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United Palestine Appeal, 1940 May-December.

May 1, 1940

Mr. Paul Baerwald
120 Broadway
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Baerwald:

Permit me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 26 and the enclosed statement of Mr. Morris C. Troper. It is indeed a tragic and a frightening picture which Mr. Troper presents and we would be terribly remiss in our duties if we did not bring it forcibly to the attention of our people - particularly the rich Jews of America.

I have been very much concerned, as undoubtedly you have, with the failure of the wealthier Jews of America to respond to the desperate emergency of the hour. Rabbi Jonah Wise and I have just received word from Chicago that the United Jewish Appeal should expect Four hundred thousand dollars less this year than it did last year because of the failure of the campaign in Chicago. You know, of course, that some of the large gifts which were received in New York City last year will not be repeated this year for one reason or another, and that most of the other large gifts failed to reflect the increased quota which the United Jewish Appeal has set for 1940.

New York City which was to have raised Ten million dollars in 1940 raised a little over Five million net. From present indications it will probably raise less than this amount in 1940.

As responsible heads of the United Jewish Appeal, we ought to bring these facts home to our people forcibly, challengingly and without apologetics. Our national headquarters, instead of spending so much time and energy in stimulating the campaigns throughout the country which did well last year, and which will do well again this year, should concentrate upon New York and Chicago where nearly sixty percent of the Jews of the United States live and where more than sixty percent of the wealth of the American Jews is concentrated.

Perhaps you can suggest some way of arousing our wealthier fellow Jews. Perhaps a meeting should be held of our entire Executive Committee at which this subject should be

Mr. Baerwald

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May 1, 1940

thoroughly discussed -- a meeting which should be attended by all the members of the Executive and not merely by our office force.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:EK



Please Return to Rabbi Silver

THE AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE, Inc.

100 EAST 42nd STREET, NEW YORK CITY

MRS FELIX M. WARBURG, *Honorary Chairman*PAUL BAERWALD, *Chairman*EDWARD M. M. WARBURG, *Co-Chairman*JAMES N. ROSENBERG, *Chairman, Executive Committee*JAMES H. BECKER, *Chairman, National Council*ALBERT H. LIEBERMAN, *Vice-Chairman, National Council*JOSEPH C. HYMAN, *Executive Vice-Chairman**Vice-Chairmen*

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May 2nd, 1940

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
Rabbi Jonah B. Wise
Co-Chairmen
United Jewish Appeal

Dear Rabbi Silver and Rabbi Wise:

The purpose of this communication is to acquaint you with the financial plight of the J.D.C. and our immediate need for large additional funds in order to enable us to continue our feeding program in Poland at least on its present scale.

During the negotiations leading to the agreement for the 1940 United Jewish Appeal, my associates and I, representing the Joint Distribution Committee in the discussions with the United Palestine Appeal, continually made the point that the present war emergency, particularly in Poland, would necessitate greatly augmented funds for the Joint Distribution Committee. It was our conviction, which we reiterated on many occasions, that the Joint Distribution Committee was even then feeding large numbers of Polish Jews, and engaging in other forms of emergency relief in Poland. This contention of ours was generally countered with the statement that it was impossible to conduct any sort of activity in Poland, nor could anyone predict just when such work would be permitted.

For some time, now, we have had definite knowledge as to the scope of our present work in Poland. It comprised the feeding of as many as 350,000 to 500,000 starving Jews daily, in addition to other forms of relief, such as medical aid, child care, clothing, sheltering, etc. We also have a reasonably accurate estimate of the extensive and vital requirements for continued work in Poland.

We were able to conclude an arrangement with the German authorities whereby we could carry on our feeding program in German-occupied Poland without sending any dollars into that country. This method has the great advantage of enabling us, at the same time, to aid a large number of Jews in Germany and Austria to emigrate to North and South America, Palestine and elsewhere. In brief the method is as follows: We deposit amounts of \$100,000 with the bank in Brussels to be used for the purchase of steamship tickets for emigrants from Germany and Austria. These emigrants in turn deposit a mark

Rabbi Jonah B. Wise
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver

May 2nd, 1940

equivalent with the Jewish organizations in Germany and Austria and this mark equivalent is then converted into zloty and sent into Poland for our feeding and relief programs. The German authorities agreed to this clearance arrangement, since it meant more Jews would leave Germany. The consent, however, was made conditional on the understanding that the dollars made available for this zloty clearance would not in any way affect our regular appropriations for work in Greater Germany and would be over and above our monthly grants. These funds are also used for emigration work through a clearance arrangement, whereby prospective emigrants deposit marks inside Germany and Austria, which are used for relief, schooling and retraining, etc., of the remaining Jews in those countries and the dollar equivalent is expended outside for the purpose of steamship tickets, landing money, etc.

In our present straitened circumstances, lacking both cash on hand, and a definite knowledge of what our total income will be for the year 1940, we are confronted with one of two alternatives, either of which would spell untold suffering and human misery:

(1) Reducing or eliminating our appropriations for aid to the Jews of Germany. This is a double-edged weapon. In the first place, withdrawing these dollars will mean that German Jews who have visas for other countries will lose their emigration possibilities. In the second place, the assistance and welfare programs for the Jews who remain in Greater Germany would be greatly reduced. Furthermore, there is a real question whether the German authorities would permit us to carry on the zloty clearance arrangement if we cut down substantially the aid given for normal emigration and internal relief.

(2) Reducing or eliminating assistance to refugees in the European countries of asylum, primarily France, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland. This would be an extremely serious step. Even at the present time, the refugees in these countries are being maintained on a rock-bottom scale, barely sufficient to keep body and soul together. The discontinuance of this aid would mean literal starvation for them. Apart from the effect upon the refugees themselves - and there are over 150,000 such refugees in Europe today - any further reduction or cessation of our aid in these countries would have an extremely unfavorable effect on the governments of these lands, who have been humanitarian enough to admit the refugees freely, even when they did not possess proper papers. This, in turn, would jeopardize the position of the Jews who are citizens of these countries, and whose government has shown continued goodwill. Further, should the support of the refugees in these countries be made entirely, or even largely, dependent on public funds supplied by the respective governments, the pressure might become so great as to involve a real danger of deportation. We might also mention that our program of aid in the South American countries and in Shanghai has reached such a reduced basis that the position of 100,000 refugees, as well as of the local populations, is definitely threatened.

We enclose a statement made by Mr. Troper at our last Executive Committee meeting, in which the situation facing us is described in greater detail.


Rabbi Jonah B. Wise
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver

May 2nd, 1940

We are sure you can appreciate our very real dilemma. Unhappily, we are compelled to place this situation before you in this realistic manner. We are desirous of receiving from you any suggestions that you may have as to what measures can be taken, either within or without the framework of the United Jewish Appeal, which will enable us to obtain the funds which are so urgently necessary for the continuation of our work.

In view of the extreme gravity of this situation, we would greatly appreciate your suggestions at the earliest possible moment.

Sincerely yours,



Paul Baerwald
Chairman

PB:DF
encl.



May 3, 1940

Mr. Paul Baerwald, Chairman
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
100 East 42nd St.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Baerwald:

Permit me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 2nd addressed to me as Co-chairman of the United Jewish Appeal. I share with you a realization of the seriousness of the situation and the need for raising much larger sums of money if large-scale suffering among our people overseas is to be averted. I read the memo which you sent me containing Mr. Troper's statement and I have had occasion already to bring it to the attention of the people here in Cleveland where we will open our campaign next Sunday, and last night, in Indianapolis, where I opened their campaign. I will speak of the situation as reflected in your letter and in Mr. Troper's memo before the Detroit Jewish community next Monday when I open their campaign.

But I cannot help pointing out to you again, as I did in my letter of May 1 to you, and as I have pointed out to Governor Lehman in a recent communication, that the answer to your problem lies in the City of New York and among your own friends. The New York Jewish community failed to respond to its obligations miserably last year, whereas the rest of the country exceeded the quotas assigned to it. Judging from reports which have come to me, the New York Jewish community will fail even more miserably this year. The rich Jews of New York are simply not doing their duty, and instead of apologizing for them and protecting them, they should be challenged and, if necessary, denounced. The New York Jewish community was expected to raise Ten Million Dollars last year. It raised a little over Five Million net. Had it done its duty, the plight of the JDC and the UPA would have been eased by Five Million Dollars. The New York community should raise at least half of the Twenty-three Million Dollar goal which has been set for the nation. If it does that, you will have additional millions with which to operate. If it fails to do that, the rest of the country can not be expected to take on the additional load which the Jews of New York refuse to carry.

The rest of the communities of the United States are again doing well this year, and an added amount of high pressure put upon them may squeeze out of them an additional small sum of

May 3, 1940

money. But the solution does not lie in that direction. The communication which you have addressed to me and to Rabbi Jonah Wise, as well as Mr. Troper's memo, should immediately be sent to ten thousand Jews in the city of New York, and they should be confronted with it as well as with the fact that up to now they have not met their responsibilities.

If instead of spending nearly three months in jockeying for a percentage position, the representatives of the JDC, the UPA, and the National Refugee Service had devoted their time and thought to discovering ways of how the Jews of New York City could be brought to a fuller realization of their responsibilities, and how the city could be better organized for campaign purposes, we would be much better off today. This, you will recall, is what I have been urging now for nearly two years.

With all good wishes, I remain

Most cordially yours,

AHS:RK



May 13, 1940

Mr. Henry Montor
United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd St.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Montor:

Rabbi Jonah Wise spent the morning with me at my home and we talked over some of the matters outstanding between the JDC and us. We agreed that we were to write to the Hofheimer Foundation calling attention to their unpaid pledge and requesting them to meet with us to talk over the whole situation.

We agreed that \$50,000 which was turned over to the UPA from the Night of Star should be remitted to the UJA. The rest, as in previous years, is to be kept by the Night of Star to launch its next program. The deduction from the allotments to the UPA are to be spread over a period of three months.

It was also agreed that the JDC be requested to turn over to the UPA whatever is outstanding on the account of 1938 in consonance with the agreement. This includes all funds which were received by the JDC in response to its emergency appeal in the Fall of 1938 covering the Welfare Fund cities.

We discussed the representation on the Distribution Committee. We agreed that action should not be delayed much longer. You suggested, in your last letter, that the JDC would approve of the names of Jacob Balustein and Robert Koshland. Are these names acceptable to us? If so, then the problem narrows itself down to a third person. Perhaps you can suggest to the JDC people the names of Louis Kirstein, Fred Butzel, Bernard Flexner or Oscar Berman.

We discussed at great length the situation in New York City. My impression is that for the first time some of the leaders in New York are becoming worried about the situation and have set about doing something about it. The matter should be aggressively pressed.

We did not discuss the matter raised by Mr. Goldwasser concerning the decision of the Allocations Committee.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

C O P Y

May 14, 1940

Dr. Jonah B. Wise
35 East 62nd St.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Jonah:

I had the opportunity, this afternoon, of checking over the forty-six largest donors in the 1940 campaign in New York City and comparing the amounts which they contributed this year to their giving last year. Of these forty-six, twenty-two decreased their giving this year, twenty gave the same as last year, and only four increased. The total increases in dollars and cents amounted to \$21,000; the total decreases, to \$369,849.68. The total giving of these forty-six donors last year amounted to \$392,146. The percentage total decrease, therefore, is a little over thirty-nine percent.

This fact is serious in itself, but is even more disheartening when you bear in mind that the United Jewish Appeal is trying to raise this year thirty-five percent more than it raised last year. If the other large donors in New York will follow the general line indicated by these forty-six, the New York campaign will be a disastrous and scandalous failure - even worse than last year.

Most cordially yours,

AHS:BK

(Signed) Abba Hillel Silver

EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS
Financial Statement
May 21, 1940

Accounts Receivable	\$ 1,690.00	
Cash in Bank	668.73	
Expenses incurred to date	22,641.27	
Income through the U. P. A.		<u>\$25,000.00</u>
	<u>\$25,000.00</u>	<u>\$25,000.00</u>

Expenses:

Rent	\$ 224.50	
Secretary-Stenographer	816.65	
Clerical Assistance	556.95	
Travelling	1,720.15	
Cables, telephone, postage	1,029.78	
Printing, supplies	241.84	
Washington Bureau	5,208.68	
Bureau for German Refugee Work	1,216.34	
Economic Department	696.30	
Protest Meeting	1,021.54	
Special Expense - Wash.	500.00	
President's Advisory Com.	2,500.00	
Palestine Fund	100.00	
Dr. Weizmann's Expenses		
Secretary	450.00	
General Meetings	44.00	
Reception	195.39	
Travelling, etc.	5,467.11	
Loan (tel & tel)	<u>652.04</u>	<u>6,808.54*</u>
TOTAL		<u>\$22,641.27</u>

Accounts Receivable:

Hechalutz	\$ 1,340.00	
Dr. Benno Frank	<u>350.00</u>	
TOTAL		<u>\$ 1,690.00</u>

*All charges for the Loan (including travelling costs) are to be covered by the Keren Hayesod.

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE OF
THE UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
AT THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
41 EAST 42nd STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y.

THURSDAY, MAY 23, 1940 at 3 P.M.

PRESENT: Stephen S. Wise presiding, Sol Cohen, Mrs. Moses P. Epstein, Mendel N. Fisher, David Freiburger, Leon Gellman, Leib Glantz, Israel Goldstein, I.M. Kowalsky, Abraham Krumbein, Arthur M. Lamport, John L. Leibowitz, Abraham L. Liebovitz, Joseph Lookstein, Samuel Markewich, Irving Miller, Henry Montor, Charles Ress, Mrs. Sol Rosenbloom, Israel Sachs, Robert Silverman, Abba Hillel Silver, Jacob Sincoff, Mrs. Joseph Strock, Sigmund Thau, Harold M. Weinberg, David Wertheim

Samuel Blitz, Kurt Blumenfeld, Eliezer Kaplan, Morris Margulies, Alex Rothenberg

REGRETS: Regrets for inattendance were received from the following: Barnett R. Brickner, Jacob H. Cohen, Solomon Goldman, Edward L. Israel, Jacob J. Kaplan, Maurice J. Karpf, Joseph Kraemer, Louis Lipsky

CAMPAIGN REPORTS

A statement of income and expenditures of the United Palestine Appeal for 1940 as of May 20, 1940 (Appendix A), and of the United Palestine Appeal for 1939, as of December 31, 1939 (Appendix B), and a Comparative Income Record of the United Palestine Appeal for the period from January 1 to May 15, 1939 and 1940 (Appendix C) was presented by Mr. Montor who also reported on the United Jewish Appeal for 1940 as of May 20, 1940 (Appendix D) and presented a tentative analysis of the United Jewish Appeal campaign for 1940 (Appendix E).

Mr. Montor mentioned the anxiety felt at the beginning of the year with regard to the outcome of the campaign, which anxiety had waned in the succeeding two or three months. However, when the campaigns actually got under way, particularly in the larger cities, he said, new situations developed: the result of the situation abroad, and of conditions locally, the most important of which, the setting aside of very large amounts for local refugee purposes, must be taken into account when determining the income of the United Jewish Appeal. Based on the campaign experience of the first five months of 1940 and on contacts with the major communities, Mr. Montor estimated that the income of the United Jewish Appeal, outside of New York City will in 1940 total from the same cities which gave \$5,148,000 in 1939, about \$4,243,000-- a difference of approximately \$1,000,000 due to a number of factors. Baltimore will not hold a regular public campaign, but will merely have a private drive. Boston has decided to combine its United Jewish Appeal campaign with that of the Associated Jewish Philanthropies, with \$600,000 guaranteed from the first income for the Associated Jewish Philanthropies. Chicago has notified the United Jewish Appeal that this year the allocation will be \$1,000,000 as against \$1,400,000 in cash already received for 1939. It is expected that Detroit, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Los Angeles will not give much more than last year; Newark slightly more, Philadelphia slightly less. Pittsburgh is a special problem because \$100,000 is being set aside for local refugee purposes as against \$25,000 in 1939. Los Angeles and San Francisco will probably give the same amounts as last year

In the smaller communities, Mr. Montor said, there seems to be an increase of between 10 and 25% over last year, but the great loss sustained in the major communities cannot possibly be made up by the smaller communities.

On the basis of figures prepared by Mr. Lamport, Mr. Montor pointed out that the national United Jewish Appeal may expect a total of \$2,890,000 from the New York City campaign, which allows for shrinkage and for the allotment of \$1,000,000 to the National Refugee Service, and \$11,000 to Ort. Mr. Lamport's analysis was on a percentage rather than total amount raised basis. Therefore, Mr. Montor, explained, if it is assumed that the total net income of the United Jewish Appeal for 1940 will be \$11,390,000, after the deduction of the allocations to the Joint Distribution Committee, the United Palestine Appeal, the National Refugee Service and estimated expenses of \$430,000 there may be available for distribution by the Distribution Committee the sum of \$710,000 as against a total in 1939 of \$3,250,000.

Mr. Montor pointed out that Page A indicates an additional income of \$5,000 from the 1939 "Night of Stars", bringing the total income of the United Jewish Appeal from the 1939 "Night of Stars" to \$50,000. He explained that the total income was \$62,000, but that the balance of \$12,000 above the \$50,000 was kept by the "Night of Stars", in accordance with an agreement between the National Chairmen of the United Jewish Appeal, for operating expenses toward the forthcoming "Night of Stars".

Mr. Montor advised that the notes for a loan which the United Palestine Appeal had taken out the early part of the year had all been paid. In referring to the 1940 income of the United Jewish Appeal of \$2,616,252, Mr. Montor explained that this small amount was due to the fact that the United Jewish Appeal does not take upon its books any prospective allotment from a local campaign unless formal and official word has been received from the community.

NEW YORK CITY UJA

Mr. Blitz, in reporting on the New York United Jewish Appeal, felt that the estimates of New York income were unduly pessimistic. He stated that the New York campaign already had pledges of \$3,250,000, which had been achieved after a cut of \$1,000,000 in group gifts and big gifts. He complimented United Palestine Appeal leaders and workers on their excellent participation in the New York campaign. He praised the leadership of Mr. Warburg as Campaign Chairman and said that he was particularly active in the field of special gifts. A committee has been formed to review pledges already made and to ascertain whether these pledges could not be increased. Governor Lehman had agreed to hold another meeting on June 10th in order to make a final attempt to obtain the gifts which have not as yet been received and also to try to increase gifts which have already come in.

Mr. Blitz was hopeful of reaching \$5,000,000 in the New York campaign, which would mean \$4,500,000 net, because, instead of curtailing the campaign, as was done in 1939, an effort will be made to initiate practically another drive, in which Mr. Blitz felt an additional \$500,000 might be achieved.

Commenting on the national campaign situation, Dr. Silver felt that Mr. Montor might have painted the picture unnecessarily darkly.

Dr. Silver stated that, after making a study of the New York campaign, he found that the rank and file and the people in the middle register in New York City were in many instances giving more than last year. However, big delinquencies were to be found on the part of the big givers. Out of forty-six big givers he found that four had increased their gifts over 1939; twenty-two decreased their giving, twenty gave the same as last year.

There was a percentage decrease in the giving of these 46 people of nearly 40%. He stated that he had called these facts to the attention of Messrs. Baerwald, Warburg and Rosenwald, and that he had written on this matter to Governor Lehman (Appendix F), and that the Governor had replied that he was perturbed about the facts and would present them to the meeting which was to be held at his home on May 8th. He had also written to Mr. Baerwald on the subject (Appendix G).

Dr. Silver was inclined to believe that the rest of the country, outside of New York, would do about as well as it did in 1939 short of the decrease of \$400,000 from Chicago.

Mr. Blitz advised that among the substantial increases made by UPA people, the outstanding increase for 1940 was made by Louis Altschul from \$6,000 in 1939 to \$18,000 in 1940.

DELEGATES TO CONVENTION OF THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

A request was read from the Zionist Organization of America that the United Palestine Appeal, in accordance with tradition, appoint three delegates to the forthcoming Zionist Organization of America Convention with power to vote,

It was moved and carried that the National Chairman be authorized to appoint three delegates, with power to vote, to the forthcoming Convention of the Zionist Organization of America.

WELFARE FUND REPRESENTATIVES ON UNITED JEWISH APPEAL DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE

With reference to the selection of three representatives of Welfare Funds on the Distribution Committee of the United Jewish Appeal, Mr. Montor stated that after much negotiation the list had finally come down to seven names, any three of which the Joint Distribution Committee said would be acceptable to them. The three names the United Palestine Appeal ought to consider on the basis of a consensus of opinion sounded out in advance are those of Harris Perlstein of Chicago, Monte Lemann of New Orleans and Leon Sunstein of Philadelphia.

Mr. Montor felt that it should be noted that a series of distinguished names presented by the United Palestine Appeal was turned down. The names included such persons as Charles Rosenbloom of Pittsburgh, E.I. Kaufman of Washington, Fred Butzel of Detroit, Henry Wineman of Detroit, Henry Monsky of Omaha, Judge Jacob Kaplan of Boston, Louis E. Kirstein of Boston.

Motion was made and carried that the three names presented: Harris Perlstein, Monte Lemann, Leon Sunstein, be accepted as representatives of the Welfare Funds on the Distribution Committee of the United Jewish Appeal.

RESEARCH DIRECTOR, UNITED JEWISH APPEAL DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE

Mr. Montor reported that several names had been discussed for the position of Research Director on the Distribution Committee of the United Jewish Appeal, but that no decision had yet been reached.

Dr. Silver said that he was inclined to bring a suggestion before the United Jewish Appeal to abolish this post, as he felt there was no necessity for spending a large sum of money to make an intensive investigation, when the total amount to be distributed would probably not exceed seven or eight hundred thousand dollars.

ALLOCATIONS FOR 1939-1940 TO HEBREW UNIVERSITY

A cable from Ussishkin, Hantke, Kaplan (Appendix H) agreeing to an allocation to the Hebrew University for 1939-1940 was presented.

As this was a matter purely within the purview of the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth

Motion was made and carried that the matter of an allocation for 1939-1940 to the Hebrew University be referred to the Joint Committee of the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth.

Dr. Goldstein advised that the matter would be taken up at the next meeting of the Joint Committee.

Mr. Lamport asked that the Joint Committee facilitate the payment of this money by requesting the United Palestine Appeal to make the payment and charge it to the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth.

APPLICATIONS FOR GRANTS FROM IMMIGRANT PENSIONERS SOCIETY OF JERUSALEM AND MASADA

Applications for grants from the United Palestine Appeal by the Immigrant Pensioners Society of Jerusalem (Appendix I) and from Masada (Appendix J) were presented.

In accordance with the usual procedure in applications of this kind.

Motion was made and carried that the applications for grants from the United Palestine Appeal by the Immigrant Pensioners Society of Jerusalem, and by the Masada be referred to the Joint Committee of the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth.

INVITATION TO ADDRESS HAPOEL HAMIZRACHI CONFERENCE

In response to an invitation received by the United Palestine Appeal from Hapoel Hamizrachi asking that a representative speak at its forthcoming Conference.

Mr. Gellman was appointed representative of the United Palestine Appeal to speak at the Conference of the Hapoel Hamizrachi.

The Chairman congratulated Mr. Gellman on his re-election as President of the Mizrachi Organization of America.

MR. RIMSKY'S RESIGNATION AS ASSOCIATE TREASURER; ELECTION OF MR. SINCOFF

A letter from Mr. Rimsky, dated May 9, 1940 (Appendix K) was read, in which he asked to be relieved of his duties as Associate Treasurer owing to illness.

The Chairman felt that much as the Committee regretted it, under the circumstances it must accept Mr. Rimsky's resignation, with sincere thanks for his services and with the earnest and prayerful hope that he will soon regain normal health and strength.

Mr. Jacob Sincoff was then proposed for and unanimously elected Associate Treasurer of the United Palestine Appeal to fill the vacancy created by Mr. Rimsky's resignation. The appropriate bank resolution authorizing Mr. Sincoff to sign checks of the United Palestine Appeal was passed.

PRIORITY PAYMENTS TO NATIONAL REFUGEE SERVICE

Mr. Montor asked whether, when checks are presented in the New York City UJA to the Treasurers for signature -- where priority is given to the National Refugee Service-- United Palestine Appeal signatories could not refuse to sign them. Priority was being given to the National Refugee Service in the distribution of funds from New York City, Mr. Montor said, and he felt that, if this were allowed to continue, the United Palestine Appeal might find itself receiving less than 20% of the total.

Following a full discussion Mr. Liebovitz, who is a member of the New York committee handling these matters, said that he would take the matter up and adjust it as nearly equitably as he possibly could.

OUTSTANDING MONIES, INCLUDING "NIGHT OF STARS"

Dr. Silver advised that he had had a meeting with Rabbi Jonah Wise at which was discussed the 1939 "Night of Stars" money. He explained that the reason the United Palestine Appeal had held the "Night of Stars" money out was that the Hofheimer Foundation had not yet made good its pledge of \$40,000 to the NRS. Rabbi Wise had agreed to write to the Hofheimer Foundation in his own and Dr. Silver's name asking that they meet with the Foundation officers for the purpose of discussing its pledge. Dr. Silver said that it had also been agreed that the \$50,000 income to the United Palestine Appeal from "Night of Stars" be turned over to the United Jewish

Appeal, the payments to be spread over a period of four months. The balance of "Night of Stars" income would be held as an operating fund.

Dr. Silver also discussed with Rabbi Wise the question of over \$17,000 which is owing to the United Palestine Appeal from the Joint Distribution Committee on 1938. Dr. Silver felt that this amount would be paid to the United Palestine Appeal.

Dr. Silver said that at a meeting with Rabbi Wise (which would take place the following day) he would take up the matter of 1938 money which was raised in the Emergency Campaign by the Joint Distribution Committee and in which the United Palestine Appeal should share.

MR. ELIEZER KAPLAN

Dr. Silver welcomed and introduced Mr. Eliezer Kaplan, Treasurer of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, who spoke on the present situation in Palestine (Appendix L)

Dr. Silver thanked Mr. Kaplan for his very fine and illuminating statement. He said that all the officers of the United Palestine Appeal are most anxious to do all in their power to meet the problems of Palestine and are working as hard as possible in that direction, but, as Mr. Kaplan had heard during the afternoon's discussion, Dr. Silver felt that very little more could be expected from the campaign of 1940. However, that left open the matter of the loan which he felt should be vigorously prosecuted, and he saw definite possibilities for its success if Dr. Weizmann would come to the United States and lead in the work. Without Dr. Weizmann, Dr. Silver did not think the loan could be consummated.

Respectfully submitted

Florence Eitelberg

(A)

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL FOR 1940
REPORT OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURES
AS OF MAY 20, 1940

(1939-209,340.6)
 (1938- 2,864.17
 (1937- 4,396.29

BANK BALANCES AS OF JANUARY 1, 1940.....\$216,601.06

CASH RECEIVED - 1/1/40 thru 5.20.40:

United Jewish Appeal.....1940.....	\$300,000.00	
Jewish National Fund.....1940...(thru April).....	156,280.73	
United Jewish Appeal.....1939.....	862,833.33	
Night of Stars.....1939.....	5,000.00	
United Palestine Appeal.....1938.....	15,878.63	
United Palestine Appeal.....1937.....	393.92	
United Palestine Appeal.....1936.....	300.00	\$1,340,686.61

Cash Received on Notes

(\$200,000- Less Disc. of \$1003.47)

198,996.53

1,539,683.14

1,756,284.20

DISBURSEMENTS:

Koren Hayesod.....1940).....	\$150,000.00	
Includes \$7,150.00 toward Mifal Bitzaron in 1939).....	497,000.00	
accordance with 1937-1938 agreements 1938).....	19,950.00	
1937).....	1,500.00	668,450
Keren Kayemeth.....1940).....	150,000.00	
Includes \$7,150 toward Mifal Bitzaron in 1939).....	497,000.00	
accordance with 1937-1938 agreements 1938).....	19,950.00	
1937).....	1,500.00	668,450.
Mizrachi Palestine Fund.....	55,000.00	
Emergency Comm. for Zionist Affairs.....	25,000.00	
Hashomer Hatzair (K.H. & K.K. Alloc.).....	1,200.00	31,200.

SERVICE PAYMENTS

Zionist Organization of America.....	27,000.00	
Mizrachi Organization of America.....	4,000.00	
Peale Zion-Zeire Zion.....	4,000.00	35,000.

Payments on Notes 199,937.50
 (\$200,000- Less Earned Disc. \$62.50)

EXPENSES (covering all activities in 1940 as well as previous campaigns)..... 31,306.97

Miscellaneous Advances..... 437.71

BANK BALANCES AS OF MAY 20, 1940.....

\$ 1,684,782.18) 1940-57,654.12
71,502.02) 1939- 7,914.89
) 1938- 3,842.80
) 1937- 2,090.21

(B)

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL FOR 1939
REPORT OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURES
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1939

(1938-\$80,698
(1937- 17,540
(1936- 1,308

BALANCES AS OF JANUARY 1, 1939.....\$99,547.42

CASH RECEIVED - From 1/1/39 to 12/31/39

United Jewish Appeal-----1939.....	\$2,750,000.00	
Jewish National Fund-----1939. (thru Dec.).....	373,235.83	
Night of Stars-----1939.....	45,000.00	
United Palestine Appeal-----1938.....	666,337.29	
United Palestine Appeal-----1937.....	39,956.75	
United Palestine Appeal-----1936.....	2,285.71	
		<u>3,876,815.58</u>
		3,976,363.00

DISBURSEMENTS:

Keren Hayesod.....	\$1,704,612.45	
Includes \$127,032.87 toward Mifal Bitzaron in accordance with 1937-1938 agreements)		
Keren Kayemeth.....	1,704,612.44	
Includes \$127,032.87 toward Mifal Bitzaron in accordance with 1937-1938 agreements)		
Mizrachi Palestine Fund.....	90,000.00	
President's Advisory Committee for Political Relief.....	4,500.00	
Council of Jewish Federations & Welfare Funds.....	2,500.00	
American Friends of the Hebrew University.....	3,024.32	
Hashomer Hatzair.....	1,200.00	
Youth Aliyah (earmarked item).....	1,700.00	\$3,632,149.21

SERVICE PAYMENTS:

Zionist Organization of America.....	54,000.00	
Mizrachi Organization of America.....	9,800.00	
Poale Zion-Zeire Zion.....	9,800.00	73,600.00

MISCELLANEOUS ADVANCES.....3,146.43

Expenses (covering all activities in 1939 as well as previous campaigns)	50,866.30	<u>3,759,761.94</u>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------	---------------------

BANK BALANCES AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1939

\$ 216,601.06
(1938- 209,340
(1937- 2,864
(1936- 4,396

C.
UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
COMPARATIVE INCOME RECORD- JANUARY 1st to MAY 15th

- - - - -

<u>1940</u>	<u>1939</u>
<u>Income as of 5/15/40</u>	<u>Income as of 5/15/39</u>
United Jewish Appeal-1940- \$275,000.00	-
Jewish National Fund-1940- 104,213.11	\$144,393.48
United Jewish Appeal-1939- 862,833.33	550,000.00
Night of Stars- 1939 - 5,000.00	-
United Palestine Appeal- 1938 - 15,878.63	501,060.38
United Palestine Appeal- 1937 - 393.92	27,950.14
United Palestine Appeal- 1936 - 300.00	2,198.03
<u>\$ 1,263,618.99</u>	<u>\$ 1,225,602.03</u>



(D)

REPORT OF UNITED JEWISH APPEAL FOR 1940

as of

May 20, 1940

PLEDGES \$2,616,252.00*

CASH RECEIVED 1,540,882.24

DISBURSEMENTS: JDC \$682,500.00
UPA 325,000.00
NRS 325,000.00

Administration \$180,860.93

GREATER NEW YORK UNITED JEWISH APPEAL

as of

May 20, 1940

		<u>Organization Pledges</u>	<u>Totals</u>
PLEDGES	\$2,935,421.57	\$100,654.00	\$3,036,075.57
CASH RECEIVED	1,240,249.93	10,056.65	1,250,306.58

DISTRIBUTED:

National Office UJA 540,000.00
National Refugee Service 180,000.00

Expenses (as of April 30) 179,726.08

-
- * This includes the sum of \$615,000 received in cash from New York City United Jewish Appeal and no allotments from any of the ten major cities which are now conducting campaigns and which have not yet notified us of allocations: Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Newark, Boston, Chicago, Indianapolis, St. Louis.

The only additional advance received was from Chicago -\$559,850 on account.

(E)

TENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED JEWISH APPEAL CAMPAIGN
for 1940

General estimated income for country (outside New York City)	\$8,500,000
Net estimated income to national UJA from New York UJA	<u>2,890,000</u>
TOTAL NET ANTICIPATED INCOME TO NATIONAL UJA	<u>\$ 11,390,000</u>

Definite disbursements:

JDC	\$5,250,000	
UPA	2,500,000	
NRS	2,500,000	
Expenditures	<u>430,000</u>	<u>10,680,000</u>

NET ESTIMATED AVAILABLE FOR
DISTRIBUTION \$ 710,000

(The National Refugee Service has right to make application
for additional amount beyond \$3,500,000 up to \$500,000)

ESTIMATED ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK UJA INCOME
(prepared by Mr. Lamport)

Net income (after deduction of expenses and shrinkage)	\$ 4,000,000
Allotted to NRS	\$ 1,000,000
Allotted to Ort	<u>110,000</u> <u>1,110,000</u>
Balance remaining for national UJA	<u>\$ 2,890,000</u>

Distribution of New York UJA Income based on \$1,000,000 allotment
to NRS and on distribution to NRS from income accruing to
national UJA:

NRS	\$1,731,250	
JDC	1,463,000	
UPA	695,750	- 17%
Ort	<u>110,000</u>	
		<u>\$4,000,000.</u>

April 26, 1940

The Honorable Herbert H. Lehman
Albany, N.Y.

My dear Governor Lehman:

I am writing you this letter in my capacity as Co-chairman of the United Jewish Appeal. I was happy to learn that you are again calling a meeting of some of the leaders of the Jewish community of New York on May 8 in behalf of the Campaign. I recall with pleasure the meeting which was held under your auspices last year.

May I suggest that you will have an opportunity at the May 8 meeting to bring home to those who will attend not only the desperate needs of our people at this time, but also the fact that the Jewish community of New York City, and particularly its wealthier members, have not carried their just share of the foreign relief responsibilities of American Israel in recent years.

Last year, American Jewry set out to raise Twenty Million Dollars. It was thought that the Jews of New York City, representing about one-half of the Jewish population of the United States, and more than one-half of its wealth, would contribute half of this total and that the rest of the country would contribute the other half. The rest of the country actually did contribute more than half while the New York Jewish community failed miserably. Instead of raising Ten Million Dollars, it raised just a little over Five Million Dollars.

The prospects for the 1940 campaign, as far as New York City is concerned, are even gloomier. We have already been apprised that some of the very large gifts which were made last year will not be repeated this year. The Guggenheimer gift of \$250,000, for example, it now eventuates had been intended for the two years 1939 and 1940, so that there will be no contribution from this Foundation and the families which it represents, this year. The Rosenwald family which gave \$225,000 last year has not announced any contribution for 1940, although Mr. William Rosenwald has agreed to contribute a little more than his share of last year which was \$31,000. Other large donors have indicated that they plan to reduce their contributions of last year although the quota of the United Jewish Appeal for 1940 is thirty-five percent higher than in 1939.

My work as National Co-chairman of the United Jewish Appeal has taken me across the country in the last few months, and in more than one community I have had to listen to sharp criticism of the Jews of New York and their failure to meet their responsibilities. The communities of America are willing to carry their share of the burden, but they are not willing to carry New York City's share. There is a growing resentment about this throughout the country which may soon find an expression in the public press.

I know of no way of bringing this fact forcibly to the attention of the leaders of the Jewish community of New York without provoking unpleasant publicity in the newspapers. Perhaps you do. Perhaps the meeting of May 8 may afford you an opportunity to bring this fact to the attention of the people in a way that would be helpful.

With all good wishes for success, I remain

Most cordially yours,

(signed) Abba Hillel Silver



(APPENDIX G)

C
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May 1, 1940

Mr. Paul Baerwald
120 Broadway
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Baerwald:

Permit me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 26 and the enclosed statement of Mr. Morris C. Troper. It is indeed a tragic and a frightening picture which Mr. Troper presents and we would be terribly remiss in our duties if we did not bring it forcibly to the attention of our people-particularly the rich Jews of America.

I have been very much concerned, as undoubtedly you have, with the failure of the wealthier Jews of America to respond to the desperate emergency of the hour. Rabbi Jonah Wise and I have just received word from Chicago that the United Jewish Appeal should expect Four hundred thousand dollars less this year than it did last year because of the failure of the campaign in Chicago. You know, of course, that some of the large gifts which were received in New York City last year will not be repeated this year for one reason or another, and that most of the other large gifts failed to reflect the increased quota which the United Jewish Appeal has set for 1940.

New York City which was to have raised Ten million dollars in 1940 raised a little over Five million net. From present indications it will probably raise less than this amount in 1940.

As responsible heads of the United Jewish Appeal, we ought to bring these facts home to our people forcibly, challengingly and without apologetics. Our national headquarters, instead of spending so much time and energy in stimulating the campaigns throughout the country which did well last year, and which will do well again this year, should concentrate upon New York and Chicago where nearly sixty percent of the Jews of the United States live and where more than sixty percent of the wealth of the American Jews is concentrated.

Perhaps you can suggest some way of arousing our wealthier fellow Jews. Perhaps a meeting should be held of our entire Executive Committee at which this subject should be thoroughly discussed - a meeting which should be attended by all the members of the Executive and not merely by our office force.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

(signed) ABBA HILLEL SILVER

APPENDIX H

COPY OF CABLE

JERUSALEM APRIL 27, 1940

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
111 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK

FURTHER OURS FIRST MARCH AGREE ALLOCATION UNIVERSITY

15000 DOLLARS FOR 1939 1940 EACH



HANTKE KAPLAN

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APPENDIX I

IMMIGRANT PENSIONERS SOCIETY

(Registered under Nr.3939/1372 at the District Commissioner's Offices
Jerusalem)

4, Aaron Road
Jerusalem
April 14th, 1940

United Palestine Appeal
Suite 703
111 Fifth Avenue
New York

Dear Sirs:

We, the undersigned, take the liberty of addressing you on the following matter:

2. There are at present in Palestine 450 persons - together with their families over 1000 people - who are entitled to receive pensions and allowances from the German Reich, Authorities or Organizations in Germany.
3. These pensioners or annuitants have established an association, registered at the District Commissioner's Offices, Jerusalem, as the "Immigrant Pensioners Society".
4. These people belong to three different groups:
 - a) Ex Government officials or officials of public or religious institutions authorized by the Government; among them are High Court judges, University professors, Rabbis and other officials of the Jewish Communities, or their widows
 - b) People who fought in the Great War and they or their heirs are entitled to a pension or allowance.
 - c) People who are entitled to receive allowances from social insurance institutions.
5. Until the war began these people received their pensions or allowances by means of transfer. This transfer was effected partly direct by post and partly through a special transfer institution, the so-called "Haavara".
6. The sum of the pensions and allowances, paid in in Germany, amounted to approximately 60,000 Reichsmarks monthly; the sums, paid out in Palestine, amounted - because of transfer losses - to approximately £ 3,000 monthly.
7. Even after the outbreak of war the pensions and allowances were still being paid, in Germany itself, into the "Sonderkonto Versorgungsbezüge" at the Warburg and Wasserman Banks. But the transfer of the pensions and allowances ceased simultaneously with the outbreak of war and all our endeavors to find a way of transferring them have been unsuccessful.
8. This has brought about a situation of great poverty to us, which is getting more acute day by day, for the pensioners are, on the average, over 60 years of age and an overwhelming majority of them have no means whatsoever nor the possibility of acquiring any new source of existence here.
9. The Jewish institutions in this country, though full of sympathy for our distress, are not able to support us.
10. In this desperate situation we take the liberty of approaching you with the heartfelt request to help us in any way you will be kind enough to find out.
Please accept our deepest thanks for your kindness
We beg to remain, dear Sirs, Yours very truly
Dr. R. Katzenstein

Dr. A. Jacobus

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APPENDIX J

M A S A D A
111 Fifth Avenue
New York

May 13, 1940

Mr. Henry Montor
United Jewish Appeal
342 Madison Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Montor:

The Executive of Masada has requested me to send the following letter.

Masada, Youth Zionist Organization of America, wishes the following matter to be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the Executive of the United Palestine Appeal.

As a propaganda arm of the United Palestine Appeal, it has long been the contention of Masada that it was entitled to some measure of support from that body. In spite of this principle, we have never addressed our selves for direct aid until the present moment and we do so only because it is an absolute necessity.

Faced with the possible bankruptcy of our organization, we beseech the United Palestine Appeal for a grant which will enable Masada to continue its Zionist work amongst the Jewish youth of America. Our main source of support, the Zionist Organization of America, is unable to furnish the necessary aid. Our membership is already saddled with the backbreaking task of raising additional sums even at the risk of dissipating our Palestine endeavors; we must have immediate help or curtail our activities.

Needless to say, our chapters all over the country are extremely active in the joint campaign. We have potentialities of inoculating other Jewish youth with the desire to aid. And, what is most important - we are creating Zionists, the backbone of UPA support.

We urge an immediate consideration of this request and trust that the Executive of the UPA will view this appropriation as a necessary and just investment.

Sincerely yours,

Eleazar Lipsky
For the Executive of Masada
Eleazar Lipsky
President

APPENDIX K

Louis Rinsky
415 Central Park West
New York

May 9, 1940

Rabbi Hillel Silver, Chairman
United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd Street
New York, N.Y.

My dear Rabbi Silver:

For the last few months I have been suffering from a severe heart ailment, which makes it practically impossible for me to attend to my duties as Associate Treasurer of the United Palestine Appeal.

It is with deep regret that I must ask you to relieve me of my duties of office and to elect someone else in my place. The privilege that was mine, working together with you, will always remain with me as a great source of joy and inspiration. It is a rare distinction to work under your leadership, but circumstances are such that I must forego the pleasure of taking an active part in that work which is near to my heart.

Wishing you all the success in your great work, I want to remain with Zion greetings

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS RIMSKY

STATEMENT OF ELIEZER KAPLAN AT MEETING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL, THURSDAY, MAY 23, 1940

Mr. Chairman: I thank you very much for the greeting. With your permission I shall give a report of the position and the problems in Palestine as they were approximately three weeks ago.

During the first seven months of the war we succeeded in improving the economic position of Palestine. This was accomplished by the expenditure of additional substantial sums of money by the Jewish Agency. We spent and took upon ourselves, in the first seven months, obligations amounting to approximately £630,000. The result was that we expended approximately £110,000 to £112,000 more than we received. We were faced at the outset by two major problems -- the problem of immigration and the problem of social relief and unemployment. Approximately 14,000 Jews -- both certificated and non-certificated immigrants -- entered the country in the first seven months of the war. The greater proportion of these came penniless. We were compelled to give them immediate aid, and then to try to absorb them. When they arrived without certificates they were usually interned by the Government for several days or weeks; then released in our custody. The Jewish Agency had to take upon itself the responsibility of caring for the new arrivals. I will not go into details but I may mention that in these seven months we spent, on account of immigrants, training, etc., the sum of more than £70,000.

We are giving aid to all immigrants regardless of their party. We are making no discrimination. We are limiting our aid only to relief, because we are unable, with the funds at our disposal, to help the newcomers in a more constructive way. The minimum cost of initial aid to a new immigrant is approximately £25 per head.

The Government granted 9,000 permits for the six months from the first of April to the end of September. It is difficult now to say how many of the 9,000 we shall be able to utilize. There are 1,854 capitalist certificates, but now that Germany has occupied Denmark, Norway, Belgium and Holland, many of the capitalists have lost the possibility of escape. We shall negotiate with the Government with regard to transferring the certificates from one country to another, and from one category to another. But this depends upon funds. We must satisfy the Government that we have sufficient funds to absorb the new arrivals.

Despite the war we are continuing immigration, and we are trying to find new ways of bringing the people into Palestine. Since coming to the United States I have received a cable with regard to 600 immigrants. Of them 400 are in Trieste, approximately 100 in Stockholm, and 91 in Vilna. We have reached an agreement with the Soviet Government to send the people from Scandinavia and the Baltic countries, via Odessa. Furthermore, from the South, if Trieste will be closed, we can use the port of Constanza. Immigration will go on via the East Coast; and the East Coast is protected, so the British tell us.

Regarding the question of unemployment and social relief, the number of people who required relief increased at the beginning of the war to the terrific figure of approximately 80,000. Among these were approximately 18,000 totally unemployed. It was first for the Jewish Agency and then

for the Vaad Leumi, the labor organizations, and latterly for the Government to deal with the problem. The Jewish Agency spent in the first seven months of the war, for direct relief, approximately £43,000; for relief work £15,000; and for the organization of the distribution of works and other forms of aid to the workers in the colonies, approximately £20,000. We decided to concentrate the direct relief in the hands of the Vaad Leumi, and since October the Vaad Leumi has been dealing with the problem with our help. The Vaad Leumi has spent during the six months from October 1st to April 1st approximately £80,000 for direct relief. Of that amount the Government has provided approximately £25,000.

I do not think it necessary to explain the other items of our work. I should like only to mention two additional figures. We spent approximately £33,000 for industrial development, commerce and handicraft; and £140,000 for colonization. I feel that we have succeeded in overcoming many of our difficulties in Palestine. In the months of March and April there were signs of improvement. The number of men employed increased. At the same time the position of the so-called middle class improved slightly because of the general improvement of trade in Palestine. Industry is expanding. There are prospects for great improvement --- perhaps even prosperity in agriculture. The position is different in the orange and building trade.

I wish to mention the question of land. I do not wish to go into the political problems, but you know all about the land restrictions; and I think you know all about the influence of the land ordinance upon Jews, English and Arabs. We discussed the question of how to fight this new ordinance, and we came to the conclusion that there is a possibility of fighting the new restrictions in a constructive way. The Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemeth and the Jewish Agency prepared a scheme to establish fifteen new settlements in different parts of the country --- mostly in the so-called prohibited area; to extend our settlements in the South to Beersheba; and to strengthen our positions in Galilee in the neighborhood of Hanita. I may add that it is intended to establish these settlements partly on private Jewish land and partly on National Fund land. We hope to be able to establish many settlements on newly acquired land. The Arabs are earnestly trying to have this land transferred officially to Jews. I think they will succeed. By these means we sought to break down the limitations and to go into the parts of the country which the Government is barring from the Jews.

But this program of colonization, when fully realized, will cost approximately £800,000. In its initial stage it requires approximately £450,000 to £500,000. I do not think it necessary to explain here the importance of this project.

In furthering the program for industrial development we negotiated with the Government to create in Palestine a base for war supplies. We were rebuffed at the beginning of the war, but we have renewed negotiations, and I hope they will meet with more success. At least there are better prospects today. Again, this cable for huge sums of money. Our idea is not only to consolidate our position in Palestine. It is our belief that Palestine will have to play a still greater role in Jewish life after the war. And we must prepare now. Our intention is to create in Palestine new strongholds to face new problems as they come. But in the meantime we must consolidate our position in Palestine, and absorb as many immigrants as we can. Especially for Polish Jewry, Palestine is the only country of immigration now.

It is impossible to hope that the Yishuv in Palestine can take upon itself all these tasks. In this war period there is practically only one country that can help us -- the United States. We received from the United States approximately 60% of the income of the Keren Heyesod in our budget year -- October 1938- September 1939. In the six months of this budget year the Keren Hayesod received approximately 70% of its total income from the United States. May I mention that the war has already taken away from the Keren Hayesod approximately £60,000 in income from Poland, the Scandinavian countries, Holland and Belgium; and the most recent developments have endangered an additional £50,000 of the income of the Keren Hayesod.

At the Congress we discussed an ordinary budget of approximately £720,000; and we hoped that of this £720,000 we might get approximately £450,000 from the United States. This figure of £450,000 was the basis of the budget of £720,000. We received in Palestine during the first six months £170,000 from the United States. I know that additional sums were transferred to Geneva. I do not have the exact figures before me. I think that the total funds transferred from the United States during the first six months were approximately £200,000. This is less than we had hoped to receive -- not much less, but less.

If I took into consideration the decrease in income from the other countries, and the increase of our need as a result of the war, then I might say that, in order to continue the work in Palestine as it was carried on during the first six or seven months of the war, the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth should demand from the United States approximately £400,000 each for the next six months. I am not taking into consideration additional emergency needs that may arise should Italy enter the war; but I am taking into consideration the loss from other countries. We must receive from you approximately 80% of our total income; the other 20% we may get from other countries outside of the United States.

I am asking £400,000 for the Keren Hayesod alone. Really, I do not ask. I am merely stating the facts. I am not on one side, and you on the other. You are now the only country which we may consult. I am bringing the facts before you, and you will have to decide and bear together with us the responsibility of these tasks. If we do not succeed in raising the necessary funds for the continuation of constructive work, we will have to face the alternative -- instead of construction we will have to increase social relief and renew the dole on a very large scale.

We may face an additional emergency if the Mediterranean is closed. The crisis in the orange trade is a bitter one. Nevertheless, the season was better than many had anticipated. There is still a loss, but we succeeded in exporting approximately 8,000,000 cases. If the Mediterranean is to be closed, no one knows what will happen. But we must continue to cultivate the orange groves. That requires a yearly expenditure of approximately £750,000. The Jews invested approximately £12,000,000 in the orange trade apart from the cost of the land.

I have mentioned the improvement in industry. The old factories are working with greater speed, and many new factories have been established. We prepared a program for the further development of industry. Apart from the financial problem we must face the question of the importation of raw materials. We obtained the greater part of these from Europe. Now Europe is closed or may be closed. Some of the material we may start to produce in Palestine. But that puts before us the question of diverting the trade

from Europe to other countries, probably mainly to America. These materials would have to come through the Suez Canal or the Persian Gulf from the East. We now also have good overland roads to Cairo and Bagdad.

These are many of the problems that we may have to face. Perhaps we will not be able to solve them one hundred percent, but we may solve them partially if we get the necessary funds.

This compels me to turn to the question of the loan. We did not intend to invest the money of the loan for ordinary budgetary items, but in securities of subsidiary Palestinian companies, creating new assets that would reasonably assure the repayment of the loan from their income. But you know what the actual position is. And most of our friends are advising that we postpone the actual initiation of the loan because of prevailing conditions. I am ready to accept this view, but we need additional sums, especially in view of the acute emergency.

I may add a word with regard to the English and the Arabs from the economic point of view. We offered our help to the British Government. We were refused. But the change in the Government in England opens new prospects for us -- and wide prospects. (Of course, we go on the assumption that the Allies will not collapse).

A few words with regard to the Arabs. I will not discuss the political side of the problem, but only the economic side. There is an active readiness on the part of Arabs to renew social and economic relations with us. The economic position of the Arabs in Palestine is a bitter one. They have the advantage of being more primitive. Their primitive economy is more resilient than our modern economy; and, therefore, they are better able to adapt themselves to the new conditions. Tens of thousands of them have gone back into their villages. But, nevertheless, their position is not enviable. I may say the higher class

of the population -- the land owners, orange growers and house owners--- suffers more acutely. They now see that the only hope for improvement is economic cooperation with the Jews. This was why a large group of the Arab population was so amazed at the new land ordinance, and was - apart from the followers of the Mufti- opposed to it. They were ready to start a protest action, but were prevented from so doing by the interference of many government officials.

The practical question of the availability of land for purchase by us, at least for the next few years, does not bother us in Palestine as much as it appears to be bothering many Jews in the United States. Even under the terms of the latest British land restrictions, imposed by the Government -- which government has since been superseded --, there are approximately 750 dunams of land which we can reasonably hope to acquire in the next years if the funds are available. This does not include the negeb. The acquisition of these 750 dunams and the colonization of the land will require the huge sum of approximately £18,000,000 to £20,000,000. However, this will pave the way for the agricultural settlement of approximately 25,000 to 30,000 Jewish families.

All the foregoing does not diminish by one iota the political significance of the land restrictions and the necessity for our taking continued steps to achieve the withdrawal of the White Paper and its policy.

The war solved one big economic problem --- marketing. We have a market for our agricultural and industrial products. We will have to face a very serious shortage in a few items such as meat, sugar, butter, and many industrial products. However, we have vegetables, flour, wheat, milk and eggs. This situation created the possibility for increase in agriculture and in many industries, including fishing. This demands funds. We were often handicapped by the attitude of the Government. Because of political considerations the administration was not interested in strengthening our economic life or in giving us the opportunity to create new strongholds in Palestine. The Government intervened only when the position was acute. When the number of unemployed went up into the tens of thousands, then the Government offered £750,000 for relief and relief work for Jews and Arabs alike. When the position in the orange industry was very acute, in order to enable the continuation of cultivation, the Government offered a partial guarantee in the amount of £340,000 to the banks, which were lending the money to the growers. The Government always takes this very cautious line in order not to strengthen the Jews too much. I sincerely hope that this attitude of the Government has already changed. Because of the new developments of the war they are going to be compelled to take a more favorable attitude. Perhaps they will not proclaim a new policy, but they will not hamper us. That opens large opportunities for us. It is simply a question of funds.

My last word relates to the future of the Jews. There are left in the world only two communities which are vital forces in Jewish life; the 500,000 Jews in Palestine, the vanguard of the Jewish people; and the 5,000,000 Jews in the United States, the only remnant of the Jewish people in the Diaspora.

This is the message: "Are you ready to recognize this state of affairs, and to mobilize your forces in accordance with the needs, the prospects, the hopes?"

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JEW PALESTINE APPEAL
EAST 42nd STREET
NEW YORK CITY

MEMORANDUM

May 24, 1940

TO: Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

FROM: Mr. Henry Montor

MEETING TO DISCUSS COMPOSITION OF DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE
OF UJA FOR 1940 HELD AT UJA OFFICE

342 MADISON AVENUE, FRIDAY MORNING, MAY 24, 1940

PRESENT: Dr. Lowenstein, Presiding, Abba Hillel Silver, Sidney Hollander,
Paul Maerwald, Jonah B. Wise, Joseph C. Hyman, Isidor Coons and
Henry Montor

Mr. Hyman stated that following preliminary negotiations and subsequent conversations between Mr. Montor and himself there had been agreement by the JDC on seven names from among whom might be chosen three men to represent Welfare Fund communities on the Distribution Committee of the UJA, which is to consist of seven members: two for the UPA, two for the JDC and three for the Welfare Fund communities. These names were as follows:

Jacob Blaustein, Baltimore
Robert Koshland, San Francisco
Monte Lemann, New Orleans
Judge Horace Stern, Philadelphia
Harris Perlstein, Chicago
David Watchmaker, Boston
Leon Sunstein, Philadelphia

Dr. Silver, pointing out that the UPA had recommended many names which had been vetoed by the JDC, stated that the UPA had considered the list of seven names and had agreed upon three acceptable to it: Harris Perlstein, Monte Lemann and Leon Sunstein.

Dr. Lowenstein then said that Leon Sunstein must be considered out and that he was unacceptable.

Mr. Hollander then declared that Judge Horace Stern ought not to be considered.

Dr. Silver pointed out that the functions of the Distribution Committee will be sharply circumscribed. When the Distribution Committee had been originally considered it was contemplated that it would have between six and eight million dollars to act upon, but from an analysis that had been made of the campaign it seemed that there would be a maximum of between one and one and a half million dollars for the Distribution Committee to allocate. In that event the role of the Distribution Committee could not be considered on the same level as it had been originally and that the composition of the membership need not be dealt with so stringently.

Dr. Lowenstein felt, however, that the Distribution Committee could have great value which had nothing to do with the amount at its disposal, but with procedures which it would establish for the future. He felt that the haggling that had characterized the negotiations for the 1940 agreement of the UJA had been bad and that the country at large was indignant at such procedures. The work of the Distribution Committee might create the basis for future negotiations.

Dr. Silver added that among the names which the UPA had suggested and which had been turned down was that of Fred Butzel of Detroit. He added that Robert Koshland of San Francisco was acceptable to the UPA. However, Jacob Blaustein was out.

Mr. Baerwald then said that Fred Butzel would be acceptable to him.

Dr. Silver then pointed out that among other names which had been recommended by the UPA were those of Judge Kaplan of Boston and Henry Wineman of Detroit as well as Henry Monsky, President of Bnai Brith. The name of Mr. Monsky was turned down by the JDC, but Mr. Baerwald said that the names of Judge Kaplan and of Henry Wineman would be agreeable to him.

As a result of these discussions an agreement was reached that Mr. Hollander, on behalf of the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds, could communicate with the following seven people inviting three to represent Welfare Fund communities on the Distribution Committee and taking one succeeding name in the event that those originally called upon declined to serve. The nominees were as follows:

Harris Perlstein, Chicago
Monte Lerman, New Orleans
Robert Koshland, San Francisco
David Watchmaker, Boston
Fred Butzel, Detroit
Henry Wineman, Detroit
Judge Jacob Kaplan, Boston

Mr. Hyman reported that he, Harry Lurie and Henry Montor had investigated the qualifications of many individuals for the post of research director for the ~~Executive~~ Distribution Committee but that no decision had yet been arrived at. These three were authorized by the group to make recommendations to the Distribution Committee for research director, although it was pointed out that the actual selection of the research director must be made by the Distribution Committee itself.

Mr. Hollander asked who the UPA and JDC representatives on the Distribution Committee would be. Dr. Silver and Mr. Baerwald stated that the names would be forthcoming within the next day or two.

Mr. Hollander asked who would elect the chairman of the Distribution Committee of seven. It was agreed that the committee would elect its own chairman.

EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS
111 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY


MEMORANDUM

May 24, 1940

TO: MEMBERS OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

FROM: SAMUEL CAPLAN

1. Attached is a copy of the minutes of the last meeting of the Emergency Committee.
2. The next meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, May 28th, at 2.30 P.M. at the ZOA office.



MINUTES OF MEETING OF EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS
HELD ON TUESDAY, MAY 21, 1940, AT THE ZOA OFFICE, 111 FIFTH AVE., NEW YORK

PRESENT:

Louis Lipsky presiding; Israel Goldstein, Hayim Greenberg, Mrs. David de Sola Pool, Morris Rothenberg, Mrs. Herman Shulman, Robert Szold, David Wertheim, Stephen S. Wise.

Kurt Blumenfeld, Josef Cohn, Eliezer Kaplan, Morris Margulies, Henry Montor, by invitation.

Samuel Caplan, secretary.

Minutes of the previous meeting as circulated were approved.

DR. WEIZMANN'S ARRIVAL:

The chairman reported that a cable had been received on May 11th from Dr. Weizmann, stating that the latest developments abroad prevented his departure at this time but that he would try to come early in June.

Mr. Kaplan said that before his departure he had spoken to Dr. Weizmann, who had expressed his desire to come to the United States as soon as possible and had promised to send a cable the following week as to his plans.

Dr. Wise felt that in view of the war developments, the time was not propitious for Dr. Weizmann to consummate his plans with regard to the loan for Palestine.

Mr. Kaplan suggested that the Committee wait for a few days until word is received from Dr. Weizmann regarding his plans.

The chairman extended a formal welcome to Mr. Kaplan on behalf of the Emergency Committee and invited him to report on the situation in Palestine.

REPORT BY MR. ELIEZER KAPLAN:

1. Economic Situation: While Palestine is undergoing a transition from peace economy to war economy, there has nevertheless been a general improvement in trade and mixed agriculture. There has been an increase in the domestic demand which largely contributed to the solution of the marketing problem arising as a result of decrease in imports. Unemployment has decreased since the outbreak of the war, the figure having fallen from 18,000 in September, 1939, to 10 or 11,000 in April, 1940. Bank deposits which decreased sharply after the outbreak of the war have now shown a steady rise so that they now amount to more than 17 million pounds as compared with 20 million pounds at the outbreak of war. In the first three months of the war approximately 12 new factories were built, with a capital investment of 60,000 pounds, and employing about 250 people.

2. Economic Relations with the Palestine Government: The Palestine economy is now completely controlled by the government. While efforts were made by the Jewish Agency to influence the government to exercise its power of control in the direction of permanent, constructive help to the country, these have not met with success owing to the negative attitude of the government to Jewish enterprise. The Palestine government had no intention of doing anything that would strengthen Jewish economy and was moved to action only when the situation became acute. Thus it made a grant of 750,000 pounds of which the Vaad Leumi received about 70,000 pounds for direct relief, and the major portion of the money was given in the form of loans to municipalities. The government also extended a loan to the citrus growers and is contemplating the setting up of a citrus control board with broad powers. It is clear that the government in its economic policy was governed by political considerations designed to implement the provisions of the White Paper and to weaken the position of the Yishuv so as to break down its resistance to the White Paper policy. This was evident in the government's systematic effort to confiscate all arms despite its previous promise not to search for arms. However, because of the fall of the Chamberlain government, it is hoped that the Palestine government will adopt a more liberal policy.

3. Arabs: The masses of Arabs have suffered more than the Jews in the disturbances, their standard of living having fallen to that of the early twenties. But with the cessation of the disturbances and the prospect for a good crop this year, their situation will improve, particularly if the government will protect them against the usurers. The upper classes of Arabs have also suffered much and they cannot be helped so easily. There is now a sincere desire among the Arabs for the resumption of closer social and economic relations with the Jews because they see in the Jews their only hope for improving their economic condition. Certain groups of Arabs were ready to protest against the land regulations but the government's interference stopped this movement.

Despite the resumption of friendly relations between Jews and Arabs, it is fruitless to engage in political negotiations for the following reasons: (1) the Mufti, living in Bagdad, is still conducting a sharp anti-British campaign in the Arab countries under the guise of "neutrality." He is reported to have taken the position that it was premature for Arabs to throw their weight to either side because it is not yet evident who will be the winner. The other Arab parties have lost their following and the Mufti is now the only one who has any influence among the leading Palestine Arabs. (2) There is no basis for negotiations because Jews cannot offer the Arabs any more than the government has already given them in the White Paper. (3) The Arabs in Palestine are aware that political decisions are reached elsewhere than in Palestine. However, there have been approaches for negotiations on the part of non-Palestine Arabs.

4. The change of British Cabinet: The fall of the Chamberlain government has created a new situation and from the Zionist point of view the new government, including as it does so many pro-Zionists, is an ideal one, with which it will be possible to discuss the problems of Palestine in a friendly atmosphere. The new British government is not likely to issue a new declaration abolishing the White Paper, because of the war situation. However, with the sympathetic cooperation of the new government it may be possible to create many new Jewish strongholds in Palestine and it is the intention of the Executive to press the following demands: (a) a Jewish military unit in Palestine; (b) supplies; (c) immigration.

In response to a question from Judge Rothenberg, Mr. Kaplan stated that Palestine is inadequately prepared against air attacks. The army which is now stationed in Palestine and neighboring countries is being held in readiness for operations in the Balkans. There are ample food supplies but in the event of actual warfare, Palestine may be faced with a shortage of raw materials.

Touching upon the financial situation, Mr. Kaplan said that in the past six months the Jewish Agency has expended approximately 600,000 pounds of which about 70% came from the United States. The Nazi invasion of the Scandinavian and the Low countries has cut off an approximate income of 60,000 pounds. The financial question is becoming acute, there being a shortage of funds with which to acquire land which the Arabs are making every effort to transfer to us and upon which it is possible to establish 16 new settlements. Immigration is continuing, but there is not enough money to care for the immigrants, most of whom must be helped after their arrival in Palestine. Mr. Kaplan stated that preparations had been made for routing immigrants through Odessa and Constanza in the event that the Mediterranean is closed by the war.

Mr. Kaplan concluded his statement by pointing out that there are only two forces remaining in Jewish life -- Palestine and America, and he urged that the Emergency Committee, representing the totality of American Zionism, organize itself in such a way as to be able to cope with the immense problems arising out of the present situation.

It was decided that the Chairman name a sub-committee to meet with Mr. Kaplan in order to formulate proposals for action which should be submitted to a meeting of the Emergency Committee on Tuesday, May 28th.

TREASURER'S REPORT:

The treasurer submitted a financial statement as of May 21st, 1940.

Respectfully submitted

SAMUEL KAPLAN
Secretary

May 28, 1940

Judge Louis E. Levinthal
606 City Hall
Philadelphia, Pa.

My dear Friend:

Let me thank you for your kind note of May 23. There is a long story to Mr. Norman's effort to organize an American Palestine Fund. I wish I had the time to go into detail. I would certainly not join this organization. I suspect that it is an effort on the part of anti-Zionists and those who are opposed to the Jewish Agency in Palestine to set up a competing organization which will undermine not alone the authority of the United Palestine Appeal, but also of the Jewish Agency in Palestine. As you may note from the list of directors, they are all either bitter anti-Zionists or non-Zionist members of the American branch of the Jewish Agency, or partisan foes of the Jewish Agency. A few innocents are being inveigled into the organization.

Neither the United Palestine Appeal, the Zionist Organization of America, the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem nor the Vaad Leumi have been consulted by these gentlemen who propose to found the American Palestine Fund Incorporated. You know, of course, that Mr. Norman has on several occasions delivered most vicious and most unfair attacks on Zionism.

As I size up the situation, it is a subtle attempt on the part of the same New York crowd which is running the Joint Distribution Committee and the American Jewish Committee to get a controlling influence upon life in Palestine through a control of the support of all the cultural, religious and philanthropic institutions in that country whose source of income from now on will be exclusively from the United States.

Considerable work has already been done by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds in conjunction with the Vaad Leumi in Palestine to check up on the various Palestine American organizations who are making appeals in the United States, to obtain information about them, and to inform local Welfare Funds concerning them. Many of the Welfare Funds in the

Judge Levinthal

-2-

May 28, 1940

United States have established their own special contingency funds to take care of these appeals. The situation does not call for the creation of a new super organization in the United States.

Mr. Montor, I am sure, could provide you with considerably more information about this project.

Very sincerely yours,

AHS:BK



EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS
111 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY

MEMORANDUM

May 31, 1940

TO: MEMBERS OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

FROM: SAMUEL CAPLAN

Attached herewith is a copy of the minutes of the last meeting of the Emergency Committee.

The next meeting will be held on Monday, June 3rd, at 4 P.M. at the ZOA office.

MINUTES OF MEETING OF EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS
HELD ON TUESDAY, MAY 28, 1940, AT THE ZOA OFFICE, 111 FIFTH AVENUE, N.Y.

PRESENT:

Louis Lipsky presiding; Gedaliah Bublick, Israel Goldstein, Mrs. David de Sola Pool, Mrs. Herman Shulman, Robert Szold, David Wertheim, Stephen S. Wise.

Kurt Blumenfeld, Josef Cohn, Eliezer Kaplan, Morris Margulies, by invitation.

Samuel Caplan, secretary

Minutes of the previous meeting as circulated were approved.

COMMUNICATIONS:

The secretary reported that a letter had been received by Dr. Wise from Mr. Jabotinsky on May 19th, suggesting the immediate establishment of a World Jewish Committee "to concentrate the care and defense of the interests of our people in the Eastern hemisphere." The same letter had been sent to Paul Baerwald, Justice Brandeis, Abraham Cahan, Rabbi Louis Finkelstein, Rabbi Solomon Goldman, Henry Monsky and Rabbi David de Sola Pool.

On May 21st Mr. Kaplan received the following cable from Dr. Weizmann:

"JABOTINSKY CABLES QUOTE PROPOSE TO YOU JOINING EFFORTS
 ESTABLISH UNITED JEWISH FRONT FOR POLICY AND RELIEF
 URGE IMMEDIATE CONSULTATION BETWEEN OURSELVES OR DEPUTIES
 UNQUOTE CONSULT FRIENDS AND ADVISE"

It was the consensus of opinion that the type of conference suggested by Mr. Jabotinsky could serve no useful purpose and Mr. Kaplan undertook to advise Dr. Weizmann accordingly.

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE:

Mr. Lipsky reported briefly on the meeting of the sub-committee held on Saturday, May 25th at Mr. Kaplan's hotel. The members of the sub-committee are: Israel Goldstein, Louis Lipsky, Mrs. David de Sola Pool, Morris Rothenberg, David Wertheim and Dr. Wise. It was the feeling of all the members of the sub-committee, Mr. Lipsky said, that the Emergency Committee as now constituted is inadequate and that immediate steps should be taken to reorganize and enlarge the Committee to include influential personalities able and willing to give service. The sub-committee also agreed, Mr. Lipsky added, that the Emergency Committee should serve as the organizing body for the formation of the new Committee.

IT WAS MOVED BY DR. WISE, SECONDED AND CARRIED:
 THAT the Emergency Committee, acting in behalf of all Zionist interests, reconstitute itself with a view to reorganizing the work assigned to it at the time of its formation;

THAT the Committee be enlarged to include the following: (a) additional members of the four Zionist parties already included in the Committee; (b) representatives of the non-Zionist forces; (c) leading personalities in American Jewish life;

THAT a special committee be appointed to study the situation and report to the whole Committee;

THAT the plan for reconstituting the Emergency Committee shall not be put into operation without the prior approval of Dr. Weizmann and the Executive.

Dr. Goldstein felt that, pending the reconstitution of the Committee, the present Committee should continue to hold regular meetings, receive periodic reports from the Washington Bureau, the Bureau for Zionist Work Among Immigrants, etc., and generally to conduct its business in such a manner as to be able to bring to the enlarged Committee a background of concrete accomplishments and experience.

In reply to Mr. Szold's question as to how the Provisional Zionist Committee functioned during the World War, Mr. Lipsky said that the Committee was formed as a result of a special conference, called at the request of Shmarya Levin, who was a member of the Zionist Executive. This Committee, comprising approximately 30 people, was the supreme body controlling all Zionist activities in America and was responsible for all Zionist fund-raising as well as expenditures. The Committee set up a Transfer Bureau for the remittance of money from America to Europe and Palestine. The first action in connection with the war was the sending of Hadassah nurses to Palestine. The Hadassah Medical Unit was organized by the Provisional Zionist Committee and all the funds for the Medical Unit were provided by the Committee.

Mr. Szold observed that the present situation differs from that which obtained in 1914 since there was then no Yishuv and no functioning Zionist Executive. He added that during the last war the Provisional Committee had taken on the functions of the World Zionist Organization but today the Emergency Committee is acting only as the representative of the Jewish Agency.

Supplementing Mr. Szold's remarks, Mr. Lipsky observed that a complex situation had developed during the growth of the Zionist organization itself and that certain independent forces had been created which operated satisfactorily under normal conditions but which must now be united in order that whatever is done on behalf of the Agency should have the coordinated interest of all the parties concerned.

Dr. Goldstein felt that caution should be used in creating a larger Emergency Committee, to include non-Zionists, because some of the questions that will arise will be purely Zionist in character. He suggested that in forming the enlarged Committee, it be understood that Zionist matters shall be dealt with exclusively by the Zionist members of the Committee.

Mr. Kaplan stressed the importance of coordinating the work of all the Zionist groups. In this connection he said that he had received a cable from Palestine urging that a shekel campaign be organized in order to demon-

strate the strength and the solidarity of the Zionist membership. We must also be prepared, Mr. Kaplan continued, to bring into our midst not only representatives of Zionist parties but also, if possible, influential Zionists and non-Zionists. It is clear, said Mr. Kaplan, that this new Committee could not function in the same manner as the Provisional Zionist Committee did during the World War. We have to deal now, he said, with three major problems: (a) political in relation to the government here; (b) economic needs of Palestine and coordination of the fund-raising agencies; (c) winning of public opinion. He proposed the appointment of a small committee, each member of which would be asked to formulate a plan of activity for a specific function of the enlarged Committee.

Dr. Goldstein suggested that Jerusalem and London be advised of the plans being formulated and that they be asked for advice.

IT WAS MOVED, SECONDED AND CARRIED:

THAT a committee be appointed, each member to be assigned a specific task and to bring in a report to the next meeting of the Emergency Committee.

The tasks of the committee and the individuals to whom they were assigned are as follows:

Economic	-----	Robert Szold
Political	-----	Dr. Stephen S. Wise
Public information	-----	Louis Lipsky
Palestine funds	-----	Dr. Israel Goldstein
Organization and Composition of Committee	----	Gedaliah Bublick, Solomon Goldman, Mrs. David de Sola Pool, David Wertheim, in addition to above named.

It was suggested by Mr. Lipsky that every member of the Emergency Committee give thought to the composition of the new Committee and submit recommendations.

Mr. Kaplan felt that the new people to be included in the Committee would respond more favorably if Mr. Brandeis would consent to invite their cooperation.

Mr. Kaplan, Mr. Szold and Dr. Wise were empowered to submit this suggestion to Mr. Brandeis.

WASHINGTON BUREAU:

It was the consensus of opinion that a report be submitted to the next meeting of the Committee by its Washington Bureau and that monthly reports be given thereafter.

It was decided to hold the next meeting on Monday, June 3rd.

Respectfully submitted

SAMUEL CAPLAN
Secretary

C O P Y

NA39 95 CABLE VIA IMP FIL RELAY VIA BY - LONDON JUNE 7, 1940

NLT KAPLAN CARE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION - 11 FIFTH AVE. NEWYORK
(DELIVER CARE HOTEL COMMODORE NYC)

PLEASE CONVEY ALL FRIENDS QUOTE IN THIS FATEFUL HOUR WHEN AMERICAN JEWRY
IS CALLED TO PLAY DECISIVE PART IN DESTINIES OUR PEOPLE OUR MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA MUST CLOSE ITS RANKS AND ALL DISPUTES GIVE WAY TO UNITED EFFORT
FOR SAKE OF PEOPLE AND COUNTRY EQUALLY DEAR TO YOU ALL STOP IN NAME ALL MY
COLLEAGUES AND PERSONALLY APPEAL TO ALL CONCERNED FORTHWITH ELIMINATE ALL
INTERNAL DIFFERENCES AND PRESENT PITTSBURGH CONVENTION ~~BECK~~ UNITED FRONT
OF ACTION AND DEVOTION SUCH AS WILL ENTITLE ZIONISM TO LEADERSHIP AMERICAN
JEWRY



WEIZMANN



THE AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE, Inc.

100 EAST 42nd STREET, NEW YORK CITY

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ISIDOR COONS, *Director of Fund Raising*

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver,
The Temple,
E. 105th St. and Ansel Rd.,
Cleveland, Ohio

June 7, 1940

Dear Rabbi Silver:

A number of our friends have been inquiring regarding the present status of J.D.C. activities and I am therefore writing you this informative note, quite apart from our Bulletin which has been sent to you.

The invasion of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, the battles now being waged in France, have enormously complicated the overseas situation and the problems of the J.D.C. The influx into France of 1,500,000 - 2,000,000 refugees from Belgium, 75,000 from Luxembourg and 50,000 from Holland, has produced such a catastrophe as to challenge the concerted efforts of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations.

The American Red Cross calls on this country for \$20,000,000. This call deserves the support of all Americans. We know that Jewish citizens, in common with their Protestant and Catholic fellow-citizens, will generously contribute to this effort, as a special effort entirely apart from their contribution to the United Jewish Appeal.

The American Red Cross program deals with the immediate emergency - with the wounded soldiers and civilians, with the people who need momentary relief. The numbers affected, the suddenness of their enforced flight, the requirements for food, clothing and shelter will quickly exhaust even the large sums now solicited. That work is being conducted without discrimination.

Among the masses that have poured into France, there are included, undoubtedly, a large number of the native Jewish inhabitants of Belgium and of Holland, as well as the German refugees who had found temporary asylum in those countries.

Mr. Morris C. Troper, the European Chairman of J.D.C., is in close touch with the European Director of the Red Cross, Mr. Wayne C. Taylor. Our relationships with the American, French and Belgian Red Cross Societies, and other bodies, have been most cordial. Officers of the J.D.C. have been meeting in Washington from time to time with Mr. Norman H. Davis, President of the American Red Cross.

For the time being, J.D.C. finds its avenues of assistance in Belgium and Holland cut off. What may be required on a large scale in France is now subject to inquiry. Meanwhile, our contributions to the French Jewish relief committees continue. It should also be remembered that J.D.C. activities extend far beyond the areas in which the present battles are being waged. More than ever, the J.D.C. is faced with the aggravated needs of hundreds of thousands of Jews in Poland, Roumania, Hungary, in Old Germany, former

Austria, Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia, in Switzerland, Italy, Shanghai, and in fifteen South and Central American countries. These programs which the J.D.C. has been conducting cannot be suspended. We have already been forced to reduce appropriations for these programs; they will have to be reduced further if adequate funds are not forthcoming. Except for the J.D.C., no other organization, Jewish or non-Jewish, is regularly operating in those countries to bring help to Jews in desperate need of food, shelter, clothing and other elementary necessities.

The situation of the 1,300,000 Jews in German-occupied Poland is indescribable. Eighty percent face actual starvation. Through J.D.C. assistance, 850 relief stations have been serving one meal a day to as high as 500,000 persons in recent months. A minimal program of aid for Poland today calls for expenditures of \$300,000 monthly, a sum we cannot provide unless the campaigns make the funds available. In Lithuania 10,000 Jewish refugees are being fed daily at the kitchens in Vilna. The impoverished native Jews of Lithuania are also helped. We spend \$75,000 monthly there. Without aid from us, the refugees in Lithuania face deportation.

In Germany, Austria and Bohemia-Moravia, 400,000 Jews remain, many of them dependent for their daily bread on what we give. During the early months of the year, we were able to help many thousands to emigrate. The refusal of Italy to issue transit visas today closes the most important avenue of escape. Alternative methods of travel, however, are being explored. These may prove more expensive, but they have to be considered.


One hundred thousand refugees in South and Central America and in Shanghai require our aid. This is imperative, if we are to do the right and just thing by them, by the normal Jewish populations in that area, and by our American neighbor requirements.

We call to your attention that the J.D.C. has appropriated, for January through July 31st, \$5,000,000 for its programs of aid. Up to the end of May, the J.D.C. spent on its 1940 program about \$3,500,000. The cash was not on hand; the campaigns had not yielded these sums in actual payments. The J.D.C. therefore borrowed \$1,500,000 from the banks and \$700,000 from affiliated institutions, - a great responsibility.

At this writing, Mr. Troper and Dr. Schwartz of our European Council, are visiting Switzerland, Italy, and Hungary to meet with representatives of the Jewish communities there and with those of Germany and Austria. Members of our staff are now stationed in Paris, Angers and Bordeaux, France, in Vilna, Budapest, Genoa and St. Gall, Switzerland. Our Warsaw office carries on. Our representatives are now covering South America.

From this summary you will see that J.D.C. requirements have in no way been lessened by the new war situation. In fact they have been aggravated. Numerous appeals come to us daily and many of them from places which heretofore never had to appeal to us. Our Budget and Scope Committee has been compelled to refuse practically all of these new requests, many of which are of great urgency and the denial of which, unfortunately, will result in untold hardships. You will see that we are not in want of opportunities to spend money and we know that there is urgent need of much more money than we have at our disposal.

Sincerely yours,



Paul Baerwald
Chairman

COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST ACTION

COMMITTEE

Robert M. Bernstein
Samuel Berson
Rabbi Herbert I. Bloom
Rabbi Maurice J. Bloom
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Robert Szold
Abraham Tulin
Abraham Uslander
Herman Weisman
Murray Wyner
Senator Jacob Weiss

List Incomplete

Office of the Secretary
HYMAN A. SCHULSON
Room 820
49 Chambers Street
New York City
COrtlandt 7-4069

June 11, 1940

Dear Fellow-Zionists :

In an effort to revitalize, strengthen and unify the Zionist movement in America for the present emergency, a national Committee For Zionist Action has recently been organized. Some of the outstanding leaders on Zionism in America are included in this Committee, which is still in formation.

The plan of action includes, among other things, an immediate inclusion of new forces into the Zionist movement. The Committee has surveyed the problem and has sought suitable figures in American Jewish life who could be induced to become active in the leadership of the movement, especially such personalities as have been identified with the movement for many years, but who have failed to assume active responsibilities for the functioning of the movement. In order to draw these figures into the work, it has been proposed to name a personality as representative of such persons in the position of leadership in the movement. In casting about for such a personality, the name of Edmund I. Kaufmann, of Washington, D.C., has been mentioned. It is felt by the Committee that if sufficient stress is put upon the importance of having Mr. Kaufmann assume the leadership of the Zionist Organization of America, he will accept the call and take on the leadership of the organization. Enclosed herewith is a biographical note on Kaufmann.

Will you kindly urge your Zionist district and region to pass resolutions calling for the draft of Mr. Edmund I. Kaufmann for President and the election of delegates to support his candidacy, and Executive Committee and Administrative Council which will implement the reorganization program and platform of Dr. Solomon Goldman:

Please mail to me as soon as possible a list of your Zionist district's delegates and their addresses, and kindly inform me whether they will support the Committee's program and platform.

With Zion's greetings,

Very truly yours,

Hyman A. Schulson

HYMAN A. SCHULSON, Secretary,
Committee For Zionist Action

HAS:EK
Enc.

P.S. In the event that your Zionist district cannot send the full quota of delegates it is entitled to send to the Convention because of distance, expense, or any other reason, your district may, under the election rules, elect as delegates Zionists in good standing who will attend the Convention. If this situation exists in your district, please inform me immediately and I will send you a list of names of Zionists in good standing whom your district can elect as its delegates. The time is short. Please reply immediately.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ON EDMUND I. KAUFMANN

Edmund I. Kaufmann of Washington, D.C., is an outstanding figure in Jewish and Zionist affairs and American business men. In all his manifold activities for Jewish interests over a long period of time, he has consistently shunned public credit, so that only those closely associated with him know the wide extent of his participation in Jewish affairs and his deep understanding of Jewish problems.

As a child in Detroit, Michigan, where he was born fifty-three years ago, Mr. Kaufmann found in his parents an example of service to the Jewish people and absorbed from them a knowledge of the Jewish question. One branch of the family immigrated to the United States as early as 1848, another in 1863. Yet in their long years in this country and in spite of their intense interest and activity in American affairs, Mr. Kaufmann's forbears never broke ties with the Jews of Europe and educated their children to a sense of responsibility to the Jewish people and Jewish needs.

The years 1916 and 1917 marked a turning point in Mr. Kaufmann's development as a leading personality in Jewish affairs. In the former year he became acquainted with Dr. Stephen S. Wise and in the latter with Mr. Justice Louis D. Brandeis. From these eminent Zionist figures, whose close friend he has been from the first meeting with them, he learned of the paramount importance of building Palestine.

Mr. Kaufmann has carried his Zionism into his business life whenever possible. Coming into daily contact with many of the wealthy Jews in this country, many of them unsympathetic and even hostile to Zionism, he always sought by personal effort and example to bring the value of Zionism home to all American Jews. He fought actively to unite the fund raising activities of the American Jewish Community and to give Zionist funds their just share in the united appeals, always seeking to impress other Jews with the significance of Palestine for Jewish survival. Feeling that Zionism and Palestine should enter the daily life of every American Jew, he, as a mature man busied with a multiplicity of business and communal interests, devoted himself to the study of Hebrew.

While long a source of strength to the Zionist Organization in his community, Mr. Kaufmann has sought by example and personal influence to bring the Zionist spirit into the entire field of Jewish affairs. As a successful leader of the United Jewish Appeal in Washington, as a member of the governing boards of the Jewish Institute of Religion, of which Dr. Stephen S. Wise is the head, the Joint Distribution Committee, the Hias, the Jewish Chautauque Society, the Washington Jewish Center and Zionist District, and many other groups, he has sought to have his collaborators come closer to the Zionist view, for he feels that Zionism has a lesson and message for all Jewish life and organizations.

His extensive business interests are in chains of jewelry and furniture stores throughout the United States, and in other commercial properties. By reason of his progressive methods he has won considerable influence in financial and government circles.

In his Zionist work, Mr. Kaufmann has always stressed the necessity of bringing the message of Palestine to the American born Jew, contending that while the European Jew is a Zionist by birth and environment, the American Jew must be made a Zionist by education and organization. He insists that there is room in the Zionist movement for every Jew worthy of the name and worthy of our age-old heritage.

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, on his recent visit to America, spent considerable time with Mr. Kaufmann in a discussion of the Zionist affairs, and was the guest of Mr. Kaufmann at his home in Florida.

June 13, 1940

EMERGENCY COMMITTEE
NEW YORK

YISHUV CALM ENDEAVORING CARRY ON NORMAL WORK AS BEST POSSIBLE
UNDER WAR CONDITIONS STOP FULLY REALISES ITS VERY EXISTENCE
DEPENDS OUTCOME STRUGGLE IS READY THROW ITS ENTIRE COLLECTIVE
RESOURCES IN MANPOWER AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION INTO DEFENCE
COUNTRY FOR DEMOCRATIC WORLD VICTORY AND SALVATION JEWISH NATIONAL
HOME STOP LOOKS TO MANDATORY GOVERNMENT TAKE FULLY ADEQUATE
MEASURES FOR PROTECTION PALESTINE AGAINST ANY PERIL MAKING
WIDEST USE OF JEWS AS FAITHFUL ALLIES STOP EXPECTS AMERICAN
JEWRY RENDER ALL POSSIBLE HELP PRESENT WORLD STRUGGLE IN WHICH
JEWISH AND ZIONIST FUTURE ARE AT STAKE AND ASSIST VANGUARD
JEWISH PEOPLE ENTRENCHED PALESTINE MAINTAIN ITS POSITIONS IN
THIS SUPREME EMERGENCY



EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS
111 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

M E M O R A N D U M

June 14, 1940

TO: MEMBERS OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

FROM: SAMUEL CAPLAN

Attached herewith are the following:

1. Minutes of the last meeting of the Emergency Committee
2. Copy of a cablegram received from the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem in reply to the cable of the Emergency Committee.
3. Copy of a report from the Geneva office on the situation in German-occupied territories.

The next meeting of the Emergency Committee will be held on Tuesday, June 18th, at 3 P.M. at the ZOA office.

MINUTES OF MEETING OF EMERGENCY COMMITTEE HELD ON TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 1940,
AT 3 P.M. AT THE ZOA OFFICE, 111 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY

PRESENT:

Louis Lipsky presiding; Gedalia Bublick, Israel Goldstein, Hayim Greenberg, Louis Segal, Mrs. Herman Shulman, Robert Szold, Stephen S. Wise.

Josef Cohn, Morris Margulies, Yoheskel Sacharov, Manya Shochat, Moyer F. Steinglass, by invitation.

Minutes of the previous meeting as circulated were approved.

CABLES FROM LONDON AND GENEVA RE IMMIGRANT TRANSPORTATION:

The secretary read the following cable from Mr. Linton of the London office:

"June 6, 1940

CAPLAN NEW YORK
VIEW DIVERSION BRITISH STEAMERS MEDITERRANEAN MUST FIND
ALTERNATIVE ROUTE FOR ABOUT SIX HUNDRED REFUGEES IN ENGLAND
INCLUDING TWO HUNDRED FIFTY YOUTH ALIYAH STOP SUGGESTED ROUTE
BRITISH STEAMER TO LISBON THENCE AMERICAN EXPORT LINE TO HAIFA
STOP HAVE ALREADY APPROACHED PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES FOR
TRANSIT VISAS WHICH UNDER CONSIDERATION STOP PASSENGER AGENTS
PELTOURS APPROACHED AMERICAN EXPORT LINE GENOA TO AGREE CALL
LISBON PICK UP PASSENGERS SAY HUNDRED PER SAILING STOP URGE
YOU INTERVENE AND SUPPORT REQUEST WITH HEAD OFFICE IN NEW YORK
CABLE LINTON"

Mr. Szold said that he had been in touch with the American Export Line with regard to the above matter, but in view of Italy's entrance into the war, he felt that the entire question was obsolete. However, he said that he would follow it up.

The secretary read the following cable from Mr. Barlas of the Geneva office:

"KAPLAN NEWYORK
YOURS 7/6 THANKS FOR INTERVENTION STOP PRESENT POSITION IMMIGRA-
TION FOLLOWING STOP SINCE MAY LEFT TRIESTE FOURHUNDRED POLISH
REFUGEES STOP ENDEAVOURING ARRANGE TRANSIT BY AIR VIA GREECE
ROUMANIA FROM WHERE STEAMER STOP SWEDEN KAUNAS VIA RUSSIA STOP
MARSEILLE IMPOSSIBLE STOP ARRANGEMENTS VERY COMPLICATED BECAUSE
SITUATION STOP IF SUCCESSFUL FOLLOWING GROUPS ARRANGABLE TRIESTE
THREEHUNDRED STOCKHOLM HUNDREDFIFTY INCLUDING HUNDREDTHIRTEEN
YOUTHS DANEMARK TWOHUNDRED SEVENTY YOUTHS KAUNAS HUNDRED FIFTY
SWITZERLAND TWOHUNDRED ALSO ROUMANIA HUNGARY STOP FINANCING
HOPEFUL BY AID HADASSAH JOINT HICEM WITH WHOM NEGOTIATING ALTHOUGH
NOTYET COMPLETED STOP GOVERNMENT AGREED ALONE WITHOUT REFERENCE
JERUSALEM WHICH FACILITATES WORK"

The following memorandum, addressed to the Emergency Committee by Mr. Sacharov and Mr. Levy, was read by the secretary:

"June 11, 1940

Gentlemen:

As you are already aware, we have on the Danube a transport of 1150 people who were saved from the Nazi countries. They are living there on barges for the last five months and kept by the local communities and the J. D. C.

The funds for their transportation were obtained here by Mr. Golomb still in February, but owing to many unforeseen reasons, including weather (the freezing of the Danube and later floods), war restrictions and lack of possibility to obtain a boat, they could not be moved.

About a fortnight ago, our people on the spot informed us that at long last they have completed the arrangements, although the boat was obtained at a much higher price.

The amount needed is \$85,000, of which \$33,500 we have in cash, \$6,000 were put at our disposal by Mr. Kaplan, and we are still short of \$45,500. Mr. Kaplan negotiated with the J.D.C. for their participation. After Mr. Tropper inspected the situation on the spot, we received yesterday the following cable; for Mr. Kaplan:

'TROPPER RETURNED FROM BEOGRAD WITH FOLLOWING FIFTYFIFTY PROPOSITION STOP JOINT WILL GIVE SPITNIE AGAIN FIFTEENTHOUSAND DOLLARS FOR LOCAL EXPENSES AND PARTICIPATE IN FORTYFIVE THOUSAND NEEDED FOR LIQUIDATION WITH TWENTYTHOUSAND PROVIDED WE PROCURE TWENTYFIVETHOUSAND BESIDES YOUR LEWAS STOP TROPPER WAITING HERE UNTIL TOMORROW MONDAY NOON FOR OUR IMMEDIATE DEFINITE REPLY STOP TRY UTMOST COMPLY HIS PROPOSAL STOP WITHOUT OUR SUBSTANTIAL PARTICIPATION LIQUIDATION IMPOSSIBLE STOP SUCH PARTICIPATION ALSO IMPORTANT FOR GOOD RELATIONS FUTURE COOPERATION WITH TROPPER ANSWER IMMEDIATELY BY URNEET CABLE OR PHONE 23639 OTHERWISE TROPPER LEAVES WITHOUT DECISION"

(signed) Richard (Lichtheim) JECHIELI

It is therefore clear that after the contribution of the J.D.C. we are still short of a sum of \$25,500.

We appeal to you to find a way to appropriate this sum, together with the Zionist Organizations in this country, in order to enable us to liquidate the matter.

We need not emphasize the importance of time, as it might be a matter of hours, and hope you will find a way to obtain the money.

In addition to the cable to Mr. Kaplan, quoted above, the following cable was sent to the Emergency Committee by Mr. Lichtheim on June 11th:

"June 11, 1940

ZIONISTS NEWYORK FOR EMERGENCY COMMITTEE
REFERRING YESTERDAY'S CABLE TO KAPLAN I RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE
ARRANGEMENTS TODAY CONCLUDED WITH TROPER WHO PROMISED FORTY-
THOUSAND OF WHICH FIFTEEN THOUSAND LOCAL NEEDS SPITZER
TWENTYFIVE THOUSAND JECHIELIS PASSAGES ON CONDITION WE GIVE
TWENTYTHOUSAND BESIDES SIXTHOUSAND PROMISED TO JECHIEL
AND LEVAS"

Mr. Sacharov reported that he had approached the various Zionist organizations for contributions towards the total amount of \$25,500 with the following results:

Junior Hadassah	- \$1,000
Poale Zion	- \$5,000
Hadassah	- Mrs. Pool is to bring the matter before the Executive Board, with the recommendation that Hadassah contribute \$5,000, provided the total amount of \$26,500 is raised.
Zionist Org.	- \$2,000 on hand and is to obtain an additional \$5,000.
Mizrachi	- \$1,000 on hand and is to obtain an additional \$2,000.

If the Emergency Committee would contribute \$5,000, Mr. Sacharov added, it would bring the total to the required \$26,500.

Mr. Szold was of the opinion that this type of activity came within the purview of the Emergency Committee and he recommended that Mr. Sacharov's request be favorably considered.

IT WAS MOVED, SECONDED AND CARRIED:

THAT an appropriation of \$5,000 be granted by the Emergency Committee on the condition that the total amount of \$26,500 is raised.

THAT if any of the Zionist organizations is unable to pay the amount promised by it on demand, the Emergency Committee is authorized to advance a loan to any such organization upon its application, provided the amount of such loan does not exceed \$5,000.

MEDITERRANEAN SITUATION:

Mr. Szold reported that the American Export, Dollar and Dutch lines still had steamship connections through the Mediterranean and that if the Mediterranean is closed, there is a possibility that these ships may go by way of South Africa. He said that the Palestine Economic Corporation would carry on "business as usual" and that reserves will be maintained.

Many Jews in this country are asking for enlightenment with regard to Palestine, Dr. Goldstein said, and he felt that the Emergency Committee should issue a statement along the following lines: that immigration can continue to a degree; that there are certain routes by which Jews can enter Palestine;

that there is no difficulty with regard to transmission of necessary moneys; that action is being contemplated with regard to supplies; that land in Palestine assumes added importance with regard to problems of subsistence; that for the time being Jews in Palestine are carrying on; and that Jews in America are expected to do their duty with regard to Palestine regardless of difficulties abroad.

It was the consensus of opinion that a cable be sent to the Executive in Jerusalem, asking for information as to the attitude of the Yishuv in the present situation, and that this information be used as a basis for a statement to be issued on Friday, June 14th, in the name of the Emergency Committee.

It was suggested by Dr. Wise that the Emergency Committee consider the issuance of a well reasoned statement setting forth the support of Jews of the Allied cause.

Mr. Segal observed that the Jewish people owe it to themselves to help the Allied cause, but he did not feel that it was within the province of the Emergency Committee to take any action in this regard. It would be more fitting for the American Jewish Congress, he said, to make a statement of this kind. This Committee, he added, should confine its activities solely to Palestine.

Dr. Goldstein disagreed with Mr. Segal's view since he felt that everything has a bearing on the Palestine situation. Our business as Zionists, he said, is to see to it that whatever Jews do to help the Allies is credited as much as possible to the Zionists of America.

IT WAS MOVED, SECONDED AND CARRIED:

THAT a committee of three be named to draft a statement, to be submitted for approval to the next meeting of the Emergency Committee.

Dr. Wise read an item by Dr. Margoshes in The Day, in which was reprinted a circular, distributed among the students of the College of the City of New York calling for opposition to both sides in the present war, and signed by the Anti-War Club, Avuká and Progressive Student Club. He felt that the leaders of Avuká should be summoned immediately by the Zionist Organization of America for a full discussion with regard to Avuká's position.

It was the consensus of opinion that the Emergency Committee request the Executive of the Zionist Organization to act immediately with respect to this matter.

CABLE FROM DR. WEIZMANN:

Mr. Lipsky read the following cable from Dr. Weizmann to Mr. Eliezer Kaplan:

"June 7, 1940

PLEASE CONVEY ALL FRIENDS QUOTE IN THIS FATEFUL HOUR WHEN AMERICAN JEWRY IS CALLED TO PLAY DECISIVE PART IN DESTINIES OUR PEOPLE OUR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA MUST CLOSE ITS RANKS AND ALL DISPUTES GIVE WAY TO UNITED EFFORT FOR SAKE OF PEOPLE AND COUNTRY EQUALLY DEAR TO YOU ALL STOP IN NAME ALL MY COLLEAGUES AND PERSONALLY APPEAL TO ALL CONCERNED FORTHWITH ELIMINATE ALL INTERNAL DIFFERENCES AND

PRESENT PITTSBURGH CONVENTION UNITED FRONT OF ACTION AND
DEVOTION SUCH AS WILL ENTITLE ZIONISM TO LEADERSHIP AMERICAN
JEWRY"

Dr. Goldstein felt that, in view of the fact that the cable referred to a situation existing in one of the Zionist groups, there was no reason why it should be discussed at a meeting of the Emergency Committee.

Mr. Lipsky stated that the cable, coming from the President of the World Zionist Organization to a member of the Executive, dealt with a matter which concerns the entire Zionist movement in America and that it should be placed in the record of the Emergency Committee.

BUDGET:

MR. SZOLD MOVED, AND IT WAS SECONDED AND CARRIED:
THAT the budget of the Emergency Committee up to June 30, 1940, be extended for a period of three months, pro rata.

REVISIONISTS:

Mr. Szold called attention to a circular distributed by the Revisionists in which it appeared that Colonel Patterson and Mr. Jabotinsky are engaged in certain activities concerning a "Jewish Army". He felt that public discussion of this matter at this time was harmful. He suggested that steps be taken to inform Colonel Patterson of the situation.

The matter was referred to Dr. Wise for action.

REPORT ON ZIONIST WORK AMONG IMMIGRANTS:

The secretary submitted a report on behalf of Dr. Blumenfeld on the progress of the work of the Bureau for Zionist Work Among Immigrants, and a copy of the report is attached hereto.

THE NEXT MEETING:

Mrs. Shulman stated that Mrs. Jacobs was expected to return to this country on Friday. The chairman said that Mrs. Jacobs would be invited to report at the next meeting of the Emergency Committee on Tuesday, June 18th, at 3 P. M.

Respectfully submitted,

SAMUEL CAPLAN
Secretary

\$23,000,000 is the National Goal for 1940
UNITED JEWISH APPEAL (Inc.) FOR REFUGEES
AND OVERSEAS NEEDS

ON BEHALF OF
AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE, INC.
UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL and
NATIONAL REFUGEE SERVICE, INC.

342 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

National Chairmen

RABBI ABBA HILLEL SILVER
RABBI JONAH B. WISE

Honorary Chairmen

LOUIS BAMBERGER
ALBERT EINSTEIN
MAX EPSTEIN
LOUIS E. KIRSTEIN
ALBERT D. LASKER
HON. HERBERT H. LEHMAN
HON. JULIAN W. MACK
HENRY MONSKY
WILLIAM J. SHRODER
HON. MAX C. SLOSS
HON. NATHAN STRAUS
MRS. FELIX M. WARBURG
RABBI STEPHEN S. WISE

June 17, 1940


Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

The United Jewish Appeal acknowledges with appreciation your notification of an allotment of \$475,000 to the United Jewish Appeal for 1940 as a result of the current campaign conducted by the Jewish Welfare Fund in Cleveland.

We are deeply appreciative of the service and devotion represented in the allotment which you have announced. We also appreciate the circumstances of your 1940 campaign which did not permit an increased participation in the goal of the United Jewish Appeal. It is gratifying, however, to note that first consideration was given to the requirements of the United Jewish Appeal in making decisions based on the fact that additional sums would be required for aid to refugees in Cleveland.

Cordially yours,



Arthur M. Lampport
Co-Treasurer

Co-Chairmen

PAUL BAERWALD
RABBI SOLOMON GOLDMAN
RABBI ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN
LOUIS LIPSKY
JAMES N. ROSENBERG
WILLIAM ROSENWALD
HON. MORRIS ROTHENBERG
EDWARD M. M. WARBURG

Co-Treasurers

I. EDWIN GOLDWASSER
ARTHUR M. LAMPOR

Executive Vice-Chairmen

ISIDOR COONS
HENRY MONTOR

Executive Committee

JAMES H. BECKER
DAVID M. BRESSLER
JOSEPH C. HYMAN
HON. JACOB J. KAPLAN
SIDNEY LANSBURGH
HON. LOUIS E. LEVINTHAL
SOLOMON LOWENSTEIN
LOUIS P. ROCKER
CHARLES J. ROSENBLUM
ELIHU D. STONE
and officers

AML:MEH

June 17, 1940

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Mr. President:

All those concerned with the impact of the war upon civilian victims are grateful for the spirit of compassion which prompted you to recommend to Congress the appropriation of \$50,000,000 for assistance to refugees through the Red Cross and other agencies which you might designate.

The war has had tragic consequences for all who have come within its sphere. But its burden has been doubly heavy for the Jewish population in the areas affected. The racial philosophy of the Nazi Government has placed special hardships upon Jews and made their adjustment to war conditions much more difficult than those facing the ordinary individual.

In the seven years in which Hitler has been engaged in the extirpation of Jewish life over a succession of European countries, the ancient Jewish homeland of Palestine has played an important role not alone in holding aloft a beacon of hope to the dispossessed and the disinherited, but in giving actual shelter to hundreds of thousands of men, women and children. Today the Jews of Palestine stand ready with their resources and their lives to aid the cause of the allies to which the overwhelming majority of Americans have given their moral approval because it is identified with the cause of the democracies.

Arrangements have been made and can be made for the transport of Jewish refugees to Palestine. It is estimated that in the first eight months of the war over 14,000 Jews who fled from Europe were able to find shelter in Palestine. Thousands of others have legal permission to enter Palestine if funds can be made available to assist their transport to the place of safety which Palestine offers. There are thousands of Jews whose need to settle in Palestine has become far more urgent as a result of the events in Western Europe in the past few days. To permit them to remain in the countries in which they are waiting for transfer to Palestine is literally to doom them to the concentration camp or to death, for to the Jewish refugee is reserved a degree of hardship and suffering beyond those of the average refugee.

With these facts in mind, may I, on behalf of the United Palestine Appeal, respectfully submit to you the cause of these Jewish refugees who must be assisted in Europe while awaiting transfer to Palestine and to enable them to reach Palestine. It is my belief that these refugees come within the framework of the fund which you have asked the Congress of the United States to appropriate for your allocation.

My associates and I would be grateful for the opportunity of coming to Washington to discuss with the appropriate individual whom you will designate the details of this application and the actual extent of the financial requirements through which great numbers of men, women and children may be saved from the ravages of war.

Very cordially yours,
(signed) ABBA HILLEL SILVER
National Chairman

In reply refer to
Eu.840.48 Refugees--
Silver, Abba Hillel

"APPENDIX E"
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1940

Dear Dr. Silver:

The President has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your recent letter in which you bring to his attention the cause of the Jewish refugees who must be assisted in Europe while awaiting transport to Palestine and to reach Palestine.

You suggest that you and your associates would be grateful for the opportunity to discuss in Washington with the appropriate authorities the possibilities of relief for this class of refugees from the fund which has been appropriated by the Congress.

Distribution of the foodstuffs and other articles for relief purchased in this country from this fund is exclusively the responsibility of the American Red Cross. You may wish to bring your special problem to the attention of the Chairman, the Honorable Norman H. Davis.

It is regretted that due to the pressure of official business there has been a delay in replying to your letter.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:

ROBERT T. PELL
Assistant Chief, Division of
European Affairs

Mr. Abba Hillel Silver, National Chairman,
United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd Street
New York, New York

"APPENDIX F"

August 2, 1940

Hon. Norman H. Davis, Chairman
American Red Cross
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Davis:

The United Palestine Appeal is deeply interested in the question of assistance that might be given to Jewish refugees in and going to Palestine, through the medium of the fund authorized by the Congress.

On June 17, 1940, I addressed a letter to the President on this subject, as per the attached copy.

Mr. Robert T. Pell, Assistant Chief, Division of European Affairs, writing on behalf of the Acting Secretary of State, wrote me on July 31, as per the copy which is also attached hereto.

It is on the basis of Mr. Pell's suggestions that I am addressing myself to you in the hope that an early meeting may be arranged between my associates and yourself for the purpose of considering the forms of cooperation that might be established.

Very cordially yours,

signed (Abba Hillel Silver)
National Chairman

"APPENDIX G"

AMERICAN RED CROSS
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 7, 1940

Mr. Abba Hillel Silver
National Chairman
United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd Street
New York City

My dear Mr. Silver:

In the absence of our Chairman, Mr. Norman Davis, who will not return to his office until next week, I am answering your letter of August 2nd with which you enclosed a letter under date of June 17th, addressed to the President of the United States, on the subject of assistance that might be given to Jewish refugees in and going to Palestine through the medium of the fund authorized by Congress for refugee war relief. On the return of Mr. Davis your letter will be brought to his attention. I am sure he will be glad to arrange an early meeting with you and your associates for the discussion of this problem.

In the meantime, may I point out that the American Red Cross in its relief operations abroad is extending its aid to refugees of all nations and categories without any discrimination. We have brought to the attention of our representatives on a number of occasions the situation of Jewish groups.

One ship load of supplies sent to Europe on the S.S. McKeesport is now being distributed in unoccupied France and we have requested of the British Government safe conduct through the blockade of other cargoes of a similar nature. The question of bringing relief to refugees in Europe depends to a large extent upon the attitude of the belligerents towards the transportation of relief supplies and the situation would be even more complicated in the case of Palestine.

Sincerely,

(signed) ERNEST J. SWIFT

Vice Chairman

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

111 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

June 24, 1940.

Mr. Paul Baerwald, Chairman
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
100 East 42 Street
New York City

Dear Mr. Baerwald:

May I call your attention to the fact that on the basis of an agreement entered into on February 8, 1938, between the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal, an accounting is owed to the United Palestine Appeal for the Emergency Campaign conducted by the Joint Distribution Committee in the fall of 1938.

1. On several occasions I have suggested that there be an accounting between the United Palestine Appeal and the Joint Distribution Committee, arising out of the agreement covering welfare funds during the year 1938. The agreement has been executed, I understand, with respect to the normal allotments and pledges accruing to the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal, under the effectuating clause of the 1938 agreement.

According to the minutes of a meeting on June 4, 1940, between Messrs. Isidor Coons and Henry Montor, it was agreed that the sum of \$17,601.73 is owing to the United Palestine Appeal by the Joint Distribution Committee, on account of the 1938 campaigns for which complete payment had been made as of that date, with the understanding that checks will be exchanged in the coming months as other communities complete payments on pledges.

2. In a personal meeting between Rabbi Jonah B. Wise and myself in Cleveland on May 13, it was understood that a similar accounting would be made available for the Emergency allotments and pledges received by the Joint Distribution Committee from the 1938 campaigns. However, no action has yet been taken in that regard.

3. The February 8, 1938 agreement between the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal had attached to it the minutes of a meeting of February 11, 1938, amplifying the details of the February 8 agreement.

Clause 3 of the minutes stated, "As the United Palestine Appeal, for purposes of this Agreement, undertakes to include not alone Keren Hayesod, Jewish National Fund and Mizrachi, but also Emergency Fund for Palestine, it is understood that the Joint Distribution Committee will include within its 60% allotment, provision for special emergencies in relation to its program."

Clause 7 had the following to say in regard to the effectuation of the 1938 agreement: "With respect to that section of the Agreement which refers to the definite arrangements that have to be made to give practical effect to the understanding between the two organizations, concerning a distribution of 60% to the Joint Distribution Committee and 40% to the United Palestine Appeal, the following principles are understood to govern this Agreement:

"Both the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal, through their national offices and most effective contacts are to endeavor, sincerely, to persuade all communities that come within the purview of this Agreement, to adopt a 60%-40% ratio. If, however, by reason of the complexion of the local community, the decision is reached locally for a ratio other than 60%-40% between the Joint Distribution

Committee and the United Palestine Appeal, then, at the end of the 1938 campaign, the representatives of the two organizations will meet to determine in how far the aggregate of subscriptions and payments to each organization exceeds its allotment, or is deficient in relation thereto. If, therefore, the subscriptions and payments out of the 1938 campaign to the Joint Distribution Committee, in the aggregate, fall short of 60% of the subscriptions to and payments from Welfare Fund communities covered by this Agreement; then in that event, the United Palestine Appeal is to make up such deficiency until 60% is assured the Joint Distribution Committee. Conversely, if the subscriptions to and payments of the United Palestine Appeal, out of the 1938 campaign in the aforesaid Welfare Fund communities, fall short of 40% of the aggregate subscriptions and collections to the two organizations; then in that event, the Joint Distribution Committee shall pay over to the United Palestine Appeal the deficiency in question."

4. On June 24, 1938, Mr. J. C. Hyman, then executive director of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, wrote a letter to Mr. H. L. Lurie, Executive Director of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, in response to a question from the latter as to the significance of the "effectuating clause" governing the 1938 campaign. Mr. Hyman then wrote, "It is the definite intention and purpose of the Joint Distribution Committee to observe meticulously this "effectuating clause", which provides, both in letter and spirit, that all funds received from specified Welfare Fund communities covered by the agreement, from all sources by the J.D.C. and the agencies of the U.P.A., are to be divided on the basis of 60% for the Joint Distribution Committee and 40% for the United Palestine Appeal. Although there has been exception to this arrangement by a number of important Welfare Fund communities, we are obliged, as a matter of good faith to adhere to the fulfilment of the agreement."

5. On October 31, 1938, Rabbi Jonah B. Wise telephoned to me in Cleveland, to suggest that I join with him in sending a message to communities throughout the country, urging the immediate remittance of funds to the Joint Distribution Committee, in view of the new emergency situation that had arisen in Europe. I then said that I would be glad to join in such a message, on the understanding that all the additional amounts made available would be divided in accordance with the 60%-40% agreement of 1938.

Rabbi Wise indicated that the Joint Distribution Committee might wish to send a telegram under its own signature without my participation. I pointed out that this would be feasible, it still being understood that the same form of distribution would be necessary. On October 31, Rabbi Wise as National Chairman of the Joint Distribution Committee campaign sent a telegram to communities throughout the country, asking for Emergency funds on the basis of the Polish situation. In that telegram, Rabbi Wise stated to the communities that "I consulted Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the United Palestine Appeal, by reason of our agreement in Welfare Fund cities this year. He approves this request providing that in accordance with 1938 national agreement new funds are divided 60% Joint Distribution Committee and 40% United Palestine Appeal."

6. As a result of a meeting held on October 13, 1939 between representatives of the United Palestine Appeal, Joint Distribution Committee, and the certified public accountants for both organizations, the United Palestine Appeal through Klein, Hinds & Finke, its certified public accountants, made available a full report of the income to the United Palestine Appeal from all sources in Welfare Fund cities covered by the 1938 agreement. The report made available by Loeb & Troper, Certified Public Accounts for the Joint Distribution Committee did not, however, cover the income from the Emergency Campaign launched by the Joint Distribution Committee in various Welfare Fund cities subject to the 1938 agreement.

7. In view, therefore, of a) the unequivocal language of the agreement of 1938, and the clarifying minutes, and b) the length of time that has elapsed since the 1938

June 24, 1940

campaigns were conducted, may I suggest that the Joint Distribution Committee authorize its various officers and certified public accountants to dispose promptly of the funds accruing from the Emergency Campaign conducted by the Joint Distribution Committee in 1938, the receipts of which in Welfare Fund cities are subject to the 1938 agreement.

Very cordially yours,

Abba Hillel Silver
National Chairman

AHS:MEt



June 21, 1940

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Mr. President:

All those concerned with the impact of the war upon civilian victims are grateful for the spirit of compassion which prompted you to recommend to Congress the appropriation of \$50,000,000 for assistance to refugees through the Red Cross and other agencies which you might designate.

The war has had tragic consequences for all who have come within its sphere. But its burden has been doubly heavy for the Jewish population in the areas affected. The racial philosophy of the Nazi Government has placed special hardships upon Jews and made their adjustment to war conditions much more difficult than those facing the ordinary individual.

In the seven years in which Hitler has been engaged in the extirpation of Jewish life over a succession of European countries, the ancient Jewish homeland of Palestine has played an important role not alone in holding aloft a beacon of hope to the dispossessed and disinherited, but in giving actual shelter to hundreds of thousands of men, women and children. Today the Jews of Palestine stand ready with their resources and their lives to aid the cause of the allies to which the overwhelming majority of Americans have given their moral approval because it is identified with the cause of the democracies.

Arrangements have been made and can be made for the transport of Jewish refugees to Palestine. It is estimated that in the first eight months of the war over 14,000 Jews who fled from Europe were able to find shelter in Palestine. Thousands of others have legal permission to enter Palestine if funds can be made available to assist their transport to the place of safety which Palestine offers. There are thousands of Jews whose need to settle in Palestine has become far more urgent as a result of the events in Western Europe in the past few days. To permit them to remain in the countries in which they are waiting for transfer to

Palestine is literally to doom them to the concentration camp or to death, for to the Jewish refugee is reserved a degree of hardship and suffering beyond those of the average refugee.

With these facts in mind, may I, on behalf of the United Palestine Appeal, respectfully submit to you the cause of these Jewish refugees who must be assisted in Europe while awaiting transfer to Palestine and to enable them to reach Palestine. It is my belief that these refugees come within the framework of the fund which you have asked the Congress of the United States to appropriate.

My associates and I would be grateful for the opportunity to come to Washington to discuss with the proper authorities whom you will designate the details of this application.

Very cordially yours,

AHS:MPC



Abba Hillel Silver
National Chairman



CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM ON ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF REQUEST OF JEWISH AGENCY FOR
MILITARY UNITS

FRIDAY, JUNE 21, 1940

I phoned today to Dr. Goldman of Chicago. He informed me that it was no longer possible for Colonel Knox to communicate with London in regard to the Jewish Agency defence measures. He said that he was prepared to communicate with William Allen White in Emporia if Dr. Wise could not reach Mr. White in New York.

I sent a wire to Miss Dorothy Thompson asking to see her in connection with the same matter.

Mr. James G. McDonald, with whom I communicated, is to telephone me during the day from the Board of Education meeting which he was attending.

I have arranged to see Mr. Arthur Hays Sulzberger at 12 Noon today.

I spoke to Rabbi Breslau of Washington who informed me of the results of a conversation which he had with Lord Lothian in Washington, and that the latter had indicated he would cable to London urging approval of the Jewish Agency request. Lord Lothian expressed the thought that cablegrams from prominent New York citizens to British Cabinet members might be helpful.

Rabbi Breslau undertook to see George Rublee and Sir Wilmot Lewis, Washington correspondent of the London Times.

I spoke to Dr. Stephen S. Wise about the two proposed cables to Winston Churchill and Duff Cooper from Zionist leaders. Dr. Wise approved his signature to the Churchill cable, on which he had no suggestions; but felt that Dr. Silver alone should sign the cable to Duff Cooper since Dr. Silver had had contact with Duff Cooper at the UPA Washington Conference last January.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver wired approval of the addition of his signature to the proposed cables to Churchill and Duff Cooper.

I spoke to Mr. James G. McDonald by phone. He is going to Washington in connection with a meeting of the Justice and State Departments. After I told him of the situation he stated that he would speak about it to Sumner Welles. He said he would also be glad to send a cable to a member of the Cabinet. He suggested Malcolm MacDonald. I indicated that Malcolm MacDonald would have no influence or would not be interested and urged the sending of a cable to someone else. He agreed to do so.

Dr. Solomon Goldman spoke to me a second time by telephone from Chicago. He suggested several changes in the Churchill cable, and also agreed with Dr. Wise that perhaps Dr. Silver alone should send the cable to Duff Cooper. He felt that there should be inserted in the Churchill cable reference to the willingness of Jews in Palestine to fight elsewhere also.

by telephone to Morris Waldman of the American Jewish Committee, who undertook to get American Jewish Committee signatures for the proposed cable to Churchill. Goldman had suggested that the American Jewish Committee and B'nai B'rith signatures be obtained. Dr. Goldman undertook to telephone to Mr. Monsky and advise me accordingly.

I met with Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times. He was very interested and sympathetic but he felt that he could not send a cable to London as an individual because his only importance was as publisher of the New York Times. However, he believed that secrecy was inadvisable. His immediate reaction was that the New York Times should publicly support the request of the Jewish Agency through an editorial. The gist of the editorial would be that England needs every source of support she can get, and that, regardless of the policies which may have guided England in the past, the situation has been completely changed, and therefore every man who can carry arms on behalf of England should be permitted to do so.

Mr. Sulzberger then called in Ferdinand Kuhn, former Chief London Correspondent of the New York Times, who would write that particular editorial. I explained to Mr. Sulzberger that our friends here had taken the position that they wished to do nothing to embarrass Great Britain. He did not see how embarrassment could occur, since it was to be done in the interest of Great Britain. His suggestion was, therefore, that, if we could make available to the papers an official statement with regard to the position of the Jewish Agency, the New York Times would have a basis upon which to write an editorial promptly.

Mr. Sulzberger concluded, however, by saying that he regarded our present conversation as executive, but that would not debar him from publishing an editorial in the next few days if something in the developments in the Near East should give him occasion to do so.

It was apparent, therefore, that he was most anxious that the Times be given the permission immediately to publish such an editorial.

Mr. Morris Waldman telephoned to say that he was trying to reach the members of the American Jewish Committee for the signature to the cable to Winston Churchill. He did not know whether assent could be obtained in time to send the cable by Friday afternoon. He felt, however, that the American Jewish Committee would certainly send a cable of its own.

Dr. Solomon Goldman wired that in a conversation with Mr. Henry Monsky, President of B'nai B'rith, the latter had agreed to sign the cables to Churchill and Duff Cooper.

I endeavored to reach George Backer, publisher of the New York Post, who is known to be a very close friend of Winston Churchill. Unfortunately he is out of town until Monday.

SATURDAY, JUNE 22, 1940

Morris Waldman, Secretary of the American Jewish Committee, telephoned me to make the following report on what had been decided by the American Jewish Committee in response to the suggestion that they take some action in supporting the Jewish Agency's request for Jewish military units. The Committee did the following:

(a) Sent a cable to the British Board of Jewish Deputies asking it to communicate to Prime Minister Churchill and other members of the Government, the profound concern of the American Jewish Committee at the jeopardy in which the Jews of Palestine find themselves; and to

request that the appeal of the Jewish Agency for the establishment of Jewish military units be favorably acted upon;

(b) Sent a private supplementary wire to the Board of Deputies to make clear to the members of the British ~~Extrajurisdictional~~ Government the nature of the American Jewish Committee for the purpose of showing that American Jewry was united behind the Jewish Agency's request;

(c) A telegram was sent to Lord Lothian, British Ambassador at Washington, containing the text of the cable which the American Jewish Committee had sent to the Board of Deputies for transmission to the British Cabinet.

Mr. Waldman also communicated with Wickham Steed, former editor of the London Times and important figure in the Ministry of Information, urging his support of the Jewish Agency's request.

Dr. Stephen S. Wise stated that he had been in touch with the closest friend of William Allen White. That friend had expressed the view that Mr. White would not feel it just that, because he had been active on behalf of the British cause, he was entitled to ask any favors. And, therefore, nothing could be undertaken with Mr. White.

Friday, June 21

Mr. Edward Warburg phoned me on Friday afternoon to say that after reconsidering the matter, he could not send the cable to Duff Cooper that he had suggested in the morning that he was prepared to send. He said that he had discussed the matter with several friends and he had come to the conclusion that this was a "nationalist" issue. He had not been aware that the question of Jewish units had been raised in the House of Commons. He did not think that Jews had the right to ask for the protection of their own lives and property as distinct from that of other peoples in Palestine. After an extended discussion, during which I tried to clarify the issue for Mr. Warburg he concluded that his position might not be considered reasonable by me, but there was nothing else that he could do under the circumstances.

MONDAY, JUNE 24, 1940

I spoke to Harry Lang of the Jewish Daily Forward, who said that he had been in touch with Mr. William Green who would be in New York on Tuesday. Mr. Green stated he was prepared to send a cable supporting the Jewish Agency's request for Jewish military units; and himself suggested the name of Ernest Bevin.

Mr. Lang also said he spoke to Mr. Woll of the American Federation of Labor, who also was prepared to send a cable.

Since no editorial appeared in the New York Times I called Ferdinand Kuhn of the New York Times today to inquire why. He said that in order to protect itself the Times editorial department had been looking for the publication of the item that had been released by the Emergency Committee publicizing the request of the Jewish Agency for military units. He said that he would press for the insertion of the news item, and that we could be sure that an editorial supporting it would appear.

June 24, 1940

Mr. Louis Lipsky
Zionist Organization of America
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Lipsky:

I have had occasion to look through the report of the Sub-committee on Reorganization which was sent to me by the Zionist Organization of America. I should like to call your attention to the possible implications of one of the recommendations of this committee if it is adopted. Under number 5, "Special Suggestions", it is recommended that in order to carry into effect the recommendations of this committee, the Convention be requested to approve a budget for the coming year in the total sum of \$350,000. Towards this budget, the Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemeth should be requested to underwrite such portion of the additional funds (not exceeding \$150,000 inclusive of the amounts they now pay to the Zionist Organization of America as service charges) as will be needed by the Zionist Organization of America in the ensuing year to meet its regular and special budgets.

This means that the United Palestine Appeal will be called upon to make an additional allocation to the Zionist Organization of America of a sum approximately \$100,000 more than this year; for it is to be assumed that the full amount if authorized will be expended.

If the Zionist Organization of America is to receive in 1941 three times what it is receiving in 1940, it is to be expected that the Mizrahi and Poale Zion will demand a proportionate increase in their allotments. This would aggregate \$36,000 in increases for these two organizations. The total allotments from the United Palestine Appeal for so-called services charges in 1941 would then be \$204,000 instead of the present \$74,000.

The United Palestine Appeal has also granted the Emergency Committee a sum of \$50,000 which will be repeated, and in all probability, increased next year.

Mr. Louis Lipsky

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June 24, 1940

The United Palestine Appeal therefore faces the prospect of appropriating nearly \$300,000 of its funds next year, which should go to Palestine, to operate Zionist Activities in the United States.

The income of the United Palestine Appeal this year will be considerably less than last year - possibly a million dollars less. The income for 1941 may be even less than that. I submit to you the question whether it is just to Palestine and to the donors to the United Palestine Appeal who now are contributing on the supposition that their contributions are sent to Palestine, to deduct such a substantial amount for the local administrative activities of the Zionist groups. I think that the chairmen of the Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemeth should give serious thought to this proposal of the Sub-committee and should consult their respective agencies in Palestine.

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BX

Copy to Dr. Israel Goldstein
Henry Montor



M I N U T E S

OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL
HELD AT THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL OFFICE
342 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 1940. 6:30 PM

PRESENT: Messrs. Jonah B. Wise, in the Chair
Paul Baerwald
David M. Bressler
I. Edwin Goldwasser
Joseph C. Hyman
Arthur M. Lampert
Louis Levinthal
Louis Lipsky

Charles J. Rosenbloom
William Rosenwald
Morris Rothenberg
Abba Hillel Silver
Stephen S. Wise
Isidor Coons
Henry Montor
Philip Hoffman

Excuses were received from:

Messrs. Louis Bamberger
James H. Becker
Albert Einstein
Max Epstein
Solomon Goldman
Israel Goldstein
Jacob J. Kaplan
Louis E. Kirstein
Sidney Lansburgh
Albert D. Lasker
Herbert H. Lehman

Solomon Lowenstein
Julian W. Mack
Henry Monsky
Louis P. Rocker
James N. Rosenberg
William J. Shroder
Max C. Sloss
Elihu D. Stone
Nathan Straus
Edward M. M. Warburg
Mrs. Felix M. Warburg

* * * * *

RESOLUTION ON THE DEATH OF DR. CYRUS ADLER AND SAMUEL UNTERMYER

The following resolution on the death of Dr. Cyrus Adler and Mr. Samuel Untermyer, who had served as Honorary Chairmen of the United Jewish Appeal, was unanimously voted by the members of the Executive Committee:

"The Executive Committee of the United Jewish Appeal records its profound sorrow on the death of Dr. Cyrus Adler and Samuel Untermyer, Honorary Chairmen of the United Jewish Appeal, whose services to the Jewish people in all their constructive activities will be a permanent memorial in the hearts of their fellow American Jews. We recall with affection and gratitude the leadership that they gave to the Jewish community and especially to the agencies embraced within the United Jewish Appeal."

DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE

Mr. Montor reported that the following steps had already been taken toward the formation of the Distribution Committee of the United Jewish Appeal: The Joint Distribution Committee has nominated Dr. Solomon Lowenstein and Mr. James G. Becker as its representatives; the United Palestine Appeal has nominated Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Dr. Stephen S. Wise. As of the date of the meeting,

MINUTES - 2

acceptances had been received from Harris Perlstein of Chicago and David Watchmaker of Boston as members representing Welfare Funds on the Distribution Committee. Invitations to the latter had been issued by the Council of Federations after consultation with and approval of the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal; (subsequently it was announced that Mr. Henry Wineman had accepted as the third nominee representing Welfare Funds).

Mr. Hyman stated that the Joint Distribution Committee had not only nominated its principals but also alternates to serve on the Distribution Committee. These are Mr. I. Edwin Goldwasser and Mr. Harold Linder.

REPORT ON CAMPAIGN

On behalf of the Executive Vice-Chairmen, Isidor Coons and Henry Montor, the former read a written statement on the status of the United Jewish Appeal campaign as of this date. (Appendix A)

Mr. I. Edwin Goldwasser moved to accept the report of the Executive Vice-Chairmen. This was seconded and carried.

Rabbi Stephen S. Wise believed that copies of the report should go to a number of the key people throughout the country. Following a discussion participated in by Rabbi Jonah B. Wise, Mr. Goldwasser, Mr. Bressler and Mr. Rosenbloom, Messrs. Lampert and Baerwald suggested that the Executive Vice-Chairmen should re-draft the report eliminating certain items and then preparing a list of those to whom the report might go beyond the Board of Directors and that the list of names thus drawn up should have the approval of Rabbis Silver and Wise before the report is issued.

This was moved, seconded and approved.

Dr. Silver, in commenting on the report, remarked that the major losses to be suffered by the United Jewish Appeal would occur in New York City and in Chicago. On the basis of figures cited by Mr. Baerwald, Dr. Silver felt that the most optimistic figure for the net amount of the New York campaign would be \$4,500,000. This includes \$1,000,000 to enable New York to meet its own refugee problem, inasmuch as every community in the United States provides an additional sum beyond what it gives to the United Jewish Appeal for local refugee needs.

Dr. Silver emphasized that his intention is not criticism of the New York campaign, but merely to express his conviction that much more can be raised in the city of New York if proper organization is initiated early. He had made suggestions along these lines on several occasions but his remarks had been misinterpreted in the nature of criticism, when all that he had been interested in was objective consideration of the New York campaign program in the same way as the United Jewish Appeal would concern itself with a problem in any other city. In the same way, he believed the national United Jewish Appeal ought to sit in with Chicago and any other community from which the results are not satisfactory.

Mr. Goldwasser commented on the special problems confronting campaigns in New York City and referred to the difficulties encountered by such organizations as the New York Federation and the Greater New York Fund.

Mr. Goldwasser believed that there should be a survey of the New York campaign problems and that a report should be delivered to the Executive Committee no later than September. This should be the result of a conference

between Messrs. Coons and Montor, representing the national United Jewish Appeal and Messrs. Blitz and Bernstein, representing New York City, adding to these four someone like Mr. Bregman and Mr. Willen and one or two others from Federation; then some plan might be evolved for a reorganization of fund-raising methods such as Dr. Silver suggested.

Dr. Silver supplemented Mr. Goldwasser's suggestion to the effect that two or three people ought to be brought in from outside of New York who have successfully used a different technique than that utilized in New York City.

Mr. Goldwasser commented that his purpose in suggesting September for the presentation of the report is to give a responsible group an opportunity to pass on the report and to have the observations of other people in time for October.

Mr. Lamport agreed that something would have to be done for the 1941 campaign. He felt that the problem for most immediate consideration, however, is the continuation of the Fall campaign of the New York United Jewish Appeal. He felt that the campaign conducted in the Fall of 1939 had been lackadaisical and in fact had been virtually discontinued because of alleged conflict with the New York Federation.

Mr. Lamport pointed out that the cash receipts on 1939 pledges still outstanding in New York had been virtually nil after March 15th. He declared that a number of larger items had been transposed from 1939 pledge columns to those of 1940. Moreover, large cancellations had been made on the balance due on the 1939 account.

In discussing other phases of the New York campaign and campaign techniques in general, Mr. Lamport expressed regret that there was an absence of publicity in the New York papers on the United Jewish Appeal. He said also that inadequate giving in New York in the upper brackets had percolated down into other communities and it had much greater influence in determining the outcome of campaigns in other communities than most of the factors cited in the report of the Executive Vice-Chairmen.

Mr. Goldwasser stated that he had been assured by Mr. Bregman that the New York United Jewish Appeal campaign would go ahead in the Fall and would not feel itself bound by any agreement with the New York Federation. This was supplemented by Rabbi Jonah B. Wise, who said that he is in touch with the campaign office daily and that he too had been assured that the New York United Jewish Appeal campaign for 1940 is to continue until December, 1940.

Mr. Hyman felt that on the basis of experience which he had had in many communities, his judgment was that there was an inadequate standard of giving in communities outside of New York. He felt that many of the men contributing in outside communities would, if living in New York, have been compelled to give much greater sums.

Dr. Silver disagreed with this point of view. A campaign, he said, can be inspired only if there are big givers. If in a community the big givers indicate that they are cutting, the cut goes down the line. He had analyzed a list of 46 big givers in New York, with the result that it was shown that 20 gave the same amount as last year, 4 increased slightly and 22 cut. The cuts amounted to \$700,000. Such things could not be kept secret throughout the country, he said.

Mr. Hyman felt that not merely New York City, but that the whole country needs to be stimulated to a better appreciation of standards of giving. He did not think it appropriate that there should be presented a proposal to study merely campaign methods in New York City.

Mr. Baerwald did not share Mr. Hyman's point of view. He felt the suggestion made by Dr. Silver and adapted by Mr. Goldwasser should be adopted. He felt that such a report would be extremely useful and would be welcome to the New York people who are anxious to get as much money for the current and for future campaigns as possible.

Mr. Baerwald felt that Edward M. M. Warburg had done a magnificent piece of work. He did not think that there was any other man of his age who had given as much time and thought and effort and energy to the United Jewish Appeal campaign as had Mr. Warburg. He assumed that the suggestion of finding ways for the improvement in campaign methods was no reflection on the management of the New York campaign. The meeting of the Executive Committee was merely a survey of the whole situation throughout the country and it was perfectly natural that since New York was the largest money-producing city in the country that special consideration should be given to its problems.

Dr. Silver assented to this point of view.

Rabbi Jonah B. Wise also paid tribute to the New York campaign leaders for their arduous labors.

It was moved, seconded and carried that a Committee be appointed to confer with the officers of the New York City campaign with a view to assisting in the planning for future campaigns in New York. The committee would be guided for its basis of operations through the findings and suggestions of the Executive Vice-Chairmen of the national United Jewish Appeal, acting in cooperation with the Directors of the New York City campaign. The report thus prepared on campaign methods would first be submitted to the National Chairmen for their consideration prior to its submission to others.

REPORT ON UNION NEGOTIATIONS

The Executive Committee of the United Jewish Appeal, meeting on June 26, 1940, went into Executive Session to give consideration to the requests embodied in a formal contract submitted by Local 16, Union of Office & Professional Workers of America, Inc.

Mr. Montor summarized the terms of the contract as reported to the National Chairmen following conferences between the Executive Vice-Chairmen and representatives of the U.J.A. Chapter of Local 16. Mr. Montor pointed out that with the exception of a few minor adjustments in working relationships to which the Executive Vice-Chairmen agreed, the following three major factors represented the questions in dispute:

- A. A signed contract
- B. A closed shop
- C. An over-all increase in wages for those not previously granted an increase on the basis of individual merit.

After a thorough discussion, it was duly moved and carried by a vote of 6 to 5 that the National Chairmen appoint a Committee to study the problem in all of its aspects and that this Committee have full power to act in making arrangements that should prove to the best interests of the United Jewish Appeal and the Chapter of the Union of Office & Professional Workers of America, Inc. representing the Union employees of the U.J.A.

REQUEST FOR \$40,000 FOR NATIONAL REFUGEE SERVICE

Mr. William Rosenwald brought up the request of the National Refugee Service for an additional \$40,000 from the United Jewish Appeal on account of the 1939 campaign. He stated that the United Jewish Appeal was withholding the \$40,000 because of a pledge of \$40,000 made by the Hofheimer Foundation which had subsequently withdrawn its gift. Mr. Rosenwald stated, because it did not believe that its contribution could properly be made to the United Jewish Appeal.

After a comprehensive discussion of the nature of the pledge made in 1939 by the Hofheimer Foundation amounting to \$40,000 and the reasons for the withdrawal of the pledge, it was decided, on the motion of Mr. Baerwald, that the adjudication of this matter be left to the National Chairmen of the United Jewish Appeal.

REQUEST FROM COUNCIL OF FEDERATIONS

Mr. Baerwald read a copy of a telegram from Mr. Sidney Hollander, President of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds. (Appendix B)

Mr. Baerwald also read a letter which Mr. Hollander had previously written citing reasons why an allocation should be made to the Council of Federations.

Mr. Baerwald pointed out that last year when a similar request was presented, it was finally decided by the Joint Distribution Committee to make an appropriation to the Council of Federations of \$5,000 and that the United Palestine Appeal had at that time made an appropriation of \$2,500.

Mr. Hyman explained that this was in lieu of a grant to the Council from the New York United Jewish Appeal.

It was then indicated that requests similar to those received by the national United Jewish Appeal have also been addressed to the New York United Jewish Appeal, to the Joint Distribution Committee and to the United Palestine Appeal.

Dr. Silver stated that the United Palestine Appeal had voted the sum of \$2,500 to the Council for the year 1940.

Mr. Baerwald stated that it was likely that the Joint Distribution Committee would repeat its action of 1939 in voting \$5,000 to the Council.

It was made clear that these grants from the individual organizations, the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal, were in lieu of any grants that might be made by all and any other bodies, including the New York and national United Jewish Appeal.

The meeting adjourned at 9:45 P. M.

MARGOSHES - the Day
183 East Broadway
New York, N.Y.

PRESS WIRE - COLLECT

[June 1940]

ל"ה נאמנה מול קה"ל, אברהם רבינו,
1940, 2006, 2007, 2008, 1940, 1948

THE FORTHCOMING ZIONIST CONVENTION CAN DO NO MORE THAN SOLEMNLY
REASSERT THE HISTORIC ZIONIST POSITION AND RALLY AMERICAN JEWRY TO
MAXIMUM SACRIFICES TO MAINTAIN THE JEWISH POSITION IN PALESTINE IN THIS
FATEFUL AND DANGEROUS HOUR. THE ECONOMIC PROTECTION OF THE YISHUV MUST
BE OUR FIRST CONCERN UNTIL THERE HAS BEEN A CLEARER DEFINITION OF THE OUT-
COME OF THE PRESENT STRUGGLE. AMERICAN ZIONIST LEADERSHIP IS PREPARED TO
ASSUME WHATEVER ADDITIONAL POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES THE WORLD ZIONIST
EXECUTIVE MAY DEEM WISE TO CONFER UPON IT. WE SHALL HAVE TO WAIT
UPON THE EVENTS OF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS OR MONTHS BEFORE WE WILL BE IN
A POSITION TO CONSIDER MORE SPECIFIC ^{undertakings} ~~proposals~~. WE SHOULD SOLIDIFY OUR
RANKS, SUBMERGE OUR DIFFERENCES AND FACE THE GRIM TASKS WHICH LIE AHEAD
AS A UNITED AND RESOLUTE MOVEMENT.

Abba Hillel Silver

June 1940

REPORT OF UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
TO ANNUAL CONVENTION OF ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

The form in which the campaign of the United Palestine Appeal was conducted at the time of the last annual convention of the Zionist Organization of America is still continuing. The fund-raising effort on behalf of the Palestine Foundation Fund and the Jewish National Fund, as well as the Mizrahi Palestine Fund, is embraced within the United Jewish Appeal for Refugees and Overseas Needs, which includes also the Joint Distribution Committee and the National Refugee Service.

In the year 1939 the United Jewish Appeal had a goal of \$20,000,000. Out of the first funds there were allocations as follows:

\$2,500,000 to the United Palestine Appeal
5,000,000 to the Joint Distribution Committee
2,500,000 to the National Refugee Service

The balance of funds raised was allocated by a distribution committee consisting of Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Dr. Solomon Goldman for the United Palestine Appeal, Henry Ittleson and Albert D. Lasker for the Joint Distribution Committee and Louis Kirstein selected by these four. As a result of the decisions of the Allocations Committee there will be made available to the United Palestine Appeal out of the proceeds of the 1939 campaign of the United Jewish Appeal the sum of \$4,000,000.

In 1940 the campaign of the United Jewish Appeal continues to be an equal partnership between the United Palestine Appeal and the Joint Distribution Committee, with the inclusion of the National Refugee Service as a beneficiary. Following more than seven weeks of negotiations as to the ratio of distribution of funds an agreement was finally reached on the following basis: that out of the first income there was to be a distribution as follows: \$2,500,000 to the

United Palestine Appeal, \$5,250,000 to the Joint Distribution Committee, and \$2,500,000 to the National Refugee Service out of the national income of the United Jewish Appeal. In addition, \$1,000,000 is to be provided to the National Refugee Service out of the campaign for the United Jewish Appeal in New York City. The balance of the income in 1940, during which the United Jewish Appeal has a goal of \$23,000,000, will be allocated by a Distribution Committee comprising seven members, two each for the United Palestine Appeal and Joint Distribution Committee and three representing the Welfare Fund communities. Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Dr. Stephen S. Wise are the United Palestine Appeal representatives on the Distribution Committee.

The year that has elapsed since the last Zionist convention has witnessed the enlargement of the responsibilities of the national funds. Political, economic and social factors, especially those related to the outbreak of war, have thrust new and unanticipated burdens upon the Jewish Agency for Palestine and entrusted new opportunities to the Jewish National Fund.

The continued influx of immigrants, certificated and noncertificated, has produced social welfare needs which must in large part be met by the Jewish Agency, especially as they relate to noncertificated immigrants. Shelter and maintenance for refugees, the creation of public works to eliminate the dole and relief systems, consideration of the permanent absorption of immigrants into the economic life of Palestine, have been but a few of the tasks arising out of the immigration influx.

The issuance during the past year of the land transfer regulations under the terms of the White Paper issued by the Chamberlain-MacDonald Government has emphasized once again the responsibility that Jews have to acquire land in Palestine at a rate commensurate with the needs of colonization and the availability of land.

Characteristic of the determination with which the Jewish Agency and the Keren Hayesod, as well as the Keren Kayemeth, are proceeding in the expansion of Jewish settlement points is the program for the establishment during a six month period of fifteen new colonies. The total cost for the placement on a sound basis of these settlements is estimated at £800,000, but only £400,000 will be required during the first six month period so that settlers may go out on the land and find at least the rudiments of colonization requirements.

The outbreak of the war intensified economic needs and national funds responsibilities in Palestine. The early paralysis of private initiative, the repercussions on the banking system of the country, the shrinkage in citrus export markets, the consequent total or partial unemployment among the labor groups and also in the middle classes particularly for petty traders and growers, placed before the Jewish Agency a wider responsibility than it had known for many years previously. Once again the necessity of bolstering the economic machinery of Palestine with outright grants from or guaranteed funds of the national funds became imperative.

Another important factor in the outlook of the national funds insofar as income is concerned was the involvement of various countries in the war zone and their consequent inability, because of exchange restrictions or the destruction of their autonomous economic life, to share further in the up-building program. Thus, Poland and the Scandinavian countries as well as Holland and Belgium no longer constitute a source of support for the Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemeth. France and England, under extraordinary economic stringency, cannot be expected to continue on the same scale as before, if at all, the relatively high ratio of support that previously they had contributed to the national funds.

In the period 1938-1939 it is estimated that the United States provided 60% of the funds of the Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemeth. In 1939-1940 this ratio rose to 70%. But if the normal budgets of these fundamental institutions are to be continued, not to speak of the new and emergency requirements arising out of the war situation which must be met, ~~then~~ the Jews of the United States will have to provide at least 90% of the money with which to continue the upbuilding program in Palestine.

The annual conference of the United Palestine Appeal held in Washington on January 6th and 7th was the most impressive demonstration that could be afforded of the wide and representative interest that exists in the continuation and expansion of the Palestine upbuilding program. The participation of delegations from every section of the country, the keen interest displayed by the delegates and the pledges of support that were forthcoming for the 1940 United Palestine Appeal, reflected more than sympathy. It was rather an exhibition of the profound concern of American Jews that especially in the light of the destruction of widening areas of Jewish life in Europe the stronghold of Jewish existence in Palestine should be enlarged.

During the year ¹⁹³⁹1940, as in 1939, officers and workers of the United Palestine Appeal have given of themselves, their time, their energy and their funds in order that the United Jewish Appeal nationally and locally might have a successful campaign. In hundreds of communities where campaigns have been conducted, representatives of the United Palestine Appeal have been distinguished for the stimulation that they gave as speakers, for the strength they offered as leaders and for the support they evoked as campaign workers. It was clear that where the hopeful note inherent in the Palestine program was struck the response was greater than it might otherwise have been.

The first six months of the 1940 campaign of the United Jewish Appeal have reflected in the results the shifts in overseas conditions and the

psychological atmosphere in America. The deterioration of the position of the Allies in the war with Germany produced certain misconceptions as to the possibilities of help from American Jews. Despite an aggressive effort to overcome these misunderstandings there has not always been evident a comparable willingness on the part of Jews generally to increase their participation in the programs of the agencies within the United Jewish Appeal.

A preliminary analysis of the campaigns of the United Jewish Appeal in the first half of 1940 would indicate the general sums communities have raised as slightly more than in 1939. The two notable exceptions are New York City and Chicago.

It is not possible at this time to estimate what the United Palestine Appeal may obtain for Palestine during 1940 since decisions on allotments aside from the funds made available for advance purposes must be made by the Distribution Committee. But it is safe to venture the prediction that the amount that Palestine will obtain in 1940 will be less than the sum forthcoming in 1939, despite the fact that American Jewry has a far greater responsibility for the maintenance of our program in Palestine, despite the fact that Palestine today offers the one great avenue through which Jewish life may be saved not alone for individuals but for the Jewish people.

The strength of the United Palestine Appeal and understanding of its new responsibilities must depend upon leadership by Zionists and by friends of Palestine generally in every community in the United States whether the campaigning be in the form of Welfare Funds, combined drives or other methods adapted to any particular community. A special obligation rests upon members and leaders of the Zionist Organization of America to see to it that they strengthen their influence in every community fund-raising machinery not only as officers but as workers and contributors so that their zeal for

Palestine and their preparation for sacrifice may be a stimulating exemplar to all other elements in the community.

In the period from July 1, 1939, to June 1, 1940, the United Palestine Appeal received in cash a total sum of \$3,191,060.28. Of that amount \$2,900,100 was distributed between the Palestine Foundation Fund and the Jewish National Fund. \$85,000 was made available to the Mizrachi Palestine Fund for its program in Palestine. The Zionist Organization of America, the Poale Zion, the Mizrachi Organization of America, the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, the President's Advisory Committee for Political Refugees, the Hashomer Hatzair were other bodies receiving subventions for various purposes from the United Palestine Appeal. The total expenditure of the United Palestine Appeal for campaigns and for administration during the period from July 1, 1939 to June 1, 1940 totaled \$56,030.43.

Low *Remedy*
In this report submitted to the annual convention of the Zionist Organization of America I should like to acknowledge the service rendered to the United Palestine Appeal and also to the United Jewish Appeal through indefatigable efforts of my Co-Chairmen in the United Palestine Appeal, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Mr. Louis Lipsky, Rabbi Solomon Goldman, Rabbi Israel Goldstein and Judge Morris Rothenberg; to our Treasurer, Mr. Arthur M. Lampert, and his Associate Treasurers, Abraham L. Liebovitz and Jacob Sincoff, and to all the other men and women, of whom there are thousands, in every State in the Union who by their diligence, devotion and generosity have carried forward our up-building program in Palestine so that our land possessions might be greater, our colonies more numerous, our educational system more extensive, our immigration more accelerated and our general development program more sound and absorptive.

The following is the list of officers of the United Palestine Appeal:

Honorary Chairmen:

Albert Einstein
Herbert H. Lehman

Julian W. Mack
Henry Monsky
Nathan Straus
Henrietta Szold

National Chairman
Abba Hillel Silver

National Co-Chairmen
Stephen S. Wise, Chairman, Administrative Committee
Louis Lipsky, Chairman, Executive Committee
Solomon Goldman
Israel Goldstein
Morris Rothenberg

Treasurer
Arthur M. Lampert

Associate Treasurers
Abraham L. Liebovitz
Jacob Sincoff

Vice-Chairmen
Barnett R. Brickner
Leon Gellman
James G. Heller
Edward L. Israel
Louis E. Levinthal
Elihu D. Stone
Joe Weingarten
David Wertheim

Honorary Secretary
Charles Ress

Executive Director
Henry Montor



Abba Hillel Silver

PALESTINE FOUNDATION FUND

(Keren Hayesod) Inc. - קרן היסוד FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT OF THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

41 EAST 42nd STREET
NEW YORK CITY
MURRAY HILL 2-3754

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MORRIS WEINBERG
and Officers

August 3, 1940


Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
Mooselookmeguntic Lodge
Haines Landing, Me.

Dear Rabbi Silver:

Just prior to his departure from New York, Mr. Eliezer Kaplan asked me to send you a copy of the Minutes of the Meeting of the Palestine Committee of the Joint Distribution Committee held on July 15th, for your information.

I attach herewith a copy of those minutes.

Sincerely yours,


Sarah Behrman

SB:CDG

MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE PALESTINE COMMITTEE
OF THE J.D.C., HELD ON JULY 15, 1940

PRESENT: Dr. Solomon Lowenstein, Chairman
Dr. J. J. Golub
Mr. Joseph C. Hyman
Dr. Bernhard Kahn
Mr. Moses A. Leavitt
Mr. Irwin Rosen

BY INVITATION: Mr. Eliezer Kaplan, Treasurer of the Jewish Agency

Message of Regret: Mr. Edward A. Norman
Dr. Maurice P. Hexter

In view of the numerous appeals received by the J. D. C. from various organizations in Palestine, Mr. Eliezer Kaplan, on the invitation of the Palestine Committee, had consented to give a brief summary of the relief situation in Palestine and to report on which the Jewish Agency had done in this connection.

Mr. Kaplan stated that he had left Palestine on April 30th and that he had been receiving letters and cables from there, so that he would attempt to give a picture of the situation as he saw it.

The relief work of the Jewish Agency is divided into four parts:

- 1) Direct relief
- 2) Relief through work
- 3) Credits
- 4) Help to immigrants (refugees)

1. Since October 1st, 1939, direct relief in Palestine has been administered through the Vaad Leumi. The Agency negotiated with the government, and the government grants for direct relief to Jews were transferred to the Vaad Leumi; the government also appropriates its grants to the Vaad Leumi. The latter confers every month with the representatives of the local organizations, municipalities, social service offices, labor organizations, etc. and then the questions are discussed with the Agency. The appropriations

for unemployment relief are distributed mostly through the labor organizations; the social relief through the social service offices of the local authorities.

From October 1, 1939 to April 1st, 1940, more than £80,000 was spent for direct relief, made up as follows:

- £ 35,000 from the government (includes sums for Tel Aviv)
- £ 27,000 from the Jewish Agency
- £ 38,000 from the Vaad Leumi - and partially from a loan to the Vaad Leumi guarantee by the Jewish Agency. These funds came partially from a special emergency tax imposed on the Yishuv.

The money distributed through the labor organizations was distributed mostly in the form of unsecured loans.

Standards of relief:

For single men - entirely unemployed, i.e. a man who works not more than four days a month - a sum of 70 to 90 piastres per month. (When this money was distributed through the labor organizations, the latter gave 25-30% and the national organization gave the difference; where the labor organization did not distribute the relief, all came from the national organization.)

For married men - a maximum of £2 (average £1½)

The government tried to impose the Arab standard of approximately ^{forty} piastres per month, but this was not adhered to.

Formerly Miss Szold was at the head of the social department of the Vaad Leumi, but since she has given up some of her offices, she is now only a consultant, and Rabbi Ostrovsky is in charge, and is assisted by a committee. Dr. Magnes is also on this committee.

The local organizations are responsible to the Vaad Leumi. The Vaad Leumi makes no differentiation between the groups and recognizes the Histadruth, the Hapoel Hamizrachi, the National Labor Organization, the Yemenites, the Sephardic Jews, the Eastern Jews and the Agudath Israel.

Mr. Kaplan wished to call to the attention of the J.D.C. two special groups whose needs were most urgent:

1) Former German "Pensioners" - these present a most difficult problem. There are about 300-400 such persons. They are all over 50, many of them 60 and 70. It is not a question of finding work for these people as they are physically unable to work. The majority of them are of high cultural and social standing. Until the war started, they received their pensions from Germany through the Haavarah transfer, but this is no longer possible. Their plight was discussed with the government, which took a most sympathetic attitude, but stated that in view of the war no dealings could be had with the enemy.

2) Rabbis - these present a very difficult human problem. There are many hundreds of them.

Attempts are being made to arrive at some kind of help for both classifications, by means of individualized gifts.

With the exception of these two groups, all other recipients of direct relief got an equal share. Mr. Kaplan felt that if there were any special funds for these two special groups, its disbursements would have to be centralized too.

In the above mentioned sum of 90 piastres, no clothing or dwellings were taken into consideration - only food and medical help. There were attempts made to instal kitchens and community stores where food could be obtained or bought cheaply.

II. Relief through work: This is centralized mostly in the Agency. The Agency, in addition to the sums appropriated by the government for relief through work, spent tens of thousands of Pounds. Tel Aviv got substantial sums from the government. At the same time, up to July 1st, the Agency appropriated the sum of £15,000, and some sums in Haifa and Jerusalem. In Tel Aviv, the work consists of ground leveling and some road construction; in the colonies there was road construction, some agricultural work and

housing. All the sums are given in the form of long term loans, and some loans for a shorter period. Sometimes the Agency gives help in the form of guarantees for certain parts of the loan.

Four new colonies have been established since the war, and it is hoped that 15 additional ones will be started. Hundreds of the immigrants (refugees) have been sent to the colonies for which the latter get some additional small funds.

The participation of the Agency in the relief work is 5 - 7½ piastre per worker per day. For comparison Mr. Kaplan gave the wages of some work:

Government work between 15 and 20 piastre daily	
Agricultural " " 13 and 20 " "	
Building " " 25 and 30 " "	
Skilled work up to 35 and 40 " "	

(The work of the Agency consists in initiating schemes, coordinating and approving them, and the work is done through the appropriate organizations, municipalities and other public bodies).

III. Credits (free loan kassas): The Agency established tens of so-called Gemiloth Chessed Kassas, and participates in many of the existing ones. The various occupational groups have their own kassas. During the first even months of the war about \$11,000 was given in credits to small traders, and artisans, of which \$6,220 came from the Agency and \$4,880 from other sources. About 2,000 people obtained loans ranging from \$2 to \$10. Loans were extended by kassas in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Petach-Tikvah, and many of the larger towns. Generally the repayments are not bad - more than 50% being paid on time.

IV. Refugees: During the first nine months of the war, 16,000 Jews entered Palestine, 2,300 of them having been interned. The government is ready to release them if the Agency will take the

responsibility for their care. These 2,300 are mostly of the Sulina group, some 200 of whom are revisionists. About half of these 2,300 are unsuitable for any work and they will be in need of permanent relief. Great expense is connected with their release - first busses to take them from the camps, then to the hostels of the Agency, or to families where they must remain for several weeks often times, until some plans can be made for their employment. Attempts are being made to "resettle" them, always with a view to absorbing them. The Agency is creating special camps for many of these people, and already 10 such have been established for housing these people. The camps consist of tents with sanitary installation, and large dining rooms. Some arrangements are being made for garden work. Efforts are being made to have them insured in some sick benefit. It would cost £25, to £27 for the initial resettlement of these people, per head, but the Agency is unable to cover even the initial cost. There are approximately 1300 to 1500 in the Agency camps. There is a constant demand for new camps.

The Agency has spent between £40,000 and £50,000 in Palestine alone, purely for refugees. This was spent largely on persons coming in without certificates.

In reply to a question whether the Agency was still buying land, Mr. Kaplan replied that they cannot stop buying land as the money is given for this specific purpose, - constructive work must go ahead.

Mr. Kaplan then stated that, despite the fact that the Yishuv also contributes substantial funds for the refugees and levies very heavy taxes, the Agency and the Vaad Leumi are unable to do all the work required. He continued by saying that if the J.D.C. is ready and able to help, it should do so only through the national institutions of Palestine, The Jewish Agency, in cooperation of the Vaad Leumi, and not to create special organizations or Committees.

Dr. Lowenstein asked just what amount was talked of, were the J.D.C. to contribute, Mr. Kaplan said he had talked with Dr. Magnes and Mr. Rattenberg. Dr. Magnes had mentioned the possible financial participation of the J.D.C. in the Kupat Milwoh, to the extent of perhaps £5,000 with a like amount from the P.E.C. and the Agency.

Mr. Rattenberg had mentioned the figure £100,000. This, Dr. Lowenstein said, was out of the question.

Mr. Kaplan went on to say that £150,000 had been spent by the Jewish Agency during the first 7 months of the war for relief and refugees. In September there were 18,000 unemployed and this had been reduced to 10,000 by May. In June the economic position again deteriorated.

The funds required for the emergency program for the next 6 months' program were as follows:

1. £360,000 as a fonds perdu for unemployment help, medical care, losses and refugee help, and for those who will still arrive - maybe 5,000 in the next few months;
2. £640,000 for constructive help.

Mr. Kaplan pointed out that help for Palestine can only come from the western hemisphere.

CABLES

SEPTEMBER 9, 1940

KAPLAN
JEWISH AGENCY
JERUSALEM

CONFIDENTIAL: MET REDCROSS OFFICIALS WASHINGTON TOGETHER NAHUM GOLDMANN. DISCUSSED POSSIBILITIES ASSISTANCE PALESTINE. THEY EMPHASIZED \$50,000,000 FUND ESTABLISHED BY CONGRESS FOR DISPOSITION BY REDCROSS PROVIDES EXCLUSIVELY FOR PURCHASE SUPPLIES IN UNITED STATES FOR USE OF REFUGEES AFFECTED BY WAR CONDITIONS. UNLIKELY, BECAUSE OF BLOCKADE AND EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS, REDCROSS CAN AID PROSPECTIVE EMIGRANTS IN EUROPE BUT PALESTINE OFFERS DEFINITE POSSIBILITIES THOUGH NO COMMITMENT MADE BY REDCROSS.

OUTLINED FOLLOWING WAYS IN WHICH REDCROSS COULD HELP:

1. 12,000 REFUGEES ENTERING PALESTINE SINCE OUTBREAK WAR INVOLVING MINIMUM GRANT \$3.00 MONTH
2. 12,000 TO 15,000 CHILDREN EVACUATED FROM COAST INLAND
3. 3,600 RELEASED INTERNEES
4. 5,000 PEOPLE ARRIVING IMMINENTLY ON CERTIFICATES
5. ADULT VICTIMS WAR PALESTINE PARTICULARLY EVACUEES AND THOSE REMOVED BY PHYSICAL HAZARDS

MUST NOW SUBMIT MEMORANDUM FOR WHICH NEED YOUR CABLED INFORMATION INDICATING ACTUAL FACTS ABOVE FIVE CATEGORIES AND EXACT QUANTITY MEDICAL, FOOD, CLOTHING, SIMILAR SUPPLIES REQUIRED, WITH CLEAR DESCRIPTION KIND MATERIALS IN EACH CASE, NUMBER TO BE ASSISTED AND DURATION ASSISTANCE REQUIRED. ALSO INDICATE WHAT GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL JEWISH COMMUNITY DOING OR ABLE DO ALSO WHAT BODIES LIKE MAGEN DAVID OR OTHERS DOING. POSSIBILITY REDCROSS ASSISTING DEPENDENT EXACT INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON RELATION COSTS SUPPLIES TO SHIPPING, AVAILABILITY SHIPPING CHANNELS, COOPERATION GOVERNMENTS THROUGH WHICH SUPPLIES PASS. ENDEAVORING CHECK HERE ON SHIPPING FACILITIES. INFORM SHIPPING METHODS FROM BASRA OR OTHER INFORMATION HELPFUL THIS PHASE PROBLEM

MONTOR

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS
HELD ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1940

A meeting of the Emergency Committee was held on Wednesday, September 18th, 1940 at 3 P.M. at the office of the Keren Hayesod, 41 East 42nd Street, New York.

PRESENT: There were present: Dr. Stephen S. Wise, in the Chair; Messrs. Gedaliah Bublick, Isadore Breslau, Samuel Caplan, Kurt Blumenfeld, Leon Gellman, Nahum Goldman, Israel Goldstein, Louis Lipsky, Arthur Lourie, Edmund I. Kaufmann; Morris Margulies; Mrs. David De Sola Pool; Charles Ress, Mrs. A. Schoolman, Sokal, Abba Hillel Silver, David Wertheim; By invitation, Mr. Henry Montor.

Dr. Goldmann reported that he had received a letter from Dr. Solomon Goldman stating that he would be unable to attend the meeting for unavoidable reasons.

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MAINTENANCE
OF EUROPEAN ZIONISTS

Dr. Goldmann reported that three lists had already been submitted to the State Department with the request that the prominent Zionists named therein be granted visitors' visas to the United States. The three lists consisting of about 150 families had been accepted in toto and the respective American Consulates had been authorized by the State Department to grant the necessary visas. An additional list, said Dr. Goldmann, was in the process of being prepared and he estimated that some 100 families were involved. They were, for the most part, families which had succeeded in leaving various parts of war-stricken Europe and reaching more or less neutral places, such as Portugal, or unoccupied France; a number who were in Kaunas had been granted visas, prior to the removal of the Kaunas Consulate to Moscow. Some of the persons on the list who had their own funds were able to make their bookings immediately on receipt of the visas. The difficulty for the

others lay in their inability to raise the funds necessary for their transportation, as well as their maintenance here.

Dr. Goldmann pointed out that when the matter was first discussed on the recommendation of a sub-committee which was appointed to study the matter the Emergency Committee set aside a sum of \$10,000 for transportation costs, and he added that the approximate cost of transportation from Lithuania would be \$450 to \$550, and from southern France and Portugal \$250 to \$300.

Following the appointment by the previous meeting of Dr. Silver and Dr. Goldmann as a committee of two to confer with the Joint Distribution Committee with a view to obtaining their cooperating by providing part of the transportation costs, a meeting of the sub-committee with Mr. Troper had taken place. While the conference was a very friendly one, the results were not favorable. Mr. Troper did not respond favorably to the suggestion that the Joint Distribution Committee and the Emergency Committee should share equally in the transportation costs. Subsequently it was suggested that the money be provided by the groups, and the Committee would contribute to each group. To this Mr. Troper seemed to agree, and he said he would instruct the Hicem to give a certain preference to these people. Then, when the first test case came up, involving one of the persons on the Mizrachi list, Mizrachi said it was ready to pay one-half, and asked Hicem to make its payment, Hicem said that it had no funds available. After a lengthy discussion with Messrs. Kahn and Leavitt of the JDC, a meeting was arranged for Messrs. Hyman, Leavitt, Kahn, of the JDC for Hicem, Mr. Tartakover for the World Congress and Dr. Nahum Goldmann; for the Emergency Committee. At that meeting the Hicem representatives said that they had no money; and the JDC had no money. Dr. Goldmann took occasion then to refer to the fact that the JDC had given money for this purpose to the Labor Committee, which had been granted 500 visas. These included 350 persons from France and 150 from Russia, among them doubtful elements.

They admitted having given the Labor Committee \$30,000, as against \$80,000 or \$90,000 provided by the Labor Committee, and stated that they would be prepared to talk in terms of a 25% contribution, but not 50%. They thereupon agreed to contribute toward the first list of 20 to 25 persons, the equivalent of 25%.

Following this meeting, a meeting was called of the members of the sub-committee which was originally appointed to deal with the whole question: Messrs. Szold, Lipsky and Wertheim, and the Poale Zion asked the Emergency Committee to contribute \$2,500 toward the transportation costs for their group, on the basis that the Poale Zion give 50%, the Emergency Committee 25% and the Hicem 25% of the total. The sub-committee had accepted the terms of this arrangement, not only for Poale Zion but for the other groups as well, it being understood that such payments by the Committee be kept within the \$10,000, and that each additional payment be considered on its own merits by the sub-committee.

Dr. Goldmann called attention to the fact that under these arrangements the general Zionists would suffer because in accordance with this plan each party was to supply 50% and the Emergency Committee 25%. While the Emergency Committee would be prepared to meet its 25% tax for the General Zionists, there was no indication how the 50% would be raised.

After further discussion it was moved, seconded and carried that the arrangements agreed upon by the sub-committee be ratified, and that \$2,500 be paid to Poale Zion toward the fund required by it to pay for the transportation of its group.

It was suggested that Poale Zion be informed that it would be impossible to entertain a further list of names, since the Emergency Committee would be unable to cope with the costs involved.

In reply to Mr. Kaufmann's question as to how many persons it had been planned to bring over, in the category of political refugees, Dr. Goldmann

replied that the State Department had already passed on a list of approximately 100 families. Dr. Wise added that three lists had already been submitted and all the names on those lists had been passed upon by the State Department. Another list was in the process of preparation for submission very soon. However, added Dr. Wise, he was afraid that there might be some difficulties. The Labor Committee, which began its activities some months earlier, and had the cooperation of Mr. Green, succeeded in securing about 500 visas. If it were true that those included pro-communist elements, it would react unfavorably on our work.

Dr. Goldmann further reported that he had received from Geneva an additional list of leading Zionists, and since the agreement with the State Department applied to Russia as well as to the other European countries, he felt that it might be well to call on Mr. Oumansky in Washington and advise him that efforts would be made by us to secure United States visas for these persons if he would help secure their release from Siberia.

Returning to his report on the conference with Mr. Haber of the National Refugee Service, Dr. Goldmann stated that he had asked Mr. Haber what would be the attitude of the National Refugee Service to the persons coming to America as a result of this action, and Mr. Haber replied that they would be given the same consideration as is given all refugees. This was not regarded as altogether satisfactory, whereupon Mr. Haber said that they would be given help immediately on arrival and would not have to wait for investigations, etc.

KLADOWA GROUP: Dr. Goldmann referred briefly to the status of the group of approximately 1,000 persons who had hoped to be able to enter Palestine without certificates and had been stranded, last November, on the Danube. He stated that these persons had become a burden on the Jewish community of Kladowa and that despite the financial help which had been rendered, the Jewish community of Kladowa had been compelled to sell its synagogue and to give up many of its

possessions in order to keep that group alive. He reported that in a conference which Dr. Silver and he had had with Mr. Troper regarding the matter, it had been agreed that of the \$45,000 required to take care of the transportation costs of the whole group to Palestine, the Joint Distribution Committee would contribute \$25,000 and the Emergency Committee \$20,000. Mr. Troper had pointed out, in the course of the discussion, that an additional \$30,000 would be required to keep those persons alive until they were admitted into Palestine. This the Joint Distribution Committee was prepared to pay, in full. So that its contribution toward the maintenance and transportation of that group would be \$55,000 in all. Of the \$20,000 which the Emergency Committee would be required to pay, about \$7,000 was reported as being on hand and there was a promise of \$1,000 from Mizrachi, \$5,000 had been promised by the Emergency Committee, provided the remainder would be raised, leaving \$7,000 still to be raised. Conferences had been had with Hadassah, from whom it was hoped that about half the required sum could be had. The Zionist Organization of America had been asked whether it could pay the remainder, but up to the time of the meeting, there had been no report. Cables had been sent to Geneva to inquire into the possibility of finally liquidating the matter, since it had been decided that no money was to be forwarded unless there was every assurance that the persons involved could be sent to Palestine. The report came back that 170 of them had already been prepared to leave in a body, since they had certificates, and it is hoped that certificates will eventually be supplied to the rest of them, since illegal immigration is out of the question. Advice also came from Geneva that \$10,200 would be required to deal with these 170 persons. The Joint Distribution Committee was again approached, and agreed that all the planned steps should be taken but asked that in view of the fact that it was short of funds, the Emergency Committee advance the full \$10,200 required, it being understood that the Emergency Committee would be paying the Joint Distribution Committee 55 $\frac{1}{2}$ % share

in addition to its own 44 $\frac{1}{2}$ % share, which would be repaid at a later date.

After discussion, it was moved, seconded and voted

THAT Dr. Goldmann's report, and the decisions arrived
at between the Joint Distribution Committee
and the Emergency Committee in the above matter, be
approved.

RED CROSS: Dr. Goldmann reported that Dr. Silver had approached the Red Cross in Washington with a request for help on behalf of Palestine, because of the needs arising out of the bombings in Tel Aviv and Haifa. Thereafter an appointment had been made with Mr. Swift of the Red Cross, by Mr. Montor, acting on behalf of Dr. Silver, and Mr. Montor had asked Dr. Goldmann to accompany him to Washington. He asked whether Mr. Montor could be called upon to give an account of the meeting.

Mr. Montor reported that on September 9th Dr. Goldmann and he had met with Mr. Swift, Vice Chairman of the Red Cross, and with Mr. Nichols, assistant to Mr. Davis, at which time Dr. Goldmann and he presented the general question of giving assistance to Palestine, through the Red Cross. Mr. Swift pointed out that the \$50,000,000 which had been voted as a war relief fund by Congress and was to be distributed by the Red Cross would be spent only for the purchase of things in the United States. It was indicated that there was no likelihood of making funds available for people in Poland on their way to Palestine. Mr. Swift added that in general the funds of the Red Cross were not being used on the Continent. With regard to Palestine itself there were two questions raised by Mr. Swift: one was: what kind of supplies was needed; second: the number of persons affected. Upon returning to New York after the conference, cables were dispatched to Mr. Kaplan, who was familiar with the letters that Dr. Silver had sent to Mr. Davis and the President, and he was requested to cable statistical details. Mr. Kaplan replied indicating that extensive lists were being prepared. The lists were delayed

because Mr. Kaplan went to Tel Aviv after the bombing. In the meantime, Mr. Rehabiah Lewin-Epstein had undertaken a survey of the gasic materials that exist here, that could be used in Palestine. He prepared a comprehensive memorandum on what was required and on the shipping facilities between here and Palestine. It contained details regarding not only the quantities of supplies but the costs, because the Red Cross had pointed out that everything would depend on costs. Mr. Lewin-Epstein obtained material also from Hadassah, which had been communicating with its own officers and offices in Palestine. It was clear that there should be a unified instrumentality through which to approach the Red Cross for all needs for refugees and war victims.

Mrs. Pool reported that during the summer Dr. Magnes had suggested that Hadassah approach the Red Cross for assistance. The Emergency Committee had already been established at that time, and Hadassah had informed Dr. Magnes that he could count on \$150,000 from June 1940 to October 1941 for war emergency needs. Apparently this was regarded as insufficient, and he continued to suggest that Hadassah contact the Red Cross. Hadassah did not do so, because it wished to wait for an opportune moment. Hadassah therefore regarded it as unfortunate that when a delegation did call on the Red Cross officials, that one of its members was not called. Mrs. Pool further reported that immediately on Italy's entering the war, Hadassah had cabled Palestine to ask whether supplies should be rushed there. A long list was received, and three boats were loaded within three days. Unfortunately, one of the ships was turned back, and after cabled communications it was sent off again. Hadassah was glad to report that it had within the week received cables (after three months) reporting that the supplies had reached Palestine via Basra, and asking for more.

Mr. Kaufmann agreed with Hadassah that action had been taken without consulting interested and responsible persons and bodies. He believed that Mr. Montor and Dr. Goldmann should have approached someone in Washington before

conferring with Red Cross, He, himself, was close to a number of important officials in Red Cross, and might have been helpful, He felt that too many things were being dealt with by the Emergency Committee without consultation, and pointed to the matter of the Kladowa group as a case in point. He believed it was the responsibility of the Joint Distribution Committee to take care of that matter, and if properly approached, it might have done so. He felt that the Emergency Committee should not have been committed to the payment of \$20,000, especially since he did not know where the money was coming from.

In order to clarify the matter, Dr. Silver explained that no person or persons had assumed responsibility in the matter or had taken action precipitately. He stated that, as always, the United Palestine Appeal was interested in sending the largest possible sum of money to Palestine to help the situation there, and that when the National Red Cross launched its campaign for \$20,000,000 and the government made its appropriation to the Red Cross, it was decided to explore the situation with a view to ascertaining whether some of the money which was being raised for relief overseas could be diverted to Palestine. The President suggested that the President of the Red Cross be contacted. That action was twice reported to the Emergency Committee. Mr. Norman Davis of the Red Cross then wrote that they would be glad to meet with Dr. Silver. An appointment was then negotiated, and since Mr. Davis was out of town, the appointment was fixed with Mr. Swift. Dr. Silver, being unable to go to Washington, requested Mr. Montor to go instead. Mr. Montor asked Dr. Goldmann to go with him, because Dr. Goldmann was so thoroughly acquainted with the work and also because he knew Mr. Swift personally. The interview was held, and Mr. Montor had reported to the committee, and it was hoped that in all further negotiations, the committee would be kept fully informed. As the national organization, the Emergency Committee has certain responsibilities, and Dr. Silver believed it was for that body to decide whether or not it approved of the action taken. He expressed surprise, however, that Hadassah had not raised the question

at the previous meeting at which the matter had been discussed.

Mrs. Pool assured the committee that she felt that there was no ill-will, and that she was only calling the matter to the attention of this body.

Dr. Silver went on to state that there was also a long history to the matter of the cost of transportation of the Kladowa group, and that for ten months the Emergency Committee, as well as some of the most responsible representatives from Palestine had been endeavoring to persuade the Joint Distribution Committee that it was its responsibility to deal with the matter, without success. It may be that all of us are not as influential with the Joint Distribution Committee as some other people, in which case it might be possible to reopen the whole Kladowa case, if Mr. Kaufmann believes it should be done. All the steps taken, however, were taken only after full consultation.

Dr. Goldmann added that the whole matter had been initiated not here but in Europe, and it was only after it seemed that ten months of negotiation would result in a complete loss of the 1,000 Kladowa people that the sub-committee was instructed to come to terms with the Joint Distribution Committee.

With respect to the matter of the Red Cross, Dr. Goldmann stated that if the Emergency Committee would ask him to continue his visits to Washington he would do so. If it did not, he would not go. He would continue his practice of refraining from entering into any discussion in Washington unless requested to do so.

Mr. Montor stated that he had urged Dr. Goldmann to visit Washington with him, against his repeated request that he be excused from going. He added that in his view it was of practical importance to consider the 5 ways in which the Red Cross could be helpful to Palestine. That help could be given through the following media:

- (1) Refugees who have entered Palestine since the outbreak of the war: some 12,000 in number.

- (2) Children evacuated from the larger cities;
- (3) 3,600 refugees released from internment camps;
- (4) 5,000 who are about to arrive in Palestine of whom the Red Cross is ready to consider for a budgetary appropriation.
- (5) Air-raid victims in Palestine.

What is involved is questions of shelter, food supplies, clothing and similar equipment. For example, the memorandum under consideration asks for the supply of thousands of tents; thousands of mattresses and cots could also be supplied, if the Red Cross were so minded.

It was Mr. Montor's opinion that Mr. Swift was most sympathetic and was eager for action, and asked for action in the matter. He called attention to a cable received from Mr. Kaplan, in which the latter submitted a list of necessary supplies. He added that Mr. Kaplan was in touch with the representative of Red Cross in Geneva, now in Syria. In his cable Mr. Kaplan asked whether a money appropriation from Red Cross was possible, and he also asked whether it would be possible to obtain an additional amount from other sources, particularly in view of the air raids. As far as the request for a money appropriation from Red Cross, that was a matter to be discussed with Red Cross. As far as the extra-budgetary money was concerned, Mr. Kaplan was asking whether it was possible to secure funds outside of the regular United Palestine Appeal which funds would be a matter for the United Palestine Appeal to consider. In view of the fact that the entire contact between the Red Cross and this body had been throughout Mr. Davis on the one hand and Dr. Silver on the other, and in view of the lack of precise of information, Mr. Montor suggested that on the basis of Mr. Kaplan's cable, Dr. Silver advised Mr. Davis that a memorandum would be sent him, containing all details, but that in view of the cable from Mr. Kaplan, the Red Cross be urged that \$100,000 be sent in cash to Palestine.

After further discussion, it was moved, seconded and voted

THAT a sub-committee of the Emergency Committee in cooperation with the United Palestine Appeal committee shall deal with the matter of the Red Cross.

Mr. Montor and Mrs. Pool both reported that in cables from Palestine it was clearly indicated that in dealing with this matter all the agencies had been consulted in Palestine, so that there seemed to be unity in the action in Palestine in the matter.

MR. RUTENBERG'S RESIGNATION FROM THE VAAD LEUMI: Dr. Wise stated that he had heard some unfavorable comments regarding Mr. Rutenberg's resignation from his post in the Vaad Leumi, and urged the committee to cable the Executive in Palestine, inquiring into the reasons for his resignation.

It was moved, seconded and carried

THAT a cable be sent to Palestine inquiring into the reasons for Mr. Rutenberg's resignation from his post in the Vaad Leumi.

REVISIONIST PROPAGANDA REGARDING JEWISH ARMY: Dr. Goldmann reported that he had cabled to London inquiring into the matter and had been informed that the statement issued by the Revisionists was more a statement of what they wished to have rather than what had been accomplished. But in the meantime news had been received from the Jewish Agency in London regarding the establishment of the first unit, for which the Jewish Agency had struggled for about a year. The suggestion was made here that a statement be issued welcoming the news, but before taking any steps in the matter, further word should be received from Palestine. A cable, said Dr. Goldmann, had been sent to Palestine asking for the details, but no reply had been received to date.

Mr. Kaufmann asked whether it was wise to give publicity of any kind to the matter, in view of all the implications.


A lengthy discussion then ensued with respect to the matter of Arab-Jewish relations, in which Mrs. Pool, Mrs. Schoolman and other members of the committee took part, in the course of which it was declared that a sub-committee had been appointed to discuss the matter of arranging debates, etc. with leading Arabs in the United States, but that nothing had been done about it; the committee had been inactive. Hadassah believed that steps should be taken to set the committee into action, since such a series of discussions was more desirable.

After further discussion, it was decided to study the matter further before seeking such debates with Arabs.

There being no further business, the meeting adjourned.

Respectfully submitted

Arthur Lourie
Secretary



UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

41 EAST 42nd STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y.

September 20, 1940

Mr. Edmund I. Kaufmann
205 Homer Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kaufmann:

Attached herewith is a copy of a telegram which Dr. Silver sent to Norman Davis, as a result of the decision made today of the sub-committee of the Emergency Committee, working in cooperation with the United Palestine Appeal.

The subcommittee meeting was attended by Mrs. de Sola Pool, Rabbi Isadore Breslau, Behabiah Levin-Epstein and myself.

With the approval of Rabbi Breslau, we took the liberty of telling Mr. Davis that you would call on him on Monday to urge a favorable reply to the request for an immediate grant of \$100,000 for immediate relief work in Palestine. This, of course, is outside the much greater requirements for food, clothing, medical supplies, etc., which are to be described in a memorandum to be submitted subsequently to the Red Cross.

Trusting that this action meets with your approval, and that we may hear from you immediately after your conversation with Mr. Davis if you are able to meet with him on Monday, I am

Cordially yours,

Henry Montor
Executive Director

HM:ET

POSTAL ** NIGHT LETTER

SEPTEMBER 20, 1940.

NORMAN DAVIS
RED CROSS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

HAVE RECEIVED URGENT PLEAS FOR ASSISTANCE BY AMERICAN RED CROSS FROM JEWISH AGENCY EXECUTIVE FOR PALESTINE, SUPREME REPRESENTATIVE JEWISH PEOPLE IN PALESTINE AND RECOGNIZED AS SUCH BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT AS MANDATORY POWER FOR PALESTINE. DESTRUCTION IN TEL AVIV AND CRITICAL EMERGENCY RELIEF NEEDS COMPEL JEWISH AGENCY TO CABLE US TO RELAY TO AMERICAN RED CROSS PLEA FOR IMMEDIATE CASH APPROPRIATION IN ORDER THAT ASSISTANCE MAY NOT BE DELAYED IN MEETING PITIFUL NEEDS OF GREAT NUMBERS OF MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN MADE HOMELESS AND REQUIRING ELEMENTARY MEDICAL FOOD HOUSING ASSISTANCE DUE PARTICULARLY TO RECENT ITALIAN AIRRAIDS.

MEMORANDUM BEING PREPARED SUPPLYING INFORMATION REQUESTED BY MR. ERNEST SWIFT AT MEETING AT WASHINGTON WITH MR. HENRY MONTOR MY ASSISTANT. IN RELAYING PLEA OF JEWISH AGENCY FOR AMERICAN RED CROSS APPROPRIATION AM NOT INTENDING TO OVERLAP REQUESTS FOR URGENT MEDICAL FOOD CLOTHING AND SIMILAR SUPPLIES WHICH MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE OUT OF FIFTY MILLION DOLLAR GRANT OF THE CONGRESS SPECIFICALLY FOR SUPPLIES. EARNESTLY HOPE THAT IN VIEW WIDESPREAD IMMEDIATE NEEDS RED CROSS MAY SEE ITS WAY CLEAR TOWARD APPROPRIATION TO JEWISH AGENCY FOR PROMPT RELIEF OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS.

WANTON BOMBING OF NON MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND SUFFERING CAUSED TO JEWS IN PALESTINE HAS ALREADY AROUSED ATTENTION AMERICAN PUBLIC. AM CONFIDENT THAT AS ALWAYS RED CROSS WILL RESPOND BY ALLEVIATING DISTRESS. IN VIEW OF EMERGENCY SITUATION AND NECESSITY PROMPT ACTION AM ASKING MR. EDMUND I. KAUFFMAN OF WASHINGTON TO CALL UPON YOU ON MONDAY TO DISCUSS REQUEST.

ABRA HILLEL SILVER

POSTAL ** NIGHT LETTER

SEPTEMBER 20, 1940.

NORMAN DAVIS
RED CROSS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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ABRA HILDE SILVER

C
O
P
Y

VAAD BITACHON
Room 720A
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.
Algonquin 4-3600

Dr. Meyer L. Rosoff
Chairman

Louis P. Rucker
Treasurer

Morris Margulies
Secretary

Albert K. Epstein

Leon Gellman

Isaac Hamlin

Louis Lipsky

Mrs. Herman Shulman

Robert Szold

S.A. Udin

Executive Secretary

September 22, 1939

Mr. A. K. Livingston
221 Third Ave.
Rock Island, Ill.

Dear Mr. Livingston:

The Vaad Bitachon Committee has functioned during the last year and a half and has found in you understanding and cooperation for this work which is so fundamental to the very existence of our positions in the Yishuv.

You will be pleased to know that the Vaad Bitachon has sent about \$100,000 to Palestine. Thanks to the efforts of many friends like yourself who have a full appreciation of the significance of the Vaad Bitachon, this money has been raised through private efforts, without interfering with the public fund-raising campaign for Palestine.

Under the present conditions of war, the work of defense and security is assuming new forms. The man power and material resources of the Yishuv are being mobilized by the Jewish Agency to withstand the shock of the world cataclysm. Naturally, the Yishuv looks to the Jews of America in this hour of grave crisis for the utmost help they are capable of giving. What form this help is to take is yet to be clarified by the leadership of our movement. But we are confident that when the call comes you will again extend to the Vaad Bitachon the same cooperation as in the past.

We ask you to pass this information on to the friends who assisted you in the work of the Vaad Bitachon and to keep intact the committees already established in preparation for any new work that Palestine may summon us to do.

We wish at this time to extend to you our New Year greetings and hopes for Shalom for all Jewry.

Sincerely yours

Morris Margulies, Secretary

Louis P. Rucker, Treasurer

September 23, 1940

Council for Democracy
420 Lexington Ave.
New York, N.Y.

Gentlemen:

Permit me to acknowledge receipt of your letter of September 18, and your invitation to accept membership on the Board of Directors of the Council for Democracy. I have read carefully the outline of the program which the Council has set for itself, and I am in hearty agreement with it. I am therefore happy to accept membership on the Board.

With all good wishes for success in this tremendously significant and urgent work, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK

COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRACY
420 LEXINGTON AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY

Murray Hill 3-2465

September 18th,
1940.

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
East 105th Street and Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Rabbi Silver:

We who are signing this letter want you to join us in a vital service and grave responsibility which is, without question, one of the most important facing our Country today -- as important as the rebuilding of America's military defenses.

That service is to mobilize and unify the minds of Americans on behalf of Democracy as a dynamic way of life.

And we hope you will consent to enroll yourself with other men and women of distinction as a member of the Board of Directors of a carefully planned, thoroughly representative national organization designed to coordinate and stimulate all American activity in the promotion and defense of Democracy.

* * *

To carry on the fight against the forces that are working twenty-four hours a day to spread confusion and cynicism, division and defeatism in America, many organizations have come into being. But the need for a single, fully integrated, nationally effective organization still existed. To fill this need, with the aid of several of these existing groups a new, large scale organization has emerged -- non-partisan and non-political, incorporated in the State of New York under the name:

COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRACY

Broadly, the functions of the COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRACY will be:

1. To crystallize and instill in the minds of Americans the meaning, value, and workability of Democracy as a dynamic, vital creed -- just as Nazism, Fascism, and Communism are to their adherents.
2. To engender the will to defend and promote Democracy in America and to stimulate the active participation of each individual in the activities necessary for its defense and growth.
3. To study and reveal to Americans the work of all anti-democratic organizations and individuals and to counteract their propaganda.

To carry out the first two functions, every medium of popular education will be put into play -- the radio, press, movies, advertising, magazines, books, theatres, pamphlets, handbills, etc. -- all the facilities of communication and all the pageantry which the current inertia of Democracy finds so hard to muster in its own cause.

And in addition to activity initiated and carried out by its own committees and affiliates, the Council will seek to assist in every way the many existing groups who are eager to serve in the defense and promotion of American Democracy -- Women's Clubs, Boy Scouts, YMCA, American Legion, Churches, Labor Organizations, Educational Groups, Rotary Clubs, etc.

In asking you to become a Director of the COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRACY we do not want you merely to lend your name.

If you honor us by accepting this invitation, we hope you will feel that as a member of the Board of Directors of the COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRACY you are serving your country in an important capacity, and that you will be willing to give us the benefit of your counsel and lend us active aid as the activities of the Council develop.

The varied activities of the Council will be carried out by committees of experts and executives in the particular fields involved. Mr. Raymond Gram Swing, noted commentator and journalist, has agreed to serve as Chairman of the Board of Directors. To serve as President and full-time executive, the Council has secured the services of Mr. C. D. Jackson, Vice-President of Time Inc., and on leave of absence as General Manager of Life Magazine.

The COUNCIL FOR DEMOCRACY will be strictly and sincerely non-political and non-partisan, and all of us hope most sincerely that you will join with us in this important work.

Military strength -- and even victory -- will be of little value to America unless its people is united and zealous in the principles upon which this country was founded.

We are anxiously awaiting your earliest reply.

Cordially

Charles P. Taft
CHARLES P. TAFT

Henry R. Luce
HENRY R. LUCE

William J. Donovan
COLONEL WILLIAM DONOVAN

Robert J. Watt
ROBERT J. WATT

Freda Kirchwey
FREDA KIRCHWEY

FAST

DIRECT

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FULL RATE	FULL RATE
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Send the following Radiogram *"Via RCA"* subject to terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed toDEFERRED

September 23, 1940

KAPLAN
JEWISH AGENCY
JERUSALEM

CONFIDENTIAL NOT TO BE PUBLICIZED IN ANY WAY UNTIL YOU HEAR DIRECTLY FROM
 REDCROSS STOP NORMAN DAVIS CHAIRMAN REDCROSS IN RESPONSE MY APPEAL FOR
 IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE PENDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHIPMENT SUPPLIES STATED
 QUOTE DESIRE BE HELPFUL EVERY POSSIBLE WAY RELIEF WOMEN MEN CHILDREN
 MADE HOMELESS BY DESTRUCTION BOMBING TELAVIV PALESTINE BUT PRESENT
 POLICY SEND RELIEF IN SUPPLIES RATHER THAN CASH HOWEVER BECAUSE OF
 EMERGENCY HAVE ALLOTTED TWENTYFIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS HELP MEET ELEMENTARY
 MEDICAL FOOD SHELTER NEEDS UNQUOTE DAVIS DIRECTED CABLE FUNDS DIRECTLY
 YOU STOP CONFIRM TO ME ON RECEIPT STOP INDICATE TO DAVIS IN EXPRESSING
 APPRECIATION WE HERE WILL CARRY ON FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS YOUR BEHALF

ABBAHILLEL SILVER

CHARGE - United Palestine Appeal

FULL-RATE MESSAGE UNLESS MARKED OTHERWISE

JEWISH NATIONAL FUND INCOME

OCT. 1, 1939 - SEPT. 30, 1940

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>GROSS JNF INCOME</u>	<u>AMOUNT NOT SUBJECT TO UPA AGREEMENT</u>	<u>AMOUNT SUBJECT TO UPA AGREEMENT</u>	<u>JNF EXPENSES</u>	<u>NET INCOME TO UPA</u>
Oct. 1939	\$18,427.10	Requests \$150.00	\$18,277.10	\$8,204.48	\$10,072.62
Nov. "	49,836.94	" 1,127.69	48,709.25	8,583.62	40,125.63
Dec. "	57,753.73	" 100.00	57,653.73	8,774.48	48,879.25
Jan. 1940	45,879.40	Request 122.55) N.Y. 15.00)	45,741.85	11,059.64	34,682.21
Feb. 1940	34,733.84	Request 500.00	34,233.84	10,650.73	23,583.11
March "	55,687.31	Request 525.00	55,162.31	9,214.52	45,947.79
April "	62,020.67	" 75.00	61,945.67	9,878.05	52,067.62
May "	57,502.12	" 1,207.50	56,294.62	9,826.05	46,468.57
June "	58,662.04	" 4,220.53) U.J.A. 3,086.84)	51,354.67	8,958.99	42,395.68
July "	48,925.88	Request 181.27) N.Y. 500.00)	48,244.61	6,013.04	42,231.57
August "	27,654.37	Request 300.00	27,354.37	11,391.94	15,962.43
Sept. "	30,213.01	Requests 6,000.00) New York 200.00)	24,013.01	8,758.34	15,254.67
	<u>\$547,296.41</u>	<u>\$18,311.33</u>	<u>\$528,985.03</u>	<u>\$111,313.88</u>	<u>\$417,671.15</u>

"Give Today --- Tomorrow May Be Too Late"

—DR. CHAIM WEIZMANN

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

PALESTINE FOUNDATION FUND (KEREN HAYESOD)
JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (KEREN KAYEMETH)
For the Settlement in Palestine of Jews of Germany, Poland, Rumania and Other Lands

41 EAST 42ND STREET

NEW YORK CITY

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Herbert H. Lehman
Julian W. Mack
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Executive Director

Henry Montor

October 1, 1940.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

Dr. Nahum Goldmann called me in this afternoon to take part in a conference relating to the Emergency Committee problems. There were present, in addition to Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Edmund I. Kaufmann, Mr. Robert Szold, Mrs. Israel Brodie of Hadassah, Arthur Lourie, and Mr. M. L. Perlzweig.

At the last meeting of the Emergency Committee a decision had apparently been made to finance the transportation to the United States of a group of Zionists formerly in Poland, who were caught in Soviet Russia.

Apparently these leaders were being threatened with some special form of punishment because of their Zionist convictions, and their immigration to the United States was reported to be urgent. Accordingly, there was obtained through the State Department fifty visas.

Dr. Goldmann reported that the Mizrachi and the Poale Zion had provided funds to match the JDC, and to match a similar offer of the Emergency Committee to finance the transportation of Mizrachi and Labor Zionist leaders. Apparently, no one was concerned with the General Zionists, who number some nine or ten people.

The Emergency Committee apparently wished the United Palestine Appeal to take over the obligation for the General Zionists.

The observations I made included the following:

(a) that the United Palestine Appeal had already participated in making available to the Emergency Committee any money that it used for transportation purposes; moreover, that the very functioning of the Emergency Committee was possible through the grant of \$50,000 that had been made from the funds of the United Palestine Appeal;

(b) that the decision could obviously not be made by myself, but only by the officers of the United Palestine Appeal, and therefore

October 1, 1940.

I suggested to Dr. Goldmann, since he was pressing for immediate action, that he communicate with you to get your point of view.

Mr. Kaufmann, to whom Dr. Goldmann appealed for a grant of \$2,000 at least, took the position that the budget of the ZOA was not balanced, and that he could not undertake any additional commitments at this time.

The Hadassah, through Mrs. Brodie, apparently is considering the possibility of providing \$2,000.

I thought I ought to give you this picture, since Dr. Goldmann may telephone you.

I realize that in these emergency problems precedents and routine responses are neither binding nor considerate, but still I can visualize many ways in which the money raised by the United Palestine Appeal in this country might be used, for very legitimate and urgent reasons, to such an extent that the Palestine program would suffer extensively.

With kindest personal regards, I am



Cordially yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Montor".

Henry Montor
Executive Director

HM:JET

COPY

THE TEMPLE
East 105th St. at Ansel Road
Cleveland

October 19, 1939

Dr. Stephen S. Wise
40 West 68th St.
New York, N. Y.

Dear Dr. Wise:

I received your letter of October 17. It is a serious question as to where we ought to center our efforts at the moment, on the relief of the Yishuv or on the transportation of additional immigrants to Palestine. Kaplan's radiogram of October 12 states that the relief question has been aggravated in the last few years and paints a very dark picture of the status of the Yishuv. The country is evidently confronted with a major economic crisis. According to Kaplan's radiogram, the Keren Hayesod had to give relief to some thirty thousand people last month. This number is likely to increase. Should we, at this moment, concentrate on sending all the money available into Palestine so as to avert a major collapse, or should we use part of our funds to transport additional immigrants into the country who, by the way, might still further increase the relief burden of the Yishuv?

Frankly, I am unable to answer this question. It seems to me that we should depend in a large measure upon the judgment of our Executive in Palestine and in London. There is, of course, terrific pressure brought to bear from our distressed refugees in all parts of Europe. But is not our first responsibility to look after the minimum needs of those already in the country, and of our institutions there?

I would suggest that we send an immediate inquiry to Weizmann, Kaplan and one or two others whom you would suggest, touching this subject. If you wish to put it in the form of asking for their approval to the proposal that we, here, use the sum of one hundred fifty to two hundred thousand dollars in cooperation with the J. D. C. to finance the transportation of European refugees to Palestine, I would agree to such a cable.

What has been the final action taken by the Emergency Committee with reference to the Mizrahi's request for an appeal for food packages? I recall that our understanding was that if the answer from Jerusalem was negative, we would discuss the subject again.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Abba Hillel Silver

AHS:EK

From: Henry Montor

CONFIDENTIAL

[Oct. 20, 1940]

MEMORANDUM OF A MEETING OF SUB-COMMITTEES REPRESENTING THE JOINT
DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE AND THE UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
TO CONSIDER 1941 CAMPAIGN PLANS

Present: Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Dr. Stephen S. Wise, Louis Lipsky,
Dr. Israel Goldstein and Henry Montor for the U.P.A.;
Paul Baerwald, Dr. Solomon Lowenstein, James Becker,
Rabbi Jonah B. Wise, Edward M. Warburg and Joseph C. Hyman
for the J.D.C.

October 20, 1940, 3:15--5:30 P.M., at 342 Madison Avenue,
New York City.

Rabbi Jonah B. Wise, acting as chairman at the suggestion of Dr. Silver, opened the meeting to say that the discussions were to be of an exploratory character with regard to the campaign plans of the J.D.C. and U.P.A. for 1941.

Mr. Warburg declared that the J.D.C. is in principle for the continuation of the United Jewish Appeal. That is the sentiment of the country as a whole, a sentiment that is so strong that it over-rides the individual wish of any organization.

Dr. Silver raised the question of the inclusion of the National Refugee Service in the United Jewish Appeal. He felt that the UJA should limit its scope to overseas needs. The NRS was a purely American domestic organization. On that basis its appeal should be presented to the American communities.

Mr. Becker said that he had no set convictions in the matter but he believed the NRS had a tremendous appeal for the raising of funds. In Chicago, he declared, the major contributors were more concerned with the NRS than with the JDC or UPA. If the NRS were to be withdrawn, he felt it would lose large sums of money for the UJA.

Dr. Lowenstein felt that the strongest single appeal within the UJA to the generosity of America in 1940 was the NRS.

Mr. Lipsky believed that it was the overseas needs which constituted the heart of local campaigns. If it was true that many communities were primarily interested in the NRS, then it would be fairer to all concerned that the NRS present its case directly and exclusively to the communities, while the JDC and UPA could conduct a vigorous campaign to arouse American Jews to a better understanding of overseas responsibilities.

Mr. Hyman, quoting experience in Cincinnati recently, said that the community was more concerned with local than with overseas requirements. A point that was made to contributors was that 68% of the total income was going to domestic purposes.

Rabbi Jonah B. Wise said that if the UJA allows the NRS to conduct its own campaign, control would be lost of its applications to welfare funds. The NRS, taking advantage of pre-refugee sentiment in the communities, would ask for more than it actually needed. By keeping the NRS within the UJA this could be controlled.

Dr. Silver remarked that there was a confusion in terms. It was true that a sentiment for the refugees existed throughout the country. But each community was facing the problem in its own way. In Cleveland as throughout the nation a very large sum was set aside to meet local refugee requirements. This was completely outside the allotment to the UNITED JEWISH APPEAL. He believed that if the NRS, with its national activities were to approach the individual communities, it would get far less than it is now obtaining as its share in the UJA. The refugee cause was important in local campaigns but each community was meeting its responsibility outside the NRS.

Mr. Baerwald commented that the budget of the NRS will be in 1941 pretty well what it was in 1940, that is, about \$300,000 a month or in the neighborhood of \$4,000,000 a year.

Dr. Lowenstein said that communities are agitated against increased costs of campaign, both locally and nationally. They would resent the increased cost of campaigning that would result from an independent campaign by the NRS.

Mr. Montor cited his own experience in 1940 campaigns. He did not think that the cause of the NRS, as such was an important factor in the success of the campaigns. On the contrary, it was the emphasis on the overseas requirements which evoked the largest generosity. Moreover, the needs of refugees, though strongly sympathized with in every community, were being met--not so much through the NRS as through the local refugee committees.

Mr. Lipsky felt it was to the interest of the overseas causes to segregate the NRS from the overseas causes. The communities ought to have an opportunity to judge the differentiated needs of American and overseas causes. The provision for American refugee needs arose out of protective instincts, but it was essential that the Jewish instinct for philanthropy that did not have self-interested motives should be developed.

Mr. Warburg said that it was a mistake for any organization to believe that it was the agency which prompted generosity. People today contributed to the refugee cause in general when they gave to the UJA and not to one or another organization. His own feeling was that if the NRS were to conduct a separate campaign it would get the lion's share of the funds, because Americans felt American needs should be primarily safeguarded. This would be particularly true in the coming year when the patriotic sentiments would be stressed as never before.

Dr. Stephen S. Wise described the origins of the NRS in the National Coordinating Committee. Now that its position has been stabilized, he felt that the process of education in America with regard to the refugees and their integration in American Jewish life would be facilitated through the separation of the NRS from the UJA.

Dr. Lowenstein contended that the separating of the various causes would be fatal. In the public mind, the agencies in the UJA had achieved a unity. Their disintegration would be resented.

Mr. Warburg remarked that on the basis of Mr. Lipsky's reasoning-- to the effect that the process of education required the separation of the NRS from the UJA-- by the same token, each agency in the UJA should approach the communities separately with independent campaigns.

Describing the situation in 1940 and the prospects for 1941, Mr. Becker believed that local institutions would be given more money in relation to overseas requirements. Many communities are now saying that their local projects have been too long neglected for overseas needs and that now the trend must be stopped.

Mr. Montor asked whether a formulation of the discussion in figures would be relevant. He believed, for various reasons, including deductions for local purposes, lesser contributions, etc., that the UJA in 1941 would not raise more than \$10,000,000 to \$10,500,000. Mr. Baerwald had said that the NRS would require \$4,000,000. Was it possible for the JDC and the UPA to operate on six to six and a half million dollars between them? That was the essential question to be answered.

Dr. Silver declared that the major difficulty within the UJA was the insistence by the NRS that it was entitled to priority. He could not accept that position. He did not see why Jews already in the United States deserved greater consideration than those in war-torn Europe. There ought to be a more courageous facing of the issue as to whether the UJA had a right to spend so much more for the comparatively few refugees in the United States than for the millions who required assistance abroad. Insofar as the UPA was concerned-- and he had to face his constituency as head of the UPA to answer questions and objections-- he could not understand how the UPA could look forward to the same kind of campaign in 1941. If \$10,000,000 were raised in 1941--and he was far from thinking that Mr. Montor was pessimistic; perhaps even less than that would be raised--then, on the ratios existing in 1940, the UPA would get about \$2,000,000. That would be intolerable. There was no advantage to the UPA under such circumstances for the continuation of a United Jewish Appeal. That the position he would have to take in facing his people in the UPA.

Rabbi Jonah B. Wise felt that a separate campaign for the NRS would introduce quarrels into the community. The representatives of the UJA would have to plead for their cause and minimize the needs of the NRS. He still felt that retention of the NRS in the UJA would provide control of the NRS operations.

Dr. Lowenstein said that the discussion had not reached the stage of ultimatums, especially since the entire discussion was on an amicable, exploratory basis. He was thinking aloud. There might be a third possibility for 1941. The first was continuation of the UJA in its present form; the second was the exclusion of the NRS from the UJA; the third possibility might be the joining of the JDC with the NRS to conduct a joint campaign. Then the UPA would have to conduct a separate campaign. As far as he was concerned, if he were forced to vote as between a tie-up between the JDC and the UPA and the JDC and the NRS, he would vote for a joint drive of the JDC and NRS.

Dr. Silver observed that such a solution was not objectionable to the UPA.

Mr. Hyman said that perhaps all the alternatives had not been exhausted. Perhaps the NRS need not get \$3,500,000 in 1941, as it had in 1940. Perhaps all the agencies should share and share alike, in adversity as in times of good campaigns. Perhaps the three agencies in the UJA could start off with much smaller sums to begin with and then the Allotment Committee would have a greater sum at its disposal.

Mr. Becker felt that in the long run separate campaigns were a mistake. People don't know what will happen in six months. By keeping the three organizations together, it was possible to shift emphasis as the situation changed for one agency or another.

Dr. Silver said that theoretically it was correct to say that the Allotment Committee should have larger sums at its disposal. But in practise the amounts available for the organizations to begin with are so meagre that after these irreducible minimums have been apportioned, very little is left for an Allotment Committee.

Mr. Baerwald, referring to the distrust expressed in some communities with respect to the possibility of expending funds now, declared that the money was much better in our hands than in the local communities. They should trust us that we will not fritter away their funds.

Rabbi Silver and Rabbi Jonah Wise both referred to the Chicago situation as typical of what the UJA had to face in 1940. Chicago had declined to give the UJA officers even the opportunity of discussing their local problems. The cut which the UJA suffered from Chicago this year was the second most severe in the country.

Mr. Warburg asked what the situation would be in New York if the UJA were not continued. The community could not tolerate separate campaigns.

He was told that New York would have to adjust the problem within its own framework. Dr. Silver observed that representatives of the UPA, the JDC and the NRS would come together and work out a mutually satisfactory campaign formula.

Discussing New York's 1940 experience, Dr. Silver said that \$5,100,000 was recorded as the 1940 pledge. From that must be deducted \$600,000 for expenses, \$110,000 for the Ort and \$1,000,000 for the NRS. Out of the balance, which was in turn divided three ways, the UPA received as its share less than a million dollars, which is a smaller sum than the UPA could obtain through its independent efforts without the huge effort of a great united campaign. The purpose of the union was supposed to stimulate larger giving and greater income for each agency, but if the result of the union was to give the UPA less than it could raise alone, what was the advantage of such a union from Palestine's point of view. He also remarked on those individuals who are close to the NRS but have refused to participate in the UJA because of the inclusion of the UPA. That too gave point to the question as to what the UPA gained by such unity.

Mr. Warburg felt that none of the agencies can force a split campaign in New York; nor did he believe that any of the agencies could look forward to the old-time kinds of money, because of new developments in American Jewish community life.

Dr. Silver asked how much the JDC will spend in 1940. \$6,000,000, replied Mr. Hyman.

Dr. Silver continued to say that in the United States we had spent \$5,000,000 on refugees here while only \$6,000,000 was being spent on millions of refugees and Jews throughout the rest of the world. He for one could not understand the justice of that ratio.

Dr. Lowenstein remarked that local communities were not moved by that argument, however just it might be.

Dr. Silver declared that American Jewish leadership must face the fact that a relief program for Jews will be continued for the rest of our lifetime. Regardless of who wins the war, there will be problems of relief, rehabilitation, reconstructions. We shall need huge sums, hitherto undreamed of. We should begin to educate our people on a long-range program with regard to these overseas needs. To yield to current situations and to neglect that long-range educational program will cause grave injury to the agencies which have the responsibility for that overseas work.

Mr. Lipsky too thought that there ought to be a greater development of the larger aspects of Jewish needs. Taking care of refugees in the United States was self-serving politically and socially for American Jews. It did not represent true philanthropy.

Dr. Lowenstein offered a formula: perhaps there should be a reduction of the original amounts assigned to each of the three agencies, to tide them over a six-month period. Then the Allotment Committee, on the basis of the research work now being done, could deal equitably with organizational needs during the balance of 1941.

Trying to bring the discussion to a head, Rabbi Jonah Wise asked what would be the position if the UJA as such goes on. He felt that sufficient consideration had been given to the proposal of Dr. Silver for the elimination of the NRS from the UJA. There would have to be further thought on that particular subject.

Dr. Silver said that the ratios obtaining in the 1940 UJA were definitely unacceptable to the United Palestine Appeal.

Dr. Lowenstein again suggested that the sums be left flexible, with a six month basis of allocations. He added that he believed that the NRS should have two representatives on the Allotment Committee without any votes, so that they would have an opportunity of presenting NRS needs.

Dr. Silver remarked that the NRS representatives now have the right to make representations to the Allotment Committee and to be called in for statements.

Mr. Becker felt it was to the advantage of all the agencies to make a decision on 1941 expeditiously. He was the one most responsible for protracting negotiations last time, he admitted, but he realized the country was impatient of prolonged discussions.

Dr. Lowenstein felt that the further meeting of the sub-committees might be postponed till after the Allotment Committee had made its report.

Mr. Montor could not see what the Allotment Committee report had to do with the fundamental principle as to whether the continuation of the UJA was desirable for 1941.

Mr. Becker and Mr. Lipsky agreed that there ought not to be any waiting for the action of the Allotment Committee.

Mr. Montor observed that there were two questions to be decided: (1) should the NRS be included in the UJA; (2) if it was desirable to continue the UJA, what would be the financial relations between its component agencies.

It was then agreed, after a consideration of various dates, that there should be a second meeting of the subcommittees of the JDC and the UPA on Thursday evening, October 31st at 8 P.M. at the UJA office, 342 Madison Avenue. Mr. Montor was asked to remind the members of the meeting.

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The meeting throughout was marked by calmness and good humor. There was a complete absence of the intransigence that had marked the negotiations for 1940. It was particularly evident that the representatives of the JDC were uniformly in favor of a United Jewish Appeal.



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October 25, 1939

Mr. Henry Montor
United Palestine Appeal
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Montor:

In view of the fact that the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees again refused to give any consideration to the subject of Palestine, should not the UPA inform Dr. Wise that future subsidies to the President's Committee will not be made by the UPA, in keeping with the thought expressed at our last meeting?

There are many matters which should come up before the UPA meeting next Monday. Please work out the Agenda carefully eliminating all non-essentials, but including all matters which should receive consideration. I am particularly anxious to have the subject of the appeal of Chief Rabbi Herzog, etc. put on the Agenda; the question of whether the UPA should or should not ask for authority to keep a certain fund for distribution under its own authority or that of the Emergency Committee without reference to London or Jerusalem; also the matter of the agreement to be worked out by the Keren Hayesod, the Keren Kayemeth and the Mizrahi for the 1940 Campaign. Less time should be devoted at this time to the report of the 1939 Campaign (although such a report should be made in brief) and more to the pressing problems which confront us in the immediate future.

I knew that President Roosevelt's over enthusiastic concern with the refugee problem and that of some of his Jewish and non-Jewish advisers would run into a snag and I notice by today's newspapers that the Allies have made unofficial representation to the White House with reference to Mr. Roosevelt's fantastic statement on the subject of post-war refugees. I have maintained right along that there is no solution of the refugee problem except in the destruction of those governments which are producing refugees. All else is costly and futile makeshift unintentionally arousing false hopes and setting in operation projects which are doomed to failure. That is the reason why I refused, last Spring, to go on the committee. I made my position quite clear to Mr. Ittelson and Mr. Straus. That is why I also opposed the UPA participating in that million dollar project to implement the refugee corporation. I think that the sooner the UPA and our Zionist leaders dissociate themselves from these refugee mass settlement schemes, the better. If the war is won, there

Mr. Montor

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October 25, 1939

will be no need for these projects. If the war is lost, no project will be great enough to take care even of a fraction of a fraction of those millions of Jews whose lives and careers will be shattered. The best we can do at the present time is to concentrate on the immediate relief of the stranded refugees abroad and the war victims, and the getting of as many of them into Palestine as possible. Whatever small numbers can be settled through infiltration into other countries should, of course, be assisted. Mass evacuations and colonization schemes are not only impractical, they are suicidal for the position of the Jews in the world.

Ever since our Conference in Washington, three years ago, when the delegation of British Jews came to arrange for a mass exodus of the Jews from Germany, I have been crying this message into the ears of our people. But I am afraid that it has so far been a voice crying in the wilderness.

You might wish to send as much of this letter as you deem desirable to the officers of the UPA in time for the next meeting.

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK



WHO SHALL DISTRIBUTE AMERICAN JEWRY'S FUNDS?

The Democratic Versus the Oligarchic Procedure

IN AN atmosphere of hysteria surrounding the dissolution of the United Jewish Appeal, a proposal has been submitted to entrust to the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds the power to determine by recommendation the ratios which agencies shall receive from the funds raised by Welfare Funds for their purposes.

It would be unfortunate, if not irremediably harmful, for an issue of this magnitude to be decided in a climate of controversy. What is essentially at stake is whether local communities, with their cross-currents of opinion and delicate scales of adjustment of conflicting and complementary views, shall have the democratic right of determining how the funds they raise shall be distributed or whether a handful of men, having fixed convictions and not subject to the flexibility of broad community thinking, shall assume this supreme power.

Summarized, the question is whether the democratic or the oligarchic procedure shall prevail.

I

On July 2, 1940, the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds initiated a study of the feasibility

Is American Jewry Prepared for "National Budgeting"?

of establishing some acceptable method for reviewing the budgets of the overseas and national Jewish agencies receiving general support from welfare funds. When the first announcement of the project was made, it was stated by the Council that "the problem is a complex one, with wide ramifications. . . . There are differences of opinion among our own Board members as to the feasibility of extending our service in this direction."

The reaction of various members of the Committee on the Study of National Budgeting Proposals that was formed by the Council further reflected the sharp difference of opinion.

Mr. Harry L. Lurie, Executive Director of the Council, said as recently as October 10, 1940, that "I have not reached any definite conclusions of my own as to whether national budgeting is possible in 1941 or in 1942."

Men who accepted places on the Committee emphasized the hazards and the impracticabilities of the national budgeting proposal. Thus, Mr. Samuel Goldhamer, Director of the Cleveland Jewish Welfare Fund, said on September 27, 1940:

"The Council itself should, of course, continue its functions of community organization and planning as well as fact-finding, but it may be necessary to stop there if the Council is to survive for its initial purposes. . . . I consider the Council's task of aiding in the organization of American Jewish life as much more important to the ultimate ends than its entry into the field of budgeting."

Mr. Samuel A. Goldsmith, Director of the Chicago Jewish Welfare Fund, was most vigorous in dissenting from the proposal to turn over to the Council of Federations the determination of how much agencies should receive from Welfare Funds. On September 20, 1940, he wrote:

"I do not favor, at this time, the development of any plan for central budgeting of national agencies making appeals to Welfare Funds. . . . All budgeting proposals, when carried into effect, tend toward a crystallization of program and of financing. The agencies involved are not ready for such crystallization, at least not in so far as I can see. . . . Another way, and one to which we may come, is to frankly have every one of these organizations make an independent appeal, and try to establish themselves in the Welfare Funds and in the communities where there are no Welfare Funds. This looks a little costly, and may resolve itself into securing more or less money (I don't know which) than is secured, for example, through the United Jewish Appeal. But it is the only way to practically deal

with the problem of trying to determine the ability and the willingness of people to give to various things."

Mr. George L. Levison, Chairman of the San Francisco Welfare Fund Budget Committee, doubted the ability of a small central body on budgeting to improve upon the results obtained by individual cities. He felt that "the only way a welfare fund can continue successfully is by maintaining within its own community a feeling among contributors that the funds are being distributed in accordance with the wishes of those contributors."

Dr. William Haber, Director of the National Refugee Service, was not prepared to say whether a national budgeting committee would or could be sufficiently objective, and recognized the danger of a national budgeting coming under the control of a few influential individuals representing strong organizations.

An analysis of the practical impossibility of a national budgeting process in the light of fundamental ideological differences was provided by Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the Cleveland Welfare Fund, when, on October 18, 1940 (long before the United Jewish Appeal was dissolved), he wrote to the Council in response to an invitation to join the Committee:

"Centralization without thorough-going democratic control is highly undesirable. And until that control is satisfactorily fashioned by a national organization of democratically constructed Jewish community councils, no such serious centralization as is contemplated in a national budgeting committee should be, in my humble judgment, undertaken even if its character shall at first be purely advisory. The inevitable trend of such advisory agencies is in the direction of being used as mandate and authority. Many of the difficulties in the present set-up are, of course, real. Some of them may be solved without the creation of a national budgeting committee. Others may not. These latter difficulties are, however, far less serious than those which would be created under the contemplated set-up. By and large, the Jewish communities have not done a bad job of the problem which confronted them.

"May I remind you of the failure to achieve unity of budgeting and planning even in a limited field where four organizations are involved in similar and at times overlapping activities. I refer, of course, to the General Council for Jewish Rights. Fundamentally, the difficulty there is the same to which I have alluded above.

"As far as I am authorized to speak for the Zionist agencies and institutions in Palestine, let me assure you that they stand ready to give the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds the fullest cooperation in any inquiry which it cares to undertake,

into the financial set-up, expenditures, system of accounting, institutions and activities in Palestine."

(Full text of Dr. Silver's letter of October 18, 1940, in Appendix A.)

II

Can this major problem of American Jewry, about which outstanding experts have had fundamental differences, be successfully solved in the supercharged atmosphere resulting from the dissolution of the United Jewish Appeal? Is it fair to the Council, to the idea which is involved or to the national agencies to have this issue flung into the American scene at this time?

Dr. Silver, in a letter of January 22, 1941, to Mr. Jacob Blaustein, Chairman of the Committee to Study National Budgeting Proposals, summed up the situation as follows:

"... it seems clear to me that the final decision of whether national budgeting should be set up ought not to be made before the Jewish Welfare Fund communities of America have had a chance to discuss the proposals and to clarify their own thought on the subject, as well as to express themselves in some formal way. National Jewish organizations also whose interests are vitally concerned in any such proposal ought to have an opportunity carefully to study the subject and to crystallize their thought in the matter. To rush through, under the impact of a heated controversy involving two or three organizations, a plan of such large implications is in my judgment unwise and may cause harm to the very plan which its friends wish to see adopted. National budgeting should not precipitously be promulgated just because the United Jewish Appeal has been dissolved and there is pressure from some directions urging the Council to assume immediately the rôle of an Allocations Committee, Policy-making or Advisory Budgeting Committee (at bottom they are all the same) instead of retaining its traditional rôle of a fact-finding and servicing agency.

"American Jews ought to have time to think through this radical departure, to discuss whether it is desirable, and if desirable, whether the Council is the proper body to undertake it and to create the machinery for it, and what the proper machinery should be.

"The Committee to Study National Budgeting Proposals should be instructed to continue its work and to present to the Jewish Welfare Fund communities and to the national organizations which make applications to them for funds during the coming year, its

proposals in a fairly comprehensive way and to elicit from them a reaction after the communities and the national organizations have had a chance to discuss such proposals."

III

The Council has the power to obtain a maximum of facts about the organizations formerly within the United Jewish Appeal. It may broaden its service.

Evaluation of Causes

It is a beclouding of the issue to make it appear that the sole aim of the establishment of a national budgeting process is to discover facts about organizations. These facts are available in abundant measure and as a result of the cooperative process which has been developed between the Council and various organizations, particularly the United Palestine Appeal, there are being created new and expanded forms of information which deal with every phase of the United Palestine Appeal activities in America, and especially of the activities of the agencies which it finances in Palestine. Every community in America will have placed at its disposal all the pertinent data with respect to past expenditures, as well as detailed analyses of current budgets. This material, submitted first to the Council of Federations, can be amplified on the basis of any suggestions that might be forthcoming from the Council officers.

It has been said that there is in America a group of fair-minded, impartial men to whom could be entrusted the solemn responsibility of fixing ratios for agencies participating in Welfare Funds. It is obvious, however, that any group of men, if they are at all competent in their relationship to Jewish life, have acquired a psychological bias, whether it be for or against any particular cause. A survey of some of the leading personalities in the American Jewish community at this time would reveal a substantial number of well-meaning, devoted and conscientious Jewish leaders, but their point of view, whatever it is, has been tempered by their economic, social and cultural heritage and environment. To deny that such subjective factors exist is to insist that the millennium has arrived.

In view of the manner in which American Jewish life is organized today it is inevitable that one point of view should predominate in the upper economic level, which in the majority of instances, is reflected in the leadership of Welfare Funds. The democratic procedure weighs the various factors by averaging the majority opinion as against the views of individual leaders. Out of the amalgam comes a point of view

that is a reflection of the state of mind of the particular community, however it may be colored. But to abstract from each community one or two personalities with a preconceived set of notions on Jewish life is to provide not an accurate cross-section of American-Jewish public opinion, but merely the top layer of one psychological and economic grouping.

If the Jews of America raised sufficient funds to meet the needs of all the agencies in their full measure, it would be possible perhaps to apportion the funds on the basis of determinable expenditures. But when the amounts are so exceedingly limited and decisions must be reached in dealing with minimum requirements, the question of evaluation arises. In the field of evaluation the subjective point of view assumes commanding significance. It is admitted on all sides that Palestine, for example, could have used and can use extraordinarily larger sums than the inadequate amounts that have thus far been expended. But in juxtaposing the Palestine upbuilding program against other items in similar or other fields, the point of view of the judge on the fundamental basis of the Zionist movement becomes the final determinant.

How, then, shall an evaluation be reached as to the comparative importance of one cause in relation to another? Properly, that can be the function only of each Jewish community itself and not of a handful of men.

The mass of American Jews must determine what movements it endorses and finances. This cannot be the field of decision of an oligarchic group which will not have its roots in the traditions, experience and aspirations of the broad community whose funds are involved.

IV

There is an erroneous belief that all that is involved is the determination of ratios for the three agencies formerly benefiting from the United

All Jewish Life Affected

Jewish Appeal. Once there has been entrusted to the Council of Federations the ultimate power residing in the recommendation of ratios, it is logical that all agencies, causes and movements in Jewish life will be similarly affected. That was the expressed goal in initiating a study on national budgeting.

Are the civic-protective agencies, with their varying approaches to the Jewish problem, prepared to entrust their fate to the hands of a small body of men who may or may not share their fundamental convictions? In the field of Jewish education, will the lay and pro-

professional educators accept the point of view of some men whose philanthropic outlook on Jewish problems does not necessarily include an appreciation of Jewish education?

Were Jewish thought uniform, were religious, economic, social and cultural values among Jews standard, were there democratically organized communities throughout America dealing, by majority rule, with every aspect of Jewish life, national budgeting might have validity. Is it contended that that period has arrived?

The awesome "power of the purse" is traditional. Can any movement, having its roots at the very core of Jewish hopes, yield its destiny to those who are not animated by the same outlook? Is it cause for wonder, then, that the effort of some officers of the Council of Federations to introduce ratio-determination in the very heat of controversy on ideologies causes profound anxiety and disagreement?

Welfare Funds now make local decisions with respect to scores of causes. They are not deterred from making contributions to such organizations as the American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith, and Jewish Labor Committee because they function in similar fields. Support is not withheld from Hias because its activities are in the same area as both the National Refugee Service and the Joint Distribution Committee.

To make it appear that the very framework of American Jewry is embedded in the determination by the Council of ratios for agencies formerly in the United Jewish Appeal is to ignore the realities of the American Jewish scene.

V

Can any plan for the fixing by the Council of ratios succeed without the cooperation of the national organizations and causes affected?

Consent of National Agencies

These causes have their origin in the convictions and idealisms of hundreds of thousands of Jews. In the case of the Zionist movement, for example, it is of primary importance to build colonies and settlements in Palestine, to purchase land, to invest public funds in the encouragement of industry, to stimulate Hebrew culture and maintain a Hebrew university, to provide for the defense of the Palestine community, and to carry on necessary political action. A world movement like Zionism cannot consent to have the validity of its claims passed on by a national budgeting committee, especially when under the pres-

ent system of organization in American Jewish life it cannot be truly representative of American Jewry.

The United Palestine Appeal, as one of the agencies affected, has taken exception to the proposal before the Council of Federations. It feels that until such time as Jewish communities are democratically organized in Jewish community councils and in turn into a national organization representative of these community councils which would then be competent to speak for American Jewry in a truly democratic and representative manner, it would be best to leave each community to pass judgment on the validity of the appeals made to it reinforced by such factual information and data as the Council might supply. Every other arrangement has heretofore meant the concentration of increased authority in the hands of a small group of people who through interlocking directorships, control most of the important national institutions and who, in the past, have not given any exceptional evidence of sympathy for the upbuilding of Palestine.

Entrusted with responsibility for obtaining from American Jewry enlarged resources for Palestine, the second largest free Jewish community in the world faced with extraordinary problems of emergency and war, the United Palestine Appeal is conducting in 1941 a national referendum to determine whether the Jews of America are prepared to sustain the morale of Palestine Jewry adequately. The voting in that national referendum must be conducted by each community individually. A decision by a self-selected handful of men would be neither representative nor democratic.

Having taken that position, the United Palestine Appeal would be required to present its needs and its purposes to every Jewish community in America under all circumstances. The insistence by the Council of Federations, over the valid objection of the United Palestine Appeal, on seizing the power to fix ratios would not reduce but rather expand and intensify the area of difference of opinion as to the validity of causes.

The United Palestine Appeal is the trustee for the Yishuv in Palestine as well as for an overwhelming majority of the Jews of America who are convinced that the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home in Palestine represents the most constructive contribution to the solution of the problem of Jewish homelessness. It cannot, under the pressure of a temporary transition period, abandon the destiny of the most significant cause in Jewish life; it must place the decision for maximum support within each local community. That is the democratic as against the oligarchic procedure.

VI

The Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds was created eight years ago to correlate information for the use of Welfare Funds and to further Jewish communal organization. It largely avoided identification with specific points of view, except in so far as its dominant officers represented a special philosophy.

Is it prepared now to abandon the results of its gradual development by taking a partisan stand on an issue which is divisive?

The United Palestine Appeal, because its program is synonymous with fundamental Jewish ideologies, has been among the first to urge against transferring to the Council a power too great for any handful of

men to wield, when the fate of great causes is at stake. There are many others who share that point of view. That differences of opinion, sharp in character, exist even in the Council itself is evident in the quotations in the beginning of this exposition.

Will the Council of Federations stake its future on stubborn adherence to a proposal not at all carefully, reflectively thought out, or will it, recognizing the ramifications of the problem and the sharpness of disagreement, make haste slowly toward an ultimate objective?

The ideologies involved are too deeply rooted in the hearts and minds of American Jews to permit of any easy dismissal of the determined opposition which the acceptance of a ratio-fixing power by the Council will evoke.

It is to be hoped that the rule of reason and of calm judgment will prevail.

Appendix A

October 18, 1940

MR. H. L. LURIE, Executive Director
COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS AND WELFARE FUNDS
165 WEST 46th STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Lurie:

Let me thank you for your kind letter of October 9. I am afraid I will not be able to attend the meeting on October 25.

I have refrained from giving you my reactions to the memorandum of the Committee which was sent to me for reasons which I indicated in my conversation with Mr. Blaustein when we met in Maine last August, I believe. These same reasons caused me to hesitate about accepting membership on the Committee.

I am completely in favor of as thorough-going and as accurate a survey as possible of the financial set-up, budgets, administration and expenditures of any and every organization soliciting funds in the United States from Jewish communities. This applies to overseas agencies as well as to national agencies. I strongly approved of the Inquiry which is now being made under the auspices of the Allotment Committee of the United Jewish Appeal, and which I believe will do a necessary and valuable piece of work. In so far as the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds intends to follow up this work through this Committee, or any other committee, it should be encouraged in every way.

When it comes, however, to the subject of national budgeting which, of course, involves ultimately the task of "evaluating" the importance of the work done by the respective agencies, I am afraid that such a national budgeting committee will find itself in serious difficulties. The matter of ideologic preferences will inevitably come up. Thus, for example, to one who is opposed to Zionism, my dear Mr. Lurie, every dollar spent in Palestine, except as it might be spent in elementary relief, is wasted, regardless of how efficiently that dollar may otherwise be expended. On the other hand, those who believe in the upbuilding of the Jewish National Homeland feel that the cause is so worthy and historically so necessary that the millions already spent in Palestine are entirely inadequate. How are you going to reconcile these viewpoints, and how can any committee "evaluate" the work in Palestine?

American Jewry and world Jewry have been sharply divided on the issue of Zionism and

a Jewish Homeland ever since the first Zionist Congress in 1897, and while bitter opposition to Zionism has appreciably waned in recent years, there is still a decided difference of opinion, based on political considerations and on various philosophies of Jewish life and destiny. Certainly the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds would not wish to undertake to deliver an *ex-cathedra* judgment on American Jewry on Zionism or the need of a National Homeland.

But, if you do not take a definite position one way or another, how can you "evaluate" the work in Palestine? From a Zionist point of view, it is of primary importance to build colonies and settlements in Palestine, to purchase land, to invest public funds in the encouragement of industry, to stimulate Hebrew culture and maintain a Hebrew University, to provide for the defense of the Palestine community, and to carry on necessary political action. From the point of view of mere philanthropy, much of that is unnecessary, and no more should be done for Palestine than a system of per capita refugee relief will permit. And even on the basis of refugee relief, there are those Jews in America who think it more important and more desirable to spend money on the relief and resettlement of refugees in all parts of the world *except* in Palestine.

I do not know, my dear Mr. Lurie, how you plan to get around this basic difficulty. It is very doubtful whether a world movement, like Zionism, will consent to have the validity of its claims passed on by the national budgeting committee for whose composition it would be only in part responsible, and which committee, under the present system of organization in American Jewish life, cannot be truly representative of American Jewry. Until such time as Jewish communities are democratically organized in Jewish community councils, and in turn into a national organization representative of those community councils which would then be competent to speak for American Jewry in a truly democratic and representative manner, it would be best to leave each community to pass judgment on the validity of the appeals made to it reinforced by such factual information and data as the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds might supply it. Every other arrangement has heretofore meant the concentration of increased authority in the hands of a small group of people who through interlocking directorships, control most of our important national institutions, and who in the past have not given any exceptional evidence of sympathy for the upbuilding of Palestine.

Centralization without thorough-going democratic control is highly undesirable. And until that control is satisfactorily fashioned by a national organization of democratically constructed Jewish community councils, no such serious centralization as is contemplated in a national budgeting committee should be, in my humble judgment, undertaken even if its character shall at first be purely advisory. The inevitable trend of such advisory agencies is in the direction of being used as mandate and authority. Many of the difficulties in the present set-up to which the memorandum calls attention are, of course, real. Some of them may be solved without the creation of a national budgeting committee. Others may not. These latter difficulties are, however, far less serious than those which would be created under the contemplated set-up. By and large, the Jewish communities have not done a bad job of the problem which confronted them.

May I remind you of the failure to achieve unity of budgeting and planning even in a limited field where four organizations are involved in similar and at times overlapping activities. I refer, of course, to the General Council for Jewish Rights. Fundamentally, the difficulty there is the same to which I have alluded above. Each group speaks in the name of American Jewry but its authority derives from a specific social or economic group which in no instance is representative of organized American Jewish community life.

As far as I am authorized to speak for the Zionist agencies and institutions in Palestine, let me assure you that they stand ready to give the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds the fullest cooperation in any inquiry which it cares to undertake, into the financial set-up, expenditures, system of accounting, institutions and activities in Palestine.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

(signed) ABBA HILLEL SILVER

Issued by

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
41 EAST 42nd STREET
NEW YORK CITY

TABLE R-II

NATIONAL REFUGEE SERVICE, INC.COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF INCOME, DISTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENSES

	For the Year Ended Dec. 31, 1939	For the Nine Months Ended Sept. 30, 1940
a. <u>Distributions and Expenses:</u>		
b. Relief and Service, Migration and Central Intake Departments, J.F.W.S. J.S.S.A., N.C.J.W.	\$ 1,114,892.27	\$ 1,349,184.86
c. Resettlement including N.Y.A.	101,080.53	156,826.06
d. Employment Dept. - Retraining	2,287.55	18,443.79
e. Special Committees	25,432.25	68,685.58
f. Central Loan	35,825.83	38,800.00
g. Salaries of Personnel	647,952.07	658,063.65
h. Administrative & Office Expenses	225,869.87	224,169.28
i. Subventions to Outside Organizations	157,986.75	117,419.29
j. Cost of Enlarging Quarters	63,125.89	2,908.08
k. <u>Total Distributions & Expenses</u>	<u>2,372,453.01</u>	<u>2,634,500.59</u>
l. Less: Refunds, etc.		60,192.47
m.	<u>2,372,453.01</u>	<u>2,574,308.12</u>
n. <u>Income:</u> *		
o. United Jewish Appeal - 1939 Campaign	2,500,000.00	72,500.00
p. United Jewish Appeal - 1940 Campaign	-	2,125,000.00
q. <u>Total Income</u>	<u>2,500,000.00</u>	<u>2,197,500.00 *</u>
r. Excess of Income Over Distributions and Expenses	<u>127,546.99</u>	<u>(376,808.12)</u>

SOURCE: Statement submitted by the N.R.S.

* In 1939, there were contributions from Foundations, etc. of \$13,012.60 and in the first nine months of 1940 of \$72,875.00, which were not included in the income in accordance with the 1940 U.J.A. agreement. (See p. 18).

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
DOMESTIC	CABLE
TELEGRAM	FULL RATE
DAY LETTER	DEFERRED
NIGHT MESSAGE	NIGHT LETTER
NIGHT LETTER	SHIP RADIOGRAM

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise message will be transmitted as a full-rate communication.

WESTERN UNION

R. B. WHITE
PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

1206-A

CHECK
ACCT'G INFMN.
TIME FILED

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

D. L.

November 3, 1940

Mr. David Ben Gurion
Hotel Winthrop
New York, N.Y.

WRHS



UPA HOLDING FIRST REGIONAL CONFERENCE IN SANFRANCISCO IN OUR HISTORY. IN VIEW OF POSSIBILITY OF UPA CAMPAIGN IN 1941 AND PARTICULARLY IN VIEW ATTITUDE SAN FRANCISCO HAS LONG DISPLAYED TOWARD ZIONIST MOVEMENT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE INVALUABLE ASSET OUR ENTIRE PROGRAM IF YOU WOULD CONSENT PARTICIPATE SANFRANCISCO CONFERENCE SUNDAY DECEMBER ONE. ORIGINALLY NAHUM GOLDMANN HAD BEEN SCHEDULED BUT UNDERSTAND HE MUST LEAVE FOR SOUTH AMERICAN CONFERENCE. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR HELP GREATLY.

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

[Nov. 7, 1940]

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
BUREAU OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
427 CLEVELAND AVE., COLUMBUS, OHIO

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Columbus O., Nov. 8 -- Appointment of Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Cleveland, nationally known Rabbi of a prominent Cleveland synagogue, as a member of the Education Section of the State Advisory Commission on Negro Employment Problems, was announced today by Governor John W. Bricker.

Rabbi Silver will serve on the Commission with Courtney Burton, Cleveland, Fred G. Bennett, Columbus, H. F. Hillebrandt, Columbus, Thomas Starks, Bellaire, H. W. Nisonger, Columbus, W. W. Charters, Columbus, S. Burns Weston, Cleveland, H. C. Atkinson, Akron, James P. Walsh, Cincinnati, Dean S. Yarborough, Xenia, Chester K. Gillespie, Cleveland, and Mrs. Constance Heslip, Toledo.

H. C. Atkinson, administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, has been named by Governor Bricker temporary chairman of the Commission, which will meet to organize its activities within the next thirty days.

749 West End Avenue
New York, Nov. 8, 1940

Justice Louis D. Brandeis,
2205 California Street,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Justice Brandeis:

Last week I had occasion to speak with Mr. Henry A. Wallace in connection with an address he was going to deliver at a Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth function, and I consider it necessary to report the conversation to you.

Mr. Wallace set out by saying that he knew about Palestine and the Zionist Movement, and I acknowledged, of course, his friendly interest. He then remarked that the trouble with Palestine was that its possibilities were too small and that therefore only a limited number of Jews could be brought in. He referred to a conversation he had had with Dr. Weizmann, whose name he could not at first recall until I supplied it. Dr. Weizmann, he said, had stated in his conversation with him that there was room in Palestine for only 300,000 Jews. I promptly assured him that there must have been a misunderstanding. If Dr. Weizmann had mentioned such a figure, he had undoubtedly intended to refer either to a particular section of the country or to a specific colonization project, but in no case to the absorptive capacity of Palestine as a whole, not to mention Transjordan.

Mr. Wallace then suggested that we ought to direct our attention to possibilities in Latin America, and offered the following arguments in support. First, there are vast territories waiting to be developed. Secondly, numerous South American republics were in a situation which should render it possible to make a satisfactory deal with them for large scale Jewish immigration and colonization. Thirdly, the United States is going to make large investments in an effort to develop certain industries in South America, such as rubber. Fourthly, an influx of Jews would contribute towards Western Hemisphere defense. I replied that we Zionists, interested and concerned as we were with Palestine, were prepared to admit in principle that all other possibilities for Jewish immigration and settlement should be explored; but that our very long experience with such matters has shown that possibilities outside of Palestine were illusory, whereas Palestine has actually absorbed about half a million Jews.

Then Mr. Wallace mentioned Brazil specifically, with its vast unexploited territory. I countered by pointing to the large German population there and the strong Nazi movement. At this point Mr. Wallace interjected that such was certainly the case and it was the more reason for having Jews come in, in order to strengthen Hemisphere defense.

Throughout the conversation which lasted about half an hour, Mr. Wallace's attitude was clearly that of a friend of the Jews and a Liberal, entirely understanding of our needs and sympathetic; but he referred again and again to the limited potentialities of Palestine, to Dr. Weizmann's own viewpoint in that regard, and to the advisability of examining South American possibilities. It was impossible to go into a lengthy discussion on the absorptive capacity of Palestine, though I did give him a few figures. I cautioned Mr. Wallace that the meeting he was to address was devoted entirely to Palestine. He took the hint and actually delivered a fine Palestine talk which made a deep impression on the audience. His speech has been taken down, and a transcript is enclosed herewith.

Justice Brandeis

Nov. 8, 1940

I need hardly add that the trend of Mr. Wallace's thoughts, as expressed in the private conversation we had, disturbed me profoundly since it is probably typical of an attitude of mind among many others -- more so as I had heard precisely the same line of argument recently advanced by Jews. I attribute it to three causes: (1) The inadequacy of our own educational propaganda. (This is by no means intended as a reflection upon any person or persons.) (2) The influence of anti-Zionists who can no longer say that Palestine is unnecessary and who have therefore taken to this argument, suddenly becoming "Gross-Zionisten". (3) British influence.

My own guess, and it is only a guess, is that the last-named is probably the most important influence insofar as American officialdom in Washington is concerned. The tack taken by the British ever since the refugee problem arose has been that the Jewish refugees must be helped, but that Palestine "cannot solve the problem".

All of which confirms the opinion you expressed to me early this year, that one of our major tasks is to influence Christian opinion in this country. If Mr. Wallace is at all typical, we have a big job ahead.

Sincerely and respectfully yours,

Emanuel Neumann

en;ecb
enc.

BULLETIN

For Member Agencies

November 13, 1940

Summary of Proceedings

MEETING OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds

New York CityOctober 26, 1940
✓

In preparation for this meeting memoranda were prepared on the major questions to be presented for discussion. This bulletin summarizes both the salient facts of these memoranda and the Board decisions. Complete texts of the individual memoranda are available to member agencies on request.

I. 1941 GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The 1941 General Assembly of the Council will be held at the Biltmore Hotel in Atlanta, Georgia, on February 1, 2 and 3, the Board decided. A program committee, headed by Edward M. M. Warburg of New York, is now at work preparing the agenda for the meeting. The committee is planning to build the program around the major problems which American Jewish groups are facing locally, nationally and overseas.

II. COMMITTEE TO STUDY NATIONAL BUDGETING PROPOSALS

The Committee appointed by the Board of the Council last May to consider the possibility of setting up a national budgeting process for welfare funds, met on October 25, the day before the Board meeting. It had before it a memorandum prepared by the staff of the Council and a series of comments submitted by various members of the Committee. The group, headed by Jacob Blaustein and William Rosenwald, finally agreed on six points:

1. Budgeting of national and overseas agencies should be considered as one aspect of the program of local communities for total American responsibilities, both of a general nature and of special interest to Jews.

COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS AND WELFARE FUNDS
NATIONAL OFFICE: 165 WEST 46th STREET • NEW YORK CITY

2. A national budgeting process, in principle, is desirable and necessary.

3. The functions of the Committee should be to obtain complete data from all agencies, to evaluate the work of each agency and to recommend comparative allocations to the different agencies.)

4. The Committee should ultimately consider the programs and expenditures of all national and overseas agencies applying to welfare fund communities for support.

5. As a first step, the Committee might review the work of the present Allotment Committee of the United Jewish Appeal and, on the basis of this experience, might consider extending similar studies to agencies operating in similar or related fields. This should be done in consultation with the agencies being studied.

6. The Committee should consider the staff and costs necessary for such studies, and where the staff and the funds might be obtained.

The Board considered this interim report of the Committee and approved it after thorough discussion. The Board asked the Committee to continue along the lines indicated in its report.

III. RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A. United Jewish Appeal

1. The Board heard Elisha M. Friedman, director of Inquiry of the UJA Allotment Committee, explain the work which his staff had been doing and the difficult questions it was trying to answer. The Board discussed some of the problems of the Allotment Committee and the procedures it was following.

2. Regarding plans for 1941, the Board reviewed the desires expressed by member agencies of the Council and regional conferences for a continuation of the United Jewish Appeal and possible extension of its scope to include other overseas and refugee agencies. The President of the Council was authorized to name a committee, as occasion required, to express the wishes of the Council's member agencies to the organizations within the UJA, and to lend assistance in arriving at a satisfactory agreement for 1941.

3. Taking up a specific resolution from the Indianapolis Jewish Welfare Fund urging the inclusion of the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) in the 1941 UJA, the Board noted that this was in line with the previously expressed desire of many member agencies for inclusion of all overseas and refugee agencies in the UJA and that these viewpoints will be kept in mind by the Council's officers and Committee. The Board was informed of the agreement made between the National Refugee Service and the HIAS for the division of responsibility in the work with refugees arriving in the United States.

4. In an effort to develop a greater degree of joint thinking and planning by the Board of the Council and the leading national and overseas agencies, the Board decided to initiate an experiment for one year. Beginning with the Joint Distribution Committee, the United Palestine Appeal and the

National Refugee Service, the national agencies would be invited to exchange Board representation with the Council. Representatives of these national agencies would attend meetings of the Council Board, with all privileges of Board members except the right to vote on questions coming up for decision, and Council representatives would take part in the Board activities of the national agencies on a similar basis.

B. Tuberculosis Hospitals

Representatives from the National Jewish Hospital and the Jewish Consumptives' Relief Society, both of Denver, outlined before the Board several alternative plans which have been considered for coordinating all or some phases of the work of the two institutions. After some discussion regarding the organizational, social, and financial implications of each of these plans, it was agreed that a Committee of the Council and the staff will review the factual data with representatives of the Denver institutions and report to the next Board meeting at the General Assembly of the Council in Atlanta.

C. General Jewish Council

The Board was informed of current developments in the effort to achieve greater coordination of the finances and activities of the national civic-protective agencies affiliated with the General Jewish Council.

D. Federated Council of Palestinian Institutions

The efforts of persons in the United States to coordinate the fund-raising activities of several Palestinian charitable and educational institutions were described for the Board. Since the extent to which this group had the support of the various Palestinian institutions was not clear, the Board decided that a members' bulletin on the subject be withheld until all the facts were available.

E. Emergency Committee for War-Torn Yeshivoth

The campaign being conducted by the Emergency Committee in behalf of the Polish Yeshivoth which fled to Lithuania was described. The Board discussed the purposes for which the funds are raised and the methods by which they are transmitted to Lithuania. The Board instructed the staff to explain the situation to member agencies in a bulletin. (This information was subsequently issued in Bulletin #123.)

IV. NON-SECTARIAN RELATIONSHIPS

A. Community Chests

The Board considered at some length the financial, organizational and public relations problems involved in contributions of Jewish individuals to chests, with particular reference to the relationship between the amounts given by Jews to chests and the amounts allocated by chests to Jewish agencies.

The staff of the Council was asked to consider the advisability and methods of getting more information on the subject.

B. Aid to Britain

The Board was informed of a request which the Council had received from a rabbi in a Western community suggesting a special Jewish appeal for British aid, possibly under Council auspices. The executive director of the Council had replied that Jewish individuals should participate in such causes on the same basis as other citizens, rather than as a special group. The Board approved this position.

V. COUNCIL BUSINESS

A. Finances

The memorandum summarizing the financial problems facing the Council stated that expenditures for 1940 would total \$102,065, instead of the \$116,000 budgeted at the beginning of the year. Several staff members who resigned were not replaced even though their services were needed, and the field service which had been promised for several regions was not instituted. But the income for 1940, because of the failure of foundations this year to renew their grants of previous years, will reach no more than \$87,250. The Board discussed various ways of meeting the immediate \$15,000 deficit and of assuring a minimum budget for 1941.

At the outset of the discussion, Mr. Rosenwald and Mr. Blaustein promised to recommend contributions to the Council totalling \$9,500, from foundations and agencies with which they are connected.

After considerable discussion, the officers of the Council were urged to follow up several suggestions made during the meeting, including personal appearances by Board members before community leaders and budget committees to explain the usefulness of the Council's services to organized Jewish programs, and the assignment of a member of the Council staff to the task of promoting increased subscriptions from member agencies.

B. Nominating Committee

The Nominating Committee appointed by the president of the Council was requested to continue with its task of preparing a slate of officers to be presented to the General Assembly and the names of persons to fill vacancies in the Board of Directors.

C. National Social Work Council

Dr. Solomon Lowenstein and H. L. Lurie, treasurer and executive director of the Council, respectively, were asked to continue to represent the CJFVF at the meetings of representatives of the various national social welfare organizations affiliated with the National Social Work Council.

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

HELD THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1940, AT THE COMMITTEE'S OFFICES

PRESENT: Mr. Lipsky, in the chair; Mr. Cruso (for Poale Zion), Dr. Goldstein, Mrs. Pool, Mr. Ress, Mrs. Schoolman, Mr. Szold.
Mr. Ben Gurion, Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Perlzweig, Mr. Lourie.
Mr. Neumann (by invitation)

RECOMMENDATIONS OF ORGANIZATION SUB-COMMITTEE

Mrs. Pool reported on the recommendations of the Organization Sub-Committee as follows:

1. The name of the Committee should be "The American Emergency Committee for Palestine Affairs".
2. The Committee should include non-Zionist representatives.
3. Members of the Executive should be invited to participate as equal members of the Committee.
4. Messrs. Sol Stroock, James Rosenberg, Edward Warburg and Monsky should be invited to join the Committee. (Mr. Cruso did not concur in this recommendation)
5. The Office Committee should be named the "Executive Committee".
6. An Advisory Board should be organized who might be called on for advice and cooperation from time to time as occasion demands.
7. Both the Washington Political Bureau and Public Relations functions should be centralized in one unit.
8. A committee for peace studies should be appointed.

Regarding membership of the Committee, there was no recommendation on the subject of party representation. The Poale Zion had suggested equality. Hadassah thought that there should be some differentiation based on the size of the constituent bodies, e.g. there might be four Hadassah members, four ZOA members, two Mizrachi members and two Poale Zion members on the Committee. Revisionists should not be represented, unless within the organization, nor should the Funds (which were not political bodies) be represented as such. It was to be hoped that individuals representing the funds might find representation through the organizations.

Mr. Cruso said that the Poale Zion was opposed to the inclusion of non-Zionists, though he personally was prepared to recommend the inclusion of non-Zionist members of the Executive. Apart from that, inclusion of individual non-Zionists would hinder the work of the Committee, creating disharmony on vital issues arising in connection with the war.

Mr. Ben Gurion said that he viewed with deep anxiety both the state of the Emergency Committee in the United States and the proposals now submitted. The Committee must realize what were its objects, and he doubted whether as constituted, the Committee would be effective to act. The Committee was intended to represent organized Zionists in America, but what was important was not the organizational but political problems, and in that respect he was afraid of the results of the proposals of the sub-committee. Mr. Ben Gurion emphasized that the Committee had been appointed by a decision of the Executive to be one for Zionist Affairs and if it should decide to change its character but wished to continue representing the Executive, it must receive the Executive's assent. He did not believe that it was possible, in regard to the fundamental issues that would arise - for example in connection with the Jewish Army or Jewish Peace Aims, that a common platform could be formulated with the non-Zionists.

Mrs. Pool asked whether Mr. Ben Gurion and Dr. Goldmann thought that non-Zionist members of the Executive, at least, should be invited to the Committee. Dr. Goldmann said that he would have no objection. Mr. Ben Gurion refrained from expressing any view. Mrs. Pool thought it important that non-Zionists should be on the Committee because they would in any case have a say in the end, and there was more chance of cooperation with them if they were included in the framework of the Committee.

Mrs. Schoolman said that originally the question of Dr. Adler as well as Mr. Monsky being invited to join the Committee had been turned down on the ground that it would be improper to include them without the non-Zionist members of the Executive. The argument now was apparently reversed. Mr. Szold said that he too wished to argue for the inclusion of the non-Zionists, who were becoming more and more of a problem - they were becoming more articulate and more bitter. The 1918 situation did not exist today, and the present alignment would certainly be Zionists on the one side, and non-Zionists on the other attacking the Zionist position. Mr. Perlzweig suggested that the English precedent of a British section of the Jewish Agency in which the non-Zionists found a place, should be followed here, but Mrs. Pool thought it was too late for that now.

It was agreed that the Sub-Committee continue its work and submit a further report.

CIVILIAN AIR TRAINING

Mr. Ben Gurion proposed that the Committee should promote the civilian air training of Jewish boys in this country. The cost would be \$300 to \$400 per trainee, or a total of about \$50,000 for 125 boys. A resolution was moved and passed unanimously (Mrs. Schoolman not voting) that:

- " The Emergency Committee favors in principle the idea of the civilian air training of Jewish boys in the United States and will undertake to facilitate such training in connection with the Hechalutz. "

Mrs. Pool added that while there was strong feeling in Hadassah against the establishment of a Jewish army, she did not believe that there could be any opposition to the idea of training Jews as pilots, through she thought that Zionist money might be better spent in other directions.

It was also agreed that the Office Committee should discuss with Mr. Ben Gurion ways and means to implement the resolution.

A.L.

[1940]

(Strictly Confidential, Not To Be Duplicated)

NOTE OF MR. BEN GURION'S STATEMENT TO MEETING OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE
FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14th, NEW YORK CITY.

Mr. Ben Gurion said that he wished to formulate a number of principles on which, in his view, the policy of the Zionist Movement must be based.

1. In the first place, it must be clear that it was incumbent on us to determine on a fixed policy. The Movement could not afford to live from hand to mouth nor could it rely merely on faith in our endziel. We needed a clear line of policy for the period of the war and the period immediately following.

2. This policy must be one for the Jewish people as a whole and not for a part of the Jewish people. It could not be a policy which applied only to American Jewry, or to English Jewry, or to Palestinian Jewry. On the other hand, it was clear that in the application in an individual country of this policy, local conditions must be taken into account.

3. While our endziel was determined by the basic historical facts on which Zionism rests (Jewish homelessness, minority position, etc.) the concrete policy in any given period must be determined by the changing circumstances of the time. The circumstances which should determine our present policy are: (1) the danger of Hitler, (2) the policy of the White Paper, (3) the economic destruction of European Jewry.

4. The objectives of Zionist policy today must on the one hand be help Great Britain in destroying Hitler; on the other, the reversal of the policy of the White Paper, with a view to the establishment in Palestine at the end of the war of a regime which would enable the absorption of a maximum number of Jews from Europe in the shortest possible time, and elimination of the danger of a Jewish minority position there in fact as well as in status.

5. It will have to be accepted that, although leading members of the present British Government are strongly opposed to the White Paper policy, we cannot hope to obtain its reversal during the war. There are two main reasons for this: first, the preoccupation of British leaders with the actual conduct of the war prevented consideration of such a change; secondly, the factors which have led to the White Paper still operated.

6. It would be a dangerous illusion to rely on the justice of our cause to bring about at the end of the war a reversal of the White Paper unless a new factor was brought into play changing the constellation of forces in our favor. Without that it was idle to suppose that the British Government would of its own accord risk a quarrel with the Arab world, or that the American Government would take up our cause against the wishes of Britain. The only realistic Zionist policy at present which could reasonably hope to bring about a change of Britain's policy in Palestine at the end of the war was the development of such additional Jewish strength during the war as would, at its conclusion, make impossible, or at least very difficult, the implementation of the White Paper.

7. This new strength could in the first place, be derived from an increase in our positions in Palestine through continued immigration, the establishment of new agricultural settlements, and the strengthening of our defense forces in the country. While war conditions and the new land legislation clearly impede our efforts in that direction, progress was not impossible, and it was necessary to exert ourselves to the maximum to bring in as many young people to Palestine as possible and to acquire new land and found new settlements.

8. The possibilities of growth of the Yishub during the war were, however, necessarily confined within narrow limits. The possibility of acquiring a new and considerable strength capable of affecting radically the ultimate issue lay only in a specifically Jewish war effort -- the creation of a Jewish army.

9. A Jewish army was a political and moral necessity from a purely Zionist as well as from a general Jewish point of view. England's war against Hitler was our war, and we were bound to make a maximum contribution in helping England to defeat Hitler. But we could help England only as Jews. Help which we would render England not as Jews would have no effect on our position, nor would it absolve the Jewish people in the judgment of history from their failure to contribute to the destruction of the greatest enemy that had ever arisen against the very existence of the Jewish people.

10. An effective Jewish contribution which would help both England and the Jews as a people could be made only through the establishment of a Jewish army to participate in the war as Britain's ally. The Near East and Palestine in particular is becoming if not a decisive, one of the most important theatres of the war. The contribution which a Jewish army might make on that front would be of the greatest help to England, while strengthening our own position in Palestine, as would no other factor at this historical juncture.

11. In determining our policy we must remember that while a victory for Hitler meant annihilation of the Jewish people, a victory for England does not of itself provide a solution of the Jewish problem -- a problem which existed before the menace of Hitler ever arose. The creation of a Jewish army to aid Britain, and its existence as an instrument for changing the status of Palestine at the end of the war in our favor, must, therefore, be the main aim of Zionist policy at present; as such an army could not be created without the consent of the British Government, all our political effort must be bent towards securing such consent.

12. While a Jewish army if agreed to by the British Government would have to be composed of Jews from all over the world wherever free to enlist, the participation of American Jewry in the actual formation of the army would depend on the prior consent of the American Government. Accordingly once a decision had been reached by the British Government, it would be the task of American Zionism before any action could be taken in the United States, to secure the consent of the American Administration and to conform with the laws of this country, for the enlistment of Jews here in a Jewish army.

"Give Today --- Tomorrow May Be Too Late"

—DR. CHAIM WEIZMANN

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

PALESTINE FOUNDATION FUND (KEREN HAYESOD)
JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (KEREN KAYEMETH)
For the Settlement in Palestine of Jews of Germany, Poland, Rumania and Other Lands

41 EAST 42ND STREET

NEW YORK CITY

Dr. Wise's personal address is
40 West 68th St., New York, N. Y.

November 19, 1940

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Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

I am sorry that you could not attend the meeting of Saturday. There were just six or seven of us: L.D.B., B.V.C., Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Dr. Sol Goldman, Bob Szold, Emanuel Neumann, Mrs. Pool and myself. We met, of course, to consider primarily two matters. Others were left without consideration because L.D.B. was exhausted after little more than an hour. We were with him from 9:00 to 10:15.

There was some hesitation about dealing directly with Churchill in view of the Coventry massacre and myriad obligations which rest upon him. Instead of that it was decided that I should supplement my telephone message of two days earlier to the British Embassy by paying a personal call. That we did, Dr. Solomon Goldman and I, and we urged upon Mr. Malcolm that he make a second and supplementary inquiry of London.

We also went to the State Department and saw Ray Atherton, first assistant to Sumner Welles, who was tied up and had no previous notice of our coming. We urged that Mr. Welles do no more than make an inquiry of London, seeing that the facts were not absolutely certain. Atherton promised to take the matter up with Welles, though up to this time, Tuesday noon, I have had no reply.

We also saw Secretary Knox, who promised to see Lothian as soon as he arrived and take up the matter with him. One thing we want to be sure of is that the Cabinet knows about it. Today we have a cable that the matter is before the Cabinet. I have asked Chayim Greenberg, who is in attendance at the American Federation of Labor Convention, to get in touch with Sir Walter Citrine at New Orleans and with Green, and urge that both of them cable to Ernest Bevin and get him to explain to the Cabinet why the deportation of those Jews to Mauritius is intolerable and unthinkable.

With cordial greeting, I am

SSW:fe

Faithfully yours,

Wesl

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Brandeis against Jewish Army!

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

41 EAST 42nd STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH
JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE, Inc.

100 East 42nd St.
New York City

November 19, 1940

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman
United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd Street
New York, N. Y.

Dear Rabbi Silver:

Pursuant to the terms of the 1940 U.J.A. agreement which called for a meeting between the J.D.C. and the U.P.A. before October 31st, to consider 1941 campaign plans, the subcommittees of our organizations have now held two meetings, the first on October 21st, and the second on October 31st. The discussions were quite informal. The following seems to be the positions taken by our respective organizations:

The representatives of the U.P.A. were decidedly of the opinion that the National Refugee Service ought not be included in a United Jewish Appeal for 1941. The refugee problem in the United States, they felt, was primarily a domestic one. The inclusion of the N.R.S. in the campaign obscured the overseas and Palestine needs, and in effect, reduced sharply the amounts required by the J.D.C. and the U.P.A. From the campaign viewpoint, they believed that a united appeal of J.D.C. and U.P.A. could more successfully approach the country.

The J.D.C. representatives, on the other hand, took the position that in point of campaign usefulness, the N.R.S. constituted a most persuasive and cogent basis for securing larger funds. Moreover, the welfare fund communities as well as communities like New York City and other cities, had now accustomed themselves to the inclusion of the N.R.S. in a national united appeal, dealing with the problem of the refugees in this country -- their adequate absorption and their integration in our American life. The J.D.C. delegates felt strongly that the N.R.S. program looms up as of primary consequence to our entire community and must be adequately supported. Its inclusion in a United Jewish Appeal in 1941 is consistent with a full recognition of this situation. They therefore strongly urged not only the retention of the N.R.S. but also a more direct utilization of the manpower and forces of the N.R.S. for the purposes of the 1941 campaign. The J.D.C. group urged that the N.R.S. should be given more adequate opportunity to participate in the planning and in the carrying through of the campaign.

Furthermore, the J.D.C. delegation declared that the unmistakable trend of opinion and wishes of the Jewish communities of this country, indicated complete insistence on a united campaign. The J.D.C. was convinced that that opinion was wholesome and directly in the interest of the major agencies. In principle, therefore, the J.D.C. proposed a continuance of a United Jewish Appeal in 1941. The J.D.C. also took into account new factors which had emerged as a result of the war. The rapidly shifting conditions overseas, the threat of attack on Palestine, new difficulties affecting emigration, sudden political and military movements of the warring governments, had their impact on all our programs. These situations have given rise to strong feeling on the part of active and devoted workers and contributors in many communities, that an impartial objective, fact-finding body be given considerable latitude in determining how a substantial part of the funds to be raised in 1941 should be allocated among the

beneficiary agencies. It was quite clear that the J.D.G., U.P.A. and the N.R.S. would need a given limited fixed amount so as to carry on programs already initiated or continuing over a period of months; but as to the balance of the amounts to be raised, the J.D.G. found itself wholeheartedly in accord with the manifest attitude of the country, that existing needs during the year 1941 as appraised by an Allotment Committee, should determine the appropriations to be made available to the three organizations. To that end, an Allotment Committee of the kind now acting on behalf of the 1940 United Jewish Appeal, should be continued with a larger sum of money subject to distribution by it. In this way, the communities would be assured flexibility in the distribution of the funds collected.

The J.D.G. proposed therefore: that the U.J.A. of 1941 include as its constituent and beneficiary bodies, the J.D.G., U.P.A. and N.R.S.; that it should set aside an amount from the 1941 prospective collections to cover certain of the minimal needs of the three agencies for the first half of the year. Thereafter, an Allotment Committee should distribute among the agencies available sums to meet so far as equitable and feasible, the requirements as they might develop for the balance of the year. As to the initial fixed amount, the J.D.G. wished to point out that the demands on it from all parts of the world, the aggravated needs caused by the extension of the war, imposed on the J.D.G. burdens far in excess of what it faced during the early months of 1940. Moreover, the European agencies and local committees which theretofore had collaborated with the J.D.G. and had furnished substantial financial means, no longer could make contribution or remit funds. The burden of vast problems of destitution, emergency aid and emigration, rested almost in their entirety on the J.D.G. Nevertheless, in order to meet what seemed to be the unanimous desire of the American communities for the continuance of a united appeal in 1941, the J.D.G. stood ready to accept for the first half of 1941 the same ratio for the initial fixed allotments as had prevailed in the agreement of 1940.

On October 31st, our respective committees met for a second time. Again, the representatives of the U.P.A. affirmed their belief that the National Refugee Service logically did not belong in the structure of a United Jewish Appeal for Overseas and Palestine Needs, but expressed their willingness, in deference to the J.D.G. position, to include the N.R.S. in an appeal for 1941. In principle, the U.P.A. representatives added, they were ready to agree that out of the sums raised next year, a fixed amount should be set aside during the first half year for the three organizations, and that the balance be subject to distribution by an Allotment Committee. However, as to the fixed minimal amount for the first six months, they proposed the following:

To the N.R.S.	—	\$1,500,000
To the U.P.A.	—	2,500,000
To the J.D.G.	—	2,500,000

They declared that the budget adopted by the Jewish Agency for the ensuing fiscal year was \$11,000,000; of that sum, 80% must be raised in the U.S.; the other sources of support of the Jewish Agency had fallen out. They must therefore be assured at the outset of a fixed amount of \$2,500,000, irrespective of grants from an Allocations Committee.

In elaboration of their position, the U.P.A. delegates stated that the Jewish people of this country were especially sympathetic to the program in Palestine at this stage, in view of the identification in interest of Palestine with the needs of the British Empire. The U.P.A., if it were to launch an independent appeal, could easily raise, they said, not only \$2,500,000 but substantially more. As to the J.D.G.'s program, they expressed some doubt as to whether the J.D.G. could actually spend the sums allotted to it and make any large contribution to a solution of the problems of the persecuted Jews abroad. On the other hand, they said,

the continuance of the entire program of upbuilding the Jewish National Home and the needs of the present Jewish population there would commend the U.P.A. to the American Jewish community in unusual measure at this time.

The representatives of the J.D.C. took definite exception both to the validity and the accuracy of the statement made concerning the J.D.C. program. The primary difficulty with which the J.D.C. was now confronted was the inadequacy of funds with which to meet even a small portion of the large needs, the suffering and the destitution overseas. Given larger sums, relief that now had to be denied could be granted by J.D.C. to hundreds of thousands of the Jewish population, many thousands would be enabled to emigrate, and the cruel hardships now undergone by masses of Jews in Poland, in unoccupied France, in Shanghai and elsewhere, could be appreciably alleviated. This work of the J.D.C. has been conducted, is being carried forward today, and can continue to be extended without in any sense aiding the economy of aggressor nations. In Central and South America, too, the J.D.C. was called upon to assume ever larger responsibilities, both in the temporary relief and along long-range, constructive lines. Almost daily, new emergency pleas came to the J.D.C. Many of these could measurably be met if the J.D.C. were put in funds. Considering the number of human beings affected, the harshness of their plight, the possibility of rendering them aid, the J.D.C. as a trustee for these multitudes of people overseas, could not consent to subordinating their position in the year 1941 below the standard of allocation agreed to at the beginning of this year. The 1940 agreement had allotted out of the first collections the following fixed sums: to the J.D.C., \$5,250,000; to the U.P.A., \$2,500,000; to the N.R.S. \$2,500,000 from the national collections, and an additional allocation from the Greater New York City campaign.

It was quite clear, as the war went on, that the emergencies and the corresponding needs of masses of our fellow-Jews would require much larger funds from the J.D.C. than were needed during the early part of 1940. Nevertheless, in the interest of a united Jewish community here, the J.D.C. was willing to restrict itself again to the same basis of allocation, so far as any fixed sums were concerned, as had prevailed in the ratio established for 1940.

It was also pointed out that if the U.P.A. were accorded \$2,500,000 at once, the U.P.A. would be receiving one hundred percent of the same amount granted it in 1940, while the J.D.C. as well as the NRS would be expected to reduce their percentage of the fixed grants substantially. That being the case, the U.P.A. would put itself in the position of taking no risks at all for the 1941 campaign. This was not merely a question of financial allocation, but involved practical considerations affecting the whole conduct of the campaign.

In response to these statements, members of the U.P.A. delegation thereupon personally expressed their willingness to recommend to their constituents agreement on the basis of a grant of \$3,000,000 or even \$3,500,000 to the J.D.C. toward its first fixed requirements. But they added they must still insist on the U.P.A. securing from the first fixed amounts at least \$2,500,000. The J.D.C. representatives thereupon declared that they could not accept such an arrangement and that they must insist on maintaining the same ratio in the first fixed sums as for 1940. If therefore, the U.P.A. insisted on having in the first half year of 1941 \$2,500,000 towards its first fixed amount, exactly the same sum as for the whole year of 1940, it would mean that the J.D.C. would be obliged to ask for the same amount which it had received towards its first fixed program in 1940, namely, \$5,250,000. The N.R.S. undoubtedly likewise would insist on receiving an amount equal to its fixed grant in 1940, namely, \$2,500,000 from the national collections, and there would remain, subject to the allocations by an Allotment Committee in 1941 only a nominal sum of money to distribute, unless the campaign of 1941 yielded substantially larger sums than this year. That would run counter to the wishes of the community since the desire of the country, as the J.D.C. understood it, was to

November 19, 1940

leave to the Allotment Committee a larger amount of money for distribution.

In conclusion, therefore, the J.D.C. delegates reaffirmed their position for the continuance of a United Jewish Appeal, leaving to an Allotment Committee as large an amount as possible to distribute. The J.D.C. was definitely opposed to any change from the ratio established in 1940 for the division of the first fixed amounts among the beneficiary agencies, but was willing to leave to the judgment of an Allotment Committee authority to determine and award the allocations of an amount preferably equal to about one-half of what these organizations will have received in toto from the 1940 drive. There would, of course, have to be some minor modifications in the text of the agreement in order more effectively to elicit the largest possible contributions. These matters, it was hoped, would be discussed and could be worked out.

Would you let us know whether the U.P.A. stands ready to enter into an agreement for 1941 on the general principles indicated in the above paragraph? If so, may I propose that you and Rabbi Jonah B. Wise fix a mutually convenient time of meeting for our subcommittees, preferably within the next two weeks.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Paul Baerwald



Chairman



PALESTINE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

41 EAST 42nd STREET
ROOM 1111
NEW YORK CITY
MURRAY HILL 2-3754

November 20, 1940

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Abba:

I was sorry to hear that your cold has kept you in bed and prevented your coming to New York for a meeting of the Emergency Committee. It has been postponed.

You may be interested to know that on Saturday a group of us, including Wise, Szold, Nahum Goldmann, Ben-Gurion, Mrs. Pool and myself went to Washington to confer with L.D.B. Our conference was devoted mainly to the question of the two boatloads of refugees which the Palestine Government wanted to deport to Mauritius. We took certain action in the matter.

On the question of the army, L.D.B. was decidedly cool so far as action in this country, at any rate, was concerned. He felt that we should wait until the British Government, in need of Jewish military aid, should make a request upon the American Government and upon American Jewry. If a Jewish unit is formed in Palestine, even at this time, we might help it financially. That was his attitude in a nutshell.

In the meantime, Britain is continuing to extend the scope of her requests for assistance from the U.S.A., step by step--loans, flying fortresses, the help of the Navy, etc. More and more, it seems to me that this crisis is perhaps the only opportunity that we may have to deal with Britain on a basis remotely approaching that of give and take. The opposition in this country to "going the limit" with Great Britain is a serious one. We cannot, of course, join it, but we must be very stupid indeed if we cannot find a way of utilizing the situation to the advantage of our cause. Certainly there is not much to hope for if and when Britain comes out victorious and sits

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver

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November 20, 1940

on top of the world. We will then talk "justice" and the gentlemen at the Colonial office will smile benignantlly. Can't we muster up the courage to act like men?

I am enclosing copy of a brief memorandum on the coordination of Zionist war-time propaganda. I will be glad to have your comment on this, as well as on other parts of the letter.

I hope your cold is over by this time. With kindest regards to your family, and yourself, I am

Faithfully yours,


Emanuel Neumann

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November 22, 1940

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, National Chairman,
United Palestine Appeal,
41 East 42nd Street, New York.

Dear Rabbi Silver:

I am in receipt of your favor of November 19th,
which crossed my letter to you of the same date.

I have circulated your letter among the few
members of our Negotiating Committee and pending discussions
with them, I do not feel at liberty at this moment, to go
into a detailed discussion of your communication. If, pend-
ing further discussion in our group, you would wish to make
any observations with regard to my letter to you of November
19th, I shall, of course, be only too glad to hear from you.

With best wishes,

Cordially yours,

(signed) PAUL BAERWALD

November 22, 1940

Mr. Henry Montor
United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd St.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Montor:

In the draft of a reply to the JDC which you are getting up, please include the following:

1) In the negotiations for the 1940 UJA, it was the JDC representatives who opposed "throwing the responsibility for determining the needs upon an allocations committee or budgeting committee". These are the words of Dr. Lowenstein as reported in your minutes of a Negotiations Committee meeting held on January 3, 1940. The original proposals of the JDC as read by Mr. Becker on December 18, 1939 for a UJA campaign in 1940, made no mention of an allocations committee at all. The clear intention of the JDC was not to have any allocations committee for 1940. The JDC was displeased with the distribution of the 1939 funds which the allocations committee made by unanimous agreement.

2) That it was at the insistence of the JDC that a larger sum was initially distributed in 1940 (nine and a half million in 1939, and eleven and a quarter million in 1940). This was also made necessary by the insistence of the NRS for priority and guaranties of its minimum three and a half million dollars.

3) The representatives of the JDC also opposed the inclusion of the HIAS and the Ort in a UJA.

4) We have never accepted the principle of a six months budgetary arrangement. The Jewish Agency can not plan its work on a six months basis. Unlike the JDC, it has other than emergency needs to meet - the large scale program of the upbuilding of Palestine. Many annual commitments have to be met. If a six months budget is insisted upon, then the UPA must ask for a minimum of two and a half million dollars, which is not all that the Jewish agency requires for six months, nor all that the UPA hopes to receive out of the 1940 or 1941 campaigns. But it does represent an indispensable minimum.

5) The present enthusiasm of the JDC for an allocation committee is based on the hope that the three "neutral" members of this committee, representing the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds,

November 22, 1940

who are not Zionists, will evaluate the work in Palestine on a purely philanthropic basis, on the same level of relief service such as the JDC is carrying on. Palestine will thus become just another item in the total emergency relief problem of world Jewry. To this the UPA can not subscribe. The upbuilding of Palestine is far more than a solution for the needs of Jewish refugees at this time - although in this field alone, Palestine has done as much as the whole of the rest of the world combined. The UPA has for years been making a direct appeal to American Jewry on the basis of a program for the upbuilding of a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine which program calls for large-scale projects of colonization, land purchase, stimulation of industry, etc. etc. The fundamental value of Zionism to the Jewish people can not be left to the decision of an allocation committee, in which the UPA has a twenty-five to thirty percent representation. The JDC rejected, and had the right to reject, the names of representatives of the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds who were known to have Zionist sympathies. "Neutrality", thus, to all intents and purposes, means anti-Zionism...

6) To preserve unity in 1940, and to meet new conditions which arose (the invasion of Poland and the increased number of refugees coming to the United States) the UPA, at a substantial sacrifice to itself, agreed to a revision of the agreement which was operative in 1939. For the coming year, another revision is clearly indicated because conditions have again radically changed. (See my last letter to Mr. Baerwald). The JDC and the NRS should now agree to an adjustment such as the UPA made last year.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:BK

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United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd St.
New York City

CONFIDENTIAL

November 28, 1940

Mr. Paul Baerwald
120 Broadway
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Baerwald:

I informed you on November 19th of the action taken by the Administrative Committee of the United Palestine Appeal at a meeting held on the same date. Your letter of November 19th - in which you stated the position of the Joint Distribution Committee with respect to the campaign for 1941 - seems to have crossed with mine.

In order that the position of the United Palestine Appeal on the question of a joint campaign for 1941 may be understood, I desire to say the following in acknowledgment of your letter of November 19th:-

1. ON THE QUESTION OF UNITY

The United Palestine Appeal has been consistently in favor of the holding of a united campaign. May I remind you that the meeting finally held of the sub-committees of the Joint Distribution Committee and of the United Palestine Appeal to consider a joint campaign for 1941 followed three pleas which I made that the negotiations should be initiated without delay.

The United Jewish Appeal for 1939 was made possible by the United Palestine Appeal overlooking questions of prestige and percentages, believing as it did, that what was important was not percentage and ratios, but the net results of the participants in the campaign. It was for that reason the United Palestine Appeal had also waived the question of ratios in the joint campaign of 1938. I submit that by adhering to this position again in 1939 we made a major contribution to the cause of unity in American Jewry.

The Allocations Committee met at the end of 1939 to distribute the unallotted income. It was composed of two representatives of the Joint Distribution Committee, two of the United Palestine Appeal, and a fifth member selected jointly. The Allocations Committee decided on the allotment of the balances by a unanimous vote. It is not unfair to say that the Joint Distribution Committee was disappointed with this decision, and that its dissatisfaction in this connection was largely responsible for the countless weeks spent in negotiation in an effort to persuade the Joint Distribution Committee to enter a joint campaign for 1940. The consent of the Joint Distribution Committee was given, however, only after an increase in its allotment in the initial setup had been conceded, and the National Refugee Service had been given \$1,500,000 more than was voted in 1939. In spite of increasing needs in Palestine, the United Palestine Appeal entered The United Jewish Appeal in 1940, feeling confident that if the situation changed and the relative needs for Palestine became apparent, due consideration to its requirements would be given by its partners in the joint campaign.

Thus, in 1939 the United Palestine Appeal received \$4,000,000 in a campaign which gave \$8,200,000 to the Joint Distribution Committee and \$2,600,000 to the National Refugee Service. In 1940, however, the United Palestine Appeal received only \$2,500,000 as against \$5,250,000 received by the Joint Distribution Committee, and \$3,500,000 by the National Refugee Service out of a total of \$11,250,000 thus far allotted.

The Joint Distribution Committee now wishes to freeze the proportions that produced these results - to freeze them for the first six months and then have all balances thrown into the hands of the Allocations Committee. The United Palestine Appeal would thus receive for the first six months in 1941 only \$1,250,000. We of the United Palestine Appeal would be disloyal to our responsibilities if we accepted this proposal as a fair estimate of the war-time and normal needs in Palestine, as a sympathetic appraisal of the historic and moral values of Palestine Jewry, or as a genuine contribution to the cause of unity in American Jewry.

The United Palestine Appeal has given proof of its faith in the ideal of unity in fund-raising by the repeated sacrifices it has made in order to maintain the joint campaign. It has given unprejudiced thought to the totality of Jewish needs. The United Palestine Appeal again urges a united campaign for 1941, but it must insist on terms that will reflect an impartial consideration of all Jewish requirements, and not merely serve to appease organizational pride or to congeal the unfair relations of previous years.

2. WHAT IS FLEXIBILITY?

In offering an explanation of its attitude with respect to its joint campaign proposals for 1941, the Joint Distribution Committee declares that it is imbued with a desire for "flexibility" in the distribution of funds. For three consecutive years the United Palestine Appeal has paid tribute to the principle of "flexibility", but if that term is to have any meaning it must be made applicable to all Jewish interests involved, and not merely to the needs of Palestine; not merely in the years that are past, but in 1941 as well.

In 1940 the Joint Distribution Committee declined to accept the ratios established by the decisions of the Allocations Committee of 1939. In the negotiations for the 1940 United Jewish Appeal, it was the Joint Distribution Committee representatives who opposed "throwing the responsibility for determining the needs upon an Allocations Committee or Budgeting Committee." The original proposal of the Joint Distribution Committee for a United Jewish Appeal campaign in 1940 made no mention of an Allocations Committee at all. The clear intention of the Joint Distribution Committee was not to have any Allocations Committee for 1940. The Joint Distribution Committee was displeased with the unanimous agreement of the Allocations Committee of 1939.

It was at the insistence of the Joint Distribution Committee that a larger sum was first distributed in 1940 than in 1939, i.e., \$11,250,000 as compared with \$9,500,000.

To preserve unity in 1940 and to meet conditions which had arisen, the United Palestine Appeal at a substantial sacrifice to itself agreed to a revision of the agreement which was operative in 1939.

For the coming year, another revision is clearly indicated because conditions have again radically changed. Accordingly, the United Palestine Appeal proposed that the first income of a United Jewish Appeal in 1941 be divided as follows: \$1,500,000 to the National Refugee Service (including New York City), \$3,000,000 to the United Palestine Appeal and \$3,000,000 to the Joint Distribution Committee -- and not, as your letter indicates, \$2,500,000 to the United Palestine Appeal and \$2,500,000 to the Joint Distribution Committee. The needs of Palestine have greatly increased because Palestine is in the active war zone today. Its economic life has been seriously affected. Its normal sources of income from other lands have been practically cut off. The Jewish community of America must now provide eighty percent. of the funds which are necessary to maintain the Yishuv and to provide elementary relief for the thousands of refugees who have come into the country and for those who are still coming in.

In all fairness, with due regard for these changed conditions, the Joint Distribution Committee and the National Refugee Service should now concede that re-adjustment is in order, just as the United Palestine Appeal was willing to make concessions last year. If the principle of "flexibility" is to be invoked, why does the Joint Distribution Committee now insist on a mathematical preponderance in the first allotment, since it seems to be willing to leave to an "impartial, objective, fact-finding body the determination of the needs of world Jewry?" Why should the ratios of 1940 be regarded as sacred and unchangeable? These ratios were not determined by "an impartial objective fact-finding body". They were the result of the usual negotiations, of pressure involved where one party for the sake of unity makes concessions, and the other remains obdurate and unyielding.

3. WHAT ARE THE NEEDS?

If an allocation for a period of six months is to be made - and we do not advocate it - the United Palestine Appeal is forced to ask that account should be taken of the indispensable minimum budgets required by Palestine during that period. \$2,500,000 is a fragment of the total budget for 1941 of the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund, which is about \$14,000,000. \$2,500,000 is only a part of what the United Palestine Appeal has a right to expect American Jewry will make available for Palestine in 1941.

To agree to an arrangement that would give \$1,250,000 for the first six months as the contribution of 5,000,000 Jews in America to the work of the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund - the instruments responsible for our entire building program - would be disastrous to our work in Palestine; it would deal a staggering blow to the morale of Palestine Jewry; it would impair the morale of Jews throughout the world, whose sustaining hope is the Jewish National Home.

Why should the Joint Distribution Committee be concerned with ratios if its object is the most effective use of the available funds? One is forced to the conclusion that it is not validity of requirements which is the criterion it employs. In your letter of November 19th you state "if, therefore, the United Palestine Appeal insisted on having in the first half year of 1941 \$2,500,000 towards its first fixed amount, exactly the same sum as for the

whole year of 1940, (this is not correct, for the United Palestine Appeal anticipates a substantial sum from the fund to be distributed by the Allotment Committee), it would mean that the Joint Distribution Committee would be obliged to ask for the same amount which it had received towards its first fixed program in 1940, namely, \$5,250,000." Thus, the Joint Distribution Committee tacitly admits that it does not foresee that it will require \$5,250,000 for the six-month period, but it advances this contention in order to maintain its proper standing in relation to the United Palestine Appeal. For that reason, it will be obliged to ask for an amount of money which, apparently, it does not require.

It is imperative that the whole program of Palestine work be seen in its proper perspective to the rest of the Jewish world. It is not without significance to American Jewry that the only Jewish community in the world where a constructive, large-scale program of Jewish assistance is possible is in the Jewish National Home. It is not without significance that Palestine today represents the largest free Jewish community in the world, next to the United States. It is not without significance that the largest Jewish community in the world, next to the United States, is identified actively and whole-heartedly with the interests of Great Britain in its struggle against Nazi aggression.

In this connection it may be pointed out that a sound community of over 500,000 - such as exists in Palestine today - must be taken as a part of the desperate effort of the Jewish people to survive through the tragic difficulties of the day. In this hour of crisis, the reinforcement of morale and of substance, which American Jewry alone can make available, is of the highest importance not only for the Jews of Palestine, but for Jews all over the world. Constructive statesmanship would demand that what is wholesome and vigorous and creative should be preserved for the Jewish people. Relief for the suffering thousands on European soil is essential. Maximum help must be given those unfortunate men and women who have been caught in the maelstrom of war, and who have been overtaken by persecution and disaster. But statesmanship would recognize the fact that we have a paramount duty to save the one community which, allied with Great Britain, is engaged in a task the ultimate goal of which is the liberation of the Jews of Europe, as well as of Palestine. Any act tending to weaken the Yishuv, jeopardizing its ability to maintain its structure, would be construed as a desertion of the Jewish National Home, as a desertion of Palestine Jewry in the most difficult hour in its history.

The Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Jewish National Fund are unable to plan in these critical emergency times of overwhelming need on a six-month basis involving a definite allotment of only \$1,250,000 to be received from American Jewry. Unlike the Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Agency is called upon to meet other than emergency needs. Many annual commitments for constructive purposes have to be met. The United Palestine Appeal has been making a direct appeal to American Jewry on the basis of a program for the upbuilding of a National Home for the Jewish people. It is a program calling for large-scale colonization, immigration, land purchases, stimulation of industry, culture and the general economy of the country, and for the varied activities involved in the rebuilding of a land to give sustenance and security to a growing number of people.

The United Palestine Appeal cannot subscribe to the thought that Palestine must be regarded from the philanthropic point of view. The upbuilding of Palestine is far more than a solution of the needs of Jewish refugees, although in this field alone it has done as much as the whole of the rest of the world combined. From July 1, 1932 to July 1, 1940, some 280,000 Jews entered Palestine, while a maximum of 150,000 entered the United States during the same period. Consideration of the needs of Palestine, therefore, must take into account the wider implications of the movement.

4. THE NATIONAL REFUGEE SERVICE

The United Palestine Appeal is of the opinion that, as a matter of principle, the National Refugee Service should not be included as an integral part of the United Jewish Appeal. The National Refugee Service is a temporary, domestic organization created to meet a specific situation. Its requirements cannot be regarded as within the field of interest reflected in the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal. The needs of refugees in the United States cannot be placed on the same footing as the needs of our brethren in war-torn Europe. Refugee work makes its appeal to the sense of communal responsibility. It calls forth the traditional sentiment of Hachnoses Orchim. It serves an interest which is immediate and direct, and is best worked out through the initiative and the autonomous interest of the communities.

The Jews of America have a deep interest in the adjustment and integration of refugees in the United States, but they are showing that interest in their local communities. It is a confusion of fact to make it appear that the National Refugee Service bears the entire, or even the major load for refugee assistance in the United States. The National Refugee Service is primarily a service organization. With the exception of costs incurred for such service and for assistance to refugees in New York City, the burden borne by the National Refugee Service for refugees in the United States is auxiliary and complementary to the local co-operation given in this field. Year after year, there has been an upward trend in the allotment of local communities for local refugee service and assistance. In fact, these increases are reflected in the income of the United Jewish Appeal itself, from which substantial deductions have been made in every community to enable them to provide for their refugee needs locally. The interest of American Jewry in refugees is not gauged, therefore, by the amount the National Refugee Service receives.

The United Palestine Appeal, however, showed its fundamental desire for unity by agreeing again to include the National Refugee Service as a beneficiary agency of the United Jewish Appeal in 1941, but with full regard for its diminished needs. It cannot be denied that fewer immigrants are entering the United States now than in 1939 and 1940. There is a likelihood that even fewer refugees will be coming to the United States in 1941 than ever before. These immigrants are being aided more rapidly to adjust themselves to the American economy by reason of the general improvement in the United States.

Just as the United Palestine Appeal indicated its sympathy with and interest in refugee requirements in previous years, agreeing to increases when they seemed to be required, so - just as objectively - it now states that the

needs of the National Refugee Service in 1941 will be substantially lower and that the principle of "flexibility" which is invoked by the Joint Distribution Committee should be applied to the National Refugee Service.

You state in your letter of November 19th that your representatives favored the inclusion of the National Refugee Service in the 1941 joint campaign because "it constituted a most persuasive and cogent basis for securing larger funds." It is the conviction of the United Palestine Appeal that the needs of Palestine and of the Joint Distribution Committee are sufficiently valid and actual and persuasive in themselves, and that we do not require a campaign device presumably calculated to catch the fancy or prejudice of ill-informed contributors in order to secure funds for our purposes. It is not fair to the American public, to the purposes of the Joint Distribution Committee, nor to the long-range needs of Palestine, to consider campaign requirements from the point of view of raising money through what might be called a subterfuge; without stressing clearly and vigorously and without equivocation our own requirements as they exist. The use of a campaign organization solely to enhance fund-raising capacity is a practice often condemned in some communities. The American public should be educated to the actual requirements of each organization and of each cause, and should not be persuaded into giving money on unfounded assumptions. It is our firm conviction that in 1941 the needs of the National Refugee Service are definitely less, whereas the needs for Jewish relief outside of America, and for reconstruction purposes especially in Palestine, require the greatest generosity and it is with that program of reality we should approach the Jewish communities of America.

The sums made available to the National Refugee Service and to refugee purposes in America through the local and other organizations are rapidly approaching an amount equal to what the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal together receive for their millions of prospective beneficiaries. There is a question as to whether American Jewry understands and approves this situation. It is doubtful whether American Jewry actually desires to spend for a comparatively limited number of refugees in this country, at peace and economically strong, as much as for the vast numbers of war-driven, homeless, desperate refugees throughout the world and for the great community in Palestine and those coming to Palestine under the most distressing conditions.

5. FINALLY, WHAT IS OUR POSITION?

Because of the greater needs of Palestine, the United Palestine Appeal asks that the rule of "flexibility" be adopted for the campaign of 1941 so that a proper differential - recognizing Palestine's increased requirements for the coming year - may be reflected in the first allotments from a United Jewish Appeal in 1941. The Jewish communities of America will be persuaded of the valid basis of the United Jewish Appeal if, as conditions vary in each year, proper acknowledgment of these changed circumstances is made within the structure of the United Jewish Appeal, and that there be a fair distribution of funds accordingly. We regard it as unfair and unjust to maintain in 1941 the status quo of 1940. The rapidly shifting conditions to which you refer in your letter apply most forcefully to Palestine, where 500,000 Jews are in a position to receive and use funds in constructive enterprises, whose basic

November 28, 1940

requirements are known in advance; and where the emergency needs have assumed such an urgency as will not permit American Jewry to continue the placid tempo of 1940, which resulted in retrogression and shrinkage in the giving of funds.

The United Palestine Appeal earnestly hopes that the Joint Distribution Committee will recognize the changed Jewish situation; will consent to a United Jewish Appeal for 1941 on a basis that will assure to the United Palestine Appeal, either on a full year's basis or on a six-month basis, a substantially increased amount for Palestine as compared with 1940. But our responsibility to Palestine requires that for six months we should be able to assure the Jewish Agency of at least \$2,500,000 for the first period.

In my letter to you of November 19th I said that if "your decision not to accept any new proposal was final, please let me know so that we might proceed with our direct application to the Welfare Funds of the country. Please let me have your final decision before very long."


I again enclose a copy of the resolution adopted on November 13th by the Administrative Committee of the United Palestine Appeal, and look forward to your prompt reply.

With all good wishes, and assuring you of my highest regard, I am

Very cordially yours,

(signed) ABBA HILLEL SILVER

National Chairman



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RESOLUTION

Having received a report from its representatives on the negotiating committee to consider plans for a joint campaign in 1941, to the effect that their proposals in the name of the United Palestine Appeal for a joint campaign in 1941 were rejected by the representatives of the Joint Distribution Committee,

The Administrative Committee of the United Palestine Appeal directs its representatives to make an earnest endeavor to have the Joint Distribution Committee reconsider its position in order that a continuation of the United Jewish Appeal for 1941 may be possible.

In the event, however, that the Joint Distribution Committee maintains the position it has taken of rejecting the United Palestine Appeal proposals and insisting that the ratios in the United Jewish Appeal of 1940 be continued, the officers of the United Palestine Appeal are authorized to proceed with such preparations as may be necessary for conducting an independent campaign by the United Palestine Appeal in 1941, and for an independent approach to the Welfare Chests of the American Jewish community.

"Give Today --- Tomorrow May Be Too Late"

— DR. CHAIM WEIZMANN

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

PALESTINE FOUNDATION FUND (KEREN HAYESOD)
JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (KEREN KAYEMETH)
For the Settlement in Palestine of Jews of Germany, Poland, Rumania and Other Lands

41 EAST 42ND STREET

NEW YORK CITY

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Herbert H. Lehman
Julian W. Mack
Henry Monsky
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Henrietta Szold

National Chairman

Abba Hillel Silver

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Louis Lipsky

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Honorary Secretary

Charles Riss

Executive Director

Henry Montor

November 28, 1940.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Dr. Silver:

Attached herewith is a copy of a letter addressed to you by Mr. Paul Baerwald, under date of November 27, 1940.

Cordially yours,

Henry Montor

Henry Montor
Executive Director

HM:ET

C
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P
Y

THE AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE, INC.
100 East 42nd Street
New York City

November 27, 1940

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman
United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Rabbi Silver:

With further reference to your letter of November 19th, we feel that it is necessary to point out that the copy you enclosed of the Resolution of the United Palestine Appeal Administrative Committee gives a mistaken impression of the position of the Joint Distribution Committee in our negotiations. While it is quite correct that the proposals of the U.P.A. were rejected, these proposals concerned themselves with the apportionment of the sum of \$6,500,000 for the first half year and were based on a radical departure from the ratio of the first fixed sums allocated in 1940. The J.D.C. has not, however, insisted that the ratios of 1940 for UJA be maintained in 1941, but has insisted that these ratios be maintained for the fixed allocations within the \$6,500,000. Thereafter all funds would be subject to an Allotment Committee comprising representatives of the whole country, and their action would in no way be bound by the previously established ratios for the fixed amount, but rather on the basis of need, ability to meet that need, and the emergency of such needs.

We must express disagreement with your views on the situation of the National Refugee Service, and must take decided exception as well to your views on the possibility of service for the Joint Distribution Committee. While the areas of service may, to a certain extent, have been restricted, they have correspondingly been concentrated and present new and more desperate situations than ever. Without in any way aiding the economy of the aggressor nations, the J.D.C. is able to function to the extent that funds are made available to it. We are still helping to feed one quarter of a million people a day in Poland. We have extensive programs in unoccupied France, in Portugal, Switzerland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Central and South America and Shanghai. There is no limit to the amount that could be spent on helping emigration through our clearance arrangement both from Central Europe and from the neutral countries.

However, we assume that the "Resolution" was passed after a full explanation to your Administration Committee and that an independent campaign for 1941 appears to all of you a preferable objective. At any rate, we believe we should meet again as we still have a desire for a united campaign and we believe a short meeting should enable your group and our group to reach a final decision.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL BAERWALD
Chairman

"Give Today --- Tomorrow May Be Too Late" *file personal*
—DR. CHAIM WEIZMANN *En*

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

PALESTINE FOUNDATION FUND (KEREN HAYESOD)
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David Wertheim

Honorary Secretary

Charles Ress

Executive Director

Henry Montor

December 2, 1940

Mr. Emanuel Neumann
Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs
41 East 42nd St.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Emanuel:

Thank you for the report of the Washington interview. I am enclosing a report which appeared in the JTA News which shows that English Jewry thinks quite differently about the matter than do Brandeis, Frankfurter and members of the ZOA Executive.

Our desire to help Great Britain in this war is maneuvering us into a policy distinctly harmful to Zionism. We are asked not only to withhold criticism of outrageous acts on the part of the Palestine Government, but actually, as Butler's letter to Wise suggests, to become apologists for the Palestine Government and to make its position "understood among the Jews of America." In the meantime England intends to pursue her policy of appeasing the Arabs even more aggressively than she did before the war. We are also being asked to withhold criticism of Great Britain's policy toward Palestine so as not to embarrass the administration in Washington. In this way we practically acknowledge not only that the United States Government will do nothing to help us in affairs touching Palestine; but we also tie our hands and silence our voice in the name of American patriotism. This is an intolerable situation into which we are being moved. Every people speaks up for its own rights in these desperate times, and for its own needs. The Jews alone, the most hard-pressed of all, must speak up only in behalf -- of Great Britain.

As ever yours,

Abba Hillel Silver

AHS:BK

Karm SSM

Dr. Wise's personal address is
40 West 68th St., New York, N. Y.

December 5, 1940

Dear Sol:

Your letter of December 29th is before me. I have delayed writing, because I took it for granted - and still do - that we may have a chance to discuss things when you are to be here today and tomorrow. I hope that the storm, that is raging as I dictate, will not make it impossible for you to come to the conference today and to the meeting tonight at which we are to decide what is to be the position of Dr. Silver and myself at the Allotment Committee meeting of the United Jewish Appeal.

I agree with some of the things that you wrote on November 29th, but I am very far from being in agreement with all that you wrote. I do not understand what you mean by "the mischief wrought by the exchange of letters between Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Chamberlain" fifteen months ago. Far from that exchange of letters being mischievous, I think it was an act of high wisdom for Dr. Weizmann to write to Chamberlain as he did. There was nothing else he could do. There was nothing else we ought to have done. He must have known perfectly well that England was bent upon the implementation of the White Paper, which, even from the Zionist point of view, would be a petty evil compared with the defeat of England. Such defeat would be the one great irreparable disaster for all humanity in general, and most especially for us Jews, who always pay the price.

It may interest you to learn that after we received final notice as to the decision of the Government in London in early March 1939, half a dozen men, including principally Englishmen, urged Mr. Lipsky and me in the strongest terms to go back to America and to start a great fight against England. I said at the time, to the dismay of the group - and most especially to the English members of it -, that I would do nothing of the kind; that I would speak out earnestly about the lamentable character of the British decision and would seek to characterize the perfidy of Mac Donald. But that I could not bring myself to forget Hitler and Nazism; that we would be put in a most precarious position if we set out to move the American people against England, when at any time we might be compelled to give our unmeasured and unequivocal support to Britain. I remember their disappointment and the seeming heartbreak of Goldbloom, who is now an English refugee in Canada.

I write as I do because, though I am no less unhappy than you and Ben Gurion and Lipsky and Silver - who seems determined to

press the issue -, I still feel deeply as ever that to act as if we had two enemies, Hitler and England, would be suicidal folly on our part.

It has not been the habit of my life to yield to the so-called necessity of compromise. At this moment I am thinking in the terms of Jewish survival. Loyalty to Palestine will help us little if Jews practically cease to be. If Hitler win the war, the appeasing Facists of America will make their peace with Hitlerism however courageously F.D.R. stand in their way. What then will be the Jewish position?

I heard someone say that what Dr. Silver virtually intimates in a letter to Neumann - allusion to which involves no violation of confidence on my part -, that it is desertion of Palestine and betrayal of Zionism "to withhold criticism of Great Britain's policy toward Palestine so as not to embarrass the administration in Washington." Such is not the reason for refraining from criticism. England is in direst extremity. To add the weight of a feather to the crushing burdens now borne by England is to sin against the Holy Spirit.

I feel as deeply as you or Dr. Silver or any man, and I expressed myself vigorously - perhaps even too vigorously - in the December issue of "Opinion", a copy of which may come to your hands.

I clearly understand that your position parallels my own; or rather that my position is in agreement with yours. I am merely thinking aloud and trying to make clear to you in this letter, which I shall send to a few friends, what we must all bring ourselves to see: that anything we now say or do against England will be used by the Nyes and the Rush Horts and the Lindberghs - and let us not forget the Lessing Rosenwalds - in their policy of appeasement and their essentially anti-British crusade.

I feel that, whether for a time Palestine is the sufferer, the fortunes of the Jewish people are bound up with the triumph of England, not a stalemate, but the triumph of England. My one regret is that we Jews are not free at this moment to do what we would fain do, namely to give all for Britain as Jews. If Jews had any of that wisdom, which L.D.B. generously attributes to them, we would be arranging to do things for England, which would really help England, and which would, only incidentally, make England our debtor. If England fail, we are fallen. If England win, we have a chance, whether the implementation of the White Paper come or not. And whether Ben Gurion will agree with us or not at today's meeting, we ought to take the position very firmly that, of course we have made our comment (and I made it as strongly as I could at the Embassy), we still wish England to understand that we are with her, not because we must be, but because we Jews choose to be; that we would not, if we could, live in a world from which democracy has perished.

We must stand together in this matter; but we shall not

Dr. Solomon Goldman

December 5, 1940

move forward if we deepen strife within our own ranks by such insistence as your own upon the unwisdom of Dr. Weizmann's unequivocal and unconditional commitment to Britain fifteen months ago, or if any of us imagine that the way to strengthen the Zionist position in America is to indulge in sharp and bitter criticism of England.

There is much more that I would fain say, but I think we understand each other. Let none of us weaken the force of our united support of Britain by any diversion in any direction whatsoever.

Faithfully yours,

Stephen S. Wise



SSW:fe

To - Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver

WRHS



The attached copy of a letter from Mr. Ben-Gurion to Justice Brandeis contains confidential material including names of specific individuals and should be treated with all discretion.

A. Lourie

[Dec. 6, 1940]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Winthrop Hotel, New York
December 6, 1940

Mr. Justice Louis D. Brandeis
2205 California Street
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Justice Brandeis:

I have made new inquiries as to whether it would be possible to secure some of the material which you requested, from London or from Palestine. As I feared would be the case, I find that there is no possibility of doing so without having the documents pass through the hands of the censors. The material in question is of such a confidential nature that in the interests of the Arabs concerned, as well as in our own interests, it would be most unwise to take the risk of its being seen by the Palestine Administration. I therefore regret that I shall be compelled to limit myself to a brief recital of my own views, based on my personal experience.

I shall start with a short description of how our contact with the Arabs is organized: There is, in the Political Department of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, a special Arab division, under the direction of Mr. Shertok, as head of the Political Department, and myself, as Chairman of the Executive. In this division we employ two types of people; (a) young oriental scholars who have made a special study of Arab history and literature, including some who have specialized in economic and political questions in the Near East. They are, for the most part, former students of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; (b) native Jews who know Arabic well and who have known the Arab people from their early childhood; of these I shall mention two examples: Elias Sasson, a native Sephardi of Palestine, a journalist in the Arabic press, who has important connections in the Arab world, not only in Palestine but in the neighboring countries; and Zaslany, a native of Bagdad, who has for years

been a close student of political developments in the Near East.

In addition to the officials at work in our office, we have working for us in different parts of the country (although without salary, apart from expenses) representatives who are well known to the Arabs in their own neighborhoods, have many intimate friends and know what is going on. Among these I would mention representatives of three types: (1) Mr. Jacobson of Rehoboth, the son of a large orange grower, who was born in Rehoboth, knows Arabic as well as Hebrew, and has important connections among the effendi class and the villagers in the southern district; (2) Abba Ghushi, the Chairman of the Labor Council in Haifa, who for many years was active in organizing Arab workers in the railways and harbors as well as in other industrial branches, and who had established, during the disturbances, really excellent relations with the Druzes (a Moslem sect who live mainly in Syria, but have many villages in Upper Galilee); and (3) Nahum Horowitz of Kfar Giladi, one of the founders of Hashomer, and an outstanding representative of the labor settlements who, since before the last World War, knows almost every Arab villager in the whole of Galilee, is known to them, and trusted by them.

Through these representatives, about twenty in number, we are in constant touch with Arab life throughout the country. We know what is happening among them and can, to a certain extent, make known to them whatever we feel they ought to know. Besides these representatives, we have, in different parts of the country, Arabs who are working for us, for a salary, although this is not their only means of livelihood, since their connection with us must not be common knowledge. Here again we employ two types of men; in the towns they include upper middle class people with important connections among the effendis, also journalists and others with contacts among the more popular strata. The second type are sheikhs and villagers who have connections among the fellahin.

The Arab division publishes a daily bulletin in Arabic which is being sent to thousands of the more important Arabs in Palestine, and to many hundreds of Arabs in the neighboring countries of Egypt, Syria and Iraq as well as Saudia. The bulletin contains news about the economic development of the country; the Jewish attitude to major Jewish questions, either political or economic, and reviews all events which are of concern to the Arab world in the Near East. Apart from the daily bulletin, we publish from time to time, pamphlets on behalf of the Jewish Agency, on important economic and political matters, which are distributed in the same way, among Arabs in Palestine and the neighboring countries. We also have permanent representatives in Egypt and in Syria; and in Cairo we maintain a news agency styled "Agence d'Orient". Its bulletins serve the Arab press in the whole of the Near East.

Through our special connections with several Arab papers in Syria and Egypt, articles are published from time to time in favor of Jewish-Arab cooperation. These articles are, of course, edited and paid for by our representatives in these countries.

This, briefly, is the nature of the work of the Arab Division, which could be enlarged were the necessary funds available. And here and there it ought to be increased. But in general I believe it is working satisfactorily.

Apart from this general routine work, we have established direct contact with almost all the Arab leaders in Palestine and the neighboring countries. Mr. Shertok, as head of the Political Department; Dr. Bernard Joseph, Mr. Sasson, Mr. A. Epstein, and I myself, take every opportunity to meet representative Arabs. With the single exception of the Mufti, there is not an Arab leader in Palestine, of lesser or greater importance, with

whom we have not, from time to time, met and discussed a basis for common understanding.

We also maintain contact with Arab leaders in the neighboring countries. I myself have met, on many occasions, the representative of Ibn Saud of Saudia- in Jerusalem Beirut and in London; heads of the Syrian Government and leaders of the Arab movement in Syria; members of the Egyptian Government, as well as members of the Iraq Government, in addition to a great number of Arab leaders in Palestine itself. Shertok has met with an even greater number of them.

We were meeting these people long before the disturbances broke out and we endeavored to maintain contact with Arab leaders even during the worst phases of Arab terror, in the years of 1936 to 1939. We tried to reach an agreement with the Arab leader before the report of the Royal Commission was published, believing that there might be common ground between Jews and Arabs on the basis of which to avoid the partition of Palestine. Again, after the publication of the Report we tried to reach an agreement on the basis of the establishment of two states. It would take me too long to give you the gist of all these talks. I shall confine myself to a few fundamental questions, and give you what I believe to be the attitude of the Arabs whom we met.

It has become almost a dogma among ourselves that Jewish immigration and colonization in Palestine is not only a blessing for the Jewish people but that it benefits Palestine as a whole and helps the Arab people economically, socially and culturally. And I believe that that is true. From this fact some of our people made the deduction that there is no reason why the Arabs should not welcome our immigration and colonization, and they try to convince each other that it is only lack of action on our part which is responsible for the fact that the Arabs fail to recognize the benefits which Jewish immigration is bringing about.

I will try to give you the point of view of the Arabs as they themselves gave it to me. For many years, long before I was on the Executive, I kept insisting, both in writing and in speeches, on the importance of a political understanding between the Jews and the Arabs, and I published a book on Jewish-Arab relations entitled "Anachnu u-Schechenen (We and Our Neighbors)". And as far back as ten or eleven years ago I worked out a constitutional plan for Palestine which I believed could satisfy the legitimate interests of

Jews and Arabs. The scheme was based on:

1. A gradual development of self-government for Palestine;
2. The principle of parity as between Jews and Arabs.

Then I became a member of the Executive in 1933 I felt it my duty to endeavor to implement the Arab policy which I had advocated in the labor and the Zionist movements. I knew that economic cooperation alone was not sufficient. I had had some experience in the matter of economic cooperation, from my work in the Histadruth, where we organized joint trade unions, and established Arab labor clubs, and published an Arab paper. And while I was satisfied that as far as it went the results of the economic cooperation were satisfactory, I realized that in order to have a real understanding there would have to be political cooperation between Jews and Arabs. And one of my first acts in the Executive was to approach the Arabs.

(continued on P. 5-)

I chose for that purpose an Arab whom I knew to be a man of unusual intelligence, with a European education, honest (which is not always the case among the Arabs), and a nationalist. Although himself not publicly active in political life, because at that time he was a high official in the service of the Palestine Administration, he was very close by political and family ties to the Mufti, and was representative of the best of the Arab attitude in Palestine. You may perhaps have heard his name, as he was at one time the Attorney General in the Palestine - Mr. Mussa Alami. It is not necessary to tell you what I had to say to him, but I will give you his views.

First of all, on the question of the benefits of Jewish colonization to Palestine as a whole, he did not deny the many improvements which were introduced into agriculture in Palestine, as he himself is a large land owner and knows something about farming. He told me, however, that he viewed with great alarm our colonization work in Palestine, because we were depriving the Arabs of the best part of the country. He did not deny that Rishon-le-Zion was, before our settlement, a mere sandy waste; that Petach Tikvah was a swamp; that Mozah was mere barren rock, etc., and that it was we, with our capital and our labor, who had converted these wastes into flourishing colonies. But for him, the fact remained that potentially the most fertile parts of the country, a great part of the coastal zone of Galilee, and important tracts in the Eneq, were lost to the Arab people. They were now, he said, and perhaps for the next ten or one hundred years, unable to develop them. But a people must look ahead. A time will come when the Arabs will be in a position - will have the means and the material and the scientific possibilities - to develop these parts of the country, and because of our colonization work, these parts were lost to them. As an Arab he could not acquiesce; nor could he be consoled by the fact that the land-owners who sold this land (he himself some of

his land to Jews), received relatively high prices. This he regarded as an individual benefit, but a national loss.

As to parity, he felt it was a real insult to the Arabs, they being 75% of the population (this was in about 1933 or 1934, when our conversation took place) to suggest that they should be satisfied with only 50%. That would mean that they themselves agree that they are not entitled to the same elementary rights to which every people is entitled. He was indignant about the principle of non-domination. Why should not the Arabs be entitled to domination in Palestine, he wanted to know. Would the Jews offer non-domination to any other peoples of the world, and if offered, would it be accepted?

And as to the need of the Jews for a home, he did not deny it, being an honest and intelligent man; but although he admitted that he understood our point of view with regard to our considering Palestine our rightful home, and our desire to return to it, being an Arab he could not help but resist, as far as possible from converting a country which had belonged to the Arabs for centuries, just as had Iraq and Syria and Arabia, into a country which is becoming less and less Arabic. Selfish people among the Arabs, he said, might be willing to help this process because they are either getting high prices for their land or they are being bribed in other ways, directly and indirectly, by Jews. But the Arab people as such, and especially those who represent the true national interests of the Arabs, would never willingly agree to hand Palestine to the Jews, or even to share it with the Jews on a basis of equality. He himself would be inclined to recommend economic and social cooperation with those Jews already in Palestine; but he would support the Arab movement, which is strongly opposed to new Jewish immigration, as that would destroy the Arab character of the country/

I had (and I still have) another idea with which I went to Arab representatives; the idea of a federation - a federation between a Jewish Palestine and neighboring Arab states which would offer to the Arab the following advantages:

1. The Arabs in Palestine, with a Jewish majority, although numerically a minority, would not feel that they were in a foreign state, as they belonged together with the whole of Palestine to a larger unit which would be predominantly Arab;
2. They would have the political and economic help of the Jews in establishing Arab unity and independence in the greatest part of Arab territory;
3. They would have the benefit of a highly developed Palestine, as a member of the larger Arab federal unit.

I discussed this idea with representative Arabs of Palestine as well as other countries, as for instance, Amin Abdul Hadi, the head of the Independence Party in Palestine; Raddi Sulch, the leader of the national bloc in Syria, Emir Aslan, the head of the Palestine Syrian delegation in Geneva, and others.

This idea was more popular with the Arabs than the idea of parity. But here, too, they had strong objections from the Arab point of view. In the first place, while it is true that Arab unity is the ultimate goal of all their aspirations, they know that it will take many years, perhaps more than a century, to see its realization, because on the one hand of the foreign domination of England and France, and on the other the internal conflicts of dynasties and groups within the Arab world itself; the Jews however by their growth through immigration would in a very short time get hold of Palestine, and with their British connections would serve as a permanent wedge between Arab countries which might make the desired Arab unity impossible.

Secondly, if the Arabs can achieve independence in a short time there is no reason why they should give up Palestine which, because of its geographical position, is the natural link to all the Arab countries.

Thirdly, a highly developed Jewish Palestine, instead of being a source of strength, might become a menace to the neighboring Arab countries, since for a long time to come the Arabs would be unable to compete with the more intelligent and more enterprising Jews, and this might mean economic subservience for the Arab countries.

This was the attitude of the Arab leaders long before the troubles of 1936-39, when the atmosphere in Palestine was peaceful and the personal relations between Jews and Arabs were more or less satisfactory. When the conflict between Italy and Abyssinia started, and war was brewing, political unrest began to manifest itself among all the Arab peoples. Troubles in Europe seemed to offer the opportunity for achieving their political aims. And even before the terror broke out in Palestine, it became manifestly more difficult to arrive at a political understanding with the Arabs than it had been before.

We, on our part, did not give up for a single moment our attempts to get nearer to the Arab leaders. Only a week before the murderous attacks on the Jews in Jaffa, on April 19, 1936, I met Mr. Antonius, to work out a scheme for political agreement between Jews and Arabs. We had our meeting four days before the outbreak. And at the end of our first talk we decided to meet again the following week. After the pogrom in Jaffa, Antonius thought I would not go on with our meetings, but I told him that I was ready to go on with them, and in fact we did meet several times and worked on a scheme for a federation between Palestine and Syria to include a Jewish state in Palestine, federated with Trans-Jordania, Lebanon and Moslem Syria. But Mr. Antonius could not find a single leader among the Palestinian Arabs who would accept such a scheme.

The only time that the Arab leadership in Palestine was inclined, or at least tried to make us believe that it was inclined, to come to some political arrangement, was immediately after the publication of the Royal Commission's report. We were then approached in London, as well as in Jerusalem, by intermediaries, among whom were Mr. Albert Hyamson and Dr. Judah L. Magnes, who claimed that they were speaking on behalf of the Mufti and the Higher Arab Committee. They presented us with some written suggestions for an agreement and we expressed our desire to meet the Arab leaders directly, in order to clarify a number of questions which were rather ambiguous, on the suggestions presented to us. In the meantime a new dispatch from Ormsby-Gore concerning the appointment of the Partition Commission was made public, from which it became clear that the British Government had dropped the plan for the establishment of two states in Palestine; and we were told by the same intermediaries that the Mufti had disavowed the offers made through them; that he could never agree to such proposals and that the only basis for discussion could be independence for Palestine and stoppage of all further immigration. To which we replied, of course, that this could not serve as a basis for any discussion with us.

During the London conference on Palestine, we met unofficially with the representatives of Saudia, Iraq and Egypt. The Palestinian delegation, apart from Nashashibi, refused to meet us even unofficially at that time. The leading members of this delegation were not strangers to us - we had met them before, on many occasions. While personally some of them were more or less friendly, they maintained the position that Palestine must be treated like every other Arab country; that immigration must be stopped, and the position of the Arabs as the ruling majority must be permanently established. Privately, a few of them admitted that the Jews of Palestine could not be expected to accept the same position as Jewish minorities in Egypt and Iraq, and

that they would like to see an agreement reached between us and the Palestinian Arabs. But they maintained that in the face of the determined opposition of the Palestinian Arabs to any further immigration, the other Arab states must back the demands of the Palestinian Arabs viz-a-viz the British Government, and that for the time being they did not see any chance of changing the attitude of the Palestine Arab delegation.

The only people with whom we succeeded in establishing friendly relations and found a willingness to come to a political understanding were the Arab leaders in Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan. The former Prime Minister of Syria, Jamil Mardas, and several of his leading colleagues, have met on a number of occasions with Shertok and with members of our Arab division, as well as myself. These Arab leaders were rather anxious to reach a settlement on the Palestine question, in agreement with the Jews, because:

1. Their internal situation in Syria was very difficult, due to the existence of strong minorities such as the Druzes, Aluats and others who refused to accept the authority of Damascus;

2. They feared the expansionist policy of the Turks. This was before the annexation of Alexandretta;

3. Their difficulties with the French Mandatory Power. They had concluded a treaty with the French, granting them a large measure of independence, but the French failed to ratify the treaty, and when Blum became Prime Minister they believed that our influence could be used for the ratification of the treaty.

For all these reasons they desired to help us reach some settlement in Palestine. But unfortunately, in spite of their desire to be helpful, they could do nothing in the face of the opposition of the Palestine leaders, and as they told us quite frankly, they found themselves unable to do anything over the heads of their brethren in Palestine.

We are still in close touch with these people, although at present they have little influence, due to the changed condition in Syria. But we believe that friendly relations with prominent Arabs, in and outside of Palestine, ought to be maintained, even at a time when immediate results cannot be expected.

We enjoyed even better relations with the authorities in Lebanon, with the former President of the Lebanese Republic, Mr. Ede and the patriarch of the Maronite community in Lebanon- the strongest group in this little country, although not the majority. The position in Lebanon is rather confused. No single community has a clear majority over all the others, but the strongest group being the Maronites (Christian); the lesser Christian communities, however, support the Moslem minority. A combination of the Moslems with the lesser Christian communities outnumber the Maronites. The differences between the Maronites and the other Christians are due to the fact that while the Maronites are almost entirely concentrated in Lebanon and their vital interest is to preserve their separate entity and their hegemony of the Lebanon, the other Christian communities live only in part of the Lebanon, while the majority of their co-religionists live in Syria and dare not antagonize the Moslems. Accordingly, it became the established policy of the Maronites to maintain good relations with us as they found themselves almost in our position, and it was in their interest to have as their neighbor a strong Jewish Palestine, in order not to be submerged in the surrounding Moslem sea. While we attach great value to their friendship, and indeed to good relations with any group among the Arabs, the Maronites could hardly help us in our relations with the Arabs of Palestine, or with the Moslem Arabs of the other countries.

We also maintained, and we are still maintaining, good relations with the Emir of Transjordan and the leading Sheikhs there. We had many dealings with the Emir, and he has proved to be our constant friend, during

all these years of all kinds of "ups and downs", although he did not dare to show it publicly. He rendered us no small service during the disturbances when he made genuine efforts to keep out the Transjordan tribes. He was always anxious to have Jewish settlement in Transjordan, and was even ready to transfer some of his own lands to us, but unfortunately he could not obtain the backing of the Palestine Administration and the Mandatory Power, and he is not very popular in the Arab world.

During the London conference his representative had to maintain a common front with the other Arab representatives in formally backing the extremist demands of the Palestinian Arabs.

I have given you thus far some facts about the Arab leaders. This is not intended to be either an exhaustive or a systematic review of our Arab relations, but a rather sketchy picture, to illustrate the attitude of the Arab leadership.

A distinction must be drawn between the Arab as an individual and the Arab as a member of the political community. This distinction was brought to me in a classical way by one of my Arab friends some 25 years ago. Before the last war, I was a law student in the Turkish University of Constantinople where, among my friends was an Arab student from Jerusalem, Yechyah effendi. A few days after the war broke out I returned to Jerusalem for the summer vacation. When Turkey entered the war, a great part of the Jews in Palestine were enemy aliens, and there was danger of their being exiled. I, being one of the three or four Jews in Palestine who knew Turkish, endeavored to get the Jews to become Ottomanized, and I myself, of course, became an Ottoman subject. But when Jemal Pasha, who commanded the Turkish armies in Palestine, came there, he inaugurated persecutions against Zionists, and I was arrested and ordered to be expelled from Turkey ("forever - never to return!"). The Turkish prison was in the same building as that occupied by all other government offices. While under arrest I was permitted the freedom of the prison court during the day,

and was locked up only for the night. On one of these days, my friend Yechya Effendi came to one of the government offices, and seeing me there asked me what business I had with the government. I told him that I was not there on business but that I had been placed under arrest, and that there was an order for my expulsion, by Jemal Pasha, because of my Zionism. On hearing this he said: "As a friend of yours, I am very sorry, but as an Arab, to be frank, I am glad".

This, as far as I can judge from my experience in Palestine, is the real attitude of many of the best Arabs.

While there are Arabs who are incapable of friendship, the mass of the Arab people have hardly any hostile feeling for the Jews as such. And it is not difficult to make friends with Arabs. An Arab can become a friend not necessarily for material gain, only, and I myself, and many of my friends in Palestine, have a number of good friends among the Arabs - among the different classes of the Arab people. The Histadruth, in my opinion, did and is continuing to do very important work in trying to organize Arab workers; in helping them to improve their labor conditions and to raise their material and spiritual standards. Some of these Arabs are becoming good friends of the Jews. Our people in the labor settlement are cultivating good relations with their fellah neighbors, and they are largely successful in their efforts. Among the older colonists there are many who had close and manifold connections with the Arab world: for instance, Smilansky, Abraham Shapiro and many others. David Hacohen, the Jewish Municipal Counsellor of Haifa and Manager of Sclal-Boneh is perhaps the most popular figure among the Arabs of Haifa- rich as well as poor. Mr. Assaf, one of the main contributors to the labor daily - Davar- who made a special study of Arabic, has many friends in the Arab journalist world. And I can give you a long list of names of Jews who have many excellent connections with Arabs of all kinds. Some of these connections were maintained even during the worst days of the Arab terror. And as long as the country is

is quiet (and only when the world at large is quiet can Palestine be quiet) these friendly relations continue and are manifested in many ways. Arabs visit Tel Aviv; they come to the Jewish public celebrations, and a Jew feels more or less safe among the Arabs.

But when political tension rises, either as a result of external events, such as the Ethiopian trouble or the World War, or as a result of some internal development, and the Arab leadership begins pushing forward the political demands of the Arabs, the Arab people become united as a political entity and they oppose publicly and consistently Jewish immigration and colonization. They may differ in the choice of leaders; they may differ in the methods. While some may favor terrorism, others may oppose it. But they always continue to support two main "planks"; stoppage of immigration and complete independence for Palestine. And it has never happened that a single one of our friends has dared to voice opposition to these two demands, even though they may not be whole-heartedly behind those demands. The Arab, too, is a political animal and is unable to withstand the pressure of his surroundings and the collective sentiment and inclination of his people.

There are many Arabs, although only a minority, whose personal and immediate interests are undoubtedly bound up with the continuance of Jewish immigration and colonization; but even they will not dare to separate themselves from the general expressed sentiment and political interest of their people as a whole.

I will give you only one conspicuous example of a rich, influential Arab in Haifa, who owns a great deal of land in the north, and has several factories in Haifa - Kaharaman Effendi. His best friend in Palestine is David Hacoheh. Kaharaman is a partner in several undertakings of the Histadruth, through Solel-Boneh, which are managed by David Hacoheh. There are, for instance, the big stone quarries near Haifa. At the same time Kaharaman is a member of

of the Arab Executive, and a close friend of the Mufti . During the disturbances he gave David Hacoheh Power of Attorney for all his business enterprises. And at the same time he contributed large sums of money to the terrorist campaign, and supported the Mufti politically. Not many Arabs would dare openly work with the Jews, as does Mr. Kaharaman Effendi. And ^{not} many of them enjoy his influence. And while his case may be unique, combining as it does the closest cooperation with one of the greatest Jewish organizations in Palestine - the Histadruth - and the strongest political support of the Mufti, it is representative of the general attitude of the Arabs, in that no personal interest will prevent them from associating themselves with the national demands - whether sincerely and voluntarily or otherwise.

The four years of terror left the Arabs rather disappointed. While only a few thousand were engaged in the actual terrorist campaign, and many Arabs, either for personal reasons or as a matter of principle, strongly opposed the terrorist action, they all supported the political aims of the terrorists. The White Paper satisfied only very few of them, because in their view not a single demand had been conceded them; neither independence, nor immediate stoppage of Jewish immigration, nor complete prohibition of land sales. The promise to do all these things at a later stage hardly impressed the Arabs as being genuine.

They were also disappointed in that all the efforts which they had made in the period of almost four years to cripple Jewish economic life and arrest its development, failed completely. Thus, the Jews were not only not frightened - they did not run away from Palestine and they did not give up their work - but on the contrary, while the terror was raging, Jews continued to enter Palestine from abroad. New settlements were being established literally overnight. They saw that while the Arab port, at Jaffa, was being almost completely ruined, a new Jewish port arose in Tel Aviv. They saw that while their terrorist gangs were being destroyed either by the British troops or by

Jewish self-defense, Jewish armed units ("Jewish settlement defense") were being established.

Thus when the most intelligent Arabs tried to strike a balance, after four years of campaign against the Jews, they could not fail to see that while the losses of the Arabs were considerable - losses in life as well as in economic position - the losses of the Jews were insignificant, and their new developments not a little remarkable. And during the few months immediately prior to the war, and the first few months at the beginning of the war, there was a general weariness and disappointment among the Arabs. Daily relations with the Jews were resumed. The flight of the Mufti left the Arabs in Palestine leaderless. Attempts by some opponents of the Mufti to raise themselves in his place failed. And our own attempts in the first months of the war to establish closer relations with the Arabs were unproductive for this very reason. Not a single individual or a single group in Palestine could speak on behalf of the Arab people. The hold of the Mufti over the mass of the Arabs was certainly weakened for many reasons:

1. The Arab families which suffered from the internal Arab terror - and there were many, in all parts of the country - placed responsibility for their ills, and I believe rightly so, on the head of the Mufti;

2. The failure of the Mufti to achieve Arab aspirations after such a strenuous campaign of almost four years, resulted in a weakening of faith in his leadership.

and

The fact that the Mufti was an exile/was no longer supported by the Palestine Administration deprived him of a great part of his influence.

But it is my impression that could the Mufti return to Palestine he would again assume leadership of the Arabā. One thing is clear; that no other leader, even approximating the influence of the Mufti, has so far risen, or shown any signs of appearing among the Arabs in Palestine. And this is one of the difficulties, although not the only one, in achieving a political understanding

with the Palestinian Arabs at the present time.

However, in spite of disappointments, the Arabs are still a politically minded people, although in a relatively primitive way. And while in daily intercourse personal inclinations and interests determine a course of action, in political matters the national sentiment, and what the Arabs believe to be their national interest, is the determining factor. And I am unaware of the existence of a single Arab in Palestine with any political influence who would publicly agree to a continuation of Jewish immigration, or accord to the Jews in Palestine any other status than that of a permanent minority.

And our position in the neighboring Arab states has become even worse as a result of the war. Among the Arabs there is little sympathy for England or for France (that is, while France was still in the war). And while there is no great enthusiasm for Mussolini, there is a wide-spread sympathy for Hitler. The Arabs respect and admire strong action. The Nazi philosophy, in certain respects, is not altogether strange to the philosophy of Islam. And the success of Hitler in Europe, more than the numerous Nazi agents in the Arab countries, had made propaganda for Hitler among the Arabs. And while there are a few Arab statesmen in Egypt and Iraq who are pro-British, the Majority of the Arab leaders are either pro-Hitler or prefer to sit on the fence. That is why Egypt and Iraq maintained their neutrality, after fourteen months of war in Europe, in spite of the treaty of alliance with England. The pro-Hitler Arabs, who believe in the final victory of the Nazis, would certainly not care to come to terms with the Jews. They know, or they believe, that the victory of Hitler will bring them an Arab empire, and will clear out all the Jews. But even those who are pro-British, as for instance Nuri Pasha Said, the former Prime Minister of Iraq, and the present Foreign Secretary of that country, believe that now is the time to get out of the English all that they want for their own country, as well as for the Arabs of Palestine, as England is in

danger and needs the friendship of the Arabs.

Their viewpoint may be formulated in this way: If England wins the war, Hitler will be removed. England will be in no need of the Arabs. She will also feel that she is under no obligation to the Arabs, as they have not helped her in the war, while on the other hand, she will be under obligations to the Jews, who were strongly pro-British and were helpful. There will also be a more acute problem of Jewish migration, and if England is the victory, Palestine may be given to the Jews. Now is the time, therefore and it may even be the last chance, to save Palestine for the Arabs, while England is still struggling for her existence, and is afraid of Arab revolt in the Near East. It ought to be the task of Arab leaders to impress upon England the need for a complete liquidation of Zionist commitments and to undertake the inclusion of Palestine into one or another kind of Arab federation.

Just before I left London, at the end of September, we were told by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs that Arab representatives were pressing with full strength for the immediate and final solution of the Palestine problem. But there is no cause for us to be alarmed on this score, as this Government will hardly make new commitments in the present war. Since my departure from London, I have had no new information as to what is happening in the Arab world, or in our relations with the Arabs. And I do not preclude the possibility that under new circumstances which may arise during the war there may still be a chance of reaching some kind of understanding with the neighboring Arab states, or with some influential Arab leaders in Palestine. We on our part ought to be ready to seize every opportunity to reach such an understanding. From my knowledge, however, of conditions up to the present, there could now be found no Arab leader, either inside Palestine or outside, who would accept anything more than a permanent Jewish minority, with Palestine as a part of the larger Arab state.

While a political understanding may, for the present, be impractical there is in my view a large field for cooperation on economic matters in Palestine itself, which may be useful to both Jews and Arabs. But no measure of economic cooperation in itself can bring about a political understanding. The strengthening of our position in Palestine by means of immigration and new colonization is not only necessary for its own sake, but will also be, in my belief, a factor in preparing the ground for an ultimate political Jewish-Arab agreement. It seems to me that the more the Arabs will be convinced of the Jewish strength and the inevitability of Jewish growth in Palestine the more will they be inclined to reach an understanding which may offer them some political advantages, while their opposition to us will prove more and more futile and sterile.

I have tried to give you the main facts as they have come to my mind, without having at my disposal any written documents. If you will wish to have some additional information, or clarification of certain aspects or on certain special topics, I shall be only too glad to provide it, either orally or in writing, as long as I am here.

Very sincerely yours,

DBG:SB

David Ben-Gurion

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE, Inc.
100 East 42nd Street, New York City

December 6, 1940

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman
United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Rabbi Silver:

Your letter of November 28th crossed mine of November 27th in the mails.

First, I do not believe that either of us would wish to lay claim to credit for convening the two meetings that took place last month between your Committee and ours. The Agreement of 1940 enjoined on both our organizations the holding of such meetings. We had on a number of occasions considered writing or wiring you to call such a meeting. It happened that your notice came before ours was sent.

I. CONCESSIONS IN THE INTEREST OF UNITY.

Some of the matters affecting the arrangements for the 1939 and 1940 campaigns as set forth by you, are not in accordance with our recollection. Nor do we agree with your interpretation of those events. As to whether the United Palestine Appeal overlooked questions of prestige and percentage or as to whether the Joint Distribution Committee did so, seems today immaterial. Nor does it help toward a solution of the problems involved in our discussion for you to raise the question as to whether the J.D.C. was satisfied with the award made by the Allotment Committee in 1939. Faced with enormous responsibilities overseas and unable to secure sums adequate to discharge pressing obligations, the J.D.C. naturally was disappointed; undoubtedly, the United Palestine Appeal was likewise disappointed. That, however, had no relationship in itself to the discussions leading up to the 1940 Agreement.

The position of the J.D.C. with respect to the proposals for a 1940 Agreement, was explained by Mr. James H. Becker in a memorandum he presented in our behalf to the negotiating committees on December 18, 1939. It said in part:

"We are not concerned with any question of ideological differences among Jews or with problems of approach to Jewish philosophies of life.

"We set forth herein what we conceive to be the factual analysis of the relative size of the problem in terms of the number of human beings affected, in terms of the needs that should be met if a substantial portion of the Jewish population of Eastern and Central Europe and of the

refugees therefrom are to be accorded any measure of alleviation of their misery in these days of tragedy for most of the Jewish people in the world."

Mr. Becker likewise pointed out that an element that deserved consideration in determining the amounts to be made available to J.D.C. and U.P.A. respectively, was the considerable activity conducted outside the framework of the U.P.A. by agencies collecting funds for various programs of Palestine service. In view therefore of the overwhelming needs of the J.D.C. program, and taking into account the parallel activities of a number of agencies raising funds for Palestine, the J.D.C. then proposed that out of the first fixed sums to be received in 1940, the J.D.C. and the U.P.A. should receive respectively 75% and 25%, after making provision for the requirements of the National Refugee Service. Long discussions ensued. In the interest of harmony the J.D.C. consented to make concessions. When finally a ratio of \$5,250,000 for the J.D.C., two and one-half million dollars for the U.P.A. and two and one-half millions for the N.R.S. nationally (and an additional allocation of \$1,000,000 from the Greater New York Campaign), was agreed upon for the first fixed amounts, with the understanding that the surplus above those sums be subject to an allotment committee, the J.D.C. with good will accepted this arrangement, and its leaders and officers addressed themselves vigorously to the conduct of the present United Jewish Appeal.

In the field of fund-raising the J.D.C. officers and organizations have given their complete and sole support to the United Jewish Appeal. Their energies have in no sense been diverted into any other channels of fund-raising for programs of aid overseas. When mention is made by you of matters overlooked or conceded, you will not fail to take into account the separate campaigns that have continued throughout this year as they have in previous years, for the traditional collections of the Keren Kayemeth whose receipts are estimated this year at probably some \$370,000. The Keren Kayemeth is a constituent member of the U.P.A. and hence of the United Jewish Appeal. You will bear in mind also the substantial sums raised by the Women's group of the Mizrachi Organization; also the large campaign results of the Youth Aliyah, of the Hadassah, of the Histadruth and other Palestine fund-raising bodies.

Nor should it be overlooked that during the course of this year, the Zionist Organization as such, launched a special emergency appeal for transportation, that the Keren Hayesod undertook the raising of a loan in the United States; that the Keren Kayemeth likewise set out to raise substantial sums for land purchase by loans here. While at the moment one cannot appraise exactly the aggregate collections for all these purposes, it may safely be assumed that the sum total comes close to or may even exceed the amount available to the Joint Distribution Committee from the proceeds of the United Jewish Appeal this year. It must be emphasized that the J.D.C. has only one source of income - the collections in the United States through the United Jewish Appeal, whereas the collections in behalf of Palestine derive their income not alone from the U.J.A. but from a number of other related bodies.

We are not unaware of the fact that sources of income available to the Jewish Agency have fallen off by reason of war conditions, but we would ask you likewise to bear in mind the even graver and more critical situation affecting the program of the J.D.C. for a number of causes:

- a. The inability of the Jewish Colonization Association to collaborate financially with us as it has done heretofore;
- b. The inability of the British Council for German Jewry to contribute to refugee aid and relief as it had done heretofore;
- c. The destruction of formerly substantial committees in the countries in which the J.D.C. has been operating throughout Western, Central and Eastern Europe. These committees raised locally very large contributions for refugee assistance.

Early in 1940, we pointed out the problems that beset us in our endeavor to satisfy at least in part, the enormous needs of our fellow-Jews abroad, who live under the most oppressive conditions. As a result of the war, millions of additional Jews have been reduced to destitution and penury. While the Jewish Agency has lost income from some of these countries, the programs carried out by the J.D.C. not only lost income theretofore contributed by local groups, but in addition, the J.D.C. faced new, staggering obligations and burdens of poverty and enforced exile of many of the very same people who had helped and contributed in 1939 and before. Not only was there a failure of contribution from these people but a new burden and a new problem. All these conditions increased our requirements substantially. That being the case, the J.D.C. faced with daily new and aggravated problems overseas, was bound to urge the largest possible contribution from the 1940 United Jewish Appeal. If despite these situations, concessions were made in order to achieve harmony and good will and to relieve the local communities of this country of friction and embarrassment, those concessions were made in large measure by the J.D.C.

II. FLEXIBILITY

The situation in the world today makes imperative a reconsideration of the requirements and activities not only of the J.D.C. but also of the U.P.A. The future of Palestine itself, as well as the future of 5,000,000 Jews in Europe, depends upon the ultimate victory of Great Britain and of the democratic forces. While the struggle continues, the major criterion, it seems to us, is to sustain the lives and hopes of millions of people throughout the world. We take note of the needs of the community of 500,000 Jews of Palestine, the great bulk of whom fortunately are able to sustain themselves. They enjoy the substantial help granted by a friendly and cooperating government. On the other side we view the prospect of the 5,000,000 Jews living in conditions of insecurity and persecution in countries whose governments - voluntarily or under pressure - have taken steps inimical to their Jewish populations, at least half of whom are in need of elementary aid.

While multitudes of Jews in Central and Eastern Europe are suffering the pangs of hunger and appeal to the J.D.C. for relief, the United Palestine Appeal solicits funds for the purchase of land on a scale higher than at any time heretofore. The needs of the J.D.C. dealing with large groups are entirely disproportionate in their scope and urgency to the program envisaged by the U.P.A. Despite this, the J.D.C. again is prepared to accept for the first fixed amounts to be awarded the organizations, the same ratios as have prevailed in 1940 as a basis for maintaining

the United Jewish Appeal. Beyond those fixed amounts, the J.D.C. is prepared to leave to an impartial allocations committee the allotment of all additional sums raised. Those allotments may very well balance or offset the ratios fixed for the first months of the year.

There is no question of organizational prestige, no questions of priorities or parities which influence our position; only the fundamental question of how many human beings can be saved and helped at this time of critical world emergency. We are ready to leave to the type of impartial allotment committee already created, as soon as may be deemed feasible in 1941, the determination of prevailing and of future needs during the next ensuing year. In this, we believe we reflect the wishes of the welfare funds and of earnest and devoted leaders throughout the country who are convinced that such an approach to the problem of relief and assistance overseas and in Palestine is the only objective course of action, which would meet with the wishes of their donors and of their communities. There can be no discussion of abandoning any single groups of Jews or of favoring any single group of Jews without due consideration of the needs and possibilities of aid for all other Jewish groups.

You state on page 5 of your letter that the U.P.A. cannot subscribe to the thought that Palestine must be regarded from the philanthropic point of view. You are entitled to your viewpoint; so are we. The J.D.C. has only one basis of appeal to the generosity of the country and that rests on the foundation of broad philanthropy which involves the support not merely of emergency aid measures, but also of constructive undertakings of various kinds. The record of the J.D.C. shows its interest in productive activities as well as in emergency aid measures.

The J.D.C. has had brought to its attention many promising and feasible colonization proposals, for the settlement of Jews in various parts of the world involving expenditures of millions of dollars. These requests the J.D.C. has not followed up save for purposes of preliminary study and reference to such bodies as the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees, the President's Advisory Committee for Political Refugees and kindred organizations. Governments and committees in Latin American countries have made substantial requests of J.D.C. for the investment of capital funds, in order to increase the absorptive capacity of their countries so that immigration might be received on a large, orderly scale. Were the J.D.C. to include such capital requirements for land purchase and for the development of settlements, its budget would run into many additional millions.

III. NATIONAL REFUGEE SERVICE

We are in agreement that the Jews of America have a deep interest in the adjustment and integration of refugees in the United States. As American citizens we view this task as of fundamental and basic concern to us all. We regard it as transcending the activities or the efforts undertaken in local communities of the United States. We believe that requisite sums need to be made available to a central, national body like the N.R.S., which shall be in a position to coordinate the refugee work here, to deal with the officials of our Government and to place itself in contact with other important agencies dealing with problems of the immigrants. It is inconceivable that with 135,000 refugees in the United States we should minimize the program of the National Refugee Service.

Moreover, we are reliably informed that quotas will be more completely used up, probably to the extent of several thousand immigrants a month, which may result in a flow of immigration equal to the rate prevailing during the last few months of 1940, and perhaps exceeding the flow prevailing during the spring months of this year. We are aware of the fact that local communities have been assuming an increasing part of the burden of providing for the refugees in their midst. This we regard as a wholesome development.

The City of New York being the major port of entry, has been obliged to make provision for larger numbers than would equitably be its responsibility on the basis of mere population percentage. Just as welfare funds throughout the country have undertaken to make provision locally for the care of those refugees whom they regard as their charges, the campaign in New York found it necessary to set aside an adequate sum for that proportion of the refugees who came to New York and who properly might be regarded as the responsibility of New York. It should be pointed out that within the last months there have come to New York City groups of refugees, many beyond middle age and in increasing measure persons less susceptible of retraining and of resettlement, and requiring larger relief expenditures than was necessary for prior groups.

In addition to the continuation and extension of that program, there are the major tasks of relief, employment and the expansion of such activities as vocational retraining, change of status and the handling of special categories of refugees like professional men, rabbis, musicians, scholars, etc. There is also the large service which N.R.S. has been called upon to render to many thousands of individuals in various communities who require advice and technical aid in relation to problems of immigration of their relatives and friends.

We agree with your statement that the needs of Palestine and of the J.D.C. are sufficiently valid and actual and persuasive in themselves. We have not suggested the retention of the National Refugee Service in the United Jewish Appeal merely as a campaign device, as you assert, but rather as a basic factor which the country at large deems essential not only in the interest of the immigrants but of the entire Jewish community of this country. The inclusion of the N.R.S. does not in any sense debar the U.P.A. or the J.D.C. from making clear its just requirements.

You state that the United Palestine Appeal would make a concession in agreeing to the retention of the N.R.S. in the 1941 Campaign. We do not share that view. The sentiment of the country is overwhelmingly in favor not only of a joint campaign of our three agencies, but also in favor of extending the scope of the U.J.A. to include other organizations active in the general fields of our respective operations. While we have no opinion as to the practicability of extending the scope of the U.J.A. at this time, the sentiment of the country is definite in its insistence on the continuation of a national United Jewish Appeal. It should not be forgotten that this U.J.A. in the past few years has developed a character of its own and has commended itself to the country in remarkable degree. It has received in subscriptions in the neighborhood of thirty million dollars. It has exerted a great measure of influence in stimulating the raising of additionally large amounts for federations and welfare funds embracing a variety of other objectives. The United Jewish Appeal

during the last few years has been a major factor in galvanizing and stimulating the Jewish community of this country to look beyond the horizons of its own local community activity. It has rendered a great service to the community of the country and has obviated the necessity of duplicating campaign staffs and overhead.

Finally, what is our position? We restate it. We seek as much flexibility as possible lodged in the discretion of an impartial allocations committee which shall award appropriate amounts to our three respective organizations, bearing in mind all factors, the tangibles and the intangibles, the need and the results of our respective programs in Europe, Palestine and the United States. In approaching 1941 however, we recognize that each organization has certain fixed obligations which cannot abruptly and immediately terminate and await decisions by an allocations committee. As to these we have proposed that there should be an interim period of perhaps up to six months during which time the world situation may be properly appraised to determine where the funds contributed in this country may best be applied to do the best possible justice to all concerned. Although the critical needs facing the J.D.C. have increased far beyond our requirements during 1940, we are willing to agree that the same ratio should apply for the first months of 1941 as have been established for the initial allotments of 1940. We have confidence in the good judgment and fairness of the leadership of our communities who have indicated their willingness to entrust to a committee on which they are represented, the determination of the allotments to be made to our several agencies.

It seems most unwise for either U.P.A. or J.D.C. to allow itself the luxury of impairing the effectiveness of an organization like the U.J.A. which is capable of such important fund-raising activity and of such influence in many other directions. We therefore reiterate our position that we heartily favor the continuance of a United Jewish Appeal in 1941 on the basis of setting aside for the first months of the year, sums in the same ratios as were established for the initial allotments of 1940, but allowing greater latitude and placing greater sums at the disposal of an impartial allotment committee. In the light of these observations we hope that we shall hear from you soon as to whether you are willing to meet with us before the end of the year to attempt to reach a final decision on this matter.

With cordial greetings,

Sincerely yours,
(signed) PAUL BAERNALD
Chairman

LOUIS LIPSKY
386 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

December 9, 1940.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
Cleveland, Ohio

My dear Dr. Silver:

The experience of Saturday night in the Allotment Committee - added to the general conclusions - strengthen my conviction that the best interests of the Zionist movement demand that in 1941 we place ourselves in a position to make an independent approach for funds to the American Jewish communities.

There are factors in the situation which cannot be reconciled.

Our responsibility as Zionists compel consideration of the war needs of the Jewish National Home. This is creative work. It deals with a living, growing organism as complicated as life itself, as varied as are the problems of all organized communities. At this juncture in Jewish affairs, the building of the Jewish National Home is directly serviceable in dealing with the problems of refugees fleeing from the effects of the war. But that is only part of its service. The larger aspects of Jewish life - in dealing with which relief is merely a palliative of slight importance - are wholly contained in the work we are doing to build the National Home.

It is impossible fairly to measure this historic undertaking against a program which now, at best, is compelled to deal only with the elementary problem of Jewish relief - to have our needs tallied off, in terms of dollars, against the needs of the vast field of relief. I think we are bound to get the worst of it at the hands of any Allotment Committee - even if it were composed of unquestioned friends.

To add to the difficulties, the inclusion of the National Refugee Service is a factor which grows more and more of an absorbent of the results of any United Jewish Appeal. We have had to deal hitherto with the temporary and transitory in the European field, which is nearer to the sympathies of contributors than what seems to be the farther reach involved in the Zionist movement. Now we shall have to deal with an ever growing force, closer to home, more direct in its appeal, allied to local fears as well as sympathies. We are bound, therefore, to find, as we go on, that more and more the inter-

LOUIS LIPSKY
386 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

-2-

ests of Palestine will become subordinate, first, to the refugee problem in America, and second, to the relief problem in Europe.

The more we get ourselves involved in the Allotment Committee, the worse we shall fare. This conclusion I come to on the assumption of a friendly attitude in the Allotment Committee. There is certainly no friendly attitude toward us on the part of the representatives of the J.D.C. On the contrary, it has become a very determined opposition, because involved in our status within any joint campaign lies the *desire for* hegemony over American Jewish life.

Therefore, I think that we ought to come to the conclusion, without any further consideration, that we are to have an independent approach, and not a joint campaign. Nevertheless, I think that the circumstances require that we hold a formal meeting in order to register the conclusion which we have arrived at. To refuse to meet with the J.D.C. would prejudice our position, and we shall need all the friendship and good-will we can muster in order to carry on successfully in 1941.

Very cordially yours,

Louis Lipsky

LL/RW

December 10, 1940

Mr. Paul Baerwald
120 Broadway
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Baerwald:

Permit me to thank you for your kind letter in which you reiterate your position. It is clear from a perusal of it that you are not inclined in any way to depart from the position which your representatives took at the last meeting of the Negotiating Committee. That being the case, I am constrained to inform you that the United Palestine Appeal is compelled to adopt the only other alternative and to make an independent appeal in 1941. I have called a meeting of the Administrative Committee of the United Palestine Appeal to meet in New York next Tuesday evening to implement the resolutions it adopted at its last meeting, a copy of which I sent you.

If you are inclined to make any new proposals prior to the meeting, please let me know and I will arrange to have an authorized representative of the United Palestine Appeal meet with you at your convenience.

With all good wishes, I remain

Very cordially yours,

AHS:EK

The League for Human Rights
508 Ninth Chester Bldg.
Cleveland, Ohio
PRospect 5730

SPONSORING
COMMITTEE

E. M. Baker
Mrs. Clarence M. Ballou
Mrs. E. S. Bassett
Mrs. Stanlee Bates
George Bellamy
Rev. Phillip Smead Bird
Rev. Ferdinand Q. Blanchard
Professor Henry M. Busch
Miss Mildred Chadsey
W. C. Connelly
D. B. Cull
Rev. Arthur Culler
Prof. J. E. Cutler
Gustav Dabringhaus
Paul L. Feiss
Miss Mabel Ferris
Walter Flory
Horatio Ford
Mrs. J. W. Freeland
Alice Gannett
Edgar A. Hahn
Joel B. Hayden
Max S. Hayes
Mrs. J. Preston Irwin
R. W. Jelliff
William C. Keough
Rev. Miles Krumbine
Thomas A. Lenehan
Mrs. Herman Matzen
Mrs. William A. McAfee
Mrs. Malcolm McBride
Sylvester McMahon
Mrs. B. F. McQuate
Prof. Jacob Meyer
I. R. Morris
Dr. Oscar T. Olson
Rev. Harold Phillips
U. G. Rich
Elmer Scheuer
H. Walter Stewart
Clayton C. Townes
Mrs. Howard Thayer
Peter Witt
Monsignor Oldrich Zlamal

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver,
The Templ, Ansel Road and E. 105.
Cleveland, Ohio.

My dear Abba:

Here is the list of the active and inactive members of the
Committee of Fifteen.

ACTIVE

Maurice Bernon
Philip Bernstein
Mrs. Helen Bing
Mrs. Emil Brudno
M. E. Glass
A. I. Hausman
Irving Hexter
H. Jack Lang
Mrs. Lillian Zevin

I. R. Morris
Dan Sherby
Rabbi A. H. Silver
Max Simon
Leo Weidenthal
Adolph Weinberger
Ralph Wertheimer
Leo Neumark
Mrs. Robert Hays

INACTIVE

I. Pinesilver
George Kath - Out of city
Mrs. Leon Bialosky - Ill
Edward Liebenthal
Eugene Wolf
George Furth - Resigned

Very truly yours,

Grace E. Meyette
Grace E. Meyette
Grace

GEM:en

*100, 10332 appt, etc. /
ref. to 100, 10332 /
100, 10332*

*Rock - Himmity
Chair. Women's Forum
Mrs. Gault*

STANDARD TIME INDICATED

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TELEPHONE YOUR TELEGRAMS
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Postal Telegraph

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Canadian Pacific Telegraphs

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RABBI ABBA HILLEL SILVER THE TEMPLE=

105TH & ANSEL ROADS=

THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER TENTH. I AM NOT AT ALL
SURPRISED AT ITS CONTENTS BECAUSE IF FELT FROM YOUR PREVIOUS
LETTERS THAT YOU HAD DEFINITELY DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH A
SEPARATE APPEAL. YOU HAVE AT NO TIME REFERRED TO WHAT WE CONSIDERED
A MISTAKEN IMPRESSION UNDERLYING THE RESOLUTION OF YOUR
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE AND TO WHICH WE CALLED ATTENTION IN OUR
LETTER OF NOVEMBER TWENTY SEVENTH, NAMELY, YOU SEEM TO ASSUME
THAT WE ASK FOR A FIXED RATIO FOR ENTIRE YEAR NINETEEN FORTY ONE.
NOR DID YOU REFER TO THE POINT WE MADE IN ALL OF OUR LETTERS THAT
THE DECISION OF AN ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE MIGHT WELL BALANCE OR
OFFSET THE RATIOS FIXED FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF A YEAR. OUR
FEELING THAT YOU HAD MADE A DEFINITE DECISION WAS ALSO CONFIRMED
BY YOUR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT JONAH WISE'S TELEGRAPHIC REQUEST TO CALL
A MEETING. WE NOW HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ACCEPT YOUR DECISION.
MY ASSOCIATES AND I CONSIDER THAT YOUR DECISION IS A SERIOUS
MISTAKE AND WE FEEL IT DOES NOT MEET THE NEEDS OF THE CALAMITY
FACING WORLD JEWRY TODAY AND IT ALSO DOES NOT CONFORM WITH THE
WISHES OF THE GENEROUS AND LOYAL SUPPORTERS OF THE UNITED JEWISH
APPEAL. WITH ALL GOOD WISHES=

PAUL BAERWALD.

DAY LETTER

1206-A

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED	
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TELEGRAM	FULL RATE
DAY LETTER	DEFERRED
NIGHT MESSAGE	NIGHT LETTER
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WESTERN UNION

R. B. WHITE
PRESIDENTNEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARDJ. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

CHECK
ACCT'G INFMN.
TIME FILED

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

DECEMBER 14, 1940

MR. PAUL BAERWALD
100 E. 42nd ST.
NEW YORK CITY

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TELEGRAM. PERMIT ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE HAVE BEEN UNDER NO MISTAKEN IMPRESSION AT ANY TIME AS TO YOUR REAL PROPOSALS. WE OBJECTED TO A FIXED RATIO FOR A SIX MONTHS PERIOD BASED ON THE ORIGINAL ALLOCATIONS OF 1940 LIMITING OUR INCOME TO A MILLION AND A QUARTER FOR REASONS FULLY STATED IN MY FIRST TWO LETTERS TO YOU. YOUR REPRESENTATIVES TOOK THE POSITION THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER NO OTHER ARRANGEMENT. WE COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH AN ULTIMATUM WHICH MADE FURTHER CONFERENCES PURPOSELESS. JONAH WISE'S TELEGRAM SUGGESTING ANOTHER CONFERENCE FAILED TO INDICATE THAT YOU HAD WITHDRAWN YOUR ULTIMATUM AND FURTHER INQUIRY ON MY PART OF JONAH WISE ILLICITED NO RESPONSE. IN THREE OTHER COMMUNICATIONS, I ASKED YOU WHETHER YOU WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY OTHER PROPOSALS, BUT YOU DECLINED TO ANSWER IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. YOUR FEELING THAT WE HAD MADE A DEFINITE DECISION FOR A SEPARATE APPEAL PRIOR, DURING, OR SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS IS ENTIRELY UNFOUNDED. THE DECISION HAS BEEN FORCED UPON US BY THE FACT THAT YOU DEFINITELY CLOSED THE DOORS. NEEDLESS TO SAY THAT THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL IN UNITY IN THESE CRITICAL TIMES IS NOT LESS THAN YOURS AND THAT THE RECORD WILL SHOW THAT IT MADE SACRIFICES. IN THE LAST THREE YEARS TO PRESERVE THAT UNITY. I REGRET MORE THAN I CAN SAY THAT YOUR ARBITRARY POSITION HAS NOW DISRUPTED IT. WITH KINDEST PERSONAL REGARDS

ABBA HILLEL SILVER

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

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WESTERN UNION

1220

SYMBOLS

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Ship Radiogram

R. B. WHITE
PRESIDENTNEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARDJ. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

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RABBI ABBA HILLEL SILVER, THE TEMPLE=

:TENTH AND ANSEL ROADS CLEVELAND OHIO DELIVER

CARE COMMODORE HOTEL NYK=

OUR PROPOSALS OBVIOUSLY STILL MISUNDERSTOOD BY YOU. WE INSIST ON FIXED ALLOCATIONS FOR THREE ORGANIZATIONS BEING ON BASIS 1940 RATIOS BUT IN ACCORDANCE DESIRE OF COUNTRY LEAVING LARGEST PRACTICABLE AMOUNT FOR DISPOSITION BY ALLOCATIONS COMMITTEE. THESE PRINCIPLES STILL LEAVE WAY WIDE OPEN FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY. NO ULTIMATUM ISSUED BY US BUT BOTH THE ACTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE UPA WHICH RESOLVED UPON INDEPENDENT CAMPAIGN FAILING OUR ACCEPTANCE ITS TERMS AND YOUR UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT OUR SUBSEQUENT INVITATIONS OF NOVEMBER NINETEENTH AND TWENTY SEVENTH AND DECEMBER SECOND AND SIXTH TO DISCUSS MATTER FURTHER, MIGHT WELL BE CONSIDERED IN YOUR LANGUAGE ARBITRARY ACTION AND CONSTITUTING AN ULTIMATUM. PERSONAL REGARDS=

PAUL BAERWALD EDWARD W M WARBURG.

C O P Y

NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16, 1940

RABBI ABBA HILLEL SILVER
CHAIRMAN UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
41 EAST 42 ST.
NEWYORK

OUR PROPOSALS OBVIOUSLY STILL MISUNDERSTOOD BY YOU. WE INSIST
ON FIXED ALLOCATIONS FOR THREE ORGANIZATIONS BEING ON BASIS 1940
RATIOS BUT IN ACCORDANCE DESIRE OF COUNTRY LEAVING LARGEST
PRACTICABLE AMOUNT FOR DISPOSITION BY ALLOCATIONS COMMITTEE.
THESE PRINCIPLES STILL LEAVE WAY WIDE OPEN FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND
PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY. NO ULTIMATUM ISSUED BY US BUT BOTH THE
ACTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE UPON WHICH RESOLVED UPON
INDEPENDENT CAMPAIGN FAILING OUR ACCEPTANCE ITS TERMS AND YOUR
UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT OUR SUBSEQUENT INVITATIONS OF NOVEMBER
NINETEENTH AND TWENTY SEVENTH AND DECEMBER SECOND AND SIXTH TO
DISCUSS MATTER FURTHER, MIGHT WELL BE CONSIDERED IN YOUR
LANGUAGE ARBITRARY ACTION AND CONSTITUTING AN ULTIMATUM.
PERSONAL REGARDS

PAUL BAERWALD EDWARD M M WARBURG

(APPENDIX C)

REPORT OF 1940 UNITED JEWISH APPEALREPORT OF 1939 UNITED JEWISH APPEAL

As of December 16, 1940

TOTAL GROSS PLEDGES - \$12,809,007.15
 National - 7,853,225.77
 New York - 4,955,781.38

TOTAL CASH RECEIVED - \$ 8,433,445.71
 National - 4,958,445.71
 New York - 3,475,000.00

DISTRIBUTION ----- \$ 7,834,500.00
 JDC - 3,517,500.00
 UPA - 1,675,000.00
 NRS - 1,675,000.00
 NY UJA direct to NRS 945,000.00
 Distribution Committee 22,000.00

NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
 EXPENSES.....\$417,090.13

ANTICIPATED TOTAL PLEDGES FOR 1940 U.J.A.-----\$14,050,000.00

ANTICIPATED NET* CASH FOR 1940 U.J.A. - - - \$12,475,000.00
 National - - - 8,354,218.62
 New York - - - 4,120,781.38

* This includes following:

Expenses:- \$1,025,000.00
 National Local - 450,000.00
 New York----- 575,000.00

Anticipated Shrinkage:- \$ 525,000.00
 National-----\$200,000.00
 New York----- 325,000.00

TOTAL GROSS PLEDGES - \$16,230,076.65
 National - 10,162,536.30
 New York - 6,067,540.35

TOTAL CASH RECEIVED - \$14,983,855.05
 National - 9,633,855.05
 New York - 5,350,000.00

DISTRIBUTION ----- \$14,498,500.00
 JDC - 7,765,666.67
 UPA - 3,882,833.33
 NRS - 2,600,000.00
 Christian Refugees - 250,000.00

NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
 EXPENSES ----- \$441,187.86

Agenda I

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1940 AT 8:00 P.M.

AT THE UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL OFFICE, 41 East 42nd Street, NEW YORK, N.Y.

PRESENT: Stephen S. Wise, presiding; Sol Cohen, David Freiburger, Leon Gellman, Leib Glantz, Israel Goldstein, Maurice J. Karpf, Max Kirshblum, I.M. Kowalsky, Abraham Krumbein, Louis E. Levinthal, Abraham L. Liebovitz, Louis Lipsky, Abraham Mazer, Irving Miller, Henry Montor, Charles Ress, Charles J. Rosenbloom, Mrs. Sol Rosenbloom, Louis Segal, Abba Hillel Silver, Mrs. Archibald Silverman, Archibald Silverman, Jacob Sincoff, Ferdinand Sonneborn, Sigmund Thau, Harold M. Weinberg, Morris Weinberg, David Wertheim

David Ben Gurion, Robert M. Bernstein, Kurt Blumenfeld, Joseph Cohn, Mendel N. Fisher, Nahum Goldmann, Benjamin F. Harris, Mrs. Nathan D. Perlman, Martin Rosenblueth, Alex Rothenberg, Robert Silverman, Meyer F. Steinglass.

Regrets for inattendance were received from Louis Altschul, George Backer, Barnett R. Brickner, Albert K. Epstein, Daniel Frisch, David Glosser, Sylvan Gotshal, Edward L. Israel, Jacob J. Kaplan, Edmund I. Kaufmann, Joseph Kraemer, Abraham Krasne, Israel H. Levinthal, David Pinski, Louis P. Rucker, Albert Schiff, Simon Shetzer, Elihu D. Stone, Joe Weingarten.

MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

The minutes of the previous meeting of the Administrative Committee of the United Palestine Appeal, held on November 13, 1940, were ordered approved as circulated.

FINANCIAL REPORTS

A statement of the income and expenditures of the United Palestine Appeal as of December 16, 1940 (Appendix A); an analysis of expenditures in 1940 as of December 16, 1940 (Appendix B), and a comparative report of the 1940 United Jewish Appeal as of December 16, 1940 (Appendix C) as compared with the 1939 United Jewish Appeal were presented by Mr. Montor.

He pointed out that in Appendix A the cash disbursement of \$60,000 to the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs includes \$50,000, the amount of the allotment for 1940, and an additional \$10,000 on account of another appropriation of \$25,000 for the period ending September 1941. He also stated that in Appendix C the item of \$3,475,000 received from the New York City campaign included the amount sent to the United Jewish Appeal national office and the amount sent directly to the National Refugee Service.

Mr. Montor pointed out that the total anticipated pledges of the United Jewish Appeal for 1940 was \$14,050,000 as against \$16,230,000 in 1939.

It was moved and carried to accept the reports as presented

REGIONAL ACTIVITIES

A resume of the regional activities of the United Palestine Appeal was presented by Mr. Montor who described briefly conferences held in Los Angeles on November 24th; in San Francisco on December 1st and in Chicago on December 14 and 15; also a state meeting in Arizona on November 17th and one in New Mexico on December 8th. He praised the services of Mr. Robert Silverman and Mr. Bernard Stone in connection with these regional conferences.

In addition to these regional conferences he advised that reports of the developments in Palestine have been brought regularly to the attention of the constituency of the United Palestine Appeal, one of the most effective media being the 1940 Yearbook of the United Palestine Appeal, published by the "Night of Stars" which was directed by Mr. Blitz; and edited by Mr. Steinglass. He said that most enthusiastic letters had been received with respect to the Yearbook.

The United Palestine Appeal has made of the "U.P.A. Report", a monthly publication. Mr. Montor felt that one of the best pieces of propaganda was a calendar sent directly from Palestine to the members of the National Council for Palestine. In addition to this, attention had been directed to the National Conference for Palestine to be held in Washington on January 25 and 26, 1941; invitations to the Conference, literature and descriptive material incident to the Conference had been circulated.

Dr. Silver complimented the office and the organization for a period of really intensive and fruitful activity.

REPORT ON STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN KH AND KK

Dr. Goldstein reported that the agreement between the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth for 1941 was virtually completed and that the fundamental points were practically the same as in 1940, but that one or two items still awaited ratification from Jerusalem. There was a point of view that the Mizrachi allocation ought to be made at the fixed sum of \$125,000 provided that the proceeds of the 1941 campaign will be at least equal to those of 1940. Should these proceeds be less than those of 1940, the allocation to Mizrachi ought to be proportionately reduced. This matter, he said, must be finally decided upon in a conference between Mr. Lipsky, Mr. Gellman and himself. The same formula, it was unanimously agreed, ought to obtain with reference to the service charges to the parties, and this has been entered into the contract as a definite provision.

With reference to the setup of the officers and Administrative Committee of the United Palestine Appeal, Dr. Goldstein said the list is practically the same as for 1940, with a few additions, among which is the name of the President of the Zionist Organization of America, Mr. Edmund I. Kaufmann as a Co-Chairman; the name of the Chairman of the Board of the Keren Hayesod, Mr. Charles Ress, as a Vice-Chairman, Mr. Ress' previous office, that of Honorary Secretary of the Keren Hayesod, being abolished; and the nomination of Mr. Charles Rosenbloom to the Treasurership.

Another item which awaits the ratification of Jerusalem, Dr. Goldstein advised, was the appropriation of \$9,000 for the maintenance of the Archives Department.

As regards the allocation to the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, the recommendation of the Jewish Agency for \$25,000 for the period to September 1941, was entered into the contract.

On behalf of the Joint Committee of the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth Dr. Goldstein paid tribute to the magnificent leadership of Dr. Silver and enthusiastically called upon Dr. Silver to continue as leader for the year 1941.

In discussing the suggested appropriation for the Archives Dr. Silver questioned the wisdom of charging this to Palestine. He hoped that the representatives of the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth would reconsider their decision on this matter.

REPORT ON ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE

Dr. Silver stated that although the formal report of the Allotment Committee was not yet available, the Allotment Committee had met and made its findings. The Committee consisted of Dr. Solomon Lowenstein and Mr. James Becker, representing the Joint Distribution Committee; Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver, representing the United Palestine Appeal; and Mr. Harris Perlstein of Chicago, Mr. Fred Butzel of Detroit and Mr. David Watchmaker of Boston, representing the Welfare Fund communities. An Inquiry staff had been set up, directed by Elisha M. Friedman. The following conclusions had been arrived at by the Allotment Committee: the National Refugee Service was to receive no additional allocation over and above its allotment out of the first \$11,250,000 (although it had asked for an additional \$500,000) as the reports had indicated that the NRS had been operating on a surplus; the \$1,200,000 therefore that might remain for distribution by the Allotment Committee was divided \$800,000 to the Joint Distribution Committee and \$400,000 to the United Palestine Appeal.

There were many things to criticize in the report of the Inquiry Committee, Dr. Silver pointed out, and an Editing Committee, of which Mr. Lipsky was a member, had been organized to edit the report carefully, and the hope was expressed that the objectionable items would be eliminated.

Dr. Silver advised that the United Palestine Appeal will receive from the 1940 United Jewish Appeal campaign \$2,500,000, originally allotted and \$400,000 distributed by the Allotment Committee; in addition, some \$380,000 would be available from the Jewish National Fund, making a total of \$3,280,000.

The National Refugee Service, after its request for additional funds had been refused, submitted to the Committee that it was in great financial difficulty owing to the fact that cash funds were not available. It was agreed that, after the final report of the Inquiry was submitted, some sort of priority payments might be worked out.

Mr. Lipsky felt that thought should be given to a future Allotment, Committee and Inquiry, both of which he felt were very dangerous to the interests of the United Palestine Appeal. Dr. Silver concurred.

In response to a question from Mr. Rosenbloom as to the priority claims of the National Refugee Service, Dr. Silver said that no checks should be signed and no rearranged formula initiated until there is a final report of the Allotment Committee, countersigned by the seven members of the Allotment Committee.

REQUEST OF L.O.A. FOR \$4,500.

A letter from Mr. Louis P. Rucker, Treasurer of the Zionist Organization of America, dated December 2, 1940, requesting a delay in repayment of \$4,500 was read (Appendix D).

Following a discussion,

The Chairman ruled that this is not a matter that properly comes before the Administrative Committee of the United Palestine Appeal and directed Mr. Montor to notify the Z.O.A. that the U.P.A. could not comply.

HECHALUTZ

A letter (Appendix E) from Moshe Furmansky and Yosef Israeli, representing the Hechalutz Organization, to Dr. Silver as Chairman of the United Palestine Appeal, was presented by Mr. Montor. He explained the essence of the letter as follows: that the Ort had proposed to buy a farm in the United States for \$15,000 on which the Hechalutz movement would establish a training camp. The Hechalutz was asking advice regarding the matter.

Mr. Ress declared that the Keren Hayesod had been approached by the Hechalutz for a loan of \$10,000. The Keren Hayesod had communicated this request to the Jewish Agency, which was in sympathy with the proposition but felt that it would not be desirable at this time to use any money for this purpose that should go to Palestine; and it, therefore, suggested that the Keren Hayesod guarantee a loan to the Hechalutz. Mr. Ress said that this subject was under consideration now. He stated that he was sure that the Hechalutz would not go through with the Ort plan.

Motion was made and carried that this matter be referred for consideration to the Keren Hayesod; and that the Administrative Committee of the United Palestine Appeal voice its disapproval of the idea suggested by the Hechalutz in its letter of December 11, 1940

CONSCRIPTION: CLAUSE IN UNION CONTRACT

Mr. Montor advised that the Union had asked that the United Palestine Appeal insert in the present Union contract a clause to the effect that any employee who is drafted for service with the United States forces be restored to full seniority rights upon his return.

Motion was made and carried that seniority rights be restored upon his return to any employee of the United Palestine Appeal who might be drafted for service with the United States forces.

AMERICAN ZIONIST GUILD

Reference was made to a letter from the American Zionist Guild asking for a conference with the U.P.A. officers (Appendix F).

Dr. Silver felt that a committee should be appointed representing the United Palestine Appeal, the Zionist Organization of America and other Zionist bodies to discuss the protection of the interests of executives and employees other than those that come under the Union contract, who have formed an association under the name of the American Zionist Guild.

Motion was made and carried that a committee be organized consisting of representatives of the various Zionist bodies, that committee to consider the status of staff executives with the understanding that that committee report to this body in the course of studies.

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The Chairman advised that the President's Advisory Committee for Political Refugees had requested an additional \$2,500 which the Chairman asked the United Palestine Appeal to undertake,

It was suggested that this was a matter that came within the framework of the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, but Dr. Goldmann felt that, with its budget reduced from \$50,000 in 1940 to \$25,000 in 1941, it could not afford this outlay.

Following a discussion

Motion was made and carried that Mr. Ress and Dr. Goldstein undertake to recommend to Palestine that this expense up to \$5,000 yearly be borne by the United Palestine Appeal.

1941 CAMPAIGN

Dr. Silver presented to the Committee a resume of the negotiations with the Joint Distribution Committee with regard to a 1941 united campaign, which resulted in the final proposal of the United Palestine Appeal: out of an original allotment of \$9,000,000. National Refugee Service would receive \$2,000,000; the balance, \$7,000,000, would be divided on a 35-65 basis between the United Palestine Appeal and the Joint Distribution Committee; the balance to be left to an allotment committee. Dr. Silver advised that a reply would be received from the Joint Distribution Committee within forty-eight hours.

Following a full discussion, participated in by the Chairman, Dr. Weinberg, Dr. Goldmann, Dr. Silver, Dr. Karpf, Mr. Liebovitz, Mrs. Silverman, Mr. Montor, Mr. Lipsky, Mr. Ben Gurion, Dr. Goldstein, Mr. Archibald Silverman, Mr. Rosenbloom, Mr. Fisher, Judge Levinthal, Mr. Harris and Mr. Mazer

Motion was made by Mr. Rosenbloom, seconded by Judge Levinthal, and carried that the Administrative Committee of the United Palestine Appeal approve the proposal made to the Joint Distribution Committee representatives as follows: on the basis of the first distribution of \$9,000,000 - \$2,000,000 go to the National Refugee Service, to include New York City as well as the country as a whole; a proportion of 65-35 for the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal respectively in the distribution of \$7,000,000; the balance of the funds obtained by the United Jewish Appeal to be distributed by an Allotment Committee.

Should the Joint Distribution Committee reject this proposal, the Administrative Committee of the United Palestine Appeal directs the National Chairman to proceed immediately with the organization and conduct of an independent United Palestine Appeal campaign.

(19 for --- 2 opposed)

Mr. Segal and Mr. Glantz wished to be recorded as not voting.

NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN

It was pointed out that the national administration of the United Palestine Appeal had no contact with, no control and no direction of the New York United Palestine Appeal, and it was felt that this situation should be remedied.

Following a discussion, participated in by Dr. Silver, Mr. Segal, Mr. R_ess, Mr. Montor, Mr. Fisher

It was moved by Rabbi Miller, amended by Dr. Silver and voted that the National Chairman of the United Palestine Appeal be directed to appoint a committee which would create a functioning New York City United Palestine Appeal Committee for the 1941 campaign and other purposes serving United Palestine Appeal interests; also that this Committee maintain an organic contact with the national administration of the United Palestine Appeal to which it is to report its actions for approval.

Meeting adjourned at 12:00 Midnight

Respectfully submitted

Florence Eitelberg

(APPENDIX A)
 UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL FOR 1940
REPORT OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURES
AS OF DECEMBER 16, 1940

(1939- \$164,340.60)
 (1938- 2,864.17)
 (1937- 4,396.29)

BANK BALANCES AS OF JANUARY 1, 1940.....\$171,601.06

CASH RECEIVED - 1/1/40 thru 12/16/40:

Bequests-1940.....	\$	190.00
United Jewish Appeal.....1940.....		1,675,000.00
Jewish National Fund.....1940. (thru Nov.)...		360,965.20
United Jewish Appeal.....1939.....		1,132,833.33
Night of Stars.....1939.....		6,150.90
United Palestine Appeal.....1938.....		50,814.34
United Palestine Appeal.....1937.....		5,209.10
United Palestine Appeal.....1936.....		<u>366.34</u>

3,231,529.21
\$3,403,130.27

CASH DISBURSEMENTS:

Keren Hayesod.....1940....	\$	839,500.00
(Includes \$14,500. toward Mifal Bitzaron..1939...		634,500.00
in accordance with 1937-38 agreements....1938....		39,000.00
.....1937....		4,500.00
.....1936....		<u>183.17</u>
Keren Kayemeth.....1940....		839,500.00*
(Includes \$14,500. toward Mifal Bitzaron..1939...		634,500.00
in accordance with UPA 1937-38 agreements1938...		39,000.00
.....1937....		4,500.00
.....1936....		<u>183.17</u>

*The Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemeth have contributed \$15,000. each in 1940 to the Hebrew University making a total of \$30,000. from the funds of the U.P.A.

\$1,517,683.17

Mizrachi Palestine Fund.....		120,000.00
Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs.....		60,000.00
Emergency Committee Trans. of Zionists from Russia.		2,500.00
Council of Jewish Fed. & Welfare Funds.....		<u>2,500.00</u>

65,000.00

SERVICE PAYMENTS:

Zionist Organization of America.....		53,545.90
Poale Zion-Zeire Zion.....		9,000.00
Mizrachi Organization of America.....		9,000.00
Hashomer Hatzair.....		<u>1,200.00</u>

72,745.90

Expenses covering all activities in 1940 as well as previous campaigns

89,175.99

Miscellaneous Advances.....

2,978.07

\$3,385,266.30

BANK BALANCES AS OF DECEMBER 16, 1940.....

\$ 17,863.97

(1940-\$9,158.57)
 (1939- 7,487.84)
 (1938- 678.51)
 (1937- 539.05)
\$ 17,863.97

(APPENDIX B)

ANALYSIS OF EXPENDITURES IN 1940As of December 16, 1940

	Adopted Budget 1940	Actual Expenditures 1.1.40-12.16.40
Payroll.....	\$32,428.06	\$23,946.24
Printing & Stationery.....	3,500.00	2,882.08
Multigraphing & Mailing.....	3,000.00	5,108.78
Telephone & Telegraph.....	3,500.00	2,886.79
Rent and Light.....	7,000.00	5,859.76
Postage, Parcel Post & Express.....	4,000.00	4,537.88
Carfares, Newspapers & Incidentals.....	1,000.00	436.93
Sanitation.....	500.00	181.94
Rentals & Repairs.....	300.00	45.05
Equipment.....	3,000.00	3,472.79
Insurance.....	464.00	150.22
Auditing.....	1,000.00	650.00
Photos, Clippings, Mats & Cuts.....	1,500.00	1,339.41
Dinners & Banquets.....	1,000.00	155.45
Traveling & Speakers Fees.....	8,000.00	5,437.76
Literature.....	5,000.00	4,206.54
National Conference Expenses.....	5,280.08	5,100.93
Regional Bureaus Expenses.....	14,500.00	15,674.72
Fieldmen's Travel Per Diem.....	8,500.00	3,097.52
Miscellaneous Expenses.....	2,000.00	275.40
Films: General.....	\$137.72	2,655.33
"Daganish".....	2,285.81	
"Collective Adventure".....	236.80	
Discount on Notes Payable		815.97
	<u>\$ 107,972.14</u>	<u>\$ 88,917.49</u>
Expenditures in 1940 on previous campaign		<u>258.50</u>
		<u>\$ 89,175.99</u>

(APPENDIX C)

REPORT OF 1940 UNITED JEWISH APPEALREPORT OF 1939 UNITED JEWISH APPEAL

As of December 16, 1940

<u>TOTAL GROSS PLEDGES - \$12,809,007.15</u>	
National	- 7,853,225.77
New York	- 4,955,781.38

<u>TOTAL CASH RECEIVED - \$ 8,473,445.71</u>	
National	- 4,958,445.71
New York	- 3,475,000.00

<u>DISTRIBUTION ----- \$ 7,834,500.00</u>	
JDC	- 3,517,500.00
UPA	- 1,675,000.00
NRS	- 1,675,000.00
NY UJA direct to NRS	945,000.00
Distribution Committee	22,000.00

<u>NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION</u>	
<u>EXPENSES-----</u>	<u>\$417,090.13</u>

<u>ANTICIPATED TOTAL PLEDGES FOR 1940 U.J.A.-----</u>	<u>\$14,050,000.00</u>
-------------------------------------------------------	------------------------

<u>ANTICIPATED NET* CASH FOR 1940 U.J.A. - - -</u>	<u>\$12,475,000.00</u>
National - - -	8,354,218.62
New York - - -	4,120,781.38

* This includes following:

<u>Expenses:-</u>	<u>\$1,025,000.00</u>
National Local -	450,000.00
New York-----	575,000.00

<u>Anticipated Shrinkage:- \$</u>	<u>525,000.00</u>
National-----	\$200,000.00
New York-----	325,000.00

<u>TOTAL GROSS PLEDGES - \$16,230,076.65</u>	
National	- 10,162,536.30
New York	- 6,067,540.35

<u>TOTAL CASH RECEIVED - \$14,983,855.05</u>	
National	- 9,633,855.05
New York	- 5,350,000.00

<u>DISTRIBUTION ----- \$14,498,500.00</u>	
JDC	- 7,765,666.67
UPA	- 3,882,833.33
NRS	- 2,600,000.00
Christian Refugees -	250,000.00

<u>NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION</u>	
<u>EXPENSES -----</u>	<u>\$441,187.86</u>

(APPENDIX D)

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
1760- 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

December 2, 1940

Mr. Henry Montor, Executive Director
United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd Street
New York City

Dear Mr. Montor:

I shall deeply appreciate it if you will secure the consent of your committee to grant an extension on the repayment of the amount of \$4,500 representing advance made to the Zionist Organization of America.

The deferment of this repayment would be of considerable help to us at this time. We are hopeful that the financial condition of our organization will in the very near future undergo an improvement and enable us to repay you the amount due.

Deeply appreciative of the cooperation you have extended us in the past, I remain

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) LOUIS P. ROCKER

Treasurer

C
O
P
Y

APPENDIX E

HECHALUTZ ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

December 11, 1940

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Rabbi Silver:

A few weeks ago we were approached by the Ort Organization of America with a suggestion to combine the efforts of the Hechalutz in the preparation of chalutzim for Palestine with the general agricultural training program of Jewish refugees in this country.

The basis for our conversation was the common experience of the Ort and Hechalutz in Europe, where the Ort helped the Hechalutz and its farms as part of the general Ort program of productivization of Jewish youth in Europe. It was understood in our conversation that the Ort is not a Zionist organization, but is not theoretically opposed to the productivization of Jewish youth in America for a future pioneer life in Palestine.

As a result of a few meetings, the following points were suggested:

- 1) The Ort Organization of America will purchase a farm, in the name of Ort. As the owner of the property, Ort will pay the mortgages, interest, and taxes.
- 2) Ort will establish an agricultural training fund which will support instructors, lecturers, a library, etc.
- 3) A special investment fund will be established by Ort and Hechalutz for loans (without interest) to the farm for the purchase of new equipment, operating capital, seeds, fertilizer, etc. (It is understood that the farm will be responsible for the moveable investments which can be paid for from the profits of the farm).
- 4) The group working on the farm will be responsible for its business management during the corresponding year and the expenses of field work and group maintenance will be covered by the total income of the various farm branches. If a deficit is incurred, the Hechalutz is to cover the deficit; in case of a profit, the money is transferred to the joint investment fund.
- 5) It is understood that the farm will bear a definite Chalutz-Zionist spirit. The majority of the members of the farm will be Chalutzim.
- 6) Non-Chalutz members of the farm will not exceed one-third of the entire group and will live in separate quarters. They will conduct a work program similar to that of the chalutzim, and will have an autonomous cultural life.

We realize that an understanding between Hechalutz and Ort cannot be judged only on the basis of the material interests of Hechalutz. We

understand that in the political structure of the fund-raising institutions of the Jewish community, such a decision will have a certain effect upon our Zionist fund-raising efforts. On the one hand, Ort will have the opportunity of introducing an important factor in its propaganda, by using the slogan of helping the chalutzim train for their life in Palestine. On the other hand, through this medium Ort would subscribe to its active participation in the presentation of a Palestinian program for American youth. Realizing all this, we would like to know your opinion as soon as possible, as our preparations for the coming agricultural season are about to be made. Our answer must be given to Ort by December 20.

To our regret we have to state that we have not succeeded as yet in solving our financial problem. It is almost fourteen months since Hechalutz, the only American organization for pioneer training for Palestine, recognized by the World Zionist Congress and the Jewish Agency, has been trying to obtain the necessary funds for its training program. We are sorry that despite all our efforts we have not succeeded in obtaining assistance from the organized Zionist movement. We are not even certain whether the Zionist movement in America is aware that such a non-partisan, all-Zionist organization, as Hechalutz, has sent 45 Chalutzim to Palestine during the first year of war, operates two large farms where approximately 100 Chalutzim are now in training, and is able and prepared to expand the work of training Chalutzim for Palestine.

We hope to hear from you soon regarding this matter.

With Zionist greetings,

Moshe Furmanský
Yosef Israeli

MERCAZ HECHALUTZ

"APPENDIX F"

THE AMERICAN ZIONIST GUILD

225 West 34th Street
New York City

November 20, 1940

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman
United Palestine Appeal
41 East 42nd Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Rabbi Silver:

The administration staffs of the various Zionist organizations and Palestine Fund-Raising Institutions have organized a body to be known as The American Zionist Guild. The objects of the Guild as outlined in its constitution are:

- 1) To unite all executives and administrative employees in the Zionist civil service into one organization.
- 2) To promote a feeling of solidarity and comradeship among its members.
- 3) To preserve, maintain and protect the welfare and civil service rights of its members, through joint and collective action.
- 4) To promote the efficiency of the Zionist service.

We should like to arrange for a meeting between yourself or representatives designated by you and officers of the Guild with a view to establishing close cooperation between the United Palestine Appeal and the Guild.

I trust that I may hear from you at an early date with regard to such an official meeting.

Cordially yours,

(signed) MEYER W. WEISGAL
President

LETTER FROM VISCOUNT HALIFAX TO DR. WEIZMANN

December 18, 1940

Dear Dr. Weizmann:

Since we had our talk at the Foreign Office on the 30th of November, I have given further thought to the letter which you left with me, and I have taken the opportunity of discussing with others the matters at issue.

As I have already told you I have no authority to discuss the affairs of Palestine, which are outside my province, nor is my acquaintance with such questions sufficiently close and continuous to enable me to reply in detail to the various points raised in your letter. Writing, however, as a member of the Cabinet which was collectively responsible for the recent White Paper on Palestine policy I may perhaps venture to give you my opinion on the broader aspect of the question as I see it.

In the first place, may I remind you that the policy embodied in the White Paper was adopted by the Cabinet after long and anxious deliberation as the most equitable solution of a bitter controversy, and as the only course which would enable us to fulfil in equal measure our Mandatory obligations to Jews and Arabs. In the circumstances, it seems clear to me that it is not possible to modify or postpone the application of the White Paper policy in favour of one community without doing an injustice to the other. This strikes me as a governing consideration.

The policy of the White Paper became effective as soon as it had been approved by Parliament and as you know our attitude is that, as that policy does not involve any amendment of the Mandate, it does not require the prior approval of the League Council; neither before the War nor since has the Government said or done anything to justify the assumption that the implementation of the policy would be deferred either because it has not yet been approved by the League Council or on account of the war situation.

In conclusion let me assure you that I am the last to underrate the value of Jewish sympathy and co-operation with the Allied War effort. But highly as His Majesty's Government appreciated Jewish offers of assistance on the outbreak of war, it must not be overlooked that those offers were made unconditionally and were welcomed on that footing. So far as this country is concerned, we are putting our whole energy into a life-and-death struggle with Nazi Germany, the persecutor of Jewry in Central Europe, and by ridding Europe of the present German regime, we hope to render a supreme service to the Jewish people.

Yours sincerely,

Halifax

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SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LC = Deferred Cable

NLT = Cable Night Letter

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PRESIDENTNEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARDJ. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

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HW91 92 DL=BALTIMORE MD 26 1041A

1940 DEC. 26 PM 12 36

RABBI ABBA HILLEL SILVER=

CARE THE TEMPLE EAST 105 ST AND ANSEL RD=

I THINK YOU WILL BE MAKING GREAT MISTAKE TO REJECT
OVERWHELMING DEMAND OF JEWISH COMMITTEES FOR UNIFIED
CAMPAIGN IN 1941. SUCH A COURSE CERTAIN TO RESULT IN
RESENTMENTS SERIOUSLY AFFECTING SUCCESS OF YOUR PROGRAM
IN VIEW OF EXISTING MACHINERY AVAILABLE FOR IMPARTIAL
CONSIDERATION OF NEEDS AND PROGRAMS OF ALL THREE AGENCIES
THERE SEEMS NO JUSTIFIED REASON FOR REJECTING IT.

DESPITE PUBLISHED ANNOUNCEMENT OF DISSOLUTION OF UJA
THE COUNCIL URGES FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS AGREEMENT.

I THEREFORE ASK YOU TO ATTEND MEETING CALLED FOR THAT
PURPOSE AT COUNCIL OFFICE THIS FRIDAY AFTERNOON AT 230=

SIDNEY HOLLANDER.

1941 230 UJA.

Handwritten notes:
J. C. Willever
12/27/41
1941

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WESTERN UNION

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CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

1206-A

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TIME FILED

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

DECEMBER 26, 1940

Mr. Sidney Hollander
Baltimore, Maryland

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF YOUR TELEGRAM WHICH UNFORTUNATELY CONTAINS SOME UNWARRANTED INTIMIDATIONS. YOU WAITED TWO MONTHS DURING WHICH NEGOTIATIONS DRAGGED ON WITHOUT DOING ANYTHING, QUITE UNLIKE YOUR LAST YEARS WELCOME PARTICIPATION. WHEN NEGOTIATIONS FINALLY BROKE DOWN YOU STEPPED INTO THE PICTURE AND ASKED FOR A CONFERENCE. I KNEW THAT THE OBDURATE POSITION OF JDC WOULD MAKE SUCH A CONFERENCE FUTILE BUT I YIELDED. YOU HAD NOTHING TO OFFER AT THIS CONFERENCE. YOU HEARD US MAKE AN ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSION FOR THE SAKE OF UNITY. IT WAS REJECTED. THE NEXT DAY I RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM JDC REAFFIRMING THEIR UNALTERABLE POSITION. BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT A STATEMENT WAS THEN GIVEN TO THE PRESS ANNOUNCING INDEPENDENT CAMPAIGNS. NOW YOU CALL FOR ANOTHER CONFERENCE WITH NO SUGGESTION THAT YOU OR JDC HAS ANYTHING NEW TO OFFER. THIS PROCEDURE IS BECOMING SOMEWHAT WEARYING AND SLIGHTLY LUDICROUS. JDC MAY BE PREPARED TO SIT IN ON ANOTHER CONFERENCE WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF COOPERATION AND IN THE HOPE OF PUTTING THE ONUS FOR THE BREAK UPON UPA. WE DO NOT PLAY THAT KIND OF A GAME. KINDEST PERSONAL REGARDS.

Abba Hillel Silver

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

December 26, 1940

TO: Members of the Executive Committee
of the United Jewish Appeal

FROM: Elisha M. Friedman, Secretary of the Allotment Committee

SUBJECT: Material for Meeting of December 30th

There is transmitted herewith for your consideration the following material:

1. Report of the Allotment Committee, as approved by Mr. Harris Perlstein, Chairman of the Allotment Committee and the Editorial Committee, Messrs. Lowenstein, Lipsky and Friedman.
2. Verbatim Quotations from Minutes of the Meeting of the Allotment Committee concerning Motion on Allotment Decision and Cash Priority for the NRS. The page numbers refer to the original verbatim minutes themselves, one copy of which may be made available at the meeting. A telegram to Rabbi Silver requests him to withdraw his objections quoted below.

The Secretary omitted irrelevant portions. In view of an implied charge by Rabbi Silver, quoted below, that the Secretary of the Allotment Committee "edited the minutes" apparently with sinister intent, there is also being sent to you -

3. The Full Verbatim Portion of Minutes of Allotment Committee Meeting, re Allotment Motion and NRS Acceleration.

Dr. Silver is completely in error when he accuses the Secretary of "editing" the Minutes. There has been no change in wording of any sort from the transcript as it appeared in the original stenotyped minutes. Omission was for sake of brevity and clarity. If you received any of the above, you will not now receive any duplicate.

The following material is for your information.

Chairman Harris Perlstein telegraphed requesting Dr. Lowenstein and Dr. Silver to advise their respective organizations "regarding the Allotment Committee recommendations and to arrange for proper instructions to the Treasurers." The Secretary of the Allotment Committee carried out the Chairman's request.

Mr. Perlstein telephoned from Chicago saying that Rabbi Silver thought the matter should go not to the individual agencies, but as an official document from the Director of the Inquiry, stating the recommendations with respect to the NRS as adopted by the Allotment Committee. The Secretary carried out the Chairman's request.

Subsequently, the Secretary received a letter from Rabbi Silver, reading as follows:

"May I remind you, first, that no official report of the Allotment Committee covering its findings and recommendations has as yet been drawn up and signed by the members of the Allotment Committee and dispatched to the only body competent to receive it - the Executive of the United Jewish Appeal. Until such time you have no authorization to send any memoranda concerning what might be in the final report of the Allotment Committee to Mr. Baerwald or to me.

"Again, no one has authorized you to make available to anybody verbatim quotations from the Minutes of the Allotment Committee. To my best knowledge final disposition of what should be done with the Minutes has not been agreed upon. It is not within your competence to excise parts of such Minutes and to put dots for parts which you omit and which you think are irrelevant. No one has authorized you to send these edited Minutes either to me or to Mr. Baerwald."

Rabbi Silver however also telegraphed to Chairman Perlstein the following contradictory request:

"A meeting of the Executive Committee of the United Jewish Appeal is to be held on Monday, December 30, at 4:00 P.M. That meeting ought to receive the final report of the Allotment Committee. It would be helpful if the members of the Committee could see a draft of the report immediately so that we could make any necessary corrections before we sign the final document. It would also be helpful if we received the full verbatim unedited transcript of the minutes of our deliberations which concern themselves particularly with the actual voting and decisions."

In view of this self-contradiction of Rabbi Silver, the Secretary telegraphed Rabbi Silver:

"Your telegram to Perlstein concerning Monday's meeting requests verbatim unedited transcript of minutes concerning voting and decision. Perlstein conveyed telegram to undersigned. However, your letter to undersigned reads 'No one has authorized you to make available to anybody verbatim quotations from the minutes. To my best knowledge final disposition of what should be done with the minutes has not been agreed upon.' Which procedure do you now favor?"

To this Rabbi Silver replied:

"Would suggest that you follow advice of Chairman of Allotment Committee else. there can be no report for meeting Executive Committee United Jewish Appeal next Monday am also waiting for first draft of report to be submitted to Executive Committee."

To make available the 130 page verbatim minutes of the Allocation Committee for the United Jewish Appeal Executive Committee meeting, the Secretary telegraphed simultaneously with this mailing the request that Rabbi Silver withdraw the above quoted objections to doing so:

"To avoid misunderstanding am confirming that you have withdrawn your objection to my making verbatim quotation available. Copies being sent to UJA Executive Committee. Will you also withdraw your statement 'The final disposition of what should be done with the minutes has not yet been agreed upon'. Upon receipt your telegraphed reply will mail full 130 page verbatim minutes to Dr. Jonah Wise and yourself for the meeting."

EMF: LST

[Dec. 30, 1940]

Strictly Confidential

#35

MINUTES
OF
MEETING OF EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR ZIONIST AFFAIRS

A meeting of the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs was held on Monday evening, December 30, 1940 at 8:00 p.m. at 41 East 42nd St., N.Y.C.

PRESENT: Mr. Lipsky, in the chair; Mr. Cruso, Dr. Goldstein, Rabbis I. M. Kowalsky and Max Kirschblum (substituting for Mr. Gelman and Mr. Publick), Mr. Ress, Rabbi Silver, Mr. Sokol, Mr. Szold.

Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Mr. Neumann, Mr. Lourie, Mr. Montor.

The chairman stated that the purpose of the meeting was to ^{continue} discussion of the report of the Committee on Reorganization.

PARAGRAPH III OF REPORT - OFFICE COMMITTEE

It was agreed that for the time being the status quo remain.

PARAGRAPH IV- COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC RELATIONS AND POLITICAL ACTION

The chairman requested Mr. Szold to report for the praesidium on this question. Mr. Szold prefixed his remarks by stating that he did not want his participation in the Emergency Committee to be misunderstood. He considered himself to be a representative of the ZOA, which may take action on any of the matters discussed at the last meeting or which might be taken up here. Mr. Szold said that he could not be understood as prejudging or prejudicing any such action by the ZOA and would consider himself bound by any action the ZOA might wish to take.

The Chairman concurred in Mr. Szold's remarks and suggested that this was the position of all members of other organizations on this Committee.

Mr. Szold reported as follows: The Executive had appropriated the sum of \$25,000 for the entire work of the Committee up to September 1941. In considering the minimal running expenses of the office, it is apparent that this sum is not sufficient to include a public relations department. The praesidium therefore suggests that the Agency be asked to appropriate a further sum to make available \$25,000 for such a department. Specifically, it recommends that such a department be set up and an executive director engaged; the budget for this committee in all its details is to be submitted for approval to the regularly constituted officers. A detailed budget is to be submitted by the director and his colleagues within 60 days.

Dr. Goldstein pointed out that \$24,000 seemed insufficient to pay for an executive director plus the running expenses of an active department. Since the Executive must in any case be consulted, it was his recommendation that the matter be discussed with Mr. Ben-Gurion and with Dr. Weizmann when he arrives, so that the Executive may have a definite plan to consider, with their endorsement.

Dr. Goldmann agreed with Dr. Goldstein's view of the possible expenses of such a department. The budget of the entire Emergency Committee might, he thought, require a budget considerably in excess of \$25,000. However, he urged that the committee be set up immediately, since there was available \$10,000 for political work for a start and the rest would doubtless be forthcoming.

It was the consensus of opinion that a Public Relations department be set up immediately and an executive director engaged; application for further appropriations is to be deferred until after the working out of a definite program and discussion with Mr. Ben-Gurion and, if possible, Dr. Weizmann.

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND POLITICAL ACTION

There was considerable discussion on the question of the name and functions of the committee. Dr. Goldmann urged that there be a clearly defined distinction between political and public relations work. Political work implies close contact with the British Embassy, with the United States Government and with other governments. Decisions on policy might be required, which would not logically come within the purview of a public relations committee. Public relations, in his opinion, should concern itself with interpreting Zionism to the American public, and the establishment of good relations with leading American personages and officials, with the Christian and non-Zionist laity.

In this connection Mr. Szold recalled that Rabbi Breslau in Washington had already established contacts with the Embassy, various Congressmen, etc. The praesidium had recommended that Rabbi Breslau be maintained at his post in Washington at a reduced salary, but that the executive director of the public relations work be a member of this committee in New York.

It was the sense of the meeting that overlapping between the public relations and the political work should be avoided, and that there were two separate functions involved.

Upon the motion being put, it was carried unanimously that a Public Relations Department be set up in the charge of an executive director. The public relations committee shall be a sub-committee of the office committee: the appointment of an executive director to be left to the office committee.

PARAGRAPH V - AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR PALESTINE AFFAIRS

The question of the form and functions of such a committee was discussed at length. The suggestion was made that it include:

- a) An information service designed to answer questions on Palestine, and to initiate and stimulate such questions. It was pointed out that there is in America no source of authoritative information on Palestine.
- b) A passport bureau.
- c) An economic department: Mr. Szold reported his recommendations for this department as incorporated in a memorandum previously circulated, on December 16, 1940.

This memorandum included provision for the inclusion of (a) and (b), but was chiefly concerned with emergency war supplies for Palestine, their transportation, exchange, financing, etc. Mr. Szold reported that he had previously been in almost daily communication with Mr. Eliezer Kaplan on this subject, since it was apparent that Palestine was in urgent need of various raw materials such as sheet iron, etc., vitally important from the national point of view. Mr. Kaplan undertook to find out to what extent the employment situation in Palestine was affected by the lack of raw materials, how they would be paid for, etc. In the meantime, the difficulties of sending such commodities from this country were increasing because of the defense program, the necessity for obtaining export licenses, etc.

In Mr. Szold's opinion the whole question of emergency war supplies was one which should be given careful attention by the Emergency Committee, as part of long-range economic planning. It seemed to him, he said, to be part of statesmanship for this committee to be prepared to take the initiative in sending such supplies to Palestine, and pointed out that similar action had been taken by Hadassah in connection with medical supplies sent by that organization - the transport of which had in fact been facilitated through the economic sub-committee.

Many of the members present felt that certain functions of the economic department as presented by Mr. Szold were not within the province of the Emergency Committee which should not dissipate its energies by dealing with matters which could not be considered as strictly emergency. Dr. Goldstein and Mr. Röss both expressed the opinion that the Emergency Committee should consider itself as chiefly a political instrument. Moreover, it was pointed out that the Executive had appropriated no funds for an economic department, and that if such a department were established it would have to be with the approval of the Executive which must supply the budget necessary for the conduct of the work.

Mr. Neumann suggested that since the approval of the Exec. depended on its being convinced that something could be done, it might be wise to start the work and submit a report to the Executive.

Rabbi Silver recommended that the plan for an economic department be submitted to Palestine with the endorsement of the Emergency Committee and that the Executive be asked to finance it, but that the department should in any case concern itself primarily with economic questions arising out of the war emergency, and not, for example, with an information service.

It was agreed that Mr. Szold be authorized on behalf of the Committee to engage a person to head the economic department which shall concern itself with problems arising from the war emergency, the work of the department to be contingent on the approval of the Executive. It was further agreed that for the present this department shall not include an information service or a passport bureau.

PARAGRAPH VI: COMMITTEE ON PEACE AIMS AND ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS

This section had already been approved by the Committee and there was no further discussion.

PARAGRAPH VIII - ADVISORY COUNCIL

It was the consensus of opinion that there was little prospect of getting responsible non-Zionists to participate in such a committee if it was to be purely consultative and without effective power. It must be regarded as part of the whole problem of drawing in the non-Zionist leaders in American-Jewish life, which was on the agenda for discussion with Dr. Weizmann.

UPA CAMPAIGN

Mr. Neumann referred to a memorandum which he had prepared in connection with the forthcoming UPA campaign, pointing out that the general press had not been publicizing the participation of Jewish troops in the defense of Palestine and the Middle East. He believed that a separate "B" budget in the UPA campaign for the care of the families of Jewish soldiers would be a tremendous fillip and would, moreover, dramatize Jewish participation in the fight for democracy, and urged that such a budget and such publicity be incorporated as a regular part of UPA campaign.

Dr. Goldstein warned that a "B" budget is predicated on raising a maximum budget for the KKL and the Keren Hayesod, and made the point that the maximum raised was always less than the minimum required for these two funds. He therefore urged that the points suggested by Mr. Neumann be part of the UPA publicity, but that no separate budget be set up.

This recommendation was generally accepted.

PALESTINIANS INTERNED IN GERMANY

Dr. Goldmann recalled that the Emergency Committee had been sending \$200.00 a month for food parcels for Palestinians interned in Germany. He recommended that this was properly a charge on the Agency budget and asked for authorization to discontinue these payments. The committee endorsed his recommendation.

CHALUTZIM IN LITHUANIA

Dr. Silver reported that the UPA had decided to take full financial responsibility for the transportation of 1,000 Chalutzim in Lithuania and had refused the offer of the JDC to contribute \$25,000 for this purpose. In his opinion the publicity value of the move was of such importance that it would have been a mistake to accept the JDC offer, since in any case the major part of the budget for this purpose would have to come from UPA funds. A cable had been despatched to Jerusalem dealing with this subject, but no answer had as yet been received; Dr. Silver reported that he had assumed the responsibility of authorizing the payment of \$10,000 which had to be made that day in connection with the emigration of the Chalutzim from Lithuania.

The committee approved this action.

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Mr. Lourie reminded the committee that the payment of a further \$2,500 to the President's Advisory Committee would before long be requested. Rabbi Silver expressed himself as being opposed to further payments to this committee, which has consistently refused to be helpful in the case of Palestine, and he recommended that no further monies be appropriated for this purpose.

Dr. Goldmann asked that no decision be taken in this matter without consulting Dr. Wise, who was a member of the President's Advisory Committee. It was agreed that Dr. Wise be consulted and that the office committee be empowered to act in the matter.

STATE DEPARTMENT

Dr. Goldmann referred to the attitude of the personnel of the State Department here and of its representatives in Jerusalem, but no action was taken on this question.

Arthur Lourie

REPORT OF THE ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE
to the United Jewish Appeal Meeting, Monday, December 30, 1940

As approved by Mr. Harris Perlstein, Chairman of the Allotment Committee and the Editorial Committee, Messrs. Lovenstein, Lipsky and Friedman

The Allotment Committee of the United Jewish Appeal for 1940 numbered among its members: For the J.D.C. - Mr. James H. Becker, Chicago, and Dr. Solomon Lovenstein, New York; for the U.P.A. - Dr. Stephen S. Wise, New York, and Dr. A. H. Silver, Cleveland; and as representatives of the Welfare Fund Communities - Messrs. Henry Wineman, Detroit, David M. Watchmaker, Boston, and Harris Perlstein, Chicago. The latter is Chairman of the Allotment Committee.

The Committee met on Friday, December 6, at the office of the United Jewish Appeal, 342 Madison Avenue, New York City, and on Saturday, December 7, at the Harmonie Club, 4 East 60th Street, New York City. Owing to the complete absence of Mr. Henry Wineman, Mr. Fred M. Butzel of Detroit acted as alternate; and owing to the partial absence of Dr. Stephen S. Wise, Mr. Louis Lipsky acted as alternate on Saturday night.

The Committee was authorized in March to set up a research organization which became known as the Inquiry. Mr. Elisha M. Friedman was appointed in August as Director of the Inquiry. The staff included: Mr. Bernard J. Reis, well known for independent research in financial questions, special adviser to the Comptroller of the City of New York; his partner, Mr. Joseph Kalafa, C.P.A.; Dr. Jules Backman, of the faculty of Economics at New York University; Mr. William L. Bein, for over 20 years with the J.D.C.; Mr. A. S. Revusky, author of the well known book "Jews in Palestine"; Mr. Albert J. Phiebig, formerly Director of the Statistical Department of the Reichsvertretung of Jews in Germany and member of the research staff of the N.R.S.; and Dr. Fritz Grubel, former Executive Director of the Jewish community of Leipzig.

The Inquiry was greatly helped by advice and counsel of the Executive Directors and staffs of the three beneficiary organizations and by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds.

For two months a staff of accountants examined the books of the three beneficiary organizations and for three months the statisticians analyzed the activities of the agencies. The Report of the Inquiry was then submitted in advance to the Allotment Committee.

The Allotment Committee was aided in its consideration of the Report of the Inquiry by the presence of the officials of the J.D.C., Messrs. Paul Baerwald, Chairman, Joseph C. Hyman, Executive Vice-Chairman, and Moses A. Leavitt, Secretary; of the U.P.A., the Hon. Morris Rothenberg, and Messrs. Louis Lipsky, Chairman Executive Committee, and Henry Montor, Executive Director; and of the N.R.S., Messrs. William Rosenwald, President, and David H. Sulzberger, Vice President, and Dr. William Haber, Executive Director.

The agreement between the J.D.C. and the U.P.A. for 1940 divided the first \$10,250,000 between them on the basis of \$5,250,000 for the J.D.C. and \$2,500,000 for the U.P.A. and N.R.S. each, plus an additional \$1,000,000 from the Greater New York Campaign for N.R.S. with division of any further income of the U.J.A. subject to the decision of the Allotment Committee. The Allotment decision involved a sum which is expected to be about \$1,200,000.

The Allotment Committee considered both the short-term or emergency aspects of the three organizations and their long-term programs. The Committee also considered the diverse methods of accounting, budgeting and booking expenses. The attempt was made to avoid bargaining by pressures, and be guided instead by an assessment of the accounting and statistical data presented by the Inquiry. After long and earnest deliberation, the Allotment Committee passed the following resolution:

"Such monies beyond the original allotment as are available for division from the 1940 campaign between the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal, shall be divided on the

"basis of \$800,000 to J.D.C. and \$400,000 to U.P.A., or in like ratio as funds are made available in an amount more or less than \$1,200,000."

H.R.S. the youngest of the three organizations, received no additional allotment of funds. It was agreed, however, to recommend to the U.J.A. that it grant to H.R.S. an acceleration of cash payments in order to enable it to meet its financial problems.

Those who are close to the distressing details feel most profoundly that it is the duty of the Allotment Committee to make a strong statement to the Jewry of the United States. The resources of U.J.A. are pitifully small. The needs of world-wide Jewry are large and urgent. The greatest task of the Inquiry is to furnish the facts for a substantially increased drive.

The Committee regarded the Inquiry as a milestone in Jewish communal history. Too often Jewish affairs have been conducted on the theory of the sovereignty of the particular institution. The Report of the Inquiry is a unique step forward in the attempt to present a complete picture and to bring about an understanding between the several groups. The beginning made this year should be the basis for further scientific studies and improved methods. The research work of the Inquiry may well be of great importance in budgeting done by the Welfare Funds of the communities. The Committee stressed the devotion and conscientious effort of the staff of the Inquiry and indicated its belief that work of the character begun by the Inquiry should be continued in one manner or another.

It was felt that, as regards the effect on future campaigns and decisions, the value of the work done by the Allotment Committee and the Inquiry does not lie in the split of money finally arrived at with regard to the balance of the 1940 funds, but does lie in the assembling of information regarding the various organizations and suggestions made for the inauguration of means to obtain uniform information in comparable form from all organizations at regular intervals as a routine matter in the future.

MEMORANDUM

December 24, 1940

To : Members of the Allotment Committee
cc: Messrs. Paul Baerwald and Joseph C. Hyman
Henry Montor
William Rosenwald and William Haber

From: Elisha M. Friedman

Attached is an exchange of letters and telegrams solely for your information:

- A. Telegram from Harris Perlstein, Chairman of the Allotment Committee, to Dr. Solomon Lowenstein, dated December 16, 1940.
- B. Letter from Dr. Solomon Lowenstein to Mr. Friedman, Secretary of the Allotment Committee, dated December 18, 1940.
- C. Telegram from Rabbi Silver to Mr. Perlstein, dated December 20, 1940.
- D. Letter from Rabbi Silver to Mr. Friedman, dated December 19, 1940.
- E. Telegram from Mr. Friedman to Dr. Silver, dated December 24, 1940.
- F. Letter from Mr. Perlstein to Mr. Friedman, dated December 18, 1940.

The Secretary of the Committee was carrying out the written instructions of the Chairman and questions the authority of any member of the Committee to countermand such instructions.

EMF:WJ
Encl.

Elisha M. Friedman

per Jacqueline Biskobahn

When?

A. Wire to Harris Perlstein from Dr. Solomon Lowenstein dated December 16, 1940:

"TO AVOID DELAY IN EFFECTUATING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE FOR IMMEDIATE ACCELERATION OF PAYMENTS TO NATIONAL REFUGEE SERVICE MAY I ASK THAT YOU, ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE, ADVISE THE JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE REGARDING THE ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION AND ARRANGE FOR PROPER INSTRUCTIONS TO THE TREASURER REPRESENTING JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE ON THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL. IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL ALSO IF YOU COULD AT THE SAME TIME TAKE UP THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSED ADVANCE TO MRS. NEST MARCH FROM UJA FUNDS OR A JOINT ADVANCE BY JDC AND UPA AS DISCUSSED SATURDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 7, SINCE I UNDERSTAND THIS WOULD HAVE A GREAT BEARING ON CONVERSATIONS REGARDING BANK LOANS NOW BEING CARRIED ON BY MRS. I AM SENDING A SIMILAR WIRE REQUESTING DR. SILVER TO TAKE UP THESE MATTERS WITH UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL."

B. Letter from Dr. Lowenstein to Mr. Friedman; dated December 18, 1940:

"Mr. Perlstein telephoned to me today from Chicago to say that the response which he had received to the telegram which he had sent in duplicate both to Rabbi Silver and myself resulted in a reply from Rabbi Silver to the effect that he thought the proper way of handling this matter was that it should be referred not by the individual agencies, viz., the JDC and the UPA to the UJA but that it should come in the form of an official document from you as Director of the Inquiry stating that the recommendations with respect to the MRS were as adopted by the Allotment Committee.

"Will you please do this at once, addressing your communication jointly to Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver and Jonah B. Wise.

"For your information I enclose herewith copy of the telegram."

C. Wire to Mr. Perlstein from Dr. Silver, dated December 20, 1940:

"A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL IS TO BE HELD ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 30, AT 4:00 P.M. THAT MEETING OUGHT TO RECEIVE THE FINAL REPORT OF THE ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE COULD SEE A DRAFT OF THE REPORT IMMEDIATELY SO THAT WE COULD

"MAKE ANY NECESSARY CORRECTIONS BEFORE WE SIGN THE FINAL DOCUMENT. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF WE RECEIVED THE FULL VERBATIM UNEDITED TRANSCRIPT OF THE MINUTES OF OUR DELIBERATIONS WHICH CONCERN THEMSELVES PARTICULARLY WITH THE ACTUAL VOTING AND DECISIONS."

D. Letter to Mr. Friedman from Dr. Silver, dated December 19, 1940:

"I received a communication from you including (a) Verbatim quotations from Minutes of meeting of Allotment Committee, and (b) a memorandum addressed to Mr. Paul Baerwald and myself with reference to 'N.R.S. Acceleration'.

"May I remind you, first, that no official report of the Allotment Committee covering its findings and recommendations has as yet been drawn up and signed by the members of the Allotment Committee and dispatched to the only body competent to receive it - the Executive of the United Jewish Appeal. Until such time you have no authorization to send any memoranda concerning what might be in the final report of the Allotment Committee to Mr. Baerwald or to me. (EMP note: copy was later sent to Dr. J.B. Wise in place of Mr. Baerwald)

"Again, no one has authorized you to make available to anybody verbatim quotations from the Minutes of the Allotment Committee. To my best knowledge final disposition of what should be done with the Minutes has not been agreed upon. It is not within your competence to excise parts of such Minutes and to put dots for parts which you omit and which you think are irrelevant. No one has authorized you to send these edited Minutes either to me or to Mr. Baerwald.

"I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Perlstein."

E. Wire to Dr. Silver from Mr. Friedman, dated December 24, 1940:

"YOUR TELEGRAM TO PERLSTEIN CONCERNING MONDAY'S MEETING REQUESTS VERBATIM UNEDITED TRANSCRIPT OF MINUTES CONCERNING VOTING AND DECISIONS. PERLSTEIN CONVEYED TELEGRAM TO UNDERSIGNED. HOWEVER, YOUR LETTER TO UNDERSIGNED READS 'NO ONE HAS AUTHORIZED YOU TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO ANYBODY VERBATIM QUOTATIONS FROM THE MINUTES. TO MY BEST KNOWLEDGE FINAL DISPOSITION OF WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE MINUTES HAS NOT BEEN AGREED UPON'. WHICH PROCEDURE DO YOU NOW FAVOR?"

F. Letters from Mr. Parlsstein to Mr. Friedman, dated December 18, 1940

"Will you please let me have a copy of that part of the record of our meeting Saturday, December 7th, which contains the wording of the resolution adopted and recommendations made."



COPY

JEWISH WELFARE FUND
128 North Wells Street - Chicago, Ill.

December 31, 1940

Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver
The Temple
105th at Ansel Road
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Rabbi Silver:

This is purely a personal communication to you, thought you may desire, as Chairman of the United Palestine Appeal for 1941, to take some official action in the matter.

As you know, the Jewish Welfare Fund of Chicago has begun its 1941 campaign. We have already secured, in the Special Gifts Division, some \$720,000. The campaign is for \$1,000,000, and includes, aside from local refugee needs, a relatively small amount to meet the net deficit of The Charities, and also includes some \$300,000 toward local building needs. If the campaign is successful, I surmise that the J.D.C., U.P.A., and H.R.S. will, in grand total, secure something more than the \$1,000,000 that was distributed to them last year. If the campaign is something or much of a failure, naturally, the amount to be distributed to these three organizations will be less than last year.

Quite naturally, all of us here who have the welfare of our community at heart and who desire that our community shall do all that it can on behalf of major national agencies, are working very hard in the campaign. You probably also know that in our own community there are some small collections made for the Jewish National Fund; there is sum in the neighborhood of \$50,000 raised independently of our Welfare Fund drive for the Geverkschaften Campaign; and there is a sum which in late years has averaged around \$60,000 to \$70,000, raised also outside of the Welfare Fund, by Hadassah. Very few of our local citizens -- perhaps four or five altogether -- give substantial amounts to individual projects in Palestine beyond all this, because, in our city, only the UPA is part of the Welfare Fund.

I write you because today I had quite a number of telephone calls from persons who in the past have been active in the Trades, Industries, and Professions Division of our campaign, and I have learned through my associate, Mr. Friedlsender, of a conversation which he had with Rabbi Berman, who is Chairman of the Rabbis group in the campaign.

It seems that a number of persons here, possibly acting on advice from the national office of the UPA, have been endeavoring to bring all possible pressure on the Welfare Fund and more particularly on its President, Mr. James H. Becker, to compel a decision at this time with respect to the proportion or percentage of

C
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Agenda III (a)
Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, Inc.

December 31, 1940

From: Sidney Hollander, President

To: Member Agencies of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds

Please read this statement carefully. It concerns the most important single question that will require action by your welfare fund in 1941.

The efforts of the Council to bring about a continuation of the United Jewish Appeal for 1941 have failed. Separate campaigns have been announced. The JDC, UPA and NRS, therefore, rejoin the list of the other Jewish organizations appealing independently to the welfare funds for overseas and refugee programs.

As provided in the 1940 agreement, direct negotiations between the JDC and the UPA had been going on for several months. Early in December I was advised that these had reached an impasse. On December 12, I sent a letter to both agencies asking for a conference with the Council. This conference was held on December 17 at which time the JDC and the UPA reported on their unsuccessful efforts to reach an agreement.

On behalf of the Council, I stressed the desire of an overwhelming majority of welfare funds for a unified campaign, and urged the continuance of the UJA for 1941. I suggested that the matter be referred to the Allotment Committee of the UJA which had been set up in 1940 by joint agreement with the Council and was composed of representatives of both agencies with an impartial group representing welfare fund cities. This Committee had at its command special fact-finding services that had for months been studying the budgets and needs of these two agencies and the NRS. The Allotment Committee had as recently as December 7, allocated \$1,250,000 on an acceptable basis. I urged that this Allotment Committee be promptly reconvened and asked to recommend initial 1941 allocations for the JDC, the UPA and the NRS of amounts sufficient to make possible continuance of the programs of the three agencies on present levels; allocations beyond these initial minimum amounts would not be fixed on any predetermined ratio, but would be decided from time to time by the Allotment Committee on the basis of continuing studies of needs. As so often requested by our member agencies, I also urged the inclusion of additional agencies in the unified appeal, in order to bring about greater cooperation in these fields of service.

From the report of previous negotiations given at this meeting, I gathered that both the JDC and the UPA were willing to continue a joint appeal in 1941 if acceptable conditions for such an appeal could be found. Since they had been unable themselves to do this, they were willing to refer the matter to the Allotment Committee on the following terms:

The JDC was willing that the Allotment Committee should determine all allocations and ratios, but preferred that the initial 1941 grants be made for the first few months only, substantially on the same ratio basis as in 1940. (The initial allocations in 1940 were \$5,250,000 for the JDC and \$2,500,000 for the UPA.) Subsequent grants throughout the year would be determined as a result of continuing studies of existing needs.

The UPA, on the other hand, desired initial distribution to cover the greater portion of the expectable 1941 receipts; and since they (the UPA) were committed to a planned program for 1941 in behalf of the Jewish Agency of Palestine, they felt that they could not enter into any agreement unless they were assured an initial commitment of approximately \$2,500,000.

I think that if the UPA could have been promised this specific initial amount, the setting up of satisfactory ratios between them and the JDC might not have presented an insurmountable problem, but they were definitely opposed to giving this or any Allotment Committee more than a small portion of the expectable 1941 collection to distribute.

The problem of the NRS appropriation constituted a serious stumbling block. In the earlier negotiations the UPA had suggested that the NRS be excluded from the 1941 joint appeal. In the course of the discussion they conceded the inclusion of the NRS but for a substantially smaller amount. At our conference the UPA would agree only to a total NRS allocation of \$2,000,000 from all sources. (The NRS had received \$3,500,000 from the UJA in 1940). The JDC would not agree and representatives of the NRS later stated that such a proposal would have been rejected had they been party to the discussions. The JDC had previously asked that the NRS be accepted as a full constituent rather than a beneficiary member of the 1941 UJA. This was not acceptable to the UPA but the issue was not fully discussed.

No further progress could be made and the meeting adjourned.

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In the hope that an agreement might still be possible I sent a telegram on December 24 to Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver for the UPA, Paul Baerwald for the JDC and William Rosenwald for the NRS, asking for another conference on December 27. Rabbi Silver informed me that in view of the fact that independent campaigns had already been announced and since no new proposals had been put forward, no practical purpose could be served by another meeting.

The resulting situation contains many elements of uncertainty and perhaps some hazards to welfare fund campaigns. I am firmly convinced that even with separate appeals, welfare funds will continue as vigorously as before to promote the policy of local cooperation. I urge strongly that all possible steps be taken by local communities to avert any undesirable aspects of competition for funds which were so detrimental to the campaign efforts in the past and left trails of friction and ill-will. There can

be no question that welfare funds will continue to put forth the same energies and enthusiasm in order to secure adequate funds for these important Jewish causes, but they should not allow their communities to become battle grounds for competitive causes.

In order to avoid the friction and chaos of competitive appeals, I shall recommend to our General Assembly in Atlanta that the Council set up its own fact-finding and budgeting body, to provide information and serve as a guide to our member agencies in making their 1941 commitments.

In the event that this proposal is adopted by the General Assembly, the Council will undertake to set up immediately its own advisory budgeting service with the necessary machinery to supply local budget committees with data and recommendations so that they can make their 1941 decisions on a basis of carefully determined needs, rather than as a result of competitive pressure. I therefore earnestly suggest that welfare funds await the recommendations of such a body before completing their local budgeting.

Naturally the Council action must reflect the wishes of its member agencies. I ask that you be prepared to present the views of your community at the General Assembly and to join other member agencies in working out procedures which would be most constructive both to the local communities and to the causes which welfare funds support.

In preparation for the Assembly I need an expression of your views and I would indeed be grateful if you would send me (to my home - 2513 Talbot Road, Windsor Hills, Baltimore, Md.) your comments promptly especially on the proposal referred to above.

[1940]

THE COMMITTEE

The Committee on Study of National Budgeting Proposals that passed the memorandum presented to Board was headed by William Rosenwald (President of the NRS) and Jacob Blaustein as Co-Chairmen.

Present at the meeting which passed the memorandum were:

William Haber, Director of NRS

Joseph C. Hyman, Executive Vice-Chairman, JDC

Dr. Solomon Lowenstein, Board Member, JDC and NRS *T. N. S.*

William Rosenwald, President, NRS

James L. White, Salt Lake City

Ira M. Younker, New York City

Jacob Blaustein, Baltimore

← Sidney Hollander, Baltimore, President of Council

Henry Montor, New York, Executive Director, UPA

present also: Harry L. Lurie, George Rabinoff,

Harry Greenstein

THUS, OUT OF 9 PEOPLE PRESENT WITH THE POWER TO VOTE,
AT LEAST 4 WERE REPRESENTATIVES OF JDC AND NRS
AND 1, MR. HOLLANDER, WAS A PARTY AT ISSUE, AS
AGAINST ONLY ONE ZIONIST PRESENT.

ESSENTIALS OF PROPOSALS:

- (1) Set Up a National Budgeting Committee with power to review and evaluate all agencies;
- (2) Set up a special commission immediately to deal with UPA, JDC, NRS;
- (3) Until that commission reports, communities to be asked to give to the three agencies 60% of amounts to be allotted to them on basis of 1940 ratios, i.e.
\$6,050,000 to JDC; \$2,900,000 TO UPA; ~~\$3,500,000~~
\$3,500,000 to NRS (i.e. \$2,500,000 from rest of country and \$1,000,000 N.Y.)
- (4) An effort to be made to bring UJA together again for 1941.

[1940]

RIGHT HONORABLE PRIME MINISTER
WINSTON CHURCHILL
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON

WE ARE PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED WITH THE FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF THE VALIANT STRUGGLE BRITAIN NOW CONDUCTING AGAINST HITLERISM STOP BELIEVING THAT CIVILIZATION AS WE KNOW IT IS BOUND UP WITH BRITISH VICTORY WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO EVERY EFFORT TO AID YOUR CAUSE STOP WITH COOPERATION AMERICAN JEWS A LARGE COMMUNITY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN PALESTINE STOP IT OWES MUCH OF THIS DEVELOPMENT TO YOUR PERSONAL INTEREST STOP THAT COMMUNITY NOW SEEKS RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS FOR ITS PEOPLE ITS FUTURE AND GREAT BRITAIN STOP WE RESPECTFULLY URGE THAT PLEA OF JEWISH AGENCY TO PLACE JEWISH MANPOWER IN PALESTINE UNDER BRITISH MILITARY SUPERVISION TO INSURE EFFECTIVE HOME DEFENCE BE ACTED UPON FAVORABLY CONVINCED THAT PALESTINE JEWRY'S LOYALTY AND SACRIFICE WILL REPRESENT INCOMPARABLE BULWARK FOR STRENGTHENING DEFENCE OF PALESTINE NOT ONLY FOR BENEFIT FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND JEWS WHOSE DESTINY AT STAKE BUT FOR CAUSE WHOSE ULTIMATE TRIUMPH WE ALL PRAY FOR

SOLOMON GOLDMAN	PRESIDENT ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
ABBA HILLEL SILVER	CHAIRMAN UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
STEPHEN S. WISE	PRESIDENT AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
LOUIS LIPSKY	CHAIRMAN PALESTINE FOUNDATION FUND
ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN	PRESIDENT JEWISH NATIONAL FUND
MRS. DAVID DESOLA POOL	PRESIDENT HADASSAH
MORRIS ROTHENBERG	COCHAIRMAN AMERICAN SECTION JEWISH AGENCY
ROBERT SZOLD	PRESIDENT AMERICAN ECONOMIC COMMITTEE FOR PALESTINE
DAVID WERTHEIM	SECRETARY ZIONIST LABOR PARTY
LEON GELMAN	PRESIDENT MIZRACHI

The annual publication of the United Palestine Appeal Year Book provides an opportunity to review in brief the achievements that have been registered in the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home and to assay the prospects as a new year approaches.

Perhaps the outstanding fact in relation to the Palestine program during the past year has been the stability of the country's economic life despite a series of assaults that were political and economic in nature. Today Palestine emerges high above the ruins of Jewish life elsewhere and its towering strength beckons Jews who need homes to settle in Palestine as it challenges Jews in more fortunate positions to collaborate in the further upbuilding of the country so that its absorptive capacity may be enlarged.

The year 1939 began with a continuation of those disturbances that have marked Palestine history since April 1936. But despite these fomented attacks the economic advancement of the country was not halted. New products came out of the ingenuity and capacity of Jewish workmen. New areas of land were acquired and settled, new avenues of social and cultural life were explored. The soundness of the foundations built by the pioneers in previous years was demonstrated in every succeeding month.

During the period from October 1, 1938 through September 30, 1939, some 35,000 Jews entered Palestine. They came in response to an irresistible need, they came because the pioneers who had preceded them into Palestine had indicated that the new life which they had found offered opportunity and freedom. They came under the onslaught of conditions in Europe which deteriorated rapidly as the year 1939 saw the further despoliation of Austria, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the penetration of Nazi ideals into other lands.

In the midst of a situation which illumined the urgency of Palestine upbuilding a White Paper was issued by the British Government which threw a pall upon world Jewry even though it elicited from the Yishuv the determination not

to be swerved in any way from its steady forward-marching program of rebuilding.

But the political conditions that existed in May 1939 do not obtain in November 1939. Not only the political conditions with respect to Palestine but those affecting the entire world have undergone a metamorphosis and for the moment it would seem that the shadows upon Jewish life in Europe are deeper and more ominous than they have been even in the recent tear-stained history of European Jewry.

There are certain facts with regard to the imminent future of Palestine which summon the utmost cooperation of Jews in America through the United Palestine Appeal.

First in our thoughts is the necessity of facilitating a stream of immigration to Palestine, a stream which has no banks and no break upon its swiftness. It is a stream catapulted through the highways of Europe by the mad rush of the enemies of Israel who, in order to achieve their immediate political ends, have made the Jews the symbols of all their sufferings, whether they arise out of the Versailles Treaty, economic maldistribution or political disorientation.

We see before us hundreds of thousands of Jews uprooted from the lands which they have occupied and ordered to find haven elsewhere or else consigned to a vast concentration camp that is reported to be planned by Hitler in one section of Poland. But owing to war conditions that obtain in Europe these hundreds of thousands of human beings are trapped and doomed unless avenues of escape can be open for them. The disruption of transportation to the western world and the continued unwillingness of virtually all Governments to extend their present immigration quotas in order to absorb the refugees require that Jews think constructively and mobilize their resources swiftly to the end that Palestine's availability for the refugees may be fully utilized.

No contention is offered that Palestine today, any more than it could ten years ago, is adapted for the time being to take in every single one of those

who need its protecting wing, but the stability of its foundations and the resources already opened in the country do offer an opportunity to tens of thousands, but their transfer to Palestine requires the channeling of the substantial funds that are necessary to permanent and successful integration into Palestine's economy. Unlike other countries to which reference has recently been made as to their adaptability to refugee settlement, Palestine already has a large Jewish, homogeneous population which does not require on the part of the refugees the complete disruption of their psychological outlook. Moreover, plans for the absorption of the refugees in urban and rural areas in various branches of agriculture and industry have already been worked out by the experts of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, whose experience during more than two decades incomparably qualifies it to direct a large scale colonization program. Those who are permanently concerned with a lasting solution of the problem of Jewish homelessness cannot, must not, turn their eyes away from Palestine, which offers greater possibilities than all other lands combined. If those possibilities are not made available to a maximum number it is not because of their inadequacy but because of the slow tempo with which funds are provided for the utilization of Palestine's resources.

There is a second phase of the problem which challenges the Jews of America in relation to the fund-raising program of the United Palestine Appeal. It is linked with the consequences of war upon the economy of Palestine. It is inevitable that all countries, whether they be in Europe, Asia or America, should have reflected in their economic fluctuations the stress of a war now confined to Europe but nevertheless international in its reverberations. Palestine is not at war for the time being and if certain European countries continue their neutrality it is quite likely that, from the military point of view, Palestine will continue to remain unaffected. But with the uncertainties of exports and the limitations upon imports

it is patent that there will have to be a shifting of Palestine's internal economy to adjust itself to the new circumstances. During a transition period, which may be brief or long, depending upon the support provided by Jews in the United States, there may be hardship and suffering for thousands of workers, artisans, manufacturers and middle class people, but there are certain other prospects that hold out a bright future for the country's economy. These are bound up with the development of manufacturing enterprises which will enable Palestine to grow not only for domestic needs but for those of a wide area in the Near and Middle East. It may be recalled that it was during the World War that India's economic basis achieved new stability in industry because war created the need for an internal manufacturing development. There is no certainty but a likelihood that the same favorable consequences may result for the Jewish National Home.

To the everlasting credit of this sorely tried generation of Jews be it said that in spite of the tragedies which were piled up upon it, Ossa on Pelion, in spite of the frightful disruption of numerous old centers of Jewish life, in spite of the impoverishment, exhaustion and persecution which made of the whole household of Israel one vast hostelry of pain, it nevertheless was able to find within itself the energy, the courage and the resources to build in Palestine in twenty short years a new and resplendent center of Jewish life, already the fifth largest Jewish center in the world and first and foremost in the richness and vitality of its intrinsic Jewish spirit and culture. Here in Palestine a new and powerful bulwark for the survival of the Jew and of Judaism has been established as great and as rich in promise, and to be sure, under as great difficulties, as in the days of Ezra and Nehemiah. Regardless of any future developments something great and heartening and reassuring has already been achieved there.

And much more will be achieved in the days to come. The Jewish people has set its hand to the task and will not desist until it will have achieved that for which our people has yearned and hoped through the ages -- a free and independent Jewish life in its own home.

