

According to Khalidi's report, the conference story was featured by the New York Times, the New York World Telegram and the Reuter's news agency whose reporter attended.

Very truly yours

CC: Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver ✓
Cleveland, O.;
Mr. Harry L. Shapiro,
New York, N.Y.

Franz J. Katz.